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TWO SHORT DOGMATIC WORKS
OF ABŪ L-QĀSIM AL-QUSHAYRĪ*

by

R.M. Frank

SECOND PART: EDITION AND TRANSLATION
OF "AL-FUṢŪL FĪ L-UṢŪL" **

THE ARABIC TEXT

< الفصول في الأصول للشيخ أبي القاسم القشيري >

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بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ رَبِّ الْعَالَمِينَ وَالصَّلَاةُ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ وَآلِهِ أَجْمَعِينَ
هذه فصولٌ تتضمن^١ أصول التوحيد وباللغة التأييد.

١ فصل: «العالم» عبارة عن جميع المخلوقات كالسماوات والأرضين
وأنفسنا وغير ذلك. العالم قسمان: جواهر وأعراض، فالجوهر ما يقبل العرض
ويتغير^٢ به من حالٍ إلى حالٍ، فمثال الجوهر كالمتحرك والساكن ومثال
العرض كالحركة والسكون.

٢ فصل: حقيقة «الجسم» هو المؤلف، وهو جوهران مجتمعان. دليله
أنه يقال عند زيادة التأليف «جُسمٌ»^٣ أو «أجْسَمٌ».

* See GENERAL INTRODUCTION in *MIDEO*, t. 15 (1982), pp. 53-58.

** See FIRST PART: EDITION AND TRANSLATION OF "LUMA' FĪ L-I'TIQĀD", *Ibidem*, pp. 59-74.

٣ فصل : «القديم» هو المتقدّم في الوجود < على > شرط المبالغة ، وفي وصفه سبحانه أنه لا ابتداء له ؛ والمحدث ما لم يكن فكأن .

٤ فصل : العالم محدث . دليله استحالة خلوه عمّا يتعاقب على جواهره من الحوادث ، وما لا يخلو عن حادثٍ فهو حادث .

٥ فصل : للعالم محدثٌ . دليله أنّ اختصاصه بالوجود دون العدم يقتضي محصّصاً .

٦ فصل : محدث العالم قديم . دليله أنه لو كان محدثاً اقتضى محدثاً ، ثمّ كذلك محدثه وكان يتسلسل ولا يتناهى وذلك محال .

٧ فصل : محدث العالم قائمٌ بنفسه ، لأنّ ما لا يقوم بنفسه لا يجوز أن يكون له علمٌ وقدرةٌ ، وقد دلّ فعله على علمه وقدرته .

٨ فصل : محدث العالم واحدٌ ، لأنّ الاثنين لا يجري أمرهما على النظام ولأنّّه يجب عجزهما أو عجز أحدهما وذلك باطل .

٩ فصل : محدث العالم لا يشبه المخلوقات . دليله أنه لو كان يشبهها لوجب حدوثه أو قدم العالم ، لأنّ حقّ المثلين التساوي بكلّ وجهٍ .

١٠ فصل : محدث العالم ليس بجوهر ، لأنّ الجوهر يحتمل الحوادث والقديم سبحانه لا يحلّه الحوادث .

١١ فصل : محدث العالم ليس بعرضٌ ، لأنّ العرض لا يقوم بنفسه والبادئ قائمٌ بنفسه .

١٢ فصل : صانع العالم ليس بجسمٍ ، لأنّه واحدٌ وأقلّ الجسم جوهران تضاماً .

١٣ فصل : صانع العالم لا يجوز أن يكون في مكان ، لأنّه يوجب تناهي ذاته والتناهي دليل الحدوث بكلّ حالٍ .

١٤ فصل : القديم سبحانه لا لون له ولا طعم ، لأنّ الألوان والطعوم

متضادّة ، فجميعها يستحيل أن يثبت < له > ولا بعض أوّلَى من بعضٍ ، فلا لون له ولا طعم .

١٥ فصل : القديم سبحانه لا ماهيّة له ولا يقال «ما هو» ، لأنّ «ما هو» سؤالٌ عن الجنس ولا جنس للقديم .

١٦ فصل : لا يقال للمعبود «كيف هو» ، لأنّه يستخبر «بكيف» عن الهيئة والحال والبادئ سبحانه لا هيئة له ولا حال .

١٧ فصل : لا يقال «أين هو» ، لأنّ «أين» يستخبر بها عن / المكان والقديم لا مكان له .

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١٨ فصل : لا يقال «متى كان» ، لأنّه سؤالٌ عن الزمان والقديم سبحانه لا يجوز عليه الزمان .

١٩ فصل : القديم سبحانه لا صوت له ، لأنّ الأصوات متضادّة ولا يجوز ثبوت جميعها له ولا صوت أوّلَى من صوتٍ .

٢٠ فصل : القديم سبحانه لا حاجة له ولا سهو ولا نوم ولا آفة ، لأنها دلائل الحدوث وهو قديم .

٢١ فصل : لا ولد للقديم سبحانه ولا زوجة ، لأنّ الولد بعض الوالد وهو أحديّ النرات ، والزوجة لمن جازت عليه الشهوة والشهوة حاجة المشتبهى الى ما يشتهيه وذلك سمة الحدوث .

٢٢ فصل : لا علةٌ لصنعه سبحانه فلا يقال «لمّ فعَل» ، لأنّه لو كان لفعله علةٌ ، فلو كانت قديمةً اقتضت قدّم معلولها وذلك محال ؛ ولو كانت حادثهً لكان لها علةٌ أخرى وأدّى إلى ما لا يتناهى وذلك محالٌ ؛ وإن استغنت العلة عن العلة ، استغنى سائر الحوادث عن العلة .

٢٣ فصل : القديم سبحانه لا يُقدّره وهم^٧ ولا يُصورّه فكرٌ ؛ فما خطر بالقلب أنّه كذلك فهو قادر على أن يخلق مثل ذلك ؛ كان ولا مكان وهو الآن على الوصف الذي عليه كان .

٢٤ فصل : القديم لا يقوم بذاته حادث ، لأنَّ مَنْ قَبْلَ ذاته الحوادث لم يخل منها ، ومن لم ينفكَّ عن الحوادث فهو حادث .

٢٥ فصل : صانع العالم قادرٌ . والدليل عليه استحالة وجود الفعل ممَّن ليس بقادرٍ . ثُمَّ هو على كلِّ مقدورٍ قادرٌ كما أنَّه بكلِّ معلومٍ عالمٌ .

٢٦ فصل : صانع العالم ، لأنَّ فعله محكم متقن ، والفعل المحكم يدلُّ على أنَّ فاعله عالمٌ . ثُمَّ هو بكلِّ معلومٍ عالمٌ ، لأنَّه لو لم يعلم معلوماً ، لحقه نقص وذلك في وصفه محال .

٢٧ فصل : صانع العالم مرید ، لأنَّ فعله مرَّتبٌ ، فلا بُدَّ من أن يكون قاصداً إلى تقديم ما تقدَّم وتأخير ما تأخَّر .

٢٨ فصل : صانع العالم حيٌّ ، لأنَّ < ن > من شرط العالم القادر المرید < أن يكون > حياً ، فإنَّ الموازيَّة تنافي هذه الصفات .

٢٩ فصل : صانع العالم موجود ، لأنَّه قادر عالم ، والقدرة والعلم لا يقومان إلاَّ بذاتٍ موجودٍ .

٣٠ فصل : صانع العالم سمیع بصير ، لأنَّ السمع والبصر صفتا مدح ، وفيهما نقص لا يرتفع ذلك النقص إلاَّ بثبوتهما ؛ والنقص في صفتيه سبحانه محال .

٣١ فصل : القديم سبحانه عالمٌ بعلمٍ قادرٌ بقدرةٍ مریدٌ بإرادةٍ سمیعٌ بسمعٍ بصيرٌ ببصرٍ متكلمٌ بكلامٍ باقٍ / ببقاءٍ ، لأنَّ إثبات قادر بلا قدرة كإثبات قدرة لا لقادر وكلاهما محال .

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٣٢ فصل : علمُ الباري سبحانه واحدٌ وكذلك قدرته وإرادته وسمعُه وبصره وحيوته وبقاؤه ، لأنَّ إثبات الصفة الواحدة واجب وما زاد عليه فالقول به متعارض .

٣٣ فصل : علمُ القديم سبحانه ليس بكسبٍ ولا ضرورة ، لأنَّ ذلك من سمات الحدوث وعلمُه قديمٌ .

٣٤ فصل : القديم سبحانه متكلم . دليله أنه مَلِكٌ ، والمَلِكُ يصحُّ منه < الأمر والنهي والوعد والوعيد .

٣٥ فصل : كلام البارئ سبحانه قديم ، لأنه لو لم يكن له في الأزل كلامٌ ، لكان بصدِّ الكلام موصوفًا ؛ ولو كان ضدَّ كلامه قديمًا ، لم يجوز أن يكون له فيما^٨ لا يزال كلامٌ وذلك محال لما ذكرناه .

٣٦ فصل : كلام البارئ قائم بذات البادئ ، لأنه يستحيل أن يكون متكلمًا بكلام في غيره ، كما يستحيل أن يكون عالمًا بغير علمه . والدليل عليه أن « المتكلم » من أخصَّ الأسماء التي تُشتقُّ^٩ من « الكلام » ، فوجب أن يكون المعنى الذي منه اشتقَّ قائمًا به .

٣٧ فصل : كلام البارئ سبحانه واحدٌ ، لأن الواحد لا بُدَّ من إثباته والعدد يتعارض القول به^{١٠} فلا عدد أوَّلَى من عدد .

٣٨ فصل : كلام البارئ ليس بحروفٍ ، لأن الحروف في أنفسها متضادَّة ولا توجد دفعةً وذلك يوجب حدوثه .

٣٩ فصل : كلام البارئ ليس بصوتٍ ، لأن الأصوات يُدرك نحابها بالحسِّ ؛ فلو كان كلامه صوتًا ، لكان من جنس هذه الأصوات وذلك محال لاقتضائه الحدوث .

٤٠ فصل : كلام البارئ ليس بعربيٍّ ولا سريانيٍّ ولا عبريٍّ ، لأن هذه أوصاف اللفظ المركَّب من الحروف وكلامه ليس بحروف .

٤١ فصل : كلام الله في الحقيقة مكتوبٌ في المصاحف ؛ ومعناه أن في المصحف كتابةً دالَّةً على عين الكلام ، كما أن النبي صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ مكتوبٌ في التوراة على الحقيقة ، لا على معنى أن ذاته ممَّا بين < صُحُفٌ > التوراة^{١١} .

٤٢ فصل : المصحف مخلوقٌ بجميع أجزائه ؛ وبأن كلام الله مكتوب فيه لا يجب قدمه ، كما أن المسجد مخلوق وبأن الله معبود في المسجد لا يجب قدمُ المسجد .

٤٣ فصل : كلام الله القديم مقروء < بألسنتنا > في الحقيقة محفوظ في القلوب ، كما أن الله في الحقيقة مذكور بألسنتنا معلوم في قلوبنا .

٤٤ فصل : قراءة أحدنا القرآن ولفظه وأصواته كلها مخلوقة ، والمقروء غير مخلوق . فالمقروء كلام الله القائم بذاته ؛ والقراءة ما لا يكون ثم يكون ومرة تكون طاعة ومرة تكون معصية ، إذا كان القارئ / جُنُبًا ، ومرة يطيب ومرة لا يطيب ومرة يزيد ومرة ينقص .

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٤٥ فصل : كلام الله سبحانه بالعربية يسمى «قرآنًا» وبالسريانية «إنجيلًا» وبالعبرية «توراة» ويكون القرآن أيضًا على الحقيقة كلام الله وكذلك التورية والإنجيل ، على معنى أنه يتلى بلغة العرب < بالعبرية > وبالسريانية ؛ ويسمى المقروء «قرآنًا» كما يسمى المشروب «شربًا» . ثم شهرة الاستعمال فيه جعله ١٢ حقيقة فيه لا يعرف غيره منه عند الإطلاق .

٤٦ فصل : كلام الله أمر ونهي وخبر واستخبار وخطاب ونداء ووعده ووعيد وقصص وأمثال ، وهو كلام واحد ؛ ولا يقال لكلامه في الأزل «أمر» و«نهي» و«خبر» و«استخبار» و«خطاب» ، وقيل ذلك فيما لا يزال ، كما لم يسم «خالقًا» في الأزل ثم يسمى «خالقًا» فيما لا يزال .

٤٧ فصل : تسمية كلام الباري «قرآنًا» و«تورية» و«إنجيلًا» لا تقتضي كثرة الكلام ، كما أن الباري يسمى «الله» بالعربية و«ايزد» بالفارسية و«تكري» ١٣ بالتركية وهو وا < حد > .

٤٨ فصل : كلام الله يصح أن يُسمع وقد سمعه موسى عليه السلام .
دليله أنه موجود .

٤٩ فصل : الباري سبحانه يجوز أن يرى . دليله أن الرؤية لا تقتضي حدوث المرئي بكل وجه ، فجاز تعلقها بالقديم سبحانه ، كالعلم والخبر ؛ وعكسها القدرة والإرادة .

٥٠ فصل : رؤية الله سبحانه للمؤمنين يوم القيامة وهم في الجنة واجبة من طريق الخبر . والدليل عليه قوله تعالى ﴿ تَحِيَّتُهُمْ يَوْمَ يَلْقَوْنَهُ سَلَامٌ ﴾ ١ ؛

وإذا < كان > وَصَفُ الْحَيِّ بِاللِقَاءِ مَقْرُونًا «بِالتَّحِيَّةِ» ، كان بمعنى الرؤية .

٥١ فصل : القديم سبحانه له صفاتٌ خَبْرِيَّةٌ . والدليل على جوازها قيامه بنفسه ؛ وَأَنَّ الْمَصْحَحَ لِقَبُولِ الْمَعَانِي فِي الْجَمَلَةِ الْقِيَامَ بِالنَّفْسِ . ثُمَّ الدليل على وجوب ذلك الخَبْرُ . فمن ذلك اليد والوجه .

٥٢ فصل : القديم سبحانه موصوفٌ بأنَّ له يدين هما صفتان أثبتناهما خبرًا . والدليل عليه قوله تعالى مَخْصَصًا لِآدَمَ وَمُظْهِرًا فَضْلَهُ عَلَى إِبْلِيسَ ﴿ مَا مَنَعَكَ أَنْ تَسْجُدَ ۚ لِمَا خَلَقْتُ بِإَيْدِي ۚ ١٦ ﴾ وسائر وجوه معنى «اليد» لا يفسد معنى التخصيص في هذا الموضع إِلَّا أَنْ يَكُونَ بِمَعْنَى الصِّفَةِ .

٥٣ فصل : إرادة الباري سبحانه نافذة في مراداته لا يجوز أن يريد كون شيءٍ فلا يكون أو يريد أن لا يكون شيءٌ فيكون ، لأنَّ مَنْ جَرَى فِي سُلْطَانِهِ مَا لَا يَكُونُ بِإِرَادَتِهِ كَانَ سَاهِيًا أَوْ مَغْلُوبًا وَذَلِكَ نَقْصٌ .

٥٤ فصل : صفات الباري باقياتٌ ، لأنها مستدامة الوجود وحقيقة «الباقي» أنه دائم الوجود .

٥٥ فصل : الباري سبحانه باقٍ . دليله ما ثبت من دوام وجوده وهو...

٥٦ > ... / لا يجب عليه أن يفعل < ما هو أصلح لهم . دليله استحاله الوجوب عليه بوجهٍ .

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٥٧ فصل : الواجبات كلها سمعيةٌ وليس فيها شيءٌ عقليٌّ . دليله أنَّ العقل عرضٌ ، فيستحيل أن يقال إنه موجب .

٥٨ فصل : إرسال الرُّسُل من طريق العقل جائزٌ ، لأنَّ التصرُّف للمالك ١٧ في ملكه ؛ وهو ليس بواجب بالعقل لما ذكرنا : أنه ليس في الواجبات شيءٌ عقليٌّ .

٥٩ فصل : أسماء الله تعالى تُؤخذ توقيفًا ولا يجوز أخذها قياسًا . دليله وجوب أسماءٍ وعدم جواز أسماءٍ في معناها ، كوجوب اسم «العالم» وامتناع «العاقل» .

فإن قيل ما معنى «الله» قيل^{١٨} : من له الإلهية والإلهية القدرة على اختراع الأعيان .

و «الرحمن الرحيم» : الذي له الرحمة على شرط المبالغة ؛ ولا فرق بينهما في الحقيقة ؛ وحقيقة «الرحمة» إرادة النعمة .

و «المَلِكُ» : الذي له المُلْكُ و «المَلِكُ»^{١٩} مبالغة من «المَلِكُ» ؛ وحقيقة «المُلْكُ» القدرة على الإيجاد .

و «القدّوس» : المنزّه من النقائص واشتقاقه من «القدس»^{٢٠} والقدس الطهارة .

و «السلام» : ذو السلامة من الآفات والعيوب : ويكون بمعنى سلّم المؤمنون من عقوبته .

«المؤمن» : المصدّق لوعده ، والمخير للمؤمنين من عقوبته .

و «المهيمن» : الشاهد ، ويعود إلى معنى كونه عالمًا بالمعلومات رائيًا للمرئيات .

و «العزیز» : الغالب الذي لا يُغلب الممتنع من أن يوصل إليه بمسافةٍ أو يُقصد بآفة^{٢١} ؛ ويكون بمعنى لا مثل له وبمعنى المعزلاً وليائه والمؤمنين من عباده .

و «الجبار» : الذي لا يناله الأيدي ، والمصلح لأُمور خلقه والذي^{٢٢} لا يجري في ملكه غير ما يريد .

و «المتكبر» : المستحقُّ لصفات العلوّ المنزّه عن النقائص .

و «الخالق» : الموجد عن العدم . وفي معناه «البارئ» .

و «المصوّر» : محدث الصُّور^{٢٣} .

و «الغفار» : ستار المعاصي .

و «القهار» : القادر^{٢٤} على < شرط > المبالغة ؛ وقيل :^{٢٥}

الذي حمل^{٢٦} الخلق على ما أراد منهم وإن كرهوا .

و «الوهاب» : الكثير العطاء .

و «الرِّزَاقُ»: الممكن للمخلوقات من الانتفاع. وينقسم الرزق الى حلالٍ وحرام.

و «الفتَّاح»: القاضي على خلقه كما شاء؛ ويكون المسهل للأُمور.

و «العلم»: الموصوف بالعلم على شرط المبالغة.

و «القابض»: مضيق الرزق على قوم؛ ويكون بمعنى قابل الصدقات.

و «الباسط»: موسع النعم على قوم كما شاء.

و «الخافض»: واضع الذنب عن قوم.

و «الرافع»: رافع الدرجات والقدر لقوم كما أراد.

و «المعزّ المذلّ»: معطي العزّ والذلّ لمن أراد بالنعم الدينيّة والدينيّة وأضدادها.

و «السميع»: من له إدراك المسموعات على شرط المبالغة.

و «البصير»: الذي يرى المرئيات برويته.

و «الحكّم»: القاضي على عباده / وبين عباده ، والمخبر عن

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أحوال عباده على ما شاء.

و «العدلّ»: الذي له أنّ يفعل غير مستوجبي لومًا فيما يصنعه.

و «اللطيف»: العالم بخفايا الأشياء ودقائقها؛ ويكون بمعنى

الملطّف المحسن مع عباده.

و «الخبير»: المخبر؛ ويكون بمعنى العالم.

و «الحليم»: من له حلم^{٢٧}؛ والحلم إرادة تأخير العقوبة.

و «العظيم» و «العليّ» و «الكبير» و «المتعالى» و «ذو الجلال»

و «الجليل» بمعنى واحدٍ وهو المستحقّ لأوصاف العلوّ والرفعة

والتقدّس عن النقائص والمصائب.

و «الغفور»: الكثير الستر الزلّة؛ وفي معناه «العفو».

- و «الشكور»: هو المجازي على العمل اليسير بالثواب الكثير.
- و «الحفيظ»: العالم ، والحافظ للمؤمن .
- و «المقيت»: في معنى «الرزاق» .
- و «الحسيب»: العالم .
- و «الكريم»: المنزه عن الدناءة ؛ ويكون بمعنى المحسن بما لا يجب والصفوح عن حقٍّ وجب له .
- و «الرقيب»: العالم والمبصر للأشياء الذي لا يخفى عليه شيء .
- و «الجيب»: الذي يعطي ما يُسئَل .
- و «الواسع»: الغني^{٢٨} ويكون > بمعنى العالم .
- و «الحكيم»: <^{٢٩} العالم : > ويكون < بمعنى المصيب في أفعاله .
- و «الودود»: الذي يُودَّ عباده المؤمنين ويودُّه المؤمنون .
- و «المجيد»: العظيم الكبير؛ و «المجد» في اللغة الشرق .
- و «الباعث»: الذي يبعث العباد للجزاء ؛ وهو: الذي يبعث الخواطر من القلوب .
- و «الشهيد»: العالم الرائي .
- و «الحقُّ»: الموجود ؛ هو ذو الحقِّ أيضاً ، ومحقق الحقائق .
- و «الوكيل»: المتولّي لما فُوض إليه من أعمال عباده .
- و «القويُّ» و «المتين» بمعنى «القادر» .
- و «الوليُّ»: الناصر لعباده والمتولّي للإحسان إليهم .
- و «الحميد»: المستحقُّ لحمد^{٣٠} الحامد الحمود .
- و «المحصي»: العالم .
- و «المبتدئُ»: المخترع .
- و «المعيد»: الموجد لما أعدمه بعد الإعدام ثانياً .
- و «المحيي» و «المميت»: خالق الحياة والموت .

- و «الحيُّ» : الذي له حياة .
و «القيوم» : المستغني عن غيره ؛ القائم بأمر خلقه .
و «الواجد» : الغني .
و «الماجد» : بمعنى «المجيد» .
و «الواحد» : الذي لا قسم له في ذاته ولا شبيه له ولا شريك .
و «الصُّمد» : السيّد وهو الذي يُقصد في الحوائج .
و «القادر» : الذي له القدرة ؛ وفي معناه «المقتدر» .
و «المقدّم المؤخّر» : الذي يخلق الأشياء في أوقاتها ويرتّبها في الوجود على ما أراد وعلم ، فما ^{٣١} علم أنّه يتقدّم في الوجود قدّمه وما علم أنّه يتأخّر أخّره .
و «الأوّل» : الذي لا ابتداء لوجوده ^{٣٢} .
و «الآخر» : الذي لا انتهاء لوجوده ^{٣٢} .
و «الظاهر» : القادر .
و «الباطن» : العالم .
و «الوالي» بمعنى الوالي ^{٣٣} ؛ ويكون بمعنى المالك .
و «البرُّ» : المحسن .
و «التوّاب» : قابل التوبة ورازقها .
و «الرؤف» / بمعنى «الرحمن الرحيم» .
و «مالك المُلْك» : بمعنى «الملِك» .
و «المنتقم» : المنتصر على أعدائه ؛ وهو : المجازي لهم بالعذاب على معاصيهم ؛ ويكون بمعنى المهلك لهم .
و «المقسط» : العادل ^{٣٤} في حكمه .
و «الجامع» : حاشر الخلق للثواب والعقاب .
و «الغنيُّ» : المتمكّن من تنفيذ إرادته في مراداته ؛ ويكون بمعنى نفي الحاجة .

و «المغني»: معطي الغنى مَنْ شاءَ من خلقه .

و «المانع»: الذي يمنع العطاء عن قومٍ والبلاء عن آخرين .

و «الضائر»: موصل الضرر إلى من أراد .

و «النافع»: موصل النفع إلى من شاء .

و «النور»: هادي مَنْ شاءَ من خلقه .

و «الهادي»: المعرف؛ ويكون ذلك بخلق^{٣٥} الإيمان .

و «البديع»: المبدع المخترع؛ ويكون بمعنى لا مثل له .

و «الباقي»: الذي دام وجوده^{٣٦} وفي معناه «الوارث» .

و «الرشيد»: المرشد، وهو بمعنى «الهادي» .

و «الصبور»: الحليم .

٦٠ فصل: البارئ سبحانه أرسل الرسل إلى خلقه . < الدليل > عليه

ما أظهر على أيديهم من العجائب والمعجزات .

٦١ فصل: لا يجوز إظهار المعجزات على أيدي الكذابين لتصديقهم ،

لأنَّ جوازه يؤدِّي إلى تعجيز البارئ سبحانه وما أدَّى إلى ذلك فهو باطل .

ووجه أدائه إليه أنَّ تعريف البارئ سبحانه إيانا الفرق بين النبيِّ والمتنبيِّ من

طريق الاستدلال أمرٌ ممكن متوهم الحدوث ، فيجب أن يكون سبحانه قادراً

< عليه > ؛ ولا يكون ذلك إلا بتخصيصهم بمعجزةٍ ، فلو وُجدت مع

الكذَّاب ، لانسدَّ طريق التميُّز وذلك محال .

٦٢ فصل: حدُّ «المعجزة» فعلٌ ناقصٌ للعادة في زمان التكليف ظهر

على محلِّ بالنبوَّة ؛ فإذا اختلَّ وصفٌ من هذه الأوصاف ، لم يكن معجزةً ،

وإن كان من جنسها . ولهذا لم يسمَّ كرامات الأولياء «معجزة» ، لأنَّها لا

تقترب بما < ذكرناه من > دعوى النبوَّة ؛ ولهذا جاز ظهور مثلها في دعوى

الربوبيَّة ، لأنَّه لم يوجد فيها دعوى النبوَّة ، ونحن جعلنا من شرطها التحدي

بالنبوَّة .

٦٣ فصل: نبينا محمدٌ صلَّى الله عليه وسلَّم نبيِّ حقٍّ وقوله صدق فيما

أتى به . والدليل على صدقه الكتاب الذي بين أيدينا نتلوه . والدليل على أن معجزة^{٣٧} > أنه عجز < العرب عند تحديه إياهم عن الإتيان بمثله في معارضته . والدليل على عجزهم عن معارضته ارتقاؤهم عن محاورته إلى محاربه حين تحدّاهم به ؛ والعاقل لا يترك أيسر الأمرين عند الإمكان في همّ استقبله ويشغل بلاشقّ ثم لا يحصل مقصوده .

٦٤ فصل : الإيمان الإتيان^{٣٨} بما أمر الله به فرضاً وندباً والانتهاؤ عمّا

نهى عنه تحريماً وأدباً . والدليل عليه إطلاق لفظ «الإيمان» / في الشرع على الطاعات ، لقوله تعالى ﴿وَمَا كَانَ اللَّهُ لِيُضِيعَ إِيمَانَكُمْ﴾^{٣٩} ، أي صلواتكم إلى بيت المقدس قبل تحويل القبلة .

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٦٥ فصل : الإيمان يزيد بالطاعات وينقص بالمعاصي . دليله أنه ، لما

ثبت أنه الطاعات ، فالطاعات تزيد وتنقص ، > فهو يزيد وينقص < .

٦٦ فصل : من عرف الله بدلائل توحيد . صحّ أن يقول : أنا في الحال

مؤمنٌ حقّاً ؛ والاستثناء للمأل دون الحال . والدليل عليه أن جواز تغيير المعنى في الثاني لا يمنع من إثبات الحكم المشتقّ منه عند^{٤٠} وجوده ، كالقائم في الحال قائمٌ ، وإن جاز أن يقعد في الثاني .

٦٧ فصل : الفاسق ، إذا كان مصدقاً لربه عارفاً به وبرسوله ، لا

يخرج بفسقه عن إيمانه . دليله أنه إن أوجب فسقه اسم «الفاسق» له أوجب ما معه من الإيمان اسم «المؤمن» أيضاً .

٦٨ فصل : من خرج من دنياه عارفاً بربه مؤمناً يكون من أهل الجنة لا

محالة ، وإن عذب بقدر معاصيه مدة . دليله قوله تعالى ﴿إِنْ تَجَنَّبُوا كِبَائِرَ مَا تَنْهَوْنَ عَنْهُ نَكُفْرَ عَنْكُمْ سَيِّئَاتِكُمْ﴾^{٤١} يريد «بالكبائر» الشرك ؛ وقال ﴿وَيَغْفِرُ مَا دُونَ ذَلِكَ لِمَنْ يَشَاءُ﴾^{٤٢} .

٦٩ فصل : من ضرب الله لمعمره أجلاً لم ينقص من عمره ولم يزد فيه ،

لقوله تعالى ﴿إِذَا جَاءَ أَجْلُهُمْ لَا يَسْتَأْخِرُونَ سَاعَةً وَلَا يَسْتَقْدِمُونَ﴾^{٤٣} .

٧٠ فصل : حقيقة «الرزق» ما يكون معداً مهياً للانتفاع به ؛ وينقسم

ذلك إلى حلال وحرام. ولا يجوز أن يكون «الرزق» بمعنى «الملك» لكون الطيور والبهائم مرزوقة وليس لها ملك.

٧١ فصل : حقيقة «النعمة» اللذة؛ والله سبحانه أنعم على جميع الحيوانات بما أوصل إليها من اللذات إلا أنه تعبد بعضهم بالشكر.

٧٢ فصل : حقيقة «الشُّكر» الاعتراف بنعمة المنعم على سبيل الخضوع. والدليل عليه أطراؤه وانعكاسه في جميع أحواله.

٧٣ فصل : أحلُّ ما أنعم الله على خلقه الإيمانُ والمعرفة ، لأنَّ بهما الوصول إلى الثواب المقيم والنجاة من العذاب الأليم.

٧٤ فصل : شفاعته^{٤٥} المصطفى صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ لأهل الكبائر من أمته واجبة حتى صدق. دليله ما روى أنه قال : «أذخرتُ دعوتي شفاعَةً لأهل الكبائر من أمّتي».

٧٥ فصل : الأسعار من قبل الله لا تتغيّر بكسب العباد. > الدليل عليه... <^{٤٦}.

٧٦ فصل : إجماع أمة المصطفى حجة مقطوع بها. دليله قوله تعالى ﴿وَكَذَلِكَ جَعَلْنَاكُمْ أُمَّةً وَسَطًا﴾^{٤٧} ، أي عدلاً/ والعدل مقبول القول.

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٧٧ فصل : نصب الإمام غير واجب من طريق العقل لما بيّننا : أنَّ الواجبات كلها سمعية.

٧٨ فصل : نصب الإمام واجب من طريق السمع. دليله مبادرة الأمة في كلِّ زمانٍ إلى نصب إمام واشتغالهم به عند موت النبي صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ.

٧٩ فصل : إثبات الإمامة طريقه الاختيار دون النص لعدم النقل فيه ، إذ لو كان نصًّا لوجب اشتهاؤه.

٨٠ فصل : إمامة المفضول ، إذا لم يكن هناك عذرٌ ، لا يجوز لانبساط يده على الكفاة ونفور الطبايع عن الانقياد للمفضول.

٨١ فصل : غير القرشي لا يجوز أن يكون إمامًا ، بدليل قوله صلى الله عليه وسلم : « الأئمة من قريش » .

٨٢ فصل : الإمام بعد نبينا أبو بكر الصديق ثم عمر الفاروق ثم عثمان ثم علي . والدليل عليه حصول العقد لهم في أوقاتهم من أهل الحل والعقد .

٨٣ فصل : ترتيب الأئمة الأربعة في الفضيلة كترتيبهم في الولاية : فاق لهم ولاية أفضلهم رتبة .

٨٤ فصل : أمير المؤمنين علي بن أبي طالب رضي الله عنه كان مصيبًا في جميع ما عمل من حربه وصلحه ؛ أدار الله الحق معه حيث دار . وكان طلحة والزبير وعائشة رضي الله عنهم مجتهدين غير قاصدين إلى محاربتة ؛ وظهرت توبتهم بعد خروجهم عليه .

٨٥ فصل : معوية كان مخطئًا بالقطع في خروجه على أمير المؤمنين علي ، إلا أنه كان مجتهدًا فلا نفسقه^٨ ؛ بذلك ؛ ونحسن الظن به لكونه من الصحابة وكتابه الوحي وغيره من الفضائل ؛ فنقول^٩ خرج < من > الدنيا تائبًا ، فإن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم قال : « لا تسبوا أصحابي » .

تم كتاب الفصول في الأصول للقشيري
رضي الله عنه

NOTES TO THE ARABIC TEXT

- ١ يتضمن : تتضمن C.
- ٢ ويتغير C; perhaps one should read فيتغير with al-Fūrakī, fol. 18v° 4, where the same formula occurs.
- ٣ جسم : جسم C.
- ٤ عرض : بعرض C.
- ٥ لازين : لان اين C.
- ٦ بصنعه : لصنعه C.
- ٧ فهم : perhaps one should read فهم here following the wording of *al Mu'tamad* (74v°: لا يقدره فهم ولا يصدره فكر) *Luma' in MIDEO* 15, 60, 18-19 and *al-Risāla* I, 19, 8 (= *sharh* I, 26).
- ٨ في : فيمَا C.
- ٩ يشق : تشق C.
- ١٠ فيه : به C; cp. § 32.
- ١١ ممان بين التورية : مما بين صحف التورية C.
- ١٢ يجعله : يجعله C.
- ١٣ وتكري : وتكري C.
- ١٤ 33.44.
- ١٥ يسجد : تسجد C.
- ١٦ 38.75.
- ١٧ التصرف للمالك : تصرف من المالك C; cp. al-Fūrakī, fol. 133r° 4f. where in a parallel context he says: ان الله مالك الملك وللمالك أن يتصرف في ملكه ما يشاء
- ١٨ C^m معنى الله +
- ١٩ والملك : والملك C; cp. *al-Tahbir*, p. 26.
- ٢٠ المقدس : المقدس C; cp. *al-Asmā'*, fol. 48r° 10f.
- ٢١ بأنه : بأفة C.
- ٢٢ الذي : والذي C.
- ٢٣ للصور : الصور C.
- ٢٤ القاهر : thus C, but perhaps one should read القاهر with *al-Asmā'*, fol. 62r° 1; in the formal system of analytical reduction of the divine predicates, however, both القاهر and القهار, when taken as "essential predicates" will be interpreted as referring to القدرة, whence القادر may be correct.
- ٢٥ C^m القهار +
- ٢٦ حمل : حمل C.
- ٢٧ حكم : حلم C.

- ٢٨ الغنيّ: الغنيّ C; cp. *al-Taḥbīr*, p.64 and *al-Asmā'*, fol. 91r°.
- ٢٩ The loss here may be more extensive than I have indicated. That '*al-ḥakīm*' falls in this position is clear from *al-Taḥbīr*, p.65 and *al-Asmā'*, fol. 91r°, even though there is, in neither of them, any equivalent to افعالهِ المصيبِ، concerning which cf. *al-Bayhaqī*, 22, where '*al-ḥakīm*' is associated with الإحكام explicitly by *abū Sulaymān* and implicitly by *al-Ḥalīmī*.
- ٣٠ thus C; one should, however, perhaps read للحمد; cf. n. 16 to the translation.
- ٣١ بما: خبا C.
- ٣٢ لوجود: لوجوده C.
- ٣٣ الولي بمعنى الوالي: الولي بمعنى الوالي C; الولّ، one should note, occurs above between *al-Matin* and *al-Ḥamīd*, as it does also in *al-Asmā'* (100r°) and in *Ibn 'Arabī's Risāla* (12v°), in both of which it is defined as here above. *Al-Wālī* does not have an entry in *al-Taḥbīr* or in *al-Asmā'* but does occur in the usual order in which the Names are listed (cf. L. Gardet in art. "al-Asmā' al-Ḥusnā" in *El2*, s.v.) as also in *Ibn 'Arabī's Risāla* in this position, i.e., between *al-Bāṭin* and *al-Barr* (fol. 15v°).
- ٣٤ العالم: العادل C.
- ٣٥ يخلق: يخلق C.
- ٣٦ وجود: وجوده C.
- ٣٧ معجز: معجزه C.
- ٣٨ اتيان: الإتيان C.
- ٣٩ 2.143.
- ٤٠ عنده: عند C.
- ٤١ 4.31.
- ٤٢ 4.48.
- ٤٣ 10.49.
- ٤٤ بها: بها C.
- ٤٥ شفاع: شفاعه C.
- ٤٦ For this article C reads: العباد والمسئلة تتعلق بمسئلة الأسماعار من قل هو الله لا يتغير بكسب.
- ٤٧ 2.143.
- ٤٨ يفسقه: نفسقه C.
- ٤٩ فيقول: فيقول C.

TRANSLATION

ARTICLES CONCERNING THE FUNDAMENTAL
ELEMENTS

[209r^o] In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

“Praise be to God, the Lord of the worlds” and prayer upon Muḥammad and his people all.

The following are articles containing the fundamental elements of the true faith.¹ In God is our help.

I. ‘The world’ is an expression denoting all created beings, such as the heavens, the lands, ourselves, etc. The world is divided into two categories: atoms and entitative accidents, the atom being that which receives the accident and, by virtue of it, changes from moment to moment. The atom, for example, is that which moves or rests and the accident, for example, is the motion or rest.

II. The fundamental meaning of ‘body’ is “that which is composite”, viz., two atoms that are conjoined. The evidence for this is that when the composition is augmented one says ‘corpulent’ or ‘more corpulent’.

III. ‘The Eternal’ is “that which is preëminently prior in existence” and, when used to describe Him (let Him be praised) is that He has no beginning.² ‘The temporally contingent’ is “that which was not and then came to be.”

IV. The world is temporally contingent. The evidence for this is that it is impossible that it exist apart from the temporally contingent entities that succeed one another in its atoms and that which cannot exist apart from something that is temporally contingent is temporally contingent.

V. There is a being that caused the world to exist. The evidence for this is that its being characterised by existence and not nonexistence requires something that determines the particular characterisation.

VI. The cause of the world’s existence is eternal. The evidence for this is that if it were temporally contingent, it would require a cause of existence and so likewise, then, the cause of its existence, and there would be an infinite regression, which is impossible.

VII. The cause of the world’s existence is an independently subsistent being,

since the act of knowing and of the power of deliberate action cannot belong to that which is not independently subsistent and its action evidences its knowing and its power of deliberate action.

VIII. The cause of the world's existence is one, since the activity of two would not take place in an orderly fashion and since both or one of them would have to be incapable of realising a deliberate action, which is absurd.

IX. The cause of the world's existence is not similar to created beings. The evidence for this is that if it were similar to them it would have to be temporally contingent or the world eternal, since it belongs to likes to be equivalent in every respect.

X. The cause of the world's existence is not an atom, since the atom is capable of receiving temporally contingent entities and temporally contingent entities do not inhere in the Eternal (let Him be praised).

XI. The cause of the world's existence is not an entitative accident, since the entitative accident is not independantly subsistent and the Creator is independantly subsistent.

XII. The Maker of the world is not a body, since He is one and the least body consists of two contiguous atoms.

XIII. The Maker of the world cannot be in a place, since this would entail the limitation of His being and to be limited is in all circumstances evidential of temporal contingency.

XIV. The Eternal (let Him be praised) has no color and no taste, since colors and tastes are contraries of one another; it is impossible that He actually have all of them and there is no one of them that has any more reason to exist than another, wherefore He has no color and no taste.

XV. The Eternal (let Him be praised) has no quiddity nor does one use the expression 'what is He?', since 'what is He?' is a question concerning class and the Eternal does not belong to any class.

XVI. In regard to Him who deserves to be worshiped one does not use the expression 'how is He?', since 'how' is employed to ask concerning bodily disposition and situation and the Creator (let Him be praised) has neither bodily disposition nor situation.

XVII. One does not use the expression 'where is He?', since 'where' is employed to ask concerning [209 v^o] place and the Eternal has no place.

XVIII. One does not use the expression 'when was He?', since this is a question concerning time and the Eternal (let Him be praised) cannot be qualified by time.

XIX. The Eternal (let Him be praised) has no sound, since sounds are contrary to one another; He cannot actually have all of them and there is no sound that has any more reason to exist than another.

XX. The Eternal (let Him be praised) has no need, no unawareness, no sleeping, and no defect, since these are evidential of temporal contingency and He is eternal.

XXI. The Eternal (let Him be praised) has neither child nor spouse, since the child is a part of the parent and He is unitary in His being, while a spouse belongs to one who is capable of desire and desire is a need of the one who desires for that which he desires and this is characteristic of temporal contingency.

XXII. There is no cause for His action (let Him be praised), wherefore one does not use the expression 'why did He act', since if there were a cause for His action and it were eternal, it would entail the eternity of its effect and this is impossible; and if it were temporally contingent, it would have another cause unto infinity and this is impossible, while if the cause needs no cause, the rest of contingent entities have no need of a cause.

XXIII. No imagining³ can measure the Eternal (let Him be praised) nor can any thought picture Him; He can create the like of whatever the mind may conceive as something He is like: He was and no place existed and He is now just as He was.⁴

XXIV. No temporally contingent entity subsists in the being of the Eternal, since whoever's being receives temporally contingent entities is never without them and whoever is inseparable from temporally contingent entities is temporally contingent.

XXV. The Maker of the world is capable of deliberate action. The evidence for this is the impossibility of the existence of an act on the part of one who is not capable of deliberate action. Furthermore, He is capable of deliberately effecting the existence of every entity whose existence can be effected, just as He knows every thing that is knowable.

XXVI. The Maker of the world knows, since His action is well and skillfully wrought and the well wrought act shows that the one who did it knows. Furthermore, He knows every thing that is knowable, because if He did not know

one knowable, He would be subject to an imperfection and it is impossible that He be so described.

XXVII. The Maker of the world wills, since His action is sequentially ordered and so He must intend to cause to occur first that which occurs first and to cause to occur later that which occurs later.

XXVIII. The Maker of the world is living, since one of the conditions of the one who knows and is capable of deliberate action and wills is that he be living, for to be lifeless is incompatible with these attributes.

XXIX. The Maker of the world exists, since He is capable of deliberate action and knows and the power of deliberate action and the act of knowing subsist only in an existent entity.

XXX. The Maker of the world hears and sees, because to hear and to see are attributes of perfection and their negation is an imperfection the which is only removed by their existence and it is impossible that He (let Him be praised) be described as having imperfection.

XXXI. The Eternal (let Him be praised) knows by virtue of an act of knowing, is capable of deliberate action by virtue of a power of deliberate action, wills by virtue of an act of willing, hears by virtue of an act of hearing, sees by virtue of an act of vision, speaks by virtue of an act of speaking, and perdures [210r°] by virtue of a perdurance, since to assert that one who is capable of deliberate action exists without a power of deliberate action is the same as to assert the existence of a power of deliberate action that does not belong to any agent capable of deliberate action, and both are impossible.⁵

XXXII. The Creator's act of knowing (let Him be praised) is one and so also His power of deliberate action, His act of willing, His hearing, His vision, His life, and His perdurance, since one must assert the entitative reality of the single attribute while the thesis of the existence of any more than this is contestable.

XXXIII. The Eternal's act of knowing (let Him be Praised) is neither inferential nor non-inferential, since these are the characteristics of temporal contingency and His act of knowing is eternal.⁶

XXXIV. The Eternal (let Him be praised) speaks. The evidence for this is that He is a king and a king can command and forbid and promise reward and threaten punishment.

XXXV. The Creator's speech (let Him be praised) is eternal, since if He

had no speech in past eternity He would be qualified by the contrary of speech and if the contrary of His speech were eternal, He could have no speech for eternity to come, and this is impossible for the reasons we have mentioned [v. § XXX].

XXXVI. The Creator's speech subsists in the Creator's being, since it is impossible that He speak by virtue of speech that is in another, just as it is impossible that He know by virtue of an act of knowing other than His own. The evidence for this is that 'speaks' is one of the most particular descriptive words that is derived from 'speech' (*al-kalām*) and the referent from [the name of] which it is derived must be subsistent in Him.⁷

XXXVII. The speech of the Creator (let Him be praised) is one, since one must assert the entitative reality of the one and the thesis of a numerical plurality is contestible, as there is no one number that has any more reason to exist than another.

XXXVIII. The speech of the Creator is not syllables, since syllables as such are contraries of one another and cannot exist all at once and this would necessitate its being temporally contingent.

XXXIX. The speech of the Creator is not a sound, since the characteristic of sounds is perceptible to sense, wherefore, if His speaking were a sound, it would belong to the class of these sounds [of which we have experience] and this is impossible, because it would entail temporal contingency.

XL. The speaking of the Creator is neither Arabic nor Syriac nor Hebrew, since these are descriptions of articulated utterance that is composed of syllables and His speaking is not syllables.

XLI. God's speaking is, in the strict sense, written on the pages of the copies of the Koran; the meaning of this is that on the pages of the copy is writing that signifies the speech itself, just as the Prophet (God's prayer and peace be upon him) is written, in the strict sense, in the Torah, not in the sense that his very being resides in the Torah.

XLII. The written copy is created in all its parts and it is not necessary that it be eternal because the speech of God is written in it, just as a mosque is created and it is not necessary that the mosque be eternal because God is worshiped in it.

XLIII. God's eternal speech is, in the strict sense, recited by our tongues and stored in our minds, just as God is, in the strict sense, referred to by our tongues and known in our minds.

XLIV. The recitation of the Koran by one of us, his utterance, and his sounds, are all created, but what is recited is uncreated. What is recited is, thus, the speech of God that subsists in His being, while the act of reciting is what is not and thereafter comes to be; at one time it is an act of obedience but at another is an act of disobedience (when the one who recites [210v^o] is in a state of ritual impurity); at one time he does it in a pleasant manner and at another he does not do it in a pleasant manner; at one time he adds something and at another he leaves something out.

XLV. God's speech (let Him be praised) [revealed and recited] in Arabic is called 'a *qur'ān*', in Syriac 'a gospel', and in Hebrew 'a torah'; but the Koran is also, in the strict sense, God's speech and so too the Torah and the Gospel, in the sense that it is read in the language of the Arabs, in Hebrew, and in Syriac. What is recited is called 'a *qur'ān*' [= 'a lection', 'a reading'], just as what is drunk is called 'a drink'. Subsequently the widespread usage [of the word '*qur'ān*'] in this particular sense caused it to become a noun which, in its normal, fundamental sense, properly designates it and by which, when it is used, one does not understand anything else.⁸

XLVI. God's speech is command, prohibition, statement, question, address, calling, promise, threat, narratives, and proverbs, but it is a single act of speaking. One does not, however, predicate 'command', 'prohibition', 'statement', 'question', 'address', [etc.,] of His speech in past eternity, though these predicates are used in eternity to come, just as He was not called 'creating' in past eternity but thereafter is called 'creating' in eternity to come.

XLVII. That Creator's speech be called 'Koran', 'Torah', and 'Gospel' does not imply the multiplicity of His speech, just as He is called '*Allāh*' in Arabic, '*Izīd*' in Persian, and '*Tanrı*' in Turkish, but is one.

XLVIII. It is possible that God's speech be audibly heard and Moses (peace be upon him) did in fact hear it. The evidence for this is that it exists.

IL. It is possible that the Creator (let Him be praised) be visually seen. The evidence for this is that visibility does not entail the temporal contingency of the visible in any way. Vision can, thus, have the Eternal (let Him be praised) as its object, just as knowing and predication can. Will and the power of deliberate action are opposites to them in this.

L. To see God (let Him be praised) is, on the basis of revelation, certain for the believers on the day of judgement when they are in paradise.⁹ The evidence for this is His statement (He is exalted), "Their greeting on the day

they shall meet Him will be 'Peace'" (33.44). When a living being is described as "meeting" and this is contextually joined to 'greeting' it has the sense of "seeing".

LI. The Eternal (let Him be praised) has attributes that are known [only] by report. The evidence for their possibility is that He is independently subsistent and the immediate condition of the possibility of receiving entitative attributes at all is to be independently subsistent. Secondly, the evidence for the certitude of this matter [, viz., that they do subsist in God,] is the revealed report. Among these attributes are His hand and His face.¹⁰

LII. The Eternal (let Him be praised) is described as having two hands which are attributes whose reality we assert on the basis of revealed report. The evidence for this is His statement (He is exalted), speaking of Adam in particular and making explicit his superiority over Iblis, "What prevented you from prostrating yourself before what I created with my hands?" (38.75). None of the other various senses of 'hand' can invalidate the sense of the particularity of the reference in this passage, but rather it must have the sense of the attribute.¹¹

LIII. The Creator's act of willing (let Him be praised) directly effects the objects of His willing; it is impossible that He will that something be and it not come to be or that He will that something not be and that it come to be, since He in whose jurisdiction there occurs what is not by his will is unaware or another's will is more effective than his and that is an imperfection.

LIV. The attributes of the Creator perdure, since their existence continues and the fundamental sense of 'perdures' is that its existence continues.

LV. The Creator (let Him be praised) perdures. The evidence is that the continuance of His existence is an established fact and He [...]

LVI. [... . God is not obliged to do] [211r°] what is most to their advantage. The evidence for this is that it is impossible that God be under obligation in any way whatsoever.

LVII. All moral obligations are grounded in revelation; not one of them is grounded by reason. The evidence for this is that reason is an accident and it is impossible to say that it imposes an obligation.

LVIII. That apostles be sent is theoretically possible, since the unrestricted use of his property belongs to the owner; it is not obligatory on the basis of reason, for the reason which we mentioned, sc., that not one of the moral obligations is grounded in reason.

LIX. God's names (He is exalted) are derived on the basis of divine instruction and may not be derived on the basis of reasoning. The evidence for this is that [the use of] some names is required while some names having the same sense are not allowed, as [the use of] the noun 'the knowing' is required while 'the intelligent' is not permitted.

1. If someone says: What is the sense of 'God'?, one replies: The sense of 'God' is "the one to whom Godhood belongs". Godhood is the power of deliberately creating concrete entities from nothing.¹²

2. '*al-Raḥmān*', '*al-Raḥīm*' is "the one to whom mercy belongs in a preëminent way"; there is no difference between the two words in their fundamental sense. The fundamental sense of 'mercy' is the act of willing the benefit [of some one].

3. '*al-Malik*' is "the one to whom sovereignty belong". '*Al-Malik*' is an intensive form of '*al-malik*'. The fundamental sense of 'sovereignty' is the power of deliberately causing existence.

4. '*al-Qaddūs*' is "the one who transcends imperfections"; the word is derived from '*al-quds*' [holiness] and holiness is purity.

5. '*al-Salām*' is "who has security from harm and defects". It may also have the sense "the believers are safe from His punishment".

6. '*al-Mu'min*' is "who substantiates His threat" and "who protects the believers from His punishment".

7. '*al-Muḥaymin*' is "the witness"; it refers basically to His knowing the things that are knowable and seeing those things that are visible.

8. '*al-'Azīz*' is "the one who overcomes and who cannot be overcome": whom it is impossible to reach or to attempt to harm. It may also have the sense "He has no like" and the sense "Who glorifies among His servants His saints and the believers".

9. '*al-Jabbār*' is "the one who is beyond reach"¹³ and "Who prospers the affairs of His creatures", and "the one in whose dominion other than what He wills does not occur."

10. '*al-Mutakabbir*' is "to Whom it belongs to be called by the predicates of highest exaltation": who transcends imperfections.

11. '*al-Khāliq*' is "Who makes to exist out of nonexistence"; '*al-Bāri*' is synonymous with it.

12. '*al-Muṣawwir*' is "one who causes things to have shape".

13. *'al-Ghaffār'* is "Who covers transgressions".

14. *'al-Qahhār'* is "Who is preëminently capable of deliberate action". Some say that *'al-Qahhār'* is "He who causes His creatures to do what He wills even if they are unwilling".

15. *'al-Wahhāb'* is "Who gives much".

16. *'al-Razzāq'* is "Who gives creatures opportunity of gaining benefit". Their sustenance (*al-rizq*) is divided into the allowed and the forbidden.

17. *'al-Fattāḥ'* is "Who judges His creatures as He wills"; it may also be "Who facilitates things".

18. *'al-'Alīm'* is "Who is described as knowing in a preëminent way".

19. *'al-Qābiḍ'* is "Who withholds sustenance from some people"; it may also have the sense "Who receives alms".

20. *'al-Bāsīt'* is "Who bestows blessings abundantly upon some people as He wills".

21. *'al-Khāfiḍ'* is "Who removes the burden of sin from some people".

22. *'al-Rāfi'* is "Who elevates the levels and the status of some people as He wills".

23. *'al-Mu'izz'*, *'al-mudhill'* is "Who bestows upon whom He wills glory and lowliness through the blessings that pertain to the life to come and to this world and through their contraries".

24. *'al-Samī'* is "to Whom belongs the perception of the audibles in a preëminent way".

25. *'al-Baṣīr'* is "He who sees the visibles by virtue of His sight".

26. *'al-Ḥakam'* is "Who passes judgement upon His servants [211 v°] and between His servants" and "Who makes known the situations of His servants as He wills".

27. *'al-'Adl'* is "He who may do what He does without deserving any reproach for the action He executes".

28. *'al-Laṭīf'* is "Who knows the things that are hidden from view and that are extremely minute" and it may also have the sense "Who is gracious and kindly with His servants".

29. *'al-Khabīr'* is "He who tells" and it may also have the sense "Who knows".

30. *'al-Ḥalīm'* is "the one to whom forbearance belongs". Forbearance

is the act of willing to postpone punishment.

31. 'al-'*Aẓīm*', 'al-'*Ahī*', 'al-'*Kabīr*', 'al-'*Muta'ālī*', 'Dhū l-'*Jalāl*', and 'al-'*Jalīl*' have one and the same sense, viz., "to Whom it belongs to be called by the predicates of highest exaltation and excellence and to be absolutely free of imperfections and defects".

32. 'al-'*Ghafūr*' is "Who often covers faults"; 'al-'*Afūw*' has the same sense.

33. 'al-'*Shakūr*' is "Who requites slight action with abundant reward".

34. 'al-'*Hafīẓ*' is "Who knows" and "Who keeps the believer".

35. 'al-'*Muqīt*' has the same sense as 'al-'*Razzāq*' (no. 16).

36. 'al-'*Ḥasīb*' is "Who knows".

37. 'al-'*Karīm*' is "Who transcends baseness" and it may also have the sense "Who bestows kindness that is not obligatory" and "Who readily disregards something that is due Him as an inalienable right".

38. 'al-'*Raqīb*' is "Who knows" and "Who sees things and from Whom nothing is hidden".

39. 'al-'*Mujīb*' is "He who gives what is asked".

40. 'al-'*Wāsī*' is "the Self-sufficient" (*al-ghanī*; v. no. 75).

41. 'al-'*Ḥakīm*' is "Who knows" and it may also have the sense "Who is inerrant in His actions".

42. 'al-'*Wadūd*' is "He who loves His servants who believe" and "Whom the believers love".

43. 'al-'*Majīd*' is "the Majestic", "the Great" (*al-'Aẓīm*, *al-'Kabīr*; v. no. 31); 'al-'*majd*' (glory) in everyday usage is "nobility".

44. 'al-'*Bā'ith*' is "He who raises up His servants for punishment or reward" and "He who sends the thoughts that arise in men's minds".

45. 'al-'*Shahīd*' is "Who knows and sees".

46. 'al-'*Ḥaqq*' is "Who exists" and furthermore is "the one whose right is upheld" and "Who upholds rights".¹⁴

47. 'al-'*Wakīl*' is "Who takes charge of the acts of His servants which are entrusted to Him".

48. 'al-'*Qawī*' and 'al-'*Matīn*' have the same sense as 'al-'*Qādir*' (no. 61).

49. 'al-'*Walī*' is "Who comes to the assistance of His servants" and "Who takes responsibility for treating them with kindness".

50. 'al-Ḥamīd' is "Who deserves the praise of him who praises": the praised.¹⁵

51. 'al-Muḥṣī' is "Who knows".

52. 'al-Mubtadi' is "Who creates out of nothing".

53. 'al-Mu'īd' is "Who causes those whose existence He has terminated to exist a second time after having terminated their existence".

54. 'al-Muḥyī' and 'al-Mumīt' are "who creates life and death".¹⁶

55. 'al-Ḥayy' is "He to whom life belongs".

56. 'al-Qayyūm, is "Who has no need of another"¹⁷; "Who sees to the affair of His creatures".

57. 'al-Wājid' is "the Self-sufficient" (*al-ghanī*; v. no. 75).

58. 'al-Mājid' has the same sense as 'al-Ma'jīd' (no. 43)

59. 'al-Wāḥid' is "He who has no division in His being, no like, and no associate".

60. 'al-Ṣamad' is "the Leader", i.e., the one to whom people turn in their needs.¹⁸

61. 'al-Qādir' is "the one to whom belongs the power of deliberate action"; 'al-Muqtadir' has the same sense.

62. 'al-Muqaddim', 'al-Mu'akḥḥir' is "He who creates beings in their times and sequentially orders them in existence as He wills and knows": what He knows will be prior in existence He makes prior and what He knows will be later He makes later.

63. 'al-Awwal' is "He whose existence has no beginning".

64. 'al-Ākḥir' is "He whose existence has no end".

65. 'al-Zāhir' is "Who is capable of deliberate action" (*al-Qādir*: no. 61).

66. 'al-Bāṭin' is "Who knows".

67. 'al-Wālī' has the same sense as 'al-Walī' (no. 49) and also may have the sense "Who has proprietary ownership" (*al-Mālik*).

68. 'al-Barr' is "Who acts with kindness".

69. 'al-Tawwāb' is "Who accepts repentance" and "Who bestows it".

70. 'al-Ra'ūf' [212r°] has the same sense as 'al-Raḥmān, al-Raḥīm' (no. 2).

71. 'Mālik al-mulk' has the same sense as 'al-Malik' (no. 3).

72. '*al-Muntaqim*' is "Who triumphs over His enemies", i.e., who requites them with punishment for their acts of disobedience; it may also have the sense "Who destroys them".

73. '*al-Muqsiṭ*' is "Who is equitable in His judgement".

74. '*al-Jāmi*' is "Who gathers His creatures for reward and punishment".

75. '*al-Ghanī*' is "Who is capable of making His act of willing effect the objects of His will" and it may have the sense of the denial of need.

76. '*al-Mughnī*' is "Who gives wealth to whom of His creatures He wishes".

77. '*al-Māni*' is "He who withholds gifts from some people and tribulation from others".

78. '*al-Dārr*' is "Who causes harm to touch whom He wills".

79. '*al-Nāfi*' is "Who causes benefit to touch whom He wishes".

80. '*al-Nūr*' is "Who guides aright whom of His creatures He wishes".

81. '*al-Hādī*' is "Who causes people to know"¹⁹ and this is by creating belief.

82. '*al-Badī*' is "Who initiates being and creates from nothing" and it may also have the sense "He has no like".

83. '*al-Bāqī*' is "He whose existence perdures" and '*al-Wārith*' has the same sense.²⁰

84. '*al-Rashīd*' is "Who gives guidance" and has the same sense as '*al-Hādī*' (no. 81).

85. '*al-Ṣabūr*' is "the Forbearing" (*al-Halīm*: no. 30).

LX. The Creator (let Him be praised) has sent apostles to His creatures. The evidence for this is the wonders and the miracles that He has manifested through them.

LXI. Miracles cannot be manifested through liars in such a way as to imply that they speak the truth, since such a possibility would have the effect of making God incapable of accomplishing what He wills and whatever would have such an effect is not the case. The way it would have this effect is that God's making the difference between a prophet and one who merely claims to be a prophet recognisable for us through inferential reasoning is something whose occurrence is possible and conceivable, wherefore He must be capable of it, but this cannot be save through singling the former out by means of a miracle. If, then, such

were to exist with a liar, the means of distinguishing would be precluded and this is impossible.

LXII. The definition of 'miracle' is "an act that is contrary to the established norm²¹ at the time of the imposition of obligations and which is manifested through one who is invested with the office of prophet". When any one of these elements is lacking it is not a miracle, even if it belong to the same class of events.²² It is for this reason that the charisms (*karāmāt*) of the saints are not called 'miracle', since they are not contextually associated with the claim to be a prophet, which we mentioned. For this reason such an event may be manifested in the case of a claim of mystical union with God's Lordship (*al-rubūbīya*), since in this case there is present no claim of being a prophet. We include among its conditions also the challenge in regard to being a prophet.²³

LXIII. Our prophet, Muḥammad (God's prayer and peace be upon him) is a true prophet and his statements are true concerning what he presented. The evidence for his truthfulness is the Scripture that we have before us and which we read. The evidence that it is miraculous is that the Arabs, when he challenged them, were incapable of producing anything like it in their opposition to him. The evidence of their inability to oppose him is that they ceased talking to him and took up arms against him when he put this challenge to them; the intelligent man does not abandon the easier of two possible courses of action in a problem that confronts him and take up the more arduous and then have his purpose come to naught.

LXIV. Belief²⁴ is the doing of what God has commanded as obligatory or as advisable and to refrain from what He has forbidden as wholly unlawful or as unseemly. The evidence for this is the use of the word 'belief' [212 v°] in the revealed law to denote acts of obedience, for He (He is exalted) says, "God would not vitiate your belief" (2.143), that is to say, 'your praying in the direction of Jerusalem' prior to the alteration of the *qibla*.

LXV. Belief increases with acts of obedience and diminishes with acts of disobedience. The evidence for this is that since it is a fact that it consists in acts of obedience and acts of obedience increase and decrease, it increases and diminishes.

LXVI. He who knows God through the evidences of His Unity (*al-Tawḥīd*) can validly say "I am truly a believer at this moment"; the conditional clause²⁵ is used in reference to the future, not the present. The evidence for this is that the possibility that the referent [, viz., the entitative attribute.] change does not preclude the assertion of the truth of the judgement derived from it while it

actually exists, just as the who is standing is standing even if it is possible that he subsequently sit down.²⁶

LXVII. The sinner, when he acknowledges his Lord and recognises Him and His Apostle, does not cease to be a believer because of his having sinned. The evidence for this is that if his sin necessitates his bearing the name 'sinner', the belief he has also necessitates the name 'believer'.²⁷

LXVIII. He who departs his earthly life acknowledging his Lord and as a believer will unquestionably be one of the blessed, even if he be punished for a time according to the measure of his acts of disobedience. The evidence for this is His statement (He is exalted), "If you avoid the major sins that you are forbidden, We will free you from your wrongful deeds" (4. 31), meaning by 'the major sins' polytheism; He has said, "He will forgive what is less than that to whom He will" (4. 48).

LXIX. He for whose life God has fixed a term can neither shorten his life nor lengthen it, because of His statement, "When their term comes, they shall neither delay nor advance" (7. 34).

LXX. The fundamental sense of 'sustenance' (*al-rizq*) is "that which is apt and suited to be used to advantage"; it is of two kinds: the licit and the illicit. 'Sustenance' cannot have the sense of 'property', since birds and beasts are granted sustenance but possess no property.

LXXI. The fundamental sense of 'blessing' (*al-ni'ma*) is "pleasure"; God has blessed all living beings by the pleasures He has brought them, but on some of them He has imposed the religious obligation of showing gratitude.

LXXII. The fundamental sense of 'showing gratitude' is "the acknowledgment, in humble subjection, of the blessing of Him who bestows blessings". The evidence for this is that the expressions are coëxtensive and coëxclusive in all contexts.

LXXIII. The most licit of the blessings that God has bestowed upon His creatures are belief and knowledge, since it is through them that one achieves the everlasting reward and salvation from the painful punishment.

LXXIV. The intercession of God's Chosen One (God's prayer and peace be upon him) on behalf of those of his community who have committed major transgressions is certain, right, and true. The evidence is the report that he said, "I have postponed my supplication as intercession on behalf of those of my community who have committed major transgressions."

LXXV. God is responsible for [the levels of] prices; they do not alter because of the deliberate action of human beings. [...].

LXXVI. The consensus of the community of God's Chosen One is a definitive proof. The evidence is His statement (He is exalted), "And thus We have made you a moderate community" (2. 143), i.e., just[213 r°], and the just man is one whose statement is legally acceptable.

LXXVII. The appointment of an Imam is not obligatory on theoretical grounds, for the reason we have shown (§LVII), viz., that all obligations are grounded in revelation.

LXXVIII. The appointment of an Imam is obligatory on the basis of revelation. The evidence is 1) that the community has at all times hastened to appoint an Imam and 2) their concern to do this at the death of the Prophet (God's prayer and peace be upon him).

LXXIX. Confirmation [of an individual] in the office of Imam is by deliberate choice, not by authoritative designation, as there is no witness to the latter in the tradition, since had there been any authoritative designation it would have to be widely known.

LXXX. That the less qualified be Imam when there is no circumstantial justification is not allowed, since his authority extends to all and because of the natural repugnance to having to submit to the authority of one who is less qualified.

LXXXI. A person who does not belong to the tribe Quraysh cannot be an Imam, as is shown by His statement (God's prayer and peace be upon him), "The imams are from Quraysh".

LXXXII. The Imam next after our Prophet was abū Bakr, the Upright, next 'Umar, the Incisive, next 'Uthmān, and next 'Alī. The evidence for this is that in their times they did receive the formal acceptance of those who had the legal power of rejection and acceptance.

LXXXIII. The relative rank of the four Imams in respect of personal excellence is as their order in holding office: the most excellent of them in relative rank was prior in holding office.

LXXXIV. The Commander of the Believers, 'Alī ibn abī Tālib (may God be gracious to him) acted correctly in all that he did in making war and making peace; God caused the right to be with him wherever he turned. Talḥa, al-Zubayr and 'Ā'isha (may God be gracious to them) acted according to their best judge-

ment without intending to go to war against him. It is evident that they repented after revolting against him.

LXXXV. Mu'āwīya was unquestionably in error in his revolt against the Commander of the Believers, 'Alī, but he acted according to his best judgement so that we do not consider him a sinner on this account, but hold him in good repute because he was one of the Companions, because he wrote down the revelation, and because of other virtues, and so we hold that he departed this life repentant, for the Prophet (God's prayer and peace be upon him) said, "Do not insult my Companions".

The end of *The Articles Concerning the Fundamental Elements*
by al-Qushayrī. May God be gracious to him.

NOTES TO THE TRANSLATION OF *AL-FUṢŪL*

1. 'The true faith' is not the normal rendering of '*al-tawhūd*', but the use of the word in this sense is not uncommon; i.e., it is not infrequently employed, as by extension (*tawassu'an*) to designate the totality of the basic articles of the Muslim creed, including the common doctrines concerning the Prophet, his miracles, the imamate, etc.; cf., for example, its use as the title of Ibn Khuzayma's *Kitāb al-Tawhūd*.
2. It might be better, perhaps, to render '*al-qadīm*' here by 'ancient' (the normal sense of the word in literary, classical arabic), but its use in the following articles would then have either to be inconsistent or to be non-representative of the formal sense that it has in the *kalām* and which the author wishes here to establish.
3. For 'imagining' (*wahmun*) perhaps one should here read 'understanding' (*fahmun*) with *Luma'* and *al-Mu'tamad*; see n. 7 to the text, *supra*, p. 74.
4. This appears to be a paraphrase of a gloss (apparently by Ibn Fūrak) on a statement by Muḥammad b. al-Maḥbūb, the servant of Abū 'Uthmān Sa'īd b. Salām al-Maghribī (d. 373/983-4) cited in *al-Risāla* I, 37, 11 f. (= *sharḥ* I, 51, 20f.); cf. also *al-Niẓāmī*, fol. 54 v°, 13 ff.: مسألة : اعلم ان الله تعالى كان في الأزل ولا مكان وهو الآن على ما لم يزل كان لم يتغير يخلق المكان عما هو عليه كان . وهو مستغن عن كل مكان قد نزه عن أن تحويه جهة أو يقفه مكان . Question; Know that God (the exalted) was in eternity and no place existed and He is now just as He was from eternity; He has need of no place; He transcends being contained by a position or supported by a place". Note that the wording '*an tahwīyahū jihatun 'aw-yuqillahū makān*' would seem to indicate that the author makes the same formal distinction between 'place' (*makān*) and 'position' (*jīha*) as do the Basrian Mu'tazila; cf. my *Beings and their Attributes*, p. 114, n. 16.

5. The argument here is essentially this: the affirmation of the predicates 'knows', 'is knowing', etc., implies the existence of the entitative acts of knowing, etc., subsistent in the subject of which the predicate is affirmed, its existence being the basis of the truth of the predicate. A subject, validly so described, can no more exist without the subsistence in it of the entitative "accident" or "attribute" than can the "accident" or "attribute" without there being an entity in which it subsists and of which, therefore, the predicate is true. Since he has shown (§§ XXVI ff.) that the predicates 'knows', 'is capable of deliberate action', etc., must be true, the "attributes" must subsist in Him.
6. Inferential knowing and non-inferential knowing are the two classes of created knowing, i.e., non-inferential knowing, like that based on inference and reasoning, is correlated to experience and depends for its existence in the knower upon God's deliberate action, while God's act of knowing is eternal and embraces all knowables and so belongs to neither of these classes. 'Inferential' and 'non-inferential' are not the words most usually employed to render '*kasb*', '*iktisāb*', '*kasbī*' and '*ḍarūra*', '*iḍṭirār*', '*ḍarūrī*' respectively in this usage, but 'acquired' and 'necessary', which are usual, are contextually vague in English and convey little of the precise formal sense of the Arabic terminology.
7. The argument, analogous to that of § XXXI (see n. 5 above), is quite simple and straightforward and is common to the Basrian tradition, especially the Ash'arites (cf., e.g., al-Ash'arī, *Risāla ilā ahl al-thaḡhr in Ilahiyat Fakultesi Mecmuası* 8 [1928], p. 95, 5 ff.). The way it is formulated, however, is difficult to follow in English without a certain appearance of obtruseness which I have tried to mitigate by minor paraphrasing and insertions in the translation. The difficulty lies chiefly in the history of the formulae and the analysis, i.e., the *kalām*'s adaptation of originally grammatical terminology and notions. The sense of the argument is that the existence of the referent of the word 'speech' (*kalām*) is implied in the affirmation of the predicate 'speaks' (or 'spoke', 'has spoken', 'is speaking': *mutakallim*) which is grammatically derived from it. Thus too in *al-Risāla* 11, p. 433, 14f. (= *sharḥ* III, p. 116, 20ff.) he says that "'who wills' (*al-murīd*), by virtue of its derivation, is 'he to whom an act of willing belongs', since it belongs to the class of derived predicate nouns"; cf. also *ibid.* p. 448, 12f. (= *sharḥ* III, 139, 1 ff.) where he uses *ismun lāzim* in place of *ismun mushṭakḳ*. On this see also my *Beings and their Attributes*, pp. 135 ff. and "Attribution, Attribute, and Being: Three Islamic views" in *Ancient and Medieval Philosophies of Existence* (ed. P. Morewedge, New York, 1980).
8. Al-Qushayrī's analogy "just as what one drinks (*al-mashrūb*) is called a *sharāb*" means to explain and to clarify his thesis of the identity of the recited text as the speaking (or "speech") of the speaker: the *mashrūb* is the substance of what is consumed when one drinks: an entity that is entirely distinct from the act of drinking which is the act of the drinker. This may be contrasted with the wholly contrary analysis of the words put forward by abū Ishāq Ismā'īl b. 'Abdallāh b. Constantine (d. A.H. 170 or 190; cf. al-Dhahabī, *al-Qurrā' al-Kibār*, Cairo, 1969, I, p. 120, 2) and reported by abū 'Abdallāh al-Shāfi'ī (d. 268/881; al-Subkī 2, p. 69): "'al-Qurān' is a (simple) noun and has no *hamza*; if it were from '*qara'*'tu' (I read aloud) then everything that is read aloud would be a Koran. On the contrary it is the name of the Koran, like '*al-Tawrāh*' and '*al-Injīl*'" (al-Dhahabī, *op. cit.*, I, p. 119; the same tradition is reported by al-Azhārī, *Tahdhīb al-luḡha* 9, p. 271; cf. also *Lisān al-'Arab*, s.v.).
9. See n. 10 to the translation of *Luma'*, in *MIDEO* 15, p. 72.
10. For the contrast of "possibility" (*al-jawāz*) and "necessity" (*al-wujūb*, here rendered 'certitude') see n. 9 above. I have rendered *wujūb* by 'certitude' here in order to maintain

the parallelism with the preceding article and with *Luma'*, p. 61,8, though the word might be correctly translated 'necessity'; that is, these "attributes", since they are "essential attributes" (sc., attributes that subsist eternally in God's being) exist necessarily; cf., e.g. *Mushkil*, pp. 379, 2-5 and 381, 13 ff. (for 'ahad at p. 381, 13 of the printed edition one should probably read *ma'khadh* with MS. Damad Ibrahim Paşa no. 404, fol. 72r°, 3) and cp. *al-Niẓāmī*, fol. 103 v°, 19 ff. Al-Qushayrī reports in *al-Risāla* II, p. 612 (= *sharḥ* IV, 86) that some authorities of the first generations of Muslims (*al-salaf*) included God's love (*al-mahabba*) amongst these attributes.

11. The nature of the attribute referred to, however, is not discussed; according to the Ash'arite authorities we have no means of knowing the exact nature of this attribute, though we are certain, at least that it is not a physical hand. For the argument, cf., e.g., *Ta'wīl*, fol. 128 v°-130 r°, *Mushkil*, 34,5, al-Ash'arī, *Risāla ilā ahl al-thaghr*, pp. 96 f., and al-Bayhaqī, pp. 319 f.
12. The definition given here is formally strict and correct according to the canons of the system; i.e., the descriptive term or predicate (verb or verbal adjective or simple adjective) that does not simply name the subject or its class is understood to be derived from and to signify the noun which names an "attribute", action, or some entity that belongs to or is related to the subject in a particular way. Since there is no proper *maṣdar* (verbal noun) for 'Allāh' (or 'ilāh'), one uses the form built with the suffix '-iyā'a' (a legitimate means of forming a *maṣdar* according to the grammarians). The *mutakallimūm* of the classical period, following the logic of their rigid nominalism, understand this form not as an abstract signifying a concept or designating a universal but as a noun denoting a concrete property, perfection, or "attribute" of the subject. Those which designate God's "essential attributes" are, then, within the conventional semiotics of the predicates and names (*al-ṣifāt wal-'asmā'*) systematically reduced to the base terms used to designate the particular attributes or predicates, in this instance *al-quḍra*, following the author's interpretation of 'Allāh' in this passage. For the system, cp. the analogous interpretation of, e.g., 'al-Malik' (below, no. 3) and 'al-Ḥalīm' (below, no. 30); with this interpretation of 'Allāh' cp. Gregory of Nyssa, *Opera Minora* III, p. 22, 8 ff.
13. That this is how al-Qushayrī understands *al-ladhī lā yanāluhu l-'aydī*, cf. *al-Taḥbīr*, p. 33.
14. The sense of *muḥaqqiqū l-ḥaqā'iq* is highly ambivalent; in rendering it I have followed the indication of *al-Taḥbīr*, p. 68, ult. (محقق الحَقِّ) and *al-Asmā'*, fol. 96 v°, 11 (الحق في وصفه بمعنى يثبت الحق). One might also, however, as it stands here virtually without controlling context, understand it as "who determines rights as rights" or as "who causes things to be as they essentially are"; for the latter interpretation, cp. *ibid.*, fol. 126 v°, ult. (ان الله خالق الأعيان وبادئها وجعل العين عيناً والذات ذاتاً).
15. This is the reading of the manuscript; one should perhaps read *lil-ḥamd* for *li-ḥamd* and so translate "'Who deserves praise' and 'the praiser and the praised'"; cp. *al-Taḥbīr*, pp. 72 f.
16. Since "lifelessness" or "inanimacy" (*al-mawt*) is considered by the Ash'arites (and some of the Mu'tazila) to be a real, entitative accident, one may properly and strictly speak of "creating death".
17. 'Al-qayyūm' in this first definition he takes as an equivalent of 'qā'im bil-nafs' (independently subsistent; cf. *al-Asmā'*, fol. 14 r°, 9: القَيُّوم على الحقيقة هو الذي يقوم بنفسه) and in such a way as to restrict the use of the expression to God alone; cf. *al-Niẓāmī*, fol. 20 v°: أما القائم بالنفس فهو المستغني عن غيره وعلى هذا فلا قائم بالنفس إلا الله.
18. This is the most commonly given lexical definition of *al-Ṣamad*. Elsewhere, however,

- al-Qushayrī takes God's "being *ṣamad*" (*al-ṣamadīya*) in terms of His essential, unknowable transcendence; cf., e.g., *al-Risāla* I, p. 260, 6–8 (= *sharḥ* II, p. 92, 15 ff.) and II, 612, pp. 16 f. (= *sharḥ* IV, p. 87, 14 ff.), an interpretation that would appear to be based on a meaning frequently proposed for 'al-*ṣamad*' that he seems to reject in *al-Taḥbīr* and *al-Asmā'*: "The meaning is said to be 'He who remains, who will not depart' and is said to be 'who remains' and is said to be 'He who contains no concavity', while the lexicographers say that 'al-*ṣamad*' is 'the one to whom people turn...', and this is the correct sense": *al-Taḥbīr*, p. 88, 4–6 = *al-Asmā'*, fol. 109 v^o, 13–15.
19. 'Who causes people to know' (*al-mu'arrif*), i.e., who causes them to have *ma'rifa*. Here, because of the following, explanatory paraphrase, *wa-huwa bi-khalqī l-īmān*, it is clear that the author takes *ma'rifa* as a synonym of 'ilm, formal, conceptual knowing and understanding; 'ilm is the initial element and foundation of belief (*al-īmān*, on which see *Luma'*, p. 62, 13 and *al-Fuṣūl*, §§ LXIV ff. below). This equivalence (sc. "'ilm' = 'ma'rifa'') is common in the *kalām*, even if the words are not interchangeable in all context. (For their equivalence, cf., e.g., *al-Risāla* II, p. 601, 11 ff. = *sharḥ* IV, pp. 62 f.) Nonetheless, by saying "causes *ma'rifa*" he clearly wants also to hear the special sense of this word as it is employed by the *ṣūfīs*, on which see F. Rosenthal, *Knowledge Triumphant* (Leiden, 1970), pp. 164 ff.
 20. 'Al-Bāqī' and 'al-Wārith' are also combined into a single article in *al-Taḥbīr* (cf. pp. 93 f.) and *al-Asmā'* (foll. 127 v^o–128 v^o), the latter being defined thus: وأما الوارث فهو الباقي بعد فناء الخلق [١٦، ٤٠]... [لمن الملك اليوم] المقرب من الملائكة المقربين والأنبياء والمرسلين ثم يقول ﴿لمن الملك اليوم﴾. The definition in *al-Taḥbīr* ends with *fanā'i l-khalq*.
 21. The "norm" (*al-'āda*) is the universally observed consistency and regularity of the sequences and order of natural phenomena. There is, however, no "nature" for the Ash'arite system, so that *al-'āda* is simply God's convention ('*āda*) or custom, operating extrinsically upon material entities.
 22. 'Min *jinsihā*', i.e., the class of events that are contrary to the "norm".
 23. In the context *al-taḥaddī* is a technical expression: a prophet's formally challenging those who deny his claim of authority to produce themselves the like of a particular miracle that has been manifested through him.
 24. See above, n. 19.
 25. The conditional clause is 'in *shā'a llāh* (if God wills), which the Ḥanbalites insist must be used as a matter of *sunna*.
 26. On the argument see nn. 5 and 7 above.
 27. Cf. n. 19.