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YAḤYĀ IBN ʿADĪ  
ON THE FOUR SCIENTIFIC QUESTIONS  
CONCERNING THE THREE KINDS OF EXISTENCE

EDITIO PRINCEPS AND TRANSLATION

by

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The codex Madrasa-yi Marwī 19 includes 24 treatises by Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī that were listed by the bio-bibliographers but which had been assumed until now to have been lost.<sup>1</sup> This article is a transcription and translation of one of those “lost” treatises, the title of which is *On the Four Scientific Questions concerning the Three Kinds of Existence: Divine, Natural and Logical (Maqāla fī l-buḥūth al-ʿilmīyya al-arbaʿa ʿan aṣnāf al-wujūd al-thalātha al-ilāhī wa-l-ṭabīʿī wa-l-manṭiqī)*.<sup>2</sup>

1. These treatises are listed with transcriptions of their incipits and explicits, and collated with the orders given by G. Endress (in his *The Works of Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī: An Analytical Inventory* [Wiesbaden, 1977]) and S. Khalifāt (in his *Maqālāt Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī al-falsafīyya* [Ammān, 1988]), by R. Wisnovsky, “New philosophical texts of Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī: A supplement to Endress’ *Analytical Inventory*,” in F. Opwis and D. Reisman, eds, *Islamic Philosophy, Science, Culture, and Religion: Studies in Honor of Dimitri Gutas* (Leiden, 2012), 307-326. A facsimile edition of the entire codex, including an index of names of individuals and groups, and titles of books, is being prepared by Wisnovsky for inclusion in the series co-published by the Institute of Islamic Studies of the Free University of Berlin and Mirāth-i Maktūb of Tehran. The authors gratefully acknowledge the help and advice of Naser Dumairieh, Kostyantyn Filonenko, Taro Mimura, Ahmedreza Rahimirseh, Reza Pourjavady, and Marwan Rashed. All remaining errors are our own.
2. This treatise was listed by Endress as #5.12 and by Khalifāt as #67. It should not be confused with the text listed by Endress as #3.12 and by Khalifāt as #45, and which was translated by N. Rescher

Three of the four questions that Yaḥyā refers to in his title (*hal hiya* [whether it is], *mā hiya* [what it is], and *li-mā hiya* [why it is]) correspond to three of the four questions that Aristotle lists at *Posterior Analytics* II.1 (respectively, *ei esti*, *ti esti* and *to dioti*). However, Yaḥyā's remaining question (*ayyu l-ashyā' hiya* [which thing it is]) differs from Aristotle's remaining question (*to hoti* [that it is]). Here Yaḥyā appears to be following al-Kindī, whose list of the four questions was taken over not only by Yaḥyā but by Isaac Israeli, Miskawayh and — through Yaḥyā — Abū al-Faraj ibn al-Ṭayyib, who was a student of Yaḥyā's students Abū 'Alī ibn Zur'a and Ibn Suwār.<sup>3</sup>

The difference between al-Kindī's and Yaḥyā's four questions on the one hand, and Aristotle's four questions on the other, is deeper than the replacement of *to hoti* by *ayyu l-ashyā' hiya*. With al-Kindī and Yaḥyā, the scientific questions are construed as four successive one-place questions. With Aristotle, the questions are not successive but are instead divided into two pairs: *ei esti* and *ti esti* are construed as one-place questions, while *to hoti* and *to dioti* are construed as two-place questions. Moreover, Aristotle's fundamental claim is that to ask *what* it is (e.g., "What is an eclipse?") is to ask *why* it is (e.g., "Why does an eclipse exist?"). This claim appears to be absent in al-Kindī's and Yaḥyā's discussions of the four questions, although it can be found in a discussion by Yaḥyā's teacher, al-Fārābī, in Part III of the *Kitāb al-Hurūf*. Yaḥyā and al-Fārābī had both been students of the same teacher, Abu Bishr Mattā ibn Yūnus, and after Abu Bishr's death Yaḥyā, already a mature philosopher, became a student of al-Fārābī. The differences between al-Kindī and Yaḥyā on the one hand, and Aristotle and al-Fārābī on the other, show that it would be an oversimplification to describe Yaḥyā as a follower of al-Fārābī. They also show that Yaḥyā's Aristotelianism was sometimes refracted through al-Kindī or directly through the Neoplatonic Aristotle-commentators Elias and David, in whose texts the Greek *hōpoion ti esti* anticipates the Arabic *ayyu l-ashyā' hiya*.

Comparing Yaḥyā's discussion of the four questions with the treatments by Kindī, Israeli, Miskawayh and Ibn al-Ṭayyib, as surveyed by Stern, it emerges that all five

and F. Shehadi (as "Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī's treatise 'On the four scientific questions regarding the art of logic,'" *Journal of the History of Ideas* 25/4 [1964], 572-8), on the basis of an edition by M. Türker ("Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī ve neşredilmemiş bir risalesi," *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi* 14 [1958], 98-102). In fact, the Marwī codex contains that treatise (MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marvī 19, no. 3: fol. 445-b30), but with the title *Maqāla fī inniyyat* [Endress: *anniyyat*] *şinā'at al-mantiq wa-mā'iyyatihā wa-limiyyatihā wa-hiya l-mawsūma bi-hidāya li-man ta'attā ilā sabīl al-najāt*.

3. On al-Kindī's list, see Stern's commentary (13-23) on Isaac Israeli's *Book of Definitions*, #1 (10-12), in A. Altmann and S. Stern, trans, *Isaac Israeli* (Oxford, 1958). On Ibn al-Ṭayyib, see S. Stern, "Ibn al-Ṭayyib's Commentary on the Isagoge," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 19/3 (1957), 419-25, and the edition by K. Gyekye, *Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāghūjī li-Furfūriyūs* (Beirut, 1975).

Arabic philosophers agreed that the first of the four questions (“*whether* it is”) pointed to the thing’s existence, and that the last of the four questions (“*why* it is”) pointed to the thing’s final cause or purpose. But they differed over how to construe the second and third questions. Kindī and Ibn al-Ṭayyib thought that the second question (“*what* it is”) referred to the thing’s genus, Isaac Israeli that it referred to the thing’s quiddity, and Miskawayh that it referred to the thing’s species. As for the third question (“*which thing* it is”), Kindī, Miskawayh and Ibn al-Ṭayyib claimed that it indicated the thing’s *differentia*, and Isaac Israeli that it indicated the thing’s quality. Yaḥyā agrees with al-Kindī, and Ibn al-Ṭayyib agrees with Yaḥyā, in thinking that the second question refers to the genus, which Yaḥyā calls the “general quiddity”. Yaḥyā takes the third question as asking not precisely for the *differentia*, but for what he calls the “specific quiddity”, i.e., the genus and *differentia* together.

Also noteworthy is that a large section of Yaḥyā’s treatise is openly reproduced in a Christological treatise that he wrote, entitled *Treatise on the Necessity of the Incarnation* (*Maqālat al-shaykh Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī fī wujūb* [alt. *wujūd*] *al-ta'annus*).<sup>4</sup> Yaḥyā says in that treatise “Since the intellect in act and the intelligible in act are a single thing in substrate, as Aristotle has shown and as we too have shown in our *Book on the Three [Kinds of] Existent* (sic), and as we will mention also in the present book, our intellects while we are thinking the Creator, may He be glorified and exalted, must be united with Him.”<sup>5</sup> Until the present treatise was discovered, we could not determine how close the relationship was between these two works. We now know that Yaḥyā borrowed almost verbatim a substantial section.<sup>6</sup> At least in this case, the line dividing Yaḥyā’s theological and philosophical works was quite blurry. The section that Yaḥyā copies into the treatise on *ta'annus* is a discussion from the *On the Four Scientific Questions concerning the Three Kinds of Existence* devoted to explaining the process of intellection (in which a form comes to be in the mind of the knower) and to analyzing the definition of human. This philosophical discussion was relevant to Yaḥyā’s Christology because in his essay on *ta'annus*, Yaḥyā argues that God and Christ are one in the sense that once the form of the known thing arises (*hadatha*) in the mind of the knower, the knower becomes united with the known, and that in cases where the known thing is not a matter-form composite but a pure form, there is no distinction between the knowledge and the known thing. What makes Christ unique is that due to his special qualities, and given the unique

4. Edited by Augustin Périer as “Traité de Yaḥyā ben 'Adī sur le mode de l'Incarnation”, in his *Petits traités apologétiques de Yaḥyā ben 'Adī (Texte arabe)* (Paris, 1920), 69-86. Périer prefers *wujūd* to *wujūb*, although most of the manuscripts listed by Endress use *wujūb*; Endress, *Works*, 106-7.

5. Périer, 74,8-75,4.

6. Périer, 75,7-82,3 = Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, 66a11-28.



set of circumstances surrounding his conception and birth, the union in him between the human knower and the form of God is complete (*ittihād tāmm*). Conversely, when God knows human beings, God becomes informed (*taṣawwur*) by the form “human”. In both of these complementary ways, by God’s knowing “human” and by Christ’s knowing God, God becomes human (*ta’annus*) in Christ.

Finally, in the *Four Scientific Questions* Yaḥyā shows his commitment — particularly in the introductory paragraphs — to the larger project of harmonizing Plato and Aristotle, here following the lead of late-antique Neoplatonists. One aim of Yaḥyā’s essay is to defend Plato and Aristotle against the charge that they disagree fundamentally over the reality of separate, immaterial forms. Yaḥyā describes three types of existence: logical (or rational) existence, i.e., the existence of a form in the mind; natural existence, i.e., the existence of a form in a concrete individual; and divine (or metaphysical) existence, i.e., the existence of a form taken in and of itself, independent of either mental or concrete existence. Yaḥyā does not mean simply that there are some forms — perhaps angels or intellects — that have divine existence, and others — such as horse — that have natural existence. Rather, the quiddity of horse has all three kinds of existence. But he denies that the numerically identical form of horse which is now in Bucephalus can subsequently exist as an individual apart from matter. Rather, the quiddity of horse exists as combined with matter, it exists in human knowers, and it has a different, divine, mode of existence considered apart from matter and from human knowers. It is this last kind of existence that, according to Yaḥyā, Plato was committed to in his theory of forms. Avicenna will start from Yaḥyā’s analysis and refine it. He agrees with Yaḥyā that the quiddity of horse can exist naturally in matter or logically in the mind of a knower, and also that it can be considered purely in itself, that is, apart from matters and knowers. But Avicenna, drawing on his distinction between essence and existence, denies that the quiddity has a third mode of existence. Although a quiddity can be considered in itself, it *exists* only as bound up either with the mind or with enmattered individuals. Yaḥyā agrees that any quiddity that has divine existence also has natural and logical existence. But this is not because it depends on matter or mind for its existence. Rather, divine providence guarantees the inexhaustibility of natural species and human knowers.<sup>7</sup> Yaḥyā’s attempt to reconcile Plato and Aristotle can be compared with the project of the treatise *On the Harmonization of the Opinions of the Two Sages*,

7. On Avicenna’s debt to, and criticism of, Yaḥyā’s theory, see M. Rashed, “Ibn Adi et Avicenne: sur les types d’existants”, in V. Celluprica and C. D’Ancona, eds, *Aristotele e i suoi esegeti neoplatonici* (Naples, 2004), 107–171, and S. Menn, “Avicenna’s metaphysics”, in P. Adamson, ed., *Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays* (Cambridge, 2013).

*the Divine Plato and Aristotle*, traditionally attributed to his teacher al-Fārābī.<sup>8</sup> The impression one gets from Yaḥyā's treatise, however, is that while Yaḥyā was clearly more learned in Aristotelianism than al-Kindī was, Yaḥyā's views — at least in this treatise — were as much Kindian as they were Fārābian.

### Key:

In the Arabic text, words between <angled brackets> are textual interpolations by the editors. In the translation, words between [square brackets] are added to help convey the meaning. Paragraph numbers in angled brackets mark the scribe's breaks in the manuscript. In the footnotes, the editors' emended version is given on the right, next to the footnote number, and the original version found in the manuscript is given on the left; the two versions are separated by a colon. Thus:

١٠. والتشمّر: والتشمّر

Where there is a variance between the current edition and Périer's edition of the *Maqālat al-shaykh Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī fī wujūb* (alt. *wujūd*) *al-ta'annus*, or a variance between the current edition and a reading contained in one of the manuscripts used by Périer and recorded in his apparatus, it is given in the footnotes in square brackets. Thus:

٢٧. يغني [تغني] [P 76,3] [P 76(2) H تغني]

### TEXT

MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marvī 19, no. 45: foll. 65a34-66b20

مقالة في البحوث العلميّة الأربعة عن أصناف /65a35/ الوجود الثلاثة الإلهي والطبيعي والمنطقي

<١> قال إنّه لما كان واجباً جميلاً على كلّ مؤثر اقتفاء آثار الفلاسفة الفاضلين المتقبّلين أفعال الله / تبارك وتعالى بحسب طاقة البشر في الجود هو أفضل ولا فضل كإيجاد الذات الف/ضلي ولا ذات أفضل في الموجودات الكائنة من الحيوانات ولا في هذه / كالإنسان لما فضل به من قوّة العقل

8. The attribution of this treatise to al-Fārābī has been seriously challenged by several scholars. The most recent argument against the attribution to al-Fārābī, with references to previous discussions, is by M. Rashed, "On the authorship of the treatise *On the Harmonization of the Opinions of the Two Sages* attributed to al-Fārābī", *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 19/1 (2009), 43-82.

الهولانيّ والَّذي /65a40/ فضله وشرفه بتمامه وكماله وهو العقل / بالفعل الَّذي إنّما يتمّ وجوده للإنسان / الطبيعيّ بتصوّره ذاته / والاجتهاد //65bi// بقدر قوّته / في اقتنائه لنفسه وإيجاده / لغيره وكانت المطالب العلميّة الحقيقيّة / المقوّمة للفلسفة التي لا قوام لها من دونها ولا /65b5/ حاجة بها إلى غيرها إنّما هي المطالب الأربعة التي جميعها بحوث عن / الذات دون لواحقتها فلذلك وجب البحث عن الذوات المحضّة التقدّم / في الشرف والتحقيق والإيثار بالطلب واحتمال النصب بالمواظبة والدأب<sup>9</sup> والمبالغة في الجِدِّ / والتشَمُّر<sup>10</sup> والمجانبة للوثيّة والتقصير فلذلك ولما وجدت عليه جماعة ممّن قرب عهده من متقدّمي / الناظرين في كتب الفلاسفة ولم يكن في القدمة الزمانيّة لاحقاً بالصدر الأوّل من تلامذة أرسطوطالس الثاني /65bio/ أعني المعلّم الإسكندر الأفروديسيّ لكن من أتى بعد فرفوربوس بل بعد يحيى النحويّ وألومفيدورس<sup>11</sup> واللينوس<sup>12</sup> ومن قرب الزمان / منهم حتّى أهل زماننا قد تمكّنت من نفوسهم الطنّة بأرسطوطالس مخالفة معلّمه فلاطن فيما هو من أحقّ معاني الفلسفة بالطاق النظر فيه / واستقصاء التأمل له وهو وجود صور بسيطة محضّة خالصة ذات كلّ واحدة منها عن كلّ شيء سواها واتهموه أنّه في ذلك مخالف لرأي فلاطن وأفحشوا في الظنّ أيضًا بفلاطن وتوهّموا أنّه يرى أنّ صور الموجودات الطبيعيّة لها وجود وقوام خارجًا عن المركبات فيها حتّى أنّ ما يظهر من قولهم يخيل فيهم / أنّهم يرون أنّ فلاطن يعتقد أنّ الصورة الملايسة للهيبولي ولها وجود في غير الهيبولي في ناحية ما أو في معنى لا يمكن تصوّره من أقاويلهم وعباراتهم مهما انضاف إليه ممّا يوجبه /65b15/ هديانهم<sup>13</sup> بقبحها وبعدها عمّن نسبت إليه من هذين الفيلسوفين الجليلين المبرزين من استنفاد الوسع في دونهما عنهما وإبانة أعلاء ومحلّهما عن التدنّس بدرن أمثالها والرجاء أنّ أدرك بذلك / إحدى الحسنيين من إرشاد الحائدين عن الحقّ إليه إنّ كنت به قائلًا أو وجدان هادٍ إليه وموقف عليه إنّ كنت عنه مائلًا رأيت أنّ أنشئ هذه المقالة في ذلك معتمدًا على الله معتضدًا به وهو حسبي ونعم / الوكيل

<٢> إنّ غرضنا في هذه المقالة البحث عن أصناف الوجود الثلاثة الطبيعيّ والمنطقيّ والإلهيّ التي يحكي بعض مفسّري كتب أرسطوطالس أنّ أفلاطن كان يعتقدّها في سائر الصور الموجودات ويظنّون / أنّ أرسطوطالس يخالف على رأيه فيها ضروب البحوث العلميّة الأربعة وهي هل هي وما هي وأيُّ

9. والدأب: والذات

10. والتشَمُّر: والتشَمُّر

11. وألومفيدورس: وألومفيدورس

12. واللينوس: واللينوس

13. هديانهم: هذا أنّهم



الأشياء هي ولم هي والانقياد لما يوجهه النظر السديد والمسلك الرشيد مسترشداً إلى ذلك مستغنياً بتأييده عليه وهو / حسبي هادياً ومعيناً وكافياً

<٣> وإذا قد تقدّم من كلّ بحث تصوّر ما يدلّ عليه اسم المبحوث عنه فلنشرح أولاً دلالة واحد واحد من هذه الأسماء أعني قولنا طبيعيّة ومنطقيّة وإلهيّة فنقول إنّنا نعني بقولنا موجودات /65b20/ طبيعيّة ذوات ما موجودات في هيولى وأما بقولنا موجودات منطقيّة ولأنّ المنطقيّة منسوبة إلى المنطق ولفظة المنطق تدلّ على أكثر من معنى واحد فالأصلح أن نشرح المعاني التي يستعملها عليها الفلاسفة / فنقول إنّنا نرى أنّ لفظة المنطق يستعملها الفلاسفة بمعنيين مختلفين أحدهما معنى القوّة المميّزة التي هي فصل من الفصول المقوّمه للإنسان والثاني الصناعة المنطقيّة فإنّهم إذا قالوا إنّ من الأجناس والأنواع إلهيّة / ومنها طبيعيّة ومنها منطقيّة فإنّما ينسونها إلى المنطق الذي هو بالمعنى الأوّل وهو التمييز فيكون معنى قولهم هذا هو معناهم لو قالوا إنّ من الأجناس والأنواع ما وجوده في الهيولى ومنها ما وجوده مجرد قائم / بنفسه عري<sup>14</sup> من جميع اللواحق ومنها ما وجوده في قوّة التمييز وهذا المعنى من معني المنطقيّة قد يدخل فيه الصور المفردة الواحدة بالعدد كالصور المعقولة التي هي واحدة لا نظير لها كالبارئ جلّ وعزّ والعقل /65b25/ وإذا قالوا في أجناس والأنواع والفصول والخواصّ والأعراض العاميّة إنّها منطقيّة فإنّما ينسونها إلى الصناعة المنطقيّة وهو المعنى الثاني فيكون معنى قولهم هذا هو معنى قولهم لو قالوا إنّها معانٍ تستعملها / صناعة المنطق ويخرج من هذا المعنى الأشخاص إذ كانت الصناعة المنطقيّة لا تستعملها فإنّ قال قائل كيف يقولون إنّ الأشخاص غير مستعملة في صناعة المنطق وها هي مذكورة موضوعة في إيساغوجي و/ قاطيغورياس وباري إرمينياس وأنولوطيقا وغير هذه من كتب المنطق فليعلم أنّ ذكرهم الأشخاص فيما ذكروها فيه من كتب المنطق ليس هو على أنّها مستعملة لهم ولا على أنّها مبحوث عنها ومعنى بها وإنّما ذكروها / للضرورة الدافعة إلى ذلك من قبل أنّها مضافة إلى بعض الألفاظ المستعملة في المنطق وذلك أنّ الجنس والنوع وغيرهما من الألفاظ المنطقيّة قد تضاف من حيث هي عامّة إلى الأشخاص فاضطرّوا لذلك إلى ذكرها /65b30/ والإيماء إلى وصفها بقدر ما يتصوّر معناها في النفس فقولنا موجودات منطقيّة ها هنا إنّما نشير به إلى المعنى الأوّل من معني المنطقيّة فإنّنا نعني به صوراً أي ذوات ما متصوّرة في النفس المنطقيّة وبقولنا / موجودات إلهيّة ذوات بريّه من الهيولى ومن النفس عرية من جميع اللواحق سواهما أيضاً

<٤> فإذا قد شرحنا ما يدلّ عليه بواحد واحد / من هذه الأسماء الثلاثة فلنأخذ في البحث عن واحد واحد من مدلولاتها فالبحوث العلميّة الأربعة على ما رتبناها عليه في تعديدها ولنبدأ الطبيعة فإنّنا لها آف وبها أعرف

14. ومنها ما وجوده مجرد قائم بنفسه عري: ومنها ما وجوده مجرد قائم بنفسه عرياً



<٥> فنقول أمّا البحث عن هليتها<sup>15</sup> فهو ساقط مستغنى عنه / إذ وجودها من الوضوح بحيث يغني عن طلبه بل كلّ ما شكّ نسبته<sup>16</sup> فإنه كما قال أرسطوطالس في المقالة الثانية من السماع الطبيعيّ حيث قال

<٦> فأما تبين أنّ / الطبيعة شيء موجود فإنه لما يستحقّ أن يهزأ به وذلك أنّ من الأمور الظاهرة أنّ كثيراً من الموجودات يجري<sup>17</sup> ذلك المجرى وتبين الأمور الظاهرة /65b35/ بالأمور الخفية إنّما هو من فعل من لا يقدر أن يميّز بين المعروف بنفسه وبين المعروف بغيره فأما ما هي الأمور الطبيعيّة فإنّ الأمور الطبيعيّة / وإن كانت من حيث هي منسوبة إلى الطبيعة متّفقة في هذا المعنى فهي من حيث هي ذوات ما مختلفة وذلك أنّ منها جواهر وهذه ضربان صورة وهيولى ومنها لوازم للجواهر المركّبة كالحركة والسكون والمكان والزمان فالماهية العامّة / للصور التي يقتضيها البحث الثاني وهو ما هي الصورة هي مبدأ وأمّا الماهية الخاصّة وهي التي يقتضيها / البحث الثالث وهو عن أيّ شيء هي فهي مبدأ للحركة والوقوف لما هي فيه أولاً بالذات لا /65b40/ بطريق العرض وأمّا لمّ هي فلكمال جود الباريّ جلّ وتعالى

<٧> وأمّا ماهية / الهيولى العامّة فهي موضوع وأمّا الماهية الخاصّة لها فهي / الموضوع لشيء شيء الذي عنه يكون الشيء وهو / موجود فيه لا بطريق العرض وأمّا لمّ هي فلتوجد /65b45/ فيها الصور الوجود الجسميّ /

<٨> وأمّا الحركة فماهيتها / العامّة //66a1/ كمال وأمّا / ماهيتها الخاصّة فكمال / ما هو بالقوّة بما هو كذلك<sup>18</sup> / وأمّا لمّ هي فليتمّ بها كون الصور في الهيولى

<٩> وأمّا /66a5/ السكون فماهيتها العامّة عدم فأما ماهيتها الخاصّة فعدم / الحركة وأمّا لمّ هو فلتوجد<sup>19</sup> فيه الصور الهولائيّة<sup>20</sup> في الهيولى على نحو / ما

<١٠> وأمّا المكان فماهيتها العامّة سطح وأمّا ماهيتها الخاصّة فالسطح الداخّل من الحاوي / المساوي للسطح الخارج من المحوى وأمّا لمّ هو فليتمكّن فيه الأجسام الطبيعيّة المكوّنة المحوية

<١١> وأمّا / الزمان فماهيتها العامّة معدودة وأمّا ماهيتها الخاصّة فمعدود حركة الفلك بالمتقدّم والمتأخّر وأمّا لمّ هو /66a10/ فليقدر به تكون وحركات الطبيعيّات المتكوّنة

15. هليتها: هسها <هيتها؟>

16. كلّ ماسك نسبته؟ alt: كلّ ما شكّ نسبته

17. يجري: مجرى

18. فكمال ما هو بالقوّة بما هو كذلك: فكمال ما هو بالقوّة بما هو بالقوّة بما هو كذلك

[ap. *Phys.* III.1, 201a10-12 = Aristuṭālis, *al-Ṭabī'a*, ed. 'A. Badawi (Cairo, 1964), Vol. I, 171,2]

19. فلتوجد: فاستوجد

20. الهولائيّة: الهولائيّة لانيّة (dittography)

<١٢> فقد ظهر بما قلناه وجود ذوات طبيعية وماهياتها وألياتها<sup>21</sup> ولمياتها فأما / وجود هذه الذوات التي هي بمقارنتها<sup>22</sup> الهيولى طبيعية<sup>23</sup> المنطقي أي في النفس المنطقية فإنه [يتبين من أننا إذا علمنا ما الإنسان مثلاً وهو<sup>24</sup> ما / يدلّ عليه حدّه {Périer: 76,1} وهو قولنا حيّ<sup>25</sup> ناطق مائت بعد أن لم يكن<sup>26</sup> علمنا ذلك فواجب ضرورة أن يكون قد حدث لنا شيء ما لم يكن قبل أن نعلم ذلك وهذا / من البيان والظهور بحيث يعني<sup>27</sup> عن أن يلتمس إثباته أو يتكلّف إيضاحه<sup>28</sup> ويجب<sup>29</sup> ضرورة أن يكون هذا الحادث<sup>30</sup> إمّا موافقاً للإنسان الموجود<sup>31</sup> المركّب من مادّة<sup>32</sup> وصورة / من كلّ جهة<sup>33</sup> فيلزم ذلك محال وهو أن<sup>34</sup> يكون المركّب بهيولاه<sup>35</sup> وجثته في ذواتنا<sup>36</sup> وذلك<sup>37</sup> أن الحادث موجود في ذواتنا<sup>38</sup> وهذا ظاهر الشناعة وإمّا مخالفاً للإنسان المركّب من مادّة<sup>39</sup> /66a15/ وصورة من {P: 77,1} كلّ وجه وهذا على ضربين<sup>40</sup> إمّا أن يكون مابيناً<sup>41</sup> للإنسان المركّب وموافقاً لما هو غير الإنسان<sup>42</sup> وهذا أيضاً محال لأنّ الحادث حينئذ أولى بأن يكون علماً بغير الإنسان منه بأن / يكون علماً بالإنسان إذ قد وضع أنّه موافق لغير الإنسان ومباين للإنسان وهذا محال لأنّه مخالف

21. وألياتها: وإثباتها

22. بمقارنتها: بمقارنتها

23. طبيعياً: طبيعة

24. وهو [و] P 75,7 [وهو JK (4) 75]

25. حيّ [حيوان P 76,1]

26. يكن [نكن P 76,1] [نكن K يكن [P 76(t) Z; H]

27. يعني [عني P 76,3] [عني H (2) 76]

28. يلتمس إثباته أو يتكلّف إيضاحه [نلتمس بيانه أو نتكلّف إيضاحه P 76,3-4]

29. ويجب [فيجب JK وتجب H (2) 76]

30. أن يكون هذا الحادث [أن يكون الحادث P 76,4] [أن يكون هذا الحادث JK (4) 76]

31. الموجود [الموجود في الخارج JK (5) 76]

32. من مادّة [من هيولى P 76,5]

33. من كلّ جهة [من كلّ وجه P 76,5-6]

34. ذلك محال وهو أن [ذلك محال هو أن P 76,6]

35. بهيولاه [بجملته <و> صورته JK (6-7) 76]

36. ذواتنا: ذواتنا [ذواتنا P 76,7]

37. وذلك [وكذلك H (8) 76]

38. ذواتنا: ذواتنا [ذواتنا P 76,7]

39. من مادّة [من هيولى P 76,8]

40. على ضربين [على ضربتين P 77,1]

41. مابيناً [متابيناً؟] H (t) 77 [P 77(t) H]

42. للإنسان المركّب وموافقاً لما هو غير الإنسان [للإنسان وموافقاً لما هو غير الإنسان P 77,1-2]

للموجود<sup>43</sup> وهو أنا<sup>44</sup> إنما يكون علمنا<sup>45</sup> بماهيّة الإنسان لا بماهيّة غير الإنسان وإمّا أن يكون مبيّناً للإنسان / المركّب ومبيّناً لما هو غير الإنسان أيضاً وهذا أيضاً محال من قبل أنّه إذا كانت نسبته إلى الإنسان ونسبته إلى غير الإنسان واحدة بعينها وهي نسبة<sup>46</sup> المباينة {P: 78,I} فليس<sup>47</sup> بأن يكون علماً بالإنسان أوّلى منه بأن / يكون علماً بغير الإنسان فيلزم ذلك أحد أمرين شنيعين وهما إمّا أن نعلم<sup>48</sup> من قول القائل حيّ<sup>49</sup> ناطق مائت غير الإنسان مع الإنسان وهذا مخالف للموجود وذلك أنا إنّما نعلم من هذا القول الإنسان وحده دون غيره / وإمّا أنّنا نعلم لا ماهيّة الإنسان ولا غير الإنسان<sup>50</sup> وهذا أيضاً مخالف للموجود لأنّنا نعلم ماهيّة الإنسان<sup>51</sup> إذا علمنا ما يدلّ عليه حدّه

<١٣> وإمّا أن يكون الحادث موافقاً للإنسان المركّب من هيولى وصورة من /66a20/ وجه<sup>52</sup> ومخالفاً<sup>53</sup> له من وجه آخر<sup>54</sup> وإذ قد استحال {P: 79,I} القسمان الأوّلان ولم يبق في القسمة<sup>55</sup> قسم رابع غير هذه الثلاثة فقد حصل الوجوب والصحة<sup>56</sup> والصدق لهذا القسم وهو أن يكون الحادث موافقاً للإنسان المركّب من / هيولى وصورة وهو الإنسان الطبيعيّ من وجه ما<sup>57</sup> ومخالفاً له من وجه آخر وهذا المعنى الذي يوافق فيه الحادث الإنسان المركّب الطبيعيّ إمّا مادّة المركّب<sup>58</sup> وهذا محال وذلك أنّ مادّة<sup>59</sup> الإنسان المركّب / يشترك فيه<sup>60</sup> الإنسان وغيره وإذا ساوى الإنسان غير الإنسان<sup>61</sup> الذي يشاركه

43. للموجود: للوجود [للموجود 77,5 P]

44. أنا أنّه [77,5 P] [انا H Z; 77(2) P]

45. علمنا [علماً 77,5 P]

46. إذا كانت نسبته إلى الإنسان ونسبته إلى غير الإنسان واحدة بعينها وهي نسبة [إذا كانت نسبته إلى غير الإنسان واحدة

بعينها وهي نسبته 77,8 P]

47. فليس [وليس 78,I P] [فليس H 78(i) P]

48. نعلم [يعلم 78(2) Z; H P]

49. حيّ [حيوان 78,3 P]

50. وإمّا أنّنا نعلم لا ماهيّة الإنسان ولا غير الإنسان [وإمّا أنّنا نعلم ماهيّة الإنسان وغير الإنسان 78,5 P]

51. لأنّنا نعلم ماهيّة الإنسان: لا بالعلم ماهيّة الإنسان [لأنّنا نعلم ماهيّة الإنسان 78,6 P]

52. من وجه [بمعنى 78,8 P]

53. ومخالفاً [مخالفاً 78(3) H P]

54. من وجه آخر [بمعنى آخر 78,8 P]

55. القسمة [القسم 79,I P] [القسمة K 79(i) P]

56. فقد حصل الوجوب والصحة [فقد وجب الصحة K فقد وجبت الصحة J 79(2) P]

57. من وجه ما [من وجه 79,4 P]

58. إمّا مادّة المركّب [هو إمّا هيولى المركّب 79,5-6 P]

59. مادّة [هيولى 79,6 P]

60. فيه [فيها 79,7 P]

61. وغيره وإذا ساوى الإنسان غير الإنسان [omitted from P 79,7]

في مادّته<sup>62</sup> في الموافقة للحادث<sup>63</sup> فليس الحادث بأن يكون علماً بالإنسان أولى منه بأن {P: 80,1} يكون علماً بما هو مشارك للإنسان<sup>64</sup> / في مادّته<sup>65</sup> وهذا محال لأنه من البين أن الحادث إنما هو علم بالإنسان دون غيره

<١٤> وإما صورة المركّب وهذا الحق من البين أن المتفقين لا يتكثران من حيث اتّفاقا<sup>66</sup> بل هما شيء واحد فيما اتّفقا فيه / إذ كانت الكثرة لازمة للاختلاف<sup>67</sup> كما أن الوحدة لازمة للاتّفاق وإذا سلكت هذه السبيل بعينها في كلّ واحدة<sup>68</sup> من الذوات الطبيعيّة غير الإنسان أدّت إلى أن المعرفة<sup>69</sup> بها إنما هي حصول صورها ومعانيها /66a25/ في النفس معرّاة من هيولاها وهذا {P: 81,1} هو ما قلنا أن اسم المنطقيّة يدلّ عليه وقد تبين وجودها فإنّ العلم بالمعلوم دون مادّته<sup>70</sup> قد تبين أنّه يحصل<sup>71</sup> في نفس العالم إذا صار معلوماً وقد يليق بما قلناه / التنبيه<sup>72</sup> على معنى هو وإن كان خارجاً عن غرضنا فإنّه يتمّ به شرح حال ما للمعلوم وهو أن<sup>73</sup> العلم بالمعلومات يختلف<sup>74</sup> بحسب اختلاف ذوات المعلومات في البساطة والتركّب<sup>75</sup> وذلك أن المعلوم إن / كان مركّباً من مادّة<sup>76</sup> وصورة كان معنى العلم به هو حصول أحد جزئيه<sup>77</sup> وهو<sup>78</sup> صورته في نفس العالم دون الجزء الآخر وهو مادّته<sup>79</sup> وإن<sup>80</sup> كان {P: 82,1}

62. في مادّته [في هيولاه P 79,7]

63. للحادث [في الحادث 79,7-8 P]

64. مشارك للإنسان [مشارك بالإنسان P 80,1] [مشارك للإنسان JK 80(1) P]

65. في مادّته [في هيولاه P 80,1]

66. وهذا الحق من البين أن المتفقين لا يتكثران من حيث اتّفاقا [وهذا هو الحق ومن البين أن المتفقين لا يتكثران من حيث

اتّفاقا P 80,3-4] [هذا هو الحق ومن المتفقين يتكثران من حيث اتّفق H 80(2-5) P]

67. لازمة للاختلاف [لازمة للاختلاف P 80,5] [لازمة للاختلاف H 80(6) P]

68. كلّ واحدة [كلّ واحد JK 80(7) P]

69. إلى أن المعرفة [إلى المعرفة P 80,7]

70. فإنّ العلم بالمعلوم دون مادّته [فإنّ صورة المعلوم دون هيولاه P 81,2]

71. أنّه يحصل: أنّها تحصل [أن يحصل P 81,2]

72. التنبيه: البينة

73. وقد يليق بما قلناه التنبيه على معنى هو وإن كان خارجاً عن غرضنا فإنّه يتمّ به شرح حال ما للمعلوم وهو أنّ [وينبغي أن

نعلم أنّ P 81,3] [وينبغي أن يعلم أنّ HK وينبغي أن تعلم أنّ J 81(1) P]

74. يختلف: ويختلف [مختلف P 81,4] [يختلف JK 81(2) P]

75. والتركّب [والتركيب P 81,5]

76. من مادّة [من هيولى P 81,5]

77. جزئيه [جزأيه P 81,6] [جزويه HJK 81(4) P]

78. وهو [وهي JK 81(5) P]

79. مادّته [هيولاه P 81,7]

80. وإن [فإنّ P 81,7] [وإنّ J 81(6) P]



بسيطاً<sup>81</sup> وكذلك هو<sup>82</sup> صورة محضّة فمعنى العلم به هو تصوّر العقل بها / ومصيره<sup>83</sup> إيّاها فيكون العقل ومعقوله<sup>84</sup> حينئذ<sup>85</sup> واحداً<sup>86</sup> بعينه<sup>87</sup>]]

<15> فأما ماهيّة الموجودات المنطقية العامّة فصور وأما ماهيتها الخاصّة فصورة في النفس مجردة عرية من الهولي وأما لم هي فلصلاح / أحوال الإنسان الطبيعيّ فأما أنّ لصور<sup>88</sup> التي من شأنها أن توجد في الهولي فتصير بذلك طبيعيةً ووجوداً بأنفسها وهي التي ذواتها وماهياتها إنّما هي على تجرّدها وتعريها من الهولي ومن جميع /66a30/ لواحقها وبالجملة للذوات المجردة التي تدلّ على كلّ واحدة فيها حدّها الخاصّ بها وهو الوجود المسمّى ووجوداً إلهياً وهو أحقّ الموجودات فذلك يتبيّن على ما أنا واصفه / من البيّن أنّ الموجودات الطبيعية مركّبة وكلّ موجود مركّب فإنّما هو مركّب من بسائطه وبسائطه واجب ضرورة أن تكون إمّا بسائط غير مركّبة البتّة وهذه هي / الذوات العرية من جميع الأشياء سواها وإمّا مركّبات من أشياء هي بسائط لها فإنّ كان الموجود المركّب من بسائط غير مركّبة ولا متعلّقة بشيء آخر سواها / فمن الاضطرار أن تكون موجودة إن<sup>89</sup> كان المركّب منها موجوداً أو أنّ يكون المركّب منها معدوماً إن كانت هي معدومة إذ كان من المحال الذي / لا يمكن فهمه أن يوجد المركّب والأشياء التي هو منها مركّب معدومة إذ هي أسبابه الموجبة لوجوده ومن البيّن أنّ ما هو سبب لوجود /66a35/ شيء آخر هو أحقّ بالوجود من ذلك الشيء الآخر والصور إذاً البسيطة العرية من سائر اللواحق أحقّ بالوجود من جميع / الأشياء المركّبة منها وإنّ كانت الموجودات الطبيعية مركّبة من أشياء هي أيضاً مركّبة فيجب ضرورة أحد أمرين / إمّا أن تكون تلك الأشياء الثواني من بسائط عرية من اللواحق فيجب من وجود الثواني وجودها / وإمّا مركّبة من ثوالت مركّبة فيلزم في الثوالت ما لزم في الثواني إمّا أن يكون من / بسائط عرية أو من مركّبة روابع وكذلك يلزم في الروابع مثل ما لزم فيما /66a40/ قبلها إلّا أنّه لا بدّ ضرورة من أن ينتهي هذا التركيب في / التصعدّ إلى مبادئه إلى ذوات بسيطة عرية / من سائر الأشياء غيرها لأنّه إن لم / ينته إلى بسائط لا تتكثّر / البتّة //66b1// لزم وجود أشياء / لا نهاية لعدّتها في المركّب / بالفعل وهذا محال فما لزم وضعه هذا / المحال محال أيضاً وإنّما لزم

81. بسيطاً [بسيطاً] H 82(1) P

82. وكذلك هو [ولذلك هو] 82,1 P [وكذلك] H 82(2) P

83. ومصيره [ومصيرة] H 82(3) P

84. العقل ومعقوله [العقل والمعقول] 82,2 P

85. حينئذ [حينئذاً] H 82(4) P

86. واحداً [واحد] J 82(5) P

87. بعينه [بعينها] H 82(6) P

88. أنّ لصور: أنّ الصور

89. إن: إذ

هذا المحال وضع الموجودات /66b5/ الطبيعية غير متناهية في تصعدها إلى بسائط معرّة من / كلّ اللواحق وإذا استحال هذا صحّ نقيضه وهو أنّ الموجودات الطبيعية / ينتهي إلى بسائط عرية من جميع لواحقها وإذا كان ذلك كذلك فإنّ وضع أنّ هذه الأشياء / التي منها ركّبت الموجودات الطبيعية غير موجودة لزم محال ظاهر للعيان وهو عدم الموجودات / الطبيعية المركّبة منها ووجودها ظاهر للحسّ وهذا محال فما لزمه هذا المحال محال وهو الوضع أنّ الصور / العرية من سائر اللواحق ليست موجودة وإذا استحال هذا صحّ ووجب نقيضه وهو أنّ الصور العرية من سائر اللواحق موجودة /66b10/ ولأنّ هذه الصور هي أجزاء المركّب ولذلك هي أسباب له وكلّ سبب أقدم بالطبع من مسببه فالصور العرية من جميع اللواحق إذاً / أقدم بالطبع من مسبباتها ومسبباتها هي الموجودات الطبيعية فالصور العرية أقدم بالطبع من الموجودات الطبيعية والأقدم بالطبع يرتفع / بارتفاعه المتأخّر عنه ويوجد بوجود المتأخّر عنه فالصور العرية إذن ترتفع بارتفاعها المركّبات منها وتوجد بوجودها فهي إذاً أحقّ بالوجود من المركّبات / منها وذلك ما أردنا أن نبين

<١٦> ولا يظنّ ظانّ أنّي أعتقد أنّ الصور التي من شأنها أن تلبس الهيولى وهي التي يمكن أن تصير محسوسة تفارق الهيولى بالفعل حتّى تكون /66b15/ موجودة وجوداً حسّياً مفارقة لها ولا أنّ صورة الإنسان مثلاً يوجد في وقت من الأوقات غير ملابسة للهيولى فإنّي ما إلى هذا أذهب في قولي إنّ الصور البسيطة البريئة من الهيولى / العرية من جميع اللواحق سواها موجودة خلواً من الهيولى ومن سائر اللواحق لكنّي إنّما أعني أنّ الصور البسيطة في ذواتها التي هي على حسب ما يدلّ عليه حدودها غير ملابسة الهيولى البتّة ولا / مضطّرة إليها وإنّما تضطرّ إليها في وجودها الحسّي فأما وجودها العقلي<sup>90</sup> فلا تضطرّ فيه إلى الهيولى وإنّ كانت مضطّرة فيه إلى العقل وأما في وجودها الإلهيّ الذي هو وجودها الحقيقيّ أعني على حقائقها / الذي لا تلبس فيه غيرها فليست محتاجة فيه إلى غير ذواتها فقط وإنّ كانت لا توجد في حال من الأحوال بواحد من هذه الثلاثة الأصناف من الوجود دون الصنفين الباقيين بل جميع هذه الوجودات الثلاثة / لازمة لها دائماً ما أحبّ بارئها وموجدتها تقدّست أسماؤه وهذا في إثبات وجود الصور الإلهية كان فأما ماهيتها العامة فهي صور وأما ماهيتها الخاصّة فهي صور مجردة من الهيولى وجميع اللواحق و/66b20/عرية عن جميع الأشياء سواها

<١٧> وأما لمّ هي فلجود البارئ جلّ اسمه وتعالى جدّه

<١٨> فقد أتينا على المطالب الأربعة العلميّة<sup>91</sup> في هذه الموجودات الثلاثة وبلغنا غرضنا بمعونة

الله وحسن توفيقه والحمد لله ربّ العالمين/

90. وجودها العقليّ: وجودها العقل

91. العلميّة: العامّة

## TRANSLATION

*On the Four Scientific Questions about the Three Kinds /65a35/ of Existence: Divine [or "Metaphysical"], Natural and Logical*

<I> He said: It is an obligation and a benefaction for every seeker to follow in the footsteps of the excellent philosophers, who are the recipients (as far as is humanly possible) of the acts of God the Blessed and the Exalted, who is most excellent in respect of generosity. For the highest excellence is to give being to the most excellent essence, and there is no essence more excellent — among beings that come into existence — than animals, and among these, there is none like Man, since he has been blessed with the faculty of material intellect, whose /65a40/ complete and perfect form he has also been blessed and honored with: the intellect in act, whose existence in natural man is fulfilled only by his apprehending himself and [by his] striving //65b1//, to the full extent of his capacity, to acquire it for himself and to make it exist in others.<sup>92</sup> There are four true scientific questions that constitute philosophy, which has no constitution apart from them, nor /65b5/ a need for anything other than them; and they each consist in investigations of the essence without its concomitants. Therefore, it is an obligation of the first rank to investigate pure essences, as well as to ascertain the truth, to love inquiry, to put up with the strains of application and toil, to exert oneself with earnestness and by rolling up one's shirt-sleeves, and to avoid any slackening or curtailing [of the investigation].<sup>93</sup> It is on account of this [i.e., slackening or curtailing of the investigation], and due to a grudge borne by a group of those<sup>94</sup> who lived close to the time of the earlier

92. Cf. *anna afdala l-jā'idīna huwa l-jā'idu bi-afdali l-dhawāti*: Périer, 69,6-7. The relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades is given by Proclus as an example of this: Socrates' primary perfection is perfecting his own intellect, while his secondary perfection is perfecting his student Alcibiades' intellect; cf. Proclus, *Theol. Plat.*, edd. H. Saffrey and L. Westerink (Paris, 1968-97), Vol. 4.16, 49,2-3; 4.37, 109,1-13; in *Alc. I*, ed. L. Westerink (Amsterdam, 1954), 121,1-123,20 (*teleiōsis* is also seen as something bestowed at 129,16; 132,4; 140,8; and 141,11).

93. On the perseverance needed to confront the toil of studying philosophy, see Yahyā's *Commentary on Metaphysics Alpha Elatton: Tafṣīr Yahyā ibn 'Adī li-l-Maqāla al-Ūlā min Kitāb Aristūṭālīs al-mawsūm bi-Maṭā'āfūsīqā ay fī Mā Bā'da l-ṭabī'yyāt wa-hiya l-mawsūma bi-Alif al-Ṣuḡhrā*, ed. Khalifāt, *Maqālāt Yahyā ibn 'Adī al-falsafīyya*, 222,7-10 (= *Tafṣīr Yahyā ibn 'Adī li-l-Maqāla al-Ūlā min Kitāb Mā Bā'da l-ṭabī'a li-Aristūṭālīs al-mawsūma bi-Alif al-Ṣuḡhrā*, ed. 'A. Badawī, *Rasā'il falsafīyya li-l-Kindī wa-l-Fārābī wa-ibn Bājjā wa-ibn 'Adī* [Benghazi, 1973], 170,6-9).

94. Possibly the middle Platonists Lucius and Nicostratus, who saw the *Categories* as an attack on Plato and mounted a Platonist counterattack; their objections were recorded, via Porphyry's lost *Greater Commentary*, in Simplicius' *Commentary on the Categories*. (Ibn al-Nadīm's *Fihrist* mentions Simplicius' commentary, and one of Porphyry's commentaries, but it is not clear which one.) Alternatively, Yahyā might be thinking of Elias, who in his *Commentary on the Categories* lists the attributes of a good commentator on Aristotle, and says that "he must not be a sympathizer of some



investigators of the philosophers' books (of whom none of the students of the second Aristotle /65b10/ — I mean the teacher Alexander of Aphrodisias<sup>95</sup> — much less those who followed Porphyry, let alone those [who came] after John the Grammarian, Olympiodorus, Elias (?) and their contemporaries, all the way up to our own generation, reached the first rank), that the conviction came to prevail that Aristotle disagreed with his teacher Plato concerning the philosophical topic that most warrants subtle examination and thoughtful consideration: the existence of simple, pure forms, the essence of each of which is unmixed with anything other than it. They accused him of departing from Plato's view on this matter, and also gave voice to such an abominable view of Plato (imagining that he viewed the forms of natural beings as having an existence and subsistence outside of composite things), that the manifest [import] of their statements gives the impression that they thought Plato believed that a form that is clothed in matter somehow also has an existence in

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[other] school, which is what happened to Iamblichus: for he, being a sympathizer of Plato, attributed [as a credit] to Aristotle that he did not contradict Plato on the Ideas" (123,1-3). Elias thus thinks that Aristotle *did* contradict Plato on the Ideas, and apparently implies that he was right to do so.

95. This strongly recalls Elias *Commentary on the Categories* 128,12-13, which speaks of "the teacher Alexander" as a "second Aristotle." However, the text there is indisputably corrupt, and the description of Alexander as a second Aristotle does not seem to make sense in the context, which is talking about other people named Aristotle whose works might be falsely attributed to Aristotle of Stagira. Paul Moraux, in "Aristoteles, der Lehrer Alexanders von Aphrodisias", *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 49 (1967), 169-182, argued that Elias' text originally referred to "the teacher of Alexander" as a second Aristotle, since other evidence supports the claim that Alexander of Aphrodisias in fact had a teacher named Aristotle. In any case it seems clear that Yahyā is drawing on Elias or some parallel source, and that Yahyā, with the extant Greek manuscripts of Elias' *Commentary on the Categories*, took "the second Aristotle" to be an honorific designation of Alexander. At 65b10, the manuscript has something like *'llynsq*, evidently a copying mistake by a scribe who did not recognize the person Yahyā meant to refer to. It is not clear how the text should be restored. It is likely that Yahyā is referring to the Greek commentator Elias, and this is how, provisionally, we translate the name. But rather than restoring the Arabic text as *Ilyās*, we make the palaeographically easier correction to *'llynus*, agreeing with the references to a commentator *'llynus* in the *Commentary on the Isagoge* by Ibn al-Ṭayyib (d. 435/1043), who was a student of two of Yahyā's own students, and in related Arabic sources. *'llynus* in Ibn al-Ṭayyib may well be Elias, as was thought by Ibn al-Ṭayyib's editor Kwame Gyekye (*Tafsīr Kitāb Isāghūjī li-Furfiyūyūs*, xxvi-vii, n. 13; see also his translation of that text, *Arabic Logic: Ibn al-Ṭayyib's Commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge* [Albany, N.Y., 1979], 221, n. 43 and 228, n. 88). But the identification has been disputed, and we do not want to prejudge the case by correcting the text to *Ilyās*. For arguments against identifying *'llynus* with Elias, see Richard Walzer, "New light on the Arabic translations of Aristotle", in his *Greek into Arabic: Essays on Islamic Philosophy* (Oxford, 1962), 69-70 and 75-6; and Franz Rosenthal, "A commentator of Aristotle", in S.M. Stern, Albert Hourani and Vivian Brown, eds, *Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition: Essays Presented by his Friends and Pupils to Richard Walzer on his Seventieth Birthday* (Oxford, 1972), 337-49. For a succinct review of the question, see Cleophea Ferrari, *Der Kategorienkommentar von Abū l-Farağ ʿAbdallāh ibn al-Ṭayyib: Text und Untersuchungen* (Leiden, 2006), 15-16.



something other than matter (or in something that we cannot conceive of from their assertions and their expressions). And yet this is the kind of implication that gets connected to him [Plato] and which is entailed /65b15/ by their ranting, with its ugliness and its remoteness from whichever of these two great and excellent philosophers it gets ascribed to, [resulting] from the limited capacities of those beneath them [to understand] the two of them and [from] the disconnection of their [Plato's and Aristotle's] lofty station from contamination with muck such as this. [My] hope in this [treatise] is to perform one of two good deeds: either guiding aright those who have strayed from the truth, if I speak the truth; or finding someone who will guide [me] to it and acquaint [me] with [the truth], if I deviate from it. [So] I thought I would compose this treatise on that [topic], relying on God and asking Him for help. Indeed, "He suffices for me and is the best of helpers".<sup>96</sup>

<2> Our objective in this treatise is to investigate the three kinds of existence: natural [or, "physical"], logical [or, "rational"] and divine [or, "metaphysical"]. Some commentators on Aristotle's books say that Plato believed that they [i.e., the three kinds of existence] apply to all the forms that exist, and they suspected Aristotle of departing from his [Plato's] view about them, in regard to the four types of scientific investigation: "whether it is", "what it is", "which thing it is" and "why it is". Being led by what correct reasoning and right method entail is made easy by asking Him for guidance and support in this. He suffices for me as a guide and a helper.

<3> Since each investigation is preceded by conceiving what the name of the object of investigation signifies, let us first comment on the signification of each of these terms — I mean our saying "natural", "logical" and "divine". We assert that by our saying "natural /65b20/ beings", we mean essences that exist in matter. As for our saying "logical [or rational] beings", well, because "logical" is connected to "logic", and given that the term "logic" signifies more than one meaning, it is best that we explain the meanings that the philosophers employ. We assert that we think that philosophers use the term "logic" with two different senses. One of them is the sense of the discriminatory faculty, which is one of the specific differences that constitute human beings. The other is the art of logic. If they say "Among genera and species are those that are divine, those that are natural, and those that are logical", they will connect them [i.e. "logical" genera and species] to logic in the first sense, namely, the [faculty of] discrimination. So the sense of their saying this is what they would mean if they were to say: "Among genera and species are

96. Interestingly, Yahyā is citing the Qur'ān here (Āl 'Imrān - 3/173: *ḥasbunā llāhu wa-ni'ma l-wakīlu*) rather than the New Testament (e.g., *kifāyatunā min Allāh* at 2 Corinthians 3:5).

those whose existence is in matter; those whose existence is separated, self-subsistent and free of all concomitants; and those whose existence is in the faculty of discrimination". The former sense of "logical" sometimes includes isolated forms that are one in number, like the intelligible forms that are unique and have no counterpart, such as the Creator (may He be blessed and exalted), and the Intellect.<sup>97</sup> /65b25/ If they say: "Genera, species, *differentiae*, properties and general accidents are logical", they will connect them to the art of logic, namely, the second sense [of "logic"]. So the sense of their saying this is what they would mean if they were to say: "They are things that the art of logic deals with." Individuals are excluded from this sense, since the art of logic does not deal with them. If someone says, "How can they assert that individuals are not dealt with in the art of logic, when they are mentioned as a subject in the *Isagoge*, *Categories*, *De Interpretatione*, the *Analytics* and other books of logic?" let him know that they mention individuals in those books of logic where they bring them up, not in the sense that they [individuals] are dealt with in them, nor in the sense that they are the object of investigation or concern. They bring them up only due to the need to reject this [very notion], in view of the fact that they [i.e., individuals] are related to some terms that are dealt with in logic.<sup>98</sup> This is because genus, species and other logical terms are sometimes related to individuals inasmuch as they are general;<sup>99</sup> and for this reason they were compelled to mention them /65b30/ and gesture towards describing them, to the extent that their meaning is conceivable in the soul. Thus, when we say "logical beings" here, we signify only the first of the two meanings of "logical", and we mean by it only forms — i.e., essences — that are conceived in the logical soul. When we say "divine beings", [we mean] essences that are independent of matter and of soul, as well as free of all concomitants other than these two [i.e., matter and soul].

<4> Since we have now explained what each of these three names signifies, let us take up the investigation of each of the things signified by them. The four scientific

97. Cf. Yahyā's distinction between what is intelligible in and of itself (*al-ma'qūl bi-dhātibi*), which is absolutely unclothed with matter (*ghayr mulābis li-l-hayūlā al-battata*), and the intelligible forms found in matter (*al-suwar al-mawjūda fī l-hayūlā*), which are less intelligible in themselves: *Commentary on Metaphysics Alpha Elatton*, Khalīfāt, ed., *Maqālāt Yahyā ibn 'Adī al-falsafīyya*, 227,2-20 (= Badawī, ed., *Rasā'il falsafīyya li-l-Kindī wa-l-Fārābī wa-ibn Bājjā wa-ibn 'Adī*, 173,18-174,15).

98. ... *min qibali annahā muḍāfatun ilā ba'di l-alfāzi l-musta'malati fī l-mantiqi*; note the similarity to the title of al-Fārābī's famous treatise.

99. Because to call them "general" entails their being related to individuals, i.e., "general" is a relative term, and means nothing without being related to "individuals".



investigations are ordered as we have listed them. Let us begin with nature, for we are most familiar and best acquainted with it.<sup>100</sup>

<5> We say: investigating its [1a] *whether-it-is-ness* [*halīyya*] is omitted as unnecessary, since its existence is so manifest that there is no need to research it. Indeed, every doubt that is raised about its lineage<sup>101</sup> is like what Aristotle said in *Physics* II, where he said:

<6> “[The attempt] to ‘show’ that nature is something that exists is laughable, since it is obvious that there are many beings that are like this [i.e., there are many beings that are by nature]; and elucidating obvious things /65b35/ by means of obscure things is an act of someone incapable of distinguishing between that which is knowable in itself and that which is knowable through another.”<sup>102</sup> As for [1b] *what* are natural things: although inasmuch as they are connected to nature, they agree in this respect, inasmuch as they are some essences or other, they differ, since some of them are substances — and these are of two kinds, form and matter — and others are concomitants of composite substances, such as motion, rest, place and time. The general quiddity of forms, which the second investigation (“*what* the form is”) determines, is “principle”; whereas the specific quiddity, which is what the third investigation (namely, about [1c] “*which thing* it [i.e., nature] is”) determines, is “principle of motion and rest of that in which it is *per se* and not /65b40/ *per accidens*.”<sup>103</sup> As for [1d] *why* [nature] is, it is on account of the perfection of the generosity of the Creator, may he be glorified and exalted.

<7> Now the general quiddity of matter [*hayūla*] is “substrate”, while its specific quiddity is “substrate of each thing, out of which the thing comes to be and which is present in it [the thing] not *per accidens*.”<sup>104</sup> As for *why* it is, it is in order that /65b45/ forms might have corporeal existence in it.

100. Cf. Yahyā’s interpretation of Aristotle’s phrase *all’ hekaston legein ti peri tēs phuseos* *Metaph.* II.1, 993b1-2 (*lakinna kulla wāhidin mina l-nāsi takallama fi l-ṭabī’ati*: ap. Averroem, *Tafsīr Mā ba’dā l-Ṭabī’a*, ed. M. Bouyges [Beirut, 1938-48], Vol. I, 3,8-9): = *Commentary on Metaphysics Alpha* Elatton, Khalifāt, ed., *Maqālāt Yahyā ibn ‘Adī al-falsafīyya*, 223,18-224,10 (= Badawī, ed., *Rasā’il falsafīyya li-l-Kindī wa-l-Fārābī wa-bn Bājjā wa-bn ‘Adī*, 171,11-23).

101. I.e., its genealogy or origins. Alternatively, one could read *kullu māsiqi nisbatihī*, “everyone who grasps its connection [to reality]”. The skeleton (*rasm*) of the *nisbatuhu* must be correct, since it is shaped identically to the skeleton of *nisbatuhu* on 66a17.

102. *Physics* II.1, 193a3-6 (= Aristūṭālīs, *al-Ṭabī’a*, Vol. I, 81,1-6). When Yahyā’s quotations of Aristotle correspond exactly with the text of the Arabic translation, the reference is given directly, as it is here. In those cases where the quotation does not exactly reproduce the text of the translation, the reference will be preceded by a “cf.”.

103. This is actually Aristotle’s definition of nature, not of form: cf. *Phys.* II.1, 192b21-23 (= *al-Ṭabī’a*, Vol. I, 79,7-9) and *Metaph.* V.4, 1015a13-15 (= ap. Averroem, *Tafsīr Mā ba’dā l-Ṭabī’a*, Vol. II, 507,11-12).

104. *Phys.* I.9, 192a31-32 (= *al-Ṭabī’a*, Vol. I, 75,7-8). Note that Yahyā’s quotation leaves out the adjective “first” (*prōtonlawwal*) in the phrase “the first substrate”.

<8> The general quiddity of motion //66a1// is “perfection”, and its specific quiddity is “perfection of what is in potentiality inasmuch as it is so.”<sup>105</sup> As for *why* it [motion] is, it is in order that by means of it [motion], the coming-to-be of forms in matter be completed.

<9> /66a5/ The general quiddity of rest is “privation”, while its specific quiddity is “privation of motion”. As for *why* it is, it is in order that material forms persist in matter in a certain way.

<10> The general quiddity of place is “surface”, and its specific quiddity is a container’s inside surface which is equal to the outside surface of the thing contained.<sup>106</sup> As for *why* it [place] is, it is in order that natural, contained bodies that come to be may be located in it.

<11> The general quiddity of time is “numbered [number]”, and its specific quiddity is “the numbered [number] of the motion of the sphere, with regard to the earlier and the later.”<sup>107</sup> As for *why* it [time] is, /66a10/ it is so that by it, the coming-to-be and motions of natural things that come to be may be made determinate.<sup>108</sup>

<12> From what we have said, the existence, “whatnesses”, “whichnesses” and “whynesses” of natural essences have become clear. Now the logical existence (i.e., [the existence] in the logical soul) of those essences which, by virtue of their association with matter, are natural, [[becomes<sup>109</sup> clear when we know, for example,

105. I.e., omitting the second *bi-mā huwa bi-l-quwwati* in the manuscript as a scribal repetition, in order to match Yaḥyā’s definition with the definition of motion given in *Phys.* III.1, 201a10-11 = *al-Ṭabī’a*, Vol. I, 171,2, which reads *kānat al-ḥarakatu kamāla mā bi-l-quwwati bi-mā huwa ka-dhālika = hē tou dunamei ontos entelekheia hēi toiouton kinēsis estin*. Alternatively, Yaḥyā might be conflating this definition with the formula at *Phys.* III.1, 201b4-5 = *al-Ṭabī’a*, Vol. I, 178,15.

106. Cf. *Phys.* IV.4, 212a6 (= *al-Ṭabī’a*, Vol. I, 312,7-9). Although Yaḥyā’s wording differs from the Arabic translation of the *Physics*, he does seem to be drawing on a part of the *Physics* text which, according to Ross’ apparatus criticus (*Aristotle’s Physics: A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary*, ed. W.D. Ross [Oxford, 1936], ad loc.), is preserved in the Arabic translation (and in the Arabic translation’s Latin translation) and in the Greek commentators, although not in any of the extant Greek manuscripts.

107. Cf. *Phys.* IV.11, 219b1-2 (= *al-Ṭabī’a*, Vol. I, 420,3) and 219b5-8 (= *al-Ṭabī’a*, Vol. I, 420,7-8). Neither passage specifies that the motion is that of the sphere (*al-falāk*); but this might be inferred from GC II.10, 337a22-25. This is the view maintained, and attributed to Aristotle, by Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Maqālat al-Iskandar al-Afrūdisī fi l-zamān*, in ‘A. Badawī, ed., *Shurūḥ ‘alā Aristū mafqūda fi l-Yūnāniyya wa-nasā’il ukhrā* (Beirut, 1971), 19-24 at 21,1-2: *wa-naqūlu inna l-zamāna innamā šara ‘adada ḥarakati l-falaki dūna ḡhayriḥā mina l-ḥarakāti li-annahu lā ḥarakata asrā’u minḥā*.

108. This could mean simply that time allows us to measure things, but it could also mean that the motions of the spheres are responsible for the determinate periods of the seasons and of the life cycles of living things; cf. GA 4.10 and GC 2.10.

109. This marks the beginning of the identical passage in *Maqālat al-shaykh Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī fi wujūb* [alt. *wujūd*] *al-ta’annus*, 75,7. The Marwī codex sides with Périer’s H against Périer’s JK roughly the same number of times as it sides with JK against H. There is only one consistent difference between the passage contained in the Marwī codex and the parallel passage contained in the *Ta’annus* treatise:



what “human” is — and this is what is signified by its definition, i.e., by our saying “mortal, rational animal”<sup>110</sup> — after we had not known it. For it is strictly necessary that something new occurs in us which had not been there before we knew this. This is so evident and manifest that one does not seek proof of it nor is one obliged to make it plain. It is strictly necessary that this occurrent thing must [1] either agree in every respect with the existing human who is composed of a matter and a form (and this entails an absurdity, for the composite, [complete] with its matter and its body, will be in ourselves, and this would amount to the occurrent thing’s existing in ourselves; and this is manifestly objectionable); or [2] [the occurrent thing will be] different in every respect from the human who is composed of a matter /66a15/ and a form. And this [i.e., Option 2] is of two types. [2a] Either [the occurrent thing is] distinct from the composite human and agrees with the non-human, which is also absurd, because the occurrent thing would be better suited in that case to be a knowledge of the non-human than it would be to be a knowledge of the human, given that it has been posited that it agrees with the non-human and is distinct from the human, and this is absurd because it is different from what is found [to be the case], since our knowledge is only of the quiddity of the human, not the quiddity of the non-human. [2b] Alternatively, [the occurrent thing might be] distinct from the composite human as well as distinct from the non-human — and this too is absurd in view of the fact that if its relation to the human and its relation to the non-human are one and the same, being a [single] relation of distinctness, its [i.e., the occurrent thing’s] being a knowledge of the human would not be more suitable than its being a knowledge of the non-human. And this [i.e., Option 2b] will entail one of two objectionable states of affairs: either [2b’] we will know, from the statement of one who says “mortal, rational animal”, the non-human along with the human (and this would be different from what is found to be [the case], because we know from this statement only the human alone, and not what is other than it); or [2b’] we will not know either the quiddity of the human or of the non-human (and this is also different from what is found to be [the case], since we know the knowledge of the quiddity of human when we know what its definition indicates).

<13> Alternatively, [3] the occurrent thing will agree with the human composed of a matter and a form in /66a20/ one respect, and be different from it in another

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the nine instances of *mādda* in the passage from the Marwī codex appear as *hayūlā* in all three manuscripts of the *Ta’annus* treatise.

110. Périer drops the *wa-huwa* (introducing a *hāl* clause) in favor of *wa-*, and translates as “lorsque nous apprenons, par exemple, ce qu’est l’homme et ce qu’indique sa définition ‘vivant, raisonnable, mortel’, après un temps où nous n’avions pas cette connaissance...”.

respect. Since the first two alternatives are impossible, and no fourth alternative is left beyond these three, necessity and correctness and truth will attach to this [final] alternative, namely, that the occurrent thing agrees with the human that is composed of a matter and a form — namely, the natural human — in one respect, and differs from it in another respect. Now, this respect in which the occurrent thing agrees with the natural, composite human, is either [i] the matter of the composite — and this is absurd, because the matter of the composite human is common to both the human and the non-human, and if the human is equivalent to the non-human that shares its matter, with respect to [its] agreement with the occurrent thing, the occurrent thing will be no better suited to be a knowledge of the human than it is to be a knowledge of what shares its matter with the human; and this is absurd because the occurrent thing is a knowledge of the human, not of something else.

<14> Alternatively, it is [ii] the form of the composite, and this is evidently true: that two agreeing things will not be multiple to the extent that they agree, but rather they will be one in what they agree in, since multiplicity is implied by difference just as oneness is implied by agreement. If this self-same path is followed with each one of the natural essences other than the human, it will lead to [the conclusion that] knowledge of each of them is just the coming to be, in the soul, of their forms and intentions /66a25/ stripped of their matter. This is what we said the word “logical” signifies, and its [kind of] existence has been made clear: it has been made clear that knowledge of the object of knowledge is produced in the soul of the knower without its matter, when it becomes an object of knowledge. It would fit with what we have said in calling attention to something that, though beyond our scope, completes the explanation of a [particular] state of what is known, namely, that knowledge of the objects of knowledge differs in accordance with the difference of the essences of the things known in respect of simplicity and composition. This is because if the thing known is something composed of matter and form, what is meant by knowing it will consist in the coming to be of one of its two parts (its form) in the soul of the knower, without the other part (its matter); and if it is something simple, it will accordingly be a pure form. Thus what is meant by knowing it will be the intellect’s formation<sup>111</sup> of it and its [the intellect’s] becoming it, so that in this case the intellect and its intelligible are one and the same.]]<sup>112</sup>

111. The standard Arabic philosophical term for conceptualization is *taṣawwur*, i.e., the formation of a concept.

112. This is the end of the identical passage in *Maqālat al-shaykh Yahyā ibn 'Adī fī wujūd* [alt. *wujūd al-ta'annus*: Périer, 82,3.



<15> The general quiddity of logical beings, then, is “forms”, and their specific quiddity is “a form in the soul, abstract and free of matter”. As for *why* they are, they are for the improvement of the states of the natural human. As for the fact that forms that are apt to exist in matter and thereby become natural have an existence in themselves (they being those [things] whose essences and quiddities are just in a state of abstraction and freedom from matter and from all /66a30/ their concomitants), and [the fact that] in general each of the abstracted essences which is signified by its specific definition [also has an existence in itself], and [this] is the existence that is called divine [or “metaphysical”] existence, which is the most real of beings, this [fact] will become clear from what I am describing as self-evident, that natural beings are composite, as each composite being is only ever composed of its simples. It is strictly necessary that either these are simples that are not composite at all — and these are the essences that are free of all things other than themselves — or they are composed of things which are their simples [in turn]. If the being is composed of simples that are [themselves] non-composite and which are independent of anything other than themselves, it will be necessary either that they be existent (if that which is composed of them is an existent), or that what is composed be non-existent (if they are non-existent). This is because it is absurd and incomprehensible for the composite to exist while the things of which it is composed are non-existent, since they are the causes that necessitate its existence. It is evident that whatever is a cause of the existence /66a35/ of another thing will be more really existent than that other thing.<sup>113</sup> Therefore simple forms that are free of all other concomitants are more really existent than all the things that are composed of them. If natural beings are composed of things which are also composite, one of two things will follow necessarily. Either these second-level things will be [composed] of simples that are free of concomitants, so that their existence necessarily follows from the existence of the second-level things; or [these second-level things] will be composed of third-level things that are

113. Cf. *Metaph.* 2.1, 993b26-27 (= ap. Averroem, *Tafsīr Mā ba'da l-Ṭabī'a*, Vol. I, 13,1-3: *fā-yajibū min dhālika an yakūna awlā l-ashyā'i bi-l-ḥaqqi l-shay'a lladhī huwa 'illatun li-ḥaqqiqati l-ashyā'i llatī ba'dahu*) = *Commentary on Metaphysics Alpha Elatton*, Khalifāt, ed., *Maqālāt Yahyā ibn 'Adī al-falsafiyya*, 230,12-13 (= Badawī, ed., *Rasā'il falsafiyya li-l-Kindī wa-l-Fārābī wa-ibn Bājjā wa-ibn 'Adī*, 177,1-3). The Arabic root *ḥ-q-g* here translates *alēthes*, which would more naturally be translated “true” than “real”, but Yahyā, following the opening chapter of al-Kindī's *On First Philosophy*, takes it in the sense of “real”, which can be justified by Aristotle's saying “Each thing stands in relation to truth as it stands in relation to reality (*einai*)” at *Metaph.* 2.1, 993b30-31 (= ap. Averroem, *Tafsīr Mā ba'da l-Ṭabī'a*, Vol. I, 13,6-7: *fā-yajibū min dhālika an yakūna kullu wāḥidin mina l-ashyā'i ḥālubu fi l-wujūdi ḥāluhu fi l-ḥaqqi*) = *Commentary on Metaphysics Alpha Elatton*, Khalifāt, ed., *Maqālāt Yahyā ibn 'Adī al-falsafiyya*, 230,16-231,1 (= Badawī, ed., *Rasā'il falsafiyya li-l-Kindī wa-l-Fārābī wa-ibn Bājjā wa-ibn 'Adī*, 177,6-7).



[themselves] composite, so that what was entailed in the case of the second-level things will be entailed in the case of the third-level things: either they will be [composed] of simples that are free [of further concomitants] or they will be composed of fourth-level composites, and likewise what was entailed in the case of what /66a40/ came before them will be entailed in the case of the fourth-level things. But there is absolutely no way for this composition to avoid terminating, on the upward path, in its principles, in essences that are simple and free of all other things. For if it [the composition] did not terminate in simples that have no multiplicity at all, //66b1// the actual existence of an infinite number of things would be entailed in the composite, and this is absurd, and that whose positing entails this absurdity will also be absurd. What entails this absurdity is the positing of natural beings /66b5/ that do not terminate, on the upward path, in simples that are free of all concomitants. If this is impossible, its contradictory will be correct — namely, that natural beings terminate in simples that are free from all concomitants. Since this is so, if those things from which natural beings are composed are posited as non-existent, an absurdity that is clear for the eye to see will be entailed: namely, the non-existence of natural beings that are composed of them and whose existence is plain to the senses; and this is absurd. That which entails this absurdity will [also] be absurd, namely, positing that forms free of all other concomitants do not exist. If this is impossible, its contradictory is correct and necessary: namely, that forms free of all other concomitants do exist. /66b10/ Because these forms are parts of the composite and for this reason are causes of it, and every cause is prior by nature to its effect, forms free of all concomitants will therefore be prior by nature to their effects. Their effects are the natural beings, so forms free [of all concomitants] will be prior by nature to the natural beings. When what is prior by nature is removed, what is posterior to it will be removed; and when what is posterior to it exists, it will exist.<sup>114</sup> So when forms free [of all concomitants] are removed, the things that are composed of them will be removed, and when they [composite things] exist, they [forms] will exist. They [i.e., forms free of all concomitants] are therefore more really existent than what is composed of them. This is what we wanted to make clear.

114. For this criterion of priority by nature, see *Metaph.* V.11, 1019a1-4 (= ap. Averroem, *Tafsīr Mā ba'da l-Ṭabī'a*, Vol. II, 569,9-12) and *Cat.* 12, 14a29-35 (= *Manṭiq Aristū*, ed. 'A. Badawī [Cairo: 1964] Vol. I, 48,15-19). Yaḥyā's term *irtifā'* ("removal") translates *anaïresis* or its cognates, which are not in these "classic" passages but are commonplace in many parallel accounts of priority by nature, e.g. Aristotle *Protrepticus* B33, Porphyry *Commentary on the Categories* 118,24-119,3, Elias *Commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge* 68,22-30, Alexander *Questions* I,11, and Alexander's essay against Xenocrates preserved in Arabic and edited by 'A. Badawī, *Aristū 'inda l-'arab* (Cairo, 1947), 281-2.

<16> Let no one imagine<sup>115</sup> that I believe that the forms that are apt to be clothed in matter<sup>116</sup> — the ones that can become sensed — are actually separated from matter, such that they /66b15/ exist with a sensible existence [while] separated from it [i.e., matter]; nor [let anyone imagine that] I believe that the form of man, for example, [can] at some moment in time exist unclothed in matter. I did not maintain this in my saying that simple forms that are independent of matter and free of all other concomitants exist devoid of matter and of all other concomitants. Rather, I mean only that simple forms, in their essences — which correspond [exactly] to what their definitions signify — are utterly unclothed in matter and do not need it; they need it only for their sensible existence. As for their intellectual existence, they do not need matter for it, although they do need the intellect. Now for their divine existence, which is their real existence (I mean [their existing] in their [essential] realities), and in which they are not clothed with anything else, they need nothing at all apart from themselves — even though they do not exist at any given moment in one of the three kinds of existence without [also existing in] the other two [kinds of existence]. Rather, all of these three existences must always attach to it, as long as their Creator and Existentiator — hallowed be His names — wishes it. This is [what we have to say] about proving the existence of divine forms. As for their general quiddity, it is “forms”; their specific quiddity is “forms stripped of matter and of all concomitants and /66b20/ free of all things other than themselves”.

<17> As for why they are, they are on account of the generosity of the Creator, glorified be His name and exalted be His grandeur.

<18> We have now gone through the four scientific questions about these three [kinds] of beings, and achieved our aim with God’s help and His kindness in granting [us] success. Praise be to God, Lord of the worlds.

115. Reading the hortatory jussive *lā yaznūn*, rather than the energetic *yazunnanna*.

116. Cf. *enduesthai*, which appears twice in the discussion of reincarnation at *DA* 1.3 407b20-26 (= *Arisṭūṭālis: Fi l-Nafs*, ed. ‘A. Badawī [Cairo, 1954], 17,20-18,3; *enduesthai* at 407b23 appears in Arabic as *al-intiqāl* at 17,22; *enduesthai* at 407b25 appears as *tasta’milu* at 18,1).