This article deals with the divine knowledge of particulars in Averroes’ Tahāfut al-tahāfut and Ḍamīma. It examines how the concept of relation, generally neglected, is at the heart of the dispute bet This article deals with the divine knowledge of particulars in Averroes’ Tahāfut al-tahāfut and Ḍamīma. It examines how the concept of relation, generally neglected, is at the heart of the dispute between Avicenna, al-Ġazālī, and the Commentator. In al-Ġazālī’s eyes, Avicenna's misconception of divine knowledge “in a universal way” is based on a misuse of relation in the case of God's knowledge. If particulars change and God does not, his knowledge of particulars, insofar as it undergoes change, can be considered a pure relation without ontological consequences. Averroes contests both al-Ġazālī’s criticism and his proposal, despite the fact that, for different reasons involving the coming-to-be of human knowledge, he too employs the notion of pure relation in his Long Commentary on the Physics.