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AL-ASH‘ARĪ’S
“KITĀB AL-ḤATHTH ‘ALĀ L-BAḤTH”*

by

R.M. Frank

The text which I shall present here is not that of a hitherto unknown work of al-Ash‘arī. It has been published several times under the title *Risālat Istiḥsān al-khawḍ fi ‘ilm al-kalām*, first in Hyderabad in A.H. 1323 and again in 1344, and subsequently republished by the late Fr. Richard McCarthy, S.J. in his *The Theology of al-Ash‘arī* (Beyrouth, 1953, pp. 87–97) together with an English translation (*ibid.*, pp. 119–134).

The new text of the *Kitāb al-Ḥathth ‘alā l-baḥth* is furnished us by abū l-Qāsim Salmān ibn Nāṣir al-Naysabūrī al-Anṣārī (d. 512/1118)¹ in his *al-Ghunya fi l-kalām*, which is found in MS III Ahmet n° 1916. Cited in full, the Ash‘arite text forms the bulk of a subsection of a chapter devoted to “the obligation to [theological] enquiry” (*wujūb al-naẓar*). Having first examined the question in a general way (foll. 5v^{of.}), al-Anṣārī then takes up the thesis that to carry out formal, theological speculation is an obligation of the community (*wujūb al-kifāyah*), not one which is incumbent on each individual Muslim (*wujūb al-a‘yān*) (foll. 6r^o ff.). The text of *al-Ḥathth ‘alā l-baḥth*, following an introduction of some twelve lines, constitutes virtually the whole of the next and final subsection of this chapter, in which he deals with the contention that “to occupy one’s self with *kalām* is an innovation” (fol. 9r^o ff.).

Besides the text contained in al-Anṣārī’s *al-Ghunya* (A) and that of the Hyderabad edition (H), we have utilised in the preparation of the present edition of *al-Ḥathth* that contained in Landberg n° 1030, foll. 4v^o–6v^o (= Ahlwardt n° 2162) (B)² and that contained in Feyzullah n° 2161/2, foll.

* I wish to express my gratitude to Manuscript Institute of the League of Arab States, which furnished me the copy of al-Anṣārī’s *K. al-Ghunya* and also to the directors of the Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi and the Staatsbibliothek preussischer Kulturbesitz, who supplied me with photocopies of the texts of *al-Ḥathth* held in their collections and who kindly granted permission for their publication.

49v^o–52r^o (F). Witnessed in these four copies, however, are two distinct versions of the work, which I shall refer to as T–1 and T–2. The former is contained in A and the latter in B, F, and H. Where T–1 and T–2 are essentially identical I shall present a single text; where they differ the two are presented in parallel columns.

Regarding the title of the work, that given in A is confirmed as original by its occurrence in Ibn ‘Asākir’s supplement to Ibn Fūrak’s list of al-Ash‘arī’s writings and in that of Ibn Farḥūn.³ The title given in the Hyderabad edition is plainly spurious, a descriptive pseudo-title made up by some one, a copyist or perhaps the editor, who was either ill acquainted with the vocabulary of al-Ash‘arī and his followers or was fundamentally opposed to the position set forth in the tract and wished to label it in a disparaging manner. The expression “*istiḥsān*” would never have been used by al-Ash‘arī in speaking of something of which he approved nor likely “*al-khawḍ*” either, since both have essentially negative connotations for him and for most of the tradition.⁴ The catalogue entry for F, “*Risālah fī l-radd ‘alā man ḡanna anna l-ishtighāl bil-kalām bid‘ah*” is interesting in that it closely parallels the wording employed by al-Anṣārī at the beginning of the passage in which he presents the text of *al-Ḥathth*, but it is not found either at the beginning or at the end of the text in the manuscript. In B likewise the work is untitled.

Since we have the work in two different forms there is a question as to which of the two is primary and in what sense. Does one form represent the author’s own revision of an earlier writing presented by the other or is one of them a recension, produced by one of his disciples?

For T–2, F and H furnish an almost identical *isnād* according to which the F text is based on a copy executed in Rabī‘ I, 677 (August/September, 1278) by the Mālikite *muqri*’.

1. abū l-Qāsīm ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm b. ‘Imrān Saḥnūn (d. 4/X/695 = 6/VIII/1296) from a copy of

2. abū Ṣādiq Muḥammad, the son of the famous Mālikite traditionist abū l-Ḥusayn Yaḥyā b. ‘Alī l-Rashīd al-‘Aṭṭār (584/1188 – 662/1264), which was made from a copy of

3. abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī b. Ibrāhīm al-Qurashī, made on 8/X/600 = 9/VI/1204 from a copy of the Shāfi‘ite *muqri*’,

4. abū l-Ma‘ālī l-Mawṣilī (539/1144–5 – 621/1224), made in 573/1177–8 from a copy of

5. abū Manṣūr al-Mubārak al-Baghdādī, made in 542/1147–8 from a copy of the Shāfiʿite traditionist,
6. abū l-Faḍl Ibn al-Ukhuwwa (d. 547/1153) from a copy of
7. abū l-Faḍl Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā l-Nātilī from a copy of
8. abū Naṣr ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Shīrāzī from (a text transmitted by)
9. ʿAlī ibn Rustam from (a text transmitted by)
10. abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. Mahdī l-Ṭabarī, a direct disciple of al-Ashʿarī.

H lacks the first two names of this *isnād*. It is explicitly stated for numbers 1–7 that each copy was orally collated with the one from which it was made. Though no date is given for al-Nātilī's copy, it was executed at dictation in the residence of al-Shīrāzī, wherefore it is apparent that between this and the time of Ibn Mahdī l-Ṭabarī there is a span of at least four generations — maybe a century and a half — for which we have only the name of ʿAlī b. Rustam, whom I have been unable to identify. The presence of this gap does pose a problem,⁵ but one need not, on this basis alone, impugn the validity of the *isnād* altogether. There is, that is to say, no *prima facie* evidence on which to doubt that Ibn Mahdī is the first transmitter of T–2, at least as represented in F and H. Even so, however, the question remains as to whether this text represents the primary and original form of the tract or a secondary recension, and if so by whom.

The A text, copied in Rabīʿ I, 592 (February, 1196) bears no *isnād*. It is, however, given to us directly by abū l-Qāsim al-Anṣārī, a disciple of abū l-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī and so belongs to a line of transmission which lies within the tradition of the foremost masters of the Ashʿarite school. In this the A text stands in sharp contrast to that of FH, none of whose transmitters, after Ibn Mahdī, is a recognised Ashʿarite master. As we shall see, in addition to this there is some evidence to suggest that more than one copyist of the manuscripts representing T–2 was not in the habit of copying *kalām* texts. Nonetheless, even though the association of the A text with the leading theologians of the Ashʿarite school would indicate that it has a pedigree such as to claim considerable respect, it is yet not sufficient to indicate whether it represents the original form of the work or not.

With respect to T–2 the A text contains several clear additions which were inserted by al-Anṣārī and are plainly indicated as such, being introduced by “I say” (as contrasted to “the master, abū l-Ḥasan said”). Besides these, T–1 has one short paragraph (§2.225) which is not found in T–2. In general, however,

T-2 is longer, fuller in its expression, and more detailed than T-1 and in some places very conspicuously so. On the principle that the simpler and shorter form of a text is generally the primary one and the longer secondary, we should take it as likely that T-1 is primary. General rules, however, do not of themselves allow any certainty concerning particular individuals, wherefore we shall have to look more closely at some of the differences between the two text forms. I shall examine several of the more notable elements in which T-1 and T-2 differ from one another and which would seem to confirm the hypothesis — some of them more clearly than others — that T-2 does in fact represent a secondary revision of T-1 or of a text closely resembling it. Following this it will be opportune to look briefly at the relationship between the three witnesses to T-2.

T-2 shows a number of elements which appear as additions with respect to T-1. In several cases these additions are relatively long. One such passage, found in §2.2131, would seem unquestionably to have originated in a gloss, possibly brought in from the margin of the archetype.⁶ By contrast with this, the long sentence which stands at the end of §2.323 in T-2 seems in no way out of place. It forms a kind of coda which sums up the argument of §2.23, if not of §2.22 and §2.23 together, and anticipates the issues raised in §2.31. One may, therefore, plausibly suggest that this sentence (treated as a separate section or paragraph in McCarthy's edition) most likely was introduced as a part of a more general effort of redaction, evidence of which we shall look at below.

We find an awkward intrusion into the text in §2.223 where, following the sentence "and it is impossible to enumerate an infinity" (*wa-muḥālun ʾiḥṣāʾu mā lā nihāyata lahu*), T-2 adds "and it is impossible that a single thing be divisible, since this requires that it be two things" (*muḥālun ʾan yakūna l-shayʾu l-wāḥidu yanqasimu liʾanna hādihā yūjibu ʾan yakūna shayʾayn*). The addition of T-2 is clearly out of place, since the following sentence, "but He has made it known that they are denumerable" refers to the earlier citation of Q 36.12 and 72.82 and has, for coherence sake, to follow the statement "it is impossible to enumerate an infinity". The inserted sentence would seem originally to have stood in the margin of the archetype of T-2, where it was to be read after the "*waqaʿa l-ʿadadu ʿalayhā*" which concludes the paragraph. In order to adjust the syntax HF has altered the final *ʿalayhā* to *ʿalayhima*, making it agree with the dual, *shayʾayn*, but the conclusion, even with this, remains meaningless.⁷

An insertion of analogous material is made in §2.221 where, following “and no day but that it is preceded by another day” T-2 adds “and the discussion against those who say that there is no particle (*juzʿ*) save that it has a half limitlessly”. The context, however, deals with the question of the denial of an infinite temporal regression and the added element is wholly out of place. The ḥadīths cited in the refutation of the position of those who hold that the world is eternal are read as asserting God’s absolute initiation of the being of things, not as having to do with infinite divisibility. Here, as also with the insertion in §2.223, it would seem that at least one copyist involved in the formation and transmission of T-2 was not well schooled in *kalām* and was not used to copying *kalām* texts.

In §2.2132, following “*al-diddāhi lā yajtami‘āni ‘alā maḥallin wāḥid*” (two contraries cannot be conjoined so as to qualify a single substrate), T-2 shows an addition to the text which is corrupt in all three manuscripts. In its original form it would seem to have read “*wa-lā ‘alā l-jumlati wa-lā fī l-mawjūdi lā fī maḥall*” (nor so as to qualify the composite whole nor in what exists in no substrate). The addition is pointless in the context, since the argument involves the possibility of the bodily resurrection of the dead and specifically an objection which claims that to posit such a possibility requires that one posit the possibility of the conjunction of contrary properties or accidents (dry and damp, hot and cold) in one and the same material substrate. The sense of the addition, in fact, if its original form is as I have suggested, is not immediately clear. The phrase “*al-mawjūdi lā fī maḥall*” could, in principle, be a description of the atom, but if this is the case it stands here redundantly with the preceding “*maḥallin wāḥid*”.⁸ It could, on the other hand, be a description of God, but such a reference makes no sense at all in the context.⁹ Again, the phrase “*wa-lā ‘alā l-jumlah*” might reflect the teaching of abū Hāshim, but this would seem pointless in the context, since (a) al-Ash‘arī, together with all the Ash‘arites of the classical period, denies that any accident can qualify more than its single substrate and (b) though abū Hāshim does recognise a class of accidents which effect a quality (or state) which belongs to the composite whole (sc., a living being as a unitary whole), he denies that accidents such as those mentioned belong to that class.¹⁰ It would seem, therefore, that this pair of phrases originated as a marginal note which perhaps meant to generalise the statement regarding contraries so as to make it cover all conceivable cases, even ones which would not be considered conceivable by al-Ash‘arī, and was subsequently copied into the body of the text.¹¹

Apart from these elements, which seem more or less clearly to be extraneous additions to the text, the most general and conspicuous characteristic of T-2 with respect to T-1 is that it is longer, whether the lengthening be by addition or simply by the employment of more expansive forms of expression. In a number of places T-2 has filled out the text by stating explicitly what is merely alluded to or implied in T-1. Thus, for example, in §2.221 T-2 supplies the contextual detail for a ḥadīth which in T-1, evidently under the assumption that the reader both knows it and knows al-Ash‘arī’s exegesis of it, is only alluded to. Again, for example, in §2.212 and §2.2131 T-2 explicitly indicates the arguments which the Ash‘arite exegesis discovers in the verses cited, while T-1 feels no need to state them. Likewise at the end of §2.321 T-2 adds “which are themselves derivative matters that are accessible only through revelation and [God’s] apostles”, making fully explicit a thesis which, though important to the overall argument of §2.31, is a commonplace for the *mutakallimīn* and so is left unstated in T-1.

In other places T-2 tends to give more explicit and formal indication of the divisions of the work and its topical structure. Thus in §2.20 the simple “*dhālika*” of the A text is represented in T-2 by “*mā dhakartumūhū mina l-kalāmi fī l-jismi... wal-tarfah*”, recalling by outright repetition most of the terms found in §2.12, which are only alluded to in T-1. At §2.211, then, with “*wa-‘ammā l-ḥarakatu wal-sukūn...*”, T-2 not only recalls some of the terms previously mentioned in §2.20, but structurally introduces, as it were, a formal heading where none appears in T-1. The same sort of thing occurs again in §2.221, the beginning of the next major section of the second response, where he introduces “*wa-‘ammā mā yatakallamu bihi l-mutakallimūna min ‘anna lil-ḥawādithi ‘awwalan...*”. Analogously, T-2 introduces a formal parallelism of “heading” in both §2.223 and §2.224 by means of “*‘ammā l-‘aṣlu*”, which is taken up from §2.231 and §2.232, where it occurs in T-1 as well.

It should be noted that the effect of this rhetorical “tidying up” or, if you will, literary formalisation of the text is not entirely neutral. If one considers the first three subsections of the second response, they involve by way of example **1.** the proof for the existence of God (§2.211) **2.** the thesis that there is only one God (§2.212), and **3.** the thesis that the bodily resurrection of the dead is possible (§2.213). The topical sequence is identical to that found in al-Ash‘arī’s *al-Thaḡhr* (pp. 82–84) and his *K. al-Luma*^c (§§3–9).¹² By the introduction of the “heading” at §2.211, T-2 tends to narrow the focus of the reader’s attention; where T-1 focuses on *kalām* arguments in general and, by impli-

cation, through the examples chosen in §§ 2.211–3, shows that they are foundational to Islamic belief, T–2 at the outset focuses narrowly on a set of formal concepts and argues their particular validity through the examples. The heading in § 2.20, moreover, partially vitiates the function of the section as an introduction to the entire second response, since a wider diversity of topics is in fact discussed than is suggested in the “heading”. Again, T–2’s introduction of the phrase “*wa ʿammā l-ʿaql*” in § 2.223 and § 2.224 tends to mitigate the rhetorical effect of its occurrence in § 2.231 and § 2.232, about which we shall have something to say later in the structural analysis of the tract. Similarly, the continuation of the second person address in § 2.332 diminishes the rhetorical effect achieved by the shift to the third person in T–1.

Analogous to the introduction of introductory formulae in § 2.223 and § 2.224 so as to parallel § 2.231 and § 2.232 is the parallelism introduced in § 2.313, where T–2 inserts the words “*ʿuṣūlu l-ʿaqli l-latī ʿarīquhā*” so as to parallel the preceding “*ʿuṣūlu l-sharʿi l-latī ʿarīquhā*”.¹³

This apparent work of expansive redaction in T–2 is perhaps most conspicuous in § 2.322 and § 2.323. In the first of these sections the author raises the question of one’s attitude towards erroneous and unseemly descriptions of God. This is treated simply and succinctly in T–1, where the question is introduced by “And one says to them: If some one were to say ‘God’s knowledge is created’ or were to say in describing Him anything which is inappropriate to Him, then would you...?”. Here, however, T–2 divides the question so as to present two distinct questions, each with its own answer and response. The first is introduced by “Tell us, if some one were to say ‘God’s knowledge is created’ would you...?” and is followed by the opponent’s answer and the author’s response, which are virtually identical to those found in T–1. The second question in T–2 is, by contrast, much longer and is formally different from that of the first paragraph. The introductory “If some one were to say” presents a lengthy list of rather preposterous descriptions of God which is followed immediately by the author’s response, “then it would be the case that you ought to... or you would...”. Several things should be noted here. Firstly, the pattern according to which the author responds to the opponent’s answer to the question, found in the first paragraph as also in § 2.323, is not followed here. Secondly, in the first paragraph the author’s opponent is addressed in the plural, “Would *you all* refrain from taking a position on the matter? If *they* say...” and this plural is implicitly carried over into the statement of the second question in the “*your*” (pl.) of “your Lord” (*rabbukum*)

and is, moreover, continued in §2.323. In the second paragraph, however, the opponent is addressed in the singular in both verbs, “you ought to remain silent” (*yanbaghī ṣan taskuta*) and “you would not remain silent” (*kunta lā taskutu*). The singular would here appear to follow and to agree with that of the introductory “*law qāla qāʿilun*”, just as does the second person singular of §2.3212, where the context involves *al-tawaqquf*. Here in the second paragraph of §2.322, however, the singular is not contextually coherent, since the section begins with a plural address to the author’s opponents (*khabbirūna...*, *ṣa-kuntum...*), which ought to be carried over across the “so also” which introduces the second paragraph. It would seem highly plausible that this second paragraph of §2.322 may perhaps have been originally composed as a substitute for the first, in which case the inconsistency is simply the result of the redactor’s failure to eliminate the first paragraph. Also consonant with the hypothesis that the second paragraph is here intrusive is the fact that the author’s second “response” (the second alternative in the apodosis: “or you would not remain silent...”) would seem to suggest that in taking a position the opponent will give a theoretically reasoned argument for his position. To the extent that this is implied the second “response” would appear to be out of place in the present context in that it formally goes beyond the scope of the immediate question in such a way as to anticipate and, to a certain degree, to pre-empt the author’s response which will be given in §2.331. It certainly tends to mitigate the rhetorical force of §2.331. Thus again it would seem that T-2 is a secondary rewriting of T-1.

In what follows, T-2 is again considerably expanded with respect to T-1 and once more the sequence of questions and responses is not without some problems. Here the topic is *takfīr*, the author’s opponents’ contention that certain heretics, particularly those who hold the *Qurʿān* to be created, are “unbelievers”. As in the preceding section T-1 raises the question (§2.323) in the simplest terms and gives a response which is at once brief and effective. In the statement of the problem, the phrase “*kaffarnā l-qāʿila bi-khalqi l-Qurʿān*” is ambiguous, since it can be taken in two ways. It can be read, “we hold those who say the *Qurʿān* is created to be unbelievers” in the sense “we consider them unbelievers in the strict and formal sense”, i.e., as having the juridical status of unbelievers: they are not Muslims. On the other hand, it can be read to mean simply “we call them ‘unbelievers’”, i.e., we use the term ‘unbeliever’ but do not mean by this to ascribe the juridical status of non-Muslims to them. The former position is characteristic of the Ḥanbalites, while the latter is that of some Shāfiʿites.¹⁴ Accordingly, the general context of the

work, sc., that it is composed against al-Barbahārī and the Ḥanbalites, would suggest that it is the former reading which is correct. This would seem moreover to be confirmed by the author’s response, for after having noted that there is no precedent in the documented teaching of the Prophet for any such *takfīr* against those who hold the *Qurʾān* to be created, he goes on to cite as an analogue and precedent against his opponents the Prophet’s attitude towards the *munāfiqīn*. It will be recalled that in the *Qurʾān* (63.3) it is stated that “they believed and afterwards became unbelievers”. This notwithstanding, the Prophet accorded them the status of believing Muslims (*ḥukmu l-muslimīn*), i.e., he treated them not as unbelievers but as members, not perhaps wholly respectable but nonetheless legitimate members, of the Muslim community. Since it occurs in the *Qurʾān*, ‘unbelievers’ may be used to describe them, but it is not used in a formal, juridical sense, but rather as a term of opprobrium. By citing the precedent of the Prophet’s action with regard to the *munāfiqīn*, thus, al-Ash‘arī implicitly takes the position of some of the Shāfi‘ites with regard to those who say the *Qurʾān* is created.

In T-2 this section is introduced by “*fa-ʿin qālū*”, where the plural picks up the plural (*wa-yuqālu lahum...*, *fa-ʿin qālū*) of § 2.3211, which is continued in the “*ʿa-tatawaqqafūna*” of § 2.322.

In the treatment of the question of *takfīr*, T-2 once again presents a problem, since it consists of two distinct paragraphs which are not wholly consistent with one another nor with the overall context. It begins “If some one says, ‘I shall refrain from speaking about the matter and shall give him no response’ or ‘I shall shun him’ or ‘I shall get up and go away from him’ or ‘I shall neither salute him [when we meet] nor visit him when he is sick nor attend his funeral when he dies’,...”. In this one has to hear the pronouns of “*askutu ʿanhu*”, “*lā ʿujībuhu*”, etc., as referring contextually to the question and to the holder of the heretical theses suggested in the preceding paragraph, the first alternative of whose response it apparently takes up but qualifies.¹⁵ Consistently thus the author’s response here continues to employ the second person singular: “One replies to *him*, ‘Then it follows that in all these forms of action which *you* have mentioned *you* are an innovator and in grave error, for the Prophet neither said... nor did he say anything at all of this”. At this point, however, the text continues in the second person plural: “So *you all* are innovators since *you all* do this”. This last sentence, as it occurs here, is not altogether coherent in the context. It appears to pick up and to continue the second person plural of the first paragraph of § 2.322, but there has been, up to

this point, nothing to suggest that the opponents there addressed do in fact take such an attitude towards those who hold the position mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph. The sentence containing the plural could be read coherently with the preceding statement concerning the Prophet, but not when the latter is taken as integral with the opening portion of the section. Plainly something is amiss.

Moreover, the second person plural is continued immediately by a pair of questions which introduce what is clearly a new paragraph, in which the question of *takfīr* is taken up anew: "So why have you people not kept silent with regard to those who say that the *Qurʾān* is created? Why do you consider them to be unbelievers?". In his edition of the text Fr. McCarthy here inserts an introductory "*wa-yuqālu lahum*", but there is no support for this in the manuscript witnesses to T-2; nor, indeed, would its presence solve the larger question of the origin and relationship of the various elements. Because of the plurals, this new paragraph clearly belongs with the preceding sentence (*fā-ʾantum... faʿaltum*) and is most likely another element of the redaction which, like some of the others, was never fully integrated editorially into the whole.

Whatever may be the textual problems concerning the redaction of T-2 the first paragraph dealing with *takfīr* is concise and follows the simple pattern of question and response found earlier in §§ 2.3211, 2.3212, and the first paragraph of § 2.322. The second paragraph, by contrast, presents a much more elaborate "dialogue", in which the argument is drawn out at length through the dialectical repetition of the question with a series of responses which progresses backwards through four generations of religious authorities beginning with Ibn Ḥanbal and ending with the Companions. Since the rhetorical strategy of the polemic is different from that employed elsewhere in the tract it will be instructive to look at it more closely. The sequence of questions and responses is as follows:

Q. 1: Why do you not keep silent with regard to those who hold that the *Qurʾān* is created?

R. 1: Because Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal didn't.

Q. 2: Why didn't he keep silent on the matter?

R. 2: Because al-ʿAbbās al-ʿAnbarī, Wakīʿ, et al. didn't.

Q. 3: Why didn't they keep silent?

R. 3: Because ʿAmr ibn Dīnār, Sufyān ibn ʿUyayna, et al. didn't.

Q. 4: Why didn’t they keep silent?

R. 4: It is impossible that all the Companions have done so. (I.e., though we cannot cite any particular authority, Ibn ‘Uyayna and the rest must have been following the usage of some of the Companions).

Q. 5: Why did they not keep silent, since they had no warrent from the Prophet for doing otherwise?

The argument here is plainly focused on the Ḥanbalite doctrine of *taqlīd*, drawing out by concrete example their notion of each generation’s imitation of the belief and practice of the one preceding until the series rests finally on the foundation of the Companion’s imitation of the Prophet. The sequence of questions and responses terminates not in a formal statement or conclusion by the author but by posing to the Ḥanbalite opponent the simple query of why those Companions who allegedly spoke against the thesis that the *Qur’ān* is created, accusing those who held it of unbelief (*kufir*), did not keep silent on the subject “given that the Prophet neither discussed the matter as such nor said ‘call those who hold it *kāfir*’”. To this question there is no response because there is no report that the Prophet had anything to say on the matter. Not only is al-Ash‘arī’s Ḥanbalite opponent vanquished by his inability to respond, but by implication all the pious forebears on the authority of whose teaching and practice the Ḥanbalites found the validity of their own are “innovators”, for they do not follow the practice of the Prophet in this matter. The Ḥanbalites, in brief, are *muqallid* to men who are guilty of precisely that which they consider the root of all religious error (and of which they accuse al-Ash‘arī), namely innovation (*bid‘ah*).¹⁶

We should note here that McCarthy’s division of the text would appear to indicate that his understanding of the structure of this passage is different from that which we have presented. He indicates the beginning of a new paragraph (his §27) with the words “If they say that it is impossible” (the response to the fourth question in our analysis) and includes in this section our §2.331, beginning “And if they say, ‘the learned have to...’”. As McCarthy divides the passage, the fourth question is left without any response on the part of the opponent and the section is terminated before the series of religious authorities is exhausted. Given the formal significance of the sequential pattern of questions and answers to the argument, however, it would seem clear that one has to carry the series one step further into the generation of the Companions, and this is precisely what is done when he says “If they say that it is impossible...”. This answer, which involves on “their” part an assumption gratuitously made

without any historical evidence, is essentially inadequate from al-Ash^ʿarī's standpoint and so leads up to the final question at which, unable to find any response at all, the opponent is reduced to silence.¹⁷ Furthermore, the topic under discussion in the sentence "If they say that it is impossible..." continues to be that which was introduced at the beginning of § 2.323 (McCarthy's § 26), viz., the claim that those who hold the *Qurʾān* to be created are to be considered as unbelievers. This is clear enough from the end of the response. Finally, if one follows McCarthy's division, the passage beginning "If they say 'The learned have to...'" will stand as a distinct alternative to "If they say that it is impossible..." and this is inappropriate. That is to say, the assertion that the learned have to take up such "recent questions" and deal with them by means of formal, systematic reflection could not be understood as a reason or explanation for why it is not conceivable that all the companions have remained silent on the issue of the unbelief of those who hold that the *Qurʾān* is created (in which case one would require *liʾannahū* or *faʾinnahū* in place of *ʾin qālū*), but it cannot be understood as an alternative response within the context. As an alternative response, § 2.331 is an alternative not to the fifth and concluding question of § 2.323 but to § 2.32 as a whole.¹⁸

The basic recensional differences between T-1 and T-2 are clear enough. As one might expect, there are also, even in passages where T-1 and T-2 are substantially identical, numerous variants in which T-2 differs from T-1, e.g.,

- 1.12 *al-jismi wal-ʿarāḍi wal-harakati wal-sukūn* A
= *al-ḥarakati wal-sukūni wal-jismi wal-ʿarāḍi* BFH
- 1.222 *tamassakū* A = *iḥtajjū* BFH
- 2.1 *bi-taḍlīlikum* A = *wa-ḍallaltum* BFH
- 2.311 *fī l-kitāb* A = *fī l-Qurʾān* BFH

It remains to examine briefly the relationships between B, F, and H, the witnesses to T-2. F and H belong to one and the same basic line of transmission and so show frequent agreement against B. For example,

- 2.2130 *naḥwa hādihā l-kalām* HF: + *al-ladhī ʾakhbara llāhu taʿālā bihi ʿanhum* B
- 2.2130 *fī l-Qurʾān* FH: + *al-ʿazīmi ʿalā dhālika... l-ʿazīz* B
- 2.222 *yanqasim* FH = *munqasiman* B
- 2.224 *yaqūlū bi-ḥujjah* FH = *yuqawwimū l-ḥujjah* B
- 2.232 *ʾilā qawlihi khasimūn* FH: + *wa-hādihā naṣṣun... B*

- 2.223 *fā-qawluhū ḥazza wa-jalla* FH: + *wa-ḥaḥṣā... qawluhu* B (lost in FH by homoiotel.)
- 2.232 *taḥyīnuha* FH = *muḥayyanan* B
- 2.313 *al-ḥaqliyyāti wal-maḥsūsāti* FH: + *ḥan taruddahā ḥilā ḥuṣūli... wal-qiyās* B (lost in FH by homoiotel.)

In passages where T-1 and T-2 are fundamentally alike one finds a number of instances in which FH stands with A against B; for example,

- 1.10 *ḥāḥifāh* AFH = *qawman* B
- 1.21 *ḥilayhi ḥājah* AFH = *ḥājatun ḥilayhi* B
- 1.222 *fī tarki l-naḥari fī l-ḥuṣūl* AFH: lacking in B
- 2.0 *thalāthati ḥawjuh* AFH = *wujūhin thalāthah* B
- 2.1 *wa-takallama* AFH = *ḥaw-takallama* B
- 2.2132 *raḥbatan ḥārrah* AFH = *ḥārratan raḥbah* B
- 2.222 *ḥashbahahu* AFH = *ḥashbahā* B
- 2.222 *yakūna l-muḥdath* AFH = *takūna l-muḥdathāt* B
- 2.222 *al-makhlūqāt* AFH = *al-makhlūqīn* B
- 2.231 *ḥilayhim... yuḥminu... yaḥtiyahum* AFH = *ḥilaynā... nuḥmina... yaḥtiyanā* B
- 2.311 *muḥayyanah* AFH: lacking in B
- 2.313 *yarudda ḥukmahā* AFH = *yaruddahā* B

There are, on the other hand, a number of instances in which we find A and B in agreement against FH; for example,

- 1.21 *wa-rushdan* A(B) = *wa-rashādan* FH
- 2.0 *qāla l-shaykhu abū l-Ḥasan raḥiya llāhu ḥanhu* AB: lacking in FH
- 2.1 *yuqālu lahum* AB = *yuqālu* FH
- 2.2131 *wa-bi-qawlihī* AB = *wa-qawluhu* FH
- 2.2132 *al-ḥiddān* AB = *ḥinna l-ḥikkayn* FH
- 2.2132 *al-ḥaḥdari nāran* AB: + *fā-ḥidhā ḥantum tūqidūn* FH
- 2.222 *al-shabah* AB = *al-shabīh* FH
- 2.311 *al-nabiy* AB = *rasūlu llāh* FH

2.312 *kulli wāhidah* AB = *kulli wāhid* FH

2.312 *al-nabiy* AB = *rasūli llāh* FH

2.312 *bi-jtihādihim* AB = *wa-jtihādihim* FH

2.3212 *man qāla bi-khalqihī* AB: + *wa-man qāla bi-nafyi khalqihī* FH¹⁹

There are a few places in which it would seem that B is witness to a corruption which appears corrected in FH. For example, we find in § 2.2131, where A correctly reads *fi^clan lā^c alā mithāl* that B has lost the negative *lā*, probably by haplography with the *lam alif* of *fi^clan*. In FH, then, the phrase was corrected by introducing *ghayr* so as to read *fi^clan alā ghayri mithāl*²⁰ Similarly at § 2.313 where A correctly reads *ʿuṣūli l-shar^ci l-latī tarīquhā*, B reads *ʿuṣūli l-shar^ci l-latī tarīquhu*, which is then made grammatically coherent in FH were we find *ʿuṣūli l-shar^ci l-ladhī tarīquhu*.

In several places, again, it would seem that a corruption of the text witnessed in B likely underlies the reading of FH. For example, in § 2.232 B reads *fa-qaraʿahā l-nabiyyu ṣl^cm*, while H reads *fa-qaraʿa l-nabiyyu ṣl^cm dhālika* and F *fa-qaraʿa l-nabiyyu ṣl^cm alayhi dhālika*. Here it would appear that the *hā* of the original reading was lost in the succession of three *alifs*, following which *dhālika* was added in order to supply an object for the verb and then the *alayhi* inserted for good measure. In § 2.232 B reads *ʿaṣlun lanā wa-huwa ḥujjah...*, while FH read *ʿaṣlun lanā wa-ḥujjatun lanā...* Here it may be suggested that the *huwa* was lost following the preceding *wāw* and *lanā* then introduced in the archetype of FH.

B and FH are in some places independently corrupt and in § 2.2132 this would seem to have happened because the copyists were not used to dealing with *kalām* texts. Here B has introduced, following *yushāhidūnahū*, the phrase *lil-shajari l-ʿakhḍari alā burūdatihi wa-ruṭūbatihi dalīlan alā ḥārrihā wa-yabasihā*. The first part of this is a phrase which occurs towards the end of the section, but the line is corrupt and makes no sense at all in the place it is inserted in. Following this, the copyist has managed also to lose the words *al-ʿulā dalīlan alā jawāzi l-nashʿati* because of the homoioteleuton with *jawāzi l-nashʿah*. The archetype of FH, on the other hand, has lost *fī ma^cnāhā wa-ja^cala fī mujāwarati l-nāri alā ḥārriha wa-yabasihā lil-shajari l-ʿakhḍari alā bardihī wa-ruṭūbatihī*, changing then the following *dalīlan* to *dalilun* in order to restore the grammatical coherence of the sentence. By contrast with all this, A, whose transmission took place in the circles of the leading masters of the Ashʿarite tradition, manifests no confusion at all.

Where T-1 and T-2 are the same I have, in almost all places preferred the reading of A, even when it is unique. So too, where they are substantially the same, I have, unless there seemed good reason to do otherwise, followed the indication of A, particularly where the reading of A is supported by any of the witnesses to T-2. Given the relative independence of B from the archetype of FH it is clear that where T-2 differs from T-1 a reading supported by BF or by BH is, barring solid grounds for the contrary, to be considered the better witness to T-2. Where, as witness to T-2, B reads against FH I have tended, for reasons indicated above, to follow the reading of B.

The assumption that for T-2 the combination BF is *prima facie* a better witness to the original form of the recension than is H and BH than F, when the readings thus diverge, presents us with a difficult problem in §2.232, which is worth citing as a likely example of how corruptions may become hidden. In the first part of this section the author recounts an incident in which ‘Abdallāh ibn al-Ziba‘rā came to the Prophet and argued with him. In the A text the argument is very briefly put and begins, “He [Ibn al-Ziba‘rā] said, ‘the angels are worshipped (‘*ubidū*) and so also Jesus; do you then, Muḥammad, say that they are *the fuel of Jahannam* (Q 21.98)?’ The Apostle of God was silent...”. In the corresponding portion of T-2, H reads, “he said, O Muḥammad, do you not claim that Jesus and ‘Uzayr and the angels are worshipped (‘*ubidū*) ? The Prophet was silent...”. In B, however, we find a very different form, one in which Ibn al-Ziba‘rā’s statement is much longer and in which the text is plainly corrupt. “He said, ‘O Muḥammad, do you not claim that Jesus and ‘Uzayr and the angels are righteous worshippers?’ He replied, ‘Indeed’. He said, ‘But the Christians worship Jesus and a group of the Jews worship ‘Uzayr and the Banu Ljm [sic, *lege* Luḥayy?] here worship the angels, they be *the fuel of Jahannam*’. The Prophet was silent...”. Here not only is the form of the dialogue very different than in A and in H, but a subjunctive, “they be” is introduced which has no connection with the preceding sentence.²¹ In F, following “do you not claim that Jesus and ‘Uzayr and the angels” there is a blank space encompassing the end of one line and the first part of another, in total about two thirds of a line — enough for maybe a dozen words, not all of B’s addition — at the end of which the text recommences “that they be (‘*an yakūnū*) *the fuel of Jahannam*’. The prophet was silent...”. Here the subjunctive is governed by the particle, but still we do not know what preceded it. It is evident that the copyist of F (or his archetype) had before him something which either he could not read or which made no sense to him and which, on the evidence, we should assume should have

represented something like what we find in B. On this assumption, then, H will present a corrected text, one in which the copyist restored the sense of the text by omitting or cancelling much of the plus of B and inserting *‘ubidū* either conjecturally and on his own or on the basis of something like the A text. The H form of the text will, thus, albeit it reads coherently against B and F, represent a secondarily corrected version of T-2. It is not unlikely that, like some of the additions found in T-2 which were noted earlier, the longer form of this “dialogue” shown in B and partially represented in F, stood originally in the margin of the archetype of T-2 and was not coherently incorporated into the body of the text.²² The problem of the H reading remains, however, since it is difficult to see how, given the association of H with F and their relationship to B, it might be possible that H have independently preserved the pristine reading of T-2. *W-Allāh a‘lam.*

We may summarise the evidence regarding the text and its two forms as follows. The A text is given us by *abū l-Qāsim al-Anṣārī* and presumably derives, directly or indirectly, from a copy belonging to his master, *al-Juwaynī*. On this basis we should reasonably assume that T-1, as we have it in A, was transmitted through a series of leading Ash‘arite masters. This is confirmed in that the title under which *al-Anṣārī* presents the work is found in the lists of *al-Ash‘arī’s* writings. Compared to T-1, T-2 manifests a number of aspects (even excluding those elements which are plainly intrusive) which would indicate that it represents a secondary redaction or revision of T-1.²³ Concerning the transmission of T-2 there is some uncertainty.

Of the transmitters of T-2 other than *abū l-Ḥasan al-Ṭabarī* named in the *isnād* of FH I have managed to identify only four: 1. *abū l-Qāsim Saḥnūn*, who was a Mālikite *muqri’* (see *al-Dhahabī, al-Qurrā’*, p. 555), 2. *abū Ṣādiq Muḥammad*, the son of *al-Rashid al-‘Aṭṭar*, who was one of the most famous Mālikite traditionists (see, e.g., *al-Suyūṭī, Ṭabaqāt*, p. 505 and *al-Tinbukṭī, Nayl*, p. 354), 3. *abū l-Ma‘ālī l-Mawṣilī*, a Shāfi‘ite jurisconsult and *muqri’* (*al-Dhahabī, op. cit.*, p. 489), and 4. *Ibn al-Ukhuwwa* (*al-Dhahabī, Mīzān* 2, p. 124 and *al-Zikrīlī, al-A‘yān* 3, p. 343). We have, thus, to do with a series of important scholars and it is apparent that at least from the copy made and collated by *Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Nātilī*, probably in the last quarter of the 5th/11th century, through that of *Saḥnūn*, in 677/1278 the text was transmitted with considerable care. The variants between F and H will, consequently, derive from a date posterior to 600/1204. Passages in which B contains material lost in FH (certainly those lost by homoioteleuton, since the others may

perhaps be additions in B) indicate that the immediate antecedent of BFH must antedate the copy belonging to abū Naṣr al-Shīrāzī, from which al-Nātīlī worked and it is to this period (the century immediately following the death of Ibn Mahdī) that the major corruptions of T-2 must derive, e.g., the insertions of extraneous material found in §§ 2.2132, 2.221, and 2.223, which, as we noted above, were most likely incorporated into the body of the text from the margins of the archetype. These additions are somewhat curious.²⁴ One thing, however, they do indicate clearly, sc., that since they are common to BFH and since their incorporation into the text would hardly have been the work of a specialist, or of any one well versed in *kalām*, Ibn Mahdī was not himself responsible for the nearest common ancestor of BFH.

In conclusion, then, we may suggest, even if with some hesitancy, that minus the intrusive elements of which we have spoken (and however the corruption of § 2.232 is to be resolved) the text presented in BFH substantially represents the original of T-2 and is likely the text of abū l-Ḥasan ibn Mahdī al-Ṭabarī. The question of whether it was Ibn Mahdī or was al-Ashʿarī himself who is ultimately responsible for the revision of T-1 which resulted in T-2 as witnessed in our manuscripts and that of what possible sequence of steps the process of revision may have taken we shall not address; the available data are not such as to give firm support to any conclusion in this regard. It would seem, however, that the work of revision was never completed.

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The *Kitāb al-Ḥathth ʿalā l-Baḥth* is more subtly constructed and more thorough and rigorous in its polemic argumentation of the author's position than many of the scholars of al-Ashʿarī's writings seem to have been aware. All too often, indeed, the formal structure of *kalām* works is neglected, with the result that secondary theses and arguments are treated as if they were primary and the systematic character of their reasoning consequently ignored. It will be useful therefore to present a schematic analysis of *al-Ḥathth* outlining its main topical divisions and their subsections.²⁵ Following this I shall present a few remarks concerning the rhetoric of the work and its structure. It was written against al-Barbahārī, one of the foremost Ḥanbalite masters of the period, after he had preëmtorily refused to accept al-Ashʿarī's *Ibāna fī uṣūl al-diyāna* as evidence of its author's claim to follow the doctrine of the *ahl al-sunna*.²⁶ Even a brief consideration of the rhetorical structure of the tract is sufficient to reveal both how sharply al-Ashʿarī was stung by the Ḥanbalite's

refusal to accept him as a supporter of traditionalist orthodoxy and to demonstrate the masterful skill with which he was able polemically to counter their attack and argue his own attachment to the *sunna*.

A Schematic Outline of "al-Hathth"

I. INTRODUCTION:

I.10 THE OPPONENT'S POSITION

I.11 One should adopt the Principle of *Taqīd* in all Matters of Religion.

I.12 Those who formally (i.e., rationally) investigate the basic articles of faith are guilty of innovation (*bid'ah*) and of grave religious error (*ḍalāl*), because to discuss in formal, speculative terms *a*) the nature of created beings and *b*) the nature of God is an innovation and grave religious error.

I.20 ARGUMENT ADDUCED BY THE OPPONENT IN SUPPORT OF § I.12:

I.21 If *kalām* were an authentic element of Muslim practice (*al-dīn*) the Prophet would have practiced it and would have made it known to the community; but he did not do this.

I.220 It must be the case either that

I.221 The Prophet knew *kalām* but kept silent on the matter, in which case *a*) we need not practice it and *b*) it is not an authentic element of *al-dīn*; or that

I.222 The Prophet did not know *kalām*, in which case *a*) we need not practice it and *b*) it is not an authentic element of *al-dīn*.

2. THE AUTHOR'S REFUTATION: THREE RESPONSES

2.1 THE FIRST RESPONSE: The Prophet did not command that one consider those who practice *kalām* to be innovators who are in grave religious error; therefore, given the principles on which you base your argument (§ I.21) you are yourselves innovators who are in grave religious error.

2.2 THE SECOND RESPONSE: That the Basic Principles, Theses, and the Practice of *kalām* are authorised by the *Qur'ān* and the Sunna:

2.20 General Statement: Individual elements of *kalām* and the discussion of particular questions are found in the *Qur'ān* and in the Sunna, though only in a vague or general form, not in formal detail.

- 2.21 Examples to show that the basic principles and theses and practices of *kalām* are witnessed in the *Qurʾān* and the Sunna:
- 2.211 That no corporeal being can be a God.
- 2.212 That there is only one God.
- 2.213 That the bodily resurrection of the dead is possible:
- 2.2130 General Statement: *a)* Presentation of *Qurʾānic* formulations of pagan opposition to this thesis and *b)* that the *Qurʾān*'s counter arguments emphasise rational grounds for asserting the thesis against two classes of opponents, viz.,
- 2.2131 Against those who acknowledge the original creation of the world but deny the possibility of the resurrection;
- 2.2132 Against those who hold that the world is eternal.
- 2.22 Several Theoretical Principles and Theses Found in the *Qurʾān* and the Sunna:
- 2.221 Against the thesis that there exists no motion which is not preceded by another motion.
- 2.222 The Principles of similarity and dissimilarity: the rules of analogical reasoning.
- 2.223 Atomism.
- 2.224 The formal connotations of 'create'.
- 2.225 That all contingent events (including human actions) occur in conformity with God's determination and will.
- 2.23 The Basic Methods of Disputation and Argumentation are Sanctioned in the *Qurʾān*:
- 2.231 Demonstration of the counter thesis (*al-munāqadah*).
- 2.232 Showing the fallacy of an opponent's argument (*al-mughālah*).
- 2.3 THE THIRD RESPONSE: CONCERNING PROBLEMS AND QUESTIONS WHICH ARE NOT TREATED EITHER IN THE *Qurʾān* OR IN THE SUNNA.
- 2.31 That to Deal with New Theological Questions is Juridically Authorised.
- 2.311 The elements needed in order to deal with the problems mentioned in § I.12 are found in the *Qurʾān* and the Sunna, even though the ques-

tions were not explicitly and formally discussed as such during the lifetime of the Prophet.

- 2.312 The Companions and their successors did investigate, dispute, and argue their own solutions to juridical problems whose treatment is not attested in the *Qurʾān* or in the Sunna.
- 2.313 The sources and principles of juridical reasoning are distinct from those of theoretical reasoning; the former are discovered exclusively in revelation while the latter are founded in reason.
- 2.314 If the questions of the creation of the *Qurʾān* and the questions mentioned in §1.12 had arisen during the lifetime of the Prophet, he would have dealt with them explicitly.
- 2.32 On the Condemnation of Recently Formulated Heresies and their adherents.
- 2.3210 The opponent holds that the *Qurʾān* is uncreated, a thesis which is not authoritatively attested either in the *Qurʾān* or in the Sunna;
- 2.3211 If they ascribe this thesis to one of the Companions or Successors, then such a Companion or Successor is guilty of innovation.
- 2.3212 If one *a)* explicitly refuses either to affirm or to deny the thesis that the *Qurʾān* is created but at the same time *b)* condemns those who affirm it as unbelievers, neither *a)* nor *b)* is explicitly authorised by the example of the Prophet.
- 2.322 There is not explicit warrant in the teaching of the Prophet for taking any position with regard to the truth or falsity of any particular, erroneous or misleading description of God whose initial formulation is subsequent to the death of the Prophet.
- 2.323 If the opponent says that in condemning those who hold the *Qurʾān* to be created he follows the example of earlier religious leaders, it can be shown that such leaders did not follow the example of the Prophet, wherefore the opponent's action has, on his principles, no authoritative warrant.
- 2.33 CONCLUSIONS
- 2.331 That *kalām* is necessary in at least one case, sc. that the community know the truth with regard to questions which have arisen since the time of the Prophet.

- 2.332 In his condemnation of *kalām* the opponent is *muqallid* to one whose action is not based on sound juridical reasoning.
- 2.333 On the opponent’s principles the foremost masters of Jurisprudence will have to be judged guilty of innovation.

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The divisions between the various sections and their subsections may not in every place appear so sharply drawn in the rhetorical flow of the author’s discourse as they seem in this schematic analysis of the text. The analysis does, nonetheless, represent the elements and structure of the text quite exactly. Since *al-Ḥathth* is not a didactic work but is essentially polemical, its formal organisation and rhetorical structure deserve particular attention. Upon examination, indeed, the work appears to be much more carefully structured, more carefully crafted in the ordering of its parts and in its use of language, than are most of the polemical writings of the *mutakallimīn*. It is important that one keep in mind the intentionality of the tract and of its arguments. Nowhere is the purpose to demonstrate as such the truth of any theological or philosophical thesis taught by the *mutakallimīn*. The focus of the work is, rather, to refute the Ḥanbalites in their denial of the juridical legitimacy of *kalām* and of the need for it within the Muslim community. In §2.2, thus, he cites various texts of the *Qurʾān* and the *ḥadīth* not to prove the truth of the theses which they may be employed to support but simply to demonstrate the precedent for the *kalām*’s reasoning and argumentation with regard to those theses. Similarly in §2.321 where he introduces by way of example a question his treatment of which is at variance with that of the Ḥanbalites, he avoids the discussion of the substance of the issue, even though he does allude to their doctrine.

The overall symmetry of the tract is conspicuous. In the final sections of the conclusion (§§2.332–3) he deals with the opponent’s insistence on *taqlīd*,²⁷ mentioned in §1.11, noting in §2.333 that if it is rigorously followed the Ḥanbalites will have also to condemn the leading juridical authorities and in §2.332 that the *taqlīd* they claim with regard to the basic doctrinal tenets of Islam (*ʿuṣūl al-dīn*)²⁸ as justification for their condemnation of those with whom they disagree (§1.12) has no sound juridical basis. In §2.331, following the arguments of §2.23, he asserts the counter thesis to their contention that *kalām* contains no element of right guidance, stated in §1.21, while §2.2 is employed to answer the argument of §1.22. Al-Ash‘arī’s justification for the procedures employed in the tract occurs at the very center, in §§2.231–2.

The first response (§2.1) is a summary refutation of the Ḥanbalites' contention that those who investigate matters commonly treated in *kalām* are "innovators" (*mubtadi'ūn*) and that they are "in grave error" (*ḍullāl*).²⁹ The argument of this section is purely dialectical and intends to indicate a kind of paradox in his opponent's reasoning, viz., that his argument is based on and explicitly enunciates a principle which, if accepted as universal, must exclude the legitimacy of the thesis it is meant to support. Al-Ash'arī will return to the same basic form of argument in the third response where he argues for the validity of his own position against the Ḥanbalites. Lying between these two responses §2.2 forms the central element of the text. Here he presents the evidence to show that the argument put forth by his opponents (§1.2) in order to support their condemnation of *kalām* is based on a fundamental error of fact. He argues, that is, that the constitutive principles and elements of *kalām* are witnessed in, and therefore sanctioned by, the *Qur'ān* and the Sunna. This section of the work is not theoretical; it does not proceed by means either of a theoretical or of a dialectical argument but simply calls attention to the material evidence of the *Qur'ān* and the ḥadīth, citing a series of texts and reading them in such a way as to insist that the Ḥanbalites ignore or misconstrue the historical facts and thereby fail to recognise their significance. The witness of specific texts (*nuṣūṣ*) is central to the nature of the overall argumentation of the tract, since it is on the texts of the *Qur'ān* and the Sunna that the juridical validity of any judgement must ultimately rest. At a later point al-Ash'arī will make a point of his opponent's inability to cite an authoritative text (*naṣṣ*) in support of the Ḥanbalite position. Here in §2.2 he cites specific examples of various elements that are constitutive of *kalām* theology and which appear in the *Qur'ān* or are documented and authenticated as belonging to the teaching or to the practice of the Prophet. He begins by citing arguments concerning major theological issues (§2.21) and proceeds then to cite arguments concerning more detailed theses and principles on which arguments are based (§2.22) and closes the section by citing texts which furnish canonical precedent for the methods or argumentation employed in *kalām* in order to refute erroneous theses (§2.23). In this way §2.2 serves both to demonstrate the canonical precedent for some elements of *kalām* and to supply the foundation on which his final argument for the validity of *kalām* (§2.3) will be based. It is to be noted that, accepting the binding authority of the *Qur'ān* and the Sunna, al-Ash'arī validates in §2.23 the dialectical procedures he employs here against his opponents and so justifies the writing of the tract. Noteworthy here is the rhetorical emphasis placed on this section by the "*ʿammā ʿaṣḥunā*" which

stands at the beginning of both §2.231 and §2.232.

The third response (§2.3) presents the main point and climax of al-Ash'arī's attack and with this his sharpest polemic against his Ḥanbalite opponents. Although the third response does recall (in §2.324) the formal argument presented in §2.1, it remains nevertheless fully distinct and as such is essential to the purpose of the tract. In §2.1 he points to the inconsistency of the opponent's reasoning and in §2.2 exhibits some of the precedents which authorise formal reasoning concerning theological questions and formal argumentation against erroneous doctrines. The science of *kalām*, as a formal discipline, however, is relatively new. It was not known or practiced during the lifetime of the Prophet. Some of the topics and questions with which it deals are, moreover, themselves of recent origin and so are not witnessed as such in the canonical sources. Most importantly, within the context of this tract, the question of taking a position (of discovering, formulating, and arguing for a thesis) with regard to theological questions which are not treated, either directly or indirectly, in the *Qur'ān* or in the *hadīth* is a materially distinct issue from those mentioned in §§2.1 and 2.2, and it is this which forms the focal point of §2.3, as the proper supplement and completion of the first two responses.

The third response, like the second, is complex both in content and in structure. It is divided into two parts. In the first (§2.31) he argues that the exercise of independent reasoning in order to resolve new questions is valid in theology, just as it is in jurisprudence. With this he notes that as the two differ in the subject matters they treat, so also they differ formally in their principles, since the principles appropriately employed in the one are not the same as those which are appropriate to the other discipline. These differences, he insists, must be recognised and respected in their legitimacy. In the second part (§2.32), then, he argues *a*) that the formal theology (*kalām*) condemned by the Hanbalites is not only legitimate and valid but also necessary to the religious life of the Muslims and *b*) that to describe those who practice *kalām* and hold that the *Qur'ān* is created by the name "unbeliever", as do the Ḥanbalites, is canonically illegitimate and so invalid.

These two sections (§2.31 and §2.32) are rhetorically more subtle and more thorough in their argumentation than may appear on first reading, wherefore some further analysis of them may be useful. In §2.31 the fundamental argument is that just as the use of *ijtihād* (the independent use of reason in order to achieve conclusions or judgements not already presented authori-

tatively in the canonical sources) is legitimate and valid in jurisprudence, so also an analogous *ijtihād* is legitimate and valid for dealing with theological questions which had not been explicitly posed (*taʿayyana*) or were not clearly resolved in the *Qurʾān* or in the documented teaching of the Prophet. Accordingly al-Ashʿarī distinguishes in § 2.311 and § 2.312 two kinds of “recent questions”,³⁰ theoretical (theological) and practical (juridical). Specific examples of the former are alluded to in § 2.311 simply as “these [aforementioned] questions”, referring to the list set out in § 1.12 and later to be recalled in § 2.314. Examples of the latter are detailed in § 2.312, sc., *al-ʿawl*, etc.³¹ Both kinds of questions are “pertinent to the religious life” of the Muslim community (*lahu taʿallaqun bil-dīn*).³² Concerning the first set of questions al-Ashʿarī notes in § 2.311, which forms the introduction to the section, simply that though the Prophet was fully cognizant of them they had not been thematically posed during his lifetime, wherefore there can be no question of his having said something about them or not having said something about them (...*fa-yatakallama fihā ʿaw-lā yatakallama fihā*).³³ Where no precedent can be claimed there can be no question of following the example of the Prophet exactly or not following it. By this he expressly denies the assumed foundation of the Ḥanbalite argument stated in § 2.21. When, at the end of the paragraph, al-Ashʿarī says with regard to “these questions” that their “principles (ʿuṣūl) are found in the Scripture and the Sunna” he plainly means to indicate that as the “principles of jurisprudence” (ʿuṣūl *al-fikh*) are founded in the canonical sources, so analogously are those of *kalām*, its elements (concepts) and methods, as was shown in § 2.2. The second kind of questions, sc., those of jurisprudence, are dealt with at greater length (§ 2.312) because the facts are uncontested and he wishes to bring the full weight of their significance to bear when he applies the analogy. Here al-Ashʿarī notes that his opponents and other universally respected legists employ systematic reasoning in a rigorous way in order to come to conclusions concerning problems which are not witnessed and authoritatively dealt with in any canonical text (*naṣṣ*). Both “*qiyās*” and “*ijtihād*” occur here (§ 2.312) as terms for systematic reasoning.³⁴ The implications are clear enough. The sources and foundations (ʿuṣūl) of juridical science are the *Qurʾān*, the Sunna, the consensus of the Muslims (ʿijmāʿ), and systematic reasoning according to specific rules (*al-qiyās*). The list is not explicitly given but is implied where he mentions the “ʿuṣūl *al-sharīʿah*” at the end of § 2.312. By implications within the context, then, the same is true for theology. The sources of religious knowledge, in short, and the order of their priority are analogously the same in both disciplines, *fīqh*

and *kalām*. Because of the essential differences in the two disciplines, however, the role of rational understanding as well as the basis and the mode of reasoning differ in the two, wherefore in the *ʿuṣūl* of theology one substitutes “*al-ʿaql*” (the mind’s understanding, theoretical reasoning) for “*al-qiyās*” as the last term in the list when giving the “sources” of theological knowledge and science. The significance of this substitution, its origin in the intrinsic, formal differences of the two disciplines, will be made fully explicit in the following subsection.

The opening of §2.313 appears initially to be simply a more explicit statement and summary of what was said in §2.311, made in the light of §2.312: as al-Ashʿarī’s opponents deal with recent and secondary questions of law by the rigorous application of the *ʿuṣūl al-sharīʿah*, analogously the theologian (*al-mutakallim*) deals with recent and with derivative and secondary questions of theology, such as those alluded to in §2.311, on the basis of principles analogously founded in and authorised by the revealed texts. The expression “*ʿan yarudda ḥukmahā ʿilā jumlati l-ʿuṣūl*” (that he determine their character and status by considering them in the light of all the principles/sources) directly reflects the wording of §2.312. Rhetorically, however, al-Ashʿarī makes a very decisive move at this point. In the preceding paragraph he referred to “the secondary matters” (*al-furūʿ*) of the law and to the “primary elements and principles of the law” (*ʿuṣūl al-sharīʿah*). Contextually, then, one hears the implication that *kalām* questions of the nature of the atom and of accidents, of motion and rest, etc.,³⁵ are secondary matters (*furūʿ*) with respect to others not mentioned.³⁶ Like the juridical questions mentioned in §2.312, they too are “recent” (*ḥawādith*). He speaks in the opening of §2.313, however, of “new questions which have arisen concerning the *ʿuṣūl*”, “the *ʿuṣūl*” tout court, simply and without qualification. What al-Ashʿarī means by “*ʿuṣūl*” here is, of course, the *ʿuṣūl al-dīn*, the basic tenets of Muslim belief, which form the principle subject of *kalām*. By his omission of the qualifying “*al-dīn*” he plainly suggests that these *ʿuṣūl*, dealt with in *kalām*, are *ʿuṣūl* in some absolute sense; they are as such prior to any question of jurisprudence or ethics.³⁷ To put it conversely, all juridical matters are *furūʿ* with respect to the basic theological dogmas of Islam; jurisprudence (*fiqh*) itself is secondary, posterior to fundamental theology and its sources, as the sources of juridical knowledge, are as such posterior to the sources of theological knowledge as such. It is only after one has appropriated the truth of the basic doctrines concerning the nature of God as creator and judge, of the world and mankind as creatures, and of the status of the Prophet as God’s

Apostle to mankind, that he recognizes, and recognizing submits to, the authority of the *Qurʾān* and the Sunna and so finds himself in a position that he must consider the questions of the fundamental principles of the Sharīʿah as ethical and juridical principles. One must, in brief, believe in God as the one who reveals himself in the *Qurʾān* before he can reasonably recognise God's commands as binding; jurisprudence is an element, one of the constitutives of the totality of *al-dīn*, but not as such of its *ʾusūl*. *Kalām* as such is prior to *fiqh*. This is not the primary topic of the work and so is not spelled out here, but merely suggested. Subsequently (§2.32) al-Ashʿarī will bring up the thesis of the uncreatedness of the *Qurʾān* which, though a "recent" topic of debate, is nonetheless a fundamental tenet (*ʾaql*) for the Hanbalites as it is for al-Ashʿarī himself.

The main point of §2.313 is to distinguish the domains of fundamental theology and of jurisprudence and most particularly to insist on the difference of the principles (*ʾusūl*) which found and govern the reasoning appropriate to and characteristic of each. Both are religious sciences and for the one as for the other the significance of the *Qurʾān* and the ḥadīth is recognised and accepted. Both, moreover, are "new" disciplines: neither had been known to the community or needed during the lifetime of the Prophet. (To this he will return). Disputed questions (*masāʾil*) of law arise and are dealt with systematically within a context which not only presupposes the authority of revelation as such but begins from the authoritative data of revelation as such. Its principles which are required in order to make appropriate distinctions and to arrive at valid judgements are presented and discovered exclusively in the texts of the revelation (*al-samʿ*). The basic distinctions and principles are themselves initially presented in the revelation; the rules of systematic reasoning and inference (*al-qiyās*) simply allow the *faqīh* to apply these distinctions and principles validly to particular cases. In fundamental theology the situation is different. The principles of the fourth source (*al-ʿaql*) required in order to make appropriate distinctions and to arrive at true conclusions are prior to and independent of the revelation as such. These distinguishing principles (*ʾusūl*) consist in "the principles universally accepted on the basis of reason, sense, immediate intuition, et cetera".³⁸ It is on the basis of these 'principles' that *kalām* grounds its recognition and acceptance of the truth and the authority of the revelation and, having thus recognised the divine origin of the *Qurʾān* and the Sunna, it proceeds systematically to the theological exegesis of these sources on the basis of the same principles. It is incumbent (*yanbaghī*) on every adult Muslim of sound mind to understand these sources on the basis of these

universal principles. In essence, what al-Ash^ʿarī does here is to specify the distinctive foundations which underlie the difference of *al-ʿaql* as the fourth “source” of theological science from *al-qiyās* as the fourth “source” of juridical science and thereby to characterise the fundamental difference of the two disciplines. In each it is the fourth source which allows one to recognize and to appropriate the truth presented in the other three sources, sc., the *Qurʾān*, the Sunna, and the consensus of the Muslims. Al-Ash^ʿarī concludes §2.313, then, by insisting that matters which are properly the subject of theoretical inquiry (*al-ʿaqliyyāt*) must not be confused with those which can be known, understood, and elaborated only on the basis of authoritative report (*al-samʿiyyāt*), viz., through the teaching of God and the Prophet as authentically and publicly witnessed in the canonical sources. It belongs to the very nature of the latter (*al-samʿiyyāt*) that a kind of rigorous adherence to the teaching and practice of the Prophet and his Companions and of the religious authorities of earlier generations is necessarily required from the outset and at every level in studying, elaborating, and extending their application; the contrary is true of the former (*al-ʿaqliyyāt*). By implication, al-Ash^ʿarī's opponents, since they insist on *taqlid* in matters of theology, fail to distinguish the two kinds of questions. Because of this error they are unable to deal properly with “new questions” which arise in the area of theology. This will be the subject of the ensuing section (§2.32).

In §2.314, then having asserted on the evidence presented in §2.2 that the “principles” of *kalām* are found in the Scripture and the Sunna and that they were known to the Prophet (§2.311), and having indicated the characteristic difference between theology and jurisprudence (§2.313), al-Ash^ʿarī concludes by stating that “If the discussion (*al-kalām*) of the creation of the *Qurʾān* and the question of atoms and bodies, etc., had arisen in the time of the Prophet, he would have discussed them (*la-takallama fihā*) and made the matter clear...”. The basic assumption which underlies the argument and is presumed to be conceded by al-Ash^ʿarī's opponents is that the Prophet left the community every thing which is necessary to, and constitutive of, “the [Muslim] religion” (*al-dīn*; cf. Q 5.3), both with regard to belief and to action. That is to say, what was left by the Prophet is complete as containing every thing which the community then needed and that it would need in time to come in order to meet and to deal with whatever contingencies might circumstantially arise with regard both to belief and to practice. The assumption is not, however, that the Prophet left to the community in the *Qurʾān*, in his words, and in the example of his action specific instructions and explicit formulations as to

how to deal with every contingency or to resolve every dispute which would eventually arise. It is rather that the perfection and completeness (*al-kamāl*) of what he left them are that it embraces all of the principles needed to deal with them and to resolve them. Taking, then, the primary focus or topic of the tract to be the juridical legitimacy of *kalām*, al-Ash^carī's argument is fundamentally this: he establishes the presence of the "principles" (*'uṣūl*) of *kalām* in the *Qur'ān* and the Sunna. His opponents recognize (concede) the legitimacy (sanctioned by consensus) of drawing new judgements in juridical matters by the exercise of systematic reasoning. Given this, al-Ash^carī proceeds to set forth the evidence in order to draw a conclusion by formal rule of analogy (*qiyās*) for the legitimacy of *kalām*.

By mentioning the question of atoms and bodies and saying that the Prophet "would have discussed them" had occasion arisen, he alludes directly to §2.311, thereby closing the section. By raising the question of the creation of the *Qur'ān* he anticipates the following section (§2.32). The function of the expressions "*al-kalām*" and "*takallama*" which occur in §2.311 and §2.314 we shall examine later.

In §2.31 the argument was focused on al-Ash^carī's own position; he set forth a positive argument to show that the practice of *kalām* is in fact juridically authorised by the canonical sources according to a validly drawn juridical judgement. In §2.32 he proceeds to show that the practice of *kalām* is furthermore necessary to the religious life of the Muslim community. In contrast to §2.31 the argument here follows a kind of *reductio*, as he shows the internal inconsistency of his opponent's position. The same negative element of the reduction is repeated in each of the four subsections, as he moves from a particular case to the generalisation of it as a type. The first two subsections (§§2.321-2) could be read as being materially focused on three theses all of which were condemned by the Hanbalites as "Jahmite", sc., 1. that the *Qur'ān* is created, 2. that one should refuse to assert either that it is created or that it is uncreated, and 3. that God's knowledge is created. Though this is obviously not without significance for the rhetorical force of al-Ash^carī's polemic, it would nonetheless seem more appropriate to analyse the section in the following way.³⁹ In §2.321 he raises as an example the question of the createdness of the *Qur'ān*, taking up in §2.3211 both *a*) the "Jahmite" (and Mu^ctazilite) thesis that it is created and *b*) his opponents' (and his own) thesis that it is uncreated; in §2.3212, then, he considers *c*) a third position (that of the "*wāqifah*") which refuses to affirm either *a*) or *b*). In §2.322 he generalises the

issue by considering any “inappropriate” description of God’s attributes which, not having been explicitly proposed during the lifetime of the Prophet, is not authoritatively dealt with either in the *Qurʾān* or in the canonically authenticated teaching of the Prophet. Finally, in §2.323 he takes up the contextually correlated issue (already adumbrated in §2.321) of the Ḥanbalite thesis according to which those who hold either *a*) or *c*) are validly called “unbelievers”. This is appropriately treated here, by itself in a separate subsection, since the matter of names and status is properly juridical and is accordingly distinct from the material issues considered in the foregoing subsections.

The argument is founded on, and re-inforces, the dichotomy between the juridical and the theoretical, *al-samʿiyyāt* and *al-ʿaqliyyāt*, set out in the preceding section (§2.313). If *taqlīd*, as strict conformance to the teaching and practice of the Prophet, and his Companions, is a principle that must be rigidly adhered to in forming judgements concerning theoretical or theological matters, then both the “Jahmite” theses and their condemnation must alike lack legitimacy.

Al-Ashʿarī’s polemic is not directed at the “Jahmite” positions mentioned in §§2.3211–2 and the argument, accordingly, is not ordered to them but to the denial of the difference between juridical and theoretical reasoning and the principles on which they are founded. In §2.3211 he addresses his opponent’s position in holding that the *Qurʾān* is uncreated. Pointing to the lack of any clear authorisation for this position either in the *Qurʾān* or in the attested teaching of the Prophet, he addresses the Ḥanbalites directly (i.e., in the second person plural) for the first time in the tract saying “So why do you people hold that it is uncreated?”⁴⁰ To a reply which, presuming the principle of *taqlīd*, claims the precedent of “certain of the Companions and Successors”, al-Ashʿarī insists that, since there is no documented authorisation for holding such a position, any Companion or Successor who said that the *Qurʾān* is uncreated is “according to your view” himself “an innovator and is in grave religious error” (*mubtadiʿun ḍāll*). The expression “*mubtadiʿun ḍāll*” hearkens back to the “*bidʿatun wa-ḍalālāh*” of §1.12 and §1.21 and so turns the charge directly against the Ḥanbalites: if one follows their principles rigorously, then those on whom they rely for their opinions are heretics. This will be repeated in more explicit and more forceful terms at the end of the section (§2.323) and again at the end of the tract.⁴¹

In §2.3212 al-Ashʿarī takes up the *tawaqquf*, i.e., the position which refuses to assert either that the *Qurʾān* is created or that it is uncreated but does

nevertheless condemn the thesis of its creation and call those who hold it “*kāfir*” and “*dāll*”. Here again, the context assumes that the opponent holds *taqlid* to be a principle to which one is obligated to adhere strictly and accordingly al-Ash‘arī’s response is essentially identical to that which he gave in the preceding paragraph: there is no canonical authorisation for the opponent’s position regarding either the *Qur‘ān* or for the status of those who say it is created. This section (§2.3212) is somewhat curious, however. The formal address is to the “*Wāqifah*”. By the contextual assumption that the opponent holds *taqlid* as a universal principle in religious matters (theoretical as well as practical) and by the implication that he describes those who hold the *Qur‘ān* to be created as “unbelievers”⁴² the real address is to the Ḥanbalites. That the explicit and formal address is to the *Wāqifah* is not without rhetorical effect here. It occurs as a matter of course, given the question and the form in which the fictive “dispute” is presented (“If some one says..., then we reply, ‘You...’”). The effect of this, in view of the direct address to the Ḥanbalites in the immediately preceding paragraph, is rhetorically very sharp: the Ḥanbalites are put on the same level and are addressed in the same terms as the *Wāqifah*, whose doctrine they condemn and whom they term “unbelievers”.

As we noted earlier, §2.322 is employed to generalise what has been said in the two foregoing subsections. Here al-Ash‘arī formally addresses the Hanbalites once again, as is clear from the form of the introductory expression “*wa-yuqālu lahum*” (“One says to them” — plural in contrast to the singular of §2.3212), which parallels that of §2.3211: “If some one says, ‘God’s knowledge is created’ or describes Him by any predicate which is inappropriate to Him, will you people refuse to say either that it is true or that it is false?” (‘*tatawaqqafūna fīhi*’)). In conclusion al-Ash‘arī says that if they answer in the negative, i.e., as the Ḥanbalites in fact do, and will condemn any such description of God, their reply has no basis in the canonical sources: neither the Prophet nor any of his Companions said anything to support it.⁴³ Here al-Ash‘arī is doing more than merely repeating in a more generalised form what he has already said in the previous paragraphs. In passing from the particular case presented by the class of questions which it represents he implicitly raises a point — the principal point at issue — which will be more directly indicated in the conclusion (§2.331). If, as needs must be the case, one is able to recognize that a newly proposed description of God (or of one of His attributes) is in fact such that it is inappropriate⁴⁴ or false, then there must be some criterion or means by which it can be known to be inappropriate or false; there must, even in the absence of any direct or explicit indication of the

Qurʾān and the Sunna, be some means of discovering the appropriate or true proposition in contrast to which that which is inappropriate or false can be manifestly seen as such.

One returns thus to the distinction between the modes of reasoning in jurisprudence and their foundations and the modes of reasoning in theology and their foundations, made earlier in §2.313. If one refuses the validity of the latter, arguing that it is not juridically authorised in the canonical sources, then he cannot consistently hold that any description of God which has been recently formulated is erroneous or heretical, however absurd it may be; one has no authorisation to say anything at all concerning it if he practises *taqlīd* as the Ḥanbalites insist.

Al-Ashʿarī proceeds then (§2.323) to focus directly on the question of calling those who teach that the *Qurʾān* is created by the title “unbeliever” (*kāfir*).⁴⁵ His Ḥanbalite opponents claim that one is authorised to consider them as unbelievers by the practice of “the leading religious authorities of the earlier generations” (*aʿimmat al-salaf*). One notes that here the description of those to whose authority al-Ashʿarī’s opponents bind themselves is not the same as at the beginning of the section. Whereas in §2.321 they claimed the authority of “certain of the Companions and Successors” he has them here claiming the authority of a category of individuals which extends beyond the first two generations. This is important to the sense of the argument. The question here posed is not theological or theoretical, but rather judicial: what names (descriptions and titles: *ʾasmāʾ wa-ʾahkām*) are to be applied to what sorts or classes of people; what judgement is juridically authorised in the canonical sources according to the principles and procedures commonly recognized as valid for their interpretation? In such juridical questions the authority of the Companions and the Successors is universally recognised; but what authority has the practice of such “leading religious authorities” as here are referred to when that practice has no foundation in the *Qurʾān* and in the teaching or practice of the Prophet and in the documented practice of the Companions? There can be no claim of consensus (*ʾijmāʿ*) in the present case. Accordingly, al-Ashʿarī notes first that “no judgement (*ḥukm*) is transmitted from the Prophet concerning this”. Given, then, no positive precedent concerning those who hold the *Qurʾān* to be created, al-Ashʿarī turns to the Prophet’s practice in another matter as a valid basis for arriving at a judgement by analogy (*qiyās*), citing the Prophet’s silence with regard to whether the *munāfiqūn* were or were not really unbelievers, i.e., to his treating them

publicly as formal members of the Muslim community rather than as unbelievers. The example is apt and in conclusion al-Ash'arī comes by *ijtihād* to the decision (*ḥukm*) that what the "leading religious authorities" cited by his opponents ought to have done, "what was incumbent upon them" (*al-wājib*) given the precedent cited, "was to imitate the Prophet", sc., by keeping silent with regard to the name to be applied to those who say that the *Qur'ān* is created and with regard to their status. By implication the Ḥanbalites bind themselves to the authority of individuals who have no authority of their own and whose practice in this case is plainly an innovation (*bid'ah*) which, since it is at variance with the action of the Prophet in an analogous situation, is also religious error (*dalālah*).⁴⁶

One should note here how the subsections of §3.2 are linked to one another and to the general context of the tract by the repetition of analogous phrases which reinforce the author's polemic: "There is no valid tradition from him [sc., the Prophet]" (*lam yaṣihha 'anhu ḥadīthun*: §2.3211), "because God's Apostle neither said... nor did he say..." (*li'anna rasūla llāhi lam yaqul... wa-lā qāla...*: §2.3212), "God's Apostle did not say..." (*lam yaqul rasūlu llāhi*: §2.322), and "since no decision is transmitted from the Prophet..." (*'idhā lam yurwa 'ani l-nabiyyi ḥukmun...*: §2.323). The expression "*lam yurwa*" of §2.323 directly recalls the wording of §1.21, where the Ḥanbalites are cited as saying, "So since no discussion (*kalām*) is transmitted from him concerning anything of what we have mentioned, we know that to discuss it is an innovation and to investigate it is a religious error".⁴⁷ It is within this context that al-Ash'arī states his major conclusion (§2.331). Since 1. no conclusion regarding theological theses which have been first proposed only since the death of the Prophet and have become topics of controversy can be drawn by following the rules and procedures of juridical reasoning or by adhering strictly to the stated principles of the Ḥanbalites and since 2. it is evident that the Muslim community has to take a position with regard to whatever "new" theological questions may arise,⁴⁸ one must conclude that not only is *kalām* juridically authorised, as was shown in §2.31, but that it is also necessary for the religious life of the community.

As we have noted, the argument of §2.32 is directed to the fallacy, i.e., the internal inconsistency, of the Ḥanbalite position with regard to *kalām*: the procedure is juridically authorised by the precedent cited in §2.232. In the conclusion (§2.331), then, al-Ash'arī presents what is in effect, and what he explicitly claims as, his own position: the religious scholars (*al-'ulamā'*) have to

employ *kalām* in order to deal with theological questions that have arisen since the death of the Prophet and which will subsequently arise in order that the ignorant — the unlettered and unlearned of the community — may know the truth with regard to them.⁴⁹ *Al-Ḥathth* was not, however, composed simply in order to demonstrate the legitimacy of *kalām*. It was written chiefly as an attack on the intransigency of the Hanbalites in their doctrine.⁵⁰ This becomes clear in § 2.331, for al-Ash^ʿarī does not terminate the discussion with his *quod erat demonstrandum*. On the contrary, the “this is what we wanted you to admit” leads directly into a question: “So why then do you people shun the science of *kalām* and prohibit it?”. The discourse, in brief, passes on through the assertion of the author’s own position in order to continue the polemic against his opponents’ positions set forth at the beginning of the tract. We have already noted how the concluding paragraphs of the work pick up symmetrically the elements of the introduction. Before examining them more closely, however, it will be opportune to consider briefly the range and usage of the word ‘*kalām*’ and of the verb ‘*takallama, yatakallamu*’ and to note the rhetorical use to which al-Ash^ʿarī has here put them.

As a formal name for fundamental theology, the expression ‘*al-kalām*’ is an abridgment for ‘*ʿilm al-kalām*’, (the science of *kalām*), just as ‘*al-fiqh*’ is for ‘*ʿilm al-fiqh*’ and ‘*al-naḥw*’ for ‘*ʿilm al-naḥw*’. In this sense ‘*ʿilm al-kalām*’ is synonymous with ‘*ʿilm ʿuṣūl al-dīn*’ (the science of the basic articles of faith), a more properly descriptive expression already used in al-Ash^ʿarī’s time. The occurrences of ‘*al-kalām*’ by itself in their formal sense are generally such that the specific sense is clear from the context. So too is the use of the verb ‘*takallama, yatakallamu*’ in the formal sense “to practice theology” (*kalām*) and of its participle, ‘*mutakallim*’ where it means “a theologian”. This is not inevitably so, however, and al-Ash^ʿarī employs the potential ambiguity of these terms with great rhetorical skill in *al-Ḥathth*.

The verb ‘*kallama, yatakallamu*’ means basically to speak or to talk, to talk (with another) about (*fī*) something, and so also to discuss something. ‘*kalām*’ is commonly employed as the *maṣdar* or *nomen actionis*, though not in all contexts (one has, e.g., to employ ‘*takallum*’ where the full verbal force has to be retained). Contextually the meaning of ‘*takallama, yatakallamu*’ is often more closely specified with particular connotations as it is used in the sense of “to discuss something formally” or “to enquire into a matter and reflect on it” or “to debate a question” or “to carry on a formal disputation”. It will be useful to begin with several examples which do not involve theology as such, in order to illustrate these usages.

1. ‘*Takallama*’ is frequently employed in the sense to express and explain one’s opinion or considered judgement. A story is told, for example, that Jamīla (a famous singer of the early Umayyad period) contemplated giving up her profession since poetry and the singing of it (*al-ghināʿ*) were held by many to be contrary to the religious ethic of Islam. She told this to a large assembly of her friends and admirers whom she had invited to her house expressly for this purpose and a lengthy discussion ensued. Finally “a sheikh among them, an elderly man of learning, wisdom,⁵¹ and experience said, ‘The gathering have spoken [*takallamati l-jamāʿah*: have expressed their opinions] and each group (*ḥiṣb*) is happy with their own views (*mā ladayhim*). Listen now to what I have to say (*qawli*)...’. The assembly fell silent and the sheikh spoke (*takallama*)...”. I.e., he gave them his considered view of the matter, explaining at length why she should not give up her art.⁵²

2. The terms refer to a learned discussion and inquiry where we are told of an encounter between abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʿī (the Muʿtazilite theologian) and abū l-Ḥasan al-Karkhī (a Ḥanafite legist, d. 340/952) in which they had a heated discussion concerning ritual prayer (*al-ṣalāh*). “They began to discuss (*yatakallamāni*)... and went on discussing until abū l-Ḥasan claimed that the discussion (*al-kalām*) had reached a point of agreement” (*ijmāʿ*).⁵³ Here plainly ‘*takallama*’ indicates a serious and learned dialogue, i.e., an inquiry in which disparate views are resolved.

3. So also we find the noun ‘*kalām*’ employed in a slightly more formal sense. It is reported that some one said to Yaḥyā b. Khālid al-Barmakī introducing Sībawayh, who wished to be presented to the scholars of the ‘Abbasid court, “The outstanding grammarian of Basra here is very eager to have people hear what he has to say” (*ishtāqat nafsuḥu ʿilā samāʿi kalāmihi*).⁵⁴ That is, he wants people to give his grammatical theories a hearing; he wants them to listen to a formal presentation of them as he expounds and argues them.

4. Even closer to a formal use of the verb is that which we find where al-Nāshīʿ says that the science of medicine at first “simply happened piecemeal and afterwards was brought together (*jumiʿa*) and made the subject of formal discussion” (*tukullima ʿalayhī*), i.e., of formal study and scientific enquiry.⁵⁵

5. Finally, ‘*takallama*’ is sometimes used in the sense to debate or dispute. Thus the grammarian, al-Māzinī (d. 248/862) says, “I was present one day in the company of al-Mutawakkil and Yaʿqūb ibn al-Sikkīt (d. 243/857) was there too. Al-Mutawakkil said, ‘you two debate (*takallama*) concerning a grammatical question’. I said, ‘I’ll ask the questions’ and he said, ‘you as the

questions’, so I said,...”.⁵⁶ Here we have to do with what is clearly a formal disputation.⁵⁷

In (1)–(3) the terms plainly refer to and describe the formal presentation of the speaker’s opinion, his view or judgement, as presented in dialogue with others who hold differing or contrasting views. In (1) and (2) a resolution of the question is achieved. In (3) the ensuing dialogue takes the form of a disputation; this was expected, given the situation and the custom, though “*kalām*” here refers to and describes only the formal presentation of one speaker’s position, i.e., his own grammatical theory, which would be debated. In (4) and (5) different connotations of the foregoing become primary so that ‘*takallama*’ takes on more specific senses as determined by the contexts. In (4) the presentation of points of view is understood as a process of deliberation and takes on the sense of formal inquiry or investigation (*baḥṭh*) in order to know and understand. This is closely akin to (3), since “*kalāmuhu*” there indicates a formally elaborated theory. In (5) it has unambiguously the sense of formal disputation, not in order to resolve an issue or question but in order to see who wins: for sport. Albeit the precise historical background may not be altogether clear, it is nevertheless certain that the formal use of ‘*kalām*’ to name a specific discipline originates out of these uses of ‘*kalām*’ and ‘*takallama*’.⁵⁸

Usage of ‘*kalām*’ and ‘*takallama*’ semantically analogous to that of (1)–(3) are also found where one has to do with theologically very conservative contexts.

6. In his notice on al-Barbahārī, Ibn abī Ya‘lā cites the following from the former’s *Sharḥ Kitāb al-Sunna*: “Consider with particular care (God have mercy on you) every one of your contemporaries to whose discourse (*kalām*) you listen and do not go along with any of it until you ask and see whether one of the Companions of the Prophet (God’s prayer and peace be upon him) or one of the learned has had anything to say on the subject” (*takallama fihī*).⁵⁹

7. So too in al-Ash‘arī’s *Ibāna* there is a reported conversation between al-‘Abbās ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīm al-‘Anbarī (d. 246/860) and Ibn Ḥanbal concerning the controversy over the createdness of the *Qur’ān*, more specifically concerning the position of those who refuse to say either that it is created or that it is uncreated. In the course of the discussion, after Ibn Ḥanbal has condemned the doctrine of the Wāqifa as more pernicious than that of the Jahmiyya, we read the following: “Al-‘Abbās said ‘abū ‘Abdallāh, ‘What is your own position?’,

to which he replied, 'What I believe and hold and about which there is no doubt, is that the *Qurʾān* is uncreated'. Then he said, 'And who has any doubt about this?'. Then abū ʿAbdallāh [ibn Ḥanbal] spoke (*takallama*) stating that to doubt this is a very heinous thing...".⁶⁰

'*Takallama*' in (7) refers to and describes the formal expression of the speaker's view or judgement, set forth at length in the dialogue, the substance of which was that it is a grave and, indeed, heinous thing (*ʿazīm*) to have any doubt in this matter. (He continues, in al-Ashʿarī's account, to present his argument for the *Qurʾān*'s uncreatedness). The "*kalām*" of (6) refers, again, to the expression of theological views or doctrinal position encountered in discussion (and by extension, in writing), while "*takallama*" there refers to the formally expressed views of the Companions and of "the learned" (*al-ʿulamāʾ*), viz., those experts in tradition who follow the Sunna.

'*Takallama*' is also employed in similar contexts with the preposition '*bi-*' with the sense to speak for a given doctrine, to set it forth as one's own or arguing for it.

8. Thus we read in Ibn Saʿd's *Ṭabaqāt* that "Asʿad ibn Zurāra and abū l-Haytham al-Tayyihān spoke in Yathrib in favor of the doctrine that there is but one God" (*yatakallamāni bil-tawḥīd*).⁶¹ That is to say, in Medina prior to the Hejira they spoke of, and tried to make others believe in, Islam and the teaching of Muḥammad that there is only one God.

9. Al-Barbahārī is reported as saying, "Between a man and his being a believer there is nothing prior to his becoming an unbeliever save his rejecting something of what God has revealed... or his denying something of what God has said (*qāla*) or something of what God's Apostle (God's prayer and peace be upon him) has taught" (*takallama bihi*).⁶²

In both (8) and (9) the term describes a speaking as the expounding of a doctrine in dialogue in order that others shall appropriate it and understand it: to set it forth, expound it, teach it, urge it.

10. Finally, al-Barbahārī is reported to have said, "Know that discussion about the Lord (He is exalted) (*al-kalāmu fī l-rabbi taʿāla*) is an innovation (*muhdath*); it is a heresy and an error (*bidʿatun wa-ḍalālah*). One speaks about the Lord (*yutakallamu fī l-rabb*) only in those terms by which He has described Himself in the *Qurʾān* and which the Prophet made clear (*bayyana*) to his Companions."⁶³

In its basic sense, thus, the use of '*takallama*' and its noun, even by the

most conservative authors, does not necessarily carry any prejudicial connotations with regard to the legitimacy of presenting one’s view (or teaching) or concerning the soundness of the view expressed. The verb is used with the Prophet and with his Companions as subject as also of Ibn Ḥanbal.⁶⁴ This remains true also of “*al-kalām*” in (6): since the speaker of this *kalām* has no authority of his own, the view expressed has to be scrutinised in order to verify its conformity to the authoritative statements of the Companions. Contextually one hears in (6) that in a time when many heretical doctrines are being taught one must be cautious, but there is no automatic condemnation or rejection of this *kalām*. When, however, we get to (10), “*al-kalām*” plainly has a surcharge of pejorative connotations which are not wholly explained by the compliment ‘*fī l-rabb*’, though this does clarify the context. On a more general semantic level the use and sense of the word here may be compared *a*) to that in (3): “*al-kalām*” here denotes the dialogic discussion and exposition of one’s own understanding or theory, the result of his own systematic inquiry and reflection. This al-Barbahārī will condemn as *bid‘ah wa-ḍalālāh* precisely because, in his view, such reflection and theory cannot, by definition, conform appropriately to the tradition. Or *b*) it may be compared to (4), in which case “*al-kalām*” denotes the dialogical examination and consideration of differing views so as to arrive at agreement on what is correct. This al-Barbahārī will condemn since the limits of what can be known and correctly stated concerning God is definitively presented in the *Qur’ān* and the Sunna and about these there can be no debate. Or, finally, *c*) it may be compared with (5), in which case “*al-kalām*” denotes the formally speculative investigation of the nature of God which is beyond the reach of human understanding save insofar as it grasps what is authoritatively presented in the canonical sources. It were idle to attempt to restrict the sense of the expression in (10) to one of these three; we should, rather, hear all of them. “*Al-kalām*”, in brief, here refers to and names that activity which is constitutive of “the science of *kalām*”. With this look at the background of the terms we can now examine al-Ash‘arī’s rhetorical exploitation of ‘*takallama*’ and ‘*kalām*’ in *al-Ḥathth*.

Al-Ash‘arī begins his tract by speaking of his adversaries as a group of people who find “systematic reasoning and investigation” (*al-naẓaru wal-baḥṭh*) about theological questions too difficult. The association of *kalām* with “systematic reasoning and investigation” (and the association of the expressions) is immediate in the context, wherefore, by implication, they are incompetent in, and uncomprehending of, *kalām*, i.e., of theology as a formal activity and discipline. In (§1) the usage is plain and in accord with what we

find in Hanbalite sources. "They allege that the formal discussion of bodies, accidents... (*al-kalāmu fī l-jismi wal-ʿaraḍi...*) is an innovation and a religious error" (§1.12). Here "*al-kalām*" not only denotes formal discussion and inquiry, but implies that this is carried out in a theological context. If to do this were a matter of true guidance and direction (*hudan wa-rushd*) "the Prophet, the [rightly guided] Caliphs, and the Companions would have had something to say on the subject" (*la-takallama fīhi*), i.e., would have expressed their judgement for the instruction on the community. "Since no formal discussion (*kalām*) is reported from him about any thing of what we have mentioned, we know that to discuss it formally (*al-kalāmu fīhi*) is an innovation and to investigate it (*al-baḥthu ʿanhu*) a religious error" (*ibid.*). "*Al-kalām*" in §1.21 and in the first paragraph of §1.12 may be taken simply as "to have said something", but in its juxtaposition with "*al-baḥth*" in the last paragraph one clearly hears the connotation of a formally speculative activity (as in (4) above). The same is true of "*takallama*" in §2.1 and likely in §2.20. Up to this point one hears first the usual, non-formal sense of the word with the overtones of the formal sense (of "theological speculation"). We find the term '*kalām*' next in the heading of §2.212: "ʿammā l-kalāmu fī l-tawḥīd". Here the polemical thrust of the phrase, even though it is conventional as a heading (The Discussion of the Topic...), is clear enough in the context: the formal exposition (*kalām*) of the evidence for the thesis. The same is true of the heading of §2.2130. In the opening and in the closing subsections of §2.31 "*takallama*" occurs in a place in which it is basically neutral: one cannot speak of the Prophet's having had something to say on the subject or of his not having had anything to say—of his having spoken on the subject or not having spoken (where deliberate silence would constitute a basis of sunna). In §2.312, however, the verb occurs with the *fuqahāʾ* as the subject and in a "heavy" sense: they "discuss formally, investigate, dispute, and offer probative arguments [against counter positions]" with regard to recently raised juridical questions. The more formal use of the term here anticipates the analogy he draws in this section between systematic reasoning in jurisprudence and in theology in order to establish the legitimacy of the latter, taking "systematic discussion" as legitimate in either of the modes which he distinguishes in §2.313. Given this, the occurrence in §2.314 (the Prophet "would have discussed") takes on more pregnant overtones.

All of this is brought to a head when he reaches his conclusion in §2.331 and §2.332. "*Al-kalām*" occurs twice in §2.331 and twice again in §2.332, in both of which one passes from "*al-kalām*" to "*ʿilm al-kalām*". "The learned

have to undertake the formal discussion (*al-kalām*) concerning recent questions..., so why do you people shun the science of *kalām*...?” (§2.331). To claim to know the truth with regard to recent theological questions and to shun *kalām* is inconsistent. That is to say, one can only make a judgement of what is true or false—valid or invalid—by a kind of theological *ijtihād*, which requires the discipline of *kalām*. Whoever lacks competence in “the systematic reasoning and investigation concerning theological matters” (*thaqula ‘alayhimu l-nazaru wal-baḥthu fī l-dīn*: §1.10), since he can form no judgement of his own, requires the guidance of the learned, sc., of one who has mastered the science of *kalām*. At this point al-Ash‘arī’s opponents are reduced to silence, vanquished in the disputation. In §2.332 accordingly, he does not address them directly, either by continuing the second person of §2.331 or by continuing the “*yuqālu lahum*” of §2.32, but speaks rather to the audience (the reader) about them: “Those people⁶⁵ speak [i.e., make formal pronouncements] concerning *kalām* (*yatakallamūna fī l-kalām*) until, when they are unable to proceed any further, they say ‘we have been forbidden the science of *kalām*’...”. Again, speaking and reduction to silence, though here with an allusion to the charge of incompetence brought in §1.10. Here, as al-Ash‘arī addresses the reader concerning his opponents, he presents what he considers the origin of their difficulty: “...they bind themselves uncritically to one who came before them without any conclusive argument or demonstration [of the validity of the position taken]” (§2.332). The two final phrases here, “*man kāna qablahum bi-lā ḥujjatin wa-lā burhān*”, are wonderfully ambivalent in the context. Taking the “*man*” of “*man kāna*” as implicitly plural in the context one could understand the reference as to “the leading religious authorities of the earlier generations” whose practice the Ḥanbalites cited as authoritative precedent for their own in §2.323. Taken as singular, however, it must refer to Ibn Ḥanbal. Again, the phrase “*bi-lā ḥujjatin wa-lā burhān*” (without any conclusive argument or demonstration)⁶⁶ can be read with “*yuqallidūn*” (they bind themselves uncritically) or it could be heard either as a qualifying element to “*qablahum*” (taking “before them” as the predicate of the “*kāna*”) or as a predicate (“who before them was without any conclusive argument or demonstration”). That the reference of the “*man*” is singular and is to Ibn Ḥanbal would seem clear, since it is to his doctrine that al-Barbahārī and his followers explicitly bind themselves in their *taqlid*.⁶⁷ The statement of §2.332 is very strongly put as al-Ash‘arī underlines the inconsistency of the Ḥanbalite position in the first sentence and the unsoundness of the juridical reasoning on which it is based in the second. That Ibn Ḥanbal is not named is noteworthy.

This may indicate that al-Ashʿarī does not wish to attack him so much as his followers and their interpretation of his doctrine.⁶⁸ If this is the case, then one will interpret the final sentence of §2.332 as “with neither conclusive proof nor demonstration they bind themselves uncritically to one who was before them”. That is, they claim to follow his doctrine strictly but do not do so in a valid manner. If, on the other hand, he means to attack Ibn Ḥanbal directly, we shall read “They bind themselves uncritically to one who before them had neither conclusive argument nor demonstration”. Here as elsewhere, we must take it that the ambivalence of expression is deliberate and intentional. The primary and immediate butt of the polemic is al-Barbahārī, to whom the tract was addressed. Ibn Hanbal is a respected and venerable master, but one whose attitude towards systematic theology was irrationally biased, at least in al-Ashʿarī’s judgement.

In §2.333 al-Ashʿarī addresses his Ḥanbalite opponents for one last time, but not to ask a question. He tells them, in a final polemical thrust, what judgement they must reach, if they are to be consistent, concerning the great masters of Sunnite jurisprudence, sc., that they are all guilty of innovation and error. Though it may seem to be a somewhat otiose appendix, the primary points of the tract having been quite adequately made in §2.331 and §2.332, this final paragraph has a structural function and so is not really redundant. The central focus of the argument in most of the work, beginning with the opening section, has been on the juridical legitimacy of the science of *kalām*, a new discipline. In §2.333 he tells his opponents that they have, in order to be consistent, to condemn abū Ḥanīfa, Mālik, and al-Shāfiʿī as innovators “since they have done things which the Prophet did not do”.⁶⁹ The topic recalls materially and formally the juridical context of the earlier arguments. The inconsistency of the Ḥanbalites’ theory and practice is again suggested as also by implication that they are themselves guilty of innovation. *Taqīd* is at best a juridical principle, but if followed rigidly as al-Barbahārī insists, then the foremost jurists also be condemned as innovators. The last sentence of the tract states what the Prophet did not do—non-action in which no binding precedent is to be seen (cf. §2.311 and §2.314). Everything is there and the last phrase of the tract is “the Apostle of God (God’s prayer and peace be upon him)”. Rhetorically the work is a masterpiece.

The manuscripts

A—III Ahmet n° 1916 (= *al-Tawhīd* n° 176 of the microfilm collection of the League of Arab States), 26×19 cm, written in a clear, regular *naskhi* hand,

24 lines to the page. The copy was completed on 11/III/592 = 7/IX/1196. *Al-Ḥathth* is found of foll. 9r^o 18 – 11r^o 1. It begins

وقد قال أبو الحسن رضي الله عنه في كتابه المترجم بالحث على البحث أن طائفة ...

and ends

إنتهى كلام أبي الحسن رضي الله عنه [١١ و] في هذا الباب .

B– Landberg n^o 1031, foll. 4v^o – 6v^o (= Ahlwardt n^o 2162, 18.5 × 13.5 cm, executed in a hastily written, untidy *taḥlīq* hand, 20 to 22 lines to the page. The last leaf of the tract is missing; the text ends in §2.322 (see note 253 to the text). The copy, according to Ahlwardt, was completed about 1150/1737. The text begins, fol. 4v^o 1.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم قال الإمام أبو الحسن علي بن اسمعيل الأشعري رضي الله عنه
أعلموا وفقكم الله أن قومًا ...

and ends, 6v^o ult.

مقرور أو صفراوي .

F– Feyzullah n^o 2161, foll. 49v^o – 52r^o, 26 × 17 cm, written in a small, carefully executed *maghribī* hand, 30 lines to the page. I have not seen the manuscript itself but should judge that the copy is probably no earlier than the 12th/18th century.⁷⁰ The text begins fol. 49v^o 1

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وصلى الله على سيدنا محمد وعلى آله وصحبه وسلم تسليمًا
قال أبو صادق محمد بن يحيى بن علي القرشي انبأنا الشيخ الإمام جمال الدين أبو الحسن
علي بن ابراهيم بن عبد الله القرشي إجازة بخطه^{٧١} ...

It ends fol. 52r^o 9:

وفما ذكرنا كفاية لكل عاقل غير معاند. – آخره والحمد لله وحده وصلى الله
على سيدنا محمد وعلى آله وصحبه وسلم وبعقبه ما صورته سمعت جميعه بقراءتي على الشيخ
المحدث أبي صادق محمد بن الحافظ الرشيد أبي الحسين يحيى بن علي بن عبد الله بن
مفرج القرشي وفقه الله تعالى ورحم سلفه بمنزله بمصر كتبه عبد الرحمن بن عبد الله
ابن عبد الحلیم بن عمران في ربيع الأول سنة ٦٧٧ عابدًا مصليًا .

H– The edition of Hyderabad 1344, republished by R. McCarthy in *Theology*, pp. 87–97. Note that to the formula *Ṣallā llāhu ʿalayhi wa-sallam* this text consistently adds *wa-ʿālihi* following *ʿalayhi*, which I have omitted from the apparatus.

NOTES

1. Cf. Ibn 'Asākir, p. 307.
2. The text is incomplete in B whose final leaf is missing.
3. Ibn 'Asākir, p. 136, 8 (see also McCarthy, *Theology*, p. 228, n° 94) and Ibn Farḥūn, p. 195, 1. Concerning these lists see also below.
4. Not only is *istiḥsān* considered to have no legal validity but, more significantly al-Ash'arī's argument in the text is that the practice of *kalām* has authorising precedents in the life of the Prophet and in the *Qur'ān*. (Concerning the Ash'arite attitude towards such private or personal judgements of what is right and their sense that the school's *kalām* is not founded in *istiḥsān*, see e.g., the remarks of abu l-Ma'ālī ibn 'Abd al-Malik (d. 494/1100) cited in Ibn 'Asākir, p. 152, 5ff.). "*Khāḍa, yakhūdu, khawḍan*" does occasionally, though rarely, occur in a more or less neutral sense, but even then some negative overtones appear to be present. For example, in his *al-Maqṣid al-asnā* (ed. F. A. Shehadi, Beyrouth, 1982, p. 36) al-Ghazzālī introduces a chapter concerning "Whether names which are approximately the same may be synonymous, signifying but a single meaning, or whether they must also differ in intension" and begins, "*ʾaqūlu: al-khā'idūna fī sharḥi hādhihi l-ʾasmā'i lam yata'arraḍū li-hādhi l-ʾamr*" (Those who have undertaken to explain these names have not considered this matter). Here the use of "*al-khā'idūn*" would seem to imply that they undertook it rashly and without sufficient preparation. (Al-Ghazzālī, here as elsewhere, seems to have taken on some of the pretentiousness of the *falāsifa* along with their teaching while at the same time having too little appreciation of the work of his predecessors).
5. Cf. G. Makdisi, "al-Ash'arī and the Ash'arites" 2, p. 24. In this article (pp. 21ff.) the author contends that *al-Ḥathth* is in all probability not an authentic work of al-Ash'arī but on the contrary dates from a much later period. Concerning the authenticity of the tract and its place among the writings of al-Ash'arī which are presently available, see my "Elements in the Development of the Teaching of al-Ash'arī" where it is suggested that both *al-Ḥathth* and the *Ibāna* are probably early works. Since *al-Ḥathth* is found in the supplementary list of Ibn 'Asākir and not those given by Ibn Fūrak we have no direct evidence concerning the date of its composition. Ibn Farḥūn's list (*op. cit.*, pp. 194f.) follows a somewhat different order from those presented by Ibn 'Asākir and is probably therefore independent of them. Here *al-Ḥathth* is the tenth item and occurs among works composed, according to Ibn Fūrak's information, prior to 320/932. (Most of those cited by Ibn Farḥūn belong to this period). The *Risāla ilā ahl ath-thaḡhr*, it should be noted, is almost certainly a very early work of al-Ash'arī's post-conversion period, and it too is given in Ibn 'Asākir's supplementary list. None of these lists is complete; conspicuously, for example, *al-Ibāna*, found in Ibn al-Nadīm as well as Ibn Farḥūn and concerning the circumstances of whose composition we are informed by Ibn abī Ya'ālā (*Ṭabaqāt* 2, p. 18), is not mentioned—not at any rate by this title—in any of the lists given by Ibn 'Asākir.
6. McCarthy, in his translation, p. 124, n° 20, remarks that "this paragraph is an exegetical note which is almost independent of the text".
7. It is perhaps worth noting that following the "*hādhihā*" of this addition B shows a short blank space, about enough for one word, while the editor of H says that there was a space also in the manuscript from which he prepared the edition. Nothing seems to be missing, however,

and no emendation plausibly suggests itself. The space would, even so, indicate that the copyist of the archetype of T-2 had some problem at this point, perhaps something (in the margin?) which he was unable to read in the copy from which he was working.

8. One might suggest that the reading of H, “*lā fī jihatīn wāḥidatīn wal-lā fī l-mawjūdi fī l-maḥall*” is correct, but “that which exists in a substrate” is the accident and no *mutakallim* holds that there is such a thing as an accident inherent in another accident. Here also the reading *lā fī jihatīn* of H is surely a corruption of *lā 'alā l-jumlah* (found in both B and F) to which *wāḥidah* has been added, since *lā fī fīhah* (with or without *wāḥidah*) is substantially synonymous with *lā fī maḥall* and so would be wholly redundant.
9. The expression “*mawjūdun* (or, more commonly, *muḥdathun*) *lā fī maḥall*” is employed by al-Jubbā'ī and abū Hāshim as a description of God's volitions, but such a reference here is altogether implausible.
10. Cf. R.M. Frank, *Beings and their Attributes*, pp. 95ff.
11. It could, to be sure, be suggested that this element, sc., the “*wa-lā 'alā l-jumlatī wa-lā fī l-mawjūdi lā fī maḥall*” was lost in A by a quasi homoioteleuton with the preceding “*lā fī maḥallīn [wāḥid]*”, but this is unlikely. First, the final word of the preceding text is *wāḥid* and not *maḥall*; secondly, the inclusion of so pointless a remark would be contrary to the overall economy of the tract's style and to that of the writings of al-Ash'arī in general.
12. Note that this is not the usual sequence of topics found in the classical compendia, where the treatment of God's unity normally follows the thesis that there is only one eternal creator; see the remarks of al-Juwaynī in *al-Shāmīl*, p. 401.
13. The concomitant substitution of “*al-nazaru wal-ḥissu wal-qiyās*” for the “*al-bidāyatu wal-maḥsūsātu wal-darūriyyāt*” of T-1 is noteworthy. It is possible that the purpose of the alteration may be simply to spell out more clearly what is implicit in the more basic terms given in T-1, though it may have some greater significance which is not immediately clear.
14. Concerning the uncompromising attitude of the Ḥanbalites and the milder attitude of some other (Shāfi'ite) traditionalists on this question, see my “Elements” n. 59.
15. Note also that the expression “I shall keep silent on the matter” (*'askutu 'anhu*) is itself ambiguous; it can be understood to say “I shall keep silent on the question of the creation or non-creation of the *Qur'ān* (implied in the “*la-kāna yanbaghī 'an taskuta 'anhu*” of the preceding paragraph) or “I shall keep silent with regard to the question of the status (or title) of those who hold that the *Qur'ān* is created”. The final statement of § 2.323 in T-2 takes care of both interpretations.
16. The argument is not *tu quoque*, since the author has shown earlier, at least to his own satisfaction, that *kalām* is founded on the teaching of the Prophet.
17. McCarthy seems to take it that the clause “given that the Apostle of God did not state it” contained in the fourth question is sufficient to make the author's point and so to close the section. This clause, however, simply parallels the “*'ammā sakata 'anhu*” of the previous question and the “*wa-lam yatakallam... wa-la qāla...*” of the final question which terminates the whole sequence. The sequence ends (*if* the text is correct and complete insofar as it goes) with a question because the opponent has no further response. This is not the case with the fourth question, since there remains a yet earlier generation of pious ancestors.
18. Concerning the structural place and function of § 2.331 see the discussion below.
19. One might suggest that this phrase has been lost in A and B by homoioteleuton, but the

conjunction of AB is a strong indication of an original reading and moreover the additional phrase is not pertinent to the immediate polemic.

20. Both forms, “*lā ‘alā mithāl*” and “*‘alā ghayr mithāl*”, occur in this formula (cf. e.g., al-Bayhaqī, *al-I‘tiqād*, p. 34,6 [*‘alā ghayri mithāl*] and pp. 16f. and 56, 14 [*lā ‘alā mithāl*]); one notes, however, that “*lā ‘alā mithāl*” occurs in al-Ash‘arī’s *Luma‘*, §9. p. 8, 15.
21. This cannot be adjusted by the mere addition of a “*fa-*”, wherefore it is clear that something more than a conjunction has been lost. I have added “*fa-yajibu*” in the present edition in order to make the passage coherent.
22. The text of B here is quite similar in its wording to the account of the story found in abū l-Ḥusayn al-Wāḥidī’s *Asbāb al-nuzūl* (Cairo, 1379/1959, p. 175) and Ibn al-Jawzī’s *Tafsīr* (vol. 6, Damascus, 1385/1965, pp. 394f.) and may well be based on the same source. In this version Ibn al-Zibā‘rā says that banū Mulayḥ worship the angels, wherefore the “*ljm*” of B is probably to be corrected to Luḥayy, since they were a subgroup of Mulayḥ. Though it may account for the first part of this passage in B, the account given by al-Wāḥidī and Ibn al-Jawzī is of no help with regard to the corruption at the end where the subjunctive “*yakūnū*” occurs.
23. One has to recognize that it might, and not impertinently, be suggested that the reasoning that underlies this conclusion may be the question or that it is, viewed from another angle, maybe circular, since it is also, if not equally, plausible that a fuller form of the work have been shortened by revision and tightened up. This hypothesis might be argued for several passages (particularly, perhaps, for the shorter form of § 2.323, but it would be most unlikely that in revising the text the author or redactor should have omitted already present formulae that mark off sections of the text such as the “*wa-ammā l-‘aṣlu*” found at the head of § 2.223 and § 2.224 in T-2 and the others we indicated. Quite to the contrary. Nor does it seem likely, given the problem mentioned above, that for § 2.323 a redactor would have substituted the form in T-1 for that of T-2, while the inverse seems altogether plausible.
24. It would seem to me, indeed, that these additions were originally marginal notes made by a student not far progressed in his studies, particularly those found in §§ 2.2132, 2.221, and 2.223, which are not even pertinent to the contexts in which they occur.
25. There is a brief analysis of the content of the work in M. Allard’s *Le Problème des attributs divins dans la doctrine d’al-Ash‘arī et de ses premiers grands disciples* (Beyrouth, 1965), pp. 206–211, but he fails to see the multiplicity of distinct topics and arguments presented.
26. Concerning this see *Allard, op. cit.* and the further discussion in my “Elements”.
27. The Ash‘arites generally condemn *taqlīd* in theology as the following of the opinion or judgement of another without knowing its foundation (or lack of foundation). Although in the present tract *taqlīd* is viewed from a juridical standpoint (as involving a judgement concerning an action rather than a theological thesis), the basis of al-Ash‘arī’s condemnation remains the same, as he insists in § 2.332 that his opponents follow the judgement and practice of individuals (or of an individual) which are not based on sound juridical reasoning; they do not themselves understand the issue and the facts and therefore neither do they know the basis or lack of it for their own position.
28. Though we shall have shortly to return to the rhetorical use and the sense of these terms as they occur in *al-Ḥathth*, it is advisable to say something about their lexical basis here. ‘*ʿAṣl*’ (pl. *ʿuṣūl*) is primarily the base or foundation on which a thing rests (v. Ibn Fāris, *Maqāyīs al-lughah*, s.v.) and is commonly used to designate the roots of a plant or the stem of a tree, as opposed to the branches (*furū‘*) or crown (*far‘*). In its formal use it means generally the basic

element, constituent, principle, or foundation of a thing. This Ibn 'Abbās is cited as saying, “[God] created water first (or water together with whatever He wished), not from any ^{ʾaṣl} [i.e., not out of any already existent material] nor on the basis of any preëxistent pattern; then He made it an ^{ʾaṣl} [i.e., a basis, material foundation or principle] of what He subsequently created” (al-Bayhaqī, *al-Iʿtiqād*, p. 56). Similarly in a *kalām* context, “the atoms are the ^{ʾuṣūl} [i.e., the basis, constitutive elements] of composites and composites are bodies (^{ʾajsām}): abū l-Qāsim al-Anṣārī, *al-Ghunyah*, fol. 13v, 12. The word is commonly employed in *kalām* contexts in the sense of “a thesis” (sometimes “topic”). E.g., al-Juwaynī says (*Irshād*, p. 6, 8) that he will take up the thesis (or topic) of antecedent causes (^{ʾaṣlu l-tawallud}) in its proper place and al-Bāqillānī speaks of “this thesis” (*hādihā l-ʾaṣl*) (*Hidāya*, fol. 4r^o, 12) referring to the thesis or topic of the immediately preceding section (beginning fol. 2r^o). More narrowly, however, the term is used of the basic theses, i.e., doctrines, dogmas, or articles (*articuli fidei*) of Islamic belief (taking “dogma” here in the older sense, as equivalent of “*articulus fidei*”, not in the narrower, 19th century use). Thus Ibn Qutayba says that the ahl ḥadīth are unanimous in holding “that the *Qurʾān* is God’s speech and is uncreated, and that He will be visible on the day of resurrection...” and goes on to say that “they do not differ on these ^{ʾuṣūl}”, i.e., on these basic doctrines (*Taʾwīl*, p. 14, 17–20; see also *ibid.*, p. 14, 2). So too Ibn Fūrak speaks of the “^{ʾuṣūl} which are the universals which embrace the doctrine of God’s unicity and the *Sunna*” (*Bayān* [1941], §11, p. 15, 10f., where “God’s unicity”—*al-tawḥīd*—denotes the basic theological doctrines of Islam, not simply God’s uniqueness or unity). These are commonly referred to as ^{ʾuṣūl al-dīn} (the basic doctrines of the [Muslim] religion), as when al-Qushayrī, at the end of his *Lumaʿ*, a short *ʿaqīda*, says, “These are the ^{ʾuṣūl al-dīn} which one has to know” (p. 63, 6). Taking “^{ʾuṣūl}” in this contextually specified sense, then, the *ahl al-ʾuṣūl* are the *mutakallimīn*: they are, that is, those who study primarily the (basic) dogmas and those matters whose investigation is directly pertinent to understanding them (cf. e.g., al-Mutwallī, fol. 1v^o, 13ff. and al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil*, p. 105, 13.). Accordingly al-Anṣārī speaks of the superiority of the “science of the ^{ʾuṣūl}” (i.e., of fundamental theology or *kalām*) over all the other sciences (*al-Ghunyah*, fol. 7v^o, 10). Which dogmas are explicitly included among the ^{ʾuṣūl al-dīn} and which not may vary by author and most often simply, it would seem, on the basis of the length and detail of the tract, though the list is generally constant. Distinctions are made, in any event; as the stem (^{ʾaṣl}) of a tree is contrasted to its crown (*farʿ*) and its branches (*furūʿ*), so the basic dogmas are termed “*al-ʾuṣūl*” in contrast to secondary, derivative or simply less important, doctrines which are called “*furūʿ*”. Ibn Qutayba, e.g., contrasts the doctrines of the existence of God and of the resurrection as ^{ʾuṣūl}, not to believe in which makes one an unbeliever (*kāfir*) to that of God’s determination of human events (*al-qadar*), which is a *farʿ*, a secondary doctrine concerning which Muslims may disagree (*op. cit.*, pp. 81f.; see also *ibid.*, p. 13, 17ff.). In a wider sense, finally, “^{ʾuṣūl}” may refer to the (thematically presented) principles, axioms, presuppositions, and formal procedures which found and govern systematic reasoning in a given discipline, as al-Ashʿarī speaks of “the ^{ʾuṣūl} universally agreed upon through rational understanding, sense perception, and immediate intuition” (*al-Ḥathth*, §2.313, concerning which see below).

29. For the phrase “*mubtadiʾūn ḡullāl*” (also §2.1) cp. al-Barbahārī, cited below in n^o 63.
30. The canonical precedent for *kalām* reasoning with regard to questions which are treated in the *Qurʾān* and the ḥadīth al-Ashʿarī has already treated in §2.2, where the use of reasoning from creation to God was taken up as a separate question (§2.222) (cp. al-Ashʿarī, *Lumaʿ*, §10). One should note in this regard that in dealing with such questions, e.g., that of the contingency of the world, al-Ashʿarī’s own argumentation follows the *Qurʾān* very closely (e.g., *al-Lumaʿ*, §3, with which cp. al-Bayhaqī, *Iʿtiqād*, pp. 24f.), rejecting the more common *kalām* argument based on

the nature of atoms and their inherent accidents (cf. *al-Thaḡhr*, pp. 89f.). In this he differs from the practice of the leading Ash'arite masters of later generations. Note that the term *ḥādithah* (pl. *ḥawādith*), which occurs several times here would appear to have been a normal expression for new questions in both law and theology; cf. the use in abū Ja'far al-Ṭabarī, "Profession", p. 193, 11 and 198, 14f. and in Ibn 'Aqīl, K. *al-Jadal*, ed. G. Makdisi in *BEO* 20 (1967), p. 203, §6.

31. *Al-ʿawl* is a method for adjusting the fractions assigned in the distribution of an inheritance where the normal divisions would entail a sum greater than the whole; see art., *ʿawl* in *E.I.*².
32. This he says explicitly only with regard to the juridical questions: "new questions which arise concerning matters pertinent to religion *from the standpoint of the law*" (*min jihati l-sharīʿah*: § 2.312), but this is understood contextually as true of theological questions not explicitly raised in the canonical sources (concerning which he has noted in § 2.312 that their "principles are found in the Scripture and the Sunna"). "Pertinence to religion" is mentioned explicitly only in § 2.311. Al-Ash'arī shows reserve at this stage so as to make his major point more effectively later. Similarly he mentions *ijtihād* explicitly only in § 2.312 but understands its extension also to § 2.311; concerning this see below.
33. Note that in § 2.311 the statement "he [the Prophet] was not ignorant of any one of them in its detail" (*lam yaḡhal minhā shayʿan muḡṣṣalan*) constitutes an essential presupposition of the argument. Only if the Prophet knew the question and the truth about it as well as how it could be proven does the argument hold, for if he did not, then to deal with the question could not be an element of *al-dīn*, sc., an authentic element of valid religious practice (cf. the opponent's argument in § 1.22). Concerning the connotations of "*takallama*" here and the rhetorical use of the word in *al-Hathth*, see below.
34. "*Qiyās*" does not itself occur but as the *maṣḍar* of "*qāsū*" it is understood as implicitly expressed. J. Schacht (*The Origins of Muḡammadan Jurisprudence*, Oxford, 1953, pp. 127ff.) says that the two terms, "*ijtihād*" and "*qiyās*" are basically synonymous in context and that both connotationally exclude the notion of one's following his own him or personal preference (*al-ʿahwāʿ*). Properly speaking, however, "*qiyās*" is narrower in extension; "*al-qiyās*" (the definite, employed to designate a particular instance) means "the (logical) rule", i.e., the rule or form to be followed in reasoning about the particular case or the application of the rule; when the term is used generally (to designate the class) it refers to logical rules (or rules of analogical reasoning) in general and their application. The Ash'arites, it should be noted, do not normally employ '*qiyās*' for the reasoning employed in *kalām*, but rather '*al-naḡar*'.
35. The list of questions is given in § 1.12: "bodies, accidents, motion, rest, colors, the *ʿakwān*...". (The divine attributes are not pertinent to the context of § 2.31). It is significant that the *ʿakwān* appear in this list to be distinguished from motion and rest. Concerning the conception of the *ʿakwān* by the Ash'arites and the development of the concept in the school, see my "Bodies and Atoms", pp. 44f.
36. In § 2.212 al-Ash'arī speaks of "*furūʿu l-tawḡīd wal-ʿadl*" but gives no indication of what questions he will include among them. The expression, sc., "*al-tawḡīd wal-ʿadl*" is itself noteworthy in that it is, though certainly nor their exclusive property, characteristic of the Muʿtazila. One suspects that its occurrence here may be based chiefly, if not entirely, on polemical grounds.
37. This is made fully explicit in the descriptive clause which T-2 adds at the end of § 2.312. Al-Ash'arī's insistence on *ʿuṣūl* in the present context is anticipated in § 1 where he speaks of "*ʿuṣūl al-dīn*" (§ 1.12) in outlining his opponents' attitude towards *kalām* and of "*ʿuṣūl*" at the end of § 1.222 where he concludes the statement of their argument.

38. Note that when he says that these are the principles (or sources) of theoretical reasoning and so of the basis of *kalām* he does not mean to deny the place of the *Qur'ān*, the Sunna, and consensus in fundamental theology, but rather to indicate that principle which is unique in *kalām*. It is, in each discipline, this fourth "source" which allows one to employ the other "sources" coherently and validly. Accordingly he says here concerning the concrete possibility of the resurrection that what is given in the revelation is presented so as to "reinforce what is [or can be] known by speculative reasoning" (*ta'kīdan li-mā fī l-ʿuqūl*: § 2.2130). What he is doing, in short, is to specify the distinctive foundations which underlie the difference of *al-ʿaql* as the fourth "source" of theological knowledge and judgement from *al-qiyās* as the fourth "source" of juridical judgement. The *ʿaqliyyāt* remain fully distinct from the *samʿiyyāt* and within their own sphere are independent; cf. the use of the phrase "what is required by speculative reasoning" (*mā qadath l-ʿuqūl*) in *al-Thaḡhr*, p. 93, 22.
39. That § 2.3211 and § 2.3212 are subdivisions of a single unit is evident by the fact that "*Yuqālu lahum*" stands at the beginning of § 2.3211 and of § 2.323 but not of § 2.3212, where the "*ʿin qāla qāʿilun*" indicates a sub-question to the previous paragraph.
40. The comment "there is in your view no *Qur'ān* apart from the syllables and the sounds" is added to point *a*) to the Ḥanbalites' stubborn refusal to make the kinds of distinctions which must be made in theology and thereby *b*) to another example of the inconsistency of their thought. Here one says that the *Qur'ān* is uncreated while at the same time identifying anything which is correctly described by '*Qur'ān*' as consisting of "syllables and sounds", which are material, contingent entities.
41. The context throughout this section assumes (both on the part of al-Ash'arī and of his opponent) that there is no ḥadīth from the Prophet or one of the Companions which states that the *Qur'ān* is uncreated and which is properly authenticated in terms of the usual criteria. (The H text plays this out in an elaborately built argument, which we examined earlier). No such Ḥadīth is found in any of the "Six Books" or in the *Musnad* of Ibn Ḥanbal, and this alone, within the formal framework of al-Ash'arī's reasoning here is sufficient to ground the assumption and so the argument too. Al-Ghazzālī in his *Iljām al-ʿawāmm ʿan ʿilm al-kalām* (in the margins of al-Jlānī, *al-Insān al-kāmil*, Cairo, 1368/1949, p. 66) alleges that the Prophet said, "The *Qur'ān* is God's speech and is uncreated" (*qawluhu šlʿm al-qurʿānu kalāmu llāhi ḡhayru makhlūq*). Where he might have gotten this, or whether his attribution of the formula to the Prophet is the result of enthusiasm (the *ʿawāmm* wouldn't know!), we cannot tell. He gives no *isnād* nor any other suggestion of what might be the origin of such an ḥadīth. Al-Bayhaqī cites Ibn Dīnār as saying that the *Qur'ān* is uncreated (*Iʿtiqād*, p. 64 and *Asmāʿ*, p. 245) but has no earlier authority; as he notes in connection with a similar statement from Anas b. Mālik, the issue did not arise in the first generation (*ibid.*, 243f.). There are in abū Saʿīd al-Dārimī's *Radd ʿalā l-Jamiyyah* (p. 88) several ḥadīths which state that the *Qur'ān* is uncreated in the same common formulation employed by al-Ghazzālī. All are reported by Muḥammad b. Maṣṣūr al-Ṭūsī (d. 255/869); the formulation, however, is ascribed not to the Prophet or any of the Companions but to a number of individuals all of whom died towards the end of the second century. (Ibn Maṣṣūr claims himself to have heard this formula directly from the Prophet in a dream during dhū l-ḥijja 232; *ibid.*, pp. 88f.) Abu Saʿīd al-Dārimī studied ḥadīth with Ibn Ḥanbal (al-Subkī, *Tabaqāt* 2, p. 303 and Ibn ʿAsākir, *cit. Vitestam* in al-Dārimī, p. 53) and was considered by some Ḥanbalites as a follower of their school (Ibn abī Yaʿlā 1, p. 221); he was, however, a Shāfiʿite in law, having studied *fiqh* with Yūsuf b. Yaḥyā al-Buwaydī, a direct disciple of al-Shāfiʿī (v. al-Subkī 2, pp. 162f.): see the notice on al-Dārimī, *ibid.*, pp. 302f.

42. To my knowledge none of the so-called *Wāqifa* (or *Mutawaqqifa*) held that those who teach that the *Qurʾān* is created should be called (or considered as) unbelievers. The issue is introduced as a juridical matter correlated to the question of the createdness of the *Qurʾān* and for this reason is appropriately introduced here at the end of §2.321 in anticipation of its formal treatment in §2.323.
43. The text here (T-1) does not consider the alternative of a positive reply, since the Ḥanbalite opponent's response is determined by the school's practice. (The alternative will be given as the author's position in §2.331). As we noted earlier, T-2 does introduce two paragraphs here (the second forming the beginning of what is §2.323 of T-1) in which the affirmative reply is considered, though this is contextually unnecessary. It is possible, to be sure, that something other than (or more than) a simple "lā" has been lost in A following 'in *qālū*, but this would seem unlikely. One might, on the other hand, conjecturally suggest that the text is correct as it stands and is to be interpreted, "If they reply [i.e., if they give any reply whatsoever], then one says to them..." This is theoretically coherent and grammatically possible, but would be highly unusual; I know of no parallel for such a form and should think its occurrence most improbable, especially since 'qālū' expects a direct quotation.
44. The expression "does not befit" (*lā yalīqu*, *ghayru lāʾiq*, etc.) is extremely common in Ashʿarite writings in contexts such as this. Cf., e.g., *abū l-Ḥasan al-Ṭabarī*, *Taʾwīl*, foll. 147v^o, 10 and 118r^o, 5; *Ibn Fūrak* (1943), pp. 76, 12 and 15, 79, 6f., 91, 8, *et alibi passim*; and also *al-Bayhaqī*, *al-Asmāʾ*², p. 459, 21.
45. Concerning the ambivalence of "kaffara" here see the discussion of §2.232 above where the differences between T-1 and T-2 were treated.
46. That the terms "*bidʿah*" and "*dalālah*" are evoked by allusion to an earlier passage see above.
47. With this cp. the formulation of *al-Barbahārī* in *Ibn abī Yaʿlā* 2, p. 19; 17 cited in n^o 63 below.
48. This second premise (or antecedent) is neither explicitly stated nor argued since by their very practice the Ḥanbalites acknowledge it.
49. Note that for *al-Ashʿarī* the function and purpose of *kalām* is not, in this instance, apologetic. With this compare the statement of *abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭabarī* ("Profession" p. 193) that the learned should enlighten the ignorant with regard to religious truths by means of knowledge which they have achieved "either through a ḥadīth or some systematic reasoning" (*bi-ḥadīthin ʾaw bi-nazarin*). Similarly, *abū Saʿīd al-Dārimī*, though very much a traditionalist in spirit, is not opposed to *kalām*; with regard to the *Jahmiyya* he says, for example, "*wa-ʿalayhim ḥujajun kathīratun mina l-kalāmi wal-nazar*" (*Radd*, p. 82, 12).
50. It should be noted that the attitude of *Ibn Ḥanbal* and most of his followers towards *kalām* is altogether different from that of *al-Ghazzālī*. The former was hardened in the crucible of the *mihna* which was brought on by *kalām* (at least in the eyes of *Ibn Ḥanbal*). *Al-Ghazzālī*, by contrast, simply lost his confidence in the value of speculative theology, partially on theoretical grounds and partially, no doubt, in reaction to the success of the philosophically elaborated religious propaganda of the extreme *Shīʿa*. Generally speaking, *al-Ghazzālī* seems to have looked upon *kalām* as a more purely rational (more exclusively self-grounding) theology than it was, or had been, for most of the *Ashʿarites*; having lost confidence in the demonstrative certainty of human reasoning regarding the basic theological doctrines he had to give up any notion of the primary value of *kalām*. Consistently then, he felt that though incapable of demonstrating the truth of the basic religious dogmas of Islam, *kalām* can

nonetheless demonstrate the error of some counter theses or, at least, the inconclusiveness of the reasoning used to support them. (Note that within this framework *al-Tahāfut* can only be considered a *kalām* work; that philosophers read it and wrote against it does not make it something it wasn't originally). Unable to achieve the degree of cognitive certitude (*ʿilm yaqīn*) he desired by rational inference (*iktisāban*), he concluded that it has to be attained without inference as *ʿilm ḍarūrī* (sc., *kashf*).

51. “*Shaykhun dhū... ʿilmīn wa-ḥiqh*”; note the multiple connotations of “*ʿilm*” and “*ḥiqh*” in this context.
52. *Al-Aghānī* 8 (Beyrouth, 1948), pp. 224f.
53. ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Faḍl al-iʿtizāl*, p. 307, 9–11.
54. Ibn al-Qifṭī, *Anbāh* 2, p. 348, 3f.
55. *Kitāb al-awsat*, in J. van Ess, *Frühe muʿtazilische Häresiographie* (Beyrouth, 1971), § 204. Van Ess translates “dann würde sie gesammelt und theoretisch begründet” (p. 116).
56. Ibn al-Qifṭī, *op. cit.* 1, p. 250.
57. Concerning formal disputations see van Ess, “Disputationspraxis in der islamischen Theologie, eine vorläufige Skizze”, *REI* 44 (1976), pp. 24–60.
58. In none of these examples does ‘*kalām*’ or ‘*kallama, yatakallamu*’ specifically denote or refer to a discipline, i.e., to that theological discipline which is distinguished from *ḥikm*, etc. The same is true also of the ensuing instances. In (6) and (7) the terms signify the expression of one’s reflected consideration or view concerning the topic referred to, while (8) and (9), because of the preposition, signify the urging of a position or doctrine upon those who are addressed. In (10) “*al-kalām*” signifies speculative discussion, but again does not name, save by contextual implication or allusion, the discipline of the *mutakallimīn*. In these and similar cases, thus, ‘*al-kalām*’ and ‘*kallama, yatakallamu*’ may be seen as general expressions employed to designate and describe an activity which is carried on in various modes and to various ends and which, accordingly, may be viewed in diverse ways, depending on the context of the discourse and the perspective of the primary voice. It is an activity (*the activity*) which, in its various modes (reflection, inquiry, exposition, discussion, debate, dispute or disputation), is characteristic of the larger practice and exercise of “the science of *kalām*,” “*al-naẓaru wal-baḥṭhu ʿani l-dīn*: § 1.10). The semantic range of ‘*kallama, yatakallamu*’ in the examples we have cited is closely parallel to that of Greek ‘*διαλογίζομαι*’ and similarly the range of ‘*al-kalām*’ in these and analogous instances parallels that of ‘*διαλογισμός*’ as used in both pagan and in Patristic texts. (Cp. also the occurrences of ‘*διαλογισμός*’ in the New Testament). With this one may also compare the uses of ‘*disputatio*’ and ‘*disputare*’ in medieval Latin where the earlier use is more of reflection or thinking than of disputing over “*quaestiones*” (see H. de Lubac, *Exégèse médiévale* I/1, Paris, 1959, pp. 88ff.). Even though ‘*al-kalām*’ has been associated with ‘*διύλεξις*’ there is no more probable ground to seek for a “*calque*” in the use of ‘*kalām*’ as the name for Muslim theology than there is to look for such behind the use of ‘*ḥiqh*’ and ‘*naḥw*’ as the names of disciplines. For other examples of ‘*takallama, yatakallamu*’, etc., in religious contexts in early Muslim contexts, see J. van Ess, “The Beginnings of Islamic Theology” in J.E. Murdoch ad E.D. Sylla (eds.), *The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning* (Dortrecht, 1975), pp. 87ff. A.Pines in his “A Note on an Early Meaning of the Term *Mutakallim*”, *IOS* 1 (1971) pp. 244ff. suggests that in the beginning the *mutakallimīn* were basically and essentially religious propagandists and public disputants, the institutional champions of Islam. In this he follows the line laid out by al-Fārābī, which, he suggests, “springs from his knowledge of the history and original nature and function of

the *mutakallimīn*" (p. 228). Here, however, he seems not only to ignore the self-serving character of al-Fārābī's construction of the nature and role of *kalām* within the hierarchy of disciplines, but also to oversimplify the historical situation, even as it is witnessed in the sources he cites. Disputations were staged in the 'Abbasid court and elsewhere (often in the homes of scholars) on almost all subjects, including grammar; and it was the material subject to be debated which determined who should participate. That is, before one could rightly and appropriately be called upon to serve as a participant in a public disputation he had, in principle at least, to be an expert in the particular subject. Before becoming a disputant in a theological debate one had first to be a theologian (or at least, presumably, competent in the subject). Abū Sa'īd al-Sīrāfī enters the debate with abū Bishr Mattā concerning *mantiq* precisely because he is an expert in grammar and language, which is what abū Bishr and his fellow logicians claimed to have surpassing knowledge about. A far better indication of the nature of *kalām* and of its function within the historical context, whether seen by its proponents or by its opponents, is presented in al-Ash'arī's *al-Hathth* than in the writings of al-Fārābī.

59. Ibn abī Ya'ālā, *Ṭabaqāt* 2, pp. 18f.
60. *Ibāna*, p. 27, 3–5: *thumma takallama abū 'Abdillāhi musta'ziman lil-shakki fi dhālika*.
61. *K. al-Ṭabaqāt al-kabīr* (ed. E. Sachaw, Leiden, 1917) 1, p. 146, 19. One or the other of these two is said to have been the first to pledge allegiance to the Prophet at 'Aqaba prior to the Hegira; see Ibn Hishām, *al-Sīra* (ed. M. al-Saqā, et al., Cairo, 1355/1936) 2, p. 89
62. Ibn abī Ya'ālā, *Ṭabaqāt* 2. pp. 33, 4–6.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 19, 17–19; with the expression *bid'atum wa-dalālah*, cp. *al-Hathth* §1.12 and with *takallama wa-bayyana* here cp. *al-Hathth* §1.21 and 2.314.
64. One has here, of course, to pay attention to the contextual connotations. The Prophet does not put forth his *own* (i.e., private) teaching, but that of God; the Companions, where they do not cite the Prophet, are understood to speak in conformity with that which they have learned from the Prophet and thus do not express merely their private views. Ibn Ḥanbal in (7) implicitly argues his own view, but again, he would insist, as conforming strictly to that of the Prophet and the Companions; he does not, that is, claim to go beyond what is given in the *Qur'ān* and the Sunna. So too, "the learned" of (6) are understood to belong to the ahl al-ḥadīth.
65. Note that the deictive 'hā-' of this form gives it an almost contemptuous resonance in the context. T-2 here continues the second person address of §2.332 and thereby vitiates somewhat the rhetorical force of the section.
66. Note the juridical connotations of "*hujjah*" and "*burhān*" here.
67. That the text is to be understood thus is confirmed by the occurrence of Ibn Ḥanbal's name at the head of the sequence of authorities in T-2's version of §2.323. Cf. also the statement of al-Barbahārī, "We only recognise what has been said by abū 'Abdallāh Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal", cited in Ibn abī Ya'ālā 2, p. 18, 15.
68. Note that Ibn Ḥanbal is cited several times in the first section of al-Ash'arī's *Ibāna* and is thereby recognised as an authority whose teaching is valid. That the tract was not read as an unqualified condemnation of the tradition and of the traditionists as a whole is apparent from the occurrence of Ibn al-Ukhuwwa, abū l-Ma'ālī al-Mawṣilī, Ibn abī l-Ḥusayn al-Rashīd al-'Aṭṭār, and abū l-Qāsim Saḥnūn in the isnad of F.

69. Ibn Ḥanbal’s name does not appear in this list of jurists since he is implicitly included in the “you” of “*yalzamukum ‘an tahkumū*”. One understands, nonetheless, that if Mālik, etc., are guilty of innovation, then Ibn Ḥanbal is guilty of analogous innovations in the instances cited.
70. The copyist has simply repeated the colophons from the exemplars he copied without noting the date of his own work. That for *al-Ḥathth* is, as we noted earlier, Rabi‘ I 677; that for the preceding tract (Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī’s *Bulūgh al-marām fī adillat al-aḥkām*, ending fol. 49r^o) is 1063/1653.
71. For the remainder of this up to the beginning of the text itself see the Hyderabad edition.

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كتاب الحث على البحث
للشيخ ابي الحسن علي بن اسمعيل الأشعري

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم^(١)

إن طائفة^٢ من الناس جعلوا الجهل رأس ما لهم وثقل عليهم النظر والبحث عن الدين .

ومالوا إلى^٣ التقليد .

وطعنوا على من فتنش عن أصول الدين ونسبوه إلى الضلال فرغموا^٤ أن الكلام في الجسم والعرض والحركة والسكون^٥ والألوان والأشكال والجزء والطفرة وصفات البائ^٦ تعالى بدعة وضلالة .

قالوا^٧ : لو كان ذلك^٨ هدى ورشداً^٩ لتكلم فيه النبي عليه السلام^{١٠} وخلفاؤه وأصحابه . قالوا ولأن النبي عليه السلام^{١١} لم يمت حتى تكلم في كل ما يحتاج إليه في^{١٢} أمور الدين وبيّنه بياناً شافياً ولم يترك لأحد من بعده^{١٣} مقالاً فيما بالمسلمين^{١٤} إليه حاجة^{١٥} من أمور دينهم .

فلما لم يرو^{١٦} عنه الكلام في شيء مما ذكرناه^{١٧} علمنا أن الكلام فيه بدعة والبحث عنه ضلالة ، لأنه لو كان فيه خير^{١٨} لما فات النبي ﷺ وأصحابه^{١٩} وتكلموا فيه^{٢٠} .

(١) في اختلاف أوائل المخطوطات أنظر ما تقدم في وصفها ؛ - (٢) إن طائفة ا : فإن طائفة ح ف . إن قوما ب ؛ - (٣) + التخفيف و ب ح ف ؛ - (٤) فرغموا ا ب : وزعموا ح ف ؛ - (٥) الجسم والعرض والحركة والسكون ا : الحركة والسكون والجسم والعرض ب ح ف ؛ - (٦) تعالى ا : عز وجل ب ح ف ؛ - (٧) قالوا ا : وقالوا ب ح ف ؛ - (٨) ذلك < ب ؛ - (٩) ورشداً ا : ورشد ب . ورشاداً ح ف ؛ - (١٠) عليه السلام ا : صلى الله عليه [+ واله ح] وسلم ب ح ف ؛ - (١١) في ا : من ب ح ف ؛ - (١٢) لأحد من بعده ا : لأحد بعده ب . بعده لأحد ح ف ؛ - (١٣) بالمسلمين ا ب : للمسلمين ح ف ؛ - (١٤) إليه حاجة ا ح ف : حاجة إليه ب ؛ - (١٥) وما يقربهم إلى الله [+ عز وجل ح ف] ويباعدهم عن سخطه ب ح ف ؛ - (١٦) يرو ب ف : يرد ا . يرووا ح ؛ - (١٧) ذكرناه ا ح ف : ذكرنا ب ؛ - (١٨) فيه خير ا : في ذلك خير ب . خيرا ح ف ؛ - (١٩) وسلم وأصحابه ا . ب . ف : وأصحابه وسلم ح ؛ - (٢٠) فيه < ب ؛ - (٢١) + أحد ب ؛ - (٢٢) نحن

1.220 قالوا : ولأنه ليس يخلو ذلك من وجهين :
قالوا : ولأنه ليس يخلو ذلك من وجهين :
من ٢١ وجهين :

إما أن يكونوا علموه فسكتوا عنه او لم يعلموه بل جهلوه .

فإن كانوا علموه ولم يتكلموا فيه ، وسعنا أيضاً نحن ٢٢ السكوت عنه كما وسعهم السكوت عنه ووسعنا ترك الخوض ٢٣ ، ولأنه لو كان من الدين لما ٢٤ وسعهم السكوت عنه .

وإن كانوا لم يعلموه وسعنا جهله كما وسع أولئك جهله ، لأنه لو كان من الدين لم يجهلوه .

فعلى كلا الوجهين الكلام فيه بدعة والخوض فيه ضلالة .

فهذه جملة ما احتجوا به في ترك النظر في الأصول ٢٥ .

1.221 إما أن يكونوا [أ : ٩ ظ] علموه فسكتوا عنه ، فكذلك يجوز لنا السكوت عنه ولأنه لو كان من الدين لما وسعهم السكوت عنه .

1.222 وأما إن لم يعلموه بل جهلوه ، فوسعنا جهله كما وسع أولئك جهله ، ولأنه لو كان من الدين لم يجهلوه .

فهذه جملة ما تمسكوا به في ترك النظر في الأصول .

والجواب ٢٦ عنه من ثلاثة أوجه ٢٧ :

2.0 أحدها قلب السؤال عليهم بأن يقال لهم : فالنبي ﷺ [ف : ٥٠ و] لم يقل أيضاً ٢٩ أن من بحث عن ذلك وتكلم ٣٠ فيه فاجعلوه مبتدعاً ضالاً : فقد لزمكم أن تكونوا مبتدعة ضلالاً ٣١ بتضليلكم ٣٢ من لم يضلله النبي ﷺ .

2.1 الوجه الثاني في الجواب أننا لا نسلم أن النبي ﷺ وأصحابه لم يعلموا ذلك على الجملة ، وإن لم ينقل عنهم

2.20 الجواب ٣٣ الثاني أن يقال لهم : أن النبي ﷺ لم يجهل شيئاً مما ذكرتموه من الكلام في الجسم والعرض والحركة

< ف ؛ - (٢٣) + فيه ح ف ؛ - (٢٤) لما ب : ما ح ف ؛ - (٢٥) فهذه ... الأصول ب ؛ - (٢٦) والجواب ا ب : قال الشيخ أبو الحسن رضي الله عنه والجواب ح ف ؛ - (٢٧) ثلثه أوجه ا ح ف : وجه ثلاثة ب ؛ - (٢٨) لهم فالنبي ا ب : النبي ح . والنبي ف ؛ - (٢٩) أيضاً ف ؛ - (٣٠) وتكلم ا ح ف : أو تكلم ب ؛ - (٣١) + إذ قد تكلمتم في شيء لم يتكلم فيه النبي ﷺ ب ح ف ؛ - (٣٢) بتضليلكم ا : وضلتم ب ح ف ؛ - (٣٣) تلجوا ب ف : والجواب ح ؛ - (٣٤) إن < ف .

الكلام في احادها؛ كيف وهذه الأشياء التي ذكرتموها معينة أصولها موجودة في القرآن والسنة جملة غير مفصلة.

والسكون والجزء والطفرة وإن^{٣٤} لم يتكلم في كل أحد من ذلك معيناً وكذلك^{٣٥} الفقهاء والعلماء من الصحابة غير أن هذه الأشياء التي ذكرتموها معينة أصولها موجودة في القرآن والسنة جملة^{٣٦} غير مفصلة.

2.211 فقال سبحانه خبراً عن ابراهيم عليه السلام في قصّة أفول الكواكب وزوالها وانتقالها من مكان إلى مكان مما دلّه أن ربّه لا يجوز عليه شيء من ذلك وإن من جاز عليه الحركة والسكون والانتقال من مكان إلى مكان فليس باله^{٤٧}.

فأما^{٣٧} الحركة والسكون والكلام فيهما فأصلهما^{٣٨} في القرآن^{٣٩} وهما يدلان^{٤٠} على التوحيد وكذلك الاجتماع والافتراق. وذلك في قول الله تعالى^{٤١} خبراً عن خليله إبراهيم عليه السلام^{٤٢} في قصة أفول الكوكب والقمر والشمس^{٤٣} وتحركها^{٤٤} من مكان إلى مكان^{٤٥} ما دلّه^{٤٦} على أن ربّه عزّ وجلّ لا يجوز عليه شيء من ذلك وإن من جاز [ب: ٥] عليه الأفول والانتقال من مكان إلى مكان فليس باله.

2.212 وأما الكلام في التوحيد فأخوذ من الكتاب كما تلونا من الآيات مثل آية

وأما الكلام في أصل^{٤٨} التوحيد فأخوذ من الكتاب أيضاً^{٤٩}؛ قال الله

وهي في الهامش؛ - (٣٥) وكذلك ح ف: ولذلك ب؛ - (٣٦) جملة ح ف ا: لجملة ب؛ - (٣٧) فأما ب ف: أما ح؛ - (٣٨) موجود ح ف؛ - (٣٩) + والسنة ف؛ - (٤٠) يدلان ح ف: يدخلان ب؛ - (٤١) وذلك في قول الله تعالى ب: قال الله تعالى ح ف؛ - (٤٢) عليه السلام ب: صلوات الله وسلامه عليه ف. صلوات الله عليه وسلامه ح؛ - (٤٣) القمر والشمس ب: الشمس والقمر ح ف؛ - (٤٤) تحركها ب: تحريكها ح. تحريكها ف؛ - (٤٥) إلى مكان < ب؛ - (٤٦) دلّه ب: دل ح ف؛ - (٤٧) وبعد هذا في زيادة لابن القاسم الأنصاري: قلت وقوله عليه السلام لا أحب الأفلين أي لا أرتضيه فيما أطلبه وأبغيه ولا يقع به الكفاية. قال أبو الحسن رضي الله عنه؛ - (٤٨) أصل ب: أصول ح ف؛ - (٤٩) من الكتاب أيضاً ب: أيضاً من الكتاب ح

التمانع ومثل قوله ﴿أَمْ جَعَلُوا لِلَّهِ شُرَكَاءَ خَلَقُوا كَخَلْقِهِ: ١٣، ١٦﴾ الآية.

عز وجل ٥٠ ﴿لَوْ كَانَ فِيهِمَا آلِهَةٌ إِلَّا اللَّهُ لَفَسَدَتَا: ٢١، ٢٢﴾ وهذا كلام^{٥١} موجز منبه على الحجّة بأنه واحد لا شريك له. وكلام المتكلمين في الحجاج في التوحيد بالتمانع والتغالب إنما^{٥٢} مرجعه إلى هذه الآية وقوله عز وجل ﴿مَا اتَّخَذَ اللَّهُ مِنْ وَلَدٍ وَمَا كَانَ مَعَهُ مِنْ إِلَهٍ إِذَا لَذَهَبَ كُلُّ إِلَهٍ بِمَا خَلَقَ وَلَعَلَّ بَعْضُهُمْ عَلَى بَعْضٍ: ٢٣، ٩١﴾ وإلى قوله تعالى ٥٣ ﴿أَمْ جَعَلُوا لِلَّهِ شُرَكَاءَ خَلَقُوا كَخَلْقِهِ فَتَشَابَهَ الْخَلْقُ عَلَيْهِمْ: ١٣، ١٦﴾. وكلام المتكلمين^{٥٤} في توحيد الله إنما مرجعه إلى هذه الآيات التي ذكرناها^{٥٥}.

وكذلك سائر الكلام في تفصيل فروع التوحيد والعدل إنما هو مأخوذ من القرآن.

وكذلك^{٥٦} سائر الكلام في تفصيل فروع التوحيد والعدل إنما هو مأخوذ من القرآن.

وكذلك الكلام في جواز البعث 2.2130

واستحالته الذي قد اختلف فيه مشركو العرب ومن قبلهم من الأمم حتى تعجبوا من جواز ذلك؛ فقالوا ﴿أَيُّدًا مِنَّا وَكُنَّا تُرَابًا وَعِظَامًا أَئِنَّا لَمَبْعُوثُونَ: ٣٧، ١٦﴾ وقالوا ﴿ذَلِكَ رَجْعٌ بَعِيدٌ: ٥٠، ٣﴾ و ﴿هِيَآتَ لِمَا

وكذلك^{٥٧} الكلام في جواز البعث واستحالته الذي^{٥٨} قد اختلف فيه^{٥٩} عقلاء العرب ومن قبلهم من غيرهم حتى تعجبوا من جواز ذلك فقالوا ﴿أَيُّدًا مِنَّا وَكُنَّا تُرَابًا ذَلِكَ رَجْعٌ بَعِيدٌ: ٥٠، ٣﴾ وقوله تعالى^{٦١} ﴿هِيَآتَ لِمَا تُوعَدُونَ:

ف؛ - (٥٠) عز وجل ب: تعالى ح ف؛ - (٥١) كلام ب ف: الكلام ح؛ - (٥٢) إنما ب: فإنما ح ف؛ - (٥٣) وإلى قوله تعالى ب: إلى قوله عز وجل ح ف؛ - (٥٤) + في الحجاج ح ف؛ - (٥٥) ذكرناها ح ف: ذكرنا ب؛ - (٥٦) وكذلك ب ح: فكذلك ف؛ - (٥٧) وكذلك ب: فكذلك ح ف؛ - (٥٨) الذي < ب؛ - (٥٩) اختلف فيه: اختلف فيه ب. اختلف ح ف؛ - (٦٠) + فيه ح ف؛ - (٦١) وقوله تعالى ب: وقولهم ح ف؛ - (٦٢) وقوله ب ف: وقولهم ح؛ +

٢٣ ، ٣٦ ﴿ وقوله ٦٢ ﴾ ﴿ مَنْ يُحْيِي
الْعِظَامَ وَهِيَ رَمِيمٌ : ٣٦ ، ٧٨ ﴾ وقوله
تعالى ﴿ اَيُّعِدُّكُمْ اَنْكُمْ اِذَا مِتُّمْ
وَكُنْتُمْ تُرَابًا وَعِظَامًا اَنْكُمْ مُخْرَجُونَ :
٢٣ ، ٣٥ ﴾ ونحو ٦٣ هذا الكلام منهم
الذي اخبر الله تعالى ٦٤ به عنهم ٦٥ .

وإنما ورد الحجاج ٦٦ في جواز
البعث بعد الموت في القرآن ٦٧ تأكيداً
لجواز ذلك في العقول . وعلم الله
تعالى ٦٨ نبيه عليه السلام ٦٩ وأمه ٧٠
الحجاج عليهم في إنكارهم البعث من
وجهين على طائفتين ، طائفة أقرت
بالخلق الأول وأنكرت الثاني وطائفة
جحدت ذلك ٧١ وقالت ٧٢ بقدم العالم .

تُوعَدُونَ : ٢٣ ، ٣٦ ﴿ و﴿ مَنْ يُحْيِي
الْعِظَامَ وَهِيَ رَمِيمٌ ٣٦ ، ٧٨ ﴾ ونحو
هذه الشبهة .

فورد في القرآن الدلالة على جوازه
تأكيداً لجواز ذلك من العقول . وعلم
الله نبيه تثبيت الحجاج عليهم في
أنكادهم البعث من وجهين على
طائفتين منهم ، طائفة أقرت بالخلق
الأول وأنكرت الثاني وطائفة جحدت
ذلك وقالت بقدم العالم .

فاحتجّ على المقرّ منهما ٧٣ بالخاق الأول بقوله تعالى ٧٤ ﴿ قُلْ يُحْيِيهَا الَّذِي
أَنْشَأَهَا أَوَّلَ مَرَّةٍ : ٣٦ ، ٧٩ ﴾ وقوله ٧٥ ﴿ وَهُوَ الَّذِي بَدَأَ الْخَلْقَ ثُمَّ يُعِيدُهُ وَهُوَ
أَهْوَنُ عَلَيْهِ : ٣٠ ، ٢٧ ﴾ وغير ذلك من نظيره ٧٦ فنبههم بهذه الآيات على أن من
قدر على ٧٧ أن يفعل فعلاً لا على ٧٨ مثال سبق ٧٩ فهو أقدر على ٨٠ أن يفعل فعلاً
محدثاً ٨١ وهو ٨٢ أهون فيه فيما بينكم وتعارفكم .

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تعالى ب ؛ - (٦٣) ونحو : في نحو ب ف : وفي نحو ؛ - (٦٤) تعالى : متكررة في ب ؛ - (٦٥)
الذي ... عنهم < ح ف (ولعله قد سقط من الأصل من أجل تكرار «نهم») ؛ - (٦٦) وإنما ورد
الحجاج ب ؛ - (٦٨) الله تعالى < ح ف ؛ - (٦٩) عليه السلام ب ؛ - (٧٠) أمته ب ؛ ولقنه
ح ف ؛ - (٧١) ذلك < ب ؛ - (٧٢) وقالت < ح ؛ - (٧٣) منهما ا ب ؛ منها ف ح ؛ - (٧٤)
تعالى < ح ف ؛ - (٧٥) وقوله ا ؛ وبقوله ب ح ف ؛ - (٧٦) وغير ذلك من نظيره ا ؛ وبقوله كما
بداكم تعودون ب ح ف ؛ - (٧٧) على < ب ح ف ؛ - (٧٨) لا على ا ؛ على ب . على غير ح
ف ؛ - (٧٩) سبق ا ؛ سابق ح . وكاتب ب قد كتب «سابق» أولاً ثم شطبها فكتب «سبق» ، <
ف ؛ - (٨٠) على < ب ح ف ؛ - (٨١) محدثاً ا ب ؛ محدثاً ح . متحدثاً ف ؛ - (٨٢) وهو ا ؛ فهو

ثم قال ﴿وَلَهُ الْمَثَلُ الْأَعْلَىٰ :
٣٠ ، ٢٧﴾ الآية ، أي فليس خلق
شيء بأهون عليه من خلق الآخر.

وأما^{٨٣} الباري تعالى^{٨٤} فليس خلق
شيء بأهون عليه من الآخر.
وقد قيل إن الهاء في «عليه»^{٨٥} إنما
هي كناية عائدة إلى الخلق^{٨٦} ،
تقديره^{٨٧} إن البعث والإعادة أهون على
أحدكم وأخف عليه من ابتداء خلقه
لأن ابتداء خلقه إنما يكون بالولادة
والترية وقطع السرة والقماط وخروج
الأسنان وغير ذلك من الآيات الموجهة
المؤلة وإعادته إنما تكون^{٨٨} دفعة
واحدة ، ليس فيها شيء من ذلك^{٨٩}
فهو أهون عليه من ابتدائه .

فهذا ما أحتج به على [ف] : ٥٠
ظ [الطائفة المقررة بالخلق الأول .

وقال ﴿أَوْ لَيْسَ الَّذِي خَلَقَ
السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ بِقَادِرٍ عَلَىٰ أَنْ
يَخْلُقَ مِثْلَهُمْ : ٣٦ ، ٨١﴾ وقال
﴿لَخَلْقُ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ أَكْبَرُ مِنْ
خَلْقِ النَّاسِ : ٤٠ ، ٥٧﴾ .

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وأما الطائفة الثانية حيث قالت يقدم العالم وأنكرت الخلق الأول والثاني^{٩٠}
[ب : ٥ ظ] فشيبتهم أن^{٩١} قالوا : وجدنا^{٩٢} الحيوة رطبة حارة^{٩٣} والموت بارداً يابساً
من^{٩٤} طبع التراب ، فكيف يجوز أن يجمع بين^{٩٥} الحيوة والتراب والعظام النخرة فيصير
خلقاً سوياً ، والضدان لا يجتمعان . فأنكروا البعث من هذه الجهة . ولعمري

ب ح ف ؛ - (٨٣) وأما ب ح : فأما ف ؛ - (٨٤) تعالى ب : جل ثناؤه وتقدست أسماؤه ح ف ؛ -
(٨٥) عليه ب ح : أهون عليه ف ؛ - (٨٦) عائدة إلى الخلق ب : للخلق ح ف ؛ - (٨٧) تقديره
ب : بقدرته ح ف ؛ - (٨٨) تكون ح ف : يكون ب ؛ - (٨٩) شيء من ذلك ب :
من ذلك شيء ح ف ؛ - (٩٠) الثانية... الثاني ا : التي أنكرت الخلق الأول والثاني وقالت
بقدم العالم ب ح ف ؛ - (٩١) فشيبتهم أن ا : وإنما دخلت عليهم شبهة بأن ب ح ف ؛ -
(٩٢) + أبانا وقد شطبها الكاتب ؛ - (٩٣) رطبة حارة ا ح ف : حارة رطبة ب ؛ - (٩٤) من ا :
ومن ب . وهو من ح ف ؛ - (٩٥) بين ب ح ف : من ا ؛ - (٩٦) الضدان ا ب : أن الضدين ح

الضدّان^{٩٦} لا يجتمعان على^{٩٧} محل واحد^{٩٨}؛ بل صح^{٩٩} وجودهما في المخلين^{١٠٠} على سبيل المجاورة. وأحتج الله^{١٠١} عليهم بأن قال ﴿الَّذِي جَعَلَ لَكُم مِّنَ الشَّجَرِ الْأَخْضَرِ نَارًا: ٣٦ ، ٨٠﴾^{١٠٢} فردّهم الله^{١٠٣} في ذلك إلى ما يعرفونه ويشاهدونه من خروج النار على حرها ويسسها^{١٠٤} من الشجر الأخضر على بردها ورطوبتها؛ فجعل جواز النشأة الأولى دليلاً على جواز النشأة^{١٠٥} الآخرة^{١٠٦} لأنها في معناها وجعل في^{١٠٧} مجاورة النار على حرها ويسسها للشجر الأخضر على برده ورطوبته^{١٠٨} دليلاً^{١٠٩} على جواز مجاورة الحياة التراب^{١١٠} والعظام^{١١١} وجعلها خلقاً سوياً^{١١٢}.

وفي قول النبي عليه السلام «كان الله ولا شيء معه» دليل على بطلان قول من قال لا ليل [أ: ١٠] وإلا وقبله نهار ولا حركة إلا وقبلها سكون.

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وأما ما يتكلم به المتكلمون من أن للحوادث^{١١٣} أولاً ورددهم على الدهرية في^{١١٤} أنه لا حركة إلا وقبلها حركة ولا يوم إلا وقبله يوم والكلام على من قال ما من جزء إلا وله نصف لا إلى غاية فقد وجدنا اصل^{١١٥} ذلك في سنة رسول الله ﷺ حين قال «لا عدوى ولا طيرة»، فقال أعرابي «فا

وفي قوله عليه السلام «لا عدوى ولا طيرة» وفي جوابه للأعرابي «فن

ف؛ - (٩٧) على ا: في ب ح ف؛ - (٩٨) + ولا على الجملة ولا في الوجود ولا في محل ب: ولا في جهة واحدة ولا في الوجود في المحل ح. ولا على الجملة ولا في الوجود ولا في المحل ف؛ - (٩٩) بل صح ا: ولكن يصح ب. ولكنه يصح ح ف؛ - (١٠٠) في المخلين ا ب (وكتابت ب قد كتب أولاً حرف «على» ثم شطبها فكتب «في محل»)، في مخلص ح ف؛ - (١٠١) واحتج الله ا: فاحتج الله ب ح ف. + تعالى ح؛ - (١٠٢) + فإذا أنتم منه توقدون ب ح ف؛ - (١٠٣) + تعالى ب. عز وجل ح ف؛ - (١٠٤) + للشجر الأخضر على برودته ورطوبته دلالة على حرها ويسسها ب؛ - (١٠٥) الأولى... جواز النشأة < ب (لأجل تكرار «جواز النشأة»)؛ - (١٠٦) + مثلها ب؛ - (١٠٧) في < ب؛ - (١٠٨) في معناها... ورطوبته < ح ف؛ - (١٠٩) دليلاً ا ب: دليل ح ف؛ - (١١٠) التراب ا ح ف: للتراب ب؛ - (١١١) + النخرة ب ح ف؛ - (١١٢) سوياً [وقال ح] كما بدأنا أول خلق نعيده (٢١، ١٠٤) ب ح ف؛ - (١١٣) للحوادث ب: الحوادث ح ف (وقال محقق ح إن بعد أو لا بياضاً في النسخة)؛ - (١١٤) في < ح ف؛ - (١١٥) أصل < في نصر ف وهي في

أعدى الأول؟» دليل على ما قلناه. بال الإبل كأنها الظبياء يدخل فيها
 الجمال الأجر ب فيجر بها؟^{١١٦} فقال
 النبي ﷺ «فن أعدو الأول؟»
 فسكت الأعرابي لما أفحمه^{١١٧} بالحجة
 المعقولة.

ولو كان الأمر على ما قالوا من أنه لا حركة إلا وقبلها حركة لاستحال
 حدوث واحدٍ منهما لأن ما لا نهاية له لا حدوث له.
 فكذلك^{١١٨} نقول^{١١٩} لمن زعم أنه لا حركة إلا وقبلها حركة لو كان الأمر
 هكذا لم يحدث^{١٢٠} منها واحدة لأن ما لا نهاية له لا حدوث^{١٢١} له.

وكذلك لما قال الأعرابي^{١٢٢} إن أمرأتي ولدت غلاماً أسود وغرض^{١٢٣} بنفيه ،
 فقال عليه السلام^{١٢٤} له هل لك من إبل؟ فقال نعم . قال فما ألوانها؟ فقال^{١٢٥} حمر .
 فقال عليه السلام^{١٢٦} هل منهما^{١٢٧} من أورك؟ قال نعم إن فيها أورك^{١٢٨} . قال فأنتي
 تراه^{١٢٩} ذلك؟ قال لعل عرقاً نزعه . فقال عليه السلام لعل^{١٣٠} ولدك نزعه عرق .
 فهذا ما علمه الرسول عليه السلام^{١٣١} من رد الشيء إلى شكله ونظيره فهذا^{١٣٢}
 أصل لنا في سائر ما يحكم^{١٣٣} به من الشبه^{١٣٤} والنظير . ولذلك^{١٣٥} نحتج^{١٣٦} علي من
 قال إن الله^{١٣٧} يشبه المخلوقات^{١٣٨} وهو جسم بأن نقول^{١٣٩} له لو كان يشبه شيئاً من
 الأشياء لكان لا يخلو إما^{١٤٠} أن يشبهه من جميع جهاته^{١٤١} أو يشبهه من بعض

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هامشه ؛ - (١١٦) يدخل فيها... فيجرها ب : تدخل في الإبل الجري فتجرب ح ف ؛ - (١١٧)
 أفحمه ب ف : أفهمه ح ؛ - (١١٨) فكذلك ب : وكذلك ح ف ؛ - (١١٩) نقول < ب ؛ -
 (١٢٠) يحدث ب : تحدث ح ف ؛ - (١٢١) حدوث ب : حدث ح ف ؛ - (١٢٢) الأعرابي ا :
 الرجل يا نبي الله ب ح ف ؛ - (١٢٣) غرض ا : عرض ف . عرض ب ح ؛ - (١٢٤) عليه السلام له
 ا : [له ب] النبي ﷺ ب ح ف ؛ - (١٢٥) فقال ا : قال ب ح ف ؛ - (١٢٦) عليه السلام ا :
 النبي [رسول الله ف] ﷺ ب ح ف ؛ - (١٢٧) منها ا : فيها ب ح ف ؛ - (١٢٨) أورك ا ب ح :
 ورُقفاً ف ؛ - (١٢٩) تراه < ب ح ف ؛ - (١٣٠) عليه السلام لعل ا : النبي ﷺ و لعل ب ح ف ؛ -
 (١٣١) علمه الرسول عليه السلام ا : علمه [علم ح] الله نبيه [ﷺ ب] ب ح ف ؛ - (١٣٢) فهذا
 ا : فهو ب . وهو ح ف ؛ - (١٣٣) يحكم ب : حكم ا . تحكم ح ف ؛ - (١٣٤) الشبه ا ب : الشبه
 ح ف ؛ - (١٣٥) ولذلك ا : وذلك ب . وبذلك ح ف ؛ - (١٣٦) نحتج ا ح ف : نحتج ب ؛ -
 (١٣٧) + تعالى وتقدس ح ف ؛ - (١٣٨) المخلوقات ا ح ف : المخلوقين ب ؛ - (١٣٩) نقول ا ح
 ف : يقول ب ؛ - (١٤٠) أما ا : من ب ح ف ؛ - (١٤١) جميع جهاته ا : كل جهة ب . كل

جهاته ؛ فإن كان يشبهه من جميع^{١٤٢} جهاته وجب أن يكون محدثاً من كل جهاته ، وإن كان يشبهه من بعض جهاته وجب أن يكون^{١٤٣} محدثاً^{١٤٤} من حيث أشبهه^{١٤٥} ، لأن كل مشتبهين حكمهما واحد فيما اشتبها فيه^{١٤٦} ويستحيل أن يكون المحدث^{١٤٧} قديماً والقديم محدثاً^{١٤٨} .

وَأما الأصل بأن للجسم نهاية وأن الجزء لا ينقسم فقوله^{١٤٩} عز وجل^{١٥٠} ﴿وَأَحْصَىٰ كُلَّ شَيْءٍ عَدَدًا﴾ وقوله^{١٥١} ﴿وَكُلَّ شَيْءٍ أَحْصَيْنَاهُ فِي إِمَامٍ مُّبِينٍ﴾ . ومحال إحصاء ما لا نهاية له ومحال أن يكون الشيء الواحد ينقسم^{١٥٢} لأن هذا^{١٥٣} يوجب^{١٥٤} أن يكون^{١٥٥} شيئين . وقد خبر^{١٥٦} أن العدد وقع عليها^{١٥٧} .

وَأما الأصل في أن المحدث^{١٥٩} يجب أن يتأتى له^{١٦٠} الفعل على حسب^{١٦١} قصده^{١٦٢} ويتني عند^{١٦٣} كراهته^{١٦٤} فقوله^{١٦٥} تعالى ﴿أَفَرَأَيْتُمْ

2.223 وَأما قولنا أن للجسم نهاية وأن الجزء لا ينقسم فدل ذلك من التنزيل قوله تعالى ﴿كُلُّ شَيْءٍ أَحْصَيْنَاهُ فِي إِمَامٍ مُّبِينٍ : ٣٦ ، ١٢﴾ وقوله ﴿أَحْصَىٰ كُلَّ شَيْءٍ عَدَدًا : ٧٢ ، ٢٨﴾ ويستحيل إحصاء ما لا يتناهى وما لا نهاية له .

2.224 ومن الدليل على أن الخالق هو من يتأتى المخلوقات منه على حسب قصده . وأما من يكون مقدوره واقعاً على خلاف قصده أو دون قصده

جهاته ح ف ؛ - (١٤٢) جميع ا : كل ب ح ف (قارن لمع الأشعري ، # ٧) ؛ - (١٤٣) محدثاً من كل ... يكون < ا ؛ - (١٤٤) + مثلها ب ف : مثله ح (قارن لمع الأشعري ، # ٧) ؛ - (١٤٥) أشبهه ا ح ف : أشبهاب . (قارن لمع الأشعري ، # ٧) ؛ - (١٤٦) اشتبها فيه ا : اشتبها له ح ف ، اشبهها له وقديماً من حيث خالفها ب ؛ - (١٤٧) يكون المحدث ا ح ف : تكون المحدثات ب ؛ - (١٤٨) + وقد قال تعالى [+ وتقدس ح ف] ليس كمثله شيء [+ وهو السميع البصير ب] وقال [+ تعالى وتقدس ح ف] ولم يكن له كفوا أحد ب ح ف ؛ - (١٤٩) فقوله ح ف : بقوله ب ؛ - (١٥٠) + اسمه ح ف : - (١٥١) وأحصى ... قوله < ح ف (من أجل تكرار «قوله») ؛ - (١٥٢) ينقسم ح ف : منقسماً ب ؛ - (١٥٣) في ب بعد «هذا» بياض مقداره مقدار كلمة واحدة وقال وقال محقق ح أن فيها بياضاً بعد «ينقسم» ؛ - (١٥٤) يوجب ح ف : موجب ب ؛ - (١٥٥) يكون ب : يكونا ح ف ؛ - (١٥٦) خبر ب : اخبر ح ف ؛ - (١٥٧) عليها ب : عليها ح ف ؛ - (١٥٨) + وقلت ومن هذا القبيل قوله أفرايتم ما تحرثون أنتم تزرعون الآية ؛ - (١٥٩) للعالم ب ح ف . لكنها قد سقطت في مطبوع مكاتب ؛ - (١٦٠) له < ب ؛ - (١٦١) على حسب ب : نحو ح ف ؛ - (١٦٢) + واختياره ح ف ؛ - (١٦٣) يتني عند : يتني عن ب . تتني عن ح ف ؛ - (١٦٤) كراهته ب ف : كراهيته ح ؛ - (١٦٥) فقوله ح ف : بقوله ب ؛ - (١٦٦) وأنتم ح ف : الأنتم ب ؛ - (١٦٧) يقولوا بحجة ح

مَا تُمْنُونَ ۖ إِنَّكُمْ ۖ تَخْلُقُونَهُ ۖ أَمْ نَحْنُ
الْخَالِقُونَ .

فليس بخالق له ولا المقدور مخلوقاً له
قوله تعالى ﴿ أَفَرَأَيْتُمْ مَا تُمْنُونَ ۖ إِنَّكُمْ
تَخْلُقُونَهُ ۖ أَمْ نَحْنُ الْخَالِقُونَ : ٥٦ ،
٥٨ ، ٥٩ ﴾ .^{١٥٨}

فلم يستطيعوا أن يقولوا بحجة^{١٦٧}
أنهم يخلقون مع تمنيهم الولد فلا يكون
ومع كراهتهم له ؛ فيكون^{١٦٨} فبهمهم
أن الخالق هو من تتأتى منه^{١٦٩}
المخلوقات على حسب^{١٧٠} قصده .

2.225 وأما الدليل على أن الكائنات على
وفق تقديره سبحانه ومشيبته من
التنزيل فقوله ﴿ لَوْ شِئْنَا لَآتَيْنَا كُلَّ
نَفْسٍ هُدَاهَا : ٣٢ ، ١٣ ﴾ و ﴿ لَوْ
شَاءَ اللَّهُ لَجَمَعَهُمْ عَلَى الْهُدَى : ٦ ،
٣٥ ﴾ و ﴿ لَوْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ مَا أَشْرَكُوا :
٦ ، ١٠٧ ﴾ إلى غير ذلك من
الآيات .

وأما أصلنا من المناقضة على
الخصم في النظر فأخوده من سنة
النبي^{١٧١} ﷺ . وذلك تعليم الله عز
وجل إياه حين لقي الخبر السمين
فقال^{١٧٢} نشدتك بالله ، [ف : ٥١] و
هل تجد فيما أنزل الله^{١٧٣} تعالى من
التوراة أن الله تعالى يبغض الخبر
السمين؟ فغضب الخبر حين غيرَه

2.231 قال أبو الحسن رضي الله عنه :
وأما أصلنا في المناقضة على
الخصم في النظر فأخوذ من الكتاب
والسنة . وذلك أن النبي عليه السلام
قال لمالك بن الصيف ، وكان حبراً
سميناً من أحبار اليهود ، نشدتك الله ،
هل تجد فيما أنزل الله من التوراة أن الله
يبغض الخبر السمين؟ فغضب الرجل

ف (وقارن لمع الأشعري ، # ٥) : يقوموا الحجّة ب ؛ - (١٦٨) ومع كراهتهم (كراهيتهم ف) له فيكون
ب ف (وقارن لمع الأشعري ، # ٥) : مع كراهيته له ح ؛ - (١٦٩) تتأتى منه ف : يتأتى منه ح ، تتأتى
ب ؛ - (١٧٠) حسب < ح ف ؛ - (١٧١) النبي ب : سيدنا محمد ح ف ؛ - (١٧٢) + له ح
ف ؛ - (١٧٣) الله < ب ؛ - (١٧٤) وقال ب : فقال ح ف ؛ - (١٧٥) وهدى للناس < ح

بذلك ، وقال ١٧٤ ﴿ مَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ عَلَىٰ بَشَرٍ مِّن شَيْءٍ ۖ فَنَاقَضَهُ عَنْ قَرَبٍ لَّأَنَّ التَّوْرَةَ شَيْءٌ وَمُوسَىٰ بَشَرٌ . فَعَلِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَىٰ حَتَّىٰ قَالَ ﴿ مَن أَنْزَلَ الْكِتَابَ الَّذِي جَاءَ بِهِ مُوسَىٰ ۖ فَجَافَهُ عَنِ قَرَبٍ ١٧٦ لَّأَنَّ التَّوْرَةَ شَيْءٌ وَمُوسَىٰ بَشَرٌ ، وَقَدْ كَانَ الْحَبْرُ مَقْرَأً بِأَنَّ اللَّهَ تَعَالَىٰ أَنْزَلَ التَّوْرَةَ عَلَىٰ مُوسَىٰ .

وقال ﴿ مَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ عَلَىٰ بَشَرٍ مِّن شَيْءٍ ۖ ٦ ، ٩١ ﴾ ؛ فناقضه عن قرب لأن التوراة شيء وموسى بشر. فعلمه الله تعالى حتى قال ﴿ مَن أَنْزَلَ الْكِتَابَ الَّذِي جَاءَ بِهِ مُوسَىٰ ۖ ٦ ، ٩١ ﴾ .

وكذلك ناقض الذين زعموا أن الله ١٧٧ عهد إليهم أن لا يؤمنوا برسول ١٧٨ حتى يأتيهم ١٧٩ بقربان تأكله النار؛ فقال تعالى ﴿ قُلْ قَدْ جَاءَكُمْ رَسُولٌ مِّن قَبْلِي بِالْبَيِّنَاتِ وَبِالَّذِي قُلْتُمْ فَلِمَ قَتَلْتُمُوهُمْ إِنْ كُنْتُمْ صَادِقِينَ ۖ ٣ ، ١٨٣ ﴾ ؛ فناقضهم بذلك وحاجهم .

وأما أصلنا في استدراكنا مغالطة الخصوم فأخوذ من قوله تعالى ﴿ أَنْتُمْ وَمَا تَعْبُدُونَ مِن دُونِ اللَّهِ حَصَبُ جَهَنَّمَ أَنْتُمْ لَهَا وَارِدُونَ ﴾ إلى قوله ١٨٠ ﴿ وَهُمْ فِيهَا ١٨١ لَا يَسْمَعُونَ ۖ ٢١ ، ١٠٠ ﴾ فإنه ١٨٢ لما نزلت هذه الآية بلغ ذلك عبد الله بن الزبيرى وكان جدلاً خصماً فقال خصمت محمداً ورب الكعبة فجاء إلى النبي ١٨٣ ﷺ فقال : يا محمد ، أأنت تزعم أن عيسى وعزيراً والملائكة عباد صالحون؟ قال أجل . قال : فإن النصرى تعبد عيسى وطائفة من اليهود تعبد عزيراً وهذا بنو

2.232
وأما أصلنا في مغالطة الخصوم فذلك مأخوذ من القرآن ، فإن الله تعالى لما قال ﴿ أَنْتُمْ وَمَا تَعْبُدُونَ مِن دُونِ اللَّهِ حَصَبُ جَهَنَّمَ ۖ ٢١ ، ٩٨ ﴾ . أراد ابن الزبيرى أن يناقض رسول الله ﷺ فقال : إن الملائكة عبدوا من دون الله وكذلك عيسى ، أفتقول يا محمد أنهم حصب جهنم؟ فسكت رسول الله ﷺ تعجباً من جهله . وذلك أن الله تعالى قال ﴿ وَمَا تَعْبُدُونَ مِن دُونِ اللَّهِ ﴾ ولم يقل «ومن تعبدون» فلم يدخل فيه عيسى ولا الملائكة .

ف ؛ - (١٧٦) قرب ح ف ؛ قريب ب ؛ - (١٧٧) + تعالى ح ف ؛ - (١٧٨) برسول ا ؛ لرسول ب ح ف ؛ - (١٧٩) إليهم ... يؤمنوا ... يأتيهم ا ح ف ؛ إلينا ... تؤمن ... يأتينا ب ؛ - (١٨٠) + تعالى ب ؛ - (١٨١) وهم فيها < ح ؛ - (١٨٢) فإنه ب ؛ فإنها ح ف ؛ - (١٨٣) إلى النبي ب ؛ إليه رسول

لحم^{١٨٤} تعبد الملائكة > فيجب < أن يكونوا حسب جهنم^{١٨٥} فسكت النبي ﷺ لا سكوت عي ولا منقطع^{١٨٦} ، تعجباً من جهله ، لأنه ليس في الآية ما يوجب دخول عيسى وعزير والملائكة فيها ، لأنه قال ﴿ وَمَا تَعْبُدُونَ^{١٨٧} ﴾ ولم يقل « وكل من عبُد^{١٨٨} من دون الله ». وإنما أراد ابن الزبعرى مغالطة النبي ﷺ ليوهم^{١٨٩} قومه أنه قد حاجه .

فأنزل الله تعالى^{١٩٠} ﴿ إِنَّ الَّذِينَ سَبَقَتْ لَهُمْ مِنَّا الْحُسْنَىٰ أُولَٰئِكَ عَنْهَا مُبْعَدُونَ ﴾ فقرأها^{١٩٢} النبي ﷺ فضحكوا^{١٩٣} عند ذلك لثلاثين^{١٩٥} انقطاعهم وغلطهم . فقالوا ﴿ ءَالِهَتُنَا خَيْرٌ أَمْ هُوَ ﴾ يعنون عيسى ﷺ فأنزل الله عز وجل^{١٩٦} ﴿ وَلَمَّا ضُرِبَ ابْنُ مَرْيَمَ مَثَلًا إِذَا قَوْمُكَ مِنْهُ يَصِدُونَ : ٤٣ ، ٥٧ ﴾ إلى قوله^{١٩٧} ﴿ خَصِمُونَ ﴾^{١٩٨} .

فقال سبحانه بياناً لذلك ﴿ إِنَّ الَّذِينَ سَبَقَتْ لَهُمْ مِنَّا الْحُسْنَىٰ أُولَٰئِكَ عَنْهَا مُبْعَدُونَ : ٢١ ، ١٠١ ﴾ فقالوا ﴿ ءَالِهَتُنَا خَيْرٌ أَمْ هُوَ : ٤٣ ، ٥٧ ﴾ يعنون عيسى أرادوا مغالطة رسول الله ﷺ فقال سبحانه ﴿ مَا ضَرَبُوهُ لَكَ إِلَّا جَدَلًا بَلْ هُمْ قَوْمٌ خَصِمُونَ : ٤٣ ، ٥٨ ﴾ ، لأنه لو قال « عيسى خير » فقد أثبت لاهتهم خيرية . فقال سبحانه ﴿ إِنَّ هُوَ إِلَّا عَبْدٌ أَنْعَمْنَا عَلَيْهِ : ٤٣ ، ٥٩ ﴾ .

الله ح . إلى رسول الله ف ؛ - (١٨٤) لحم : هكذا في ب ويحتمل أن يكون الصحيح لحي ؛ - (١٨٥) عباد... أن يكونوا ، هكذا في ب . ولكنه في آخره « الملائكة يكونوا » : عبدوا ح ، وليس في ف شيء من ذلك بل في موضعه بعد « عزيرا والملائكة » بياض طويل هو منقسم بين سطرين ، مقداره مقدار ثلاثي سطر . وفي القراءة أنظر كلامنا الوارد في المقدمة ؛ - (١٨٦) عي ولا منقطع ح ف : منقطع ولا عي بل ب ؛ - (١٨٧) تعبدون ح ف : يعبدون ب ؛ - (١٨٨) من عبد ب : ما تعبدون ح ف ؛ - (١٨٩) ليوهم ح ف : لتوهم ب ؛ - (١٩٠) تعالى ب : عز وجل ح ف ؛ - (١٩١) يعني من المعبودين ح . يعني من المعبود ف ؛ - (١٩٢) فقرأها ب : فقرأ ح ف ؛ - (١٩٣) + ذلك ح ، عليه ذلك ف ؛ - (١٩٤) فضحكوا ب : فضجوا ح ف ؛ - (١٩٥) يتبين ب ح : يبين ف ؛ - (١٩٦) عز وجل ب ف : تعالى ح ؛ - (١٩٧) قوله ح ؛ - (١٩٨) + وهذا نص عليه على مجادلتهم ومجادلته إياهم بالوحي وما علمه

وكل ما ذكرناه من الآي وما لم^{٢٠٩}
 نذكره أصل لنا^{٢٠٠} وهو حجة^{٢٠١} في
 الكلام فيما نذكره من^{٢٠٢} تفصيل
 الكلام في المسائل^{٢٠٣}، وإن لم يكن
 كل^{٢٠٤} [ب : ٦ ظ] مسألة معينة في
 الكتاب والسنة، لأن ما حدث
 معيناً^{٢٠٥} من المسائل العقلية في أيام
 النبي ﷺ والصحابة قد تكلموا فيه
 على نحو ما ذكرناه^{٢٠٦}.

قال أبو الحسن^{٢٠٧}:

2.311

والجواب^{٢٠٨} الثالث أن هذه المسائل التي ذكروها وسألوا^{٢٠٩} عنها قد علمها
 النبي^{٢١٠} عليه السلام^{٢١١} ولم يجهل منها شيئاً مفصلاً، غير أنها لم تحدث في أيامه
 معينة^{٢١٢} فيتكلم فيها [أ : ١٠ ظ] أو لا يتكلم فيها، وإن كانت^{٢١٣} أصولها موجودة
 في الكتاب^{٢١٤} والسنة.

وما حدث من شيء فيما له تعلق
 بالدين من جهة الشريعة فقد تكلموا
 فيه وبحوثوا عنه وناظروا فيه وحاجّوا،
 كمسائل العول والجدّات من مسائل
 الفرائض وغير ذلك من أحكام الميراث
 وعدّة الحامل والمتوفّي عنها زوجها.
 وكذلك في قول من قال لامرأته أنت
 وما حدث من شيء فيما له تعلق
 بالدين من جهة الشريعة فقد تكلموا
 فيه وبحوثوا عنه وناظروا فيه وحاجّوا،
 كمسائل العول والجدّات من مسائل
 الفرائض وغير ذلك من أحكام الميراث
 وعدّة الحامل والمتوفّي عنها زوجها.
 وكذلك في قول من قال لامرأته أنت

2.312

الله إياه ب؛ - (١٩٩) وما لم ب ف : أولم ح؛ - (٢٠٠) لنا < ح؛ - (٢٠١) وهو حجة ب :
 وحجة لنا ح ف؛ - (٢٠٢) من ح ف : في ب؛ - (٢٠٣) الكلام في المسائل ح ف؛ - (٢٠٤)
 يكن كل ب : تكن ح ف؛ - (٢٠٥) معيناً ب : تعيينها ح ف؛ - (٢٠٦) تكلموا... ذكرناه ب
 ح : تكلمنا فيه ف؛ - (٢٠٧) قال أبو الحسن < ب ح ف؛ - (٢٠٨) والجواب ا ح ف : وأما
 الجواب ب؛ - (٢٠٩) ذكروها وسألوا ا : سألو ب ح ف؛ - (٢١٠) النبي ا ب : رسول الله ح
 ف؛ - (٢١١) عليه السلام ا : ﷺ ب ح ف؛ - (٢١٢) معينة < ب؛ - (٢١٣) وإن ب ح ف :
 فإن ا؛ - (٢١٤) الكتاب ا : القرآن ب ح ف؛ - (٢١٥) فيا ح ف : مما ب؛ - (٢١٦) فيه ح ف :
 فيها ب؛ - (٢١٧) مسائل < ف؛ - (٢١٨) كالحرام ب : وكالحرام ح ف؛ - (٢١٩) حبلك ح

عليّ حرام وغير ذلك من الحدود والمعاملات ، فتكلموا فيها من غير أن وجدوا فيه نصّاً عن النبي ﷺ ، إذ لو وجدوا فيها نصّاً لما اختلفوا فيها . وبقي الإختلاف إلى الآن .

ذكرها مما قد حدثت في أيامهم ولم يجيء في كل واحد^{٢٢٢} منها نصّ عن النبي ﷺ لأنّه لو نصّ على جميع ذلك لما اختلفوا فيها^{٢٢١} وبقي الخلاف إلى الآن .

وهذه المسائل ، وإن لم يكن^{٢٢٢} في كل واحدة^{٢٢٣} منها نصّ عن النبي ﷺ عليه السلام^{٢٢٥} ، فإنهم ردّوها وقاسوها على ما فيه نصّ من كتاب الله^{٢٢٦} أو سنة نبيه عليه السلام^{٢٢٧} باجتهدهم^{٢٢٨} ؛ فهذه أحكام حوادث الفروع ردوها إلى أصول^{٢٢٩} الشريعة^{٢٣٠} .

فأمّا الحوادث التي^{٢٣١} تحدث في الأصول من تعيين مسائل فينبغي لكلّ مسلم عاقل^{٢٣٢} أن يرد حكمها^{٢٣٣} إلى جملة الأصول المتفق عليها بالعقل والحسّ والبدئية وغير ذلك ، لأن حكم مسائل الشرع التي طريقها السمع أن تكون مردودة إلى أصول [ف : ٥١ ظ] الشرع إلى طريقها^{٢٣٤} السمع ؛ وحكم مسائل العقلية^{٢٣٥} أن تردّ^{٢٣٦} إلى البداية والمحسوسات والضروريات ليرد^{٢٣٧} كل شيء من ذلك إلى بابه ولا يختلط^{٢٣٨} العقلية بالسمعية ولا السمعية بالعقلية .

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ف : حملك ب ؛ - (٢٢٠) واحد ب ف : واحدة ح ؛ - (٢٢١) فيها < ب ؛ - (٢٢٢) يكن ح ف : سكن ا . تكن ب ؛ - (٢٢٣) واحدة ا ب : واحد ح ف ؛ - (٢٢٤) النبي ا ب : رسول الله ح ف ؛ - (٢٢٥) عليه السلام ا : ﷺ ب ح ف ؛ - (٢٢٦) تعالى ح ف ؛ - (٢٢٧) أو سنة نبيه عليه السلام ا : أو السنة ب ف . والسنة ح ؛ - (٢٢٨) باجتهدهم ا ب : واجتهدهم ح ف ؛ + وقلت ولما قال مسهب بن مخزوم لعلي رضي الله عنه فيما جرى له في حرب الجمل من القتال والقتل هل عهد إليك رسول الله ﷺ ذلك فقال على رضي الله عنه لا والله خاب من افترى ولكن القرآن خرابنا فيه دايا قال أبو الحسن ا ؛ - (٢٢٩) أصول ا : أحكام ب ح ف ؛ - (٢٣٠) التي هي فروع لا تستدرك أحكامها إلا من جهة السمع والرسول ب ح ف ؛ - (٢٣١) الحوادث التي ا : حوادث ب ح ف ؛ - (٢٣٢) مسلم عاقل ا : عاقل مسلم ب ح ف ؛ - (٢٣٣) يرد حكمها ا ح ف : يردها ب ؛ - (٢٣٤) التي طريقها ا : التي طريقه ب . الذي طريقه ح ف ؛ - (٢٣٥) + والمحسوسات ب ح ف ؛ - (٢٣٦) أن ترد ا : تردها ب . أن يرد ح ف ؛ وقراءة ح ف هذه لأن فاعل «يرد» قد صار «كل شيء» بعد ما سقط القول المشار إليه في هـ ٢٣٧ ؛ - (٢٣٧) إلى البداية ... ليرد ا : إلى أصول العقل التي طريقها النظر والحسّ والقياس ليرد ب . وهذا القول قد سقط من ح ف ؛ - (٢٣٨) يختلط : يختلط ا : يختلط ب ح . تخلط ف ؛ -

فلو حدث في أيام النبي ﷺ الكلام في خلق القرآن وفي الجزء والطفرة بهذه الألفاظ لتكلم فيه وبين^{٢٣٩} كما بين سائر ما حدث في أيامه من تعيين المسائل المذكورة^{٢٤٠}.

ثم يقال لهم : فالنبي^{٢٤١} ﷺ لم يصح عنه حديث في أن القرآن غير مخلوق أو هو مخلوق ، فلم قلتم أنه غير مخلوق ؟

فإن قالوا قد قاله بعض الصحابة والتابعين^{٢٤٢} ، قيل لهم : فيلوم^{٢٤٣} الصحابي والتابعي مثل ما يلزمكم من أن يكون مبتدعاً ضالاً ، إذ قال^{٢٤٤} ما لم يقله النبي ﷺ ، لا سيما ولا قرآن عندكم إلا الحروف والأصوات وقد قلتم إن من قال أنها مخلوقة فقد كفر.

فإن قال قائل فأنا أتوقف في ذلك فلا أقول مخلوق ولا غير مخلوق ، قيل له : فأنت في توقفك في ذلك مبتدع ضال ، لأن النبي ﷺ يقل إن حدثت هذه الحادثة بعدي توقفوا فيها ولا تقولوا^{٢٤٦} فيها شيئاً ، ولا قال ضللو وكفروا من قال بخلقه^{٢٤٧}.

وخبرونا لو قال^{٢٤٩} قائل أن علم الله^{٢٥٠} مخلوق أكنتم تتوقفون فيه^{٢٥١} ؟

2.314 ولو حدث في زمان النبي ﷺ في خلق القرآن وفي مسألة الجزء والجسم وغير ذلك لتكلم فيه وبين كما بين ما حدث في زمانه وأيامه .

2.3211 ويقال لهم : فالنبي ﷺ لم يصح عنه حديث في أن القرآن غير مخلوق ولا هو مخلوق ، فلم قلتم أنه غير مخلوق ؟

فإن قالوا قد قاله بعض الصحابة والتابعين ، قلنا : فلزم الصحابي والتابعي عندكم مثل ما يلزمكم من أن يكون مبتدعاً ضالاً ، إذ قال ما لم يقله النبي عليه السلام ، لا سيما ولا قرآن عندكم إلا الحروف والأصوات وقد قلتم إن من قال أنها مخلوقة فقد كفر.

2.3212 فإن قال قائل أنا متوقف فيه فلا أقول مخلوق أو غير مخلوق ، قلنا : فأنت من توقفك في ذلك مبتدع ، لأن رسول الله لم يقل إذا حدثت هذه الحادثة فتوقفوا فيها ولا تقولوا فيها شيئاً ، ولا قال كفروا وضللو من قال بخلقه .

2.322 ويقال لهم : لو قال قائل علم الله مخلوق أو قال في وصفه ما لا يليق به أتوقفون فيه ؟

(٢٣٩) وبين ب ف : وبينه ح - ، (٢٤٠) المذكورة ب : وتكلم فيها ح ف ، - (٢٤١) فالنبي ب : النبي ح ف ، - (٢٤٢) والتابعين ب : وبعض التابعين ح ف ، - (٢٤٣) فيلزم ب : يلزم ح ف ، - (٢٤٤) إذ قال ح ف : إذا قالوا ب ، - (٢٤٥) النبي ب : الرسول ح ف ، - (٢٤٦) تقولوا ح ف : يقولوا ب ، - (٢٤٧) + ومن قال بنفي خلقه ح ف ، - (٢٤٨) لا ، - (٢٤٩) قال : متكررة في

فإن قالوا لا^{٢٤٨} قلنا: فلم يقل
رسول الله ﷺ ولا صحابته في ذلك
شيئاً.

فإن قالوا لا قيل لهم فلم^{٢٥٢} يقل
النبي ﷺ ولا أصحابه في ذلك شيئاً.
وكذلك لو قال قائل هذا ربكم
شعبان أو ريان أو مكتسي أو عريان أو
مقرور أو صفراوي^{٢٥٣} أو مرطوب أو
جسم أو عرض أو يشمّ الريح أو لا
يشمّها أو هل له أنف وقلب وكبد
وطحال وهل يحجّ في كل سنة وهل
يركب الخيل أو لا يركبها وهل يغتمّ أم
لا ونحو ذلك من المسائل لكان ينبغي
أن تسكت عنه لأن رسول الله ﷺ لم
يتكلم في شيء من ذلك ولا أصحابه أو
كنت لا تسكت فكنت تبين بكلامك
أن شيئاً من ذلك لا يجوز على الله عز
وجل وتقدس^{٢٥٤} بحجة كذا وكذا.

فإن قال قائل أسكت عنه ولا
أجيبه بشيء أو أهجره أو أقوم عنه أو
لا أسلم عليه ولا أعوده^{٢٥٥} إذا مرض
ولا أشهد^{٢٥٦} جنازته إذا مات ، قيل
له : فيلزمك أن تكون في جميع هذه
الصيغ التي ذكرتها مبتدعاً ضالاً ، لأن
رسول الله ﷺ لم يقل من سأل عن
شيء من ذلك فاسكتوا عنه ولا قال لا
تسلموا عليه ولا قوموا عنه ولا قال شيئاً
من ذلك ، فأنتم مبتدعة إذا فعلتم
ذلك^{٢٥٧}.

ف ؛ - (٢٥٠) + تعالى ب ؛ - (٢٥١) فيه < ب ؛ + أم لا ح ف ؛ - (٢٥٢) فلم ب ف : لم
ح ؛ - (٢٥٣) إلى ها هنا انتهى ب ؛ - (٢٥٤) + كذا وكذا ح ؛ - (٢٥٥) ولا أعوده ف : أو لا
أعوده ح ؛ - (٢٥٦) ولا أشهد ف : أو لا أشهد ح ؛ - (٢٥٧) قد أدخل الأب مكارني « ويقال لهم »

ولم لم تسكتوا عنن قال بخلق القرآن ولم كفرتموه ، ولم يرد عن النبي ﷺ حديث صحيح في نبي خلقه وتكفير من قال بخلقه؟

فإن قالوا لأن أحمد بن حنبل رضي الله عنه قال بنبي خلقه وتكفير من قال بخلقه قيل لهم : ولم لم يسكت أحمد عن ذلك بل تكلم فيه؟

فإن قالوا لأن عباساً^{٢٥٩} العنبري ووكيعاً وعبد الرحمن بن مهدي وفلاناً وفلاناً قالوا أنه غير مخلوق ومن قال بأنه مخلوق فهو كافر قيل لهم : ولم لم يسكت أولئك عما سكت عنه رسول الله ﷺ^{٢٦٠}؟

فإن قالوا لأن عمرو بن دينار وسفيان بن عيينة وجعفر بن محمد رضي الله عنهم وفلاناً وفلاناً قالوا ليس بخالق ولا مخلوق قيل لهم : ولم لم يسكت أولئك عن هذه المقالة ولم يقلها رسول الله ﷺ؟

فإن أحوالوا ذلك على صحابي^{٢٦١} أو جماعة منهم كان ذلك مكابرة ، فإنه يقال لهم : فلم لم يسكتوا عن ذلك ولم يتكلم فيه النبي ﷺ ولا قال كفروا قائله؟

وإن قالوا لا بد للعلماء^{٢٦٢} من الكلام في الحادثة ليعلم الجاهل

2.323 فإن قالوا إنما كفرنا القائل^{٢٥٨} بخلق القرآن لأن أمة السلف كفروه قلنا : إذا لم يرو عن النبي عليه اسلام حكم في ذلك فلم كفروه ، وهلا سكتوا عنه كما سكت عنه رسول الله ﷺ؟ كان عالماً بالمنافقين بأعيانهم ، ومع ذلك كان يجري عليهم حكم المسلمين. فإذا لم يتكلم في خلق القرآن ولا في نبي خلقه كان الواجب على أمة السلف أن يقتدوا به في ذلك .

2.331 فإن قالوا لا بد للعلماء من الكلام في الحادثة ليعلم الجاهل حكمها ،

هنا قبل قوله ولم لم تسكتوا ، - (٢٥٨) القائل : القائلين ؛ - (٢٥٩) عباساً ف : عباس ح ؛ - (٢٦٠) رسول الله < ح ؛ - (٢٦١) صحابي ف : الصحابة ح ؛ - (٢٦٢) للعلماء ح : للعالم ف ؛ -

حكما ، قيل لهم ٢٦٣ : فهذا ٢٦٤ الذي أردناه منكم ، فلم منعتم الكلام ؟ فأنتم إن شئتم تكلمتم حتى إذا أنقطعتم قلتُم نهيينا عن الكلام ؛ وإن شئتم قلتم من كان قبلكم بلا حجة [ف : ٥٢ و] ولا بيان ؛ وهذه شهوة وتحكم .

ثم يقال لهم : فالنبي ﷺ لم يتكلم في الدور ٢٦٦ والوصايا ولا في العتق ولا في حساب المناسخت ولا صنّف فيها كتاباً كما صنعه مالك والثوري والشافعي وأبو حنيفة فيلزمكم أن يكونوا مبتدعة ضلالاً ، إذ فعلوا ٢٦٧ ما لم يفعله النبي ﷺ وقالوا ما لم يقله نصّاً بعينه وصنّفوا ما لم يصنّفه النبي ﷺ وقالوا بتكفير القائلين بخلق القرآن ولم يقله النبي ﷺ . وفيما ذكرنا كفاية لكل عاقل غير معاند .
آخره ٢٦٨

قيل : فهذا أردنا منكم فلم أضربتم عن علم الكلام ومنعتموه ؟ وهؤلاء يتكلمون في الكلام حتى إذا انقطعوا قالوا نهيينا عن علم الكلام ويقلدون من كان قبلهم بلا حجة ولا برهان .

2.332

ثم يقال لهم : فالنبي ﷺ لم يتكلم في الدور والوصايا ولا في حساب المناسخت ولا صنّف في ذلك كتاباً كما صنّف مالك وأبو حنيفة والشافعي رضي الله عنهم ، فيلزمكم أن تحكموا عليهم ٢٦٥ بالبدعة إذ فعلوا ما لم يفعله رسول الله ﷺ .

2.333

انتهى كلام أبي الحسن رضي الله عنه [أ : ١١ و] في هذا الباب .

(٢٦٣) لهم ح : له ف ؛ - (٢٦٤) فهذا ف : هذا ح ؛ - (٢٦٥) عليهم : عليه ا ؛ - (٢٦٦) الدور ف : الدور ح ؛ - (٢٦٧) يكونوا... فعلوا : تكونوا... ف . وقد شطب الكاتب نقطتي تاء تكونوا وكتب فعلوا في الهامش ؛ - (٢٦٨) آخره ف : نجز ح .