The Distinctive Terminology in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* by Raḍī l-Dīn al-ʾAstarābāḏī

Beata Sheyhatovitch

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The Distinctive Terminology in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* by Raḍī l-Dīn al-ʾAstarābāḏī

By

Beata Sheyhatovitch

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In loving memory of my grandparents, Nina and Semion Sheyhatovitch.
True love never dies!

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Contents

Acknowledgements

Introduction

1.1 Background

This book analyzes unique aspects of grammatical terminology in Raḍī l-Dīn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-ʾAstarābāḏī's[1] *Šarḥ al-Kāfya*, a commentary on Ibn al-Ḥājib's *Kitāb al-Kāfya*.

ʾAbū ʿAmr ʿUṯmān ibn ʿUmar al-Kurdī, known as Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 646/1249), was an Egyptian-born grammarian, theologian and jurist of Kurdish origin. He owes his nickname, Ibn al-Ḥājib, to his father, who was a *ḥājib* 'chamberlain' of an emir. Ibn al-Ḥājib spent some time in Damascus and in Karak, then returned to Egypt and died there.[2] His concise treatise *Kitāb al-Kāfya*, whose focus is on syntax, describes the Arabic language by a set of short definitions that can serve as a starting point for more advanced and detailed discussions. Carter (1990:134–135) considers *Kitāb al-Kāfya* to be an abridged version of Zamaḫšarī's *al-Mufaṣṣal*, and as such almost entirely lacking in originality.[3] Muḥaymar, who also points out (Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 63–64) the structural and terminological resemblance between the two treatises, and agrees that Ibn al-Ḥājib was influenced by Zamaḫšarī, maintains, however, that each of the two has his own method and opinions.[4] He argues (Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 43) that *Kitāb al-Kāfya* represents a further stage in the development of medieval Arabic grammatical thought (the previous stage being represented by Zamaḫšarī).

Kitāb al-Kāfya quickly became quite popular in many parts of the Islamic world. Consequently the king of Karak asked Ibn al-Ḥājib to compose a rhymed version of the latter's work, and then to write a commentary on that version.[5] Ibn al-Ḥājib also composed his own commentary on *Kitāb al-Kāfya* (published by Muḥaymar).[6] Muḥaymar (Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 44–56) presents a list of 110 (!) commentaries on this book that were composed over the years (for some he provides edition or manuscript details). He also mentions six abridged and

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1 See Bin Ġazī 2010:17–19 for a discussion on various versions of this name that appear in various sources.

2 Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 19–20.

3 Fleisch (1961:40–41) also points out the affinity between Ibn al-Ḥājib's grammatical works and Zamaḫšarī's *al-Mufaṣṣal*.

4 See Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 66–68 for a comparison between *Kitāb al-Kāfya* and *al-Mufaṣṣal*.

5 See Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 43.

6 A critical edition of this commentary was published recently—see Sartori 2013.

three rhymed versions of the treatise. As an interesting anecdote, he mentions a scholar named ʾAbū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān (d. 879/1474) who was nicknamed al-Kāfiyajī due to his enthusiastic work on this treatise. Such anecdotes testify to *Kitāb al-Kāfiya*'s extraordinary popularity. Bin Ġazī (2010:44–45) cites Mukarram's claim that Ibn al-Ḥājib's works were more popular in Persia than in Egypt and Syria and discusses possible explanations for this.

Carter (1990:135) states that the most important commentary on *Kitāb al-Kāfiya* is the one composed by Raḍī l-Dīn al-ʾAstarābāḏī (henceforth RDA), about whose life we know next to nothing.[7] He was likely born circa 630–640 A.H.[8] and died after 688.[9] In addition to his commentary on *Kitāb al-Kāfiya*, RDA wrote a commentary on another grammatical book by Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Kitāb al-Šāfiya*, which focuses on morphology. We do not know for certain where he lived and worked: Tawfīq (1978:143) says that he grew up in Persia and lived there until his early thirties (it is not clear, however, what are the sources of that statement). Fleisch (1974:165–166) assumes, based on a study of the manuscripts, that *Šarḥ al-Šāfiya* was composed in Najaf (Iraq). Bin Ġazī (2010:26), on the other hand, believes that RDA worked in Medīna. He was probably a Shiite.[10] Biographical sources do not mention RDA's teachers or pupils, and no later grammarian mentions him as his teacher.[11]

Both of RDA's books were lost for about 100 years after his death, and when they were rediscovered the author's name remained unknown.[12] Suyūṭī (911/1505), for instance, does not mention his full name, but rather calls him "al-Raḍī, the famous *ʾimām*" and "the star of *ʾimām*s". He says that no other book is equal to *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* in terms of its analyses and explanations, that people rely on it and that its author has unique opinions.[13] Modern scholars were also impressed by RDA's writings; Bohas et al. (1990:70), for example, refer to him as "the most brilliant and perceptive grammarian of the later classical period".

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7   Tawfīq (1978:134) also points out the importance of RDA's commentary on *Kitāb al-Kāfiya*. Bin Ġazī (2010:24–27; 81–90, etc.) makes several conjectures regarding RDA's life, based on the period in which he was active and his own statements; however, most of her claims are not sufficiently supported by the facts.

8   See Bin Ġazī 2010:20.

9   See Fleisch 1974:165–166 and Bin Ġazī 2010:22–23.

10   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 8; Larcher 1989:109; Bin Ġazī 2010:50–58. See Tawfīq 1978:101–103 for a list of ʿAlī ibn ʾAbī Ṭālib's sayings used by RDA as *šawāhid*. She concludes, based on this evidence, that RDA was a moderate Shiite, as he seems to speak of ʿAlī no differently than of other *ṣaḥāba*, without using the formula *ʿalayhi l-salāmu* 'May peace be upon him' that is usually reserved for prophets.

11   Bin Ġazī 2010:29.

12   Bin Ġazī 2010:17.

13   Suyūṭī, *Buġya* I, 567.

1.2   The Book's Objective

RDA seems to be different from other grammarians even on a superficial read-
ing. In addition to his original views on various grammatical issues, he pos-
sesses a unique writing style that may pose difficulties for readers accustomed
to earlier grammatical literature.[14] Carter (1990:135) points out the scholastic
character of *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*: Ibn al-Ḥājib's every statement is "scrutinized,
tested, expanded, dissected, objected to, refuted and counter-refuted".

It should not be surprising that such originality is found in a commentary. In
post-classical Islamic scholarship (i.e., after 656/1258, when Baghdad was des-
troyed by the Mongols) commentaries constitute the predominant format of
presentation.[15] In many cases the authors adopt a critical approach towards
the basic text, which they use as a platform to promote their own agenda and to
develop ther own argumentation (Smyth [1992] demontrates such phenomena
using Sakkākī's commentators; his conclusions appear to be true also of Ibn al-
Ḥājib's). The questions of why scholars preferred this format and why certain
treatises attracted such great scholarly interest still await an answer (and will
not be treated in this book).[16]

Contemporary research has addressed RDA's works. Some monographs ded-
icated to RDA were published in the Arab world, the most comprehensive of
which is, as far as I know, that of Tawfīq (1978), which studies specific gram-
matical topics (related to the grammatical government,[17] to the word order,[18]
etc.) as viewed by RDA, as well as his position towards various Kūfan, Baṣran
and Baghdadi grammarians,[19] and his style and methodology.[20] Athough one of
Tawfīq's stated objectives is exploring RDA's unique contribution to the medi-
eval Arabic grammatical tradition, she mostly mentions terms and principles
without further elaboration or demonstration of how they facilitate the under-
standing of the text.

Ḥakamī (2009) explores the grammatical thought of Sīrāfī (d. 368/979) as
presented in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*; Bin Ġazī (2010) addresses RDA's writing in general,

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14   See, e.g., Fleisch 1961:41; Fleisch 1974:166.
15   Smyth 1992:589.
16   Petry (1993:325) offers some tentative answers to the former question.
17   See Tawfīq 1978:191–201.
18   See Tawfīq 1978:201–209.
19   She characterizes him as "a Baghdadi grammarian with Baṣran orientation". See Tawfīq
      1978:260–270.
20   For instance, she analyzes the function of excurses in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*, and lists specific
      expressions used by RDA to present opinions he supports or criticizes. See Tawfīq 1978:133–
      144.

while surveying examples that illustrate his approach to the *ḥadīṯ*, Qurʾānic readings, poetry, other grammarians, etc., without, however, attempting to clarify the author's intention in each particular case; ʿAlī (2011) deals with the terms *ʾaṣl* and *farʿ* in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*; Ġaḍḍāb (2008) focuses on the term *fāʿiliyya* in the same treatise.

As for Western research of RDA, the contributions of Pierre Larcher particularly stand out. He pays special attention to the pragmatic aspects of RDA's grammatical theory, exploring the term *ʾinšāʾ* (see, e.g., Larcher 1988:122 ff.; Larcher 1991a; Larcher 2007), and also topics such as the meaning of *lākinna* 'but' (Larcher 1991c), the difference between *mā faʿala* and *lam yafʿal* (Larcher 1994) and delocutive verbs (Larcher 1983). In addition, Larcher (2011) as well as Guillaume (2011) published articles on the term *kalima* as used by RDA. Bohas et al. (1990) deal extensively with the notion of predication in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*.

However, despite these publications, contemporary research has yet to decipher the distinctive features that set RDA apart from other grammarians and make his writings difficult to deal with.[21] My work seeks to rectify this shortcoming. I believe that in order to understand what may be called the "RDA phenomenon", it is not enough to examine his opinions on certain grammatical issues, although he definitely holds unconventional views on several issues— e.g., on the jussive verb[22] (Bin Ġazī has surveyed the issues on which RDA holds unique opinions, and also issues on which he agrees with other grammarians;[23] however, her book does not bring us closer to an understanding of his originality). I argue that the key to a better understanding of *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* lies in a thorough study of its terminology, whose systematic presentation may provide scholars and ordinary readers with tools for further dealing with RDA's work and for a better understanding of his position in medieval Arabic grammatical theory.

My book demonstrates that RDA's uniqueness lies, at least partially, in influences from other Islamic sciences, such as logic, philosophy, theology and jurisprudence. I am not the first to make this claim—Tawfīq (1978:143–166) argues that influences from logic in Arabic grammatical literature intensified gradually over the years; she classifies these influences in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* into categor-

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21   For instance, Fleisch (1974:166) says that RDA's argumentation is sometimes difficult to follow.

22   See Bin Ġazī 2010:272–275.

23   See Bin Ġazī 2010:257–282 for a discussion of topics on which RDA opposes most grammarians' opinions; see Bin Ġazī 2010:239–256 for a presentation of his approach to Ibn al-Ḥājib's views; see Bin Ġazī 2010:180–207 for an analysis of his position on various other grammarians.

ies; Larcher (1989:133) notes that RDA's linguistic culture exceeds the limits of a single discipline; Carter (1990:135) says that *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* has "a strong logical underpinning"; Bin Ġazī (2010:79) surveys the logical terminology that appears in that treatise, and also demonstrates influences from the realm of Isamic jurisprudence.[24] However, these influences have never been studied systematically, and scholarship has yet to demonstrate how the study of terms and ideas from other Islamic sciences can deepen and enrich our understanding of RDA's writings. In general, I maintain that exploring terminology and methodological principles across various Islamic sciences may promote not only our understanding of those terms and principles, but also our knowledge of those sciences and their interaction.

Modern scholarship has until now focused primarily on the study of specific terms, phenomena, and concepts in medieval Arabic grammatical theory as a whole[25] (Sībawayhi is among the few to whom separate studies were dedicated[26]). My impression is that focusing on specific grammarians (especially relatively late ones, whose originality is often doubted[27]) can lead to new discoveries. This book (based on a close and comprehensive reading of *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* in the course of which recurring terms and ideas that seem essential for understanding the treatise were detected) offers a possible method for such a project.

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24   See Bin Ġazī 2010:70–74. She also cites medieval sources that ascribe to RDA books on logic and theology—see Bin Ġazī 2010:32–33.

25   See, e.g., Owens 1988; Owens 1990, Suleiman 1999b, Peled 2009a.

26   See, e.g., Carter 2004, Baalbaki 2008, Marogy 2010.

27   For instance, Owens (2005:110) claims that after the early 4/10th century there was no real need to compose grammatical books, since the only way to innovate after Ibn al-Sarrāj was to add more and more details (which is what Ibn Yaʿīš did in his *Šarḥ al-Mufaṣṣal*). He adds that scholars continued to compose grammatical treatises out of professional and bureaucratic considerations, rather than for academic and pedagogical purposes. At this point the Arabic grammatical tradition could have stagnated; however, creative linguists began to look in new directions, such as the "methatheoretical" approach characteristic of the *ʾuṣūl al-naḥw* genre. Additionally, there were developments in semantics, pragmatics and textual analysis: "Jurjānī broke new ground in the explication of word order and new/old information, RDA in the pragmatics of linguistic structure, the scholars of the *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* in semantics". Each part of this description by Owens seems worthy of thorough consideration in relation to specific grammarians.

1.3   The Structure of the Book

The first chapter is dedicated to addressing several general tendencies in RDA's use of terminology that set him apart from his predecessors: a tendency towards accurate formulations (derived from RDA's criticism of other grammarians' formulations, supported by elaborate theoretical arguments); a tendency for abstract terminology (he coins his own terms using the suffix *-iyya*; many such terms are not documented by lexicographers); the use of terms labeled as Kūfan; and the use of terms from the realms of logic and jurisprudence (some of which are close in meaning to well-known grammatical terms, while others are not).

The second chapter contains an analysis of the term *waḍʿ* (here translated as 'coinage') and its derivatives, which appear in almost every discussion in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*. The term originates in theology and jurisprudence, and refers to the hypothetical act of creating a linguistic expression for a certain meaning/function. The various contexts in which the term appears are presented, revealing RDA's categorization of 'coined' elements and the various characteristics established by their coinage. RDA's references to possible deviations from the basic meaning/function for which the element was coined are collected and systemized. This is a reconstruction of what could be called 'RDA's theory of coinage'.[28]

The third chapter is dedicated to two other terms essential for understanding *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*, namely *ṭaraʾān*[29] 'pouncing' (originated in early juristic sources and used by a few grammarians prior to RDA), and *ʿurūḍ* 'accidentality' (a term of logic). Both terms refer to factors/elements that are secondary and/or transient in relation to others. It is shown that they differ from each other, *ṭaraʾān* being usually reserved for a factor that suppresses others and determines the rule for the element/structure, whereas *ʿurūḍ* mostly refers to a factor that is suppressed by others and does not influence the rule.

Šarḥ al-Kāfiya is replete with semantic discussions[30] and contains many terms referring to the form-meaning relation, which are discussed in the fourth

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28 It may be of interest to examine RDA's possible influence on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* 'the science of coinage', that developed later, and to compare the Muslim scholars' concept of coinage with the Modist grammar that developed in Europe (see, e.g., Zupko 2012); however, these topics exceed the scope of this book.

29 ʿUmar (the editor of *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*) notes (*Šarḥ* I, 61) that he did not find this word in dictionaries and that RDA uses it as a verbal noun of *ṭaraʾa*. The vocalization *ṭaraʾān* is according to Lane, 1968:v, 1835 (although Lane is himself unsure of its accuracy).

30 Ġaddāb (2008:33) claims that RDA avoids clarifying his opinions on semantic topics and does not discuss them in separate chapters, because the explicit purpose of his treatise is to provide a comprehensive presentation of *ʾiʿrāb* (in which semantics has no significant

chapter of this book. None of these terms is unique to RDA, but their extraordinary frequency and diversity in his book call for a systematic study of the differences between them. The terms I examine are: *maʿnā* 'meaning', *dalāla/madlūl* 'signification/a signified [meaning]', *musammā* 'the named one', *maḍmūn* 'content' and the verb *waqaʿa ʿalā* lit. 'fell on', which can be translated, when used in the context of the form-meaning relation, as 'referred to'.

1.4   Remarks on the Translation of Arabic Terms

There are various approaches to translating the technical vocabulary of medieval Arab grammarians. According to Carter (1995:50), since these terms are fundamentally metaphorical in nature, the translation should be as close as possible to the original concepts underlying the metaphor. If a precise equivalent is unavailable, a gloss or explanatory qualification should be provided so that the term may be correctly understood within the framework of the complete system of ideas of which it is a part. It is not sufficient to choose interpretations according to a superficial resemblance; a study should strive to understand the foreign system according to its own methodology and purposes.

In contrast, Versteegh (1995b:17–19) notes that it would not be very helpful to use only literal translations of Arabic terms. He argues that there is nothing wrong in selecting English equivalents for the latter, provided the asymmetry between the terminological sets is carefully explained. Moreover, in his opinion there is an added value in the use of another language as a metalanguage in discussing Arabic theories, since otherwise it would be difficult to go beyond paraphrasing these theories.[31]

As for the terms that I discuss in the current book, in order to make RDA's ideas as clear as possible while reflecting the peculiarities of his style, I prefer to combine various strategies, rather than to adhere to one particular approach. I use the accepted equivalents for the logical terms, wherever these exist—e.g., *muqaddima* 'premise', *māhiyya* 'essence'. As for many other terms (such as multiple abstract terms with the suffix *-iyya*, terms derived from the roots *n-s-b*, *ḥ-k-m*, *w-ḍ-ʿ*, etc.), I have chosen to use relatively literal translations, while selecting

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role). He adds that this is the reason why RDA tends to accept other grammarians' opinions on these topics. The many semantics-related examples discussed in the current book refute Ġaḍḍāb's claims.

31   See Suleiman 1999b:9–11, fn. 2 and Kasher 2006:6–7 for additional discussions on various approaches to translating Arabic terminology.

different English words for terms that may be mistaken for synonyms, but actually should be distinguished—for instance, *maʿnā* is rendered as 'meaning', and *dalāla*—as 'signification'.

The method chosen by Suleiman (1999b) and Kasher (2006), who used the transcribed Arabic terms *ʾilla* and *ẓarf* (the topics of their respective studies) in order to "generalize the term's usages by different scholars"[32] and "not to choose in advance any particular interpretation, that would be transient from the translation"[33] does not seem appropriate for the present work, in which relatively numerous terms are discussed. Had Arabic been chosen for all the problematic terms, the result would have been an unreadable English text.

For terms that appear in the discussions and do not constitute a part of the book's objectives the well-known equivalents were used wherever possible: *ism* 'noun',[34] *fiʿl* 'verb/verbal predicate', *mubtadaʾ* 'subject (in a nominal sentence)', *ḫabar* '(nominal) predicate', *fāʿil* 'subject (in a verbal sentence)',[35] *ẓarf* 'time/place expression',[36] *ḥāl* 'circumstantial modifier', *mafʿūl bihi* 'direct object', *mafʿūl fīhi* 'adverbial of time/place', *istiṯnāʾ* 'exception', *al-mamnūʿ min al-ṣarf* 'diptote',[37] etc. In cases when a word is widely known as a technical term but is used in a non-technical sense (i.e., *fiʿl* in the sense of 'action' or *mafʿūl* in

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32   Suleiman 1999b:1.

33   Kasher 2006:7.

34   This translation may seem problematic, given the fact that the category of *ism*, as contrasted to *fiʿl* and *ḥarf*, includes adjectives; however, sometimes the grammarians contrast *ism* with *ṣifa* (and also with *maṣdar* and *ẓarf*). In Kasher's (2009) formulation, the term *ism* in medieval Arabic grammatical tradition is "a hyponym of itself". Despite being aware that *ism* is not completely analogous to the Western term 'noun', I shall use the latter for the sake of clarity, following, e.g., Versteegh (1995) and Bernards (2007a). It shall be noted that in Latin grammar (whence the English terms 'noun' and 'adjective' originate), the term *adjectivum* was first employed to limit the term *nomen* (see Zeitlin 1914:140).

35   *Mubtadaʾ* is often rendered in modern research as "topic" or "theme", as opposed to *fāʿil*, normally translated as "subject" or "agent" (Peled 2009a:27). The term 'subject' does not seem entirely adequate to be used for both *fāʿil* and *mubtadaʾ*, as it does not capture the Arab grammarians' notion of sentence types. However, the other alternatives, 'topic' or 'theme', fail to convey the essentially syntactic nature of *mubtadaʾ* (and, as correctly noted in Peled 2009a:45, 'topic' cannot refer to a *mubtadaʾ* that is preceded by a prepositional phrase, e.g., in *fī l-dāri rajulun* 'There is a man in the house'). Peled (2009a) solves this terminological problem by distinguishing between three types of subjects and predicates, in accordance with the three sentence types that he recognizes (he designates the subject and predicate types as S1, S2, S3 and P1, P2, P3, respectively). I do not use these designations for the sake of simplicity, speaking instead of 'subject' and 'predicate' (adding a remark regarding the sentence type, where appropriate). When *fāʿil* refers to a semantic (rather than syntactic) function, I translate it as 'agent'.

36   See Kasher 2006 for a discussion on the term and the linguistic category it stands for.

37   See Roman 2006 for a discussion on the term and the phenomenon.

the sense of '(the thing) affected by the action'), I give a translation that befits the context, and explain my considerations.

ʿAmal lit. 'action, performance' is a fundamental term in Arabic grammatical theory. It denotes the grammatical effect of one word in a sentence on another, and was used by the grammarians to explain the case and mood markers.[38] Owens (1990:13–14) translates the term as "dependency/governance", and the active participle *ʿāmil* as "governor".[39] Carter (1995:50–51) argues that this translation is inappropriate, as "the basic metaphor of *ʿamal* is linear, in marked contrast to the metaphor implicit in 'government', which is vertical and hierarchical".[40] I tend to agree with Carter's view; however, I render *ʿamal* as 'government' (occasionally as 'grammatical influence'), *ʿāmil* as 'governor' (occasionally as 'case assigner') and *maʿmūl* as 'governed (word/constituent)'. One of the benefits of this wording is consistency between the *ʿamal*-related terminology and 'a governed element', which is the widely accepted equivalent for *muḍāf ʾilayhi* (I translate *muḍāf* as 'an annexed element', avoiding here the notion of government, as many grammarians do not accept the idea of a noun governing another noun[41]).

Some terms used by RDA are polysemic—e.g., both *ṣifa* and *naʿt* may denote 'adjective' or 'adjectival qualifier', but only the former may additionally mean 'relative clause' or 'property/description' (in the widest sense).[42] Another example is the term *mufrad* that can refer to a singular form (as opposed to plural), a phrase (as opposed to a sentence) or to a single word (as opposed to a syntactic construction).[43] As for the term *fāʾida* and its derivatives, I use my own classification of its senses (presented in Sheyhatovitch 2012).

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38 See Levin 1995; Rybalkin 2006 for discussions on the principles of *ʿamal*.

39 Versteegh (1995a:104) supports Owens' approach, yet translates *ʿāmil* as "operator". Carter (1998:331) points out the inconsistency between his translating *ʿamal* in terms of "operation" and *muḍāf/muḍāf ʾilayhi* as "governing noun/governed noun".

40 See also Carter 1989.

41 According to Owens (1990:16), Jurjānī (d. 471/1078) was the first to state explicitly that the noun cannot be the governor and that it is the underlying preposition that is the governor of the governed element in the annexation. See also Ryding and Versteegh 2007:295. See section 2.4.2.3 below for RDA's position.

42 See Versteegh 2009a for a discussion on the term *ṣifa*.

43 As for *mufrad* in the sense of 'a singular form' (as opposed to dual/plural) see, e.g., Ibn al-Sarrāj, *ʾUṣūl* II, 96, where the author speaks of a singular form that appears in the position of a plural; Ibn Yaʿīš, *Šarḥ* I, 64, where it is stated that *sarāwīl* 'pants' is a noun in the singular. As for the sense of 'a single word', see, e.g., Ibn al-Sarrāj, *ʾUṣūl* I, 381, where the author explains that *lā l-nāfiya li-l-jins* together with the following noun is equivalent to a single word (the term *mufrad* here must be understood as 'a single word' in light of the grammarians' principle that three words cannot be equivalent to one, but two words can);

In some cases, where I found no satisfactory translation of the term that would not look clumsy, I use a transliteration of the Arabic term—e.g., *ʾiʿrāb* 'a change in the word's ending according to a governor',[44] *bināʾ* 'lack of change in the word's ending according to a governor',[45] *ṣāḥib al-ḥāl* 'the constituent the state of whose referent a circumstantial modifier describes', *mafʿūl muṭlaq* 'a constituent that deserves to be called *mafʿūl* in an absolute way',[46] *tābiʿ* 'a constituent that follows another constituent and receives its case from the same governor as the preceding one',[47] *naʿt sababī* 'qualifier [that describes the head noun by describing a constituent whose referent has] a semantic link [with the head noun]'.[48]

Ibn al-Sarrāj, *ʾUṣūl* II, 27, where *mufrad* stands in contrast to an annexed element and to a relative clause. As for the sense of 'phrase', see, e.g., Ibn al-Sarrāj, *ʾUṣūl* II, 262, where it is stated that an indefinite noun can be described by a phrase or by a clause; Ibn al-Sarrāj, *ʾUṣūl* II, 328, where it is stated that a relative pronoun together with the relative clause is equivalent to a nominal phrase.

44 The term *ʾiʿrāb* is usually translated as 'declension' (Dévényi 2007:401); however, I prefer the above-mentioned formulation, as a simplified version of the usual definition of *ʾiʿrāb* in the medieval Arabic grammatical literature (cited and translated in Dévényi 2007:403): "*ʾIʿrāb* is the alteration of the endings of a word because of the variation of the regents entering upon it, either verbally or implicitly" (*al-ʾiʿrābu taġyīru ʾawāḫiri l-kalimi li-ḫtilāfi l-ʿawāmili l-dāḫilati ʿalayhā lafẓan ʾaw taqdīran*). Ibn al-Ḥājib's approach is very similar, as he speaks (RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 55–56) of "a rule [related to a noun with *ʾiʿrāb* ending]" (*ḥukmuhu*), defining *ʾiʿrāb* as "the thing by which the end of [the noun with *ʾiʿrāb* ending] changes" (*mā yaḫtalifu ʾāḫiruhu bihi*). RDA (*Šarḥ* I, 57) explains that *mā* in this definition refers to the vowels and letters (i.e., the case markers themselves), and also to the governor.

45 Therefore, the terms *muʿrāb* and *mabnī* are translated as '(a word) whose ending is *ʾiʿrāb/bināʾ*". See also Bohas et al. 1990:53–55.

46 See Levin 1991b for a discussion of this term.

47 Owens (1988:154–156) translates this term as 'modifier'; however, this translation is not appropriate in the case of a coordinated constituent that is considered to be a *tābiʿ*. See also Versteegh 2009a:221.

48 Carter (2009) translates the term as 'semantically linked adjective'.

General Tendencies

2.1 A Tendency towards Accurate Formulations

The terminology used by medieval grammarians constitutes part of the challenge faced by modern researchers of medieval Arabic grammatical theory. As yet there is no scholarly consensus regarding the meaning of various terms, their appropriate translation into other languages, or even regarding the question of which elements of the grammarians' vocabulary deserve to be considered as technical terms.

Early grammarians did not feel a necessity to define their terminology, nor were they consistent in its usage. It seems that many of what we now refer to as grammatical terms were not coined as such by the early grammarians. Furthermore, there often was no clear-cut differentiation between grammatical terms and the related general concepts from which they originated.[1] For instance, the term *fiʿl* was used as either a technical term (denoting 'verb' or 'verbal predicate') or a non-technical word (denoting 'action'). Carter (1994:400) designates such terms "undifferentiated". He explains that since Arabic grammatical terminology was created by metaphorical extension of everyday expressions, the literal meaning of a term continued to affect the way in which the grammarians viewed and used it. Peled (1999:56–57) speaks of "metagrammatical intuitive terms", which, although lacking the characteristics of a clear-cut technical term, usually carry some grammatical meaning when used by the grammarians.

Another matter that can pose a difficulty for a modern scholar working with medieval grammatical terminology is grammarians' inclination to use the same term at various levels of linguistic analysis. For instance, the term *ḥarf* in different contexts can refer to grapheme, phoneme or lexeme (alongside other possibilities).[2]

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1 Peled 1999:50–51.

2 Carter 1994:401. It must be noted that even when clearly used as a phonological term, *ḥarf* poses a challenge for a contemporary scholar because it seems to have no equivalent in modern linguistics. Generally speaking, it is "a unit of a phonological (scriptural) character (semiotically specified)" (see Karabekyan and Yavrumyan 2007:236). Karabekyan and Yavrumyan (2007:237–238) state that it is "viewed as a phoneme"; however, they note the discrepancies between *ḥarf* and "the classic definition of the phoneme". It seems that the most appropriate definition of *ḥarf*, that suits most of its uses by grammarians in phonological contexts, is the one formulated by Levin (1986:425, fn. 13): "a sound which is represented in Arabic ortho-

A tendency towards accurate formulations and terminology is characteristic of later grammarians, who were influenced by logic. In their treatises there is evidence to suggest that they were aware of the necessity for technical terminology and felt the need to draw distinctions between a grammatical term and the related non-grammatical concept, between "the name" and "the named", etc.[3] RDA is a remarkable representative of this tendency. *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* is a commentary, and as such it is natural that the author would strive to achieve maximal clarity in his formulations. A commentator pays attention to inaccuracies in the text he works with, and does his best to achieve a perfect formulation.[4]

The first example of this tendency is taken from the discussion of different types of *mafʿūl muṭlaq*. RDA points out that *al-mafʿūl al-muṭlaq li-l-taʾkīd* 'for emphasis', whose function is, according to many grammarians, "to emphasize the verb" (*taʾkīd al-fiʿl*), in fact emphasizes the verbal noun included in the verb's meaning (rather than all components of the verb's meaning). RDA notes that the grammarians who spoke of "emphasizing the verb" used a "non-literal expression" (*tawassuʿ*),[5] i.e., they either used the term *fiʿl* in an unusual way (i.e., not in a grammatical sense, but in the sense of 'action', which is close to that of 'verbal noun'[6] since the verbal noun denotes an action), or did not distinguish between various components of a verb's meaning.

RDA claims that the meaning of the sentence *ḍarabtu* 'I hit' is *ʾaḥdaṯtu ḍarban* 'I performed a hitting'. Thus, if after *ḍarabtu* one adds a verbal noun *ḍarban* functioning as *mafʿūl muṭlaq*, the sentence becomes equivalent to *ʾaḥdaṯtu ḍarban ḍarban*. It is clear that the emphasized element is the verbal noun included in the verb, but not *ʾiḫbār* 'predication/function of an element which conveys information about something else',[7] nor time (which are other components of a verb's meaning).[8]

graphy by a letter", i.e., all the consonants and all the long vowels in Arabic. Henceforth I shall translate *ḥarf* as 'letter', being a short form of Levin's formulation, save for cases where RDA clearly means consonants (e.g., when he speaks of root consonants or of a consonant's vocalization). In relatively rare cases where the focus is on pronunciation, *ḥarf* will be translated as 'sound'.

3   Peled 1999:52.
4   Tawfīq (1978:166–167) views RDA's striving for accuracy and his critical attitude towards texts as the evidence of his "scientific approach".
5   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 298.
6   See Peled 1999:56–58 for a discussion of these usages of the term *fiʿl*.
7   The grammarians usually mention two components of a verb's meaning, action and time—see, e.g., Ibn al-Sarrāj, *ʾUṣūl* I, 82; Sīrāfī, *Šarḥ* I, 44; Levin 1991b:918. According to Weiss 1966:136–139, treatises on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* mentioned the *nisba* 'ascription' (of an action to its performer) as one of the three components of a verb's meaning.
8   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 298. See Goldenberg 1971 for a discussion of *mafʿūl muṭlaq* from a modern lin-

Being sensitive to terminological issues, RDA is aware of cases in which the meaning of a word that functions as a technical term is not identical to the original meaning of that word. For instance, when Ibn al-Ḥājib defines *tarḫīm* 'softening [of the voice]'[9] as "omission in the [word's] ending for the sake of lightening" (*ḥaḏfun fī ʾāḫirihi taḫfīfan*), RDA finds it necessary to explain the term *taḫfīf*, stressing that the omission intended here is "one with nothing that makes it necessary" (*mā lam yakun lahu mūjibun*)—unlike a consistent and necessary omission that occurs in nouns such as *qāḍin*[10] 'judge' and *ʿaṣan*[11] 'stick'. If we do not interpret *taḫfīf* in this way, we will not be able to grasp the difference between *tarḫīm* and other types of omission, since each omission entails lightening, but only *tarḫīm* occurs for the mere purpose of lightening, with no factor necessitating it. RDA adds that this type of omission is called also "omission without a reason" (*ḥaḏf bi-lā ʿilla*) and "an arbitrary omission" (*ḥaḏf al-iʿtibāṭ*). He views these expressions (especially the former) as problematic since every omission has a reason, i.e., the intention of lightening (thus it is not correct to speak of omission without a reason). However, such formulations are "the customary terminology of [the grammarians]" (*iṣṭilāḥ minhum*).[12]

To summarize RDA's view, the expression *ḥaḏf taḫfīfan* is not entirely appropriate in the definition of *tarḫīm*, since it does not (unless under a specific interpretation) clarify the difference between *tarḫīm* and other types of omission. The other two expressions are not entirely satisfactory either, if their literal meaning is taken into account. However, since they are customary among the scholars in the field, one may continue working with them. This notwithstanding, RDA suggests a more accurate definition for *tarḫīm*: "an arbitrary and optional omission of a word's ending" (*ḥaḏfu ʾāḫiri l-kalimati ʿtibāṭan jawāzan*).[13] The view that technical terminology is conventional and therefore not open to objections is characteristic to later grammarians.[14]

Another case in which RDA points out a technical term whose usage does not match its literal meaning is in the context of *ʾasmāʾ al-ʾafʿāl* 'the proper

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guist's point of view (including distinction between the *mafʿūl muṭlaq* and other usages of a verbal noun).

9   This phenomenon is discussed, e.g., in Wright 1896–1898:II, 88–89.

10   The morpho-phonological process occurring in words of this type is described in Wright 1896–1898:I, 90.

11   The morpho-phonological process occurring in words of this type is described in Wright 1896–1898:I, 121.

12   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 393.

13   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 393.

14   Peled 1999:62–63.

names of the verbs'.[15] It must be noted that *ʾasmāʾ*, as the plural form of *ism*, simultaneously means 'proper nouns' and 'nouns (in general)', implying that all *ʾasmāʾ* should be nouns. RDA remarks that in principle grammarians should not use *ʾasmāʾ al-ʾafʿāl* to refer to expressions originating in prepositional phrases, e.g., *ʿalayka* 'catch sth. which is in front of you!' and *ʾilayka* 'catch sth. which is by you!'.[16] He adds that it is appropriate to use the term *ʾasmāʾ al-ʾafʿāl* to refer to expressions such as *ṣah* 'Quiet!' and *ruwayd* 'slowly', since they originate in nouns, whereas prepositional phrases do not belong to the category of nouns.[17]

However, after mentioning this difficulty, RDA concludes that "[grammarians] use the term [*ʾasmāʾ al-ʾafʿāl*] to speak of each expression that was transferred into a verbal meaning by means of a transfer that is not consistent [with any rule]" (*ṭaradū hāḏā l-isma fī kulli lafẓin manqūlin ʾilā maʿnā l-fiʿli naqlan ġayra muṭṭaridin*)[18]—unlike the semantic shift that occurs in sentences such as *raḥimaka llāhu* 'May God have mercy on you!' (an example demonstrating a perfect verb that is consistently interpreted as referring to the future in sentences expressing wishes and prayers[19]) and *lam yaḍrib* 'he did not hit' (an example demonstrating an imperfect verb in the jussive mood that consistently receives the meaning of negation in the past after *lam*).[20]

We thus see that RDA is sensitive to the fact that the term *ʾasmāʾ al-ʾafʿāl*, based on its literal meaning, should refer to nouns (or, at least, to expressions derived from nouns), not to prepositional phrases such as *ʿalayka*. However, as a technical term it conventionally refers to any expression that receives a verbal meaning not via the application of any grammatical rule.

It has been demonstrated above that RDA points out technical terms that are accepted among grammarians, although they seem inappropriate given their literal meaning. Likewise, he mentions expressions that some grammarians may use to refer to linguistic phenomena because they seem appropriate, but the usage is problematic since it differs from the usual terminology.

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15   This translation was suggested by Levin (1991a:249–251), who criticizes the translation 'verbal noun' suggested by Lane.

16   These expressions are discussed in Wright 1896–1898:II, 78. See also Levin 1991a:248.

17   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 86.

18   The term *muṭṭarid* seems to be related to *ṭard*, which is translated by Suleiman (1999b:128–132) as "coextensiveness". To say that a phenomenon is coextensive (or consistent) with a rule is equivalent to saying that the phenomenon occurs each time that certain conditions stated in the rule occur.

19   See Wright 1896–1898:II, 2–3.

20   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 86.

For instance, there are grammarians that use the expression *badal al-ištimāl* 'substitution of inclusiveness'[21] to speak about *badal al-baʿḍ min al-kull* 'substitution of the part for the whole'[22]—because in this type of substitution the whole thing denoted by the head noun includes the part denoted by the substitute. However, according to the accepted terminology the substitution of this type should be called *badal al-baʿḍ* (probably a shortening of *badal al-baʿḍ min al-kull*).[23] The expressions *badal al-ištimāl* and *badal al-baʿḍ min al-kull* are close to each other semantically, but grammarians use them to distinguish two different types of substitution. Therefore, to interchange them would be wrong, even if justified given the expressions' literal meanings.

Another example: Ibn al-Ḥājib defines *majrūrāt* 'constituents in *jarr*' as "[constituents] that contain the markers of the governed element (of annexation)" (*mā štamala ʿalā ʿalami l-muḍāfi ʾilayhi*). RDA explains that "the markers of the governed element" are *kasra* (in a regular noun that can take all case markers), *fatḥa* (in a diptote noun) and the letter *yāʾ* (in dual and plural forms). Ibn al-Ḥājib defines the governed element (*al-muḍāf ʾilayhi*) as "every noun to which something is ascribed by means of a preposition, formally or reconstructably and intentionally" (*kullu smin nusiba ʾilayhi šayʾun bi-wāsiṭati ḥarfi jarrin lafẓan ʾaw taqdīran murādan*). In other words, Ibn al-Ḥājib views a noun that receives its *jarr* from a preposition as *muḍāf ʾilayhi*.[24] He explains in his *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* that in the sentence *marartu bi-Zaydin* 'I passed Zayd' "the passage is annexed to Zayd by means of the preposition" (*qad ʾaḍafta l-murūra ʾilā Zaydin bi-wāsiṭati ḥarfi l-jarri*).[25]

RDA says that Sībawayhi uses the term *muḍāf ʾilayhi* in the same way,[26] but this usage "differs from what is customary among the people [who work with language] nowadays" (*ḫilāfa l-mašhūri l-ʾāna min-i ṣṭilāḥi l-qawmi*). In

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21   This is the translation suggested by Esseesy 2006:124. Howell translates the term as "substitute of implication", and Wright says "comprehensive substitution". See Cachia 1973:14. The term refers to constructions such as *ʾaʿjabanī Zaydun ʿilmuhu* 'I liked Zayd, his knowledge'.

22   This is the translation chosen by Howell, see Cachia 1973:14. Esseesy (2006:124) renders the term as "permutative apposition". It refers to constructions such as *ʾakaltu l-raǧīfa ṯuluṯahu* 'I ate the loaf, one third of it'.

23   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 390. See Esseesy 2006 for a discussion on various types of substitution recognized by Arab grammarians.

24   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 201.

25   Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 588.

26   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 201–202. Sībawayhi says that *muḍāf ʾilayhi* can receive its *jarr* from three types of elements: those that are neither nouns nor time/place expressions (*ẓarf*), time/place expressions, and nouns that are not time/place expressions. The element intended in the first case is a preposition, since the examples are *marartu bi-ʿAbdi llāhi* 'I passed ʿAbdallāh', *hāḏā li-ʿAbdi llāhi* 'This [belongs] to ʿAbdallāh', etc. Sībawayhi, *Kitāb* I, 177.

RDA's time, when one said *muḍāf ʾilayhi*, one had in mind the constituent that receives its *jarr* due to an annexation structure, in which the first constituent loses its *tanwīn*. This notwithstanding, considering ordinary Arabic, one can say, in accordance with Ibn al-Ḥājib's formulation, that *Zayd* in *marartu bi-Zaydin* is *muḍāf ʾilayhi*—although this differs from the conventional terminology in RDA's time.[27]

In addition to the distinction between what is acceptable in ordinary language and what is acceptable as terminology, RDA here shows his sensibility to various stages in the development of Arabic grammatical terminology: even if Sībawayhi used a certain term in a certain sense, it does not mean that the same usage remains appropriate in RDA's time.

Similarly, the term *fiʿl al-taʿajjub* 'verb of surprise/wonder'[28] should ostensibly refer to any verb denoting wonder. However, "in the grammarians' terminology" (*fī ṣṭilāḥi l-nuḥāti*) it refers only to the structures *mā ʾafʿalahu* and *ʾafʿil bihi*, and not to any verb with this meaning.[29] In other words, verbs like *taʿajjabtu* and *ʿajibtu* 'I was surprised' can be considered verbs of wonder, according to the literal meaning of the phrase (because they indeed signify wonder; moreover, they are the explicit performative verbs corresponding to the structures in question[30]), but they cannot be considered as such if we view the expression as a technical term, since according to its conventional sense it can refer to a certain structures only.[31]

The following example demonstrates RDA's sensitivity to terminology and to the difference between the signifier and what it stands for (i.e., between linguistic elements and extra-linguistic reality). It appears in a discussion on *taḥḏīr* 'warning'. The structure in question consists of two constituents that receive *naṣb* from a reconstructable verb *baʿʿid* 'move away from!'. The first constituent denotes the one who is warned, and the second the one against which one is warned,[32] for instance, *ʾiyyāka wa-l-ʾasada* 'you! beware of the lion!'. RDA notes

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27 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 202.
28 This is Wright's (1896–1898:I, 98) translation.
29 RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 228.
30 See Larcher 1991b:165–166 for a discussion of "implicit performatives", i.e., structures in which, according to some modern linguists, there exist implicit performative verbs.
31 Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 925) also finds it necessary to distinguish between 'verbs of wonder' and any other verb conveying a meaning of wonder/surprise. However, in this context he does not mention the issue of technical terminology, but only says that "the chapter treats [structures] coined for performing the act of wondering" (*mā yubawwabu lahu mā wuḍiʿa li-ʾinšāʾi l-taʿajjubi*).
32 There is another structure of warning: a noun denoting the one of which someone is warned, repeated in *naṣb*. RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 290.

that the structure is called 'warning', "although it is not a warning but rather an instrument of warning" (*maʿa ʾannahu laysa bi-l-taḥḏīri bal huwa ʾālatu l-taḥḏīri*).[33] In other words, the warning is an act performed by the speaker by means of a grammatical structure presented here. The linguistic expression is thus distinct from the purpose achieved by that expression.

Although RDA in principle insists on distinguishing between the literal meaning of a term and its technical sense, there are cases in which the more literal meaning of a term affects the way in which the grammarian perceives it. When explaining why the verb in the beginning of a circumstantial clause (*jumlat ḥāl*) cannot be preceded by one of the particles characteristic of the future tense, such as *sa-* (which emphasizes future time) and *lan* 'not', RDA mentions two meanings of the term *ḥāl*—'circumstantial modifier' and 'present time'. He says that the *ḥāl* discussed in that chapter of his book (i.e., circumstantial modifier) differs from *ḥāl* signified by imperfect verb (i.e., present time). The proof is that in the sentence *ʾaḍribu Zaydan ġadan yarkabu* 'I will hit Zayd tomorrow while he is riding' *yarkabu* is a *ḥāl* in the first sense of the term, but not in the second.[34] In other words, it functions as a circumstantial modifier, but does not signify a present time, since it refers to a future (relative to the time of the utterance).

Although it is clear that the two senses of the term *ḥāl* are completely different, Arabic speakers insist on not opening a circumstantial clause with future markers—"due to an apparent contradiction between *ḥāl* (which also means present time) and future time" (*li-tanāquḍi l-ḥāli wa-l-istiqbāli fī l-ẓāhiri*).[35] This contradiction is not real: although the term *ḥāl* is used in Arabic to refer to a circumstantial modifier and to present time, these concepts are different. Even if there is a contradiction between present and future times, it does not entail a contradiction between a circumstantial modifier and the future. Similarly, speakers precede a perfect verb opening a circumstantial clause with *qad* (a particle that may be used to signify that the act expressed by the following verb has taken place just a little before the time of speaking[36]), either explicit or reconstructable[37]—although it is important for a circumstantial modifier "to

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33 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 479.

34 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 43.

35 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 43.

36 The grammarians say that *qad* is used, inter alia, *li-taqrīb al-māḍī min al-ḥāl* 'to approximate the past to the present'. See Wright 1896–1898:II, 3–5 for a discussion on this particle (including its function in *ḥāl* clauses).

37 For instance, Q. 4/90: *ʾaw jāʾūkum ḥaṣirat ṣudūruhum* 'or come to you with breasts constricted [from fighting with you or fighting their people]'. The circumstantial clause is opened

be in present in relation to its governor" (*ḥāliyyatuhu bi-l-naẓari ʾilā ʿāmilihi*; i.e., semantically, the occurrence signified by the circumstantial modifier must occur more or less simultaneously with the occurrence signified by its governor), whereas *qad* "brings the perfect [verb] close only to the time in which the utterance is produced" (*tuqarribu l-māḍiya min ḥāli l-takallumi faqaṭ*).[38] This means that in RDA's view the structure *qad faʿala* literally signifies that the occurrence in the past happened not long before the time of the utterance, but does not signify anything with respect to the temporary relations between the two occurrences mentioned in the sentence.[39] However, "an overt combination between a perfect verb and the function of a circumstantial modifier is not acceptable" (*kāna yustabšaʿu fī l-ẓāhiri lafẓu l-māḍī wa-l-ḥāliyyata*). Therefore, speakers say, e.g., *jāʾa Zaydun-i l-ʿāma l-ʾawwala wa-qad rakiba* 'Zayd came last year, after he rode'.[40]

Although RDA knows that 'circumstantial modifier' and 'present tense' are separate concepts, and even gives examples in which the circumstantial modifier does not refer to the present time, he mixes up two senses of the term *ḥāl* in discussing the behavior of the verb in circumstantial clauses (namely, in discussing the fact that an imperfect verb should not be preceded by future markers and a perfect verb should be preceded by *qad*).

Although he strives to achieve accurate formulations, RDA does not always succeed in being consistent in this.[41]

2.2   A Tendency towards Abstract Terminology

According to Afnan (1964:9) Jāhiliyya poetry (considered to be the earliest documentation of classical Arabic) is characterized by a lack of abstract terms (except for such notions as love, honour, bravery, generosity and the like). Aramaic, Syrian and Greek words started entering into Arabic already in the Jāhiliyya, and Brockelmann even claims that "almost all the concepts related

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by a perfect verb without *qad*, and the solution is to say that this is a case of a suppressed *qad*. RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 46.

38   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 44.

39   Peled (1998:120) says that in a circumstantial clause opened by *wa-qad faʿala* the particle *qad* brings the occurrence signified by the verb following it close to the sentence's main verb. The content of the clause is presented as background to the content of the main sentence. Circumstantial clauses sometimes carry additional meanings, besides the circumstances of the main action.

40   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 44.

41   See Bin Ġazī 2010:124.

to civilization are expressed in Arabic by Aramean words".[42] A lack of abstract terms in Arabic posed an obstacle for early scholars who translated scientific and philosophic treatises into Arabic,[43] an obstacle which they tried to overcome in various ways.[44]

One of the ways to overcome the difficulty was creating new terms by using the ending *-iyya*. This ending is quite rare in early classical Arabic. Although *rahbāniyya* (Q. 57/27: 'monasticism'[45]) appears in the Qurʾān, it is not abstract in the full sense of the word, as it "stands for the practice of priesthood and not for the concept of it".[46] There were scholars who claimed that this ending entered Arabic from Syriac, which in turn adopted it from the Greek—ía, the common suffix denoting an abstraction. Alternatively, the form may be the result of Pahlawī and Persian influence, since abstractions were more frequently coined and used by Persian philosophers that by those of Arab origin.[47] Unlike Afnan, Ali (1987:9–10) does not mention the possible foreign origin of this ending, but splits it into two Arabic morphemes, *yāʾ al-nisba* and *-ah* of abstract nouns. Abed (1991:156–157) also holds that this ending is of Arabic origin (he bases his opinion on passages from Fārābī and Ibn Rušd).

Afnan (1964:32) recognizes a growing tendency to use terms with the ending *-iyya* in Arabic philosophy: Kindī (d. 252/866) scarcely used abstract terms with this ending, Fārābī (d. 339/950) used them more, and Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037)—even more. This characteristic of Ibn Sīnā may be possibly related to his Persian origin.[48] Ali (1987:31–32) also points out the gradual increase in the usage of terms with the ending *-iyya* in Medieval Arabic.

Similarly to the aforementioned tendency in philosophical writing, it seems that the development of Arabic grammatical theory can be also characterized by a tendency towards abstraction, in terminology and in grammarians' areas of interest. Carter (1990:125) recognizes this tendency already in grammarians from the 3rd/9th century (the most prominent of whom is Mubarrad). These grammarians started using terms that were not used by Sībawayhi, e.g., *tamyīz* 'specifying element', *ʾafʿāl al-muqāraba* 'verbs of appropinquation' and *ismiyya*

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42 See Afnan 1964:9–10.

43 For a discussion of the Arabic translation project see, e.g., Goodman 1990.

44 Afnan 1964:27.

45 This and subsequent translations of Qurʾānic verses are taken from Arberry 1964, unless stated otherwise.

46 Afnan 1964:32. Afnan mentions "*al-zabāniyya*" as another example of the ending *-iyya* in the Qurʾān, but it must be a mistake since the vocalization in the Qurʾān is *al-zabāniya* (Q. 96/18: 'the guards of Hell'). See Lane 1968:III, 1214 for a discussion of this word.

47 Afnan 1964:32.

48 Afnan 1964:45.

'nominality'.[49] Carter (1990:125–126) associates this evolution of terminology to a gradual change in grammarians' approach. In the course of time they came to show more and more interest in *ʿilla*, the abstract reason for a linguistic phenomenon—sometimes at the expense of their treatment of *ʿamal*, grammatical government, a relatively concrete phenomenon. In the course of time *taqdīr*, reconstruction of suppressed constructions and meanings,[50] increased in importance. A growing interest in abstract issues naturally created a need for abstract terminology.

It seems that a tendency towards abstraction culminates with RDA: *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* contains many abstract terms with the ending *-iyya*, some of which are derived from well-known grammatical terms, whereas others are derived from everyday words (the distinction between grammatical terms and non-technical words is often non-trivial; in this context I classify as technical the terms that are recognized as such by most scholars).

2.2.1   *Abstract Terms Derived from Grammatical Terms*

From the term *ḫabar* 'a nominal predicate (sometimes the term is used also to speak of a predicate in general[51])' RDA derives the term *ḫabariyya* 'predicativity, function of a predicate'. The term is used, e.g., in a discussion on time/place expressions (*ẓurūf*[52]) functioning as nominal predicates. The author states that when the subject is an abstract noun and the predicate is a noun signifying a span of time,[53] if the occurrence denoted by the subject took place during the entire time span signified by its predicate or most of it, and if the noun denoting the time is indefinite, the predicate usually takes *rafʿ*[54]

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49   Troupeau (1976:15) also notes that Arab grammarians started using terms with the ending *-iyya* only in the 3rd/9th century; Sībawayhi did not use them at all.

50   Versteegh (1997a:244) explains that "in the system of Baṣran grammarians the counterpart of the speaker's suppression of elements in the surface sentence is the grammarian's *taqdīr*, his reconstruction of the underlying sentence".

51   Peled 2009b:737.

52   Marogy (2010:184) translates the term as "spatiotemporal qualifier". Frank (1981:279) renders it as "time and place expressions". For other translations suggested for the term by various scholars see Kasher 2006:7.

53   In principle, the predicate can be a time expression only when the subject is an abstract noun. The explanation is that concrete objects tend to exist for relatively long periods, thus an utterance conveying information about the time of their existence would usually lack the potential to provide the addressee with new information. In contrast, occurrences signified by abstract nouns tend to occur for limited time spans, thus it is worthwhile to inform the addressee about the time of their existence. See, e.g., Ibn al-Sarrāj, *ʾUṣūl* I, 63; Mubarrad, *Muqtaḍab* IV, 172.

54   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 249.

(although time expressions functioning as a predicate usually take *naṣb*[55]). For instance, *al-ṣawmu yawmun* 'The fasting [lasts] a day', *al-sayru šahrun* 'The travel [lasts] a month'. This is so "because [the fasting/travel] that lasts [most of the day/month behaves] as if it is co-referential [with the day/month]" (*li-ʾannahu bi-stiġrāqihi ʾiyyāhu kaʾannahu huwa*), "especially given that [the time expression] is indefinite, which fits the function of the predicate" (*lā siyyamā maʿa l-tankīri l-munāsibi li-l-ḫabariyyati*).[56]

The term *ḫabariyya* appears again later in the discussion of time/place expressions functioning as a predicate. According to RDA, preposing a predicate of this type to an indefinite subject resolves a problem of ambiguity: if a time/place expression follows an indefinite subject, there is a risk that the former would be understood as a qualifier (*ṣifa*), and not as a predicate.[57] In contrast, a time/place expression that precedes its subject "is set aside for the function of predicate" (*taʿayyana li-l-ḫabariyyati*), since that constituent takes *naṣb*, "overtly or in the terms of its position" (*lafẓan ʾaw maḥallan*),[58] and thus cannot be interpreted as a subject. The situation is different with a nominal predicate which is not a time/place expression: its preposing would not solve a problem of ambiguity, since when one says *qāʾimun rajulun* 'Standing is a man', *rajulun* can be understood as either a predicate of *qāʾimun*, or its substitution (in addition to the intended interpretation of *qāʾimun* as a predicate of *rajulun*).[59]

In the next fragment we can see the term *ḫabariyya* alongside with *ḥāliyya* 'the function of circumstantial modifier'. RDA presents sentences containing two identical time/place expressions, between which stands a constituent that can be either analyzed as a predicate and assigned *rafʿ*, or analyzed as a circumstantial modifier and assigned *naṣb*. His examples are: Q. 11/108 *wa-ʾammā llaḏīna suʿidū fa-fī l-jannati ḫālidīna fīhā* 'And as for the happy, they shall be in Para-

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55   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 243–244. Explanations given by the grammarians for this phenomenon are surveyed in Kasher 2006:175–179. See also fn. 211 below.

56   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 249.

57   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 260. Ibn Yaʿīš (*Šarḥ* I, 86) makes a similar argument.

58   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 261. According to Versteegh (1978:277–278) the term *maḥall* (which does not occur in Sībawayhi's *al-Kitāb*) is close in later sources to the term *mawḍiʿ*, and is usually used in contexts where a word that is mentioned "does not look like a declined word, but behaves as if it was".

59   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 261. Alternatively, Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 367) holds that preposing the time/place expression functioning as a predicate, when the subject is indefinite, has a "repairing" (*muṣaḥḥiḥ*) function. He does not explain his intention, whereas RDA (*Šarḥ* I, 260) clarifies that it means repairing the problematic structure with an indefinite subject—by specifying the subject.

dise, therein dwelling forever' and Q. 59/17 *fa-kāna ʿāqibatahumā ʾannahumā fī l-nāri ḫālidīna fīhā* 'Their end is, both are in the Fire, there dwelling forever'. The Kūfans maintain that the constituent between the two time/place expressions must take *naṣb* as a circumstantial modifier (and this indeed happens in the two given verses). Their position is explained as follows: "if [the constituent positioned between the time/place expressions] were assigned *rafʿ* as a predicate and the expressions were interpreted as connected to it, the second one would not add any information [to the sentence]"[60] (*li-ʾannaka law rafaʿtahu ḫabaran wa-ʿallaqta l-ẓarfayni bihi, lam yakun li-l-ṯānī fāʾidatu*).[61]

According to the Baṣrans' view, in contrast, "the option of circumstantial modifier is preferable to the option of predicate, but is not obligatory" (*al-ḥāliyyatu rājiḥatun ʿalā l-ḫabariyyati, lā wājibatun*). If the constituent positioned between the two time/place expressions is a second nominal predicate, the second time/place expression is connected to it. Alternatively, the first time/place expression can be connected to the predicate following it, in which case the second expression functions as an emphasizer (*taʾkīd*) of the first one, since emphasis is not rare in the language.[62]

Other appearances of the term *ḥāliyya* in the sense of 'circumstantial modifier': in the discussion on *wāw al-ḥāl* in *ʾaqrabu mā yakūnu l-ʿabdu min rabbihi wa-huwa sājidun* 'A man is the closest to his Lord while prostrating' (a *ḥadīṯ*)— the *wa-* is called *ʿalāmat al-ḥāliyya* 'the marker of a circumstantial modifier';[63] in the discussion on the governor of the *maṣdar* in structures such as *ʾataytuhu rakḍan* 'I came to him running' (in this context the term *ḥāliyya* appears alongside with another abstract term, *maṣdariyya* 'the function of *mafʿūl muṭlaq*'),[64] etc. *Ḥāliyya* appears in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* also in the sense of 'present time': e.g., RDA explains that there is no contradiction between the meaning of the future in *ʾin* 'if' and the meaning of the present in *wāw al-ḥāl*, since "the present time

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60   *"Fāʾida* as an addition to the message" is one of the four main senses of the term *fāʾida* which I discern. See Sheyhatovitch 2012:71–92.

61   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 28.

62   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 28.

63   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 276. The same expression appears also in RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 44.

64   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 39. In this fragment it can be seen that RDA, despite his sensitivity to terminological issues and his efforts to be accurate in his formulations, still uses the term *maṣdar* in the sense of *mafʿūl muṭlaq* (although it would have been more appropriate to save the former for the morphological form of the verbal noun only). Perhaps he says *maṣdariyya* because one cannot derive an abstract noun from the phrase *mafʿūl muṭlaq*. Peled (1999:62) points out the grammarians' tendency not to distinguish between *mafʿūl muṭlaq* and *maṣdar*, even in late stages of theory development. Carter (1981:344) points out that Širbīnī (d. 977/1570) uses *maṣdar* to refer to *mafʿūl muṭlaq* despite being aware that verbal nouns do not necessarily function as *mafʿūl muṭlaq*.

of a circumstantial modifier is in relation to its governor" (*ḥāliyyatu l-ḥāli bi-ʿtibāri ʿāmilihi*), and the governor can be a verb in the future (e.g., *ʾaḍribuhu ġadan mujarradan* 'I will hit him tomorrow, stripped') or in the past (e.g., *ḍarabtuhu ʾamsi mujarradan* 'I hit him yesterday, stripped'). Therefore there is no contradiction between the meanings of *ʾin* and *wāw al-ḥāl*[65] (thus nothing in principle prevents one from combining the two).

From the term *tābiʿ* lit. 'something which follows (something else)' (a constituent that follows the head noun and matches it in its case[66]) RDA derives the word *tabʿiyya* lit. 'dependence, subordination', 'being a *tābiʿ* [of the preceding constituent]'. For instance, RDA explains that a substitution can be considered "independent" formally, i.e., it can take the head noun's place. Alternatively, it can be considered not independent, "since it takes its case as a *tābiʿ* of the preceding constituent" (*lammā kāna ʾiʿrābuhu bi-tabʿiyyati l-ʾawwali*). These two options are relevant, e.g., for determining the case of a substitute of a constituent that follows the vocative particle: if we treat the substitute as an independent constituent, we shall say *yā Zaydu ʾaḫu* 'O Zayd, brother!' and *yā ʾaḫānā Zaydu* 'O our brother, Zayd!', assigning a *bināʾ* ending to the substitute of a constituent that follows *yā*. According to the second option, one shall say *yā ġulāmu Bišrun/Bišran* 'O lad, Bišr!'[67] and *yā ʾaḫānā Zaydan* 'O our brother, Zayd!', assigning an *ʾiʿrāb* ending to the substitute.[68]

The term *tabʿiyya* appears also in the definition of adjectives. RDA says that an adjective is, among others, an element "that was coined[69] so that [...] it can function as a *tābiʿ* of any [noun] specifying the owner [of the attribute denoted by the adjective]" (*wuḍiʿa [...] ṣaḥīḥa l-tabʿiyyati li-kulli mā yuḫaṣṣiṣu ṣāḥibahu*).[70]

From the term *mawṣūl* 'a relative pronoun'[71] RDA derives an abstract term *mawṣūliyya* 'being a relative pronoun/clause, the function of a relative pro-

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65   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 100.

66   Various types of *tawābiʿ* and the rules related to them are discussed in RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 277–397. Wright (1896–1898:II, 272) translates the term as "sequentia/followers/appositives".

67   Both these options are presented in Wright 1896–1898:II, 91. Sībawayhi (as cited in RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 346) explains the *naṣb* by a reconstructable verb *adʿū* 'I call'. As for the *ḍamma* ending, RDA (*Šarḥ* I, 364) explains it by saying that since the *ḍamma* of *bināʾ* resembles the *ḍamma* that stems from *rafʿ*, *tawābiʿ* of a constituent following the vocative particle may take *rafʿ*.

68   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 382.

69   The notion of coinage is discussed in chapter 3 below.

70   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 286.

71   According to Versteegh (2009b:236), in Ibn al-Sarrāj's writing the term *ṣila* refers to "an item that is connected with a noun in order to form a complete syntactic (and semantic) unit". *Mawṣūl* is a name for a word with which the *ṣila* is connected (i.e., the relative pro-

noun/clause'.[72] For instance, he explains that in a regular syndetic relative clause a resumptive pronoun can be omitted, if it functions as a direct object. However, it cannot be omitted after a definite article functioning as a relative pronoun, even if the resumptive pronoun functions as an object. The reason is that in this structure "[the clause's function] as a relative clause is not overt, while the [resumptive] pronoun is one of the indications of its being a relative clause" (*li-ḫafāʾi mawṣūliyyatihā, wa-l-ḍamīru ʾaḥadu dalāʾili mawṣūliyyatihā*).[73] In other words, if a clause is not marked as a relative clause by a relative pronoun, it is important to provide another indication for this function of it, viz., the resumptive pronoun.

Another abstract term, *ʿalamiyya* 'being a proper noun/the function of a proper noun' is derived from the term *ʿalam* 'proper noun'. It appears in the treatise multiple times, e.g., in the chapter dealing with *al-ʾiḫbār bi-llaḏī*.[74] The grammarian explains that in proper nouns and their like, which are annexation structures, e.g. ʾAbū l-Qāsim, Imruʾ al-Qays, Ibn ʾĀwā 'jackal', the governed element is "in the status of one of the word's letters, due to [the expression's] being a proper noun" (*ṣāra bi-l-ʿalamiyyati ka-baʿḍi ḥurūfi l-kalimati*). Therefore the two parts of such proper nouns and nicknames cannot be separated for the purpose of *al-ʾiḫbār bi-llaḏī*, just as the two parts of the expression *qaws quzaḥ(a)* 'rainbow', or the two parts of a compound cannot be separated.[75]

Additionally, the term *ʿalamiyya* plays an important role in discussions of diptote nouns—since being a proper noun, in combination with other factors,

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noun, the article in a participial construction, or *ʾayy*). As the abovementioned excerpt deals specifically with relative clause, I translate *mawṣūl* as 'relative pronoun'. It should be mentioned that some scholars argue that the term "relative pronoun" is inaccurate for *allaḏī* and its likes, as their syntactic behavior differs from relative pronouns in contemporary understanding. They prefer to call them "relative complementizers", "relative markers" or "relativizers" (whereas the Standard Arabic *man* and *mā* are considered relative pronouns). See Mughazy 2009:61–64 for a discussion. I refer to the elements that introduce relative clause as "relative pronouns" (following, e.g., Wright 1896–1898:I, 105; Owens 1984:56) for the sake of simplicity, and also because the analogy drawn by RDA between the 3rd person pronouns and these elements (see, e.g., p. 88 below) makes it particularly tempting to view the latter as pronouns.

72   Ali (1987:32) mentions that abstract nouns in Arabic can be derived also from passive participles.

73   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 24. The term appears again in a similar context in RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 58.

74   In general, *al-ʾiḫbār bi-llaḏī* (or *al-ʾiḫbār bi-l-ʾalif wa-l-lām*) transforms a chosen word in a given sentence into a nominal predicate, while the rest of the sentence is turned into an independent relative clause functioning as the subject. This transformation is used by the grammarians to test various rules and principles of their theory. See Baalbaki 2008:215–216; Goldenberg 1988:67–69.

75   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 35.

often implies diptoteness: it makes the *tāʾ marbūṭa* an inseparable part of the word, which allows the *tāʾ marbūṭa* to render the word diptote;[76] it changes the meaning of an adjective by making it apply to one referent only, which affects its diptoteness;[77] it constitutes a precondition for diptoteness in compounds,[78] etc. The term appears also in discussions on other issues related to proper nouns—e.g., the function of the definite article in proper nouns such as al-ʿAbbās and al-Ḥasan;[79] the impossibility of *tarḫīm* in names such as ʿAbdallāh and Taʾabbaṭa Šarran;[80] the impossibility of a proper noun functioning as a qualifier,[81] etc.

Ḥarfiyya 'belonging to the category of particles', *ismiyya* 'belonging to the category of nouns, nounness', *fiʿliyya* 'belonging to the category of verbs, verbalness'—these terms usually appear in discussions on the categorical identity of problematic words. For instance, in RDA's discussions of the proper names of verbs we find the three of them;[82] the terms *fiʿliyya* and *ismiyya* appear in the discussion of the status of *ḥabbaḏā* 'How beautiful!';[83] the terms *ismiyya* and *ḥarfiyya* are used in discussing the categorical identity of *rubba* 'many (a man), many (a time), sometimes';[84] *ḥarfiyya* is used in the discussion on *laysa* 'is not'.[85]

Additionally, these terms appear in discussions of features characteristic of one part of speech, which for some reason become stronger in a word, thus affecting its syntactic behavior. For instance, RDA explains that among all relative pronouns and the words that include the meaning of question and condition, *ʾayy* 'which? What?' is the only one that takes an *ʾiʿrāb* ending[86]— "because it always functions as an annexed element in annexation, which bends it to the side of nounness" (*li-ʾilzāmihim lahā l-ʾiḍāfata l-murajjiḥata li-jānibi l-ismiyyati*).[87] *ʾAyy*, like every noun, was originally supposed to take an *ʾiʿrāb* ending. The factor that was supposed to prevent *ʾayy* from taking this end-

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76   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 132.

77   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 148.

78   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 156.

79   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 368.

80   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 396.

81   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 314.

82   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 86, 110.

83   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 256.

84   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 288.

85   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 458.

86   In this context RDA mentions the existence of various opinions regarding the status of *allaḏāni/allatāni* (relative pronouns in dual, masc. and fem.) and *ḏū* in the dialect of the Ṭayyiʾ tribe (see Mughazy 2009:61–62 for this dialectal usage).

87   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 60.

ing is the fact that it requires a relative clause (when functioning as a relative pronoun[88]) or includes the meaning of a question (when functioning as a question word[89]). It can be concluded that the tendency to function as an annexed element, which strengthens the nominal characteristics of *ʾayy*, is stronger than factors that drive it close to particles.[90]

In this context RDA notes that not every annexed element automatically takes an *ʾiʿrāb* ending, but only those that always fulfill this function. For instance, in the examples *ḫamsata ʿašaraka* 'your (masc.) fifteen' and *kam rajulin* 'How many men!' the annexed elements do not take *ʾiʿrāb* endings, since this is not the only function of these words.[91]

Other abstract terms derived from accepted grammatical terms: *ẓarfiyya* 'function of time/place expression';[92] *šarṭiyya* 'meaning/function of condition';[93] *fāʿiliyya* 'semantic function of an agent/syntactic function of a subject in a verbal sentence';[94] *mafʿūliyya* 'semantic/syntactic function of an object';[95] *maʿmūliyya* 'constituent's being grammatically governed';[96] *jinsiyya* 'being a generic noun' (an antonym of *ʿalamiyya* 'being a proper noun');[97] *faṣliyya* 'being *ḍamīr al-faṣl*';[98] *jumliyya* 'being a clause';[99] *ʾamriyya* 'function/meaning of imperative'.[100]

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88 RDA (*Šarḥ* III, 7) says that relative pronouns are supposed to take *bināʾ* endings, because they request a relative clause that includes a resumptive pronoun, like a particle, which requests other constituent(s) in order to function as a part of sentence.

89 A noun functioning as a question word is supposed to receive a *bināʾ* ending, because it includes the meaning of the question particle *ʾa-* (a particle introducing yes/no questions). RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 41.

90 Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 736) also explains the *ʾiʿrāb* ending in *ʾayy* as due to the fact that it always functions as an annexed element, although he does not expand his argument and does not use the term *ismiyya* in this context.

91 RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 60.

92 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 253; III, 106, 160, 179, 183.

93 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 270, 271; III, 193, etc.

94 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 295, 335; III, 39, 160. Ibn al-Ḥājib also uses this term—see, e.g., *Šarḥ*, 241.

95 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 335–336, 338; III, 41, 160. See also Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 241.

96 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 338; III, 162.

97 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 370; II, 314.

98 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 461–462. The medieval grammarians' term *ḍamīr al-faṣl* 'the pronoun of separation' appears to be close to the Western term 'copula', and some modern writers indeed use the term 'copula' to refer to this phenomenon in Arabic. However, Peled (2009:131–132) outlines seven points of difference between the two notions. He prefers to leave the Arabic term untranslated (see also Peled 2006c:558–559), and I follow him in that.

99 RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 242.

100 RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 118.

2.2.2 *Abstract Terms Derived from Non-technical Words*

From the noun *juzʾ* 'part' RDA derives the term *juzʾiyya*, which can be translated, in some cases, as 'functioning as a part of a sentence'. The term appears in this sense, e.g., in a discussion of relative pronouns. One possible explanation for their *bināʾ* ending is their resemblance to particles. They need to be followed by a clause with a resumptive pronoun "in order to constitute a complete [indispensable][101] part [of a sentence]" (*fī tamāmihā juzʾan*)—"just like a particle needs another [word/s] in order to function as [an indispensable] part [of a sentence]" (*ka-ḥtiyāji l-ḥarfi ʾilā ġayrihi fī l-juzʾiyyati*).[102]

In another place *juzʾiyya* appears in the sense of 'functioning as a part of a word': assuming that *kaʾanna* 'as if' consists of two parts (according to Ḫalīl's view), the original structure of *kaʾanna Zaydan ʾasadun* 'As if Zayd is a lion' is *ʾinna Zaydan ka-l-ʾasadi* 'Indeed Zayd is similar to a lion'. The particle of comparison *ka-* was preposed and put at the beginning of the sentence in order to announce from the outset that there is an intention to compare. Thus *ʾinna* had to turn into *ʾanna*, since *ka-* can join single words (and not clauses).[103] *Ka-* and *ʾanna* together became a single word, thus *ka-* does not exert the grammatical influence that it used to exert in the position of the predicate (in the underlying structure)—because now *ka-* is a part of a particle.[104] Although a preposition should be linked to a verb or an element with verbal power,[105] the *ka-* in *kaʾanna* does not require any element to which it can be linked "since its becoming a part of a particle causes it to cease being a preposition" (*li-ʾannahā ḫarajat bi-l-juzʾiyyati ʿan kawnihā jārratan*).[106]

101　This addition is based on RDA's own explanation (RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 6) that *juzʾ* in this context means a subject (of a verbal or a nominal sentence) or a nominal predicate—i.e., an indespenable part of a sentence. This corresponds to the sense of the term *juzʾ* identified by Levin (2011) as "technical". However, most of the appearances of the term *juzʾiyya* in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* are unrelated to that sense, which justifies the discussion of *juzʾiyya* in the current section.

102　RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 7. The term appears in the same sense also in RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 52 and RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 259 (in a citation from Ibn al-Ḥājib).

103　RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 369. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 974) presents this opinion without using the term *juzʾiyya*. He prefers viewing *kaʾanna* as a single word (i.e., not as a combination of two particles). It should be mentioned that *ʾanna*, together with the clause that follows it, is considered to be equivalent to a single noun, whereas *ʾinna* always opens an independent clause. Peled 1998:39.

104　RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 370.

105　A preposition is defined as "an element that was coined in order to link a verb, or something that resembles it, or its meaning, to a following constituent". RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 260.

106　RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 370.

In yet another case the term *juz'iyya* can be understood as 'the idea of partialness' or 'being a part of something'. In the sentence *al-burru l-kurru bi-sittīna* 'A wheat—a *kurr* (a certain measure) [of it is sold] for 60' a prepositional phrase *minhu*, including the resumptive pronoun (that refers back to *al-burr*), is omitted (although a predicative clause in principle must include a resumptive pronoun referring back to the subject of the main sentence[107]). RDA says that in this case the omission is possible, since the idea of partialness included in *kurr* "gives notice of the pronoun" (*tušʿiru bi-l-ḍamīri*).[108] That is to say, the word *kurr* implies a certain quantity of goods, i.e., a part of a category. Therefore, in the vicinity of this word the prepositional phrase *minhu*, which also denotes partialness, can be omitted.[109] In this case the connection between the predicative clause and the subject is clear even without the resumptive pronoun.

From the proper noun Zayd RDA derives the abstract term *zaydiyya* 'zaydness', denoting the characteristic of a person that makes him Zayd. For instance, the grammarian says that the sentence *hāḏā Zaydun* 'This is Zayd' means that the referent of the demonstrative pronoun *hāḏā*[110] "is either characterized by zaydness, or judged to be such" (*muttaṣifun bi-l-zaydiyyati ʾaw maḥkūmun*

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107   Ibn al-Sarrāj (*ʾUṣūl* I, 62–64) distinguishes between a nominal predicate which is co-referential with the subject, and a nominal predicate which "is not co-referential with [the subject] and includes its pronoun" (*yakūnu ġayra l-ʾawwali wa-yaẓharu fīhi ḍamīruhu*). See also Ibn Yaʿīš, *Šarḥ* I, 88–89. According to Peled (2006a:49), in principle there must be a semantic relation of identity between the subject and its nominal predicate. As a clause is by definition a non-referential element, in order to create a link between the predicative clause and the subject (or between the relative clause and the head noun) the clause must include a linking element. Usually this is a pronoun referring back to the subject (or the head noun); however, it may take other forms (see Peled 2006a:49–50). Ibn Yaʿīš's opinion on the example *al-samnu manawāni bi-dirhamin* 'the butter, two *manan* for a dirham' (whose structure is analoguous to RDA's abovementioned example) is presented in Peled 2006a:49.

108   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 238 (the term *juz'iyya* appears in the same sense also in RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 465). Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 361) in discussing the same example does not explain how the context allows reconstructing the pronoun, but only says that "its omission is possible since it is known" (*lammā ʿulima sāġa ḥaḏfuhu*).

109   One of the meanings of the preposition *min* is "division/partition" (*tabʿīḍ*). See RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 265–266.

110   The use of the term "demonstrative pronoun" in relation to *hāḏā* and its likes is considered inaccurate by some scholars—e.g., Vicente (2006) prefers to speak of "demonstratives", and says (Vicente 2006:572) that they "may have two syntactic roles, attributive and pronominal", but Hasselbach (2007:4) notes that only a few Semitic languages distinguish between these categories morphologically. The term "demonstratives" appears too broad for the purposes of my study as it may include "adverbial demonstratives" such as "here/there" (see Hasselbach 2007:4). I shall henceforth use the term "demonstrative pronoun", following, e.g., Wright 1896–1898:I, 105 and Hasselbach 2007:9–10.

ʿalayhi bi-kaḏā).[111] It is worth noting that RDA distinguishes between reality and the content of the utterance: although the sentence states *hāḏā Zaydun*, the person in question is not necessarily Zayd; there is a possibility that the sentence ascribes to him this characteristic regardless of the real state of affairs (since the speakers can lie or use non-literal language).

The grammarian uses abstract nouns derived from active and passive participles in semantic analyses of syntactic structures. For instance, he says that in the phrase *ḍarb Zayd* 'Zayd's hitting' the verbal noun "signifies a meaning in another expression" (*mufīdun li-maʿnan fī lafẓi ġayrihi*)[112]—it signifies the idea of "Zayd's being the hitter" (*ḍāribiyyat Zayd*).[113] It is worth noting that the phrase *ḍarb Zayd* is ambiguous: Zayd can be either the hitter or the hit one, but RDA does not mention this here.

Elsewhere he presents the structure of exception (*istiṯnāʾ*) as one of cases in which the subject must precede the object.[114] He explains that when the exception particle is preceded by a constituent that is governed by the same governor as a constituent that follows the particle, "the first constituent's function of agent, semantic object or circumstantial modifier" (*mā li-ḏālika l-mutaqaddimi min-a l-fāʿiliyyati ʾaw-i l-mafʿūliyyati, ʾaw-i l-ḥāliyyati*[115]) must be restricted to the second constituent.[116] The same semantic functions that can pertain to the constituent that follows the exception particle remain potential, neither general nor specific.[117]

For instance, in *mā ḍaraba Zaydun ʾillā ʿAmran* 'Zayd did not hit [anyone] but ʿAmr', i.e., Zayd hit only ʿAmr, "the function of Zayd as the hitter is restricted to ʿAmr" (*ḍāribiyyatu Zaydin maḥṣūratun fī ʿAmrin*). "The function of ʿAmr

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111 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 255; the word *zaydiyya* appears in the same meaning also in RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 152.

112 See Sheyhatovitch 2012:71–92 for a discussion of terms derived from the root *f-y-d* in the sense of "addition to the message".

113 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 38. After that the term *rajuliyya* 'manhood' appears in a similar context: the grammarian presents one constituent as adding information to another. The term *rajuliyya* appears also in RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 284, however there the discussion is not on information added, but rather on an element of the meaning of the word.

114 According to the medieval grammarians, a basic word order in Arabic verbal sentence is VSO, but in the vast majority of cases the object can precede the subject. See, e.g., Peled 2009a:49–54. Various grammarians, starting with Sībawayhi, discussed possible reasons for changes in the basic word order. See Peled 2009a:76–80 for survey of arguments put forward in this context. The cases in which, in RDA's view, the VSO pattern is obligatory, are presented in RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 189–196 (after this the author presents cases in which the VOS pattern is obligatory—see RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 196–197).

115 These are abstract terms discussed above—see section 2.2.1.

116 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 191.

117 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 191–192.

as the hit one is potential" (*ʾammā maḍrūbiyyatu ʿAmrin fa-ʿalā l-iḥtimāli*), i.e., there is a possibility that he was hit by other people. Placing the object before the subject would result in the sentence *mā ḍaraba ʿAmran ʾillā Zaydun* 'No one hit ʿAmr but Zayd', and thus bring about an essential change in meaning, since in the new sentence the situation is reversed: "the function of ʿAmr as the hit one" (*maḍrūbiyyat ʿAmr*) is restricted to Zayd (i.e., ʿAmr was hit by Zayd only), whereas "the function of Zayd as the hitter" (*ḍāribiyyat Zayd*) remains potential, i.e., there is a possibility that he hits other people as well.[118]

In this discussion the terms *ḍāribiyya* and *maḍrūbiyya* appear as specific cases of *fāʿiliyya* and *mafʿūliyya*.

Other terms used by RDA to denote various characteristics of linguistic elements: *ṣalāḥiyya* 'an element's appropriateness [for taking on a certain meaning],'[119] *lafẓiyya* 'having to do with form',[120] *nuṣūṣiyya* 'signifying a meaning unequivocally'[121] (abstract term derived from *naṣṣ* 'text, wording').

Abstract terms that RDA uses in discussions on possible explanations of linguistic phenomena: *ʾaqyasiyya* 'better corresponding to basic principles [of the theory]'[122] (referring to one of possible explanations of a linguistic phenomenon), *ʿilliyya* 'being a cause of …',[123] *farʿiyya* 'being secondary, in comparison to …'.[124]

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118   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 192 (the term *ḍāribiyya* appears in a similar sense also in RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 295; the term *maḍrūbiyya* appears also in RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 31, 451). Ibn al-Ḥāǧib (*Šarḥ*, 329) discusses the same example without using the terms *ḍāribiyya* and *maḍrūbiyya*. While discussing cases in which the object must be placed before the subject, Ibn al-Ḥāǧib (*Šarḥ*, 330) presents the sentence *mā ḍaraba ʿAmran ʾillā Zaydun*, noting that it cannot be changed into *mā ḍaraba Zaydun ʾillā ʿAmran*, since the purpose is "to negate the genus [that can perform the function of] agent, and confirm [the agency in relation to] Zayd" (*nafyu jinsi l-fāʿiliyyati wa-ʾiṯbātuhā li-Zaydin*).

119   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 144; IV, 16, 27, etc.

120   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 403.

121   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 411. The term was used also by Ibn al-Ḥāǧib (*Šarḥ*, 450, etc.).

122   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 112.

123   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 513.

124   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 420; IV, 6–7. This term is related to the well-known distinction between *ʾaṣl* (lit. 'root, origin', the most basic pattern in a category) and *farʿ* (lit. 'branch', secondary pattern in a category). This distinction affects various levels of grammatical analysis. Owens (1988:199–226) points out the resemblance between this distinction and the notion of markedness in modern linguistics. Baalbaki (2008:98–112) makes a connection between Sībawayhi's notion of *ʾaṣl* and his attempts to organize linguistic elements in a way that reveals the relationships between regular and irregular forms, between documented usages and those that the grammarian expects to find, and between different elements in categories of words with common features. See also Baalbaki 2006b.

2.3   Use of "Kūfan" Terms

Relatively late treatises (from the 4/10th century and later) speak of two major schools in early Arabic grammar, the Kūfan and the Baṣran, which held different opinions on various grammatical issues. The main book that presents these disagreements is *Kitāb al-ʾInṣāf* by Ibn al-ʾAnbārī (d. 577/1181). However, it is not certain whether these later books present an accurate picture of Arabic grammar in the 2nd/8th and 3rd/9th centuries. Various scholars in the past and the present expressed their doubts concerning the existence of the Kūfan school of grammar.[125] Baalbaki (1981) demonstrates that Farrāʾ (d. 207/822; considered one of the leaders of the Kūfan school) and Mubarrad (d. 286/899; one of Sībawayhi's followers) indeed held different views on about a third of the issues presented by Ibn al-ʾAnbārī as controversial. Bernards (1997:93–97) draws attention to the fact that alongside the differences between early "Kūfan" and "Baṣran" grammarians there were many similarities, and, on the other hand, there were many discrepancies among so called "Baṣran" grammarians. In addition, she points out that the answer to the question of the schools' existence depends on our definition of the term "school".[126]

I have no intention to treat the question of the schools' authenticity here. The important point is that later grammarians believed in their existence and labeled certain terms and opinions as "Kūfan".[127] Views recognized as "Baṣran" were considered within the consensus—so much so that Owens (1991:237) claimed that opinions that were not accepted as part of this consensus were labeled anachronistically as "Kūfan".[128] "Baṣran" terms were widely accepted among grammarians, although some of them combined terms from both schools in their writings.[129] The "Kūfan" terms survived as an alternative to the "Baṣran" ones.[130]

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125   The main studies dealing with this topic are mentioned in Marogy 2010:19.

126   See Baalbaki 2007:xxxix–xlii for a systematic survey of the modern polemic over the authenticity of the two schools.

127   For instance, Zajjājī (d. 337/948 or 339–340/949–950) says in his *Kitāb al-ʾĪḍāḥ* that he "translates" Kūfan into Baṣran terms in order to facilitate understanding; Sijistānī (d. 250/864) criticizes Baġdādī grammarians for using Kūfan terms instead of Baṣran. The relevant fragments are cited and translated in Versteegh 1993:9–10. Owens (1991:225) says that all grammarians, from the 4/10th century on, mention the two schools in their writings.

128   See also Bohas et al. 1990:7.

129   Bin Ġazī 2010:123.

130   Owens 1991:230.

There is no doubt that RDA perceived the existence of the two schools as a fact.[131] Although he is not the only grammarian to have used terms perceived as "Kūfan", the fact that he uses them, alongside the fact that sometimes he prefers controversial "Kūfan" views, reveals just another aspect of his originality.

When speaking of the bound possessive pronoun 'my', RDA uses the term *yāʾ al-ʾiḍāfa* lit. 'the *yāʾ* of annexation' three times, whereas the widely accepted Baṣran term is *yāʾ al-mutakallim* lit. 'the *yāʾ* of the speaker (i.e., of the 1st peson sing.)'. Bin Ġazī (2010:125) recognizes the term as Kūfan, and it indeed appears in Farrāʾ's *Maʿānī l-Qurʾān*[132] (alongside *yāʾ min al-mutakallim*[133]).

In *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* the term appears for the first time in the discussion on *ʾiʿrāb* 'a change in the word's ending according to a governor'. Although the last consonant of a noun to which *yāʾ al-ʾiḍāfa* or *yāʾ al-nisba* is suffixed receives *kasra* regardless of the governor (just like the last consonant of a noun to which *tāʾ marbūṭa* is suffixed receives *fatḥa* regardless of the governor),[134] this does not exclude these nouns from the definition of nouns with an *ʾiʿrāb* ending, since a governor joins the word after the aforementioned morphemes are suffixed to it.[135] The second appearance of the term *yāʾ al-ʾiḍāfa* is in the discussion of *nudba* 'lamentation',[136] in a citation from Sībawayhi.[137] The third appearance is in a discussion of the consonant *t* that replaces the possessive pronoun 'my' in exclamations *yā ʾabati/ʾummati* 'O my father/my mother!'.[138] The term *yāʾ al-mutakallim* is far more frequent in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* than *yāʾ al-ʾiḍāfa*, occurring 27 times.[139]

RDA uses the term *kināya* in the sense of 'pronoun' (whereas the more common meaning of *kināya* is 'metonymy',[140] and the regular term for 'pronoun' is *ḍamīr*). When presenting Sībawayhi's opinion RDA cites the verse

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131   The evidence is that the word *al-kūfiyyūna/al-kūfiyyīna* appears in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* more than 200 times—see, e.g., RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 65, 77, 86, 107. The word *al-baṣriyyūna/al-baṣriyyīna* appears more than 160 times—see, e.g., RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 64, 202, 227, 244.

132   See Kinberg 1996:998.

133   Kinberg 1996:999.

134   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 57.

135   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 58.

136   This is the translation of Howell and Wright. See Cachia (1973:98).

137   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 415. It is worth noting that Sībawayhi uses the term *yāʾ al-ʾiḍāfa* several times in chapters dealing with lamentation—see, e.g., Sībawayhi, *Kitāb* II, 279, 280.

138   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 329.

139   See RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 76, 98, etc.

140   See Cachia 1973:86.

> *wa-lam yartafiq wa-l-nāsu muḥtaḍirūnahu*
> *jamīʿan wa-ʾaydī l-muʿtafīna rawāhiquh*

He does not lean on his elbows when all the people come to him, and the hands of those who ask for his favors reach out for him.[141]

He says that Sībawayhi "considered the *hāʾ* [in *muḥtaḍirūnahu*] a pronoun" (*jaʿala l-hāʾa kināyatan*).[142] It is noteworthy that Sībawayhi himself does not use the term *kināya* in this specific context, but only *ḍamīr* and *muḍmar*.[143] Tawfīq (1978:142) and Versteegh (1993:112–113) recognize *kināya* in the sense of 'pronoun' as a Kūfan term; it indeed appears in Farrāʾ's *Maʿānī l-Qurʾān* in this sense multiple times, alongside with *maknī*, which is even more frequent there.[144] RDA does not use the term *maknī* at all.

Bin Ġazī (2010:126) recognizes as Kūfan the term *muḍmar*, which also appears in *Šarḥ al-Kāfya* in the sense of 'pronoun'.[145] It was in fact used by Farrāʾ, although it seems that in most its appearances in *Maʿānī l-Qurʾān* the term *ism muḍmar* refers to a pronoun that does not appear overtly, either because of its being hidden, or because of elision which allows a reconstruction.[146] Thus it is not clear whether Farrāʾ uses *muḍmar* in the sense of 'pronoun' or as 'an element that does not appear overtly, but remains in speaker's mind'.[147]

RDA uses the term *ḥurūf al-ʾiḍāfa* lit. 'particles of annexation', which Bin Ġazī (2010:126) recognizes as Kūfan, in the sense of 'prepositions', without, however,

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141 See Baġdādī, *Ḫizāna* IV, 271–272 for a discussion of the verse's meaning. Baġdādī maintains that the verse is "artificial" (*maṣnūʿ*), i.e., was made up for the purpose of grammatical discussion. Jumʿa (1989:226–227) accepts this opinion.

142 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 232.

143 See Sībawayhi, *Kitāb* I, 79.

144 Kinberg 1996:733–736.

145 See, e.g., RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 481. The grammarian explains there that the constituent denoting the warned one (*al-muḥaḏḏar*) in the "warning" (*taḥḏīr*) structure can be either an overt noun, or a pronoun (*muḍmar*). Another example occurs in RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 267. There is a distinction between nouns that must function as an annexed element in an annexation structure and "cannot be annexed to a pronoun" (*lā yuḍāfu ʾilā muḍmarin*), and those that can appear outside an annexation and "can be annexed to a pronoun" (*yuḍāfu ʾilā muḍmarin*). The former category consists of *ḏū* 'possessor/owner' only, whereas the latter includes the other members of "the six nouns" group (see Wright 1896–1898:I, 249 for a discussion of this category of nouns).

146 Kinberg (1996:358) translates *ism muḍmar* as "suppressed pronoun".

147 Carter and Versteegh (2007:300–301) mention two senses of *muḍmar*: 'suppressed' and 'pronominalized'. *ʾIḍmār* (a verbal noun from which the passive participle *muḍmar* is derived) is one of the most ancient terms in medieval Arabic grammatical theory. Levin (1997:144) translates *muḍmar* as 'concealed in the mind' and links it to the *taqdīr* theory.

mentioning a source for this claim.[148] Ryding and Versteegh (2007:294) note that Sībawayhi used this term to refer to "noun/noun constructions and preposition/noun constructions". Talmon (2003:238) assumes that the term *ḥurūf al-ʾiḍāfa* as used by Sībawayhi reflects earlier grammatical thinking.[149] RDA is aware of the fact that the term was not common in his time, and thus glosses it by the regular term *ḥurūf al-jarr*.[150] This appears in the discussion of *naṣb*, which is, according to RDA, a marker of *faḍla* 'an optional constituent of the sentence' (in contrast to *rafʿ*, which is the marker of *ʿumad*, 'essential constituents'). An optional constituent can be required by an essential one either directly (this is the case with all kinds of *mafʿūl* other than *al-mafʿūl maʿahu*,[151] and also with the circumstantial modifier and *tamyīz*), or with the mediation of a particle, which is the case with *al-mafʿūl maʿahu*, *mustaṯnā ġayr mufarraġ* 'a non-void excepted element'[152] and "nouns that follow prepositions" (*al-ʾasmāʾu talī ḥurūfa l-ʾiḍāfati ʾaʿnī ḥurūfa l-jarri*).[153] The mention of "nouns that follow prepositions" may seem irrelevant for the discussion of the *naṣb* (since these constituents take *jarr*). However, RDA views nouns that are connected to verbs by prepositions as objects that "appear in *naṣb* position" (*manṣūb al-maḥall*).[154]

He once uses the term *nūn al-ʿimād* 'nūn of support', recognized by Bin Ġazī (2010:126) as Kūfan, instead of the accepted Baṣran term *nūn al-wiqāya* lit. 'nūn

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148   The better known "Kūfan" term for a preposition is *ṣifa*. See Talmon 2000:247–248 for a discussion of how *ṣifa* "degenerated" from denoting the concept of "adverb" in Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ's logical treatise into a preposition.

149   See also Talmon 2000:248–249.

150   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 62. His use of the term *ḥurūf al-ʾiḍāfa* seems surprising, given that he noted elsewhere that it is not correct to use the term *ʾiḍāfa* to refer to prepositional phrases. See pp. 15–16 above.

151   The term *mafʿūl* and the main elements in *naṣb* designated under it are discussed in Taha 2008:101–102.

152   *Istiṯnāʾ mufarraġ* 'a void exception' is the most common exception structure in Arabic. This is a negative sentence in which the general term does not appear, and the excepted element takes the case that the general term was supposed to take. In contrast, in a non-void exception the syntactic function of the excepted element depends on whether the antecedent containing the general term is positive or negative. If positive, the excepted element takes *naṣb*; if negative, the excepted element might be considered a substitute for the general term and given the same case as the latter. See Bernards 2007b:411.

153   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 62.

154   See RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 261. That differs from Ibn al-Sarrāj's position, who says (*ʾUṣūl* II, 65) that in the sentence *marartu bi-Zaydin* 'I passed by Zayd' the entire prepositional phrase (and not just the noun in *jarr*) stands in the position of *naṣb*, which allows it to be coordinated with a constituent in *naṣb*. Ibn Jinnī's position is similar to that of Ibn al-Sarrāj—see Ibn Jinnī, *Ḥaṣāʾiṣ* I, 107, 342 (the relevant excerpts are discussed in Owens 1988:176–177). See also Taha 2008:103.

of defense'. The term appears in a discussion of diptote nouns, which, when formally indefinite, cannot receive in their ending either *tanwīn* or *kasra*. RDA explains that they cannot receive *kasra* due to their resemblance to verbs. A verb cannot receive *kasra*, therefore the bound pronoun 'me' in *naṣb* comes with *nūn al-ʿimād*, and the speakers say *ḍarabanī* 'he hit me' and *yaḍribunī* 'he hits me/will hit me'.[155] In other words, the bound pronoun of the 1st person singular in *naṣb* should have been -*ī* (identical to the same pronoun in *jarr*, e.g., *kitābī* 'my book'), but this would result in *kasra* in the verb's ending, which is impermissible. Therefore *nūn al-ʿimād* / *nūn al-wiqāya* is used, and the pronoun in *naṣb* is -*nī*.

Bin Ġazī (2010:127) recognizes as Kūfan the term *ʾin al-ʿāzila* 'the isolating *ʾin*', whose Baṣran counterpart is *ʾin al-kāffa* 'the stopping *ʾin*'. The term appears in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* in a discussion of the negating particle *mā*, which cannot exert a grammatical influence similar to that of *laysa*, when followed by *ʾin*. The reason is that *ʾin*, although redundant in this case, formally resembles the negating *ʾin*. A combination of two negating particles yields a positive meaning; therefore, *ʾin* contradicts the meaning of *mā* and annuls its government.[156] Interestingly, according to the Kūfan grammarians, *ʾin al-ʿāzila* is not redundant, but a negating particle emphasizing the negative meaning of *mā*. RDA notes that this analysis is invalid, because two particles with an identical meaning cannot follow each other directly.[157]

The term *wāw al-ṣarf* 'wāw of averting', the Kūfan counterpart of *wāw al-maʿiyya* 'wāw of simultaneity',[158] appears in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* three times,[159] but this seems less interesting than the aforementioned cases, since RDA explicitly presents it as a Kūfan term,[160] i.e., he does not consider it a part of his own terminology.

Similarly, the term *ʿimād* lit. 'support', the Kūfan counterpart of *ḍamīr al-faṣl*[161] in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* is related to a Kūfan view. It appears in RDA's discussion of the famous debate between Sībawayhi and Kisāʾī (d. 189/805). Kisāʾī claimed that one must say *kuntu ʾaẓunnu ʾanna l-ʿaqraba ʾašaddu lasʿatan min-*

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155   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 102–103.

156   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 185.

157   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 186.

158   Carter 1973:294. For a discussion of the term *ṣarf* see Peled 2009a:153 and Carter 1973:295–296.

159   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 43, 67, 300 (in discussions on *wa-* followed by the subjunctive).

160   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 43.

161   See Owens 1990:166–167 for a discussion of the term *ʿimād* in Farrāʾ's writing and a comparison to Sībawayhi, Mubarrad and Ibn al-Sarrāj. For a discussion of *ḍamīr al-faṣl* in medieval Arabic grammatical theory see Peled 2009a:126–131.

a l-zunbūri fa-ʾiḏā huwa ʾiyyāhā 'I used to think that a scorpion stings stronger than a hornet, but it turned out to be the same', whereas Sībawayhi argued that the correct usage is *fa-ʾiḏā huwa hiya*,[162] since *ʾiḏā* that expresses surprise is followed by a separate nominal sentence.[163] Ṭaʿlab (d. 291/904) said, in favor of Kisāʾī's approach, that the independent pronoun *huwa* in the sentence is *ʿimād*, and *ʾiḏā* is equivalent to a combination of the cognitive verb *wajadtu* 'I found out' with its first direct object. If so, one can say *fa-ʾiḏā huwa ʾiyyāhā*, analogously to *fa-wajadtuhu huwa ʾiyyāhā*. After that RDA presents Zajjājī's opinion, according to which this citation from Ṭaʿlab is incorrect, and then summarizes and explains the cases in which *ḍamīr al-faṣl* can appear.[164] The fact that RDA uses the term *ʿimād* when presenting a Kūfan approach would seem to indicate that he does not consider *ʿimād* a part of his own terminology.

Bin Ġazī (2010:128) views the term *lām al-juḥūd* 'lām of denial' that appears in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*[165] as Kūfan, but this is a standard term in Arabic grammatical theory for the particle *li-* in the structure *mā kāna/lam yakun* X *li-yafʿala*, denoting complete denial of any possibility for the occurrence denoted by the subjunctive verb.[166] Bin Ġazī was probably misled by the fact that *juḥūd* is closely related to the noun *jaḥd* 'negation', considered to be a Kūfan counterpart of the accepted Baṣran term *nafy*.[167] The term *jaḥd* appears in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* four times, but not in RDA's own discussions: three appearances occur in presentations of Farrāʾ's opinions,[168] and one in a presentation of Sīrāfī's approach.[169]

The term *ʾadāt* lit. 'tool, instrument' is widely considered a counterpart of the Baṣran term *ḥarf* 'particle',[170] although Larcher (2014) claims that it is not

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162   This problem is known in the Arabic grammatical literature as *al-masʾala al-zunbūriyya* 'the hornet problem'. See Carter 2004:13–14.

163   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 194.

164   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 195.

165   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 79. The author explains there that *lām al-juḥūd* cannot be followed by an overt *ʾan* (which is usually reconstructed by the grammarians before the subjunctive which does not follow a typical governor of subjunctive—see Jurjānī, *Muqtaṣid* II, 1049), because this *lām* cannot be followed by a noun (while *ʾan*+subjunctive is equivalent to a verbal noun—see e.g. RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 469).

166   Peled 1998:68. See also Wright 1896–1898:II, 28–29 and Sadan 2012:252–256.

167   Owens 1990:195; Versteegh 1993:12. The term *jaḥd* is indeed very frequently used by Farrāʾ, who also used the term *juḥūd* in a similar sense—see Kinberg 1996:94–99. Farrāʾ used also the term *nafy*, but far less than *jaḥd/ juḥūd*—see Kinberg 1996:848–849.

168   See RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 239 (discussion on the possibility to omit a resumptive pronoun); RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 428 (discussion on *bal* 'but, rather').

169   See RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 239 (discussion on the possibility to omit a resumptive pronoun).

170   See Owens 1990:161, where a brief discussion about the meaning of the term *ʾadāt* in *Maʿānī l-Qurʾān* can be found, alongside with relevant references. See also Versteegh

synonymous with *ḥarf* but refers to "function words". The term appears in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* dozens of times, mainly in the expressions *ʾadāt al-istiṯnāʾ* 'the exception particle', i.e. *ʾillā* 'except',[171] *ʾadāt al-nidāʾ* 'the vocative particle',[172] *ʾadāt al-nafy* 'negating particle',[173] *ʾadāt al-tašbīh* 'the particle of comparison', i.e., *ka-* 'as, like'.[174] Additionally, *ʾadāt* appears in the phrases *ʾadāt al-šarṭ* 'conditional word'[175] and *ʾadāt al-istifhām* 'interrogative word',[176] which do not necessarily refer to particles (although RDA holds that nouns functioning as interrogative/conditional words contain the meaning of a particle[177]).

The term *ḥafḍ* lit. 'lowering' is considered a Kūfan alternative for the regular Baṣran *jarr*.[178] The term appears in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* twice in citations from other grammarians: the first in presenting an opinion of "one of the Baṣrans",[179] and another in presenting Sīrāfī's approach.[180]

As demonstrated above, the use of "Kūfan" terms by itself is not unique to RDA—in fact, all grammarians used them to some extent. The distinctive feature of RDA is that he uses "Kūfan" terms and also accepts certain opinions labeled as "Kūfan". Bin Ġazī (2010:189–193) in her book presents several examples where RDA's rejects and sharply criticizes Farrāʾ's arguments;

1993:12. The logicians also used this term to refer to particles—see, e.g., Fārābī, *Manṭiq* II, 68–71 (discussion of parts of speech). The term is not rare in the grammatical literature: see, e.g., Ibn al-Sarrāj, *ʾUṣūl* I, 430 (*ʾadawāt al-qasam* 'particles of oath'); II, 106 (referring to the particles in general); II, 77 (referring to *ʾinna* 'indeed/that').

171   See RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 191, 193, 263, 476; II, 126, 128, etc.

172   See RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 346, 347.

173   See RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 170.

174   See RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 187; IV, 369.

175   See RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 257 (the example includes the word *man* 'who', considered to be a noun), 442 (referring to the particle *ʾin* 'if'); III, 161 (referring to *matā* 'when', which is a noun), 188 (referring to *ʾayy* 'which', a noun), etc.

176   See RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 257 (the example includes the noun *man* 'who'); IV, 68 (referring to the particle *hal*, which introduces yes/no questions), 164 (referring to the noun *ʾayy* 'which'), etc.

177   For instance, concerning *kam* 'how many/how much' (a nominal element) RDA (*Šarḥ* III, 149) says that when it functions as an interrogative word, it includes the meaning of an interrogative particle. He also says about *ʾiḏā* 'when' (which is considered to be a time/place expression, i.e., a noun) that when functioning as a conditional word, it includes a meaning of the conditional particle *ʾin* (see RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 187).

178   Versteegh 1993:12. The term is very frequent in *Maʿānī l-Qurʾān*; however, Farrāʾ uses it also to speak of *kasra* which does not depend on any governor. See Kinberg 1996:226–231. Farrāʾ uses the term *ḥāfiḍ* to refer to the governor of *jarr*, and the passive participle *maḥfūḍ* to speak of a constituent in *jarr*. See Kinberg 1996:232–236. Later grammarians that were identified as Baṣran also used the term *ḥafḍ*—see, e.g., Ibn al-Sarrāj, *ʾUṣūl* I, 211, 227, 301.

179   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 210.

180   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 227 (the citation from Sīrāfī is indeed accurate—see Sīrāfī, *Šarḥ* IV, 53).

however, according to Tawfīq (1978:250), he adopts Kūfan opinions on 30 issues mentioned in Ibn al-ʾAnbārī's *ʾInṣāf*.

A prominent example in this context is his acceptance of the Kūfan idea that the subject and the predicate in a nominal sentence assign the *rafʿ* to each other.[181] RDA says that he accepts this opinion of Kisāʾī and Farrāʾ, since "each of these [two predicative constituents] becomes an essential part of the sentence through the other" (*kullun minhumā ṣāra ʿumdatan bi-l-ʾāḫari*).[182]

Against this opinion it may be argued that it entails that the subject precedes its predicate, and the predicate precedes its subject—since the governor is supposed to precede the governed constituent. This in turn entails that a constituent must precede itself, since "if A precedes B that precedes C, then A precedes C" (*al-mutaqaddimu ʿalā l-mutaqaddimi ʿalā šayʾin mutaqaddimun ʿalā ḏālika l-šayʾi*).[183] This is an attempt to demonstrate with logical tools why grammatical government must be unidirectional, i.e., why one constituent cannot govern another and be governed by it simultaneously.

RDA retorts that "a grammatical governor does not affect [the governed constituent] in reality" (*al-ʿāmilu l-naḥwiyyu laysa muʾaṯṯiran fī l-ḥaqīqati*), and thus it is not necessary for it to precede the governed constituent. The governor is just a marker (*ʿalāma*). He adds that even if we were to accept the claim that a governor must precede the governed element, because of the former's resemblance to a cause (that causes the governed element to take a certain case), it could still be argued that there are factors requiring each one of the two predicative constituents to follow the other (although the considerations of grammatical government require each one to precede the other).[184] Thus there is no circularity:[185] the subject comes first because "the constituent ascribed [to another constituent] deserves to follow the constituent to which it is ascribed and to be secondary in relation to it" (*ḥaqqu l-mansūbi ʾan yakūna tābiʿan li-l-mansūbi ʾilayhi wa-farʿan lahu*; here RDA uses the terms *mansūb* and *mansūb ʾilayhi*[186] instead of the regular syntactic terms for subject and predicate,

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181   See Ibn al-ʾAnbārī, *ʾInṣāf* I, 44–51 for a detailed discussion on this suggestion, alongside with various arguments against it. RDA's views on this point are presented in Bohas et al. (1990:68–72). Tawfīq (1978:153–156) presents this discussion by RDA as an illustration of his view of *ʿilla*.

182   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 63.

183   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 66.

184   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 66.

185   See Sheyhatovitch (forthcoming) for a discussion of circularity in the context of definitions.

186   These terms are discussed in section 2.4.1.1 below.

because the discussion is logic-oriented). As for preposing the nominal predicate, it can be explained in terms of "location of the informative value" (*maḥaṭṭ al-fāʾida*)[187] and the purpose of producing the utterance.[188]

RDA also accepts the Kūfan attitude towards the governor of optional constituents of the sentence, according to which these constituents receive the *naṣb* from the verbal predicate and the subject together (he cites this opinion from Farrāʾ). The underlying logic is that a constituent becomes optional because of the predicative constituents joined together (i.e., the predicative constituents together supply the sentence with everything necessary, thus rendering each additional constituent optional). Therefore, the predicative constituents are the cause for the case of the optional one. RDA cites another Kūfan grammarian, Hišām ibn Muʿāwiya (d. 209/824; Kisāʾī's disciple), who held that the governor is the subject only. According to RDA, this claim is not far from the truth, since the subject renders the verbal predicate (the first predicative constituent of the verbal sentence) a complete sentence, by joining it, and thus renders all the remaining constituents optional.[189] Only after that RDA presents the Baṣran opinion, according to which the verb assigns the *naṣb* to optional constituents, because the former requires them. It is clear that RDA prefers the other two approaches.[190]

Another example demonstrating RDA's acceptance of Kūfan views appears in the discussion of exception sentences. Some Baṣran grammarians did not permit the exception structure when the excepted items constitute a half and more of a group denoted by the general term. In contrast, RDA accepts sentences such as *lahu ʿalayya ʿašaratun ʾillā sabʿatan* 'I owe him ten less seven', and thus agrees with the Kūfan grammarians.[191]

RDA attempts to reconstruct the considerations of those who do not permit such sentences: he says that they may have imagined (*tawahhamū*, this choice of verb infers that he considers this opinion incorrect[192]) that the speaker uses non-literal language when mentioning the general term, since he mentions the

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187 The term *fāʾida* in the sense of "informative value" is discussed in Sheyhatovitch 2012:47–59. The expression *maḥaṭṭ al-fāʾida* seems very close to the expression *mawḍiʿ al-fāʾida*, which appears in Ibn al-Sarrāj, *ʾUṣūl* I, 181; the relevant fragment is discussed in Sheyhatovitch 2012:54.

188 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 66.

189 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 63–64.

190 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 64.

191 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 114.

192 Sībawayhi's use of the term *tawahhum*, different from its use by later grammarians, is discussed in Baalbaki 1982 and Baalbaki 2008:199–201.

whole group, having in mind only its part. Then the speaker returns to literal speech by excepting from the group items which may be mistakenly considered by the addressee as included in it.[193] For instance, he may designate 'nine' as 'ten', and then return to literal speech and except 'one' from this group, in order to refute the addressee's misconception. According to this approach, the general term can be only used to refer to something that is close to inclusiveness and wholeness, so that the subtracted items constitute less than half of it.[194]

RDA does not accept this line of thought. He says that the purpose of using the exception structure is "to convey two judgments in the shortest form" (*bayānu ḥukmayni bi-ʾaḥṣari lafẓin*). For instance, *jāʾanī l-qawmu ʾillā Zaydan* 'The people except Zayd came to me': if one says *jāʾanī ġayru Zaydin* 'Someone who is not Zayd came to me', the sentence will not convey explicitly that Zayd did not come,[195] and if one says *lam yajiʾnī Zaydun* 'Zayd did not come to me', he does not state explicitly that other people did come to him. In contrast, *jāʾanī l-qawmu ʾillā Zaydan* conveys both messages. Similarly, the sentence *lam yajiʾnī l-qawmu ʾillā Zaydan*[196] 'No one but Zayd came to me' conveys two messages opposite to those of the previous example. RDA moves on to an example with numbers: if speaker A says *lī ʿalayka ʿašaratun* 'You owe me ten [dirhams]', and speaker B responds *laka ʿalayya ʿašaratun ʾillā dirhamayni* 'I owe you ten less two dirhams', B conveys explicitly that he does not owe more than eight dirhams. If he had said *laka ʿalayya ṯamāniyatun* 'I owe you eight', he would not have conveyed this message explicitly.[197]

If the purpose of the exception is as stated above, and it can exist also in cases in which the excepted element constitutes half of the group denoted by the general term, or more, there is no reason not to use the exception structure in such cases. However, it is not appropriate to say *laka ʿalayya ʿašaratun ʾillā ḫamsatan/sittatan* 'I owe you ten less five/six' in the beginning of a conversation, when there is no particular reason to mention the 'ten'. In contrast, if the utterance is produced as a response to someone who says *lī ʿalayka ʿašaratun*, or

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193   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 114–115.

194   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 115.

195   In the edition the sentence is written as: *lam yakun naṣṣan ʿalā ʾannahu lam yajiʾka ġayru Zaydin*, but it is clear from the context that the word *ġayr* was added by mistake. Probably there was a mistake in the manuscript (the sentence is written similarly in another edition—see RDA, *Šarḥ²* II, 146).

196   The sentence is spelled identically in another edition—see RDA, *Šarḥ²* II, 146. It should be noted that *lam yajiʾnī l-qawmu ʾillā Zaydan* is acceptable (although *lam yajiʾnī l-qawmu ʾillā Zaydun* is preferable). See RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 91–99 for a discussion of such structures.

197   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 115.

there is another motive for mentioning 'ten', it is appropriate to say even *ʿalayya ʿašaratun ʾillā tisʿatan* 'I owe you ten less nine'.[198]

A study of terms considered Kūfan in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*, alongside with cases in which RDA adopts controversial opinions labeled as Kūfan, sheds light upon yet another aspect of his originality and non-conformism.[199]

2.4 Terms from Other Islamic Sciences

2.4.1 *Terms from Logic and Philosophy*

Carter (2004:3) holds that in Sībawayhi's *al-Kitāb* no concrete evidence of any acquaintance with Greek sources is to be found. According to Versteegh (1993:35–36) and Muḥassab (2007:41), the few points of similarity between early grammatical treatises and Arabic translations of Aristotle are insufficient to prove any real influence. Ḥassān (1991:192) and Muḥassab (2007:42) note that in the period when Arabic grammar emerged, translations from Greek were not yet sufficiently widespread to engender the birth of a new science. However, Talmon (2000:250) argues that "the early, pre-Sībawayhian growth of Arabic grammar has claimed influence by two Greek linguistic traditions [i.e., the Dionysian and the Aristotelian[200]], mainly via a Syriac medium". He supports his claim with evidence from early grammatical terminology and from discussions on parts of speech, *ʾiʿrāb* etc.[201]

Whatever the circumstances at the beginning of the Arabic grammatical tradition may have been, there is no doubt that philosophy and logic did influence later grammarians. Carter (1990:126–128) says that such influences appear already in Mubarrad's writings, and that they became prominent in the grammatical literature of the 4/10th century.[202] Grammarians' interest in logic grew

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198 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 115.

199 Additional cases in which RDA accepts Kūfan opinions are discussed in Bin Ġazī 2010:224–228.

200 Talmon 2000:248.

201 See Talmon 2000:247–250. It is worth mentioning that the tendency to link the emergence of Arabic grammatical theory to Greek logic and philosophy began with Merx's book, published at the end of 19th century. See Versteegh 1993:22–23 for a short presentation of Merx's approach. Fischer (1962) held that the division into three parts of speech originated in Aristotle's poetics (see also a critical discussion in Muḥassab 2007:32–33). Greek ideas in Arabic grammatical theory are discussed in Versteegh 1977.

202 Muḥassab (2007) also maintains that influences from Greek philosophy and logic became especially prominent in Arabic grammatical literature in the 4/10th century.

over the time;[203] Bin Ġazī (2010:76–77) argues that those who wrote comment-
aries on earlier books used Aristotelian logic more than those who laid the
foundations of Arabic grammatical theory. She claims that in RDA's time (7/13th
and 8/14th centuries) grammarians' interest in logic, in possible explanations
for and connections between linguistic phenomena reached its peak. Like his
contemporaries, Ibn Mālik (d. 672/1274) and Ibn al-Ḥājib, RDA had a good know-
ledge of logic; some sources even attribute to him treatises in this field. Bin Ġazī
(2010:79–80) speaks of his tendency to use logical terms.

I prefer not to distinguish between logical and philosophical terminology,
since logic was perceived as a tool used in all branches of philosophy,[204] and
thus it is natural for key terms from the field of logic to appear in books on
philosophy (so that it is unclear what the exact sources of RDA's terms are).

2.4.1.1   *Mansūb ʾilayhi/mansūb*

The terms *mansūb ʾilayhi/mansūb* 'something to which [something else] is
ascribed'/'the ascribed one' can refer to the subject and the predicate of a sen-
tence (respectively), but also to other kinds of syntactic relations. They do not
appear in early books of logic: I have not found them either in Fārābī's *Kitāb al-
ʿIbāra* 'On interpretation' (where they would be expected, since the book deals
with the structure of propositions),[205] or in Ibn Sīnā's logical treatises. The term
nisba appears in the introduction of *Kitāb al-Mustaṣfā* by Ġazzālī in a sense very
close to that of a predicative relation. Although this is a book on *ʾuṣūl al-fiqh*,
its introduction briefly surveys various subjects related to logic, using logicians'
terminology.

At a very early stage in his discussion Ġazzālī distinguishes between two
types of understanding:
1. The understanding of "separate entities" (*al-ḏawāt al-mufrada*), i.e., un-
    derstanding of things denoted by single words, such as 'body', 'movement',
    'world', 'having a temporal origin', 'eternal',[206] etc.

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203   Baalbaki 2007:xxxvii.
204   See, e.g., Fārābī, *Manṭiq* I, 59.
205   See Fārābī, *Manṭiq* I, 133–163. It is worth noting that the term *nisba* appears in the phrase
      ʾadawāt al-nisba that refers to prepositions (Fārābī's examples are *li-, bi, min* etc.—see
      Manṭiq I, 136), and elsewhere in the sense of 'logical relation'—e.g., when Fārābī (*Manṭiq*
      I, 142) mentions "the relation between the wall's base and the wall" (*nisbatu ʾasāsi l-ḥāʾiṭi
      ʾilā l-ḥāʾiṭi*).
206   Arnaldez (1986) translates *qidam* as "eternity" in the sense of "constant duration of exist-
      ence in the past" and "having been preceded by nothing else". He presents the term as an
      opposite of *ḥudūṯ* "(having) a temporal origin", and also links it to the ideas of excellence
      and superiority.

2.   The understanding of "ascription of one of these separate things to an-
     other" (*nisbatu hāḏihi l-mufradāti baʿḍihā ʾilā baʿḍihā*), an ascription
     which may be positive or negative.

Thus, one may know initially the meaning of the word 'world', which is a separat-
ate thing, and the meaning of the words 'having a temporal origin' and 'eternal',
which also are separate things, and then ascribe (*tansibu*) one separate thing to
another, positively or negatively. For instance, "one negatively ascribes the idea
of eternity to the world" (*tansibu l-qidama ʾilā l-ʿālami bi-l-nafyi*) by saying *laysa
l-ʿālamu qadīman* 'The world is not eternal' (i.e., the world did not exist etern-
ally, but was created at some point), and "one positively ascribes the idea of
a temporal origin [to the world]" (*tansibu l-ḥudūṯa ʾilayhi bi-l-ʾiṯbāti*) by saying
al-ʿālamu ḥādiṯun 'The world has a temporal origin'.[207] These examples show
Ġazzālī's position in the debate between the philosophers and theologians on
the question of whether the world is co-eternal with God or was created at
some point.[208]

The discussion in Weiss (1985) may shed additional light on the terms de-
rived from the root *n-s-b* (although his article is based mainly on treatises
later than *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*[209]). He translates (Weiss 1985:605) the term *nisba* as it
appears in Taftāzānī's definition of the sentence as "ascriptive linkage". He notes
that he purposely avoided translating it as "relation" or "relationship", since a
relation, as presented by philosophers starting with Aristotle, exists between
more or less homogenous entities, whereas a predicative *nisba* exists between
heterogeneous entities. Weiss explains that he uses the adjective "ascriptive" to
point out that the relation is asymmetric: one of the constituents is ascribed
to another, and not *vice versa*. I translate the term *nisba* and its derivatives in
terms of 'ascription' (while leaving 'link' and its derivatives for terms derived
from the root *ʿ-l-q*).

Weiss (1985:607) stresses that *mansūb ʾilayhi* and *mansūb* are components
of meaning (in contrast to *musnad ʾilayhi* and *musnad*, which are syntactic
components). He offers the translations "subject-term" and "predicate-term" for
the former pair, and "subject-expression"/"predicate-expression" for the latter
(these translations of the former pair are appropriate when the *nisba* is com-

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207   Ġazzālī, *Mustaṣfā* I, 11.
208   The Muslim philosophers held that the world was not created *ex nihilo*, but rather "eman-
      ates" from God. This is one of the principal points of Ġazzālī's criticism of them. See
      Arnaldez 1965:772–773.
209   It is based mainly on two commentaries by Taftāzānī (d. 793/1390) on *Talḫīṣ al-Miftāḥ* by
      Qazwīnī (d. 739/1338). *Talḫīṣ al-Miftāḥ* is an abridged version of the third part of *Miftāḥ
      al-ʿUlūm* by Sakkākī (d. 626/1229). See Weiss 1985:605.

plete, i.e., when it exists between the predicative constituents of a sentence, and not between a phrase's constituents).[210] According to Weiss (1985:608–610) the pair *mansūb ʾilayhi*/*mansūb* differs from *maḥkūm ʿalayhi*/*maḥkūm bihi* in that the latter pair refers to constituents of a proposition only (therefore he renders them as "subject-term/predicate-term of a proposition"), whereas the former pair can be applied equally to propositions and to sentences that do not realize propositions.

One example of the use of terms derived from the root *n-s-b* in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* occurs in the discussion of sentences whose predicate is a time/place expression. These sentences are problematic in the grammarians' view, because their predicate is not co-referential with the subject (the predicate in principle should be co-referential with the subject, in order to convey information about it). Another problematic point is the *naṣb* case of such a predicate, whose governor is not easily identifiable. Most grammarians reconstruct a verb or an active participle which assigns it *naṣb*,[211] although Sībawayhi's approach is different.[212]

RDA says that most grammarians adhere to the view that "the omitted element to which [the time/place expression] is linked" (*al-maḥḏūf al-mutaʿallaq bihi*) is a verb. Their choice is based on the fact that in sentences such as *ʾanā mārrun bi-Zaydin* 'I am passing by Zayd' the prepositional phrase can be linked to the active participle due to the latter's resemblance to a verb. Therefore, if we are to reconstruct an element to which the time/place expression is linked, it would be best to choose one that fulfills this function in its basic pattern, namely the verb. Additionally, the reconstructed element should be a verb, analogously to *allaḏī fī l-dāri Zaydun* '[The person] who is in the house is Zayd' and *kullu rajulin fī l-dāri fa-lahu dirhamun* 'Each man in the house will get a dirham', where "the constituent [to which the place expression] is linked" (*al-mutaʿallaq*) must be a verb.[213] RDA says that this point will be elucidated later, but I have not found in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* any explicit explanation.

His argument can be understood in the light of his explanation that *fa-* that does not coordinate[214] may be inserted in sentences that can be paraphrased

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210   In principle, there is a *nisba* also between the constituents of a phrase. A phrase differs from a sentence in that the sentence's constituents are ascribed to each other in a way that allows the speaker to become silent afterwards; such ascription is "complete" and presented as the main content of the utterance. A phrase that is not a sentence does not include a "complete ascription". See Weiss 1985:607.

211   Various opinions and arguments on this issue are surveyed in Peled 2009a:152–159.

212   The relevant fragment from *al-Kitāb* is presented in Peled 2009a:148–149.

213   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 245.

214   Curiously, here RDA refers to this *fāʾ* as *fāʾ al-sababiyya*, although his examples do not

as conditional sentences starting with *ʾiḏā*. In this context he proposes to para-phrase *Zaydun fāḍilun fa-ʾakrimhu* 'Zayd is outstanding, so respect him' as *ʾiḏā kāna kaḏā fa-ʾakrimhu*[215] (a conditional particle should be followed by a verbal clause, hence the presence of *kāna* in the reconstruction). According to this line of thought, *kullu rajulin fī l-dāri fa-lahu dirhamun* should be paraphrasable as *ʾiḏā kāna fī l-dāri rajulun fa-lahu dirhamun*, which means that there is an impli-cit verb in *kullu rajulin fī l-dāri*. Another example mentioned above, *allaḏī fī l-dāri Zaydun*, has no *fa-*; however, according to a principle mentioned by RDA, *fa-* may appear after a subject composed of a relative pronoun followed by a verb or a time/place expression.[216] This means that this example should be also paraphrasable as a conditional sentence, and thus includes an implicit verb.

After presenting the opinion of those who claimed that the reconstructed element should be a verb, RDA moves on to the opposite approach (accord-ing to which this element should be a participle). The author attributes this view to Ibn al-Sarrāj and Ibn Jinnī, although these grammarians only said that this element must be *mustaqirr* 'settled', without supplying explanations.[217] The starting point of RDA's discussion on this opinion is that the reconstruc-ted constituent must be a noun, since a noun is a single word (*mufrad*),[218] and the basic pattern for the predicate is that of a single word.[219] If the reconstruc-ted constituent is a verb, then the predicate of the main sentence is a clause, and a clausal predicate is secondary in relation to a non-clausal one.

In explaining why the basic pattern for a predicate is being non-clausal, RDA says that a sentence is "an utterance that requires ascribing something to something else" (*al-qawlu l-muqtaḍī nisbata ʾamrin ʾilā ʾāḫara*). Thus "the ascribed element should be a single thing, like the element to which it is

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correspond to the *fā' al-sababiyya* structure. See p. 218 below for a discussion of *fā' al-sababiyya*.

215   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 387.

216   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 268.

217   See Ibn al-Sarrāj, *ʾUṣūl* I, 63; Ibn Jinnī, *Lumaʿ*, 74–75. Sībawayhi did not reconstruct any con-stituents in these cases, but used the term *mustaqarr* to refer to the time/place expression functioning there as a predicate. Levin (2007b:136) understands this term as "an indis-pensable predicate of the nominal sentence, denoting the place where the subject is". RDA (*Šarḥ* IV, 210) uses the same term to refer to that time/place expression (although unlike Sībawayhi he does believe that its case is assigned by an implicit element): he explains that the meaning of the sentence *kāna fī l-dāri Zaydun* 'Zayd was at home' is *kāna mustaqirran fī l-dāri Zaydun* 'Zayd was settled at home', and the prepositional phrase designates "[the place] where [someone] is settled" (*mustaqarr fīhi*).

218   For a discussion on the term *mufrad* (which is, in one of its senses, the opposite of *murakkab*) see pp. 9–10, fn. 43 above.

219   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 245.

ascribed" (*yanbaġī ʾan yakūna l-mansūbu šayʾan wāḥidan ka-l-mansūbi ʾilayhi*).
Otherwise the sentence would include "two ascriptions or more" (*nisbatāni ʾaw
ʾakṯaru*), and thus "two new messages or more" (*ḫabarāni*[220] *ʾaw ʾakṯaru*) instead
of one:[221] the message (or ascription) of the main sentence and the message (or
ascription) of the clause. According to this approach, the underlying structure
of *Zaydun ḍaraba ġulāmuhu* 'Zayd—his lad hit' is *Zaydun mālikun li-ġulāmin
ḍāribin* 'Zayd possesses a hitting lad'.[222] Although grammarians mostly use
underlying structures to explain case markers or other formal phenomena,[223]
here the underlying structure is proposed to solve a logical problem and to
clarify that, although the sentence has a clausal predicate (which seemingly
contradicts the basic principle whereby a sentence should include only one
message), the sentence is acceptable, since the clausal predicate can be para-
phrased by a noun phrase, and therefore the sentence does not contain two
messages.

RDA responds to this argumentation by saying about the aforementioned
example the following:

> *ʾanna l-mansūba yakūnu šayʾan wāḥidan kamā qultum, lākinnahu ḏū nis-
> batin fī nafsihi, fa-lā nuqaddiruhu bi-l-mufradi, fa-l-mansūbu ʾilā Zaydin fī
> l-ṣūrati l-maḏkūrati ḍarbu ġulāmihi llaḏī taḍammanathu l-jumlatu*

> The ascribed element is indeed one thing, however [that element] itself
> includes an ascription. It should not be paraphrased by a phrase, since
> what is ascribed to Zayd in the aforementioned structure is the beating
> [performed by] his lad, included in the clause.[224]

In other words, according to RDA there is no need to paraphrase *Zaydun ḍaraba
ġulāmuhu* by *Zaydun mālikun li-ġulāmin ḍāribin*, because the main sentence
does not include two ascriptions: the element ascribed to Zayd (i.e., to the
grammatical subject of the main sentence) is "the beating [performed] by his
lad", i.e. one specified thing. The logical relationship between the beating and
the lad differs from the one existing between the beating and Zayd.

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220 I translate the term *ḫabar* here as 'message' rather than 'predicate', since the case in point is
     a sentence with a clausal predicate. The formal predicate is one, but semantically-logically
     speaking there are two messages.
221 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 245.
222 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 245.
223 See Levin 1997.
224 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 245.

Subsequently RDA presents other arguments that can be raised in favor of the claim that the reconstructed element assigning *naṣb* to the time/place expression functioning as a predicate must be a participle; he refutes them either.[225] He also does not overtly support those who hold that this element must be a verb, so it may be assumed that he believes that both options are acceptable.[226]

We see that the basic idea conveyed by the clause *ḍaraba ġulāmuhu* can be conveyed also by the nominal phrases *mālikun li-ġulāmin ḍāribin* and *ḍarb ġulāmihi*. These three constructions ascribe the attribute of beating to someone's lad. This facilitates understanding how terms derived from the root *n-s-b* can refer to other (non-predicative) types of syntactic relations.

Another example of the use of terms derived from the root *n-s-b* occurs in RDA's discussion on the exception. He notes that this structure is problematic "as far as its grasp by the mind is concerned" (*bi-ʿtibāri maʿqūliyyatihi*). The problem lies in the fact that if we claim that in the sentence *jāʾanī l-qawmu ʾillā Zaydan* 'The people except Zayd came to me' Zayd is not included in 'the people', it will "differ from the consensus" (*ḫilāf al-ʾijmāʿ*[227])—since it is agreed that *mustaṯnā muttaṣil* 'a joined excepted element'[228] is "excluded", and the exclusion is possible only after something is included in something else.[229] This point is clearer in the example *lahu ʿalayya dīnārun ʾillā dāniqan* 'I owe him a dinar less a *dāniq* ('a sixth of a dinar')'—the sixth must be subtracted from the dinar, i.e., excluded from a category denoted by the general term 'dinar'. The sentence states something about the sum remaining after the subtraction. But if we say that in *jāʾanī l-qawmu ʾillā Zaydan* Zayd was first included in 'the people' and then excluded from this group by the particle *ʾillā*, then the sentence means *jāʾa Zaydun maʿa l-qawmi wa-lam yajiʾ Zaydun* 'Zayd

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225 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 245–246.

226 Elsewhere in his book RDA (*Šarḥ* IV, 261) explicitly says that in the sentence *Zaydun ʿindaka/fī l-dāri li-ʾikrāmika* 'Zayd is in your place/at the house in order to honor you' the implicit term to which the prepositional phrases (and the place expression *ʿindaka*) are linked can be either *istaqarra* or *mustaqirr*. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 362) does not develop a complex discussion in this context, but only says that the reconstructed element must be a verb, because a time/place expression in its basic pattern is supposed to be linked to a verb. He does not use terms derived from the root *n-s-b* in this context.

227 The term *ʾijmāʿ* as used by Ibn Jinnī is mentioned by Suleiman (1999b:15), who says that it means an agreement between the Kūfan and Baṣran grammarians on some points.

228 *Mustaṯnā muttaṣil* is an excepted element in a structure where the general term is explicitly mentioned, and the excepted element belongs to the same category as the general term. Bernards 2007b:452.

229 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 76.

came with the people, and Zayd did not come', a contradiction that should not appear in speech.[230]

Some grammarians claimed that the excepted element is not included in the category denoted by the general term: e.g., in *jāʾanī l-qawmu ʾillā Zaydan* the term *al-qawm* is "general and specified" (*ʿāmm maḫṣūṣ*[231]). That means that the speaker has in mind not any group of people, but a group without Zayd. *ʾIllā Zaydan* is "a contextual clue that allows the addressee to understand the speaker's intention" (*qarīnatun tadullu l-sāmiʿa ʿalā murādi l-mutakallimi*), namely a group that excludes Zayd.[232]

After that RDA presents his preferred opinion, which (in his view) solves the logical problem. This approach states that "the excepted element is included in the general term in the same way as the thing that remains after a substitution of the part [for the whole] is included [in the group denoted by] the head noun" (*al-mustaṯnā dāḫilun fī l-mustaṯnā minhu, wa-l-bāqī baʿda badali l-baʿḍi dāḫilun fī l-mubdali minhu*). According to this approach, *jāʾanī l-qawmu ʾillā Zaydan* does not entail a contradiction between Zayd's coming and non-coming:

> *wa-ʾinnamā yalzamu ḏālika, law kāna l-majīʾu mansūban ʾilā l-qawmi faqaṭ, wa-laysa ka-ḏālika, bal huwa mansūbun ʾilā l-qawmi maʿa qawlika ʾillā Zaydan, kamā ʾanna nisbata l-fiʿli fī jāʾanī ġulāmu Zaydin wa-raʾaytu ġulāman ẓarīfan ʾilā l-juzʾayni*

> [The contradiction] would have been entailed if ['the coming'] were ascribed to 'the people' only, but this is not the case, since ['the coming'] is ascribed to 'the people' together with 'except Zayd'—just like the verb in 'Zayd's lad came to me' and 'I saw a nice lad', which is ascribed to both constituents [of the nominal phrase functioning as a subject (in the former case) and as a direct object (in the latter case)].[233]

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230   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 77. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 534) also formulates the logical problem that occurs in the exception structure in terms of contradiction: he says that in the sentence *lahu ʿindī ʿašaratun ʾillā dirhaman* 'He has with me ten dirhams less one' the idea stated at the beginning (i.e., one dirham's being included in the group of ten) is negated by the rest of the sentence, which means that one of the statements must be false.

231   The distinction between the general and the specific that plays an important role in *Šarḥ al-Kāfya* will be explored in subsequent publications.

232   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 77. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 532–533) presents this approach and explains that it is not compatible with the view of the joined exception as "excluding".

233   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 78.

Here RDA solves the logical problem related to the idea of exception by claiming that the predicative ascription is originally created by the predicate and the subject which is a single unit consisting from the general term and the excepted element (just like in two other examples it is created between the verb and a constituent consisting from a head noun and its qualifier). Therefore, in *jāʾanī l-qawmu ʾillā Zaydan* there is no point in considering Zayd as included in the group of people that came—since those who came are "the people except Zayd". After that RDA clarifies his position even more:

> *al-manṣūbu ʾilayhi l-fiʿlu, wa-ʾin taʾaḫḫara ʿanhu lafẓan, lākinnahu lā budda lahu min-a l-taqaddumi wujūdan ʿalā l-nisbati llatī yadullu ʿalayhā l-fiʿlu, ʾiḏ-i l-manṣūbu ʾilayhi wa-l-manṣūbu sābiqāni ʿalā l-nisbati baynahumā ḍarūratan*

> An element to which the verb is ascribed must exist before the ascription signified by the verb,[234] even if in the linguistic expression [this element] comes after the verb. That is because the element [to which another element] is ascribed and the ascribed element necessarily exist before their ascription to each other.

Since in an exception structure the element to which something else is ascribed (*al-manṣūb ʾilayhi*) is the general term, there is no doubt that the excepted element's inclusion (in the group signified by the general term) and its exclusion (from this group) happened "before the ascription [of the verb to the general term]" (*qabla l-nisbati*). Thus there is no contradiction (between the participation of the excepted element's referent in the occurrence signified by the verb, and the lack of such participation).[235]

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234 Elsewhere RDA also mentions ascription as a component of a verb's meaning, an idea which I have not found in other grammatical books, but is found in treatises on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* (see fn. 7 above). These examples strengthen my hypothesis that RDA influenced the emergence of that field (see p. 75 below).

235 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 78–79. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 536) demonstrates the same approach by stating that "what is intended by [the general term] is the entire thing as a nominal phrase without the judgment [embodied by] the predication" (*murādun bihi l-jamīʿu bi-l-naẓari ʾilā l-ʾifrādi min ġayri ḥukmi l-ʾisnādi*). The excepted element is first excluded from the group signified by the general term, "and after the intention of exclusion, the judgment by the predication is performed" (*ṯumma ḥukima bi-l-ʾisnādi baʿda taqdīri l-ʾiḫrāji*). Ibn al-Ḥājib adds that "someone proficient in Arabic judges by the predication about the speaker's utterance only after [the utterance] is completed" (*lā yaḥkumu ʿālimun bi-luġati l-ʿArabi ʿalā kalāmi mutakallimin bi-l-ʾisnādi fīmā ḏakarahu ʾillā baʿda tamāmihi*). See Levin 1997:151–157 for a discussion on *taqdīr* in the sense of 'speaker's intention'. The main idea in Ibn

The idea of ascription serves as a starting point also in the discussion of the case markers in exception sentences:

> *jarat-i l-ʿādatu bi-ʾannahu ʾiḏā kāna l-fiʿlu mansūban ʾilā šayʾin ḏī juzʾayni ʾaw ʾajzāʾin, qābilin kullu wāḥidin minhumā li-l-ʾiʿrābi, ʾuʿriba l-juzʾu l-ʾaw-walu minhumā bi-mā yastaḥiqquhu l-mufradu ʾiḏā waqaʿa mansūban ʾilay-hi fī miṯli ḏālika l-mawqiʿi*

> When a verb is ascribed to a unit that consists of two constituents or more, each of which should take case markers, it is customary that the first constituent takes the case marker that a single word would take, if [a verb] was ascribed to it in the same position.

As for "the remaining parts of the [unit to which a verb is] ascribed" (*mā baqiya min ʾajzāʾi l-mansūbi ʾilayhi*), they take *jarr* if there is a reason for it (i.e., a preposition or an annexation), or the same case as the preceding noun (if the constituent in question is one of the *tawābiʿ*). If neither of these two options is appropriate, the constituent takes *naṣb*, analogously to the direct object (since such a constituent resembles a direct object in following another constituent in *rafʿ*). This explains the *naṣb* of the excepted element.[236]

The next example, taken from RDA's discussion of *tamyīz*, demonstrates his use of terms derived from the root *n-s-b* referring to the relation between the elements of an annexation. He explains that if a *tamyīz* is preceded by a 'vague' pronoun whose referent is unknown (i.e., the pronoun does not refer to anything mentioned before it), this is "a *tamyīz* removing the vagueness of a single word" (*al-tamyīz ʿan al-mufrad*[237]). For example, in ʿAlī ibn ʾAbī Ṭālib's saying *yā lahu marāman mā ʾabʿadahu* 'O what a far-reaching aspiration!' *marām* functions as a *tamyīz* that removes the vagueness of the bound pronoun *-hu* in *lahu*.[238]

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al-Ḥājib's argumentation is that the subject must exist in the speaker's mind with all its specifications, before a predicate is assigned to it. It resembles RDA's discussion; however, Ibn al-Ḥājib does not use terms derived from the root *n-s-b* in this context.

236   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 78. Opinions of various grammarians (including Ibn al-Ḥājib) as to the governor of the excepted element are discussed in Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 132–137.

237   The term *al-tamyīz ʿan al-mufrad* is clarified in RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 55. The author explains that the preposition *ʿan* in this context signifies that the element preceding it is an origin or a reason for what follows it. In other words, a *tamyīz* of this type appears because of a word preceding it (i.e., because of the vagueness of that word).

238   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 60.

In contrast, if the referent of the pronoun preceding the *tamyīz* is known (i.e., if the pronoun refers back to a particular referent mentioned beforehand), the *tamyīz* does not remove the vagueness of a single word (because there is no vagueness in the word preceding it), but instead "[removes the vagueness] of an ascription existing in an annexation" (*ʿan-i l-nisbati l-ḥāṣilati bi-l-ʾiḍāfati*). For instance, *jāʾanī Zaydun fa-yā lahu rajulan* 'Zayd came to me, and what a man he is!'. Similar structures can be created with a "governed element" which is an overt noun (instead of a pronoun): *yā li-Zaydin rajulan* 'What a man Zayd is!'.[239] Interestingly, RDA here uses terms related to annexation to speak of prepositional phrases *lahu/li-Zaydin*, although he said elsewhere that this formulation is problematic.[240]

Al-tamyīz ʿan al-nisba is "co-referential with [the element to which another element is] ascribed (i.e., with the governed element in the annexation), it does not denote something connected [semantically-logically with this element]"[241] (*nafsu l-mansūbi ʾilayhi, lā mutaʿalliquhu*). For instance, the meaning of *li-llāhi darru Zaydin rajulan* 'God bless Zayd as a man!' is *li-llāhi darru rajulin huwa Zaydun* 'God bless a man who is Zayd!'. *Kafā bi-Zaydin rajulan* 'Zayd is enough as a man' means *kafā rajulun huwa Zaydun* 'A man who is Zayd is enough'.

In contrast, in sentences such as *ṭāba Zaydun ʿilman* 'Zayd was good in terms of his knowledge', the *tamyīz* refers to "something connected semantically-logically with an element [to which another element is] ascribed (i.e., with the subject *Zayd*); it is not co-referential with that element" (*mutaʿalliqu l-mansūbi ʾilayhi, lā nafsuhu*). *Ṭāba Zaydun ʿilman* means *ṭāba ʿilmu Zaydin* 'Zayd's knowledge was good'.[242]

The use of terms derived from the root *n-s-b* in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*, where they are incorporated in analyses without being defined or distinguished from similar terms, can be viewed as an intermediate stage in the crystallization of the *nisba* concept: between Ġazzālī (who uses words derived from the root *n-s-b* to refer to propositions but does not use the terms *mansūb ʾilayhi/mansūb* to refer to specific constituents of the propositions) and Sakkākī's commentators, who not only made systematic use of *mansūb ʾilayhi/mansūb*, but also defined various types of *nisba*.

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239 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 60.
240 See pp. 15–16 above.
241 This translation of the term *mutaʿalliq* is based on Levin (1995:225), who translates *taʿalluq* as "syntactical and logical connection".
242 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 61.

2.4.1.2   *Mawḍūʿ*

Sometimes RDA prefers to speak of predication in terms taken from other Islamic sciences, instead of the regular technical terms of the Arab grammarians, which are *mubtadaʾ* 'a subject in a nominal sentence', *ḫabar* 'a predicate in a nominal sentence', *fiʿl* 'a predicate in a verbal sentence' and *fāʿil* 'a subject in a verbal sentence', and also instead of the terms used by grammarians to refer to the predicative constituents regardless of the sentence type, which are *musnad ʾilayhi/musnad*,[243] *muḫbar ʿanhu* lit. '[the constituent] about which information is provided', i.e., 'subject'/*ḫabar* lit. 'information', i.e., 'predicate' and *muḥaddaṯ ʿanhu* lit. 'the one spoken about', i.e., 'subject'/*ḥadīṯ* lit. 'story', i.e., 'predicate'.[244] In *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* we find, in addition to these well-known terms, also the following: *mansūb ʾilayhi/mansūb* (a pair discussed in the previous section, that can refer to the predicative constituents of a sentence as well as to other syntactic relations), *mawḍūʿ* (whose opposite in logic is *maḥmūl*,[245] but I have not found the latter in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* in a sense related to the predication, but only in a sense of 'behaves analogously to something'[246]) and *maḥkūm ʿalayhi/ḥukm* (terms taken from Islamic jurisprudence that are discussed in section 2.4.2.1 below).

On the one hand, terms of logic are expected to refer to the ideas for which the linguistic elements stand, and not to the linguistic elements themselves (already Fārābī notes that logic deals with ideas grasped by the mind, just as grammar deals with language[247]), but on the other hand Arab philosophers admitted that one cannot speak of ideas without taking into account their linguistic expressions.[248] Thus it is not surprising that logical treatises include numerous discussions on language, and that logicians' insights could be used also by grammarians.

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243   These terms are based on a passive participle derived from the verbal noun *ʾisnād* lit. 'leaning', as a technical grammatical term—'predication, predicative relation'. They are not easily understandable, and it seems that their meaning changed over time. See Levin 1981; Talmon 1987; Goldenberg 1988:42–46.

244   These terms are discussed in Goldenberg 1988:46–48.

245   See Maróth 2008.

246   See, e.g., RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 499, where it is stated that *bukra* 'early morning' "behaves analogously [to *ġudwa*]" (*maḥmūla ʿalayhā*); RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 445, where the author says that *ʿasā* 'maybe' behaves analogously to *laʿalla*; RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 361, where *našhadu* 'we witness' is presented as behaving analogously to *naʿlamu* 'we know'. Additionally, RDA frequently uses the ideas of *ḥaml ʿalā l-lafẓ/l-maʿnā/l-maḥall* 'considering the form/the meaning/the position (in determining the rule)'—see, e.g., RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 20, 41, 163–164, 411, 444. The term *ḥaml* in RDA's writing seems worthy of a separate study.

247   Fārābī, *Manṭiq* I, 55.

248   See, e.g., Ibn Sīnā, *Šifāʾ*, 22–23.

Mawḍūʿ in logic is the standard term for the subject of a proposition. Fārābī says that logicians call the "attributes" (*al-ṣifāt*) *maḥmūlāt*, and "the possessors of the attributes" (*al-mawṣūfāt*)—*mawḍūʿāt*.[249] It is clear from his discussion that he has in mind the subject and the predicate of a proposition (since each proposition can be viewed as describing something by means of some attribute of it). In another place Fārābī draws a parallel between the syntactic terms *al-muḫbar ʿanhu/al-ḫabar* and the logical terms *mawḍūʿ* and *maḥmūl*.[250]

RDA uses the term *mawḍūʿ* in the sense of 'subject' twice.[251] One example occurs in the discussion of the parts of speech.[252] RDA notes that it can be claimed that the sentence *madlūlu l-fiʿli lā yuḫbaru ʿanhu* 'The verb's significa-tion[253]—it is impossible to convey information about it (or: to add a predicate to it)' includes a contradiction: it states, on the one hand, that one cannot con-vey information about (or add a predicate to) the meaning of the verb, but on the other hand the phrase *madlūlu l-fiʿli* functions as the subject of the sen-tence, and its predicate is a clause—*lā yuḫbaru ʿanhu*.[254]

It is worth noting that RDA speaks here about "the meaning of a verb", unlike other grammarians, who speak about the verb that cannot function as the sub-ject of a sentence.[255] That is because RDA has explained beforehand that a verb can function as a noun and be the subject of a sentence, if the speaker has in mind the linguistic sign itself (rather than its meaning)—e.g., in *ḍaraba fiʿlun māḍin* 'hit is a verb in past tense'. This is what is called by modern linguists "meta-linguistic usage"[256] (nowadays we usually use brackets or italics to set it

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249   Fārābī, *Manṭiq* I, 60.

250   Fārābī, *Manṭiq* I, 71. Fārābī uses the term *mawḍūʿ* also in another sense—'a location [of some attribute]'. See, e.g., Fārābī, *Manṭiq* I, 69–70, where adjectives are presented as "nouns whose form implies locations [of the attributes that are the nouns'] meanings" (*al-ʾasmāʾu llatī tadullu ʾaškāluhā ʿalā mawḍūʿāti maʿānīhā*). For other citations and references see Alon and Abed (2007:I, 522–523).

251   This term appears again in the sense of 'subject' in the discussion of *ʿaks* (RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 43), a term that is discussed in Sheyhatovitch (forthcoming). It must be noted that the term appears multiple times in the sense of "[an element] that was coined [for a certain meaning/function]". See chapter 3 below.

252   Larcher (2005:103–110) studies this fragment of RDA's discussion of the parts of speech under the title "Troix jeux paradoxaux sur le métalangage et l'autonymie".

253   The term *madlūl* is used here to refer to a meaning signified by the verb (in contrast to the linguistic sign itself). This use of the term is discussed in section 5.2.4 below.

254   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 29.

255   For instance, Ibn al-Sarrāj (*ʾUṣūl* I, 37) defines a verb as "[an element] that can function as a predicate, but not as a subject" (*mā kāna ḫabaran wa-lā yajūzu ʾan yuḫbara ʿanhu*).

256   See Lyons 1977:I, 5–13. Larcher (2005:109) distinguishes between an autonymy and meta-language: an autonym is a noun that refers to its own expression (in al-Šarīf Jurjānī's words, *ismun yadullu ʿalā lafẓihi*), and it may take a meta-linguistic expression as its predicate.

apart from regular usage[257]). In contrast, "when this expression (i.e., the verb) is used for the meaning for which it was coined"[258] (*ʾiḏā ʾurīda bi-ḏālika l-lafẓi maʿnāhu l-mawḍūʿu huwa lahu*), it cannot function as a subject. So we may infer that the phrase "the meaning of a verb" in the example sentence means a verb used in its primary meaning (i.e., an occurrence connected to a specific time).

Similarly, it can be argued that the sentence *al-majhūlu muṭlaqan lā yuḥkamu ʿalayhi* 'Something absolutely unknown—a judgment cannot be given about it' includes a contradiction. This sentence represents a famous principle in Arabic grammar, according to which one should not provide an addressee with information about something completely unknown to him.[259] Here this principle is formulated in jurisprudential terms.[260] It can be claimed that the sentence is self-contradictory, because it states that one cannot give a judgment about something unknown, whereas it itself represents a proposition which gives a judgment about the term *al-majhūl*, whose meaning is 'something unknown'.

RDA's solution is as follows: each one of these sentences has "two subjects" (*mubtadaʾāni*), one that is "mentioned in the expression" (*al-maḏkūr fī lafẓika*) and "about which some judgment is given" (*maḥkūm ʿalayhi bi-šayʾ*), and another, "that is alluded to by the expression" (*al-maknī bi-lafẓika ʿanhu*), "about which an opposite judgment is given" (*maḥkūm ʿalayhi bi-naqīḍ ḏālika*).[261] "The first subject" is *madlūl al-fiʿl* and *al-majhūl* in their metalinguistic sense, which function as a subject in sentences that give some judgment about them, whereas "the second subject" is *madlūl al-fiʿl* and *al-majhūl* in their regular senses, which are known as words about which no judgment can be given. There is no contradiction, since a contradiction can only arise if "the two subjects are one" (*ittiḥād al-mawḍūʿayni*).[262]

This explanation is clearly logic-oriented. The purpose of logic is to check the validity of an argument by formal tools,[263] which means also checking it for possible contradictions. According to one of the definitions, a contradic-

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257   See Lyons 1977:I, 18–25.

258   The term *waḍʿ* 'coinage' and its derivatives are discussed in chapter 3 below.

259   This principle appears already in Sībawayhi (*Kitāb* I, 17–18). Additional examples of discussions of this kind: Mubarrad, *Muqtaḍab* IV, 88; Ibn al-Sarrāj, *ʾUṣūl* I, 59; Sīrāfī, *Šarḥ* I, 303, etc. Marogy (2010:76) says that indefinite and unspecified subjects flout Leech's politeness principle.

260   The derivatives of the root *ḥ-k-m* are discussed in section 2.4.2.1 below.

261   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 29.

262   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 29.

263   See, e.g., Copi et al. 2012:2.

tion is a result of combining a proposition with its opposite.[264] It is obvious that in order for a contradiction to occur, the subject of the negative proposition must be identical to the subject of the positive one: Fārābī explains that the propositions "A man is an animal" and "A wall is not an animal" are not comparable, since their subjects are not identical,[265] and thus they cannot be contradictory.[266] Therefore, if we can prove that the subject of the negative proposition differs from the subject of the positive one, then we prove that there is no contradiction between the two.

2.4.1.3 *Muqaddima*

Muqaddima 'premise' is an important term in logic. Fārābī says that each proposition which is a part of a syllogism (*qiyās*) or intended to be a part of one, is called a premise.[267] When distinguishing between *qiyās ḥamlī* 'categorical syllogism' and *qiyās šarṭī* 'hypothetical syllogism',[268] he stresses that we know everything via syllogisms (save for four specific classes of things);[269] most of his *Kitāb al-Qiyās* 'Syllogistics' is dedicated to different types of syllogisms.[270]

The term *muqaddima* appears in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* at least four times, in presentations of premises upon which arguments are based.

One example appears in a discussion on a combination of an oath expression and a conditional sentence. If a conditional particle is preceded by an oath, overtly or in a way that allows reconstruction, usually the apodosis is attributed to the oath (and not to the condition). In this case the apodosis of the condition is unnecessary, because it is replaced by the apodosis of the oath.[271] This happens, e.g., in *la-ʾin ʾuḫrijū lā yaḫrujūna maʿahum wa-la-ʾin qūtilū lā yanṣurūnahum* Q. 59/12 'If those are expelled, they will not go forth with them, and if they are fought against, they will not help them',[272] and *wa-llāhi ʾan law jiʾtanī*

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264   Copi et al. 2012:326. See Larcher 2005:109 for an additional discussion on logical contradictions.

265   Fārābī, *Manṭiq* II, 14–15.

266   Fārābī, *Manṭiq* II, 15–16.

267   Fārābī, *Manṭiq* II, 20. For an additional discussion on this term and additional examples see Alon and Abed 2007:I, 350–358.

268   Fārābī, *Manṭiq* II, 20. Hypothetical syllogisms originate in Stoic and not in Aristotelian logic. See Muḥassab 2007:165–166.

269   Fārābī, *Manṭiq* II, 18–19. Syllogisms in Aristotelian logic are discussed, e.g., in Muḥassab 2007:161–164.

270   See Lameer 1953 for a study of Aristotelian syllogistics in Fārābī's writings.

271   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 456.

272   Although there is no overt oath expression in this verse, grammarians and Qurʾānic exegetes reconstruct it in order to explain the apodosis, whose structure differs from the one accepted in conditional sentences. See, e.g., ʾAbū Ḥayyān, *Baḥr* IV, 215–216.

la-jiʾtuka 'I swear by God, had you come to me, I would have come to you!'.[273]
The conditional particle does not affect the apodosis because the latter belongs
to the oath.

However, sometimes the condition that follows an oath is taken into account
(in that the apodosis belongs to the condition) because it is closer to the
apodosis than the oath[274] (moreover, the condition is stronger than the
oath[275]). In contrast, when the condition precedes the oath, the former must
be taken into account, whereas the effect of the oath may be either canceled—
e.g., *ʾin jiʾtanī wa-llāhi ʾukrimka* 'If you come to me, then, by God, I will honor
you!', or not—e.g., *ʾin jiʾtanī fa-wa-llāhi la-ʾukrimannaka* 'If you come to me—by
God I will honor you!'.[276] In both examples the apodosis belongs to the condi-
tion: in the former the verb in the apodosis is jussive because of *ʾin*, and in the
latter the apodosis is preceded by *fa-* because its structure differs from the one
accepted in conditional sentences.

"The explanation of these rules is based on a premise" (*taʿlīlu hāḏihi l-
ʾaḥkāmi mabniyyun ʿalā muqaddimatin*), whereby words denoting oath and
condition should, in principle, come at the beginning of a sentence, like inter-
rogative words, because they affect the meaning of the sentence. However,
words denoting oath and condition "may fall from their [basic] position that
is before their apodosis" (*qad yasquṭu ʿan darajati taṣaddurihi ʿalā jawābihi*)—
because of their frequent use (which apparently grants a word syntactic plas-
ticity) and because of their remoteness from the apodosis, which they are sup-
posed to affect. Their government will be canceled in this case, i.e., it will not
be manifested in the apodosis. An example with a conditional: *ʾātīka ʾin taʾtinī*
'I will come to you, if you come to me'.[277] An example with an oath: *Zaydun
wa-llāhi qāʾimun* 'Zayd, by God, is standing'. In these cases condition and oath,

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273   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 456.
274   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 459. See some poetic examples in RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 457.
275   RDA (*Šarḥ* IV, 458) explains that the oath's government is canceled more frequently than
      the condition's—because oaths are more widespread in language than conditionals, and
      because the semantic effect of an oath is weaker than that of a condition (since an oath
      only adds emphasis to the sentence, whereas a condition adds the conditional mean-
      ing).
276   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 457.
277   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 457. From Sībawayhi's point of view (*Kitāb* I, 387) this sentence is not accept-
      able (although it may appear in poetry), because the condition in it has no apodosis with a
      jussive verb. Modern linguists distinguish between conditional sentences and conditional
      clauses. For instance, in *ʾātīka ʾin taʾtinī*, *ʾātīka* is the main clause and *ʾin taʾtinī* is the con-
      ditional clause. See Peled 1998:153–154; Peled 1992c:138–162.

respectively, have no apodosis formally, while, semantically speaking, the part preceding the condition/oath (or surrounding the oath) is the apodosis.[278]

"If this premise is indeed correct" (*ʾiḏā taqarrarat hāḏihi l-muqaddimatu*), it can be argued that when the oath precedes the conditional, it is better to attribute the apodosis to the oath, "since the oath becomes stronger when it appears in its basic position at the beginning of the sentence, whereas the conditional weakens when appearing at the middle of the sentence" (*li-taqawwī l-qasami bi-l-taṣadduri llaḏī huwa ʾaṣluhu, wa-ḍuʿfi l-šarṭi bi-l-tawassuṭi*).[279]

Although, according to the rules of logic, a conclusion is derived from two premises, and in the above discussion only one premise is mentioned explicitly (and called *muqaddima*), it is known that an "incomplete syllogism" may be used, i.e., that one of the premises (perceived as obvious) may be omitted.[280] The central points in RDA's discussion can be formulated as follows:

a. An interrogative/conditional word at the beginning of a sentence appears in its basic position.

b. A word appearing in its basic position is "stronger".

Conclusion: An interrogative/conditional word appearing at the beginning of a sentence is stronger (the fact that a "strong" particle is supposed to affect the sentence is almost obvious).[281]

2.4.1.4 The Term *jawhar*

The distinction between *al-jawhar* 'substance/essence'[282] and *al-ʿaraḍ* 'accident' is important in Islamic logic and philosophy.[283] Fārābī, following Aristotle, recognizes 10 categories, i.e., highest genera that include all imaginable genera and species. Only one of these categories is a substance (*jawhar*), and

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278 RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 458.

279 RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 458.

280 Fārābī (*Manṭiq* II, 38–39) gives an example of a complex argumentation which proves that the world is not eternal. He notes that some parts of the syllogism are omitted, so that the discussion will not be too lengthy. According to the Greek philosophers, this method (enthymeme, *qiyās al-ḍamīr*) belongs to rhetoric, a field that was not supposed to be included in logic, although Arabic philosophers such as Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā did view rhetoric as a part of logic. Bohas et al. 1990:105. Muḥassab (2007:175) gives examples of the use of this method by Ibn al-Sarrāj. He calls this kind of syllogism *qiyās muḍmar* and says that it is mentioned in Fārābī's *al-Ḫaṭāba* 'Rhetoric'.

281 See Larcher 2005:104–108 for some careful reconstructions of syllogisms underlying RDA's discussions (RDA does not use the term *muqaddima* in these loci; however, presenting his ideas as syllogisms facilitates understanding).

282 The origin of the term *jawhar* is discussed in Afnan 1964:99–101.

283 For instance, Afnan (1964:36) views it as central in Islamic metaphysics.

the rest are accidents (*ʿaraḍ*).[284] He treats these terms also in *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf*, where he explains that *jawhar* refers to "an indicated one that originally does not exist in a place" (*al-mušār ʾilayhi llaḏī huwa lā fī mawḍūʿin ʾaṣlan*),[285] i.e., to a substance whose existence is independent. Another sense of *jawhar* is "what allows one to know the essence of anything from any category", i.e., the complex of universal attributes that compose the essence of a thing.[286] Interestingly, the distinction between *al-jawhar* and *al-ʿaraḍ* is important also in the Islamic theology, where the meaning of the terms seems close to the first sense mentioned by Fārābī: substances are objects (which are divided into animals, plants and inanimate beings), and accidental attributes (e.g., knowledge, speech, sight, color, smell) exist in objects.[287]

From the abovementioned examples and explanations it can be concluded that the term *jawhar* has two main meanings: (1) a substance that can exist by itself; (2) essential attribute(s) which make(s) the thing into what it is.[288] The terminology is not entirely clear-cut: the terms *ḏāt* and *ʿayn* were sometimes used as synonyms of *jawhar* in sense (1),[289] but sometimes expressions referring to essential attributes, i.e., to sense (2) of the term *jawhar* were derived from them—*ḏātī/bi-ḏātihi/bi-ʿaynihi*.[290] It is not always clear in the sources what sense of the terms is meant. I translate *jawhar* and its synonyms in sense (1) as 'substance', and in sense (2) as 'essence'.[291]

RDA speaks about relationships between the governed element and its governor using the logic terms *jawhar*, *ʿaraḍ* and *maḥall*. Ibn al-Ḥājib defines the governor as "something by means of which the required meaning is 'straightened'" (*mā bihi yataqawwamu l-maʿnā l-muqtaḍā*). RDA explains that in this context 'straightening' means "existence of an accident in the substance" (*qiyām al-ʿaraḍ bi-l-jahwar*). The meanings of *fāʿiliyya* 'function of the subject

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284 Fārābī, *Manṭiq* I, 90.

285 Fārābī, *Ḥurūf*, 100.

286 Fārābī, *Ḥurūf*, 100–101. The term *jawhar* as it appears in *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf* is discussed in Abed 1991:68–73. See also Fārābī, *Manṭiq* I, 91–93 and Alon and Abed 2007:I, 59–63.

287 See, e.g., Ġazzālī, *Mastaṣfā* I, 5–6.

288 Alon and Abed (2007:I, 59, 62) translate *jawhar* as "substance" (the first of the above two meanings), but they note that sometimes *jawhar* is used in the sense of "essence" (the second meaning), and then it is interchangeable with *ḏāt* 'essence' and *māhiyya* 'quiddity'.

289 The similar uses of these terms and their Greek origins are discussed in Afnan 1964:99–102.

290 See Alon and Abed 2007:I, 139–140. See also Van den Bergh 1960 and Rahman 1965.

291 It seems that the syntactic context helps to distinguish between these two senses: when *jawhar* or its synonym has a governed element, it refers to an essential attribute (since it is natural for an attribute to belong to something), and when it appears without a governed element, it is likely that it refers to a substance (which is not supposed to belong to something else).

in a verbal sentence', *mafʿūliyya* 'function of an object'[292] and *ʾiḍāfa* 'annexation' are, respectively, a word's being an essential constituent of the sentence, an optional constituent, or a governed element.[293]

Here RDA returns to the three basic meanings denoted by the three Arabic grammatical cases, which were presented by Ibn al-Ḥājib beforehand,[294] and relates them to the three main syntactic functions. He notes:

> *wa-hiya ka-l-ʾaʿrāḍi l-qāʾimati bi-l-ʿumdati wa-l-faḍlati wa-l-muḍāfi ʾilayhi bi-sababi tawassuṭi l-ʿāmili. Fa-l-mūjidu kamā ḏakarnā li-hāḏihi l-maʿānī huwa l-mutakallimu, wa-l-ālatu l-ʿāmilu, wa-maḥalluhā l-ismu*

> [These three meanings are] like accidents than exist in [words that function as] an essential constituent, an optional constituent and the governed element because of the governor's mediation. As we have mentioned, the one who creates these meanings is the speaker, the instrument is the governor and the substrate [in which the meanings exist] is the noun.[295]

This discussion presents a noun as a substance that can receive various meanings/functions marked by the three cases; the meanings constitute accidents in relation to it. Additionally, a noun is presented as a substrate in which these meanings exist. This analysis is consistent with the logicians' approach according to which an accident must exist in a substrate.[296] RDA repeatedly stresses in his book that a governor does not really affect the governed element. Elsewhere he even calls it *ʿalāma* 'marker' instead of 'instrument'.[297] The meanings/functions manifested by the various cases are determined by the speaker; the governor is a formal mark/instrument that serves the speaker's intentions.

The term *jawhar* in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* refers several times to the root of a word. For instance, in presenting the Baṣran approach to verbs (which they consider as originating from the verbal noun—as opposed to the Kūfans, who maintain that the verbal noun's origin is the verb), RDA explains:

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292 The abstract terms *fāʿiliyya* and *mafʿūliyya* are discussed in section 1.2.1 above.
293 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 72.
294 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 69.
295 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 72. For Ibn al-Ḥājib's discussion of his definition see Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 242. He does not use the terms *ʿaraḍ*, *jawhar* or *maḥall* in this context.
296 See, e.g., Fārābī, *Manṭiq* I, 145.
297 See RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 57, 66, 227.

kullu farʿin yuʾḫaḏu min ʾaṣlin wa-yuṣāġu minhu, yanbaġī ʾan yakūna fīhi
mā fī l-ʾaṣli, maʿa ziyādatin hiya l-ġaraḍu min-a l-ṣawġi wa-l-ištiqāqi

Each secondary structure derived and formed from an origin must in-
clude what exists in the origin, with an addition that is the purpose of
its formation and derivation.

RDA's examples of this principle are the following: a door is formed from wood,
a ring is formed from silver, and a verb is formed from a verbal noun. The verb
includes the meaning of the verbal noun, with an addition of the meaning of a
time, and this is the purpose for which the verb was coined. RDA notes in this
context that:

kāna yaḥṣulu fī qawlika li-Zaydin ḍarbun maqṣūdu nisbati l-ḍarbi ʾilā Zay-
din, lākinnahum ṭalabū bayāna zamāni l-fiʿli ʿalā wajhin ʾaḥṣara, fa-waḍaʿū
l-fiʿla l-dālla bi-jawhari ḥurūfihi ʿalā l-maṣdari wa-bi-waznihi ʿalā l-zamāni

The intention of ascribing the idea of hitting to Zayd would be achieved
also by 'Zayd has a hitting', however [speakers] wanted to clarify the occur-
rence's time in the shortest way, and thus coined the verb, which signifies
the occurrence by the essence of its consonants (i.e., the consonants of
the root), and the time by its pattern.[298]

This fragment presents the consonants of the verb's root as constituting its
essence. From them the word that signifies a time is created—just like a thing
that has a certain form is created from a material. It is noteworthy that Zajjājī
presents the verbal noun as "the [verb's] origin and the material from which
[the verb] is created" (*ʾaṣluhu wa-māddatuhu*), and compares this situation to
silver from which rings or other things can be made.[299] The term *mādda* lit.
'material' seems close to *jawhar*—Fārābī even remarks in his *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf*
that those who are not philosophers tend not to distinguish between them,
although Fārābī himself does.[300]
    Another example in which *jawhar* refers to the root of a word occurs in the
discussion of conditional sentences. Although in these sentences *kāna* 'he was'
usually converts the meaning of the protasis to past,[301] it can also appear in

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298   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 400.
299   Zajjājī, *ʾĪḍāḥ*, 59.
300   Fārābī, *Ḥurūf*, 100. This fragment is explained in Abed 1991:69.
301   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 114.

a protasis that refers to the future—e.g., *ʾin kuntu ġadan jālisan fa-ʾtinī* 'If I sit tomorrow, come to me'. This usage is acceptable "if we take into account the absolute occurrence [signified by the verb *kāna*] and not the time that occurs accidentally in all verbs due to the [morphological] pattern that pounces on the word's essence" (*naẓaran ʾilā ḏālika l-ḥudūṯi l-muṭlaqi dūna l-zamāni l-ʿāriḍi fī jamīʿi l-ʾafʿāli bi-sababi l-ṣīġati l-ṭāriʾati ʿalā jawhari l-kalimati*).[302]

As in the previous example, here the consonants of the root are presented as "the essence of the word", whereas the pattern into which the consonants are placed is presented as "accidental" and "pouncing".[303] This idea helps to explain why the perfect verb *kāna* that should, in principle, convert the meaning of the sentence to the past, can in certain circumstances join a clause whose meaning is in the future. If the meaning of an occurrence that is signified by the root's consonants is perceived as the essence, and the meaning of time, signified by the morphological pattern, is perceived as an accidental factor, then the component of time is less important than the component of the occurrence, and sometimes can be ignored. Since the occurrence denoted by *kāna* is abosolute (i.e., this verb can refer to an occurrence of any kind),[304] it is natural that it can also be added to the aforementioned example.

Elsewhere *jawhar* refers to the "essence" of a sound (or perhaps to the basic form of a word—this is not completely clear in this context). RDA explains that words ending with quiescent *ʾalif* receive *hāʾ al-sakt* 'the pausal *hāʾ*' in their pausal form,[305] in the case of *lā* 'no' and nouns that always take a *bināʾ* ending, such as *ḏā* 'this' and *hunā* 'here'.[306] The *hāʾ* is needed in this case because quiescent *ʾalif* is "a hidden sound" (*ḥarf ḫafī*), that is pronounced clearly only if it is followed by another sound (i.e., if it is not pausal), and hides when there is no

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302   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 115.

303   These terms are discussed in chapter 4 below.

304   The term *muṭlaq* is related to the distinction between the general and the specific that is important in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*, and will be discussed in subsequent publications.

305   See Hoberman 2008 and Birkeland 1940 for a general discussion on pausal forms. The pausal *hāʾ* (also called *hāʾ al-waqf* and *hāʾ mawqūfa*) is discussed in Birkeland 1940:31–45.

306   In contrast, pausal *hāʾ* is not added to fully declined nouns, such as *ʾafʿan* 'adder' and *ḥublā* 'pregnant', since the *bināʾ* ending is accidental in them (just like in nouns that receive a *bināʾ* ending after *lā l-nāfya li-l-jins*, whereas otherwise their ending is *ʾiʿrāb*). A possible explanation for them not receiving the pausal *hāʾ* is a concern that in such nouns it will be confused with a bound pronoun. RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 498. Birkeland (1940:33) also distinguishes between nouns whose *bināʾ* ending is permanent (such nouns can be suffixed by the pausal *hāʾ*) and nouns whose *bināʾ* ending is impermanent (such nouns cannot take this suffix). He notes that Ibn Yaʿīš preferred the pausal forms of the former category without this suffix. The notion of accidental *bināʾ* is discussed in Baalbaki 2006c.

other sound after it, so that the addressee may mistakenly think that the word ends with *fatḥa*. Therefore the pausal form is joined by a suffix, "to clarify the essence [of quiescent *ʾalif*]" (*li-yubayyina jawharahā*).[307] It seems reasonable that the bound pronoun in *jawharahā* refers to the *ʾalif*; however, one cannot refute a suggestion that it refers to the word, since the fragment deals with certain words that receive *hāʾ al-sakt*, and since in other passages in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* the term *jawhar* refers to the essential part of a word (and not to sounds).

RDA also uses example sentences that include the terms *jawhar* and *ʿaraḍ*. For instance, *hāḏā ʾimmā jawharun ʾaw/wa-ʾimmā ʿaraḍun wa-humā muḥdaṯāni* 'This is either a substance or an accident, and both of them have a temporal origin'. This example is used in a discussion of personal pronouns referring back to constituents conjoined by a disjunctive particle. RDA explains that the choice of pronoun is determined by the speaker's intention: if he has in mind one of the mentioned items, the pronoun is in the singular, and if he has in mind both of them, the pronoun is in the dual[308] (which is the case in the example).

The example is theologically flavored: according to Ġazzālī, theology deals with "existing things" (*al-mawjūd*), which can be devided into "eternal" (*qadīm*, i.e., something that existed always; Ġazzālī holds that this applies only to God, although there existed other views[309]), and "having a temporal origin" (*ḥadīṯ/muḥdaṯ*). The "created" is devided into substance and accident.[310] This approach is clearly manifested in RDA's example.

2.4.1.5   The Term *qasīm*
The term *qasīm* lit. 'partner' refers to categories placed on an equal level in the categorical devision. Fārābī mentions it while discussing "genus" (*jins*), i.e., category, and "species" (*nawʿ*), i.e., sub-category.[311] The starting point of this discussion is the following statement: "among two simple predicates in relation to which two things are similar to each other in their essences, the more general [predicate] is called 'the genus', and the more specific is 'the species'" (*ʾaʿammu l-maḥmūlayni l-basīṭayni llaḏayni yatašābahu bihi šayʾāni fī jawharayhimā yusammā l-jinsa, wa-ʾaḫaṣṣuhumā huwa l-nawʿu*). For instance,

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307   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 498.

308   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 352 (a similar example appears in RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 397).

309   Muslim philosophers hold that the world is co-eternal with God, opinion which Ġazzālī views as heresy. See fn. 208 above. The question of the Qurʾān eternity was controversial between the Muʿtazila and other theological schools. See Gardet 1978.

310   Ġazzālī, *Mustaṣfā* I, 5–6.

311   The terms *jins* and *nawʿ* are very common in books of logic and used frequently by RDA. They are especially important in discussions on definitions; this use of them will be discussed in Sheyhatovitch (forthcoming).

Zayd and ʿUmar are essentially similar in their being human and animals. Thus, 'animal' is a genus in relation to 'human' (since 'animal' is more general than 'human').[312] A genus can include several species, each of which can include additional species and so on, until "the last species" (*nawʿ ʾaḫīr*) is reached, which consists of "individuals" (*ʾašḫāṣ*).[313] Fārābī defines "partner species" as species placed under a genus, so that there is no other genus between them and that genus. Species included in different genera cannot be considered partners.[314]

The term *qasīm* appears in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* three times. One of its appearances is in the discussion of *tamyīz*. Ibn al-Ḥājib says:

> *ʾin kāna sman yaṣiḥḥu jaʿluhu li-mā ntaṣaba ʿanhu, jāza ʾan yakūna lahu wa-li-mutaʿalliqihi, wa-ʾillā fa-huwa li-mutaʿalliqihi fa-yuṭābiqu fīhimā mā quṣida ʾillā ʾan yakūna jinsan ʾillā ʾan yuqṣada l-ʾanwāʿu, wa-ʾin kāna ṣifatan, kānat lahu wa-ṭibqahu wa-ḥtamalat-i l-ḥāla*

> If [the *tamyīz*] is a noun that can be perceived as co-referential with [a noun] that is the origin of the [*tamyīz*'s] *naṣb*,[315] it can refer [to a noun which is the origin of its *naṣb*] or to something connected to [that noun] semantically. If [the *tamyīz* cannot be perceived as co-referential with that noun], it refers to [an element] connected semantically to it. In both cases [the *tamyīz*] agrees [in number] with [the constituent the speaker] intends [it to agree with]—unless [the *tamyīz*] denotes a genus (and then the question of agreement is irrelevant, since such a *tamyīz* must be in the singular), or species (and then the question of agreement is irrelevant, since such a *tamyīz* must be in the plural). If [the *tamyīz*] is an adjective, it refers to [the noun which is the origin of its *naṣb*], agrees with it [in the number], and can be alternatively viewed as a circumstantial modifier.[316]

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312 Fārābī, *Manṭiq* I, 60.

313 Fārābī, *Manṭiq* I, 76–78.

314 Fārābī, *Manṭiq* I, 78.

315 RDA (*Šarḥ* II, 55–56) explains the expression *mā ntaṣaba ʿanhu* in the context of *tamyīz* as referring to "the noun that is the origin of the *tamyīz*'s *naṣb*" (*al-ismu llaḏī ṣadara ʿanhu ntiṣābu l-tamyīzi*). For instance, *ṭāba Zaydun nafsan* 'Zayd was good in terms of his heart': if *Zayd* did not function as the subject of *ṭāba*, *nafs* would have taken *rafʿ* instead of *naṣb*, since it would have functioned as the subject in *ṭāba* [*sic*] *nafsu Zaydin* 'Zayd's heart was good'. Thus *Zayd* became the origin of the *naṣb* in *nafs* by taking the position of the subject (which otherwise would have been taken by *nafs*).

316 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 66. My translation is based on RDA's commentary on this fragment—see RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 66–69.

RDA notes about this passage that the clause opened by *wa-ʾin kāna ṣifatan* is "the partner" (*qasīm*) of *ʾin kāna sman*.[317] This claim means that the two main categories of *tamyīz*, with respect to agreement in number (to which that chapter is dedicated), are nominal and adjectival. A nominal *tamyīz* can denote a genus and thus appear in the singular (regardless of the preceding noun), whereas an adjectival *tamyīz* must agree in number with the noun it describes—since there are no adjectives that can appear in the singular and refer equally to multiple or single objects[318] (unlike nouns, that can be collective and as such refer to any quantity of a certain genus[319]).

The term *qasīm* is used also in RDA's discussion of personal pronouns. Ibn al-Ḥājib defines a personal pronoun as "[an element] coined [to refer] to the 1st or 2nd person, or to a 3rd person [word] that precedes [the pronoun] formally, semantically or by entitlement"[320] (*mā wuḍiʿa li-mutakallimin ʾaw muḫāṭabin ʾaw ġāʾibin taqaddama ḏikruhu lafẓan ʾaw maʿnan ʾaw ḥukman*).[321] Explaining these three types of anaphora, RDA says that Ibn al-Ḥājib discerns two types of "formal anaphora" (*al-taqaddum al-lafẓī*):[322]

1. "Actual formal anaphora" (*mutaqaddimun lafẓan taḥqīqan*), e.g., *ḍaraba Zaydun ġulāmahu* 'Zayd hit his lad'[323] (*-hu* in *ġulāmahu* refers back to *Zayd*).

2. "Reconstructable formal anaphora" (*mutaqaddimun lafẓan taqdīran*), e.g., *ḍaraba ġulāmahu Zaydun* 'Zayd hit his lad'. *Zayd* "overtly precedes [*ġulāmahu*], and this can be reconstructed" (*mutaqaddimun fī l-lafẓi taqdīran*), since *Zayd* is the subject of the sentence,[324] and according to the basic rule of word order in Arabic the subject should precede the object[325] (thus, constructions in which the subject does not precede the object can be reconstructed so that it does precede the object).

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317 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 69. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 528) neither explains the structure of this passage nor uses the term *qasīm* in this context.

318 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 69.

319 See Wright 1896–1898:I, 180–181 for a distinction between collective nouns, "which form a *nomen unitatis*" (and are called *ʾasmāʾ al-jins*) and collective nouns that do not form a *nomen unitatis* (and are called *ʾasmāʾ al-jamʿ* or *ʾašbāh al-jamʿ*).

320 Anaphora of the third type ("anaphora by entitlement") is found in cases where the noun that should function as the pronoun's antecedent comes after the pronoun and nothing requires it to precede the pronoun. See RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 405–406 and Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 677–678. Most grammarians did not accept constructions of this kind—see ʿAlī 2011:85.

321 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 401. This definition is discussed in Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 675.

322 This distinction appears in a similar formulation in Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 675.

323 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 402–403.

324 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 403.

325 See ʿAlī 2011:85–91.

RDA says that Ibn al-Ḥājib similarly divides into two the second type of anaphora, "the underlying anaphora" (*al-taqaddum al-maʿnawī*):[326]

1. "The pronoun is preceded by an expression that includes an elucidating [element], so that the elucidating [element] is a component of that expression's signification" (*ʾan yakūna qabla l-ḍamīri lafẓun mutaḍamminun li-l-mufassiri bi-ʾan yakūna l-mufassiru juzʾa madlūli ḏālika l-lafẓi*). For instance, in Q. 5/8 *iʿdilū huwa ʾaqrabu li-l-taqwā* 'Be equitable—that is nearer to godfearing' the pronoun *huwa* refers back to *ʿadl* 'justice', the verbal noun that is a component of the meaning signified by the verb *iʿdilū*, since the verb signifies a verbal noun (i.e., an occurrence) and a time.

2. "The context signifies something that elucidates the pronoun by a logical entailment, not by inclusion"[327] (*ʾan yadulla siyāqu l-kalāmi ʿalā l-mufassiri ltizāman, lā taḍammunan*). This is the case in Q. 4/11 *wa-li-ʾabawayhi li-kulli wāḥidin minhumā l-sudsu* 'and to his parents to each one of the two the sixth [of what he leaves]', where the referent of the possessive pronoun in *ʾabawayhi* is apparently unclear. Since the context beforehand deals with "legacy" (*mīrāṯ*), the possessive pronoun semantically refers back to "the legator" (*muwarriṯ*).[328]

After these distinctions RDA criticizes Ibn al-Ḥājib for presenting a reconstructable anaphora as one type of formal anaphora. His criticism is based on the fact that "[Ibn al-Ḥājib] mostly presents something reconstructable as a partner of the formal, not as its type" (*ʿādatuhu jaʿlu l-taqdīri qasīma l-lafẓi lā qismahu*).[329] RDA supports his argument with examples of statements by Ibn al-Ḥājib in which the formal (i.e., the overtly expressed) and the reconstructable are clearly presented as distinct: for instance, in the beginning of the discussion of nouns with *ʾiʿrāb* endings Ibn al-Ḥājib says that "the endings [of such nouns] change, formally or reconstructably, because of the change in governors" (*yaḫtalifu ʾāḫiruhu li-ḫtilāfi l-ʿawāmili lafẓan ʾaw taqdīran*).[330]

Ibn al-Ḥājib can say in defense of his categorization of anaphora that in sentences such as *ḍaraba ġulāmahu Zaydun* the anaphora is "close to be formal, by virtue of the reconstruction" (*kaʾannahu mutaqaddimun min ḥayṯu l-taqdīru*);

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326 Versteegh (1997a:246) notes that "the reconstructed underlying sentence was sometimes called the *maʿnā* of the actual utterance". Keeping that in mind, *al-taqaddum al-maʿnawī* can be interpreted as an anaphora that exists on the underlying level.

327 The terms 'inclusion' and 'entailment' are discussed in section 5.2.5.2 below.

328 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 403. This discussion appears in Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 376 (without the terms *taḍammun* and *iltizām*). See also section 5.2.5.2.5 below.

329 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 403.

330 The fragment is taken from RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 55.

however, if we take this stand, there will be no difference between the anaphora here and in *iʿdilū huwa ʾaqrabu li-l-taqwā*, since in the latter sentence it is also "close to be formal".[331]

In RDA's view, the most appropriate analysis is to designate the anaphora as formal only when the noun elucidating the pronoun overtly appears before it, whether it should precede it also from the semantic point of view, as we see in the sentence *ḍaraba Zaydun ġulāmahu*, with the basic word order in Arabic (i.e., VSO), or not, as we see in Q. 2/124 *wa-ʾiḏ-i btalā ʾIbrāhīma rabbuhu* 'And when his Lord tested Abraham',[332] where the word order differs from the basic one (the object overtly precedes the subject, although it should in principle follow it).

We have seen that the term *qasīm* plays an important role in a discussion on anaphora. The discussions in which this term appears show that RDA pays attention to categorizing linguistic phenomena, and takes pains to justify classifications that he considers appropriate.

2.4.2   *Terms from Islamic Jurisprudence*

The connection between the grammatical and the juridical literature formed at a very early period: Sībawayhi's interest in jurisprudence began even before his interest in language,[333] and Carter (2004:50–51) claims that he drew inspiration from that field while developing his grammatical theory. Various grammarians were also jurists,[334] and the *ʾuṣūl al-naḥw* genre developed under the influence of *ʾuṣūl al-fiqh*.[335]

Distinctly juristic terms are not very numerous in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*, but they clearly reflect a deep acquaintance with this field. In addition to using terms from this field, RDA sometimes mentions *ʾuṣūl al-fiqh* specialists (whom he calls *al-ʾuṣūliyyūna*) and their opinions.[336] He even mentions the names al-

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331   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 403.

332   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 404.

333   See Carter 2004:10.

334   Versteegh (1989:295) states that most grammarians had no official source of income deriving from their teaching activity, and hence had to seek other sources of income. Two most popular occupations to be found in combination with the study of grammar were the study of law and of *qirāʾa* (see Versteegh 1989:297 ff.). For instance, Sīrāfī was a Ḥanbalī judge—see Humbert 1997; Ibn al-Ḥājib was a Mālikī jurist—see Fleisch 1971a; Ibn Hišām was a specialtist of Šāfiʿī jurisprudence, and near the end of his life turned to the Ḥanbalī school—see Fleisch 1971b.

335   Haarmann (1972) delineates the development of *ʾuṣūl al-naḥw* from Ibn al-Sarrāj to Ibn al-ʾAnbārī, and presents the latter's writing as the high point of using juristic methods in grammatical literature.

336   See, e.g., RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 196 (*al-ʾuṣūliyyūna*'s opinion on the function of *ʾinnamā* 'but, how-

Šāfiʿī (d. 204/820) and ʾAbū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767)[337] (grammarians in general are not inclined to mention scholars from other fields by name).

2.4.2.1   *Maḥkūm ʿalayhi/ḥukm*

In addition to the regular grammatical terms for subject and predicate, and to the corresponding logical terms (discussed in sections 2.4.1.1 and 2.4.1.2 above), RDA also uses, when speaking about the predication, the terms *maḥkūm ʿalayhi* lit. 'the one about which judgment is made' and *ḥukm* lit. 'judgment', which are mentioned by Ġazzālī as juristic counterparts of the grammatical terms *mubtadaʿ/ḫabar* and of the logical terms *mawḍūʿ/maḥmūl*.[338]

Ġazzālī frequently uses the terms *maḥkūm ʿalayhi/ḥukm* when discussing propositions that constitute a syllogism. For instance, he examines the following one:

1. Palm wine intoxicates.
2. Intoxicating substances are forbidden.
Conclusion: Palm wine is forbidden.

Ġazzālī explains that anything that takes the "palm wine"'s position in syllogisms of this type is called *maḥkūm ʿalayhi*, and anything that takes the "forbidden"'s position is called *ḥukm*. The premise (*al-muqaddima*)[339] that includes the *maḥkūm ʿalayhi* of the conclusion is the first one, and the one that includes the conclusion's *ḥukm* is the second.[340] These terms are especially appropriate for discussing propositions and syllogisms in a juridical context, since the purpose of Islamic jurisprudence is to give judgments using data from the Qurʾān and other sources. The predicate of the conclusion in a juristic syllogism is the verdict; thus it is natural that it be called *ḥukm*, a word that also means judgment/verdict.

As for RDA's uses of the terms, the first example is taken from the discussion of the parts of speech. Ibn al-Ḥājib says about a "word" (*kalima*) that "it is a noun, a verb and a particle" (*hiya smun wa-fiʿlun wa-ḥarfun*). RDA notes

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ever'); RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 361 (on agreement with nouns in the dual); RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 63 (a question of *duʿāʾ* 'prayer' belonging to the category of command/prohibition).

337   For instance, he mentions ʾAbū Ḥanīfa's opinion on the exception—RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 118; ʾAbū Ḥanīfa and Šāfiʿī's opinions on the meaning of *kaḏā* 'so and so'—RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 166; Šāfiʿī's view of homonymy—RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 348.

338   Ġazzālī, *Mustaṣfā* I, 35–36.

339   The term is discussed in section 2.4.1.3 above.

340   Ġazzālī, *Mustaṣfā* I, 38.

that it can be mistakenly understood from this statement that a noun, a verb and a particle together constitute a word, i.e., that a segment such as *ʾa-ḏahaba Zaydun* 'Did Zayd go?', composed of a particle, a verb and a noun, is actually a single word. RDA explains that Ibn al-Ḥājib's intention is to distinguish between various elements included in a category.[341] The *wa-* does not mean that the conjoined elements "are together in the same condition" (*yajtamiʿāni maʿan fī ḥālatin wāḥidatin*), but rather that "they function together as [an element] about which a judgment is given" (*yajtamiʿāni fī kawnihimā maḥkūman ʿalay-himā*), e.g., *jāʾanī Zaydun wa-ʿAmrun* 'Zayd and ʿAmr came to me', or "function together as a judgment about something" (*yajtamiʿāni fī kawnihimā ḥukmayni ʿalā šayʾin*), e.g., *Zaydun qāʾimun wa-qāʿidun* 'Zayd is standing and sitting'.[342] In other words, the use of *wa-* does not entail that things signified by the conjoined elements are simultaneously in the same condition (to stress the point, in the last example the *wa-* links "standing" and "sitting", two actions that cannot be performed simultaneously by the same agent). It only entails that the conjoined elements fulfill the same logical function in the proposition.[343]

Another example appears in the discussion on the basic word order in a nominal sentence. RDA says that according to the basic rule, the subject precedes its predicate, "because it is [the element] about which a judgment is made, and it must exist before the judgment; therefore it should precede the judgment also in the linguistic expression" (*li-ʾannahu maḥkūmun ʿalayhi, wa-lā budda min wujūdihi qabla l-ḥukmi, fa-quṣida fī l-lafẓi ʾayḍan, ʾan yakūna ḏik-ruhu qabla ḏikri l-ḥukmi ʿalayhi*).[344] Logically, the subject represents something about which the speaker makes a judgment, and in the real world something

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341   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 27.

342   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 28.

343   Other grammarians also stress that conjunctive *wa-* implies neither chronological order nor simultaneousness, but only signifies that the conjoined elements fulfill the same syntactic and/or logical function—see, e.g., Jurjānī, *Muqtaṣid* II, 937–938; Ibn Yaʿīš, *Šarḥ* VIII, 90.

344   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 229. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 356) says at this point: "because [the subject] is the one about which a judgment is made, and in the mental reality it must precede [the judgment], so that the judgment would be about something that exists" (*li-ʾannahu l-maḥkūmu ʿalayhi fa-lā budda min taqdīmi ʿaqliyyatihi li-yakūna l-ḥukmu ʿalā mutaḥaqqiqin*). Ibn al-Ḥājib's formulation seems more appropriate, as it explicitly mentions mental reality (whereas RDA speaks of existence, which may be interpreted as existence in the external world). The speakers' mind seems more relevant to language issues that the external world. However, RDA explicitly mentions linguistic expression, whereas Ibn al-Ḥājib does not do so in this context.

about which a judgment is made must exist before that judgment. Thus the subject is expected to precede the predicate.[345]

According to this line of thought, the subject of a verbal sentence is also expected to precede its predicate, since the former also represents something about which a judgment is given. However, in fact the predicate must precede its subject in such a sentence, since the verbal predicate assigns *rafʿ* to the subject, and the governor should precede the governed element. RDA even explains why in this case a formal consideration (i.e., grammatical government) is given preference over a semantic one (i.e., a judgment versus something about which a judgment is made)—"because grammatical government is a pouncing factor, and it is the pouncing factor that is to be taken into account, not the one pounced on" (*li-ʾanna l-ʿamala ṭāriʾun, wa-l-iʿtibāru bi-l-ṭāriʾi dūna l-maṭrūʾi ʿalayhi*).[346]

2.4.2.2   *Istiḥsān*

The term *istiḥsān* 'preference' refers to a method of reasoning much discussed in books on *ʾuṣūl al-fiqh*. The term already appears in the *ḥadīṯ*, and thus was already used in the first half of the 8th century AD. The verb *istaḥsana* is found in Buḫārī with the meaning of "make a decision for a particular interpretation of the law as a result of one's own deliberation". Mālik (d. 179/795) uses the term in connection with legal decisions for which he cannot find an authority in tradition. ʾAbū Yūsuf (d. 182/798) uses it to refer to decisions of his which he reached in ways that did not conform to the usual *qiyās* method.[347] Later scholars also use *istiḥsān* in this meaning. Šāfiʿī and his followers reject *istiḥsān*, whose supporters belong for the most part to the Ḥanafī school.[348]

In the grammatical literature prior to RDA, Ibn Jinnī used *istiḥsān* to explain facts of language; however, he viewed it as a weak form of argumentation.[349]

RDA mentions the dialect of the Huḏayl tribe, in which an *ʾalif* that is not related to the ending of the dual, i.e., the *ʾalif maqṣūra* in words such as *fatā*

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345   This is reminiscent of the iconicity principle, according to which word order reflects the chronological order of events in reality. Peled 2009a:71.

346   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 229. In this fragment we see the term *ṭāriʾ* in the same sense that is discussed in section 4.1 below. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 356) does not mentions verbal sentences in this context.

347   The term *qiyās* has various meanings in grammar, logic, theology and jurisprudence. In the juristic context it mostly denotes an analogical syllogism used to derive a rule in cases where there is no explicit rule in the Qurʾān or in *ḥadīṯ*. See Bernand 1986.

348   See Paret 1978.

349   See the discussion in Suleiman 1999:80–82.

'boy', *ḥublā* 'pregnant' and *miʿzā*[350] 'goats', can turn into *yāʾ* when the noun is followed by the bound possessive pronoun 'my'—whereas in other dialects the *ʾalif* does not change, and the respective forms are *fatāya*, *ḥublāya* and *miʿzāya*. The rationale behind the *fataaya*[351] > *fatayya* shift in the Huḏayli dialect is an analogy to words with sound root and their like whose last consonant takes *kasra* when joined by the bound pronoun 'my'. Since a quiescent *ʾalif* cannot take *kasra*, Huḏayli speakers choose to turn the quiescent *ʾalif* into *yāʾ*, which is the consonant closest to *kasra*.[352]

RDA explains that the shift *ʾalif maqṣūra* > *yāʾ* is possible "because of a matter of preference; it is not obligatory, even in their [dialect]" (*li-ʾamrin-i stiḥsān-iyyin lā mūjabin ʿindahum ʾayḍan*), and it does not happen when it results in semantic ambiguity (e.g., the *ʾalif* in the ending of the dual forms, pronounced identically to the *ʾalif maqṣūra*, does not turn into *yāʾ* before the bound pronoun 'my', because such a shift would eliminate the difference between the *rafʿ* and the two other grammatical cases). This differs from the shift *wāw* > *yāʾ* in the sound masculine plural form, when joined by the bound pronoun 'my' (e.g., **muslimuwya* > *muslimiyya* 'my Muslims'), which is obligatory by all means. It happens for phonetic reasons (combination of quiescent *wāw* and *yāʾ*), and "this consistent and obligatory shift occurs despite an ambiguity that accidentally occurs in some cases" (*lā yutraku hāḏā l-ʾamru l-muṭṭaridu l-lāzimu li-ltibāsin yaʿriḍu fī baʿḍi l-mawāḍiʿi*).[353]

This is a comparison between an optional shift *fataaya* > *fatayya* in the Huḏayli dialect and the obligatory shift **muslimuwya* > *muslimiyya*, which occurs in all dialects. The former does not take place when it can result in ambiguity, since it is basically related to speakers' preferences (not being obligatory); the latter occurs even when it results in ambiguity (e.g., the form *muslimiyya* is the same for all three cases, yet this does not prevent the shift). These facts show that phonological considerations (turning an unacceptable and/or a "difficult" combination of sounds into an acceptable and/or "easier" one) can override analogical levelling or semantic considerations. In this context RDA also mentions the forms *muḥtār* 'choosing/chosen one' and *muḍṭarr* 'forcing/

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350   This noun can be pronounced as *miʿzā* or *miʿzan* when indefinite—depending on whether the last letter is considered a feminine marker or *ʾalif al-ʾilḥāq*. See Wright 1896–1898:I, 179.

351   The first *a* represents a *fatḥa*, the second *a* represents a quiescent *ʾalif*.

352   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 263.

353   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 264. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 611–612) describes this phenomenon in the Huḏayli dialect without using the term *istiḥsān*.

forced one', which were created by a phonological shift, although the process resulted in ambiguity.[354]

The verb *ustuḥsina* (derived from *istiḥsān*) appears in the discussion on omitting the verbal governor of *mafʿūl muṭlaq*. RDA states:

> *ustuḥsina ḥaḏfu l-fiʿli fī baʿḍi l-mawāḍiʿi ʾimmā ʾibānatan li-qaṣdi l-dawāmi wa-l-luzūmi bi-ḥaḏfi mā huwa mawḍūʿun li-l-ḥudūṯi wa-l-tajaddudi ʾay-i l-fiʿli [...] wa-ʾimmā li-taqaddumi mā yadullu ʿalayhi [...] ʾaw li-kawni l-kalāmi mimmā yustaḥsanu l-farāġu minhu bi-l-surʿati*

> In some cases [speakers] prefer to omit the verb in order to clarify the intention of continuity and permanence by omitting [the element] that was coined [to express] occurrence and renewal, i.e., the verb; or because [the omitted verb] is preceded by [an element(s)] that imply(s) it's [meaning]; or because the utterance belongs to those that [the speakers] prefer to finish quickly.[355]

The examples of the first case are *ḥamdan laka* 'Bless you!', *šukran laka* 'Thank you!' and *ʿajaban laka* 'You impress me!'. The verbs that should assign the *naṣb* to the verbal nouns are omitted in order to emphasize that the ideas expressed by the verbal nouns are constant in relation to the addressee (since verb-less sentences are usually perceived as expressing more stable situations than sentences that contain verbs). The examples of the second case are several Qurʾānic verses, in which the previous context makes the verb redundant. As for the third case, the examples are *labbayka* 'At your service!', *saʿdayka* 'Be happy!', *dawālayka* 'over and over', etc. RDA presents these utterances as such that the speakers prefer to finish quickly, probably because these are exclamations, whose brevity increases their effect on the addressee.[356] In each of these cases the verbal noun stays "vague" (*mubham*), since the subject and object that should be associated with it are not known. Thus the verbal noun is followed

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354　RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 264. The shift resulted in forms such as *muḫtār* is described in Wright 1896–1898:I, 83; as for forms such as *muḍṭarr* see Wright 1896–1898:I, 68.

355　RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 306.

356　The same pragmatic argument of speaker's preference to finish his utterance quickly is used to explain the omission in "warning" (*taḥḏīr*) structure, where the brevity is especially important, as such structures are usually used to warn the addressee when the dangerous thing is very close to him (see RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 483). A similar argument is used in RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 393 to explain the phenomenon of *tarḫīm* in vocative structures, and in RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 485 to explain the omission in the *ʾiġrāʾ* 'incitement' structures. See Wright 1896–1898:II, 74–75 and Levin 2007:432–433 for a discussion on the latter term.

by either semantic subject or object, depending on the speaker's intention, so that the verbal noun "would be related to it specifically" (*li-yaḫtaṣṣa bihi*).[357]

In both discussions presented in this chapter the term *istiḥsān* and its derivatives refer to "preference", and the juridical connotations of this term infer that the grammarian has in mind a preference for something that is perceived as a deviation from the norm and from basic principles.

2.4.2.3 *Mansūḫ*

Al-nāsiḫ wa-l-mansūḫ 'the abrogating and the abrogated' (or *nasḫ* 'abrogation') is a general term encompassing various theories advanced in *tafsīr*, *ḥadīṯ* and *ʾuṣūl al-fiqh* to resolve possible coflicts between two Qurʾānic verses, or between two *ḥadīṯs*, or between a *ḥadīṯ* and a Qurʾānic verse, or between a *ḥadīṯ*/Qurʾānic verse and juridical literature. Contradictions between verses are explained by claiming that they were revealed under different circumstances. Some of the "abrogated" (i.e., juridically irrelevant) verses are found in the Qurʾān, whereas other are not found there, because God made the Prophet forget them. Naturally, these matters provoked multiple controversies amongst Islamic scholars.[358]

The term *mansūḫ* appears in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* in the discussion on the *jarr* of the governed element in annexation. RDA says that some grammarians claim that this *jarr* is assigned by the reconstructable prepositions *li-* or *min*, whereas others maintain that the annexed element is the governor.[359] Those who speak about a preposition believe that in the underlying structure it is placed between a verb and the governed element. For instance, the underlying structure of *ġulāmu Zaydin* 'Zayd's lad' is *ġulāmun ḥaṣala li-Zaydin* 'A lad that happened to be in Zayd's possession'. According to this approach, "the meaning of annexation is created in the governed element by means of the preposition" (*maʿnā l-ʾiḍāfati qāʾimun bi-l-muḍāfi ʾilayhi li-ʾajli l-ḥarfi*). Although usually an implicit preposition should not govern anything, it governs a governed element in an annexation, because that preposition is strongly inferred by the annexed element that is specified or clarified by the governed element.[360]

However, RDA prefers another opinon, that the annexed element itself assigns *jarr* to the governed element. His argument is as follows: "the preposition

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357   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 307.

358   See Burton 1993.

359   For instance, Sībawayhi (*Kitāb* I, 177–178) distinguishes between three types of elements that can assign *jarr*: prepositions, time/place expressions, and nouns which are not time/place expressions (i.e., regular annexed elements).

360   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 72–73.

is an abrogated law, and the annexed element includes its meaning" (*ḥarfu l-jarri šarīʿatun mansūḫatun, wa-l-muḍāfu mufīdun maʿnāhu*).[361] RDA does not deny that annexation structures include the meaning of a preposition—indeed, he implies that the fact that the annexed element includes the meaning of a preposition allows it to govern the governed element (since a noun in principle should not govern, and if it does govern, this is explained in terms of the noun's resemblance to a verb or a preposition). However, he prefers not to say that the governor is a preposition. He considers the preposition "an abrogated law"—it exists at some level of analysis, but does not have any actual effect (just like the abrogated Qurʾānic verses exist in the holy book, but do not have any legal effect).

RDA could have based his argument on the well-known principle that an implicit preposition should not govern,[362] but he chooses instead to base it on semantics: if the preposition were reconstructable, the phrase *ġulāmu Zaydin* would be indefinite, like the phrase *ġulāmun li-Zaydin* 'a lad of Zayd'.[363] In other words, if we accept that in *ġulāmu Zaydin* the *jarr* is assigned by a reconstructable preposition, it entails that the phrase is equivalent to *ġulāmun li-Zaydin*, whereas the two phrases are not synonymous, since the former is definite and the latter is not. RDA summarizes the discussion by stating that the annexed element can govern the governed element because "the second constituent [of the annexation] takes the functional meaning of the governed element through the mediation of the first [constituent]" (*maʿnā kawni l-ṯānī muḍāfan ʾilayhi ḥāṣilun lahu bi-wāsiṭati l-ʾawwali*).[364] This is consistent with RDA's general view of governors as mediators through which the governed elements receive functions intended for them by the speakers (functions that are marked by the various grammatical cases).[365]

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361 I have translated the active participle *mufīd* in terms of "including the meaning", since it is clear that the implicit preposition is only a part of the annexed element's meaning. Various uses of terms derived from the root *f-y-d* are discussed in Sheyhatovitch 2012:66–71.

362 This principle is mentioned several times in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*—see, e.g., RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 336; IV, 54.

363 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 73.

364 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 73.

365 See p. 59 above.

The Term *waḍʿ* and Its Derivatives

The literal meaning of the term *waḍʿ* is 'laying down/placing'.[1] In grammar it denotes a hypothetical act of creating a linguistic expression for a certain meaning/function.[2] According to Weiss (1966:62), who discovered that his sources stress the given and established character of the language, the term refers to "establishment of all the linguistic givens" (i.e., establishment of all the linguistic elements that the jurist shall take for granted in his work with texts). Versteegh (1997b:131) translates the term as "institution/imposition", while Mahdi (2007:135) renders *waḍʿ* as "placing", and the active participle *wāḍiʿ* as "name maker/name giver". Vishanoff (2011:56) offers the translation "semantic assignment".[3]

I have chosen to render *waḍʿ* as 'coinage', since it seems to better capture RDA's view of the process of language creation: ideas exist before their verbal realization, and linguistic elements are invented/created in order to express those ideas. The word 'assignment' implies that linguistic elements may exist independently from ideas until being assigned to them, and this does not stand to reason. The relationships between linguistic elements and the ideas behind them are dynamic, according to RDA; thus the words 'establishment/institution' would be not entirely appropriate. Importantly, RDA frequently uses derivatives of the root *w-ḍ-ʿ* in relation to the purpose of the process, which means that the chosen English terms will often need to come with the preposition 'for', making the term 'coinage' more attractive than 'imposition'. My choice of 'coinage' is in line with Kaplan (1993:24) and Sawaie (2000:396ff.), who speak, respectively, of "coinage of the phrase …" by Moshe ibn Giqatilla and Ṭahṭāwī's "methods of coinage".

Modern research recognizes two main contexts in which the term *waḍʿ* is used in the Arabo-Islamic intellectual tradition: discussions on the origin of

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1   Thus, *waḍʿ* appears to be a calque translation of the Greek term *thésis*, whose literal meaning is related to 'putting'. Weekley 1967:II, 1496. Versteegh (1977:140) also points out the parallel between *waḍʿ* and *thésis*.

2   In the Greek philosophical tradition, the term *thésis* and its derivatives appear in discussions on the origin of speech already in *Cratylus* by Plato (427–347 BCE). See Sluiter 1997:179 for a discussion of the term *nomothétēs*, which she translates as "establisher of custom" or "law-giver".

3   See also the discussion in Versteegh 1978:271–272.

language (conducted mainly by theologians and jurists)[4] and *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* 'coinage studies' literature, which evolved from jurists' efforts to formulate the linguistic principles of deriving rules out of the Qurʾānic text.[5] According to Weiss (1966:92), the first scholar to dedicate a separate treatise to *ʿilm al- waḍʿ* was ʿAḍūḍ al-Dīn al-ʾĪjī (d. 756/1355), the author of *al-Risāla al-Waḍʿiyya* 'Epistle on coinage', on which several commentaries were written.

It seems that modern scholarship has yet to discover the sources and features of 'coinage studies'. I believe that in order to understand this field, one should look into the idea of coinage in grammatical literature, in addition to theological and juristic sources. *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* arguably represents an important stage in the development of coinage theory (although the term *waḍʿ* is present also in earlier grammatical literature).

3.1 The Term *waḍʿ* in Grammatical Literature prior to RDA

Some appearances of the term *waḍʿ* and its derivatives can be found already in early grammarians' writings, but the examples are sporadic and do not demonstrate principles on which arguments can be built.[6]

Sībawayhi uses terminology derived from the root *w-ḍ-ʿ* in the sense of coinage only three times. In one case he explains that the sentences **sawfa Zaydan ʾaḍribu* 'I will Zayd hit' and **qad Zaydan laqītu* 'I have Zayd met' are not acceptable, since the particle *qad* (which appears before verbs in the perfect or imperfect forms and emphasizes past or future time, respectively) "was coined for verbs" (*wuḍiʿat li-l-ʾafʿāli*),[7] which means that it cannot be separated from the verb by other elements.

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4   The central controversy in this context is between the view of language as a product of convention between people, and belief in the divine origin of language. See Weiss 1966:8–41 and Versteegh 1997b:101–114 for a description of this debate. Although the term *waḍʿ* is derived from the same root as *tawāḍuʿ* 'agreement', identified with the first approach (see, e.g., Weiss 1966:22), the former focuses on the process of coining itself, not on any particular 'coiner'.

5   The development of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* is discussed in Weiss 1966:42–89 and Versteegh 1997b:127–139.

6   It is noteworthy that they frequently use the term *mawḍiʿ* that is derived from the same root, in the sense of 'position/function in the language'. The term in Sībawayhi's *al-Kitāb* is discussed in Carter 2004:77–80. Versteegh (1978:272–274) deals with the term in medieval grammatical theory in general, seeking to distinguish between *mawḍiʿ* and *mawqiʿ*. He claims that the former is related to all positions that the word can fill and for which it was invented from the beginning (this is the connection between *mawḍiʿ* and the idea of coinage), whereas the latter is related to a specific usage. However, he admits that the terms can be interchangeable.

7   Sībawayhi, *Kitāb* I, 40.

In another case he uses the passive form *wuḍiʿat* in order to speak of words that function exclusively as adverbials of time/place and cannot take the place of the subject when the sentence is transformed into the passive voice. These are verbal nouns that "were coined for [the meaning of] time" (*wuḍiʿat li-l-ḥīni*), together with other nouns.[8] The third example appears in a morpho-phonological discussion, in which Sībawayhi explains that the usual pattern of verbal nouns and "nouns of place"[9] (*ʾasmāʾ al-makān*) of first-weak verbs is *mafʿil*. In *mawḥad* 'one' the second consonant of the root takes *fatḥa* (instead of *kasra*), because *mawḥad* is not a verbal noun nor a noun of place, but a "coined noun" (*ism mawḍūʿ*).[10] This formulation possibly means that the word in question was not created by combining a root with a morphological pattern, but in a separate act of coinage that created a new word, based on the form *wāḥid* 'one'. According to this approach, the *fatḥa* in *mawḥad* signalizes that the word was created in a different way than *mawḍiʿ* 'place', *mawʿid* 'appointed time', etc.

In these three examples terms derived from the root *w-ḍ-ʿ* refer to a coinage of separate words, and only in two of them the notion is used to explain linguistic phenomena.

Ibn al-Sarrāj uses terms derived from the root *w-ḍ-ʿ* more frequently than Sībawayhi, and they appear in his book not only in reference to the coinage of separate words: e.g., he explains that an indefinite subject with a definite nominal predicate would constitute "an inversion of [the principle] upon which a sentence/speech was coined" (*qalbu mā wuḍiʿa ʿalayhi l-kalāmu*).[11] Elsewhere he states, in relation to cases in which the *ṣāḥib al-ḥāl* is difficult to determine, that ambiguous speech is problematic, "since language was coined for clarifying" (*li-ʾanna l-kalāma mawḍūʿun li-l-ʾibānati*).[12]

Ibn Yaʿīš uses terms derived from the root *w-ḍ-ʿ* more frequently and in a greater variety of contexts than his predecessors. The first appearance of the term in his *Šarḥ al-Mufaṣṣal* is found already in the book's introduction, where

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8   Sībawayhi, *Kitāb* I, 96.

9   This is the translation chosen, e.g., by Carter (1981:477) and Bernards (2007a:424).

10   Sībawayhi, *Kitāb* II, 266.

11   Ibn al-Sarrāj, *ʾUṣūl* I, 67. The literal meaning of *kalām* is 'speech', but in the grammatical literature it appears mostly as a technical term referring to an independent sentence (unlike *jumla*, which can refer to both a sentence and a clause). However, in some cases *kalām* seems to appear in its literal meaning (see Iványi 2007 for translated examples of various uses of the term in the grammatical literature). In the aforementioned example it is difficult to make a choice between the two senses of *kalām*, because it is unclear whether, in RDA's view, the hypothetical coiner considers separate sentences or speech in general.

12   Ibn al-Sarrāj, *ʾUṣūl* I, 219.

the grammarian discusses the question of whether the word *allāh* 'God' is "a coined or a morphologically derived noun" (*ismun mawḍūʿun ʾaw muštaqqun*).[13] By "morphologically derived noun" Ibn Yaʿīš probably means a form that can be divided into the definite article *al-* and a basic noun that was, in turn, created by a combination of a root and a morphological pattern.[14] Therefore, "a coined noun", which is contrasted to a morphologically derived one, means a noun that was created as a single unit and cannot be divided into smaller elements.[15]

The term *waḍʿ* and its derivatives refer, in most of their appearances in *Šarḥ al-Mufaṣṣal*, to the coinage of single words. The coinage determines various characteristics of the word such as its meaning, definiteness, and person, as the following examples demonstrate.

1. Ibn Yaʿīš says that from the form *ḍārib* 'hitting one' it is understood that there is an occurrence of hitting and that this hitting is directed towards someone (since such an action logically necessitates a semantic object), although the form *ḍārib* "was not coined" (*lam yūḍaʿ*) for these two things, but was coined for the performer of the action only.[16]

2. He says that in *al-faynata baʿda l-faynati* 'time after time' *al-fayna* is made definite by two means: by the definite article and "by virtue of coinage and being a proper noun" (*bi-l-waḍʿi wa-l-ʿalamiyyati*; these two are presented as a single reason for definiteness; probably being a proper noun is perceived as equivalent to being coined as a definite noun).[17]

3. Ibn Yaʿīš stresses on several occasions that an overt noun (as opposed to a pronoun) is coined for a 3rd person, a claim relevant for a discussion on pronouns that can refer to these nouns.[18]

In some cases Ibn Yaʿīš uses *waḍʿ* in the sense of syntactic coinage. For instance, in explaining that a verb cannot function as the subject of a sentence, he states

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13 Ibn Yaʿīš, *Šarḥ* I, 3. For a discussion on the term *ištiqāq* and its comparison to the modern term 'derivation' see Larcher 2006.

14 Weiss (1985:617) translates *ism muštaqq* in its more common sense as "deinfinitival noun". He notes that Wright translated the term as "deverbal", but he believes that his own choice is more appropriate, since most grammarians view the verb and the participles as derived from verbal nouns (therefore, it is incorrect to present participles as "deverbal").

15 The term *mawḍūʿ* in the sense of 'pattern that was coined as a single unit/was not coined according to the regular morphological rules' appears also in a discussion on dual forms of pronouns. See Ibn Yaʿīš, *Šarḥ* III, 128, 141–142.

16 Ibn Yaʿīš, *Šarḥ* I, 22–23. For other examples see Ibn Yaʿīš, *Šarḥ* I, 27, 32, 34; II, 96, 128; III, 2, etc.

17 Ibn Yaʿīš, *Šarḥ* I, 39. For other examples see Ibn Yaʿīš, *Šarḥ* I, 40, 42, 43; III, 45–46, 128, etc. See section 2.2.1 above for a discussion on the term *ʿalamiyya* and its likes.

18 See Ibn Yaʿīš, *Šarḥ* II, 4; III, 158; IV, 25, etc.

that "a verb was coined in order [to function as] a predicate" (*al-fiʿlu mawḍūʿun li-l-ḫabari*).[19] At the beginning of the discussion on the *jarr* Ibn Yaʿīš asserts that "the case markers were coined to distinguish between meanings/functions" (*al-ʾiʿrābu ʾinnamā wuḍiʿa li-l-farqi bayna l-maʿānī*).[20] He says about *ʾayy* 'Which? What?' that "it was coined [in order to function as an annexed element] in the annexation" (*mawḍūʿatun ʿalā l-ʾiḍāfati*), since it denotes a part of the referent of its governed element in all three of its uses (interrogative, conditional, and relative pronoun).[21] The use of derivatives of the root *w-ḍ-ʿ* in the sense of morphological coinage seems to be the rarest in *Šarḥ al-Mufaṣṣal*—e. g., Ibn Yaʿīš says that the pattern *faʿīl* "was coined [in order to signify] intensiveness" (*mawḍūʿun li-l-mubālaġati*).[22]

To summarize, Ibn Yaʿīš uses the term *waḍʿ* more frequently than earlier grammarians and in a greater variety of meanings. He is arguably the only one of RDA's predecessors whose use of the notion of coinage is comparable to his. However, he neither attempts to give it a definition nor makes any generalizations concerning the types of coined elements.

From a study of the term *waḍʿ* in the grammatical literature before RDA, we may conclude that the use of the term became gradually more frequent over time, and the contexts of its use became more varied. RDA was the first to use it as an explicit technical term, to define it and to develop what may be called a "coinage theory". RDA was probably influenced by Ibn Yaʿīš and developed his ideas (we know that RDA was well acquainted with Ibn Yaʿīš's book, since he mentions it several times in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*[23]).

3.2   The Term *waḍʿ* in Islamic Philosophy

The main context in which the term *waḍʿ* is used by Muslim philosophers is the distinction between "the first coinage" (*al-waḍʿ al-ʾawwal*) and "the second coinage" (*al-waḍʿ al-ṯānī*) of linguistic expressions. The idea originates in Greek logic. The first source that mentions it explicitly is Porphyry's (234–305 CE) commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, which states that "calling this sort of thing 'gold' [...] belongs to the primary imposition (*prôte thesis*)[24] of words,

19   Ibn Yaʿīš, *Šarḥ* I, 24.
20   Ibn Yaʿīš, *Šarḥ* II, 117.
21   Ibn Yaʿīš, *Šarḥ* II, 131.
22   Ibn Yaʿīš, *Šarḥ* II, 126.
23   See, e.g., RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 271; II, 104, 270; III, 258.
24   The term was translated into Latin as *prota positio*. See Strange 2014:34, fn. 22.

while saying that the expression 'gold' is a noun belongs to their secondary imposition (*deutera thesis*)".[25] Strange (2014:34, fn. 23) notes that this distinction resembles the modern one between object language and metalanguage. Porphyry's commentary is mentioned in ʾAbū Nadīm's *Fihrist*; however, only one of the former's books is preserved in a complete Arabic version—the *Isagoge*.[26] According to Versteegh (1977:166) "the doctrine of two impositions was known to the Arabs from the translation of the relevant passages in Ammonios' [d. 517 or 526 CE] commentary on Aristotles' *De Interpretatione*".[27]

In Arabic tradition the distinction is found already in Fārābī's *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf*. Fārābī does not define the terms *al-waḍʿ al-ʾawwal* and *al-waḍʿ al-ṯānī*. The clearest explanation of them seems to be found in his discussion of grammatical terminology, which he says can be created in two ways: creation of new words, or attaching a new meaning to existing words.[28] Fārābī prefers the second option. He says that expressions that are used to speak of linguistic rules are "expressions in the second coinage" (*al-ʾalfāẓu llatī fī l-waḍʿi l-ṯānī*), whereas the "primary expressions" (*al-ʾalfāẓ al-ʾuwal*, i.e. expressions in their primary function) are "expressions in the first coinage" (*al-ʾalfāẓu llatī fī l-waḍʿi l-ʾawwali*).[29]

It can be inferred from this passage that the first coinage is the first ascription of an expression to a certain meaning, that is to say, creation of an expression for a certain meaning, while the second coinage is an ascription of a technical meaning to an existing expression. Druart (2012:54), who translates *waḍʿ* as "imposition", explains that "words of second imposition" refer to other words (and not to objects in the extra-linguistic world). For instance, the word 'dog' is a noun, whereas no dog in the world is a noun. Druart (2010:11) holds that Fārābī considers terms that were created in both of the aforementioned ways as a "words of second imposition"; however, I prefer to interpret the expression as referring only to terms created by attaching a new meaning to existing words. He explicitly speaks about "the second coinage" in terms of attaching a new meaning: "expressions of second coinage are transferred from the meanings

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25   Strange 2014:34.

26   See Walzer 1965; D'Ancona 2017.

27   As Versteegh (1997:120, fn. 38) points out, Ibn Suwār (d. after 408/1017) mentions Ammonios by name in his Arabic version of Aristotle's *Categories* (cf. Georr 1948:369). See Georr 1948:361 for Ibn Suwār's discussion on the two types of coinage.

28   Fārābī, *Ḥurūf*, 147–148. This passage is discussed in Druart 2010:11. Similar ideas were expressed by Porphyry when explaining the fact that Aristotle uses the word 'categories' in a sense different from that in the ordinary Greek language. See Strange 2014:29.

29   Fārābī, *Ḥurūf*, 148.

that they signified [in the first coinage]" (*al-ʾalfāẓu llatī fī l-waḍʿi l-ṯānī manqū-latun ʿan-i l-maʿānī llatī kānat tadullu ʿalayhā*).[30]

Fārābī presents the study of grammar as an example of various sciences that a society creates after reaching a certain stage of language development.[31] It can thus be assumed that his view of technical terminology in other fields would be similar to the one implied by his statements about grammatical terminology, although I have not found any specific examples in Fārābī's writings in which the concept of second coinage is applied in areas other than grammar, or to changes of a word's meaning made not for the sake of creating technical terminology (that theoretically can also be considered a second coinage).

Fārābī additionally mentions first and second coinage in his statement that "the expressions coined in the second coinage" (*al-ʾalfāẓu llatī tūḍaʿu fī l-waḍʿi l-ṯānī*) take the same case markers as the words of "the first coinage" (*al-waḍʿ al-ʾawwal*). Therefore the word *rafʿ* can take the *rafʿ* case, and the word *naṣb* can take the *naṣb* case.[32] He also uses derivatives of the root *w-ḍ-ʿ* in discussing the development of language[33] and the primary meaning of words.[34]

In *Kitāb al-Šifāʾ* by Ibn Sīnā the notion of coinage is also used in the context of distinction between the first and second coinages, where "the second coinage" refers to the creation of logical terminology. For instance, he says that the Greek word for genus (*jins*) "signified in its first coinage [in that language] something else, and then was transferred by means of a second coinage to a meaning that is called 'genus' by logicians" (*kānat tadullu ʿindahum bi-ḥasabi l-waḍʿi l-ʾawwali ʿalā ġayri ḏālika, ṯumma nuqilat bi-l-waḍʿi l-ṯāni ʾilā l-maʿnā llaḏī yusammā ʿinda l-mantiqiyyīna jinsan*).[35]

Ibn Sīnā uses the expression "first coinage" to refer to the creation of a word for the primary meaning. He explains, for example, that it is not appropriate to define *nawʿ* 'species' as "what is subordinate to genus" (*al-murattabu taḥta l-jinsi*).[36] In his view, this definition is too broad since, in addition to species, it also includes the individual (*šaḥṣ*), differentia (*faṣl*) and exclusive attribute (*ḥāṣṣa*).[37] Various interpretations of the definition can exclude some of

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30   Fārābī, *Ḥurūf*, 148.

31   Fārābī, *Ḥurūf*, 146–149.

32   Fārābī, *Ḥurūf*, 65.

33   See Fārābī, *Ḥurūf*, 138, 141–142. The process of language development according to Fārābī is discussed in Druart 2010:8–12 and in Druart 2012:51–54.

34   See, e.g., Fārābī, *Ḥurūf*, 113, 114, 115.

35   Ibn Sīnā, *Šifāʾ*, 47.

36   Ibn Sīnā, *Šifāʾ*, 60.

37   Genus, species, differentia and exclusive attribute constitute, together with accident (*ʿaraḍ*), which has not been mentioned here, five important general terms in Arabic logic,

these unwanted things, but the definition can be considered as referring exclusively to species only at a price of a very artificial interpretation of the passive participle *al-murattab*. Since *al-murattab* "does not signify, neither in its first coinage nor by a semantic shift, this meaning limited by all these conditions (i.e., the meaning corresponding to that artificial interpretation, in whose discussion certain conditions are mentioned)" (*laysa tadullu ʿalā hāḏā l-maʿnā l-muḥaddadi bi-kulli hāḏihi l-ištirāṭāti, lā bi-ḥasabi l-waḍʿi l-ʾawwali wa-lā bi-ḥasabi l-naqli*), the definition is not appropriate.[38] It is not clear whether Ibn Sīnā means by "the semantic shift" simply a deviation from the primary meaning, or specifically assigning a word a technical meaning; however, it is obvious that the meaning determined by the first coinage is the literal one for which the word was coined in the first place.

In Ġazzālī's book on logic some cases are found where he distinguishes between the primary meaning for which an element was coined and other meaning(s) which it can receive in the course of use,[39] as well as cases where he distinguishes between element's meaning which originates in coinage, and a meaning achieved by an element from a different origin[40] (these ideas are prominent also in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*[41]).

3.3   The Term *waḍʿ* in Islamic Theology and Jurisprudence

A thorough investigation of the notion of coinage in the vast theological and juridical literature would amount to an investigation of the perception of language in it, a task that far exceeds the purpose of the current book. I shall therefore limit myself to a presentation of the main findings of Weiss (1966), whose research is based on multiple sources, followed by a more detailed discussion of the terminology derived from the root *w-ḍ-ʿ* in the writings of Ġazzālī (whose *Kitāb al-Mustaṣfā* is considered a prominent representative of *ʾuṣūl al-*

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discussed already by Fārābī. See Abed 1991:10–28. The term *šaḫṣ* 'individual/particular' can refer to one thing only in every occurrence (unlike the aforementioned five terms, that are general and can refer to many things simultaneously; they are also called predicables). Abed 1991:3.

38   Ibn Sīnā, *Šifāʾ*, 60–61. For other examples see Ibn Sīnā, *Šifāʾ*, 38, 40, 41.

39   See, e.g., Ġazzālī, *Miʿyār*, 48–49.

40   For instance, he speaks of a meaning that "was not coined by the language's coiner" (*mā waḍaʿahā wāḍiʿu l-luġati*), and "is signified by entailment and subordination" (*al-dalālatu bi-ṭarīqi l-iltizāmi wa-l-istitbāʿi*). Such a meaning should not be included in the definition of a term. Ġazzālī, *Miʿyār*, 39.

41   See section 3.4.4 below.

fiqh at the peak of its development and includes all the standard contents of this genre[42]) and in Ibn al-Ḥājib's *Muntahā l-Wuṣūl* (which is relevant to RDA, since the latter composed commentaries on two other books by this author, and might well have been influenced by him).

Weiss (1966:38–39) asserts that the Muʿtazilites were the first to have used terms derived from the root *w-ḍ-ʿ* in theological and juristic literature. He recognizes two main senses of the term *waḍ* in *Kitāb al-Muʿtamad* by ʾAbū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044): the creation of language by convention, and a written account of language by lexicographers. This explains, according to Weiss, why lexicographers are often called ʾahl al-waḍʿ.[43]

In the first stages of conflict between the Muʿtazilites and their opponents, ʾahl al-sunna, the latter did not accept the idea of coinage, since it entails that language was created at some point in time (contrary to their belief in the eternal and uncreated Qurʾān, which naturally presupposes that its language is eternal as well). In due course an approach was developed that distinguished between God's inner speech and human language, which made it possible to integrate the notion of coinage into the worldview of all theological schools (since there was no need anymore to present the Arabic language as eternal).[44]

The notion of coinage in Ġazzālī's book on God's names bears a great resemblance to Fārābī's and Ibn Sīnā's, in its stress on a first and second coinage.[45] Ġazzālī's innovation in this respect is his mention of a third and fourth coinage, at least as a theoretical possibility. For instance, the word 'noun' as a grammatical category is a word of the second coinage, since it refers to a word and not to an extra-linguistic entity. If we divide the category of nouns into sub-categories, each one of which receives its own name, those names are words of the third coinage. For instance, when we say that there are definite and indefinite nouns, 'definite' and 'indefinite' are words of the third coinage.[46]

Ġazzālī uses terms derived from the root *w-ḍ-ʿ* to refer to the primary meaning/function for which the word was coined. For instance, he says that there are imaginable things for which there is no "explicit linguistic expression that was coined in order to communicate it" (*ʿibāratun ṣarīḥatun mawḍūʿatun li-l-ʾinbāʾi ʿanhu*).[47] He even uses the expression *ʾaṣl al-waḍ* 'the original coinage', which

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42   See Calder 1998 for a discussion on Ġazzālī's position in *ʾuṣūl al-fiqh*.

43   See Weiss 1966:49–54 for additional discussion on Baṣrī's notion of coinage.

44   Weiss 1966:40–41. Different approaches to language that existed in Islamic theology are presented in Gardet 1978.

45   See, e.g., Ġazzālī, *Maqṣad*, 11.

46   Ġazzālī, *Maqṣad*, 12.

47   Ġazzālī, *Mustaṣfā* I, 16.

appears numerous times in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*.[48] He says, e.g., that the word *fiqh* "in its original coinage denotes knowledge and understanding" (*ʿibāratun ʿani l-ʿilmi wa-l-fahmi fī ʾaṣli l-waḍʿi*).[49] Like his book on logic, his juridical treatise also contains cases where he makes a distinction between meaning that originates in coinage and meaning from another source. For instance, he points out that we know that each one of the words *allāh* 'God' and *al-šams* 'the sun' has only a single referent only not because of the word's form, but because of our knowledge of the world.[50]

An important difference between Ġazzālī's *Kitāb al-Mustaṣfā* and Ibn al-Ḥājib's *Muntahā l-Wuṣūl* is that the latter dedicates a separate chapter to *mabādiʾ al-luġa* 'the principles of language',[51] which deals with *al-mawḍūʿāt al-luġawiyya* 'things coined in the language',[52] unlike Ġazzālī, who integrates linguistic remarks into a logic-oriented discussion. Ibn al-Ḥājib defines *al-mawḍūʿāt al-luġawiyya* as "every expression coined for a certain meaning" (*kullu lafẓin wuḍiʿa li-maʿnan*). He divides such expressions into "simple and complex" (*mufrad wa-murakkab*). A simple expression is one composed of a single word. Simple expressions are divided into nouns, verbs and particles, whereas complex expressions are divided into "sentence/clause and something which is not a sentence/clause" (*jumla wa-ġayr jumla*). *Jumla* is defined as "something which was coined in order to convey to the addressee [a complete] ascription" (*mā wuḍiʿa li-ʾifādati nisbatin*).[53]

Ibn al-Ḥājib uses terms derived from the root *w-ḍ-ʿ* when discussing homonymy.[54] Additionally, they play an important role in a discussion on literal and non-literal usages. The former, *ḥaqīqa*, is defined as "an expression that is used according to its first coinage in the terminology in which the discourse is conducted" (*al-lafẓu l-mustaʿmalu fī waḍʿihi l-ʾawwali fī l-iṣṭilāḥi llaḏī bihi l-*

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48 In *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* this expression appears more than 20 times. See, e.g., RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 39, 127, 132; II, 208; III, 230, 271. It is worth mentioning that modern linguists writing in Arabic also use this term—e.g., Ḥassān (1991:109–122) dedicates a chapter in his book to *ʾaṣl al-waḍʿ*.

49 Ġazzālī, *Mustaṣfā* I, 4.

50 Ġazzālī, *Mustaṣfā* I, 31.

51 Weiss (1966:58–59) translates *mabādiʾ al-luġa* as "linguistic premises", and points out its connection to the Aristotelian view of science, according to which *mabādiʾ* are principles imported from other sciences, used in a given science as premises. *ʾUṣūl al-fiqh* uses three types of such principles: theological, linguistic and juristic.

52 Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Muntahā*, 12. Weiss (1966:60) translates the expression as "linguistic givens".

53 Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Muntahā*, 12. The term *nisba* is discussed in section 2.4.1.1 above. The addition "complete" in the translation seems necessary, because there is a distinction between an ascription that is complete in itself (which can only be in a sentence) and one that is not (as in phrases).

54 Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Muntahā*, 13.

taḥāṭubu); the latter, *majāz*, is defined as "an expression that is not used accord-ing to its first coinage" (*al-lafẓu l-mustaʿmalu fī ġayri waḍʿihi l-ʾawwali*).[55]

Ibn al-Ḥājib deals in his treatise with "the beginning of coinage" (*ibtidāʾ al-waḍʿ*), i.e., the origin of language. In this context he first says that "there is no natural relation between an expression and its signification" (*laysa bayna l-lafẓi wa-madlūlihi munāsabatun ṭabʿiyyatun*).[56] He summarizes various opin-ions about the origin of language among Muslim scholars, concluding that it is impossible to determine which is correct.[57]

3.4　　The Term *waḍʿ* in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*

3.4.1　　*The Definition of* waḍʿ

RDA defines *waḍʿ* at a very early stage of his book, when discussing Ibn al-Ḥājib's definition of the term *kalima* 'word'[58] as "an expression coined for a simple meaning" (*lafẓun wuḍiʿa li-maʿnan mufradin*).[59] RDA explains that *waḍʿ al-lafẓ* 'coinage of a linguistic expression' means "the first assignment of [a lin-guistic expression] to a meaning, with an intention that it will become conven-tional between people" (*jaʿluhu ʾawwalan li-maʿnan min-a l-maʿānī maʿa qaṣdi ʾan yaṣīra mutawāṭaʾan ʿalayhi bayna l-qawmi*).[60] Thus, if someone uses a lin-guistic expression "after its coinage in the meaning [that was determined by the coinage]" (*baʿda waḍʿihi fī l-maʿnā l-ʾawwali*), he should not be called "its coiner" (*wāḍiʿuhu*), since it is not the first assignment of the expression. In contrast, if someone uses a linguistic expression with a meaning which differs from that determined by the first coinage, with an intention for it to become conventional, he is called its coiner. For instance, when a person gives another

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55　　Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Muntahā*, 14.

56　　Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Muntahā*, 19. The arguments raised on this topic in Islamic tradition are presented in Weiss 1966:16–17.

57　　Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Muntahā*, 20.

58　　The term *kalima* in medieval Arabic grammatical theory is discussed in Levin 1986; for discussions of the use of this term by RDA see Guillaume 2011; Larcher 2005:104, fn. 25; Larcher 2011.

59　　RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 19. Larcher (2011:36) translates this definition as "an expression instituted for a single meaning", Guillaume's translation (2011:56) is very similar to Larcher's; however, he renders *mufrad* as "simple". The term *mufrad* as used in the grammatical literature has various meanings—singular (as opposed to dual/plural), a separate noun (as opposed to a syntactic construction), phrase (as opposed to a clause). However, here it seems appro-priate to translate it as "simple"—according to RDA's explanation that is discussed below (see pp. 85–86 below).

60　　RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 21.

person the name Zayd, he is the coiner of this name. However, "linguistic mistakes in the speech of common people cannot be considered coined expressions" (*muḥarrafātu l-ʿawāmmi laysat ʾalfāẓan mawḍūʿatan*), despite the fact that these usages differ from those determined by the primary coinage. The reason is that mistakes are not produced with an intention to become conventional.[61]

This discussion demonstrates that RDA views *waḍʿ* as a technical term with a restricted range. He concludes that Ibn al-Ḥājib should not have used the formulation *wuḍiʿa li-maʿnan* 'was coined for a meaning' in his definition of a word, since a coinage, by definition, must be for a meaning. If Ibn al-Ḥājib views coinage as creating an expression, regardless of whether the expression is used in language or not, and whether it is conventional or not, he should mention 'meaning' as the purpose of coinage, but such use of the term *waḍʿ* would be "different from the accepted terminology" (*ʿalā ḫilāfi l-mašhūri min-i ṣtilāḥihim*).[62] We see that in RDA's view a definition should not include unnecessary words, or use words in a sense that differs from the accepted one.[63]

3.4.2 *Types of Coined Elements*

3.4.2.1 RDA's Classification of Coined Elements

In his discussion of Ibn al-Ḥājib's definition of the term 'word', which is "an expression coined for a simple meaning" (see above), RDA raises the question of whether the adjective 'simple' is necessary in that definition. It may be argued that the adjective is unnecessary, "since the coiner coins only separate words, whereas constructions [are created] by whoever uses the language after coinage of the separate words, not by the coiner" (*li-ʾanna l-wāḍiʿa lam yaḍaʿ ʾillā l-mufradāti, ʾammā l-murakkabātu fa-hiya ʾilā l-mustaʿmili baʿda waḍʿi l-mufradāti, lā ʾilā l-wāḍiʿi*).[64]

RDA interprets the phrase "simple meaning" mentioned by Ibn al-Ḥājib as a meaning whose parts cannot be put into correspondence with parts of its linguistic expression. Such a meaning may consist of a number of parts (e.g., the meaning of the verb *ḍaraba* 'he hit' consists of its verbal noun, i.e., the action of hitting, and the time; however, the word itself cannot be divided into two parts, each of which would signify one of these meanings) or just one (e.g.,

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61   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 21.

62   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 21.

63   See Sheyhatovitch (forthcoming) for a detailed discussion on RDA's approach to definitions.

64   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 25.

the meaning of *ḍarb* 'hitting' and *naṣr* 'victory').[65] In other words, "a simple meaning" is a meaning that cannot be divided into smaller units, each one of which would be represented by a part of the linguistic expression representing the whole meaning. Although in the case of *ḍaraba* (or any other verb) one can say that the consonants of the root represent action, and the morphological pattern represents the time, these parts of the linguistic expression cannot exist independently. Thus, the meaning of *ḍaraba* can still be considered to be simple.

In contrast, a "complex meaning" (*al-maʿnā l-murakkab*) is one whose parts can be put into correspondence with its linguistic expression, e.g., *ḍaraba Zaydun* 'Zayd hit' and *ʿabdu llāhi* 'God's servant', unless these expressions function as proper nouns. When they do function as proper nouns, their meaning is considered to be simple[66] (since the proper noun *ʿAbdu llāhi* constitutes a single unit denoting a single person; the person cannot be divided into two parts, one of which would be called *ʿabd*, and the second one—*allāh*).

In this context RDA notes that logicians usually prefer the formulation *lafẓ mufrad/murakkab* 'simple/complex expression', not *maʿnā mufrad/murakkab* 'simple/complex meaning'.[67] He proposes what in his opinion is a better definition of 'word': "A simple coined expression" (*lafẓun mufradun mawḍūʿun*).[68] Ibn al-Ḥājib's attempt to define the term *kalima*, which belongs to the realm of linguistic expressions (*lafẓ*), in terms of meaning (*maʿnā*), indeed causes some difficulty in understanding.

RDA considers the idea of simplicity essential for the definition of a word. His response to a hypothetical opponent who claims that the coiner coins only single words, is that the coiner actually coins three types of things:

1.   "Particular expressions that are learned by listening [to native speakers]" (*ʾalfāẓ muʿayyana samāʿiyya*). The science that allows us to know them is lexicography (*ʿilm al-luġa*).[69]

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65   For an alternative translation of the passage see Larcher 2011:36.

66   This passage is discussed also in Guillaume 2011:58–59.

67   Logicians indeed speak of *lafẓ mufrad/murakkab*, and explain it in a way similar to RDA's: a simple expression is an expression no part of which has its own meaning. They also mention proper nouns, which are considered simple expressions even when they do not seem as such. See, e.g., Fārābī, *Manṭiq* I, 133; Ibn Sīnā, *ʾIšārāt* I, 143. However, in logical treatises one does find references to simple and complex meanings—e.g., Fārābī (*Ḥurūf*, 140–141) speaks of *tarkīb al-ʾalfāẓ* 'creating complex expressions' and *tarkīb al-maʿānī* 'creating complex meanings'. He says that expressions are connected to each other "when they signify complex meanings" (*matā kānat dāllatan ʿalā maʿānin murakkabatin*).

68   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 22.

69   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 25.

2. "A universal rule by which [the coiner] makes the expressions known, so that they are analogically productive" (*qānūn kullī yuʿarrifu bihi l-ʾalfāẓa fa-hiya qiyāsiyyatun*). RDA has in mind active and passive participles of different patterns, imperative, diminutive, etc.[70] The science that allows us to know these forms is morphology (*ʿilm al-taṣrīf*).

3. A rule that allows one to know "complex [expressions] that are analogically productive" (*al-murakkabāt al-qiyāsiyya*). For instance, there are rules that state that the governed element in an annexation structure must follow the annexed element, and the subject of a verbal sentence must follow the verb. In order to master some of these expressions one needs to know morphology, and for others one needs syntax (*ʿilm al-naḥw*).[71]

It is clear that the first type includes basic words that cannot be divided into smaller units, and thus no morphological or syntactic knowledge is needed in order to understand them or use them properly. As for the two other types, it may seem that the second includes morphological rules and the third—syntactic. However, the reference to morphology in (3) makes things more complicated. Apparently the third type includes also rules pertaining to the verb, which can receive its subject and object as bound pronouns (and thus falls into the realms of morphology and syntax simultaneously). Perhaps RDA also has in mind rules related to mood endings in verbs. We cannot know for sure, since he says nothing more about the classification of coined elements. There is even a possibility that he does not intend to present a systematic and comprehensive classification, but only to demonstrate that the coiner coins not only single words.

The next sections demonstrate various types of coined elements in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* (since RDA's classification is not entirely clear, I adhere to the modern division into lexical, morphological and syntactic levels). The chosen examples demonstrate arguments which RDA bases on the concept of coinage.

3.4.2.2 Lexical Coinage

A noun is defined by Ibn al-Ḥājib as "[a word] that signifies a meaning in itself that is not associated with one of the three times" (*mā dalla ʿalā maʿnan fī nafsihi ġayri muqtarinin bi-ʾaḥadi l-ʾazminati l-ṯalāṯati*).[72] In the light of this definition, the nominal status of relative pronouns and third person personal pronouns may appear problematic, as they seemingly do not signify anything

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70 This idea is particularly interesting in the light of Weiss' (1966:90) claim that morphological elements such as patterns and suffixes were not viewed as coined before the crystallization of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* as an independent science (in the 8/14th century).

71 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 25.

72 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 35.

by themselves, and need other elements to elucidate them.[73] RDA explains that these pronouns indeed need other elements, but not in order to convey their own meaning, which is "a vague thing" (*al-šayʾ al-mubham*), but in order to remove obscurity. For instance, the relative pronoun *allaḏī* 'which/that' has its own meaning—"a vague thing", and it needs a relative clause to remove the vagueness, not to confirm it. This is also the case with third person personal pronouns (which require a clarifying element, but cannot be considered as signifying a meaning in another element). Thus, elements of these two categories of pronouns are nouns, and, moreover, definite ones, since "it is conditioned by their coinage that they must refer to something particular and specified" (*ušturiṭa fīhimā min hayṯu l-waḍʿu ʾannahu lā budda lahumā min muʿayyanin muḫaṣṣaṣin*).[74]

In the above citation the concept of coinage is used to distinguish between noun and particle. Relative pronouns and third person personal pronouns may appear to fit the definition of a particle better than that of a noun, because they need other elements to convey their meaning completely. However, the difference between these pronouns and a particle is that the latter was coined not in order to stand independently, but to induce a change in another element's meaning, while the pronouns were coined in order to signify a vague thing. This is their independent meaning, which should be elucidated by another element. Additionally, these pronouns are coined so that they refer to something specific. This is the reason why they are considered definite. Thus, in this discussion the concept of coinage serves to explain why certain pronouns belong to the category of nouns, and why they are definite.

RDA mentions the coinage of vague nouns in other contexts as well—e.g., in discussing the vocative structures *yā ʾayyuhā l-rajulu/yā hāḏā l-rajulu/yā ʾayyuhāḏā l-rajulu*[75] 'O the man!', in which a vocative particle *yā* is combined with

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73   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 40.

74   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 40. In principle, the two last words in the sentence can be read as active participles (*muʿayyinin muḫaṣṣiṣin*), and then the sentence would mean '[the two types of pronouns] require [a constituent] that would render them particular and specific'. This interpretation corresponds to the characteristics of 3rd person personal pronouns and relative pronouns that should be clarified by their antecedents and by clauses that follow them, respectively. However, I prefer the reading *muʿayyanin muḫaṣṣaṣin* and the former interpretation, since the passage's purpose is to prove that the abovementioned pronouns signify a meaning of their own, and thus fit into the category of nouns. Moreover, if the sentence is interpreted in terms of reference, that would clarify its relation to the definition of definite noun, which is the following: "[a constituent] coined for one particular thing" (*mā wuḍiʿa li-šayʾin bi-ʿaynihi*). See RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 234 (see p. 114 f. below for a discussion).

75   For an explanation of why *ʾayy* in this structure must be followed by *hāʾ al-tanbīh* or by a demonstrative pronoun, see RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 375–376.

a noun preceded by the definite article.[76] He first explains why a noun preceded by the definite article must not follow the vocative particle directly. His argument is based on a principle that a noun can take either an *ʾiʿrāb* or a *bināʾ* ending. A *bināʾ* ending is rare in nouns preceded by the definite article (because the definite article is in complementary distribution with *tanwīn*, and thus resembles it, being therefore incompatible with *bināʾ*). This explains why a noun that takes a *bināʾ* ending in a vocative structure should not be definite in this way. However, an *ʾiʿrāb* ending is also problematic in the vocative, since there is a reason for *bināʾ* (viz., the fact that this noun appears in a position characteristic to the object pronoun *-ka* 'you', and resembles that pronoun in definiteness and in not being an annexed element).[77] By proving that *ʾiʿrāb* and *bināʾ* endings are problematic for a noun with the definite article following *yā*, RDA actually proves that a noun with an article must not follow that particle directly (since *ʾiʿrāb* and *bināʾ* are the only possible options).

After that RDA explains why the elements between the vocative particle and the definite noun in *yā ʾayyuhā l-rajulu/yā hāḏā l-rajulu/yā ʾayyuhāḏā l-rajulu* are those chosen to separate between the two:

> *ṭalabū sman mubhaman ġayra dāllin ʿalā māhiyyatin muʿayyanatin muḥtājan bi-l-waḍʿi fī l-dalālati ʿalayhā ʾilā šayʾin ʾāḫara, yaqaʿu l-nidāʾu fī l-ẓāhiri ʿalā hāḏā l-ismi l-mubhami li-šiddati ḥtiyāǧihi ʾilā muḫaṣṣiṣihi llaḏī huwa ḏū l-lāmi*

> There was a need for a vague noun that does not signify any particular essence and requires by its coinage another thing in order to signify [a particular essence]. The vocative [particle] affects that vague noun on the surface,[78] since that vague noun strongly requires a specifying noun, viz., the noun preceded by the definite article.[79]

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76   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 373.

77   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 373–374.

78   RDA apparently means that the element separating the definite noun from the vocative particle takes, in surface structure, the position reserved for a noun governed by the vocative particle, and thus prevents the problematic situation in which a noun preceded by the definite article would follow the vocative particle directly. Terms derived from the root *w-q-ʿ* in the context of the form-meaning relation are discussed in section 5.5 below. Versteegh (1978:265–266) links these terms, whether related to an element's meaning or its syntactic position, to that element's behavior in a specific example (in contrast to terms derived from the root *w-ḍ-ʿ*, which are usually related to an element's function in the language in general).

79   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 374.

In other words, in a vocative construction it is possible for a vague noun to take the formal position of a noun preceded by the definite article, because of the strong link between these two nouns. This link is due to the requirement that a vague noun be clarified by another noun, a requirement that is conditioned by the coinage of the vague noun. Thus whenever a vague noun is produced the addressee waits for a clarifying element. Once that element is mentioned, it is completely clear that it is co-referential with the preceding vague noun, and the speaker's intention is understood properly.

RDA adds that "the essence of a noun that follows a vocative particle must be distinguished [from other things], even if its identity is unknown" (*min ḍarūrati l-munādā ʾan yakūna mutamayyiza l-māhiyyati wa-ʾin lam yakun maʿlūma l-ḏāti*). Therefore, utterances such as *yā šayʾu* 'O thing!' or *yā mawjūdu* 'O existing thing!' are meaningless (unless the speaker has a metaphorical usage in mind, in which case the addressee is treated as devoid of any quality characteristic of reasonable beings, and so may be called 'a thing'; RDA adds that he does not intend to deal with metaphorical usages in this context).

Thus, *ʾayy* (disconnected from the clarifying governed element, which usually follows it in phrases such as *ʾayyu rajulin* 'which man/any man') and demonstrative pronouns may suitably follow a vocative particle, because they are vague nouns requiring a clarifying element. In contrast, *šayʾ* and its likes are unsuitable for this function. Although their meaning is vague, they "were not coined in order for their vagueness to be removed by a specification" (*lam yūḍaʿā ʿalā ʾan yuzāla ʾibhāmuhumā bi-l-taḥṣīṣi*)—unlike *ʾayy* and demonstrative pronouns, which "were coined as vague [nouns], with a condition that their vagueness be removed somehow" (*wuḍiʿā mubhamayni mašrūṭan ʾizālatu ʾibhāmihimā bi-šayʾin*). The vagueness of a demonstrative pronoun is removed by physically pointing (to the intended object) or by a qualifier,[80] whereas the vagueness of *ʾayy* is removed by the following noun.[81]

Therefore, among all nouns whose meaning is vague, only *ʾayy* and demonstrative pronouns are suitable for separating the vocative particle from a noun preceded by the definite article. The reason is their coinage, which made them

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80   Modern linguists usually view demonstrative pronouns in demonstrative phrases as modifying their nouns, and consider the latter as the head of the phrase. See, e.g., Peled 1998:20; Hachimi 2007:161; Amir-Coffin and Bolozky (2005:14), who analyze Modern Hebrew. In contrast, medieval Arabic grammarians view the demonstrative pronoun as the head, and the noun that follows as its *tābiʿ* (probably because of the theoretical difficulty of analyzing a constituent as a head in relation to a preceding constituent)—e.g., Ibn Yaʿīš (*Šarḥ* III, 126–127) speaks of this noun in terms of *ṣifa* and *naʿt*.

81   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 374–375.

require to be followed by a clarifying element. Thus their link with the following noun is strong enough for the addressee(s) to understand that the two words are co-referential (or even to understand that the vague noun's role is only formal and that attention should rather be focused on the following noun). RDA feels a need to explain why a 3rd person personal pronoun cannot fulfill the same function: "it was coined as a vague [noun], with a condition that its vagueness be removed by a preceding [element], not by a following one" (*wuḍiʿa mubhaman mašrūṭan ʾizālatu ʾibhāmihi bi-mā qablahu, lā bi-mā baʿdahu*). Although there are cases in which that pronoun is clarified by a following element, these are rare, whereas the structures *yā ʾayyuhā l-rajulu/yā hāḏā l-rajulu/yā ʾayyuhāḏā l-rajulu* demand a vague noun clarified by a following element.[82]

Another example appears in a discussion on word order in a nominal sentence. Ibn al-Ḥājib in his presentation of cases in which the predicate must precede the subject refers to sentences in which the predicate is a phrase/single word[83] that deserves to open the sentence. The example is *ʾayna Zaydun* 'Where is Zayd?'.[84] RDA remarks that Ibn al-Ḥājib's presentation of *ʾayna* as a single word may seem unclear, since according to the latter's own earlier statement time/place expressions are usually paraphrasable by a clause.[85] RDA resolves the problem by explaining that *ʾayna* is, without a doubt, "a single word in its coinage" (*ismun mufradun fī l-waḍʿi*), regardless of whether it is paraphrased by a clause or a phrase. As for the example *ʾayna Zaydun*, one can say that *ʾayna* here is "a single word that appears in the position of a clause" (*mufradun wāqiʿun mawqiʿa l-jumlati*).[86]

Another example deals with the sentence *lawlā ʿAliyyun la-halaka ʿUmaru* 'If not for ʿAlī, ʿUmar would have failed'.[87] RDA says that the predicate of *ʿAlī* must be omitted, because the two conditions making an omission obligatory are sat-

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82   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 375. The discussion of *yā ʾayyuhā* in Ibn Yaʿīš (*Šarḥ* I, 130) is less detailed and does not include terms derived from the root *w-ḍ-ʿ*. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 424) does not explain why the words *ʾayyuhā, hāḏā* and *ʾayyuhāḏā* were chosen for this structure.

83   RDA uses here the term *mufrad*, the most intuitive meaning of which is 'a single word', but since he usually uses it in a contrast to *jumla* 'clause/sentence', 'phrase' seems to be an appropriate translation (however, the current example focuses on *ʾayna*, which is a single word).

84   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 259.

85   RDA (*Šarḥ* I, 260) points out this apparent contradiction; his claim is based on Ibn al-Ḥājib's statement that appears in RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 243.

86   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 260.

87   Muslim tradition ascribes this citation to ʿUmar ibn al-Ḥaṭṭāb, who uttered the sentence after having received good advice from ʿAlī. See Lecomte 1962:180.

isfied[88] (previously he states two conditions for the obligatory omission of a nominal predicate—a context that makes the omitted element reconstructable, and an element that replaces the omitted one[89]):

1. One can reconstruct the omitted element through the context, since *law*[90] "was coined in order to signify a negation of something entailed [by a condition]" (*mawḍūʿatun li-tadulla ʿalā ntifāʾi l-malzūmi*). Therefore, *lawlā* signifies that the predicate following it must be "exists" (*mawjūd*), not 'stands', 'sits' or something else.

2. There is an expression that replaces the predicate—namely, the apodosis of *lawlā*.[91] Although it is unclear from a semantic perspective how the apodosis (which speaks of ʿUmar) can replace the predicate of the protasis (which refers to ʿAlī), this argument does have some merit from a formal point of view: medieval grammarians drew an analogy between the two clauses which constitute a conditional sentence and the two predicative constituents of a nominal sentence.[92] The analysis of the *ʾammā- fa-* construction is a good case in point. Arabic grammarians paraphrase it as a conditional sentence,[93] but it can be paraphrased also as a regular nominal sentence, by turning the apodosis into a nominal predicate clause, whose subject would be the subject from the protasis of the original sentence. Modern linguists in fact prefer to analyze the *ʾammā- fa-* construction as a regular nominal sentence, whose subject is the element following *ʾammā-*, and whose predicate is the element following *fa-*.[94] In a *lawlā* sentence the semantic connection between the two clauses is less clear than in an *ʾammā- fa-* sentence, and thus the appropriateness of paraphrasing *lawlā*-sentence as a regular nominal sentence is less self-evident

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88   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 275. For a discussion on *lawlā* sentences see Peled 1992c:64–65 and Peled 1998:156–157.

89   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 274.

90   In the body of the text the word is *lawlā*, but this is clearly a mistake. The editor refers to this point—see RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 275, fn. 2.

91   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 275. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 376) does not use the notion of coinage in this context. He says that since *lawlā* signifies the impossibility of one thing because of the impossibility of another, "it implies a judgment on the existence of the thing mentioned after it" (*kāna fīhā ʾišʿārun bi-ḥukmi l-wujūdi ʿalā mā yuḏkaru baʿdaha*), i.e., *lawlā* tells us that the predicate of the clause that follows it should be related to existence (*ḥukm* is used here in the sense of 'predicate', that was discussed in section 2.4.2.1 above). Ibn al-Ḥājib also notes that the apodosis of *lawlā* replaces the nominal predicate of the protasis, but does not give any example.

92   See Peled 2009a:25–26.

93   Peled 2009a:26.

94   See Peled 1998:27–28.

than the aforementioned paraphrasing of *ʾammā- fa-*; however, one can understand the line of thought that allowed RDA to view the apodosis as formally replacing the protasis' subject in *lawlā ʿAliyyun la-halaka ʿUmaru*. The concept of coinage is also used to discuss meanings of other particles. It can be seen, e.g., in the chapter on exception (*al-istiṯnāʾ*) constructions. Ibn al-Ḥājib discusses a sentence in which the excepted element (*al-mustaṯnā*) should take the same case as the general term (*al-mustaṯnā minhu*), but since the same case is impossible, the case of the excepted element is determined according to the syntactic position of the phrase in which the general term appears. His example is *mā jāʾanī min ʾaḥadin ʾillā Zaydun* 'No one but Zayd came to me'.[95] The excepted element (*Zayd*) should have taken the same case as the general term (*ʾaḥadin*), however the preposition *min* cannot assign *jarr* to a noun that comes after *ʾillā*. Therefore the excepted element takes *rafʿ*, according to the position of the prepositional phrase *min ʾaḥadin*, which functions as the subject of the sentence.

RDA explains that *min* cannot assign the *jarr* case to a noun that comes after *ʾillā* because that *min* "was coined in order to signify that the non-affirmation affects all parts of the [entity signified by the noun] that receives the *jarr* case from it" (*wuḍiʿat li-tufīda ʾanna ʿadama l-ʾījābi šāmilun li-jamīʿi ʾajzāʾi l-majrūri bihi*). When *ʾillā* comes after a non-affirmative clause, it refutes the non-affirmation. The annulled non-affirmation cannot affect the parts of the entity that are mentioned after it.[96] Similarly, *bi-* cannot assign the *jarr* case to an excepted element.[97]

Here RDA uses the concept of coinage in order to explain why the noun that comes after *ʾillā* cannot receive the *jarr* case: since the basic meaning for which *min* was coined is related to non-affirmation, this preposition cannot grammatically affect a noun that comes after *ʾillā* that annuls the non-affirmation. In other words, there is no logical connection between *min* and the noun that comes after *ʾillā*, thus the preposition cannot affect this noun grammatically.

Our last example sheds light on the position of proper nouns in coinage theory. It is taken from the beginning of the discussion on dual forms, which Ibn al-Ḥājib defines as words that receive the ending *ʾalif-nūn-kasra*, which "signifies that together with [the referent of the word] there is another one of the same genus" (*li-yadulla ʿalā ʾannahu maʿahu miṯluhu min jinsihi*).

RDA explains, using Ibn al-Ḥājib's own *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*, that 'genus' here means "what was coined so that it can denote more than one individual, due

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95   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 107.
96   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 108.
97   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 108.

to a meaning that brings [these individuals] together in the coiner's view" (*mā wuḍiʿa ṣāliḥan li-ʾaktara min fardin wāḥidin, bi-maʿnan jāmiʿin baynahā fī naẓari l-wāḍiʿi*).[98] The essences (*māhiyyātuhā*[99]) of things that are included in such a 'genus' can be different: e.g., one can say *al-ʾabyaḍāni* 'the two white ones', having in mind a man and a horse. These two are united in the speaker's view due to their white color. In this case the speaker does not take into account the essence, but only the common attribute. The essences of the things included in the 'genus' can also be identical, e.g., when one says *al-ʾabyaḍāni* of two people. The coiner can be one, e.g., in the case of *al-rajul* 'the man'; there can be also more than one coiner, e.g., in the case of *al-Zaydāni* 'the two men named Zayd' or *al-Zaydūna* 'the men named Zayd' (of course, each Zayd received his name from his own parents, and therefore there is more than one coiner). RDA adds, regarding proper nouns:

> *naẓara kullu wāḥidin min-a l-wāḍiʿīna fī waḍʿi lafẓati Zaydin laysa ʾilā māhiyyati ḏālika l-musammā, bal ʾilā kawni ḏālika l-musammā, ʾayya mā-hiyyatin kāna, mutamayyizan bi-hāḏā l-ismi ʿan ġayrihi.*

> Each coiner, while coining the name 'Zayd', did not take into account the essence of the named one,[100] but only its being dinstinguishable from others by virtue of this name, whatever its essence.[101]

Thus a man and a horse can be called Zayd. Like the case of *al-ʾabyaḍāni* (where the coiner takes color into account and ignores other attributes of the referents), here "both coinages take into account one thing" (*al-naẓaru fī l-waḍʿayni ʾilā šayʾin wāḥidin*), viz., the essence's being distinguishable from others by virtue of that name.[102]

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98   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 347. Ibn al-Ḥājib does not say explicitly what he means by the term *jins*. RDA probably infers the abovementioned idea from Ibn al-Ḥājib's discussion of his own definition of the dual—see Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 810.

99   Ighbariyah (2002–2003:22) explains, relying on numerous important logical treatises, that *māhiyya* means what is said as an answer for the question *mā huwa* 'What is it?', i.e., the essential attribute which makes the thing what it is. According to Arab logicians, this question should be answered by mentioning a species or a genus. Afnan (1964:31) notes that *māhiyya* is one of the rare examples of a term that was created by combining two words. This has drawn criticism from linguistic purists.

100   The term *musammā* 'the named one' is discussed in section 5.3 below.

101   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 347.

102   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 347. Frank (1981:275) notes that the notion of 'genus' in Arabic grammatical literature differs from the same notion in the Aristotelian tradition, since the grammarians did not view a genus as an abstract idea that can refer to multiple individuals, but rather

RDA adds that the term 'genus' here does not have the usual meaning encountered in the grammatical literature, where a noun denoting a genus (in contrast to a proper noun) is said to "refer to multiple [individuals] in a single coinage" (*wuqū'ahu 'alā kaṯīrīna bi-waḍ'in wāḥidin*). In this sense, the name 'Zayd' cannot be considered a noun denoting a genus, although there are many people with this name[103]—because each ascription of a proper noun to a person/object is a separate act of coinage. Unlike a "regular" noun, which is used to refer to an object with regard to its essence (thus a man cannot be called "a horse", except metaphorically—because the essence of man is different from the essence of the object that is properly called "a horse"), a proper noun is used to distinguish things from each other, regardless of their essence. The relation between a proper noun and "the named one" is arbitrary. Thus each act of naming someone with a proper noun is considered to be a separate act of coinage, even if it is a name that has been given to many others as well.

The distinction between dealing with the essence of things and dealing with what is necessary to distinguish between things is reminiscent of Ibn Taymiyya's (d. 728/1328) position that one cannot reach the essence of anything through definitions, whose aim is rather to distinguish between different things.[104] According to RDA, language sometimes deals with the essence of things, and sometimes serves only to distinguish between things.

In the same discussion on dual forms the problem of homonymy is raised. RDA remarks that Ibn al-Ḥājib does not have a consistent view on whether or not the dual/plural form of a homonymous noun can refer to "its various meanings" (*ma'ānīhi l-muḫtalifa*)—for example, whether or not *al-qur'āni* can refer to the two states of menstruation and purity, or *al-'uyūn* to a water spring, the sun and gold.[105] Whereas in his *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* Ibn al-Ḥājib says that these usages are impossible,[106] in *al-'Īḍāḥ* he states that these usages are possible, although anomalous.[107]

RDA notes that Juzūlī (d. 606/1209), 'Andalusī (d. 661/1263)[108] and Ibn Mālik accepted such usages. According to 'Andalusī, one can say *'aynāni* to refer to the sun and the pointer of scales, because when creating a dual/plural

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as an attribute (or attributes) found in multiple individuals, making it possible to use one name to refer to them collectively.

103   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 347–348.
104   See Ighbariyah 2002–2003:31–35.
105   See Lane (1968:V, 2215–2216) for these meanings of *'ayn*.
106   See Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 810.
107   This discussion appears in Ibn al-Ḥājib, *'Īḍāḥ* I, 529.
108   See RDA, *Šarḥ²* V, 156 for a discussion of this grammarian.

form, one takes into account only the identity in form and not the differ-
ence in meaning (i.e., a single word in the dual/plural can replace multiple
words whose meaning is different, as long as their form is identical[109]). This
approach is close to Šāfiʿī's, according to which when homonyms appear as
"general expressions" (*bi-lafẓi l-ʿumūmi*),[110] e.g., *al-ʾaqrāʾ* 'the states of men-
struation and/or purity', they shall be interpreted as general words. The same
holds for such expressions when they appear in a position characteristic of
a general word, e.g., an indefinite noun in a non-positive sentence, such as
mā laqītu ʿaynan 'I have encountered no eye/sun/scales' pointer': "[the expres-
sions] embrace all the various things they can potentially signify, just like
general expressions" (*fa-ʾinnahā taʿummu fī jamīʿi madlūlātihā l-muḫtalifati ka-
ʾalfāẓi l-ʿumūmi, sawāʾan*).[111]

RDA notes in this context:

> *lā yaṣiḥḥu ʾan yustadalla bi-taṯniyati l-ʿalami wa-jamʿihi ʿalā ṣiḥḥati taṯniy-
> ati l-muštaraki wa-jamʿihi bi-ʿtibāri maʿānīhi l-muḫtalifati, bi-ʾan yuqāla:
> nisbatu l-ʿalami ʾilā musammayātihi ka-nisbati l-muštaraki ʾilā musam-
> mayātihi li-kawni kulli wāḥidin minhumā wāqiʿan ʿalā maʿānīhi lā bi-waḍʿin
> wāḥidin*

> One can draw no conclusion from [the speakers' using] dual/plural forms
> of proper nouns about the possibility of using dual/plural forms of hom-
> onyms while referring to their various meanings; one cannot say that the
> relation between a proper noun and its possible named ones is the same
> as between a homonym and its referents, only because each of them (i.e.,
> each proper noun and each homonym) refers to its [various] meanings
> not by a single coinage.[112]

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109 This discussion can be best understood in light of the view that the dual/plural form is
     designed to obviate the need to repeat a word twice or more with coordinating *wāw*. See,
     e.g., Jurjāni, *Muqtaṣid* II, 937.

110 "General expressions" (i.e., expressions that refer to entire categories of things/people/
     actions) presented a difficulty for Qurʾān exegetes and theologians, who had to establish
     the range of reference of such expresions in the Qurʾān—see, e.g., Vishanoff 2011:5–6, 25–
     26, especially of definite nouns in the plural—see Vishanoff 2011:57. Šāfiʿī maintained that
     general expressions must be interpreted as such, unless the context includes some specify-
     ing clues (although in his view a very wide range of contextual clues can overcome this
     generality)—see Vishanoff 2011:58. The distinction between the general and the specific
     is an important issue in RDA's *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* that will be discussed in subsequent publica-
     tions.

111 RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 348.

112 RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 348.

In RDA's view of coinage proper nouns and homonyms are treated quite similarly, since each of these is related to every named one/meaning in a separate act of coinage. Therefore, a claim that from proper nouns no conclusions about homonyms can be drawn, calls for additional explanation.

RDA presents Ibn al-Ḥājib's position on this issue, according to which "it is possible to use dual/plural forms on condition that the singular forms of the words [the repetition of which is to be replaced by a dual/plural form] have the same meaning, whether by a single coinage or not" (*yaštariṭu fī l-taṯniyati wa-l-jamʿi kawna al-mufradāti bi-maʿnan wāḥidin, sawāʾun kāna bi-waḍʿin wāḥidin ʾaw ʾakṯara*).[113] Unlike the meaning of a proper noun, the meanings of a homonym differ from each other.[114]

This statement probably means that when an addressee hears, e.g., the proper noun Zayd, his mind creates one mental picture only. Even without knowing whom exactly the speaker has in mind, the addressee imagines some person with this name. In contrast, when the addressee hears a homonym such as *ʿayn*, his mind creates several unrelated mental pictures (unless there is a context that allows one to choose between the diferent possibilities). Most probably, the "meaning" mentioned by RDA here is a kind of mental picture created by the addressee, of which there is one in the case of proper nouns, and more than one in the case of homonyms. This explains why a speaker can use a dual/plural form of a proper noun, which evokes various named ones, but cannot use a dual/plural form of a homonym that evokes various different meanings.[115]

RDA mentions the views of other grammarians as cited by Ibn al-Ḥājib, who argue that even if one accepts the claim that the relation between a proper noun and its different named ones is the same as between a homonym and its different meanings, the two cases are still different. A homonym denotes several genera, whose individuals may be spoken of in the dual or the plural. If the speakers were to use a dual/plural form of the homonym to refer to "its various meanings" (*maʿānīhi l-muḫtalifa*), it would cause ambiguity (since it would be unclear whether the form signifies individuals from one genus or from different genera; such an ambiguity should be avoided). In contrast, a proper noun does not refer to a genus, and therefore a dual/plural form of such a noun does not

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113   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 348–349. Although RDA ascribes this claim to Ibn al-Ḥājib, I have found its source in neither the latter's *ʾĪḍāḥ* nor in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*.

114   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 349.

115   This discussion supports my assertion that the term *maʿnā* refers to the mental representation of a concept behind a linguistic element (and not to the object in the outer world denoted by that element). See section 5.1.1 below.

refer to individuals from any genus. Thus when a dual/plural form of a proper noun is used to refer to "its different meanings" (*maʿānīhi l-muḫtalifa*; i.e., even if we consider different named ones of the proper noun as its different meanings), there is no fear of ambiguity.[116]

3.4.2.3   Morphological Coinage

RDA uses the concept of coinage to explain why the definite article *al-* can be added to nouns only: the reason is that "[this article] was coined in order to render particular the entity that the signifier signifies in itself by correspondence" (*li-kawnihā mawḍūʿatan li-taʿyīni l-ḏāti l-madlūli ʿalayhā muṭābaqatan fī nafsi l-dālli*).[117] The definite article cannot join verbs, since the latter signify an entity "through inclusion" (*ḍimnan*), or particles, since "the thing signified [by a particle]" (*madlūluhu*) is found in another element and not in the particle itself.[118]

It is not easy to determine the meaning of *ḏāt* in this context. The word is occasionally used as a synonym of *jawhar/ʿayn* in the sense of '(concrete) substance'. However, this interpretation seems inappropriate here, since a verb does not signify any concrete substance by inclusion. The two main components of its meaning are time and action, neither of which is concrete. Although a verb implies an agent, a link between a verb and the idea of an agent seems

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116   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 349. This is a non-literal transmission of Ibn al-Ḥājib's discussion (*Šarḥ*, 811–812), in which the idea of coinage also plays an important role: the main difference between the same proper noun being given to several named ones and homonyms is "a difference in their coinage" (*iḫtilāf waḍʿihā*). However, Ibn al-Ḥājib's explanation is less clear than RDA's.

117   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 44. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 231) formulates the explanation differently: "since definiteness, whenever it exists, renders the thing about which a judgment is made particular for the addressee" (*li-ʾanna l-taʿrīfa mahmā ḥaṣala yajʿalu l-maḥkūma ʿalayhi muʿayyanan ʿinda l-muḫāṭabi*). Since the verb cannot be the thing about which a judgment is made, there is no need to make it definite. Ibn al-Ḥājib's use of the terms *maḥkūm ʿalayhi* and *ḥukm* is noteworthy: for instance, in *Šarḥ al-Wāfiya* (as cited by Muḫaymar in Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 171) he says that a direct object is "something about which a judgment is made" (*maḥkūm ʿalayhi*) and that an adjectival qualifier is "a judgment about the head noun" (*ḥukm ʿalā l-manʿūt*). It can be deduced from these excerpts that Ibn al-Ḥājib uses terms derived from the root *ḥ-k-m* to refer to ascribing a property to something, regardless of the syntactic manifestation of this ascription.

118   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 44. RDA here uses terms from the realm of the form-meaning relation, the first appearance of which seems to be in Ibn Sīnā's writings. *Muṭābaqa* means a complete correspondence between the word and the concept (in contrast to *taḍammun/ḍimn* 'inclusion', which refers to concept/s contained in the meaning of the word, and *iltizām* 'entailment', which refers to concept/s entailed by the meaning of the word). See Inati 1984:50–51; Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Muntahā*, 12. See also section 5.2.5 below.

to be weaker than a link of inclusion. Moreover, the requirement that a noun signify a concrete substance cannot be a condition for that noun receiving a definite article, since the definite article can be added to abstract nouns as well, of course.

Among the various meanings of the term *ḏāt* presented by Tahānawī, the most apt in the present context is "[a substance] in which something else exists" (*mā yaqūmu bihi ġayruhu*). That substance may have an independent existence, e.g., *Zaydun-i l-ʿālimu qāʾimun* 'The knowledgeable Zayd is standing' (Zayd is a substance with an independent existence, in which the attributes of knowledge and standing reside), or not, e.g., *raʾaytu l-sawāda l-šadīda* 'I saw an intense blackness' (of course, blackness cannot exist independently but must be an attribute of something; nevertheless, the attribute of intensity exists in it).[119] In other words, one of the meanings of *ḏāt* is a substance (concrete or abstract) which has some attributes (and thus can be described by an adjective). Such substances are represented linguistically by nouns. Therefore, the definite article cannot join a verb, as that would contradict the purpose for which the article was coined. In any case, regardless of the exact meaning of the term *ḏāt* in RDA's discussion, it is clear that a verb does not signify anything by correspondence (because its meaning consists of two components, namely, action and time), and a particle does not denote anything at all by itself.

It can be concluded that of the three parts of speech, the noun is the only one that signifies a substance by correspondence. RDA uses this to explain several properties of nouns—that they are the only part of speech that can function as a subject in a sentence, that they have dual/plural/feminine forms (the verb seemingly has these forms as well, but they actually pertain to the subject pronoun, i.e., a nominal element included in the verb, and not to the verb itself), that the *yāʾ al-nisba* ending can be attached to them, etc.[120]

RDA also uses the concept of coinage in discussing the feminine marker *tāʾ al-taʾnīṯ* in the context of diptote nouns. Adjectiveness and feminineness are mentioned by Ibn al-Ḥājib among nine conditions, two of which in any combination can be expected to render a noun diptote.[121] However, adjectives with the feminine marker are not diptote, a fact that requires an explanation. RDA explains that "*tāʾ al-taʾnīṯ* was originally coined as an accidental and non-constant thing" (*wuḍiʿa tāʾu l-taʾnīṯi fī l-aṣli ʿalā l-ʿurūḍi wa-ʿadami l-*

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119   Tahānawī, *Kaššāf* I, 817. Al-Šarīf Jurjānī defines *ḏāt* as "that which deserves an attribute or judgment". The excerpt is translated in Alon and Abed 2007:I, 139.

120   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 49.

121   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 100–101.

ṯabāti).[122] For this reason, *tāʾ al-taʾnīṯ* of adjectives in the feminine form does not cause diptoteness, since "an accidental [factor] is not taken into account" (*lam yuʿtadda bi-l-ʿāriḍi*).[123] In other words, *tāʾ al-taʾnīṯ* does not cause diptoteness in regular feminine adjectives because it is not an inseparable part of the word and as such can be ignored.

RDA adds that "the basic coinage [of *tāʾ al-taʾnīṯ*]" (*ʾaṣlu waḍʿihā*) is for creating a distinction between the masculine and the feminine genders. When it has this function, e.g., in the words *ḍāriba* 'hitting one, fem.' and *maḍrūba* 'hit one, fem.', it is never an inseparable part of the word. When it does not have this function, e.g., in the words *ḥijāra* 'stones' and *ġurfa* 'room', it may be an inseparable part of the word.[124] Put differently, in nouns like *ḥijāra* and *ġurfa* one cannot omit *tāʾ al-taʾnīṯ* and change the gender only—in contrast to nouns like *ḍāriba*, in which such an omission is possible. Thus the feminine marker in *ḥijāra* and *ġurfa* is not accidental. However, these nouns are not diptote, since except for their feminineness they satisfy no other precondition of diptoteness in Ibn al-Ḥājib's list.[125]

When a word of Arabic origin functions as a proper noun, it is "protected" from any possible omission, and hence the feminine marker becomes an inseparable part of the word. *Tāʾ al-taʾnīṯ* in *ʿĀʾiša* is not different from the *rāʾ* in *Jaʿfar*, and can be omitted only in a state of *tarḥīm*.[126] RDA explains the difference between the feminine marker in proper nouns and in generic nouns: "using an expression as a proper noun is its coinage; any letter with which the word was coined cannot be separated from it" (*al-tasmiyatu bi-l-lafẓi waḍʿun lahu wa-kullu ḥarfin wuḍiʿat-i l-kalimatu ʿalayhi lā yanfakku ʿan-i l-kalimati*).[127] When *ʿāʾiša* is used as a generic noun (whose meaning is 'living one, fem.'), "it

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122   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 132. RDA (*Šarḥ* I, 397) uses the same idea also when explaining why one can perform *tarḥīm* on a word that ends with *tāʾ al-taʾnīṯ*, even when standard conditions for this procedure are not satisfied. In contrast, *ʾalif* functioning as a feminine marker "was coined as a constant thing" (*waḍʿuhā ʿalā l-luzūmi*). Unlike *tāʾ al-taʾnīṯ*, this *ʾalif* is not omitted, and thus there are no cases in which it is reconstructed. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 263) links the fact that this *ʾalif* was coined as an inseparable suffix of a noun, to the fact that this suffix can replace two conditions of diptoteness—in his view, the inseparability of *ʾalif al-taʾnīṯ* is equivalent to an additional feminine marker, so that a noun with this suffix can be considered as containing two feminine markers. Terms derived from the root *ʿ-r-ḍ* are discussed in section 4.2 below.

123   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 132. This is an important general principle, upon which I expand in section 4.2 below.

124   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 132.

125   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 100–101.

126   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 132. The phenomenon of *tarḥīm* is discussed in Wright 1896–1898:I, 88–89.

127   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 132.

is not coined with the feminine marker" (*laysa mawḍūʿan maʿa l-tāʾi*), but when it is used as a proper noun, "it is coined in a second coinage with the feminine marker, and in this coinage the *tāʾ* is similar to the last consonant of the word" (*waḍaʿtahu waḍʿan ṯāniyan maʿa l-tāʾi fa-ṣāra l-tāʾu ka-lāmi l-kalimati fī hāḏā l-waḍʿi*).[128]

The main question treated by RDA in the above discussion is whether the word under discussion was coined with a suffix (which would then form an inseparable part of the word that affects the word's morphological behavior) or whether the form can be treated as a basic word + suffix (in which case there are other morphological implications). The expression *waḍʿ ṯānī* is reminiscent of the discussions on "first/second coinage" in Fārābī's and Ibn Sīnā's writings,[129] but RDA expands its meaning: the process meant here is neither a creation of a technical term, nor a semantic shift, but rather a separate act of coinage. The new form produced by this coinage may be inspired by an existing form, but the meaning of the original form is irrelevant for the new form. The original meaning of the word *ʿāʾiša* has no bearing on the proper noun *ʿĀʾiša*, which cannot be divided into a basic word + feminine marker. It is not a feminine form of the active participle *ʿāʾiš* 'living one, masc.' but rather an independent form that was coined as a single unit. Therefore the *tāʾ al-taʾnīṯ* is perceived in this case as an inseparable part of the word.

Words such as *Qadam* (proper noun, fem.) and *Saqar* (one of the names for Hell) are diptote, since these are feminine nouns for which the grammarians reconstruct a *tāʾ al-taʾnīṯ* (although these words consist of three consonants only, the vocalized middle consonant is considered to be the equivalent of a fourth consonant, which can replace the *tāʾ al-taʾnīṯ*).[130] If these nouns are used as masculine proper nouns (whether the masculine is natural or not), e.g., if a man is named *Saqar* or a book is entitled *Qadam*, the nouns will be triptote, according to all grammarians—since in this case the *tāʾ al-taʾnīṯ* will not be reconstructable. This is the case of "the masculineness which in the second coinage pounced on a noun whose femininity was weak even in the first coinage" (*ṭaraʾānu l-taḏkīri fī l-waḍʿi l-ṯānī ʿalā mā ḍaʿufa taʾnīṯuhu fī l-waḍʿi l-ʾawwali*).[131]

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128 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 132.

129 See section 3.2 above.

130 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 134.

131 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 135. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 285) in the same discussion uses neither the concept of pouncing nor the idea of coinage. He says that in these cases the semantic component of feminineness is not relevant since the nouns function as masculine proper nouns, while

The basic use of these nouns, as the names of semantically feminine entit-ies, is presented as their "first coinage", in which they are diptote, being proper nouns for feminine entities with a reconstructable *tāʾ al-taʾnīṯ*. But if these nouns functioned as proper nouns for semantically masculine entities, that would be their "second coinage" (because this usage differs from the one for which the words were coined in the first place). In this case they will not be dip-tote, since there will be no reason for diptoteness: without the semantic femin-ineness, there is no need to reconstruct the feminine marker. This change in the morpho-syntactic behavior of these nouns is possible, because their feminine-ness was not "strong" already in the "first coinage" (since they do not contain any visible feminine marker), and the masculineness in the "second coinage" is "pouncing" (*ṭāriʾ*). It is noteworthy that RDA usually presents the "pouncing" element as the one that determines the rule.[132]

Yet another example is taken from a discussion of dual nouns, which RDA defines as "every noun that has a singular form, and its ending was joined by [the letters] *ʾalif* and *nūn* to signify that with [its referent] is found another one of the same genus" (*kullu smin kāna lahu mufradun ṯumma ʾulḥiqa bi-ʾāḫirihi ʾalifun wa-nūnun li-yadulla ʿalā ʾannahu maʿahu miṯluhu min jinsihi*).[133] These forms are presented as one of the categories of nouns that receive their case markers in the form of the letters *ʾalif/yāʾ* (in contrast to most nouns whose case markers are vowels).

RDA explains that the pronouns *hāḏāni* 'these, dual, masc.' and *allaḏāni* 'which/that, dual, masc.' are "forms that were coined for the dual and were not built from singular [forms]" (*ṣiyaġun mawḍūʿatun li-l-muṯannā ġayru mab-niyyatin ʿalā l-wāḥidi*). He draws an analogy between these forms and words such as *ʿišrūna* 'twenty', which is also a "coined form" (*ṣīġa mawḍūʿa*), though one can conceive of a noun that can be its singular form.[134] There is morpho-phonological evidence proving that *hāḏāni* and *allaḏāni* cannot be considered dual forms of *hāḏā* and *allaḏī*, respectively (e.g., the pronouns in the dual have no diminutive forms, whereas the pronouns in the singular have them).[135] Like-wise, *ʿišrūna* may seem to be a plural form of *ʿašr* 'ten', but there is a semantic reason not to view it this way—it does not mean 'tens'. In this passage RDA uses

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formally they do not contain a feminine marker or anything that can replace it. Therefore, feminineness as a factor of diptoteness is not taken into account.

132   See section 4.1.3 below.
133   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 83.
134   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 84.
135   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 84.

the expression *ṣīġa mawḍūʿa* to refer to a form that was coined as a single unit—in contrast to forms that were created by joining a morpheme to a certain base.

He uses the concept of coinage in a similar way to explain why broken plural forms take case markers in the form of vowels (unlike the sound masculine plural forms, which take the case markers in the form of the letters *wāw/yāʾ*). The reason is a twofold similarity of the broken plural to singular forms: the broken plural is "a new form different from the coinage of its singular" (*ṣīġatun mustaʾnafatun muġayyaratun ʿan waḍʿi mufradihi*), and the patterns of the broken plural are diverse like the patterns of the singular.[136]

In other words, broken plural forms, unlike the sound plural, are not created by joining a singular with some constant ending. According to RDA, they are created in a separate act of coinage, like basic forms. Broken plural forms do not have recognizable distinctive feature, they vary like singular forms. Therefore, it is to be expected that they take their case markers in the form of vowels, like singular forms.

3.4.2.4   Syntactic Coinage

RDA uses the concept of coinage to explain the potential syntactic functions of different parts of speech: the noun can be either subject or predicate "because of [its] coinage" (*bi-ḥasabi l-waḍʿi*),[137] whereas a verb can function only as a predicate, and a particle can be neither subject nor predicate.[138] The concept of coinage obviates the need for further arguments: each part of speech can fulfill specific function(s) because it was coined this way.

Elsewhere RDA claims that in coining distinct linguistic elements the coiner has taken into account the fact that they should appear in a syntactic context—although Arab grammarians have usually maintained that in their most basic state words are not part of any construction.[139] This claim appears in the discussion of the bound possessive pronoun 'my' in vocative constructions. This morpheme consists of *kasra* in the last consonant of the original noun, followed by the letter *yāʾ*.[140] RDA mentions various opinions regarding the vocalization of this letter, among them the view that originally it should have taken *fatḥa* "since the coiner of separate words regards the word in its separate state

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136   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 75.

137   Goldenberg (1988:53) translates the phrase as "according to function", which does not seem quite apt.

138   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 33. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 219) also uses the idea of coinage in this context.

139   Ḥassān (1991:160) presents this as one of the basic principles in medieval Arabic grammatical theory.

140   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 262.

rather than in any [syntactic] construction" (*li-ʾanna wāḍiʿa l-mufradāti yan-ẓuru ʾilā l-kalimati ḥāla ʾifrādihā dūna tarkībihā*).[141] Any word that consists of one consonant only, such as *wa-* 'and' and *fa-* 'then' must be vocalized because a word cannot begin with an unvocalized consonant. Thus, if the *y* is regarded as standing by itself, not part of any construction, it too must be vocalized. The chosen vowel in this case is *fatḥa*, since it is the "lightest" vowel, and one consonant, especially "a weak letter" (*ḥarf al-ʿilla*, i.e., one of the letters *ʾalif*, *wāw* and *yāʾ*, which can be *matres lectionis*[142]), cannot bear heavier vowels.[143]

According to another approach, the *y* originally was unvocalized. This is the view which RDA prefers, "because the *sukūn* is the origin" (*li-ʾanna l-sukūna huwa l-ʾaṣlu*).[144] He explains that the above claim that the coiner regards words by themselves as not part of any construction, is not correct:

> *al-ẓāhiru ʾannahu naẓara fī l-muḍmarāti ʾilā ḥāli tarkībihā bi-dalīli waḍʿihā marfūʿatan wa-manṣūbatan wa-majrūratan, wa-l-ʾiʿrābu lā yakūnu ʾillā fī ḥālati l-tarkībi*

> It is clear that [the coiner] considered the personal pronouns within a syntactic context, as is proven by the fact that he coined them in *rafʿ*, *naṣb* and *jarr*, and cases cannot exist outside a syntactic context.[145]

The pronouns prove that the coiner took syntactic context into account when coining words, since the personal pronouns' forms differ completely according to case. For instance, the personal pronoun of the 1st person (sing.) in *rafʿ* is *ʾanā*, whereas the ending *-nī* signifies the same pronoun in *naṣb*, and the ending *-ī* the same pronoun in *jarr*.[146] Even if in the case of regular nouns (in which only the ending changes according to case) this argument does not strictly hold, any doubt concerning its validity will surely disappear when the personal pronouns, whose form changes completely according to case, are taken into account.

RDA bolsters his position with yet another argument:

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141   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 389.

142   See Wright 1896–1898:I, 5.

143   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 389. For a discussion on Sībawayhi's view of light/heavy vowels see Baalbaki 2008:114–115.

144   This is a well-known principle in Arabic grammatical theory. See, e.g., Ibn al-Sarrāj, *ʾUṣūl* II, 368.

145   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 389.

146   For a discussion of the personal pronouns see, e.g., Ibn al-Sarrāj, *ʾUṣūl* II, 115–121; Ibn Yaʿīš, *Šarḥ* III, 85–98; Wright 1896–1898:I, 53–56.

wa-law lam yanẓur fī l-kalimāti ʾilā ḥāli tarkībihā, lam yaṭṭarid waḍʿuhu li-l-kalimi llatī laysa fīhā ḥālata l-tarkībi ʿillatu l-bināʾi ʿalā ṯalāṯati ʾaḥrufin fa-mā zāda, bal jāza waḍʿuhā ʿalā ḥarfin ʾaw ḥarfayni, kamā waḍaʿa yāʾa l-ḍamīri wa-kāfahu wa-naḥwa mā wa-man

Had [the coiner] not taken into account the syntactic context of words, nouns that have no reason to take a *bināʾ* ending in a syntactic construction, would not have been coined consistently from at least three consonants, but rather would have been coined from one or two consonants, similarly to the bound personal pronouns *-ī* 'my' and *-ka* 'your/you (2nd person masc., sing., *naṣb/jarr*)', *mā* 'what' and *man* 'who'.[147]

This passage deals exclusively with nouns. In principle, nouns should take an *ʾiʿrāb* ending, unless there is a reason that makes them take a *bināʾ* ending (e.g., if they resemble a particle[148]). According to another well-known principle, a noun that takes an *ʾiʿrāb* ending should consist of at least three letters.[149] In RDA's view, the fact that all nouns that take *ʾiʿrāb* endings consist of at least three, whereas nouns with a *bināʾ* ending may consist of two or even one letter, supports his assertion that the coiner of the language has taken syntax into account when coining words. The coiner planned in advance which nouns should take *ʾiʿrāb* endings, and which nouns should take *bināʾ* endings.

This idea of planning by the coiner appears in a discussion on *ladun* 'by/near/close to', which Arab grammarians consider a time/place expression (and thus a nominal element) with a *bināʾ* ending. RDA cites Ibn al-Ḥājib's explanation, that *ladun* takes a *bināʾ* ending because "some of its dialectal forms were coined in a coinage of particles, while other forms behave analogously to [these dialectal forms]" (*min luġātihā mā waḍʿuhu waḍʿu l-ḥurūfi, fa-ḥumila l-baqiyyatu ʿalayhā tašbīhan bihā*).[150] The "dialectal forms" in question consist of two letters only, e.g., *lad*. According to Ibn al-Ḥājib, "a coinage of particles"

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147 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 390.

148 The main causes for *bināʾ* endings in nouns are discussed in RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 397. The principle that nouns should take *ʾiʿrāb* endings is discussed in ʿAlī 2011:35–38; the resemblance to a particle as a cause for *bināʾ* endings in nouns is discussed in ʿAlī 2011:40–42.

149 RDA mentions this principle, e.g., in *Šarḥ* I, 397. In other place he says that an *ʾiʿrāb* ending is not appropriate for a word that was coined from fwo letters only—see RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 233.

150 Some grammarians use the same argument to explain the *bināʾ* ending of *qaṭṭu* 'ever/never (used in negative sentences)'. RDA (*Šarḥ* III, 225) rejects this explanation and offers an alternative: *qaṭṭu* takes a *bināʾ* ending because it contains the meaning of a particle. See Tawfīq 1978:337 for an additional discussion, and section 5.2.5.2.4 below for some other examples of RDA's use of this argument.

is the only possible reason for the *binā'* ending of *ladun*, since in other respects this word is very similar to *'inda* whose ending is undoubtedly *'i'rāb*.[151] RDA responds to this argumentation as follows:

> *jawāzu waḍʿi baʿḍi l-ʾasmāʾi waḍʿa l-ḥurūfi, ʾay ʿalā ʾaqalla min ṯalāṯati ʾaḥru-*
> *fin, bināʾan min-a l-wāḍiʿi ʿalā mā yaʿlamu min kawnihā ḥāla l-istiʿmāli fī*
> *l-kalāmi mabniyyatan li-mušābahatihā li-l-mabniyyi*

> The possibility to coin some nouns in particle coinage, i.e., from less than three letters, is determined by the coiner's knowledge that in usage [these nouns] will receive a *binā'* ending, due to their resemblance to [words] that take *binā'* endings.[152]

He adds: "Therefore, the *binā'* ending [in nouns] cannot be explained by particle coinage" (*fa-lā yajūzu ʾan yakūna bināʾuhā mabniyyan ʿalā waḍʿihā waḍʿa l-ḥurūfi*)[153]—since such an explanation would, according to RDA, interchange the cause and the effect. "Particle coinage", i.e., creation of a noun consisting of less than three letters, is possible due to the coiner's knowledge that the word will not take any case markers (whereas a word whose ending is *'i'rāb* should consist of at least three letters[154]). Thus, the *binā'* ending of a noun cannot be explained this way—the argumentation would be circular.

RDA offers an alternative explanation for the *binā'* ending of *ladun*: its syntactic plasticity is even lower than that of other time/place expressions, although the latter are also restricted in the syntactic positions in which they can appear.[155] That is because *ladun* necessarily has the meaning of *ibtidā'* 'begin-

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151   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 221. This explanation appears in Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 780–781 (RDA does not quote Ibn al-Ḥājib directly, but conveys his ideas).

152   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 221–222. Although this passage mentions coinage and usage (RDA's distinction between these two is discussed in section 3.4.3 below), it does demonsrate the idea of syntactic coinage, because of its focus on the fact that the coiner plans ahead and foresees the contexts in which the word is to appear.

153   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 222. RDA (*Šarḥ* III, 232) uses the same argument to prove that *maʿ* (a dialectal form of *maʿa* 'with') must be a particle (although most grammarians consider *maʿa* to be a time/place expression): if we were to assume that *maʿ* is a noun, we would not find any explanation for its *binā'* ending except for "particle coinage", which RDA considers insufficient. Thus it is better to explain *maʿ*'s *binā'* ending by assuming that it is a particle.

154   Although nouns such as *yad* 'hand' and *dam* 'blood' take *'i'rāb* endings in spite of consisting of two letters only, RDA (*Šarḥ* I, 397) regards these cases as anomalies that should not affect the basic rules. See the discussion on p. 151 below.

155   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 222.

ning' (which, according to RDA, is the meaning of the particle *min*[156]), and thus typically appears besides *min*.[157] To summarize, the *bināʾ* ending of *ladun* can be better explained by its syntactic and semantic resemblance to particles, not by "particle coinage".

In a discussion of the *tawābiʿ* of a single noun following a vocative particle, RDA says that if such a *tābiʿ* is not an annexed element, it can take *rafʿ* or *naṣb*.[158] But if it is an annexed element, no grammarian other than Ibn al-ʾAnbārī permits it to take *rafʿ*. That is "because the *naṣb* in the *tawābiʿ* of a noun following a vocative particle, whose ending is *ḍamma*, conforms to the basic principles of the theory" (*li-ʾanna l-naṣba fī tawābiʿi l-munādā l-maḍmūmi kāna huwa l-qiyāsu*[159]). One must remember that the five types of *tawābiʿ* "were coined so that they conform in their ending to an *ʾiʿrāb* ending of a noun whose ending is *ʾiʿrāb*, not to the *bināʾ* ending of a noun whose ending is *bināʾ*" (*ʾinnamā wuḍiʿat tābiʿatan li-l-muʿrabi fī ʾiʿrābihi, lā li-l-mabniyyi fī bināʾihi*).[160] Thus, the speakers do not say **jāʾanī hāʾulāʾi l-kirāmi* 'These noble [people] came to me', in which the qualifier's case marker matches the overt ending of the head noun,[161] which is *kasra*, but give the qualifier the *rafʿ* case, in keeping with the syntactic position of the head noun.[162]

At this point it is clear that the ending of a *tābiʿ* in principle should not conform to the *bināʾ* ending of the head noun. RDA still has to explain why the *rafʿ* case is possible in a *tābiʿ* which does not function as an annexed element and what the difference is between an annexed element and element which does not function thus, in terms of case endings in vocative constructions. He says that the *ḍamma* in the ending of a single word following the vocative particle, which is in principle a *bināʾ* ending, appears because of the vocative particle, and disappears if that particle disappears. Thus this ending resembles *rafʿ*, and the particle resembles the governor of *rafʿ* (one can say

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156   See p. 185 below for a discussion.

157   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 221.

158   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 362–363.

159   The original meaning of *qiyās* is 'analogy/syllogism'. In linguistic contexts the term is usually taken to mean a process in which the speakers recognize the existence of a certain similarity between two elements, and analogically extend to one of them a feature which the other possesses. In a wider sense the term signifies the basic principles of linguistic theory and even the inner logic of language. See Baalbaki 2008:47–56.

160   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 364. The same principle is mentioned also in RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 365 and RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 175–176 (in a discussion on *lā l-nāfiya li-l-jins*).

161   See fn. 80 above for a discussion of various analyses of demonstrative phrases such as *hāʾulāʾi l-kirām*.

162   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 364.

the same about the *fatḥa* of the noun in *lā rajula* 'not a single man').[163] The *ḍamma* of *bināʾ* resembles "the *ḍamma* which functions as a case marker of *rafʿ*" (*rafʿa*); for this reason a qualifier of a head noun with such an ending may take *rafʿ*, because it resembles a qualifier of a head noun in *rafʿ* (on condition that the qualifier is not an annexed element).[164] RDA continues his explanation:

> *wa-qallala šayʾan min-i stinkāri tabʿiyyati ḥarakati l-ʾiʿrābi li-ḥarakati l-bināʾi llatī hiya ḫilāfu l-ʾaṣli kawnu l-rafʿi ġayra baʿīdin fī hāḏā l-tābiʿi l-mufradi*

> The fact that *rafʿ* is not unreasonable in a *tābiʿ* [of the noun that follows the vocative particle] which is not an annexed element,[165] lessens the difficulty in matching the *ʾiʿrāb* ending [of the qualifier] to the *bināʾ* ending [of the head noun], although [such usage] deviates from the basic rule.

RDA then goes on to explain what is meant by "the fact that *rafʿ* is not unreasonable": if the same constituent, which is not an annexed element, follows the vocative particle immediately, it takes the *ḍamma* ending which resembles *rafʿ*. Now the difference between being and not being an annexed element in the case of the aforementioned *tābiʿ* is clear: had an annexation construction been positioned immediately after the vocative particle, the annexed noun would have taken *naṣb*, not *rafʿ*.[166]

RDA himself calls his argumentation "imagining [the *tawābiʿ*'s appearance] in the position of the constituent following the vocative particle" (*taṣawwur wuqūʿihā mawqiʿa l-munādā*). He says that Ibn al-ʾAnbārī did not use this technique when permitting *rafʿ* in the *tābiʿ* of the constituent following the vocative particle, even when this *tābiʿ* is an annexed element. According to RDA's interpretation, Ibn al-ʾAnbārī's points of departure were the resemblance between the *ḍamma* ending of the constituent in vocative and the *rafʿ* case, and the fact that a *tābiʿ* of a constituent in *rafʿ* takes *rafʿ* regardless of its own character. RDA concludes his analysis of Ibn al-ʾAnbārī's approach with the statement that it

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163   There is a similar discussion in Ibn Yaʿīš, *Šarḥ* I, 106, without, however, using the idea of coinage.

164   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 364.

165   The term *mufrad* is used in medieval grammatical literature in several meanings (see fn. 59 above). Here I translate it as "which is not an annexed element", because RDA stated beforehand that the current discussion deals with a *tābiʿ* of this type.

166   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 364.

is "not unreasonable given the theory's basic principles" (*laysa bi-baʿīdin fī l-qiyāsi*), but is incorrect given the linguistic realities of Arabic.[167]

The following example, in which the idea of syntactic coinage appears, is taken from a discussion on emphasizer (*taʾkīd*; one of the *tawābiʿ* types[168]). RDA explains that this constituent was "coined" (*wuḍiʿa*) for 3 purposes:

1. To prevent misunderstandings due to the addressee's inattention.
2. To prevent the addressee from thinking that the speaker made a mistake in his speech.

    If the speaker has in mind one of these two purposes, he must use "a literal repetition" (*takrīr lafẓī*) of the word that in his view the addressee did not hear properly or that the addressee may consider a mistake on the speaker's part, and say, e.g., *ḍaraba Zaydun Zaydun* 'Zayd, Zayd hit' or *ḍaraba ḍaraba Zaydun* 'Zayd hit, hit'.[169] In such cases a "semantic repetition" (*al-takrīr al-maʿnawī*) will not be useful, since if the speaker says *ḍaraba Zaydun nafsuhu* 'Zayd himself hit', the addressee could still think that the speaker had *ḍaraba ʿAmrun* "Amr hit' in mind, and that the emphasizer *nafsuhu* refers to ʿAmr. Thus, if the addressee did not hear the word *Zayd* properly because of inattention, the use of *nafsuhu* would not solve this problem.[170]

3. To prevent the addressee from thinking that the speaker used a word non-literally. In this context RDA distinguishes between three types of cases:

    a. The addressee may think that the predicate (*al-mansūb*; lit. 'a constituent that is ascribed [to another one]'[171]) is used non-literally. "Sometimes one ascribes a verb to something else non-literally, in order to exaggerate, but with no intention to ascribe to [another element] the actual action [signified by the verb]" (*rubbamā tansibu l-fiʿla ʾilā šayʾin majāzan wa-ʾanta turīdu l-mubālaġata, lā ʾanna ʿayna ḏālika l-fiʿli mansūbun ʾilayhi*). For instance, one may say *qutila Zaydun* 'Zayd was killed', having in mind that he was only badly beaten and not actually killed. Another example: speakers say *hāḏā bāṭilun* 'This is invalid', having in mind that the thing in point is not perfect (without being entirely invalid).

        When the speaker uses *taʾkīd* to prevent the addressee from thinking that his speech is non-literal in the aforementioned sense, he

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167   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 364.
168   See Wright 1896–1898:II, 282–283 for a discussion on emphasizer and other types of *tawābiʿ*.
169   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 357–358.
170   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 358.
171   Terms derived from the root *n-s-b* are discussed in section 2.4.1.1 above.

should repeat the word so that there will be no doubt that the word is used literally. For instance, the Prophet said *ʾayyumā mraʾatun naka-ḥat bi-ġayri ʾiḏni waliyyihā fa-nikāḥuhā bāṭilun bāṭilun bāṭilun* 'Any woman who marries without her legal guardian's permission—her marriage is invalid, invalid, invalid'.[172] The adjective *bāṭil* is repeated three times, so that there will be no doubt that it is used in its literal sense, and thus such a marriage is invalid, not just imperfect or non-recommended.[173] This last example is clearly taken from the realm of jurisprudence; the interpretation of the repetition of *bāṭil* determines the rule derived from this *ḥadīṯ*.[174]

b. The addressee may think that the non-literal usage is "in mentioning the particular subject (lit. 'the element to which another element is ascribed')" (*fī ḏikri l-mansūbi ʾilayhi l-muʿayyani*). "It happens that a verb is ascribed to some [subject], while [the speaker's] intention is something with a semantic link to that subject" (*rubbamā nus-iba l-fiʿlu ʾilā l-šayʾi, wa-l-murādu mā yataʿallaqu bi-ḏālika l-mansūbi ʾilayhi*). This is the case, for instance, if one says *qaṭaʿa l-ʾamīru l-liṣṣa* 'The emir cut off [the hand of] the thief', having in mind that a servant performed the action on emir's command.

When the speaker assumes that the addressee may think of a non-literal usage of this kind, he should repeat the subject and say, e.g., *ḍaraba Zaydun Zaydun* 'Zayd, Zayd hit', i.e., Zayd himself, not someone on his behalf. Alternatively, the speaker can repeat [the subject] semantically, using *nafs/ʿayn* 'itself' and their derivatives.[175]

c. *ʾan yaẓunna l-sāmiʿu bihi tajawwuzan, lā fī ʾaṣli l-nisbati bal fī nisbati l-fiʿli ʾilā jamīʿi ʾafrādi l-mansūbi ʾilayhi, maʿa ʾannahu yurīdu l-nisbata ʾilā baʿḍihā, li-ʾanna l-ʿumūmāti l-muḥtaṣṣata kaṯīratun.*

The addressee may think that the non-literal usage is not in the basic ascription, but rather in ascribing the verb to all the individuals [included in the group denoted by] the subject, whereas the speaker intends to ascribe [the action denoted by the verb] only to some of these individuals. There are many general [words] that are specified.[176]

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172   Different versions of this *ḥadīṯ* appear, e.g., in Ibn Ḥibbān, *ʾIḥsān* IX, 384–385.

173   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 358.

174   For other examples proving RDA's wide knowledge of and interest in jurisprudence see section 2.4.2 above.

175   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 358.

176   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 359.

In these cases the addressee's incorrect understanding is prevented by using either the words *kulluhu* 'all of it/him', *ʾajmaʿu* 'all' and its derivatives, *kilāhumā* 'both of them', *ṯalāṯatuhum* 'the three of them', etc.[177]

This discussion is a detailed answer to the question of why the hypothetical coiner of the Arabic language coined the syntactic structure of emphasis. The categorization of different purposes of this structure allows RDA to explain which words can fulfill this role and in which contexts.

3.4.2.5 Discussion of the Previous Examples

The examples presented in the previous three sections are merely a small sample out of hundreds of occurrences of the term *waḍʿ* in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*. They show that an element's coinage determines its various properties, such as form, meaning, categorical identity, syntactic positions, etc. RDA uses these properties to explain numerous linguistic phenomena—the definiteness of words (e.g., relative and personal pronouns are considered definite, because they were coined to denote a definite referent), omission of constituents (e.g., the predicate in the protasis following *lawlā* must be omitted, since *lawlā* was coined for a meaning that allows the omitted constituent to be reconstructed), case assignment (e.g., the case of the excepted element in a negative sentence with a general term preceded by *bi-/min* is explained by the meaning for which these particles were coined), possible (or impossible) combinations of elements (e.g., the fact that only nouns may be preceded by the definite article *al-* is explained by the meaning for which that article was coined), diptoteness (e.g., the fact that in some cases the feminine marker does not render the word diptote is explained as due to the fact that this marker was coined in such a way that it does not constitute an inseparable part of the word), and the types of elements that can occupy a certain position (e.g., the fact that only certain words can function as emphasizer is explained by analyzing the semantic functions for which that syntactic structure was coined).

RDA's use of the concept of coinage in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* may occasionally seem *ad hoc*, as sometimes he seems to use the argument that "the element behaves thus because it was coined this way" in order to spare himself further exlanations. Perhaps it was this tendency that caused some scholars to claim that RDA had little interest in theoretical discussions and explanations, and focused primarily on linguistic description.[178] This claim is incorrect; in fact, *Šarḥ al-*

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177 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 359.
178 See ʿAlī 2011:48–49.

Kāfiya contains numerous quite profound and detailed discussions on possible causes of various linguistic phenomena.

The use of apparently *ad hoc* explanations can be understood in light of the fact that most linguistic phenomena can be explained only by arguments that in their turn also call for explanations and proofs, which again are not self-evident. Since the discussion cannot last forever, some claims must be viewed as axioms (*ʾawwaliyyāt*, i.e., principles that are known instinctively, and thus do not need to be proved).[179] It seems that RDA considers things determined by coinage as axioms of a sort, basic facts about linguistic elements that the speaker is supposed to know intuitively. However, in some cases matters presented as related to coinage are not self-evident, and RDA does prove his position—as we have seen in the discussion on whether the coiner when coining distinct elements takes into account the syntactic context, or not.

RDA does not explicitly address the question of the coiner's identity or the debate on this question in Muslim tradition. This is consistent with Versteegh's (1997b:83) observation that Arab grammarians, unlike Muslim theologians and jurists, did not show a particular interest in the question of the origin of language. However, in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* one can find some clues suggesting that RDA believed in the conventional nature of language: e.g., in his definition of *waḍʿ* (where the idea of conventionality is stressed) and in the discussion on proper nouns (where it is stated that an existing word can be used as a proper noun, and each name giver is a coiner).

3.4.3 *Coinage versus Usage*

In the preceding sections we showed examples of various types of coined elements, elements' properties determined by their coinage and arguments based on the idea of coinage. The present section deals with cases in which RDA observes a possible mismatch between elements' coinage and their actual usage (*istiʿmāl*). Here one can see the difference between RDA and Muslim theologians and jurists; the latter, as pointed out by Weiss (1966:1–5), viewed language as constant and unchanging entity, each and every element of which has been established once and forever.[180]

The approaches are different, because the starting point of theologians and jurists was the sanctity of the Qurʾānic text and the need to seek legitimization for Qurʾānic exegesis and the rules derived from the holy text. If one accepts the possibility that the meaning of Arabic words can change, how can one be

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179   See, e.g., Ġazzālī, *Mustaṣfā* I, 21.

180   Weiss' statement merits further inquiry, but that is beyond the scope of the present book.

sure that one understands the Qurʾān correctly and that the rules one derives from it fit God's intention? Thus from the religious point of view it is more convenient to consider the Arabic language as unchanging. In contrast, RDA as a grammarian focused on linguistic reality, and could not ignore the fact that sometimes actual usage differs from what one expects. He did not have to deal with the theological and juristic implications of this observation, since these issues exceeded the scope of his work.

The first example is taken from RDA's discussion of the parts of speech. He says that the following two statements can be made about the imperfect verb:

1. Its literal meaning (*ḥaqīqa*) is in the present, whereas its non-literal meaning (*majāz*) is in the future.

2. Its expression is the same for the present and the future, so that both of these meanings are literal (i.e., the expression is homonymous). The expression "was coined for each one [of these two times]" (*mawḍūʿun li-kulli wāḥidin minhumā*), "so that its primary coinage is for one particular time out of the three" (*fī ʾaṣli l-waḍʿi li-ʾaḥadi l-ʾazminati l-ṯalāṯati*). The same thing happens in usage (i.e., in usage the imperfect verb also always signifies one specific time). The fact that the verb seems ambiguous to the addressee does not contradict the fact that it was created to signify one specific time.[181]

The purpose of this discussion is to show that the imperfect verb, according to both approaches, "signifies by its coinage one time out of the three" (*dāllun ʿalā ʾaḥadi l-ʾazminati l-ṯalāṯati bi-l-waḍʿi*),[182] in line with the definition of verb: "[a word] that signifies a meaning in itself that is connected to one time out of the three" (*mā dalla ʿalā maʿnan fī nafsihi muqtarinin bi-ʾaḥadi l-ʾazminati l-ṯalāṯati*).[183] Although imperfect verbs apparently signify both the present and the future, either the meaning of the future is not literal, or the expression is homonymous.

RDA's statement about homonymy[184] can be understood in light of his definition of coinage: "the first assignment of linguistic expression to a meaning, with the intention that it will become conventional between people".[185] It can be inferred that each assignment of a linguistic expression to a meaning is a

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181   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 39.

182   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 39.

183   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 38. For a similar discussion by Ibn al-Ḥājib see Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 224. Ibn al-Ḥājib's main argument is similar to RDA's: "the coiner coined the imperfect verb only to signify one time" (*al-wāḍiʿu lam yaḍaʿ-i l-fiʿla l-muḍāriʿa ʾillā dāllan ʿalā ʾaḥadi l-ʾazminati ʾabadan*); however, the former's discussion is less detailed.

184   For a survey of various approaches to homonymy in *ʾuṣūl al-fiqh* see Weiss 1966:85–88.

185   See section 3.4.1 above.

separate act of coinage. The coiner intended to create a verbal expression for the present and a verbal expression for the future. Eventually the expressions that were created for these two purposes turned out to be the same, but that is not important. The important thing is that in each act of coinage the coiner intended to create an expression for a specific time.

RDA points out that the imperfect verb signifies specific time in actual usage as well. The fact that he refers to usage after referring to coinage proves that he is aware of a possible mismatch between the two (although in this specific case there is no mismatch). Despite the fact that the imperfect verb may seem ambiguous to the addressee, the speaker always knows what specific time he has in mind. RDA shows that the time signified by the imperfect verb is specific in coinage and usage alike, as evidence for the claim that it fits the definition of a verb.

An interesting example of the coinage-usage distinction is found in the discussion on definite and indefinite nouns. Ibn al-Ḥājib defines a definite noun as "[a noun] that was coined in order to signify one particular thing" (*mā wuḍiʿa li-šayʾin bi-ʿaynihi*).[186] RDA explains that Ibn al-Ḥājib had to include in his definition the phrase "one particular thing" in order to exclude indefinite nouns (that were not coined in order to signify particular things). He notes that Ibn al-Ḥājib did not mean that "the coiner when coining [a definite noun] had in mind one specific thing" (*al-wāḍiʿu qaṣada fī ḥāli waḍʿihi wāḥidan muʿayyanan*), since if this were the meaning of the definition, it would include proper nouns only. Personal pronouns, "demonstrative and relative pronouns" (*al-mubhamāt*[187]), nouns with a definite article and nouns that are annexed to nouns of the former categories (i.e., all types of definite nouns besides proper nouns) "can signify any particular thing meant by the user [of language]" (*taṣluḥu li-kulli muʿayyanin qaṣadahu l-mustaʿmilu*). Therefore, the meaning of Ibn al-Ḥājib's definition must be "[a noun] that was coined in order to be used [to signify] one

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186   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 234. In his own discussion of this definition Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 786) stresses that what he has in mind is semantic rather than formal definiteness. He adds that he does not mean an expression that signifies something particular for an addressee, which cannot be confused with others, but rather "an expression coined for a meaning, in a way different from the coinage of indefinite nouns, that are coined for a non-particular one among those that have a common general meaning" (*ʾan yakūna l-lafẓu mawḍūʿan li-maʿnan ʿalā ḫilāfi waḍʿi l-nakirāti fī kawnihā mawḍūʿatan li-wāḥidin lā bi-ʿaynihi min ʾāḥādin muštarakatin fī maʿnan kulliyyin*). It seems that Ibn al-Ḥājib finds it difficult to characterize a definite noun semantically, and thus formulates his explanation in negative terms, which make it difficult to understand.

187   RDA himself explains that this is the meaning of the term *al-mubhamāt*—see *Šarḥ* III, 240.

particular thing, whether this thing was intended by the coiner, which is the case with proper nouns, or not, which is the case with other [categories of definite nouns]" (*mā wuḍiʿa li-yustaʿmala fī wāḥidin bi-ʿaynihi, sawāʾun kāna ḏālika l-wāḥidu maqṣūda l-wāḍiʿi, kamā fī l-ʾaʿlāmi, ʾaw lā, kamā fī ġayrihā*). Had Ibn al-Ḥājib formulated his definition this way, it would have been clearer.[188]

RDA notes that Ibn al-Ḥājib "considers nouns preceded by the definite article as coined […] in spite of their being complex (i.e., consisting of a definite article + a basic form), since it was stated in the definition of noun that complex [expressions] are also coined" (*jaʿala ḏā l-lāmi mawḍūʿan […] wa-ʾin kāna murakkaban, li-mā marra fī ḥaddi l-ismi ʾanna l-murakkabāti ʾayḍan mawḍūʿatun*).[189] By the coinage of complex expressions he means the coinage of rules according to which such complex expressions are created.[190] Alternatively, the definite article can be viewed "as if it is coined with [the noun] which it joins, in the coinage of separate words" (*kaʾannahu mawḍūʿun maʿa mā daḥala ʿalayhi waḍʿa l-ʾafrādi*)—since the morpheme *al-* is not independent, and constitutes a part of the word it precedes.[191] In any case, it is appropriate to discuss definite nouns in terms of coinage, whether this coinage is morphological or lexical.

In the discussion above RDA deals with a problem which *ʿilm al- waḍʿ* also addresses.[192] On the one hand, there is no doubt that a definite noun signifies one particular thing (unless the definiteness is generic). This is a part of word's basic meaning and thus must stem from its coinage. On the other hand, the coiner could not know in advance the particular objects to which the word would refer in usage. In principle, any noun can refer to a multitude of things in different contexts. For instance, the definite noun "the dog" can refer to any dog among the millions of dogs in the world. Only in case of proper nouns does the coiner know in advance the one particular object to which the noun will refer, while in other categories of definite nouns the coiner knows only that in each usage the noun will refer to a specific object of a certain species.

Our next example is taken from a discussion of case markers. According to RDA nouns in their primary form are context-free, not part of any syntactic construction, and thus should take no case endings. However, he also asserts that

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188 RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 234. RDA continues his criticism of Ibn al-Ḥājib's definition of definite nouns in *Šarḥ* III, 235–236.

189 RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 234.

190 See section 3.4.2.1 above for detailed discussion on this point.

191 RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 234.

192 See, e.g., Weiss 1966:101–110.

nouns should in principle take case endings.[193] In order to resolve this apparent contradiction he uses the concept of coinage: nouns in principle should take case endings, "because the coiner has coined them in order for them to be used in a syntactic construction; therefore, their use without any construction is opposed to the coiner's intention" (*li-ʾanna l-wāḍiʿa lam yaḍaʿ-i l-ʾasmāʾa ʾillā li-tustaʿmala fī l-kalāmi murakkabatan, fa-stiʿmāluhā mufradatan muḫālifun li-naẓari l-wāḍiʿi*). The *bināʾ* ending of single words, although they are more basic than words in construction, is accidental (*ʿāriḍ*[194]) for them—"because the use of [nouns] outside a construction is accidental in their case, and does not stem from their coinage" (*li-kawni stiʿmālihā mufradatan ʿāriḍan lahā ġayra waḍʿiyyin*).[195]

The coiner may thus be said to coin nouns as separate words, but with the intention that they be used in a syntactic context (we have already seen that coinage determines, among other properties, an element's syntactic behavior[196]). Thus there is no contradiction between the claim that a noun's primary form is context-free and that a noun in principle should take an *ʾiʿrāb* ending. When a speaker uses nouns outside a syntactic context, this contradicts the coiner's intention. Therefore, a *bināʾ* ending, characteristic to nouns in this usage, is accidental to them.

In another example RDA says that "the verb was coined in order [to signify] renewal and occurrence, although the imperfect verb is sometimes also used in order [to signify] continuity" (*wuḍiʿa l-fiʿlu ʿalā l-tajaddudi wa-l-ḥudūṯi wa-ʾin yustaʿmal-i l-muḍāriʿu li-l-dawāmi ʾayḍan*)—for instance, in the sentence *Zaydun yuʾawwī l-ṭarīda wa-yuʾamminu l-ḫāʾifa* 'Zayd gives shelter to the outcast and protects the frightened one' the imperfect verbs refer to a continuous state. This is possible because the imperfect verb resembles the active participle, "which in its coinage does not signify any time" (*allaḏī lā dalālata fīhi waḍʿan ʿalā l-zamāni*).[197]

The next example is taken from a discussion on qualifiers. Ibn al-Ḥājib says that "[the qualifier] was coined to signify [an abstract] meaning, either generally or specifically" (*waḍʿuhu li-ġaraḍi l-maʿnā, ʿumūman ʾaw ḫuṣūṣan*). The examples given for the former are *tamīmī* 'Tamimi' and *ḏū māl* 'wealthy' lit. 'owning money', whereas the latter is exemplified by the sentences *marartu bi-*

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193   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 65. Some examples of nouns without a syntactic context are presented in RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 53.

194   The term *ʿāriḍ* is discussed in section 4.2 below.

195   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 65.

196   See section 3.4.2.4 above.

197   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 316.

rajulin ʾayyi rajulin 'I passed by a man, and what a man!' and *marartu bi-hāḏā l-rajuli/bi-Zaydin hāḏā* 'I passed by this man/this Zayd'.[198]

RDA explains that what is meant by "[words] coined to signify a meaning generally", are words "coined to signify a meaning in the head word in all their usages" (*wuḍiʿa li-l-dalālati ʿalā maʿnan fī matbūʿihi fī jamīʿi stiʿmālātihi*). For instance, adjectives ending with *yāʾ al-nisba* and annexation structures starting with *ḏū* 'owner' have a head noun in all their occurrences, either overt or reconstructable. Relative pronouns also belong to this category, since the relative clause *allaḏī qāma* 'who stood up' is equal in meaning to the adjective *al-qāʾim* 'the standing one'.[199]

In contrast, "words coined to signify a meaning specifically" are words "coined to signify a meaning in the head word in some of their usages" (*ʾan yūḍaʿa li-l-dalālati ʿalā maʿnan fī matbūʿihi fī baʿḍi stiʿmālātihi*). This is the case, e.g., with underived[200] (*jāmid*) nouns, which function as qualifiers when appearing after a demonstrative pronoun in phrases such as *hāḏā l-rajulu* 'this man'.[201] In contrast, when the same nouns appear as qualifiers after a noun which is not a demonstrative pronoun, e.g., in *marartu bi-Zaydin-i l-rajuli* 'I passed by Zayd the man' (meaning that Zayd is perfect in his masculinity), one cannot claim that *al-rajul* "was coined to signify a meaning in its head word" (*mawḍūʿan li-maʿnan fī matbūʿihi*)—because its usage in the sense of "perfect in his masculinity" "does not stem from its coinage" (*laysa waḍʿiyyan*). Similarly, the use of the word *ʾasad* 'lion' in the sense of "brave" in the sentence *marartu bi-rajulin ʾasadin* 'I passed by a man who was a lion' "does not stem from its coinage" (*laysa waḍʿiyyan*).[202]

The distinction between the two types of qualifiers is presented here in terms of coinage: the first type includes words that were coined to signify a meaning in their head word (i.e., describe the head word) in all their uses. Even if the head word does not appear overtly, it can be reconstructed. The words meant here are adjectives (the annexation construction with *ḏū* is designed,

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198   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 289.

199   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 289–290. Most of these points appear also in Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 626; however, he does not mention relative pronouns in this context.

200   This is the translation offered by Larcher 2006:573.

201   In this context Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 627) also mentions the word *ʾayy*, which can function as a qualifier in sentences such as *marartu bi-rajulin ʾayyi rajulin* 'I passed by a man, and what a man!', whose purpose is to describe the man as perfect. However, RDA (*Šarḥ* II, 291) holds that *ʾayy* "does not signify any meaning in its head word by its coinage" (*lā yadullu bi-l-waḍʿi ʿalā maʿnan fī matbūʿihi*), but is an interrogative word that underwent a semantic shift.

202   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 290.

according to RDA, to format words that are not adjectives so that they can be used to describe a head noun;[203] in his book he shows more than once that these structures are equivalent to adjectives[204]). As for the second type of qualifiers, it includes words that were coined to function as qualifiers only in certain contexts, especially after demonstrative pronouns.[205] Although this behavior is determined by coinage, they actually function as qualifiers also in other contexts, where their use is not dictated by their coinage.

After this discussion RDA asks why underived nouns can function as qualifiers after demonstrative pronouns only, and not after other "vague" nouns. Nouns such as *rajul* 'man' and *sabʿ* 'predatory animal' would appear to be semantically vague and in need of elucidation, just like demonstratives. His answer is that in *marartu bi-rajulin ʾasadin* the second noun in principle should not function as the qualifier of the first "because the head noun is stripped from an addition to the message, compared to what would have been understood from generic nouns had they not functioned as qualifiers" (*li-tajarrudi l-mawṣūfi* [...] *ʿan fāʾidatin zāʾidatin ʿalā mā kāna yaḥṣulu min ʾasmāʾi l-ʾajnāsi law lam taqaʿ ṣifātin*).[206] This formulation is not easy to understand. It means, most probably, that if the head noun is a regular noun, it does not add anything to the meaning of the noun functioning as its qualifier (compared to cases in which the latter does not function as a qualifier). For instance, *rajul* in *marartu bi-rajulin ʾasadin* "conveys the meaning of a person" (*yufīdu l-šaḫṣiyyata*), and *ʾasad* "conveys the meaning of a predatory animal" (*yufīdu l-sabʿiyyata*)[207]— just as when these words appear in other constructions. In contrast, in the phrase *hāḏā l-rajulu* 'this man' "the head noun's contribution is in rendering the qualifier present and particular" (*li-l-mawṣūfi fāʾidatu jaʿli l-waṣfi ḫāḍiran muʿayyanan*), and in *yā ʾayyuhā l-rajulu* 'O the man!' "the head noun's contribution is in preventing the vocative particle from directly preceding a noun with a definite article" (*li-l-mawṣūfi fāʾidatu manʿi ḥarfi l-nidāʾi min mubāšarati ḏī l-lāmi*).[208]

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203   See RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 274.

204   See, e.g., RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 38, 199; IV, 473.

205   After that RDA presents several additional types of elements that can function as qualifiers in certain contexts, some of which are analogically productive (*qiyāsī*), whereas others are *samāʿī*, i.e., should be used only as they were documented from the native Arabic speakers.

206   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 290. The term *fāʾida* in the sence of 'addition to message' is discussed in chapter 6 in Sheyhatovitch 2012.

207   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 290.

208   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 291. In contrast, Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 627–628) explains that a regular noun can function as a qualifier of a demonstrative pronoun, because the latter "signifies a sub-

We have seen that some deviations from properties determined by an element's coinage are possible in linguistic usage. However, such deviations are limited. This point can be demonstrated via the *iḫtiṣāṣ* 'specification' structure, i.e., sentences such as *ʾanā l-miskīnu ʾayyuhā l-rajulu* 'I am the miserable man!',[209] in which the vocative particle cannot appear overtly next to *ʾayy-* (although the combination *yā ʾayyuhā* is common in Arabic). RDA explains that the vocative meaning has been completely removed from this structure, whether in the literal (such as in *yā Zaydu* 'O Zayd!') or non-literal (such as in the cases of *mutaʿajjab minhu* 'object that causes wonder' or *mandūb* 'the lamented one') sense. In an *iḫtiṣāṣ* construction the meaning of the vocative is canceled, because the qualifier of *ʾayy-* (*al-rajul* in the aforementioned example) is co-referential with the personal pronoun preceding it (in the same example—with *ʾanā*). In other words, the qualifier of *ʾayy-* does not refer to the addressee (whereas mentioning the addressee is essential for a construction with vocative meaning). According to RDA, "[the speakers] did not want to use the marker of the vocative in an [utterance] totally void of [vocative] meaning" (*kuriha stiʿmālu ʿalami l-nidāʾi fī l-ḥālī min maʿnāhu bi-l-kulliyyati*).[210]

In this discussion RDA does not use terms derived from the root *w-ḍ-ʿ*; however, it is clear that he views *yā* as a particle coined for the function of vocative. In a regular vocative structure *yā* can be either used next to *ʾayyuhā*, or omitted. In contrast, in *taʿajjub* 'wonder' and *nudba* 'lamentation' structures opening with *yā ʾayyuhā*, one cannot omit *yā*. The reason is that the objects mentioned in these two structures are presented as metaphorically "called". Unlike a regular vocative, these types of utterances are produced without an intention to attract anyone's attention or make anyone come to the speaker. In RDA's words,

stance" (*dalla ʿalā l-ḏāti*), and thus a noun following it must signify a meaning (connected to that substance), whereas signifying a meaning connected to some substance is actually "a function of the qualifier" (*maʿnā l-ṣifati*; the term *maʿnā* in the sense of 'function' is discussed in section 5.1.4 below). It happens only with a noun following a demonstrative, because a demonstrative "does not signify the nature of any substance, and needs [another element] to elucidate this nature" (*lā dalālata fīhi ʿalā ḥaqīqati l-ḏāti fa-ḥtīja ʾilā bayāni ḥaqīqatihā*), i.e., the demonstrative needs the following noun.

209   My translation adheres to RDA's explanation (*Šarḥ* II, 431) that the sentence means "I am distinguished from other men by misery" (*ʾanā muḫtaṣṣun bi-l-maskanati min bayni l-rijāli*); Wright (1896–1898:II, 93) translates this sentence as "I am the miserable one, O man!".

210   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 431.

fa-lammā nuqilā ʿan-i l-nidāʾi ʾilā maʿnan ʾāḫara maʿa baqāʾi maʿnā l-nidāʾi
fīhimā majāzan, lazimā lafẓa ʿalami l-nidāʾi tanbīhan ʿalā l-ḥaqīqati l-man-
qūlayni humā minhā

[These utterances] were transferred from the meaning of vocative to
another meaning, but the meaning of vocative remained in them in a
metaphorical sense. Thus they stick to the formal marker of the vocative,
so that attention would be attracted to the literal meaning from which the
structures were transferred.[211]

In other words, sentences that express surprise and lamentation are considered
to be vocative sentences that underwent a metaphorical shift. They retain some
of the meaning of the vocative, since the thing mentioned after *yā ʾayyuhā* is
such that it theoretically can be called in order to attract its attention (although
in these particular cases it is not the speaker's intention to do so). These usages
deviate from the function for which the particle *yā* was coined, and thus are
subject to a certain limitation: there is no possibility to omit *yā*, which reminds
the addressee of the literal meaning of the structure. In contrast, the *iḫtiṣāṣ*
structure does not have any vocative meaning, not even a metaphorical one,
since the noun mentioned after *ʾayyuhā* is co-referential with the speaker and
thus does not denote an object that the speaker can call, even theoretically.
Therefore, the deviation from the basic function for which *yā* was coined is too
big, making it impossible to use that particle.

The coinage-usage distinction presented in this chapter seems to have no
precedent in earlier grammarians' writings. Ibn Yaʿīš, the only grammarian
comparable to RDA in his use of the notion of coinage, juxtaposes mainly *qiyās*
(that can be translated in this context as 'the principles of grammatical the-
ory/of language'[212]) and usage. For instance, he says that the forms *tilika* and
tālika (rare variants of the demonstrative *tilka*, 'that, fem.') are "rare in usage,
but not refuted by the principles of language" (*qalīlatun fī l-istiʿmāli wa-l-qiyāsu
lā yaʾbāhā*).[213]

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211   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 427. Interestingly, Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 456) does not mention literal and non-
      literal uses in this context. He states that the intentions of asking for help and lamentation
      require "prolonging [the utterance]" (*takṯīr*), and that therefore it would not be reasonable
      to omit *yā* in these cases.

212   See fn. 159 above.

213   Ibn Yaʿīš, *Šarḥ* III, 136. For additional examples see, e.g., Ibn Yaʿīš, *Šarḥ* IV, 71, 107, 144.

3.4.4 *Signification by Coinage versus Other Types of Signification*

Although the meaning of linguistic elements is usually viewed as determined by their coinage, RDA mentions two other ways in which an element achieves its meaning (these ways may be called "modes of signification"): "by nature" (*bi-l-ṭabʿi/ṭabʿan*[214]) and "by means of reason" (*ʿaqlan*[215]).

Already at the beginning of his book, in his discussion of the definition of the term "word" (*kalima*), RDA says that a word can signify meaning not only by its coinage, but also "by nature" (*bi-l-ṭabʿi*). For instance, the onomatopoeic word *kāḥḥ* imitates the sound of coughing.[216] The idea of signification by nature brings to mind the discussion on the origin of speech in Greek philosophy, in which the two major approaches were *phúsis* (the naturalistic approach, according to which language originated in natural sounds and a natural connection exists between the sign and what it signifies) and *thésis* (the conventional approach, according to which linguistic signs were arbitrarily chosen by speakers).[217] As far as I know, the example of *kāḥḥ* is the only one in which RDA speaks of signification by nature. This is to be expected, since in Arabic (as in other languages) it is difficult to point out any natural connection between words and their meaning—except in onomatopoeic words.[218]

A meaning may also be inferred, without regard to coinage, by means of reason (*ʿaqlan*). For instance, even if someone utters a combination of sounds

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214 Tahānawī (*Kaššāf* I, 788) defines "natural signification" (*dalāla ṭabīʿiyya*) as a signification in which "reason finds a natural link between signifier and signified, allowing [reason] to move from [the signifier] to [the signified]" (*yajidu l-ʿaqlu bayna l-dālli wa-l-madlūli ʿalāqatan ṭabīʿiyyatan yantaqilu li-ʾajlihā minhu ʾilayhi*). He explains that "a natural link" means that "one of the natural attributes, whether belonging to the one producing the expression, or to the meaning, or to something else, is causing an accidental appearance of the signifier, when the signified appears accidentally" (*ʾiḥdāṭu ṭabīʿatin min-a l-ṭabāʾiʿi sawāʾun kānat ṭabīʿata l-lāfiẓi ʾaw ṭabīʿata l-maʿnā ʾaw ṭabīʿata ġayrihā ʿurūḍa l-dālli ʿinda ʿurūḍi l-madlūli*).

215 Tahānawī (*Kaššāf* I, 788) defines "rational signification" (*dalāla ʿaqliyya*) as a signification in which "reason finds an essential link between signifier and signified, allowing [reason] to move from [the signifier] to [the signified]" (*yajidu l-ʿaqlu bayna l-dālli wa-l-madlūli ʿalāqatan ḏātiyyatan yantaqilu li-ʾajlihā minhu ʾilayhi*). He explains that "an essential link" means that "the existence of the signifier absolutely necessitates the existence of the signified in the same matter" (*istilzāmu taḥaqquqi l-dālli fī nafsi l-ʾamri taḥaqquqa l-madlūli fīhā muṭlaqan*).

216 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 23. Ibn Jinnī's approach to onomatopoeia is discussed in Weiss 1966:12–13 and Versteegh 1997a:269.

217 See, e.g., Versteegh 1997b:80.

218 The theory of matrices and etyma (which deals with words' phonetic features instead of root radicals) may provide us with tools to shed light on the relationship "between the words and the world". See Bohas and Dat 2008 for a further discussion.

"which has not been coined for any meaning" (*muhmal*), it can still be inferred by reason that the speaker is alive.[219]

Another example of signification by reason is taken from a discussion on the definition of the verb. Ibn al-Ḥājib defines a verb as "what signifies a meaning in itself associated with one of the three times" (*mā dalla ʿalā maʿnan fī nafsihi muqtarinin bi-ʾaḥadi l-ʾazminati l-ṯalāṯati*).[220] RDA explains:

> *ʿalā maʿnan wāqiʿin fī ʾaḥadi l-ʾazminati l-ṯalāṯati muʿayyanan, bi-ḥayṯu yakūnu ḏālika l-zamānu l-muʿayyanu ʾayḍan madlūla l-lafẓi l-dālli ʿalā ḏāli-ka l-maʿnā bi-waḍʿihi lahu ʾawwalan, fa-yakūnu l-ẓarfu wa-l-maẓrūfu mad-lūla lafẓin wāḥidin bi-l-waḍʿi l-ʾaṣliyyi*

> A meaning [signified by the verb] takes place in one particular time out of the three (i.e., past/present/future), while this particular time is also part of the verb's signification, for which it was coined in the first place (alongside with the meaning, which is usually an action). Thus, in a verb [the time] that contains [the action] and [the action] that is contained [in the time] constitute the signification of the same expression as determined by the original coinage.[221]

It follows that verbal nouns such as *ḍarb* 'hitting' and *qatl* 'killing' do not meet the definition of a verb, although they signify an action that must occur at one particular time—because this particular time is not signified by the form of the verbal noun.[222] In other words, reason tells speakers that the action signified by a verbal noun must occur at some particular time, but the form of the verbal noun was not coined in order to signify time—unlike the verb, which was coined in order to signify action and time simultaneously. This is the main difference between a verb and a verbal noun, which prevents the latter from being included in the definition of a verb, as formulated by Ibn al-Ḥājib and explained by RDA.

In the same way, phrases such as *ḫalq al-samawāt* 'creation of the heavens' and *qiyām al-sāʿa* 'the resurrection' are excluded from the definition of a verb. Although they seemingly signify an action and its time simultaneously (since the action signified by the first phrase is believed to have taken place in the past,

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219   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 23.
220   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 35.
221   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 38.
222   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 38.

while the action signified by the second is believed to take place in the future), the speakers actually infer the time using their general knowledge, independently of the words' coinage.[223]

Active and passive participles also do not meet the definition of a verb, although they exert grammatical government only when they signify present or future time (i.e., from the fact that they exert government one can infer that they signify the present or the future[224]). However, in these cases time "is signified by the accidental government [of these forms], it is not [part of] their signification by coinage" (*madlūlu ʿamalihā l-ʿāriḍi, lā madlūluhā waḍʿan*).[225] In other words, particular time is not part of a participle's basic meaning, but inferred by reason from the linguistic context.

In addition to signification by means of reason, RDA also speaks of other elements that are required on grounds of reason (rather that by coinage). He cites Ibn al-Ḥājib's claim that "a verb can grammatically affect [an expression denoting] a vague place, because it signifies [this kind of place]" (*al-fiʿlu lammā kāna yadullu ʿalā l-makāni l-mubhami taʿaddā ʾilayhi*),[226] and maintains that this is not correct, since a verb does not originally (*ʾaṣlan*) signify any place.[227] He adds:

> *al-maqṣūdu min dalālati l-lafẓi ʿalā l-šayʾi l-dalālatu l-waḍʿiyyatu lā l-ʿaqliyyatu, wa-dalālatu l-fiʿli ʿalā l-makāni ʿaqliyyatun lā waḍʿiyyatun*

> When we say that a linguistic expression signifies something, we mean a signification by coinage,[228] not a signification by means of reason (i.e., not a meaning that can be inferred by reason). The verb signifies places by means of reason, not by its coinage.[229]

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223 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 39.

224 See RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 415–420 for a discussion on active participles' government.

225 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 39. See Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 225 for a similar discussion.

226 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 491. This is apparently an imprecise citation of Ibn al-Ḥājib's statement that "[a verb] requires a non-particular place, therefore verbs assign *naṣb* to a non-particular place, according to [the verb's] requirement" (*yaqtaḍī makānan ġayra muʿayyanin fa-taʿaddat ʾilā ġayri l-muʿayyani wa-huwa l-mubhamu ḥasaba mā kāna qtiḍāʾuhā*). See Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 486.

227 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 491.

228 Tahānawī (*Kaššāf* I, 790) defines "signification by coinage" (as perceived by philologists and jurists) as an "expression's being such that when it is used, its meaning is understood by knowing its coinage" (*kawnu l-lafẓi bi-ḥaytu ʾiḏā ʾuṭliqa fuhima minhu l-maʿnā li-l-ʿilmi bi-l-waḍʿi*).

229 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 491–492.

According to RDA it is not correct to explain the ability of a verb to assign *naṣb* to a place expression as due to fact that place is part of a verb's basic meaning. Although a verb signifies an action that must happen somewhere, it was not coined in order to signify a place (whereas it does signify a time by its coinage). The idea of place is inferred by reason, and is unrelated to the meaning for which the verb was coined. Therefore it cannot be manifested in a verb's ability to exert grammatical government.

RDA offers other explanations for verbs' ability to govern place expressions: he says that words denoting different directions can receive *naṣb* from the verb, due to their resemblance to time expressions[230] (since terms such as "right" and "left" are relative and context-dependent, just like "yesterday" and "tomorrow"). Verbs such as *qaʿada* 'he sat' and *nāma* 'he slept' can assign *naṣb* to nouns denoting a general place, e.g., *maqʿad* 'a place of sitting', *makān* 'place'—because these verbs include the idea of staying in a place, and the aforementioned nouns are appropriate to indicate the frame of such actions.[231] As for verbs like *sakana* 'he lived' and *nazala* 'he descended', which can assign *naṣb* to any place expression, RDA maintains that in such cases there is a missing preposition, omitted due to the verbs' frequent usage.[232]

Yet another example is taken from a discussion on the grammatical government of verbal nouns. RDA explains that every verbal noun signifies an accident (*ʿaraḍ*) that logically needs a substrate (*maḥall*) to take place in,[233] as well as a time and a place. He notes that some verbal nouns also need objects and instruments, but adds:

> *lākinnahu waḍaʿahu l-wāḍiʿu li-ḏālika l-ḥadaṯi muṭlaqan min ġayri naẓarin ʾilā mā yaḥtāju ʾilayhi fī wujūdihi wa-lā yalzamu ʾan yakūna waḍʿu l-wāḍiʿi li-kulli lafẓin ʿalā ʾan yalzamahu fī l-lafẓi mā yaqtaḍī maʿnā ḏālika l-lafẓi maʿnāhu*

> This notwithstanding, the coiner has coined [the verbal noun] for an action in an absolute way, without taking into account [the elements that the action] needs in order to take place. The coiner does not have to coin

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230   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 491.

231   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 491.

232   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 492.

233   One of the senses of the term *ʿaraḍ* in logic and theology is "an abstract property/idea that must exist in some substance". The term *ʿaraḍ* in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* is discussed in section 4.2 below.

each expression so that it will be accompanied in speech by [elements] whose meaning is required by the meaning [of the expression].[234]

For instance, "[the coiner] has coined words signifying accidents" (waḍaʿa l-ʾalfāẓa l-dāllata ʿalā ʾaʿrāḍin), such as ḥaraka 'movement' and sukūn 'stillness', without obligating them to appear beside words signifying their substrates (maḥālluhā).[235] RDA demonstrates in this passage that there is a difference between a logical requirement for other elements (which is a function of the word's meaning) and grammatical government (which is a function of the coiner's planning).

Following that, RDA clarifies what is required by a verb according to its coinage:

> wuḍiʿa l-fiʿlu ʿalā ʾan yakūna maṣdaruhu musnadan ʾilā šayʾin maḏkūrin baʿdahu lafẓan, bi-ḫilāfi nafsi l-maṣdari, fa-ʾinnahu laysa mawḍūʿan ʿalā ʾannahu mansūbun ʾilā šayʾin fī l-lafẓi. [...] wa-kāna ḥaqqu l-fiʿli ʾallā yaṭluba ġayra l-musnadi ʾilayhi wa-lā yaʿmala ʾillā fīhi, li-ʾannahu laysa mawḍūʿan li-ṭalabihi ka-l-maṣdari, lākinnahu ʿamila fī ġayri l-musnadi ʾilayhi min-a l-mafʿūlāti llatī lam taqum maqāma l-fāʿili tabʿan li-qtiḍāʾihi li-l-fāʿili waḍʿan wa-ʿamalihi fīhi li-ʾannahu fataḥa lahu bāba l-ṭalabi wa-l-ʿamali

The verb is coined so that its verbal noun (i.e., the action signified by its verbal noun) is predicated on an element that overtly follows [the verb], in contrast to the verbal noun itself, which is coined so that it is not ascribed to any overt element[236] [...] The verb deserves to require and govern only the subject, since, like a verbal noun, it is coined so that it does not require [anything else].[237] However, it governs elements besides its subject, i.e., mafʿūlāt which do not occupy the subject position,[238] fol-

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234 RDA, Šarḥ III, 402.

235 RDA, Šarḥ III, 402.

236 RDA, Šarḥ III, 404. The terms derived from the root s-n-d (whose literal meaning is 'leaning upon') are well known in medieval Arabic grammatical theory and refer to predication. See, e.g., Levin 1981; Goldenberg 1988:42–46. Terms derived from the root n-s-b are discussed in section 2.4.1.1 above.

237 Intuitively it may seem appropriate to understand the pronoun in ṭalabihi as referring to musnad ʾilayhi, but it is inconceivable that RDA would say that the verb was coined so that it does not require a subject, since it is a commonplace in Arabic grammatical theory that verbs do require a subject. Therefore the only possible interpretation is that the pronoun refers to ġayra l-musnadi ʾilayhi, and the sentence thus means that the verb was coined so that it does not require anything but a subject.

238 The term mafʿūl in Arabic grammatical theory refers to several types of constituents in

lowing the [verb's] requirement of a subject, that is related to its coinage, and [the verb's] grammatical government of it, because [the subject] has opened for [the verb] the doors of grammatical requirement and government.[239]

In this way verbs have become the primary element in terms of grammatical government, while other governing elements, i.e., participles and participle-like adjectives, became secondary in comparison to them (although each one of these elements signifies an action, on account of which the verb requires other elements and governs them grammatically).[240]

RDA explains the difference between the government of a verb and that of elements that are secondary in comparison to it as due to the fact that a "verb's requirement of an element in *rafʿ* case is derived from [the verb's] coinage, while its requirement of an element in *naṣb* follows [the requirement of the subject] derived from [the verb's] coinage" (*ṭalabu l-fiʿli li-l-marfūʿi waḍʿiyyun, wa-ṭalabuhu li-l-manṣūbi tābiʿun li-l-waḍʿiyyi*). In contrast, the requirement that participles/adjectives have a subject/object "is not derived from their coinage and does not follow a coinage-derived [requirement]" (*laysa bi-waḍʿiyyin wa-lā tābiʿin li-l-waḍʿiyyi*). The requirement of other elements by these parts of speech is based on reason (*ʿaqlī*).[241]

In other words, the coiner planned the verb's requirement of a subject, while its requirement of other elements follows its requirement of a subject (which probably means that a verb can govern other elements only after receiving its subject). In contrast, the requirement of a subject or an object by participles and their likes was not planned by the coiner at all. It can be explained only by the speakers' awareness that these elements signify an action that logically needs certain conditions in order to happen.

RDA adds that "the coinage pounced on[242] the reason-based [requirement] and removed it, since the coiner [of the verbal noun] took into account the essence of the action, not the [agent] by which it came into being" (*wa-qad ṭaraʾa l-waḍʿu ʿalā l-ʿaqli wa-ʾazāla ḥukmahu, li-ʾanna l-wāḍiʿa naẓara ʾilā māhiyy-*

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naṣb—see Taha 2008:101–102. The addition "which do not occupy the subject position" is necessary in order to exclude from the discussion the subject of a passive verb, which is usually referred to as "a *mafʿūl* occupying a subject position"—see, e.g., Sībawayhi, *Kitāb* I, 14–15; Taha 2008:103–104. Since RDA deals here with constituents that do not take *rafʿ*, the subject of a passive verb is irrelevant to the discussion.

239   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 404.
240   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 404.
241   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 404.
242   See section 4.1 below for a discussion of terms derived from the root *ṭ-r-ʾ*.

ati l-ḥadaṯi lā ʾilā mā qāma bihi). Therefore, in the coiner's view the verbal noun requires neither an element signifying an agent nor an element signifying an object. Similarly, the active participle that in the coiner's view signifies the agent, needs no other element to signify it, and the passive participle, which signifies the object, also needs no other element.[243]

The discussion is designed to show that although any action logically needs a substrate, a time, a place, etc., there is a difference between the realm of logic and the linguistic realization of ideas. The coiner has chosen to coin a verb so that it highlights, in addition to the action itself, also the agent (in the case of the active voice) or the semantic object/time/place/instrument (in the case of the passive voice). In contrast, the verbal noun was coined so that it highlights the action itself, without requiring any other elements relevant to the action to be realized linguistically. Similarly, active/passive participles were coined so that they highlight the agent/object respectively, and do not require other elements. However, the verbal noun and the participles can grammatically govern the constituent that represents the agent/object—because of their resemblance to verbs.

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243   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 404.

Terms Derived from the Roots *ṭ-r-ʾ* and *ʿ-r-ḍ*

In *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*, words derived from the root *ṭ-r-ʾ* typically refer to factors/elements that are secondary and/or transient in comparison to others and usually determine the grammatical rule in their context. These terms may seem close to those derived from the root *ʿ-r-ḍ*,[1] but the latter usually refer to factors that are suppressed by others and do not influence the rule. Exploring the differences between these two groups of terms may essentially improve our understanding of RDA's writing.[2]

The original meaning of *ṭaraʾa ʿalā l-qawmi* is "came (unexpectedly) to a group of people from a (distant) place; suddenly attacked them (from a distant place)".[3] I chose to translate it in my examples as 'pounced', since this translation captures the aspects of the root's basic meaning that are relevant for its uses in a grammatical context. RDA and others use the term to speak of a secondary, "external" element that "attacks" a linguistic constituent and overrules the grammatical rule that operated on it; this element is comparable to someone who pounces on his enemy, unexpectedly and violently, and overpowers him. It is important for the purpose of this study to translate the derivatives of the root *ṭ-r-ʾ* differently from those of the root *ʿ-r-ḍ* (which I render in terms of 'accidentality'), as I argue that the two groups of terms are different.

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1   ʾAsadī (2014:28–33) lists scholars who failed to distinguish between these two groups of terms.

2   Tawfīq (1978:336) mentions the principle *al-ṭāriʾu yuzīlu ḥukma l-ṯābiti* 'A pouncing [factor] removes the rule [pertaining to] the existing [factors]' as one of the basic principles of Arabic, without, however, explaining its meaning and the ways in which it works. ʾAsadī (2014) focuses on the term *ṭāriʾ* in the medieval Arabic grammatical tradition, and even tries to distinguish between *ṭāriʾ* and *ʿāriḍ*. However, as his book includes numerous inaccuracies (some of which will be pointed out in this chapter) and he analyzes most of his examples only superficially, the current discussion appears to be necessary.

3   Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān* II, 586. See ʾAsadī 2014:15–17 for a discussion on the meaning of the root *ṭ-r-ʾ* in the classical literature and dictionaries.

4.1 Ṭ-r-ʾ

4.1.1 The Term ṭāriʾ in Early Juristic Works

Although Carter (1991) and ʾAsadī (2014:21–27) assume that the term was invented by Ibn Jinnī, it can be found in earlier compositions. Ṭaḥāwī (d. 321/933), a Ḥanafī scholar of Egyptian origin, uses it at least three times in his *Šarḥ Muškil al-ʾĀṯār*.

Ṭaḥāwī uses it, for example, in an attempt to reconcile two apparently contradictory traditions: (1) when someone dies, his good deeds cease, all but three: the knowledge he spread, "permanent alms"[4] and a righteous son praying for him;[5] (2) a believer's *ribāṭ*[6] keeps increasing until the Day of Judgment. Ṭaḥāwī explains that these traditions actually complete each other: the three deeds mentioned in (1) take place after a person's death, but he initiated them in his lifetime (people act according to the knowledge received from him; the alms are given under his name; his son prays for him because he had taught him to do so). "All these things, in addition to his deeds before his death, make him eligible for a pouncing reward" (*wa-kullu hāḏihi l-ʾašyāʾi yalḥaquhu bihā ṯawābun ṭāriʾun ḫilāfa ʾaʿmālihi llatī māta ʿalayhā*). This differs from the case of a person who died during his *ribāṭ*: he will receive the reward for the good deeds he performed before his death, not for something performed after his death.[7]

In other words, Ṭaḥāwī juxtaposes two traditions, and concludes that one can make himself eligible for ever-increasing reward either by performing *ribāṭ*, or by ensuring that the three abovementioned actions be performed after his death. Ṭaḥāwī presents the three deeds as a "pouncing" factor, meaning that they take place later than the acts performed by the deceased during his life, and outweigh them in determining his reward.

Elsewhere Ṭaḥāwī says that God originally commanded the believers to pray in two *rakʿa*s, and "an addition [to these two in the prayer] in a civilized region is a factor that pounces on these two *rakʿas*" (*ʾanna l-ziyādata fīhā ʿalā ḏālika fī l-ḥaḍari ṭāriʾun ʿalā l-rakʿatayni*).[8]

The third example appears in a discussion on Q. 2/178:

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4 This is the translation proposed by Weir and Zysow (1995:710) for the term *ṣadaqa jāriya*.

5 Ṭaḥāwī, *Šarḥ* VI, 86.

6 *Ribāṭ* is a complex and multifaceted term in Muslim tradition. In its earliest usages it probably meant preparations for battle. Later it came to mean 'fortress', 'frontier', etc. In some sources its meaning is close to that of *jihād/ijtihād*. Ṭabarī used *ribāṭ* to refer to "a modality of devotion". See Chabbi 1995.

7 Ṭaḥāwī, *Šarḥ* VI, 89–90.

8 Ṭaḥāwī, *Šarḥ* XI, 41.

yā ʾayyuhā llaḏīna ʾāmanū kutiba ʿalaykum-u l-qiṣāṣu fī l-qatlā l-ḥurru bi-l-ḥurri wa-l-ʿabdu bi-l-ʿabdi wa-l-ʾunṯā bi-l-ʾunṯā, fa-man ʿufiya lahu min ʾaḫīhi šayʾun fa-ttibāʿun bi-l-maʿrūfi wa-ʾadāʾun ʾilayhi bi-ʾiḥsānin

O believers, prescribed for you is retaliation, touching the slain; freeman for freeman, slave for slave, female for female. But if aught is pardoned a man by his brother, let the pursuing be honourable, and let the payment be with kindliness.

Ṭaḥāwī states that the verse's first part (which commands retaliation) is followed by the second (about pardon) to demonstrate "that the duty of pardon mentioned in the verse pounces on the duty of retaliation mentioned [previously in the same verse]" (*ʾanna l-wājiba bi-l-ʿafwi l-maḏkūra fī hāḏihi l-ʾāyati ṭāriʾun ʿalā l-qiṣāṣi l-maḏkūri fīhā*), and changes the right of the murderer, from someone who must suffer retaliation, to someone who has to be treated honourably and with kindliness.[9]

The second source worth mentioning in this context is *al-Fuṣūl fī l-ʾUṣūl* by Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/981), one of the earliest extant Ḥanafī *ʾuṣūl al-fiqh* books. Jaṣṣāṣ uses the term *ṭāriʾ* several times while discussing the problem of contradictory Qurʾānic verses/ḥadīṯs. A standard method for dealing with such cases uses the concept of abrogation: the later verse/ḥadīṯ "abrogates" (*nāsiḫ*) the earlier, which is thus "abrogated" (*mansūḫ*).[10] When there is no historical data about the chronological order of the two, we must use general principles formulated by the jurists.

One of these principles states that if one verse permits something, and another one forbids the same thing, the forbidding verse abrogates the permitting one. That is because the permitting verse "may appear as confirmation of a permission which reason views as the origin" (*jāʾiz ʾan yakūna wurūduhu muʾakkidan li-l-ʾibāḥati llatī kānat hiya l-ʾaṣlu min ṭarīqi dalālati l-ʿaqli*).[11] In other words, we intuitively perceive things as permitted, unless someone tells us that they are forbidden. "There is no doubt that the forbidding verse pounces on the permission and turns it into a prohibition" (*wa-kāna ḫabaru l-ḥaẓri ṭāriʾan lā maḥālata ʿalā l-ʾibāḥati wa-nāqilan ʿanhā ʾilā l-ḥaẓri*). The legal status of a prohibition, on the other hand, cannot be changed in light of a permitting verse, since it cannot be established that the permitting verse appeared

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9   Ṭaḥāwī, *Šarḥ* XII, 423.

10   The notion of abrogation is discussed in section 2.4.2.3 above.

11   Jaṣṣāṣ, *Fuṣūl* II, 296.

after the forbidding one to change the rule.[12] Since perceiving things as permitted is more intuitive than perceiving them as forbidden, the prohibition is considered as a secondary element, which pounces on the existing state of affairs and changes it.

Jaṣṣāṣ could have been influenced by Ṭaḥāwī in his terminology, since we know that he composed a commentary on the latter's *al-Muḫtaṣar fī l-fiqh* and copied fragments from his *Kitāb iḫtilāf al-fuqahāʾ*.[13]

Qayrawānī (d. 386/996) uses the term twice in a discussion on the payment of *zakāt* from the profits from a rented house. A possible destruction of the house is presented as a "pouncing" (*ṭāriʾ*) factor.[14] The author does not explain what this means, but it is clear that this usage deviates from the basic meaning of the word; the destruction is perceived as something that changes the primary state of affairs and must be taken into account—ideas relevant to the later uses of the term.

In all the examples presented here *ṭāriʾ* refers to something which follows something else, either chronologically or in the text, and determines the consequences. The term *ṭāriʾ* in these texts does not seem to be interchangeable with *ʿāriḍ* (although the two can be interchangeable in later sources, as will be demonstrated later). We cannot know with certainty whether Ibn Jinnī was influenced by any of these sources; however, it is reasonable to suppose that he would have been aware at least of Jaṣṣāṣ's works, since the latter was a prominent Ḥanafī figure in Baghdad,[15] where Ibn Jinnī spent a significant part of his life.[16]

4.1.2   *Ibn Jinnī and Ibn al-ʾAnbārī's Uses of the Term* ṭāriʾ

Ibn Jinnī seems to have been the first grammarian to have used the term *ṭāriʾ* and its derivatives.[17] Terms derived from the root *ṭ-r-ʾ* appear in *Kitāb al-Ḫaṣāʾiṣ* nine times in four different chapters.[18] All these appearances are found in the third volume of the edited book—as if the author had decided to use it at a relatively late stage of his work, and, unlike RDA, never fully incorporated it into his linguistic theory.

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12   Jaṣṣāṣ, *Fuṣūl* II, 297. For other appearance of the term *ṭāriʾ* in similar contexts see Jaṣṣāṣ, *Fuṣūl* II, 304; III, 167.

13   Spies 1965.

14   Qayrawānī, *Nawādir* II, 129, 132.

15   See Spies 1965.

16   See Shboul 2010:300.

17   See Carter 1991 and ʾAsadī 2014:21–27.

18   See Ibn Jinnī, *Ḫaṣāʾiṣ* III, 82, 138–140, 247, 272. Some of these examples are discussed in Carter 1991:200–202.

The first appearance of the term is in a discussion on verbs denoting negation of a basic meaning of their roots, such as *ʾaškā* 'he removed someone's complaint', which constitutes a negation of the basic meaning of the root *š-k-w* 'complaint', and *marraḍa* 'he treated (a sick person)', which denotes meaning that negates the basic meaning of the root *m-r-ḍ* 'disease' (treatment is usually performed in order to remove the sickness).[19]

Ibn Jinnī states that these verbs are usually augmented forms. The explanation is that the negation is "a new component of meaning, in relation to the root's positive meaning" (*maʿnan ḥādiṯun ʿalā ʾiṯbāti l-ʾaṣli lladī huwa l-ʾīǧābu*), and as such ought to be realized by a verb with an augmented pattern, because "the augmentation is a new [element] that pounces on the root" (*kānat-i l-ziyādatu ḥādiṯatan ṭāriʾatan ʿalā l-ʾaṣli*), which is the three consonants.[20] This resembles the case of feminineness, which, being "a component of meaning that pounces on masculineness" (*kāna maʿnan ṭāriʾan ʿalā l-taḏkīri*), needs an augmentation as its marker, e.g., the *tāʾ marbūṭa* of *qāʾima* 'standing one, fem.' and the *ʾalif* of *ḥamrāʾ* 'red, fem.'. It also resembles the case of definiteness, which, being "an [element] that pounces on indefiniteness" (*kāna ṭāriʾan ʿalā l-tankīri*), needs an augmentation as its marker, e.g., the definite article of *al-ǵulām* 'the lad'.[21]

This discussion presents three semantic factors (negation of a root's basic meaning, feminineness and definiteness) as pouncing on the basic meaning of the word, and as such requiring a formal manifestation, in the form of a morpheme which is added to the basic form of the word. Elsewhere Ibn Jinnī presents other factors that "pounce", some semantic, viz., exaggeration (*mubālaǵa*)[22] and wonder (*taʿaǧǧub*),[23] others formal but whose effect is mostly semantic, e.g., *hamzat al-taqrīr* ('the *ʾa-* of confirmation', which makes a negative sentence positive and *vice versa*) and a qualifier of a proper noun.[24]

In a chapter on "vowels attacking [other vowels]" (*huǧūm al-ḥarakāt ʿalā l-ḥarakāt*) Ibn Jinnī states that "the pouncing [vowel] determines the rule" (*yakūnu l-ḥukmu li-l-ṭāriʾi minhumā*).[25] By "the pouncing vowel" he means a vowel that is not part of the basic form. For instance, the morpho-phonological shift

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19   See Ibn Jinnī, *Ḫaṣāʾiṣ* III, 78–79.

20   The parallel between a meaning added to the basic meaning of the root and letters added to the root consonants is reminiscent of the iconicity principle. See Maschler 1993:654–655 for a brief survey of various approaches to that principle.

21   Ibn Jinnī, *Ḫaṣāʾiṣ* III, 82.

22   Ibn Jinnī, *Ḫaṣāʾiṣ* III, 247.

23   Ibn Jinnī, *Ḫaṣāʾiṣ* III, 272.

24   Ibn Jinnī, *Ḫaṣāʾiṣ* III, 272.

25   Ibn Jinnī, *Ḫaṣāʾiṣ* III, 138.

* *yarmiyūna/yaqḍiyūna* > *yarmūna/yaqḍūna* 'they (will) throw/they (will) finish' is explained in the following way: the *yāʾ* became quiescent because the *ḍamma* was too heavy for it; the *ḍamma* moved to the consonant preceding the *yāʾ* and snatched its *kasra* "by pouncing on it" (*li-ṭurūʾihā ʿalayhā*).[26]

We see that in the title of this chapter the word *hujūm* 'attack' is used as a synonym of *ṭurūʾ*. In the rest of the chapter words derived from the roots *h-j-m* and *ġ-l-b* are used in a similar sense.[27] This supports my choice to render *ṭurūʾ* as 'pouncing', and also demonstrates that Ibn Jinnī uses *ṭurūʾ* as interchangeable with its synonyms (which, alongside the lack of a definition/explanation of *ṭurūʾ*, makes us assume that its use in *Kitāb al-Ḫaṣāʾiṣ* is far from technical).

In his *Kitāb al-ʾInṣāf* Ibn al-ʾAnbārī uses derivatives of the root *ṭ-r-ʾ* twice—in a discussion of "the six nouns" where he says that "the annexation pounces on the single word" (*al-ʾiḍāfatu ṭāriʾatun ʿalā l-ʾifrādi*),[28] and in a morphophonological discussion where he mentions "original/pouncing heaviness" (*ṯiql ʾaṣlī/ṭāriʾ*).[29]

4.1.3 *The Term* ṭāriʾ *in* Šarḥ al-Kāfiya

According to ʾAsadī's (2014:27) survey, terms derived from the root *ṭ-r-ʾ* appear 50 times in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* and 17 times in *Šarḥ al-Šāfiya*.

4.1.3.1 'Pouncing' in the Context of *ʾiʿrāb/bināʾ* Endings
4.1.3.1.1 *Endings of Nouns*

Ibn al-Ḥājib says that the purpose of case endings is "to signify the meanings that alternately affect [the word]" (*li-yadulla ʿalā l-maʿānī l-mutawirati ʿalayhi*).[30] In his explanation of this statement RDA presents two types of cases where there is a need to distinguish between words' meanings:

1. When a word has two meanings or more, "one of which does not pounce on the second one" (*ġayru ṭāriʾin ʾaḥaduhumā ʿalā l-ʾāḫari*). For instance, the noun *al-qurʾ* denotes simultaneously both menstruation and the state of purity;[31] the verb *ḍaraba* denotes both hitting and walking; all imper-

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26 Ibn Jinnī, *Ḫaṣāʾiṣ* III, 140.

27 See Ibn Jinnī, *Ḫaṣāʾiṣ* III, 140–141, 143.

28 Ibn al-ʾAnbārī, *ʾInṣāf* I, 19.

29 Ibn al-ʾAnbārī, *ʾInṣāf* II, 755.

30 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 57. Ibn al-Ḥājib himself (*Šarḥ*, 240) uses the verb *ṭaraʾa* in this context only once: he states that case markers were coined specifically in nouns, "because the various meanings pounce on the nouns in the grammatical context" (*li-ʾanna l-ʾasmāʾa taṭraʾu ʿalayhā maʿānin muḫtalifatun bi-l-tarkībi*). Ibn al-Ḥājib's discussion is far less detailed than RDA's.

31 ʾAsadī (2014:211–215) criticizes RDA for the latter's claim that one of the meanings of *al-qurʾ*

fect verbs, according to the approach whereby they are homonyms, de-
note both present and future;[32] the preposition *min*, which has the senses
of beginning, elucidation (*tabyīn*[33]), and partition.[34] In these cases there
is no need for a marker (*ʿalāma*) to distinguish between the word's vari-
ous meanings, "since the [person] assigning [the word] to one of its two
meanings, whether he is a coiner or a user, does not take into account the
other meaning, and thus does not fear the ambiguity and does not coin a
marker for either of the meanings" (*li-ʾanna jāʿilahu li-ʾaḥadi l-maʿnayayni
wāḍiʿan kāna ʾaw mustaʿmilan, lam yurāʿi fīhi l-maʿnā l-ʾāḫara ḥattā yaḫāfa
l-labsa fa-yaḍaʿa l-ʿalāmata li-ʾaḥadihimā*).[35]

Here RDA refers to homonymous words (*al-kalim al-muštaraka*). In mod-
ern linguistic terminology homonymous words are words that are identi-
cal in form but differ markedly in meaning and etymology. They are words
that ended up as formally identical due to sound shifts.[36] In contrast,
a polysemic word has several interrelated meanings that originated in
semantic shifts, such as metaphor and metonymy.[37] A modern linguist
would probably consider the aforementioned examples as polysemic.
However, as demonstrated above, RDA holds that the imperfect verb was
coined in two separate coinages for its two meanings[38] and thus it can
be assumed that in this case he perceived a phenomenon close to what
is called homonymy by the modern linguists.[39] In the aforementioned

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does not pounce on the second. He holds that this case should be viewed as a case of poun-
cing and that RDA was confused by various commentaries of Q. 2/228 *wa-l-muṭallaqātu
yatarabbaṣna bi-ʾanfusihinna ṯalāṯata qurūʾin* 'Divorced women shall wait by themselves
for three periods'. ʾAsadī takes pains to find clues in the Qurʾānic text and additional
sources that support his view that *qurūʾ* in the verse should be understood as 'purity', while
neglecting the fact that RDA in principle refuses to consider homonymous words as cases
of pouncing.

32   According to another view, the imperfect verb signifies the present time literally, and sig-
     nifies the future non-literally. See p. 113 above.
33   Here RDA has in mind *min al-bayān*, whose function is explained by Wright (1896–1898:II,
     137) as "the definition or explanation of a general or universal by a special or particular
     term, the latter being one of several objects that go to make up the former". *Min al-bayān*
     appears, *inter alia*, in independent relative clauses. See Wright 1896–1898:II, 137–138 for
     examples.
34   The various functions of *min* are discussed in RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 263–270.
35   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 61.
36   See Löbner 2014:42–44.
37   See Löbner 2014:44.
38   See pp. 113–114 above.
39   Bettini (2008) renders *muštarak* as "homonymous polysemic word"—probably because

excerpt he states that speakers who use *al-kalim al-muštaraka* in a certain meaning do not take any other meaning into account (which explains why there is no need for markers that would help to distinguish between different meanings).

2. When a word has two meanings or more, "one of which pounces on another or others" (*yaṭraʾu ʾaḥaduhumā ʾaw ʾaḥaduhā ʿalā l-ʾāḫari ʾaw-i l-ʾuḫari*), there are two options:

    a. "a pouncing element, if it is not obligatory" (*al-ṭāriʾu ʾin lam yalzam*), needs some marker to distinguish it from "the element pounced on" (*al-maṭrū ʿalayhi*). Thus any non-literal usage (*majāz*) needs a contextual clue (*qarīna*)—unlike literal usage (*ḥaqīqa*), which needs none. There is no need to find the easiest marker for "such a pouncing element that is not obligatory for the word" (*hāḏā l-ṭāriʾu ġayru l-lāzimi li-l-kalimati*). Sometimes the morphological pattern of the word is changed (this is the case with diminutive and broken plural forms of nouns and with the passive verb), and sometimes a letter signifying the pouncing element is added to the word, thus attaining the same status as one of the word's letters (this is the case with dual and sound plural forms, words ending with *yāʾ al-nisba*, feminine forms and the definite article).

    When there is no grammatically conditioned marker that allows one to distinguish between the different meanings, another independent word can function as a "contextual clue for the meaning that pounced on the word" (*qarīnatu l-maʿnā l-ṭāriʾi ʿalā l-kalimati*)—e.g., an adjectival qualifier that signifies a meaning in the head noun, or the governed element in an annexation signifying a meaning in the annexed element.

    b. "if the pouncing element is obligatory for the word" (*ʾin kāna ṭaraʾā-nu l-maʿnā lāziman li-l-kalimati*):

    – if there is only one possible option for "the pouncing [meaning]" (*al-ṭāriʾ*) (e.g., the verb, which must be an essential constituent (*ʿumda*) in a sentence composed of it and another element), there is no need for a marker. A marker is required only if there is a potential for confusion with something else.

    – if there are two or more possible options for "an obligatory pouncing element" (*al-ṭāriʾ al-lāzim*),[40] it is natural to seek "the slight-

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it is complicated to distinguish between the notions of homonymy and polysemy in the medieval Arabic literature.

40 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 61.

est possible marker of (grammatical) plasticity[41] that would be obligatory [for the word]" (*aḥaffu ʿalāmati tamakkunin lāzima-tin*).[42] In such a case another word "because of which that meaning pounced" (*bihā ṭaraʾa ḏālika l-maʿnā*) cannot be sufficient as a marker. In contrast, if the pouncing meaning is not obligatory for the word, the governed element (clarifying the meaning of the annexed element) and the adjectival qualifier (clarifying the meaning of the head noun) are sufficient.[43]

RDA's classification of the coined elements (discussed in section 3.4.2 above) may help one understand these sophisticated divisions: homonymous words, in which one meaning does not pounce on another, were coined in a lexical coinage. Each word was coined as a single unit in a separate act of coinage, so that speakers who use the word do not take any other meaning that the word may have into account. Therefore, no marker is needed in order to distinguish between the different meanings. Words whose meaning is pounced on by another meaning, which is not obligatory for them, were coined in morphological coinage. That meaning is realized morphologically (e.g., the patterns of diminutive and plural) and pounces on the basic word (coined in lexical coinage). Metaphorical usages are also included in the category of non-obligatory pouncing meanings: here a marker is needed to distinguish between the meanings, but that marker does not need to be of a minimal size (it can even be an independent word).

Obligatory pouncing meanings are related to syntax. RDA has in mind the syntactic function of the constituent in question. Each word in a syntactic context must function either as an essential (*ʿumda*) or an optional (*faḍla*) constituent. Therefore, it is natural for the markers that distinguish between these functions to be of minimal size (i.e., they should be vowels). If the syntactic

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41   Danecki (2009) explains that the term *tamakkun* is derived from the verb *tamakkana* 'to be powerful, to be able to do something', and in grammatical terminology "is used for a general grammatical and semantic category indicating the ability of words to be inflected and to perform various grammatical functions". In light of this explanation, the translation '(grammatical) plasticity' seems to aptly convey the meaning of the term.

42   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 61–62.

43   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 62. It should be pointed out that ʾAsadī's (2014:181) interpretation of this passage is not accurate: he claims that the sentence "another word … cannot be sufficient as a marker" means that there are other ways (in addition to the governed element and the adjectival qualifier) to clarify the meaning of a homonymous word, not mentioned by RDA explicitly. He even attempts to speculate (pp. 185–187) on what these additional ways of clarification may be—e.g., the use of prepositions. He interprets the entire passage as dealing with homonymy, ignoring the fact that it serves as an elaborate introduction to the discussion on *ʾiʿrāb*.

function of each word were marked by a heavier marker, the language would be too clumsy. A verb does not need markers of this kind, because it always functions as an essential constituent (this explains why verbs in principle should take a *bināʾ* ending).

This is a general categorization of linguistic elements in terms of "pouncing". It may be concluded that a meaning/function that pounces on a linguistic element is realized formally if such a meaning/function is not the only option possible for that element.

When discussing diptote nouns RDA needs to explain why a foreign word that functioned as a proper noun from the moment it entered the Arabic language must be diptote (regardless of whether or not it was a proper noun in the source language), whereas a foreign word that did not function as a proper noun from the beginning of its use in Arabic behaves like an Arabic word when it comes to be used as a proper noun.

He states that while a foreign word as such does not have to follow the rules of Arabic, the fact that it is being used in Arabic does require it to follow the rules of that language. If the word was used in Arabic from the beginning as a proper noun, which cannot receive a definite article or a governed element, then it is possible for it not to receive "the thing that is in complimentary distribution with them" (*mā yuʿāqibuhumā*), viz., *tanwīn*. The *kasra* usually follows the *tanwīn* (and therefore that word cannot also receive *kasra* in its ending). But such a noun does follow the other rules of Arabic, as a word used in this language—since "the pouncing element annuls the rule that affected the one pounced on" (*al-ṭāriʾu yuzīlu ḥukma l-maṭrūʾi ʿalayhi*). Thus the aforementioned nouns receive case markers and *yāʾ al-nisba*, one can derive diminutive forms from them, and sounds that make their pronunciation difficult are either omitted or changed.[44]

RDA uses the idea of pouncing to solve the contradiction between the fact that a foreign word in principle should not follow the rules of Arabic, and the existence of foreign words that are used in Arabic and should thus follow the rules of that language. In his view, the fact that a word is of a foreign origin is the original state that was pounced on by another factor (i.e., the word's use in

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44   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 142. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 288–289) in this discussion does not use terms derived from the root *ṭ-r-ʾ*; however, he says that "when [a word] that is not a proper noun is transmitted [from a foreign language to Arabic], it is pounced on by the rules of Arabic" (*ʾiḏā nuqila ġayru ʿalamin-i ʿtawarat ʿalayhi ʾaḥkāmu kalāmihim*; the meaning of the verb *iʿtawara* is close to that of *ṭaraʾa*). The distinction between foreign words that functioned in Arabic as proper nouns from the beginning and those that became proper nouns at a later stage is less clear in Ibn al-Ḥājib's *Šarḥ* than in RDA's.

Arabic). The pouncing factor changes the original state of affairs. Thus a word that originally should not have taken Arabic case markers takes them eventually, although not all of them—it is diptote as a proper noun of foreign origin. The pouncing factor, i.e., the word's use in Arabic, cancels the effect of foreign origin almost completely. The latter's only effect, in combination with the word's use as a proper noun, is to make it diptote. If it were not a proper noun, its foreign origin would have no grammatical effect at all.

4.1.3.1.2   *Endings of Verbs*

According to RDA the ending of verbs in *jazm* is a *bināʾ* ending. In fact, he maintains that every word originally should take a vowelless ending and that grammatical governors are called so because they change these original endings to something else, explicitly or implicitly. An opposing view is that the grammatical governor is called so not because it changes the original word's ending, but rather because it changes the ending from one state to another, whether or not the former state is original. According to this view, the factor that assigns *jazm* is a governor because it changes the verb's ending from *rafʿ*, due to the fact that the verb appears in a position characteristic to nouns,[45] or (according to another approach) that it has been stripped of *naṣb/jazm* governors, and turns it into a *sukūn*. The reason is that in an imperfect verb the *rafʿ* governor precedes the *naṣb/jazm* governors, because either the *rafʿ* is assigned by omitting the other two governors, or the verb takes *rafʿ* when it comes without these two in a position characteristic to a noun. According to this approach, "the *jazm* governor pounces on the *rafʿ* governor [and changes the construction]" (*yakūnu l-jāzimu ṭāriʾan ʿalā l-rāfiʿi*).[46]

We see here an attempt by RDA's opponents to prove that the *jazm* in verb is not a return to the original *sukūn* that was supposed to be the ending of each word and thus does not need an explanation, but rather an effect of grammatical government that pounces on and changes the verb's original *rafʿ* ending. This approach is based on the premise that the *rafʿ* in verbs is more basic than other moods, because unlike them it is not caused by a formal governor. The entire discussion is conducted in formal terms (unlike the discussion on nominal cases, conducted in semantic terms)—because, as RDA pointed out earlier, in the case of the verb there is only one option for a "pouncing meaning". Thus, the verb's moods do not serve for distinguishing among various meanings (unlike nominal cases).

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45   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 7.
46   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 8.

RDA responds to these arguments by stating that according to this approach the *rafʿ* is not removed due to the action of a *jazm* governor, but rather due to the removal of the *rafʿ* governor.[47] In other words, if the starting point is either that *rafʿ* is caused by the verb's appearance in a position characteristic to nouns or that there are no formal governors affecting the verb's ending, there is no need to speak of a *jazm* governor, but only of removing the *rafʿ* governor.

RDA then refutes other arguments in support of the approach that verbs take *rafʿ* due to their being stripped of formal governors, and take *jazm* due to *jazm* governors. He concludes that the most reasonable approach that allows to view the *jazm* ending as an *ʾiʿrāb* one is that of Kisāʾī, who claimed that verbs are assigned *rafʿ* "due to the prefixes of the imperfect" (*bi-ḥurūfi l-muḍāraʿati*). "Thus the pouncing *jazm* governor removes the *rafʿ* that should exist as long as its governor exists. [The *jazm* governor] prevents [the *rafʿ* governor, i.e., the imperfect prefix] from inducing *rafʿ* [in the verb]" (*fa-yakūnu l-jāzimu l-ṭāriʾu musqiṭan li-l-rafʿi l-ṯābiti bi-ṯubūti ʿāmilihi wa-māniʿan lahu baʿda ḏālika min ʾījādi l-rafʿi*). Thus the removal of *rafʿ* must be attributed to the *jazm* governor and not to the removal of the *rafʿ* governor—since according to Kisāʾī's approach the *rafʿ* governor is not removed but rather exists side-by-side with the *jazm* governor (although its effect is not manifested, being canceled by the effect of the *jazm* governor).[48]

We see that RDA adopts very unorthodox opinions on verbal moods: he criticizes the idea that *jazm* is assigned by a governor (which, according to Ibn al-ʾAnbārī, was accepted by all grammarians, both Kūfan and Baṣran[49]), and accepts it only in the framework of Kisāʾī's view, which was totally rejected by the Baṣrans.[50]

The idea of "pouncing" is essential in this discussion, since the main question is whether the *jazm* is a return to an original ending that does not need to be explained (in which case the ending is *bināʾ*), or it is something that "pounced on" the original state (in which case the ending is *ʾiʿrāb*).

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47   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 8.

48   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 8. RDA refers to Kisāʾī's abovementioned approach also in *Šarḥ* IV, 28, where he also uses the adjective *al-ṭāriʾ* to refer to the *jazm* governor. See Tawfīq 1978:362 for an additional discussion.

49   Ibn al-ʾAnbārī opens his discussion on verbal moods with the statement that all the grammarians agree that the ending of an imperfect verb (in all moods, including *jazm*) is *ʾiʿrāb*. See Ibn al-ʾAnbārī, *ʾInṣāf* II, 549.

50   See Ibn al-ʾAnbārī, *ʾInṣāf* II, 553–554.

4.1.3.1.3   *Endings of Particles*

RDA uses the idea of pouncing also to explain the *binā'* endings in particles: "nothing pounces on their meanings, but their meanings pounce on the meanings of other expressions" (*lā yaṭra'u ʿalā maʿānīhā šay'un bal maʿānīhā ṭāri'atun ʿalā maʿānī 'alfāẓin 'uḫara*).[51]

Elsewhere RDA presents the Baṣran view of *ḍamīr al-faṣl* as "a canceled noun that has no syntactic position (that would necessitate a case marker)" (*ismun mulġan lā maḥalla lahu*). Its status (*manzila*) is the same as that of the canceled *mā* which appears in expressions such as *'innamā* 'but, rather'.[52] The meaning of "cancellation" in this context can be understood in light of Ibn al-Sarrāj's definition: "*'ilġā'* is a use of a word that has no syntactic position (that necessitates a case marker), if [that word] is something that [normally] takes *'iʿrāb*; when [that word] is deleted from the sentence, the sentence does not become faulty" (*al-'ilġā'u 'innamā huwa 'an taʿtiya bi-kalimatin lā mawḍiʿa lahā min-a l-'iʿrābi 'in kānat mimmā tuʿribu wa-'innahā matā 'usqiṭat min-a l-kalāmi lam yaḫtall-i l-kalāmu*).[53] Here "cancellation" means becoming a *laġw* 'an insignificant thing' (a noun derived from the same root as the verb *'alġā*), a constituent that can neither affect other constituents nor be affected by them;[54] *laġw* seems close to the term *zā'id* 'redundant constituent'.[55] As for *maḥall*, the word is apparently used as an abbreviation for the expression *maḥall min al-'iʿrāb* 'a

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51   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 64. 'Asadī (2014:186–187) understands this statement as relating to verbs whose meaning varies with the preposition that introduces their object—e.g., in the Qur'ān the verb *daḫala* followed by the preposition *ʿalā* means 'visited (someone)', and when followed by the preposition *bi-* it means 'had sexual intercourse'. This interpretation seems far-fetched. It is much more likely that the passage relates to the particle's function of adding a certain meaning to the following constituent, e.g., *hal* (an interrogative particle) adds the meaning of a question to the following sentence, *min* 'from' adds the meaning of a point of departure to the following noun. See RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 36–37.

52   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 462. Ibn Yaʿīš (*Šarḥ* III, 113) says that when a personal pronoun functions as *ḍamīr al-faṣl*, "the nominal function is taken and snatched from [that pronoun], [the pronoun] is transferred to the domain of particles and canceled, similarly to particles that are canceled" (*fa-qad salabtahu maʿnā l-ismiyyati wa-btazaztahu 'iyyāhu wa-'aṣartahu 'ilā ḥayyizi l-ḥurūfi wa-'alġaytahu kamā tulġā l-ḥurūfu*). This passage and its parallels from other grammarians are discussed in Peled 2009a:129.

53   Ibn al-Sarrāj, *'Uṣūl* II, 257. See Versteegh 2007:308 for an alternative translation of this fragment.

54   Peled (2009a:150) renders the verb *'alġayta* in one of its uses by Sībawayhi as "you consider … as *laġw*".

55   Ibn al-Sarrāj (*'Uṣūl* II, 257–260) discusses the phenomena of *'ilġā'* and *ziyāda* in the same chapter; he mentiones *ḍamīr al-faṣl* in this context. See the discussion in Peled 1992a:157–158. See Peled 1992a:150–152 for a discussion of the phenomenon of *'ilġā'* in cognitive verbs (he translates *'ilġā'* in this context as "neutralization").

syntactic position necessitating a case marker', which appears numerous times in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*[56] and also in modern linguistic works in Arabic.[57]

RDA explains that this behavior of *ḍamīr al-faṣl* is related to "being pounced on by the meaning of a particle" (*min taraʾāni maʿnā l-ḥarfiyyati ʿalayhi*).[58] He means that the main function of *ḍamīr al-faṣl* is to prevent the nominal predicate that follows it from appearing like a qualifier (it is therefore called *faṣl* 'separation'—it separates a predicate from a qualifier, i.e., distinguishes between the two[59]), an action which, he maintains, involves adding a meaning to another constituent, which is characteristic of a particle. Thus *ḍamīr al-faṣl* becomes a particle, and loses the meaning of a noun.[60]

To summarize, *ḍamīr al-faṣl* does not take a case marker, explicitly or implicitly, since it was pounced on by a meaning of a particle, and a particle is not affected by governors (as we have seen above, RDA uses the notion of pouncing also to explain this point). *Ḍamīr al-faṣl* also does not have any grammatical effect (unlike many other particles), since its grammatical effect is canceled.

4.1.3.2 "Pouncing" and Definiteness

Most medieval grammarians consider the verb an indefinite constituent,[61] but RDA argues that a verb can be neither definite nor indefinite, whereas a noun must be one or the other: "[verbs] are stripped of the pouncing element that needs a marker, i.e., of definiteness" (*jarradnāhu mimmā yaṭraʾu wa-yaḥtāju ʾilā l-ʿalāmati wa-huwa l-taʿrīfu*) and are left in their original form, which is

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56 See, e.g., RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 308; II, 354; III, 86, 152; IV, 294.

57 See, e.g., Ḥamīd n.d.:33; Ḥamad and Zuʿabī 1992:61, 11, 137.

58 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 462.

59 This is the view of relatively late grammarians; Ḫalīl and Sībawayhi maintained that the term means a physical separation between the subject and its nominal predicate. See RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 456.

60 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 461. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 707–709) does not use the notion of "pouncing" in this discussion and does not speak about losing the meaning of a noun. In his view there are two possible explanations for the *bināʾ* ending of *ḍamīr al-faṣl*: (a) it is a particle "coined in order to separate" (*wuḍiʿa li-l-faṣli*), and its apparent agreement with the subject is analoguous to what happens with *ḥarf al-ḫiṭāb* in words such as *ḏālika/ḏālikumā/ḏālikum*. Like other particles, *ḍamīr al-faṣl* does not have a syntactic position; (b) it is a pronoun and does possess a syntactic position of an emphasizer (*taʾkīd*). Although all types of *tawābiʿ* are expected to take the same case as the head noun, this principle does not apply to personal pronouns functioning as emphasizers, which always take *rafʿ*. Ibn al-Ḥājib holds that both particles and pronouns take *bināʾ* endings.

61 See, e.g., Zajjājī, *ʾĪḍāḥ*, 119–120 (this passage is translated in Versteegh 1995a:202). Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 231) says that verbs can function only as "[constituents by means of which] a judgment [about other constituents] is given" (*maḥkūm bihā*), and judgments (*ʾaḥkām*) can be only indefinite semantically.

indefinite.[62] In other words, a verb is indefinite formally, not because of its semantic indefiniteness but because definiteness is a pouncing element that needs a marker. And a constituent that cannot be described as either definite or indefinite can hardly be given a marker of definiteness. It thus remains formally indefinite, as the state of indefiniteness is more basic and does not need a special marker.

From this discussion RDA derives the idea that a predicate (*musnad*) should in principle be indefinite. The verb constitutes the most basic form of a predicate (since it can function only as a predicate, unlike a noun, which can function as both subject and predicate). Therefore, a non-verbal predicate can be expected to behave analogously to a verbal predicate, and also be indefinite.[63] RDA does not accept the common view among grammarians that the predicate should be indefinite because it represents content that is unknown to the addressee.[64] To the contrary, he insists that the predicate's content should be known to the addressee, just like the content of the subject. What is not known is "the ascription of that predicate to the subject" (*intisāb ḏālika l-musnad ʾilā l-musnad ʾilayhi*),[65] i.e., the fact that a particular predicate is related to a particular subject.

Elsewhere RDA discusses Ibn al-Ḥājib's statement that "a head noun must be more specific [than its adjectival qualifier] or equal [to it in terms of specificity]" (*al-mawṣūfu ʾaḫaṣṣu ʾaw musāwin*).[66] RDA says:

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62 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 284.

63 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 284.

64 See, e.g., Ibn al-Sarrāj, *ʾUṣūl* I, 62; Sīrāfī, *Šarḥ* I, 303.

65 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 284–285. Terms derived from the root *n-s-b* are discussed in section 2.4.1.1 above.

66 Ibn al-Ḥājib presents this principle in *Šarḥ*, 633. He explains that its underlying rationale is the fact that the head noun is "the one intended in the informative ascription" (*al-maqṣūd bi-l-nisba al-mufīda*), whereas the qualifier is "not intended [in that ascription]" (*ġayr maqṣūda bi-ḏālika*). What he apparently means is that in a phrase the head noun is what makes connections with other sentence constituents and is influenced by them grammatically, whereas a qualifier is connected syntactically only to the head noun, and takes its case from it. The syntactic relation between a qualifier and its head noun is less important than other types of syntactic relations in the sentence, because the sentence is not produced in order to inform of this relation. Ibn al-Ḥājib adds that "according to the basic principles of the theory, it is not appropriate to make the [constituent] intended [in the ascription] subordinate to the unintended [constituent] in signifying the entity [that the speaker] has in mind" (*lā yalīqu bi-l-qiyāsi ʾan yujʿala l-maqṣūdu dūna ġayri l-maqṣūdi fī l-dalālati ʿalā l-ḏāti l-murādati*). The idea is that the head ("the intended constituent") should be above its qualifier ("the unintended constituent") in the categorical hierarchy, i.e., have a more general meaning than the qualifier.

> *laysa murāduhum bi-hāḏā ʾannahu yanbaġī ʾan yakūna mā yuṭlaqu ʿalayhi lafẓu l-mawṣūfi min-a l-ʾafrādi ʾaqalla mimmā yuṭlaqu ʿalayhi lafẓu l-ṣifati ʾaw musāwiyan lahu, fa-ʾinna hāḏā lā yaṭṭaridu fī l-maʿārifi wa-lā fī l-naki-rāti*

> The intention is not that the number of objects that can be referred to by the head noun must be smaller than the number of objects that can be referred to by the qualifier, or equal to it, since this is not consistently the case either in definite or in indefinite words.[67]

In other words, RDA says that Ibn al-Ḥājib does not have in mind specificity in the common and intuitive sense of the word. Rather, he means that a noun belonging to one of the five categories of definite nouns (viz., personal pronouns, proper nouns, *al-mubhamāt* 'vague nouns',[68] nouns prefixed by the definite article and nouns annexed to a noun belonging to one of the four previously-mentioned categories) can take an adjectival qualifier only if "the head noun is more specific, i.e., more definite than its qualifier, or is equal to it in definiteness" (*yakūnu l-mawṣūfu ʾaḥaṣṣa ʾay ʾaʿrafa min ṣifatihi, ʾaw miṯlahā fī l-taʿrīfi*). For instance, in the phrase *al-rajulu l-ʿāqilu* 'the reasonable man' the second constituent "is more specific than the first, in terms of the expression's signification" (*ʾaḥaṣṣu min-a l-ʾawwali min jihati madlūli[69] l-lafẓi*).[70] This probably means that the number of potential referents that can be called "reasonable (masc.)" is smaller than the number of referents that can be called "man". According to the traditional view, only a human being can be reasonable, and since the adjective is in the masculine, it must refer to a man. Therefore, the group of "reasonable" entities must be a subset of the group of "men". However, the two constituents are equal "in terms of the definiteness that pounces on [the thing that both words] should signify by their coinage" (*min jihati l-taʿrīfi l-ṭāriʾi ʿalā madlūlayhimā l-waḍʿiyyayni*).[71] Formal definiteness is presented here as a factor that pounces on the word's basic meaning. Once the noun and the adjective are formally definite, the latter can be the qualifier of the former, even if it is more specific that the former in its original sense.

Here RDA does not mention indefinite phrases consisting of noun+adjectival qualifier, which also present a similar problem. In *rajulun ʿāqilun* 'a reasonable

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67   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 311.
68   'Vague nouns' are demonstrative and relative pronouns. See RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 240.
69   The term *madlūl* is discussed in section 5.2 below.
70   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 311.
71   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 311–312.

man' the qualifier is more specific than the head noun, which seemingly contradicts Ibn al-Ḥājib's principle. It can be assumed that RDA would say that in this case the original specificity of the words is not relevant, since the two constituents are equal in their indefiniteness. The criterion of specificity was probably designed to explain cases in which one word cannot function as a qualifier of another, in spite of their agreement in definiteness.

4.1.3.3   "Pouncing" and Grammatical Agreement

In a discussion of proper nouns that are feminine in form (i.e., suffixed by one of the feminine markers, which are *tāʾ marbūṭa*, *ʾalif maqṣūra* and quiescent *ʾalif+hamza*[72]) but refer to naturally masculine referents, such as *Ṭalḥa* (a masculine proper noun), RDA says that feminineness, although taken into account to determine diptoteness, does not affect the grammatical agreement between other constituents and such nouns. He explains:

> *al-taḏkīru l-ḥaqīqiyyu lammā ṭaraʾa ʿalayhi, manaʿa ʾan yuʿtabara ḥālu taʾnīṯihi fī ġayrihi wa-yataʿaddā ʾilayhi ḏālika, wa-ʾammā manʿu l-ṣarfi fa-ḥālatun taḫtaṣṣu bihi lā bi-ġayrihi*

> When natural masculineness pounces on [a word whose form is feminine], it prevents the feminineness from being taken into account in [determining the form of] other [constituents], whereas the effect [of masculineness] extends beyond [the word to other constituents]. As for the diptoteness, it is something restricted to the word itself, unrelated to other [constituents].[73]

The semantic feature of natural masculineness is presented here as "pouncing on" the feminine form. The latter still affects the noun's diptoteness (since proper nouns that are feminine in form and/or meaning should be diptote), but does not affect grammatical agreement. Agreement is determined by semantics rather than form, and the proper nouns in question are masculine semantically.

RDA adds that agreement between a verbal predicate and a subject noun whose form is a broken plural or a sound feminine plural, is the same as agree-

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72   See RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 321.

73   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 339. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 807) does not use the notion of pouncing in this context; he says that the proper nouns in question "were transferred from one meaning to another signification, and the second signification is the one taken into account [for the sake of grammatical agreement]" (*naqalūhā min maʿnāhā ʾilā madlūlin ʾāḫara, fa-ʿtabarū fīhā l-madlūla l-ṯāniya*). He does not mention diptoteness in this context.

ment between a predicate and a non-natural feminine subject, with one excep-
tion: if nothing stands between the predicate and its subject, omitting the fem-
inine marker in the predicate is more acceptable in the case of a subject in the
broken plural than in the case of a subject in the feminine/dual. The reason is
that the possibility to view a noun in the plural as a feminine form "is based on
a paraphrase" (*bi-l-taʾwīl*), i.e., on the possibility of replacing such a noun with
the feminine noun *jamāʿa* 'group'.

The natural feminineness of a singular form that corresponds to a plural
noun such as *niswa* 'women' is not taken into account, "because the poun-
cing non-literal [feminineness] removed the rule pertaining to literal [femin-
ineness], just as it removed the natural masculineness in *rijāl* 'men'" (*li-ʾanna
l-majāziyya l-ṭāriʾa ʾazāla ḥukma l-ḥaqīqiyyi, kamā ʾazāla l-taḏkīra l-ḥaqīqiyya
fī rijālin*).[74] The fact that a noun in the broken plural or the sound feminine
plural can be replaced by *jamāʿa* is considered as a "pouncing factor", one that
overcomes the noun's natural feminine meaning. The really relevant fact is that
jamāʿa is not a natural feminine, which makes it possible to omit the feminine
marker in the verbal predicate related to a subject paraphrasable by *jamāʿa*.

At this point RDA has to explain why the paraphrase by *jamāʿa*, which
renders the noun a non-natural feminine, is relevant only in the broken plural
and the sound feminine plural. He says that the dual form cancels neither the
natural masculineness of *rajulāni* 'two men' nor the natural feminineness of
Hindāni 'two [women named] Hind', just like the sound plural form does not
cancel the natural masculineness of *Zaydūna* '[men named] Zayd', because in
all these cases the singular form remains intact.[75] In other words, dual and
sound masculine plural forms are not paraphrased by *jamāʿa*, and thus not con-
sidered non-natural feminine, because in their cases the singular form is kept
intact (only a suffix is added). Therefore, the original meaning of the singular
form cannot be ignored in such forms.

But by the same token the paraphrase by *jamāʿa* should be irrelevant also in
the case of sound feminine plural forms, since the singular form is apparently
kept intact in them as well. However, in the case of feminine endings the singu-
lar form is subject to slight changes: the *tāʾ marbūṭa* is omitted, as happens in
ġurufāt 'rooms' (the plural of *ġurfa*), and the *ʾalif* of the feminine is changed, as
happens in *ṣaḥrāwāt* 'deserts' (the plural of *ṣaḥrāʾ*).[76] These changes suffice for

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74   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 342. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 808) explains this point without using terms derived
      from the root *ṭ-r-ʾ*.

75   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 342.

76   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 342.

the original natural feminineness to be outweighed by the non-natural feminineness of the paraphrase word *jamāʿa*.

In the same context RDA explains, in relation to a plural that denotes human beings, that one can say *al-rijālu wa-l-Ṭalaḥātu ḍarabū* 'The men and the Ṭalḥas (i.e., the men named Ṭalḥa) hit (with the verb in masc. pl.)', "taking into account [the fact that the nouns denote] human beings" (*naẓaran ʾilā l-ʿaqli*), but one can say also *al-rijālu wa-l-Ṭalaḥātu faʿalat/tafʿalu/fāʿilatun* 'The men and the Ṭalḥas did/do/are doing (with the verbs/the active participle in fem. sing.)', "taking into account the meaning of *jamāʿa* 'group' that pounced on the expression" (*naẓaran ʾilā ṭaraʾāni maʿnā l-jamāʿati ʿalā l-lafẓi*).[77] All these options are acceptable, since one can either take into account the meaning of human beings and use full agreement, or take into account the possible paraphrase by *jamāʿa* (which is relevant because the nouns in question are the broken plural and the sound feminine plural forms) and use a verb/participle in the feminine singular.

4.1.3.4   A Semantic "Pouncing"

Ibn al-Ḥājib says that *ʾiḏ* '(and) then, at that time' refers to the past, and is followed by two clauses. RDA notes that in this case "there is no need to distinguish [between two cases]" (*bi-lā faṣlin*),[78] in contrast to *ʾiḏā* 'when, if', about which it was stated that there is a need to distinguish between cases in which it includes the meaning of a conditional particle and cases in which it does not include the meaning of a conditional.[79]

Such a distinction is unnecessary with *ʾiḏ*, since unlike *ʾiḏā*, "[*ʾiḏ*] is not pounced on by the meaning of a conditional" (*lā yaṭraʾu ʿalayhā maʿnā l-šarṭi*).[80] That is because each conditional word should include the meaning of *ʾin*, which is designed to signify a conditional in future;[81] however *ʾiḏ* "was coined for the past, and therefore there is a contradiction [between the meanings of *ʾiḏ* and *ʾin*]" (*mawḍūʿatun li-l-māḍī fa-tanāfayā*).[82]

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77   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 344.

78   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 200.

79   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 189.

80   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 200.

81   See RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 450.

82   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 200. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 775) says in this context that *ʾiḏ* has the meaning of time without the meaning of a conditional. He does not use the ideas of pouncing or coinage in this passage.

4.2   ʿ-r-ḍ

4.2.1   The Term ʿaraḍ in Philosophy and Theology

ʿAraḍ, lit. 'a thing that happens to/befalls/occurs to someone; a thing's befalling/hitting unexpectedly'[83] is the Arabic term chosen to translate the Aristotelean term 'accident'.[84] In Arabic philosophical writings it was used already by Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (d. 139/756) and Kindī.[85] Tahānawī points out differences between the term's uses in philosophy and theology.[86]

Fārābī presents *ʿaraḍ* as one of the five main general terms.[87] He explains it as follows:

> *matā šāraka l-nawʿa ʾaw-i l-jinsa kulliyyun ʾāḫaru ʾaʿammu min ḏālika l-nawʿi ʾaw min ḏālika l-jinsi, wa-kāna yalīqu ʾan yuʾḫaḏa fī jawābi ʾayyu šayʾin huwa fī ḥālihi lā fī ḏātihi fa-ʾinna ḏālika l-kulliyya yusammā ʿaraḍan li-ḏālika l-jinsi ʾaw li-ḏālika l-nawʿi*

> When one can use to refer to [the individuals included in] some species or genus another general term that is more general than that species or genus, [a term] that can serve as an answer to the question 'What kind of thing is it, regarding its state, not its essence?', that general term is called an accident of that genus or that species.[88]

Abed (1991:24) considers this definition not quite felicitous, since it does not include all the types of accidents recognized by Fārābī. After examining various definitions and explanations given by Fārābī in various books, Abed concludes that one basic distinction he makes is between universal (*kullī*) accidents that are true for the entire species, e.g., black for tar, and individual (*šaḫṣ*) accidents that are true only for some individuals in the species, e.g., gray eyes for the human species.[89] A universal accident is related to the subject's essence, while an individual accident is not.[90] Another distinction Fārābī makes is between

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83   Lane 1968:IV, 2008.

84   The term 'accident' played an important role already in Aristotle's and Porphyry's works. See Abed 1991:2.

85   See Afnan 1964:110–111.

86   See Tahānawī, *Kaššāf* II, 1175–1177.

87   Fārābī, *Manṭiq* I, 83–84 (see pp. 80–81, fn. 37 above).

88   Fārābī, *ʾAlfāẓ*, 76. This passage is discussed in Abed 1991:24.

89   Abed 1991:25.

90   See Alon and Abed 2007:I, 259; II, 540.

permanent (*ʿaraḍ dāʾim ġayr mufāriq / ʿaraḍ ġayr mufāriq / ʿaraḍ lāzim*) and non-permanent (*ʿaraḍ mufāriq*) accidents. Regarding a specific individual that belongs to a certain species, one can speak of a permanent accident, such as the shape of his nose, and a non-permanent one, such as being in a sitting position.[91]

Theologians use the term *ʿaraḍ* differently, as the opposite of *jawhar*. In this use *jawhar* is an entity that exists in its own right, whereas *ʿaraḍ* is an attribute/property/abstract idea that cannot exist independently and must be connected to some entity.[92] This distinction originates in Greek logic: Fārābī follows Aristotle in presenting *jawhar* as one of the ten basic categories, whereas the other nine represent attributes.[93] Muslim theologians were especially interested in such distinctions, which they used to discuss the relation between God's entity and his attributes.[94]

4.2.2   *Terms Derived from the Root* ʿ-r-ḍ *in* Šarḥ al-Kāfiya

In the section on the terms derived from the root *ṭ-r-ʾ* the material was organized according to the levels on which the effect of the pouncing element is manifested (since these terms usually refer to elements that determine the grammatical rule). In contrast, in the present section the material is organized according to the levels on which the accidental element appears (since terms derived from the root *ʿ-r-ḍ* usually refer to elements that do not determine the rule). The relatively rare cases in which an accidental element affects the rule are discussed in a separate sub-section.

4.2.2.1   The Morphological Level

RDA distinguishes between accidental (*ʿāriḍ*) and inseparable (*lāzim*) definite articles. This is a distinction at the morpho-syntactic level. In generic nouns the definite article is accidental (RDA does not say so explicitly, but it can be concluded from his discussions), whereas in proper nouns the issue is complicated.

The definite article is considered inseparable in "predominant" (*ġālib*) proper nouns. These are nouns that originally referred to a genus but were frequently used to refer to one specific member of that genus, "since [that object] had] some property that set it apart from that genus" (*li-ḥaṣlatin muḫtaṣṣatin*

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91   Abed 1991:26.

92   See Tahānawī, *Kaššāf* I, 602; II, 1176.

93   Tahānawī, *Kaššāf* II, 1177; Abed 1991:146.

94   See Tahānawī, *Kaššāf* II, 1177–1178 for a presentation of a theological discussion on the *jawhar-ʿaraḍ* distinction.

bihi min bayni ḏālika l-jinsi). When a noun was used to refer to one specific object, the speakers had to use the definite article in order to add the meaning of specificity to that noun. Frequent usage then transformed the word into a proper noun for that object. The definite article in such cases is inseparable because it is the word together with the article that makes up the proper noun; the article is thus similar in its status to one of the word's letters. This is the case with nouns such as *al-Bayt* lit. 'the house', used to refer to the Kaʿaba, *al-Najm* lit. 'the stars', used to refer to the Pleiades, *al-Kitāb* lit. 'the book', used to refer to Sībawayhi's grammatical treatise.[95]

If the proper noun is not "predominant", there are two possibilities: it can originate in an adjective or a verbal noun, or not originate in either. If it does originate in one of the two, e.g., al-ʿAbbās lit. 'the frowning one', al-Ḥasan lit. 'the good', al-Ḥusayn (the diminutive form of *ḥasan*), the definite article is "accidental and impermanent" (*ʿāriḍa ġayr lāzima*), since these nouns did not become proper nouns together with the definite article (in which case the article would be inseparable). The definite article joined those words after they had become proper nouns.

Although a proper noun does not need a formal definiteness marker, it can receive one "because [it contains] an intimation of its original adjectiveness" (*li-lamḥi l-waṣfiyyati l-ʾaṣliyyati*). Proper nouns that include a meaning of praise, e.g., al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn, give an intimation of praise for the named one, whereas proper nouns that include a derogatory meaning, e.g., al-Qabīḥ/al-Jahm lit. 'the ugly one' give an intimation of disparagement of the named one. In these cases it seems "as if [those names] were removed from the category of proper nouns and used to refer to the named ones as adjectives" (*kaʾannaka ʾaḫrajtahā ʿan-i l-ʿalamiyyati wa-ʾaṭlaqtahā ʿalā l-musammayna ʾawṣāfan*).[96]

As for proper nouns that do not originate in adjectives or verbal nouns, if the noun originally has a meaning of praise or derogation, it is better to take into account the original meaning,[97] i.e., to add an impermanent definite article to the noun. For instance, one can say al-ʾAsad lit. 'the lion' or al-Kalb lit. 'the dog' to refer to people whose names are ʾAsad and Kalb. In contrast, if

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95   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 367. See RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 368–369 for a discussion on other types of 'predominant proper nouns'. Frank (1981:273) calls such nouns "quasi proper names" and mentions a similar phenomenon in English (e.g., using "the Continent" to speak of Europe). Relevant fragments from Sībawayhi and Sīrāfī are discussed in Frank 1981:273.

96   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 368. See Marogy 2010:111–112 for a discussion of that phenomenon according to Sībawayhi.

97   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 368.

the proper noun does not have an original meaning of praise or derogation, it cannot be prefixed by the definite article, except in case of "occasional homonymy" (*ištirāk ittifāqī*[98]), when a governed element or the definite article is used.[99]

All these complicated explanations appear in a discussion on the case ending of a *tābiʿ* of a noun in vocative constructions. RDA presents Mubarrad's approach as understood by Ibn al-Ḥājib: if the proper noun that functions as a *tābiʿ* is of al-Ḥasan's type, in terms of "the accidentality of the definite article and the possibility to omit it" (*ʿurūḍu l-lāmi wa-jawāzu ḥaḏfihā*), it is preferable to ignore the definite article and assign *rafʿ* to the noun. In contrast, "if the definite article is inseparable" (*maʿa luzūmi l-lāmi*), e.g., in al-Ṣaʿiq 'The one who was struck by lightning',[100] the *naṣb* case is preferable—because such a noun cannot follow the vocative particle directly.[101]

After that RDA presents his preferred interpretation of Mubarrad's approach: if a proper noun prefixed by the definite article functions as a *tābiʿ* of a noun that follows a vocative particle, the *rafʿ* case is preferable. That is so because the definite article has no meaning when it precedes a proper noun. It does not render it definite (it already is definite), but "only hints at the original adjectiveness" (*yulmaḥu bihimā l-waṣfiyyatu l-ʾaṣliyyatu faqaṭ*). The definite article in a proper noun can be ignored because the latter is definite by virtue of its being a proper noun. In contrast, for a generic noun prefixed by the definite article in the same position the *naṣb* case is preferable—since in this case the article renders the noun definite and thus cannot be ignored.[102] In other words, according to Mubarrad's approach (as interpreted by RDA) the most important

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98   RDA (*Šarḥ* II, 313) explains that a proper noun is coined so that it refers to one particular referent only. Nothing else is supposed to have the same name, "and if a homonymy occasionally occurs, it happens by a second coinage" (*wa-ʾin-i ttafaqa mušārakatuhu fa-bi-waḍʿin ṯānin*). The term 'coinage' is discussed in chapter 3 above. Here 'the second coinage' may mean naming someone after someone else. Alternatively, it may mean using a proper noun preceded by the definite article in order to present the named one as a non-specific representative of the category of individuals called by that name. This is the case with proper nouns used in the dual/plural form with the definite article. See Marogy 2010:115–116 for a discussion.

99   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 368.

100   The story of the man known by this name appears in RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 367.

101   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 365. This is RDA's explanation of Ibn al-Ḥājib's statement cited in RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 359. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 420–421) in this discussion does not use the terms *ʿurūḍ* and *luzūm*, but only notes that in the case of al-Ḥasan "the detachment of the definite article can be assumed" (*ṣiḥḥat taqdīr nazʿ al-lām*), whereas in the case of al-Ṣaʿiq such an assumption is impossible.

102   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 370.

point is that proper nouns such as al-Ḥasan and al-Ṣaʿiq should take the *rafʿ* case in the position in question, since the definite article does not render them definite.[103]

RDA uses terms derived from the root ʿ-r-ḍ to refer to an accidental morpheme that can be detached from the word also in his discussion of the feminine marker,[104] the dual form of the nouns *ḏū* 'a possessor (of something)' and *fū* '(someone's) mouth'[105] etc.

Another example: RDA explains that a proper noun that is subjected to *tar-ḫīm* 'softening [of the voice]'[106] should contain more than three letters, "since [speakers of Arabic] do not want to subtract systematically and consistently from the number of letters minimal for a noun with an *ʾiʿrāb* ending, which is three, without an overt necessitating cause" (*li-ʾannahum karihū naqṣa l-ismi naqṣan qiyāsiyyan muṭṭaridan ʿan ʾaqalli ʾabniyati l-muʿrabi ʾay ʿan-i l-ṯulāṯiyyi bi-lā ʿillatin ẓāhiratin mūjibatin*). This differs from the absence of a third letter in nouns such as *yad* 'hand' and *dam* 'blood', which is rare and non-systematic. Anomalous cases should not be taken into account.[107] In other words, the existence of anomalous nouns that were left with two letters only after an omission that was not necessitated by morpho-phonological rules, does not contradict the principle that an omission should not leave a noun with fewer than three letters—since "the anomalous is not to be taken into an account". This also differs from nouns such as *ʿamin* 'blind' and *šajin* 'worried', in which the omission is indeed systematic, but is necessitated by an overt cause.[108]

To summarize, a noun with an *ʾiʿrāb* ending should in principle consist of at least three letters.[109] This principle can be violated in anomalous cases such as *yad* and *dam* or in cases of unavoidable omission (e.g., some third-weak nouns). Because softening is an omission that is not necessitated by anything, and should be consistent in proper nouns in the vocative, it should be impossible in cases where it would leave the noun with fewer than three letters.

A counter-argument would be that the ending of a softened noun in the vocative is *bināʾ*, and a noun with a *bināʾ* ending can consist of fewer than three letters—e.g., *mā* 'what' and *man* 'who'. RDA's answer is: "the *bināʾ* ending [in

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103   I did not find such a discussion in Mubarrad's *Muqtaḍab*. Ibn al-Ḥājib and RDA probably refer here to a book that did not survive (see Bernards 1997:21–22 for a list of various books on grammar composed by Mubarrad).

104   See, e.g., RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 321, 325–326.

105   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 356.

106   See p. 100, fn. 126 above.

107   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 397.

108   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 397.

109   See p. 105 above.

the softened noun] is accidental; [that noun] has the same status as a noun with an *ʾiʿrāb* ending, and the *ḍamma* [in the ending of the softened noun] resembles the ending of the *rafʿ* case" (*al-bināʾu fīhi ʿāriḍun fa-huwa fī ḥukmi l-muʿrabi wa-ḍammuhu mušabbahun li-l-rafʿi*).[110] That is to say, a single noun after a vocative particle takes a *bināʾ* ending, but that does not mean that such a noun may consist of fewer than three letters, like *mā* and *man*. Unlike the latter two, which consistently take *bināʾ* endings, the noun in question takes that ending accidentally. Thus, it remains with the same status as a noun with an *ʾiʿrāb* ending, and consequently should not consist of fewer than three letters.

4.2.2.2 The Syntactic Level

In a discussion of time/place expressions that may function as an element annexed to a clause (there are also time/place expressions that must fulfill this function[111]), RDA distinguishes between two cases: the clause that functions as a governed element of the time/place expression can either start with a perfect verb,[112] or not.

In the former case all grammarians agree that the time/place expression can take both *ʾiʿrāb* and *bināʾ* endings. The *ʾiʿrāb* ending is possible "because [that expression] need not necessarily function as an element annexed to a clause, thus the cause for the *bināʾ* ending is accidental" (*li-ʿadami luzūmihā li-l-ʾiḍāfati ʾilā l-jumlati, fa-ʿillatu l-bināʾi ʾiḏan ʿāriḍatun*).[113] A word that must appear in a certain syntactic position should take a *bināʾ* ending;[114] moreover, a noun that requires a governed element resembles a particle that also requires another element. These two principles explain the *bināʾ* ending in a time/place expression that is necessarily annexed to a clause. However, as far as a time/place expression does not necessarily appear in this position, the cause for a *bināʾ* ending is accidental for it—in other words, that factor does not necessarily determine the grammatical rule, since it is relevant only in some occurrences of the constituent in question.

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110   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 397. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 438) also presents the theoretical difficulty with a softening that would leave a noun with fewer than three letters; however, he does not mention a possible counter-argument that can be raised in this context and does not use the notion of accidentality.

111   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 180.

112   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 180.

113   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 181.

114   A limited syntactic plasticity (*taṣarruf*) or a lack thereof is a point of resemblance to a particle, and can make a noun take a *bināʾ* ending. See, e.g., RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 222 (discussed on pp. 106–107 above). See also Baalbaki 2006c.

This notwithstanding, RDA says that the *bināʾ* ending is possible in time/ place expressions that may be annexed to clauses. His explanation is the following:

> *li-taqawwī l-ʿillati l-ʿāriḍati bi-wuqūʿi l-mabniyyi lladī lā ʾiʿrāba lahu lafẓan wa-lā maḥallan, mawqiʿa l-muḍāfi ʾilayhi lladī yaktasī minhu l-muḍāfu ʾaḥkāmahu, min-a l-taʿrīfi wa-l-tankīri wa-ġayri ḏālika*

> [This is possible because] the accidental cause for [the *bināʾ* ending in time/place expressions that are not necessarily annexed to a clause, when they are followed by a perfect verb] is strengthened by the fact that the position of the governed element is occupied by [a constituent] with a *bināʾ* ending that does not take an *ʾiʿrāb* ending formally and also cannot be said to be in a position that necessitates *ʾiʿrāb* (i.e., a perfect verb). An annexed element is covered by some of the properties of the governed element, e.g., definiteness and indefiniteness.[115]

In other words, in the structures discussed here the accidental fact that the element in question is annexed to a clause is strenghtened by the fact that the position of the governed element is occupied by a constituent whose ending is *bināʾ* (and is not supposed to be affected by a governor). That allows the element in question to take a *bināʾ* ending (but it can take an *ʾiʿrāb* ending as well).

In contrast, if a time/place expression is annexed to a clause whose first word is not a perfect verb, but a constituent that should take an *ʾiʿrāb* ending, most of the Baṣran grammarians hold that the time/place expression's ending must be *ʾiʿrāb*—as the reason for a *bināʾ* ending is weak in that case.[116]

Similarly, RDA states that time/place expressions that are annexed to *ʾiḏ* to form phrases such as *yawmaʾiḏin* 'on that day' can take both *ʾiʿrāb* and *bināʾ* endings. For instance, there are two readings of the phrase from Q. 11/66 *min ḫizyi yawmiʾiḏin/ yawmaʾiḏin* 'from the degradation of that day'.[117] In the first option *yawm* takes *jarr* because of the annexation, whereas in the latter the same noun takes the *bināʾ* ending *fatḥa*. The *ʾiʿrāb* ending is possible "because

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115   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 181. RDA speaks of the phenomenon of "being covered" (*iktisāʾ*) in *Šarḥ* II, 256, where he says that the annexed element can be 'covered' by the gender or number of the governed element.

116   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 181.

117   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 182. ʿUmar notes that *yawmiʾiḏin* is Nāfiʿ's and Kisāʾī's reading, whereas others read *yawmaʾiḏin* (see RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 182, fn. 2). In the standard version of the Qurʾān the vocalization is *yawmiʾiḏin*.

the case for a *binā'* ending, i.e., an annexation to a clause, is accidental [for that noun]" (*li-ʿurūḍi ʿillati l-binā'i ʾaʿnī l-ʾiḍāfata ʾilā l-jumali*). The *binā'* ending is possible because the position of the governed element in question is overtly occupied by *ʾiḏ*, whose ending is *binā'*.[118]

4.2.2.3   The Semantic Level[119]

Our first example appears in a discussion of Zamaḫšarī's view of the vocative. Ibn al-Ḥāǧib defines a noun that follows a vocative particle, *al-munādā* lit. 'the one that is called', as "the one that is asked to approach by the means of a particle that replaces the verb *ʾadʿū* 'I call', formally or in a reconstructable way" (*al-maṭlūbu ʾiqbāluhu bi-ḥarfin nāʾibin manāba ʾadʿū, lafẓan ʾaw taqdīran*).[120] RDA notes that Ibn al-Ḥāǧib "boasted about" (*taṣallafa*) this definition of his, and claimed that Zamaḫšarī did not define *al-munādā* "because it was too complicated" (*li-ʾiškālihi*).[121]

RDA, however, claims that Zamaḫšarī refrained from defining the term not because of its complexity, but because of its obviousness. He assumes that Zamaḫšarī interprets *al-munādā* as "every [constituent] preceded by *yā* and its likes" (*kullu mā daḫalahu yā wa-ʾaḫawātuhā*). This definition includes, in addition to regular nouns in the vocative, also *al-mandūb* lit. 'the lamented one', *al-mustaġāṯ* lit. 'the one being called to help' and *al-mutaʿaǧǧab minhu* lit. 'the one that arouses wonder'. All those constituents follow a vocative particle, but include respective meanings of lamentation/call to help/wonder. According to this approach (shared also by Sībawayhi[122]), the lamentation *yā Muḥammadāh* 'Alas, Muḥammad!' is equivalent to saying 'Come because I miss you!', and the exclamation *yā la-l-dawāhī* 'What a distress!' is equivalent to saying 'Distress, come, so that one can bewonder!'.[123]

RDA adds:

118   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 182. See RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 214 for a discussion on the ending of *munḏu* 'since' that also includes terms derived from the root *ʿ-r-ḍ*.

119   Examples presented in this chapter refute ʾAsadī's claim (2014:50–51) that accidental elements do not create a new meaning (in ʾAsadī's view this is one of the criteria to discern between the terms *ʿāriḍ* and *ṭāriʾ*).

120   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 344.

121   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 345. RDA refers here to a discussion in Ibn al-Ḥāǧib, *ʾĪḍāḥ* I, 249.

122   Sībawayhi (*Kitāb* I, 278) says: "the lamented one is the one being called, however, he is being mourned" (*al-mandūbu madʿuwwun wa-lākinnahu mutafaǧǧaʿun ʿalayhi*). See Buburuzan 1993:431 ff. for a pragmatic discussion of structures considered as *nidāʾ* by Sībawayhi. Buburuzan (1993:434) claims that, according to Sībawayhi, the common feature of these structures is "à une similitude situationnelle, à savoir à l'effort que doit déployer l'énonciateur dans la réalisation des illocutions en question".

123   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 345.

lā yaridu ʿalayhi l-maḥṣūṣu fa-ʾinnahu yaqūlu: huwa munādan nuqila ʾilā
maʿnā l-iḫtiṣāṣī wa-l-ʿāriḍu ġayru muʿtaddin bihi

[The aforementioned definition of *al-munādā*] cannot be criticized [by
the claim that it includes] a constituent in the *iḫtiṣāṣ* 'specification' con-
struction, since [Zamaḫšarī] may reply: this is the constituent that follows
a vocative particle and took the meaning of specification. The accidental
is not to be taken into account.[124]

The terms *maḥṣūṣ* and *iḫtiṣāṣ* here are difficult to understand. It would be intu-
itive to interpret them as 'specific' and 'specification (in an extra-grammatical
sense)'. However, it seems that here RDA has in mind specification as a gram-
matical structure. Given the fact that he says elsewhere that this structure is
devoid of any vocative meaning, a definition of *al-munādā* that also includes
this constituent may seem problematic.[125] However, RDA solves the problem
by stating that the meaning of specification is an accidental factor that should
not be taken into account (i.e., should not prevent the element in question from
being included in the definition of *al-munādā*).

RDA's discussion on the vocative construction provides yet another example
of the idea of accidentality at the semantic level. Concerning the phrase *yā*
Tamīmu kullukum 'O [tribe of] Tamīm, all of you!' he notes that it is also possible
to say *yā Tamīmu kulluhum* 'O [tribe of] Tamīm, all of them!', if one considers
the status of the word *Tamīm* before its integration into the vocative structure,
"because [the use of *Tamīm* to refer to] the 2nd person is accidental [for that
noun]" (*li-ʾanna l-ḫiṭāba fīhi ʿāriḍun*).[126] For him any noun that is not a personal
pronoun should be considered to be in the 3rd person.[127] The possibility of
using *Tamīm* to refer to the 2nd person does not arise from the word itself, but
from the vocative structure in which it appears. This is an accidental factor that
does not abrogate the word's basic properties, so that in the abovementioned
example it is possible to treat it as a noun of the 3rd person.

The idea of accidentality is also used in a discussion on exception construc-
tions. In his explanation of the difference between *laysa* 'he is not', which can
assign the *naṣb* case to the excepted element that follows *ʾillā* 'save for, but', and
mā 'not, no', which cannot do so, RDA's main argument is that *laysa* can exercise
such government because it is a verb. The exceptive particle removes the mean-

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124   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 345–346.
125   See p. 119 above for a discussion of specification and its relation to vocative structures.
126   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 362.
127   This point is stressed also by Ibn Yaʿīš—see p. 77 above.

ing of negation and thus prevents *mā* from governing the excepted element;[128] however, that particle does not remove the verbal properties of *laysa*.[129]

RDA raises a hypothetical objection to his argument: since "the meaning [of *laysa*] is creating a meaning of negating the being in another expression, i.e., in the clause that follows [*laysa*]" (*tufīdu ʾījāda maʿnā nafyi l-kawni fī lafẓin ʾāḫara, wa-huwa l-jumlatu baʿdaha*), *laysa* should be considered a particle devoid of verbal meaning.[130] The objection is probably based on the fact that a particle was usually defined by the grammarians as a part of speech that creates a meaning in other constituent(s);[131] RDA's hypothetical opponent tries to show that there is no essential difference between *mā* and *laysa*, and that, consequently, their syntactic behavior should not be different.

RDA replies:

> *ḏālika fīhā ʿāriḍun, wa-kāna ʾaṣluhā ʾan takūna bi-maʿnā mā ṯabata wa-mā ḥaṣala fa-tufīda maʿnan fī nafsihā ka-sāʾiri l-ʾafʿāli l-tāmmati, fa-ʾifādatuhā li-l-kawni l-manfiyyi fī ġayrihā wa-ʾifādatu kāna li-l-kawni l-muṯbati fī ġayrihā ʿāriḍun, ka-tajarrudi ʿasā wa-biʾsa min-a l-zamāni*

[The resemblance to a particle] is accidental [in the case of *laysa*], since originally it should have had the meaning of *mā ṯabata* 'was not true' and *mā ḥaṣala* 'did not happen'. [*Laysa*] was supposed to signify a meaning by itself, like all full verbs. The fact that [*laysa*] signifies a negated being in another [constituent], and *kāna* signifies a confirmed being in another [constituent], are accidental [for these verbs]—just like the loss of the meaning of time [is accidental] for *ʿasā* 'maybe' and *biʾsa* 'what an evil …!'.[132]

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128   See p. 160 below for another part of the discussion on cases in which the government of the Ḥijāzī *mā* is canceled.

129   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 110.

130   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 110. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 551–553) does not mention the resemblance between *laysa* and particles in this context. His main argument is that *laysa* is equivalent to *mā kāna* 'was not', and the constituent that follows the exceptive particle is affected by *kāna* without the idea of negation.

131   See, e.g., Ibn Yaʿīš, *Šarḥ* VIII, 2; RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 259. Interestingly, Zajjājī (*Jumal*, 53) uses the term *ḥurūf* to refer to *kāna* and its sisters. By *ḥurūf* he probably means 'words' (and not particles)—see, e.g., Carter 1994:401 for a discussion on the different meanings of *ḥarf* in medieval Arabic grammatical theory. However, other grammarians thought that Zajjājī considered *kāna* and its sisters as particles, and criticized him for that. See, e.g., Baṭalyūsī, *Ḥulal*, 157.

132   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 111. See RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 39 for a discussion on the loss of the meaning of time in *ʿasā* and *biʾsa*.

Here RDA proves that *laysa* is a verb to all intents and purposes, so that the fact that it signifies a meaning in another constituent, a characteristic of particles, is accidental. It is a feature that does not weaken its grammatical effect, so that it can assign *naṣb* also to a predicate that follows *ʾillā*.

In addition to the two examples mentioned above, terms derived from the root ʿ-r-ḍ are also used in several other cases to refer to an 'accidental' meaning that does not affect the grammatical rule: *ʾiḏā* 'if, when' that has an accidental meaning of conditional;[133] *ʾiḏan* 'then, hence' that also may have such meaning;[134] active participles, that can have an accidental meaning of permanence;[135] the accidental meaning of doubt that exists in sentences with a canceled cognitive verb;[136] the accidental "performative meaning" (*maʿnā l-ʾinšāʾ*) that exists in utterances such as *biʿtu* 'I (hereby) sell!' and *ʾanta ḥurrun* 'You are free!';[137] etc.

In all the examples presented in this chapter terms derived from the root ʿ-r-ḍ refer to a semantic element that is accidental in relation to the linguistic constituent (i.e., exists in only some of its appearances and/or deviates from its original meaning) and thus does not affect the grammatical rule in question. In *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* such terms are also used to refer to semantic elements that are accidental in relation to the constituent's referent (and not to the linguistic constituent itself). For instance, a meaning signified by a verb is taken to be accidental in relation to the referent to which the verb is related—consequently, RDA presents "lack of the meaning of accidentality" (*tajarruduhu min maʿnā l-ʿurūḍi*) in combination with other factors as excluding "the verb of wonder" (*fiʿl al-taʿajjub*)[138] from the category of verbs.[139] Such semantic elements have certain grammatical implications, but these uses of the notion of accidentality do not seem relevant to the sense of the term *ʿaraḍ* that is discussed here.[140]

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133 RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 187.
134 RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 44.
135 RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 414.
136 RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 156.
137 RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 213–214.
138 What is meant are past/imperative forms of Form IV that appear in structures *mā ʾafʿal-ahu/ʾafʿil bihi*. Those structures are discussed in RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 227. See also Wright 1896–1898:I, 98. Buburuzan (1993:423) discusses these structures in Sībawayhi.
139 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 457.
140 See RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 319 for a similar use of terms derived from the root ʿ-r-ḍ.

4.2.2.4   Examples in Which an 'Accidental' Factor is Presented as Affecting
            the Rule

Some grammarians do not accept sentences such as *fī dārihi qiyāmu Zaydin* 'In
his house is Zayd's standing' and *fī dārihā ʿabdu Hindin* 'In her house is Hind's
slave',[141] if the personal pronouns *-hi* and *-hā* are co-referential with Zayd and
Hind, respectively. Their claim is that although the subject of the nominal sen-
tence is eligible to come at the beginning of the sentence (and thus sentences
such as *fī dārihi Zaydun* 'In his house is Zayd' are acceptable—since in the
reconstructed structure the subject appears before its predicate, so that there
is no cataphora[142]), the governed element of the subject does not have such
a "right". Consequently, there is a cataphora in *fī dārihi qiyāmu Zaydin* and *fī
dārihā ʿabdu Hindin* that renders them unacceptable.[143]

    However, RDA considers *fī dārihā ʿabdu Hindin* and its likes acceptable. He
explains the reason as follows:

> *ʿaraḍa li-l-muḍāfi ʾilayhi bi-sababi l-tarkībi l-ʾiḍāfiyyi l-ḥāṣili baynahu wa-
> bayna l-mubtadaʾi wa-ṣayrūratihi maʿahu ka-smin wāḥidin, martabatu l-
> taqdīmi tabaʿan li-l-mubtadaʾi, wa-ʾin lam yakun lahu ḏālika fī l-ʾaṣli*

> The governed element, due to the annexation construction created with
> the subject, together with which it becomes equivalent to a single noun,
> accidentally received, subsequently to the subject, the rank of [being eli-
> gible] to precede [the other constituents in the sentence],[144] although
> [the governed element of the subject] did not have this [rank] origin-
> ally.[145]

Here an accidental factor (namely, the fact that the pronoun's antecedent func-
tions as a governed element of the subject in the nominal sentence) is presen-
ted as determining the rule (i.e., as enabling a structure in which the pro-
noun overtly precedes its antecedent). This is surprising, given that RDA usually
presents accidental factors as such that do not affect the rule. Perhaps he chose
to use the verb *ʿaraḍa* here to stress that the basic rule, that the subject of a

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141   See Peled 1992b:100–101 for a discussion on these problematic sentences.
142   See Peled 1992b:97–100 and Peled 2006b for discussions on analyses provided by gram-
       marians to explain cases of apparent cataphora.
143   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 248.
144   Peled (2009a:17) translates *martaba* as "rank". See Peled 2009a:72 for Fārisī's discussion of
       a word order in a verbal sentence, with a similar use of the term.
145   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 248.

nominal sentence should precede its predicate, stays intact.[146] The annexed element that functions as the subject of a nominal sentence (i.e., ʿabd in *fī dārihā ʿabdu Hindin*) according to the basic principle should come at the beginning, and its governed element (*Hind*) must immediately follow it, since the two constituents of the annexation are equivalent to a single noun. Therefore, in the reconstructed structure (which is *ʿabdu Hindin fī dārihā*) *Hind* precedes the personal pronoun that refers back to it. That allows RDA to consider the sentence *fī dārihā ʿabdu Hindin* as acceptable. In the reconstructed structure *Hind* appears before the pronoun not because of something related to the word itself or to its own function as the governed element in an annexation, but because of reasons related to the annexed noun—thus it is accidental in relation to *Hind*.

Another example appears in a discussion on exception constructions. Ibn al-Ḥājib states in his *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* that one cannot use an exception particle in a clause preceded by the auxiliary verb *mā zāla* 'still, yet' and say, e.g., **mā zāla Zaydun ʾillā ʿāliman* 'Zayd is still but knowledgeable'. This is so because *mā zāla* renders the predicate of the clause positive, whereas *ʾillā* negates the predicate after it becomes positive; consequently, the predicate is simultaneously rendered positive and negative, which is illogical.[147] RDA says in this context:

> *li-qāʾilin ʾan yaqūla mā zāla li-ʾiṯbāti ḫabarihi ʾin lam yaʿriḍ mā yaqlibuhu ʾilā l-nafyi, lā muṭlaqan, kamā ʾanna laysa li-nafyi ḫabarihi ʾillā ʾiḏā ʿaraḍa mā yaqtaḍī ʾiṯbātahu, naḥwu laysa Zaydun ʾillā fāḍilan*

> Someone may claim that *mā zāla* is used to render the predicate [in the clause that follows it] positive, not absolutely, but as far as nothing accidentally appears [in the sentence] that renders [the predicate] negative. Similarly, *laysa* is used to render the predicate negative, as far as nothing accidentally appears that necessitates [the predicate's] positivity. For instance, [this is what happens] in *laysa Zaydun ʾillā fāḍilan* 'Zayd is nothing but outstanding'.[148]

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146   This use of terminology related to the notion of accidentality is reminiscent of Jurjānī, *Muqtaṣid* I, 335, where it is stated that the function of the interrogative is generally fulfilled by particles. When a noun appears in such a position, e.g., in *mā ʾaradta* 'What did you want?', it is accidental (*ʿāriḍ*); Peled (2009a:64) translates the term as "incidental". Peled (2009a:64–65) explains that since an interrogative in principle is a particle, its appearance in the beginning of the sentence does not invalidate the basic principle according to which the subject should precede the object (as this principle should be valid for a nominal object).

147   Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 549.

148   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 107.

RDA thus maintains that Ibn al-Ḥājib's explanation for the unacceptability of sentences such as **mā zāla Zaydun ʾillā ʿāliman* is not satisfactory, since one can argue that *ʾillā* abrogates the positive meaning of *mā zāla* just like it abrogates the negative meaning of *laysa* (and there is no doubt that *ʾillā* can be used after *laysa*). Verbs derived from the root *ʿ-r-ḍ* refer in this discussion to elements that affect the rule—elements that render the predicate negative (in the case of *mā zāla*) or positive (in the case of *laysa*). They are probably presented as accidental because they are secondary in comparison to constituents that open the sentence—the speaker possibly starts the sentence with the verb, and only later decides to use *ʾillā* (or any other constituent that changes the sentence's meaning).

According to RDA, it is more appropriate to explain the unacceptability of sentences such as **mā zāla Zaydun ʾillā ʿāliman* by arguing that "negation that joins another negation conveys [an idea] of permanent positivity" (*al-nafyu ʾiḏā daḫala ʿalā l-nafyi ʾafāda l-ʾījāba l-dāʾima*).[149] The verb *zāla* 'ceased' has a negative meaning of its own. If it is negated by *mā*, a "permanent positive meaning" is achieved, which cannot be abrogated by *ʾillā*. Thus, a sentence combining *mā zāla* and *ʾillā* would be self-contradictory and unacceptable.

RDA states elsewhere that the resemblance between *laysa* and the Ḥijāzī *mā* that allows the latter to exert grammatical government is weak (since the resemblance is semantic only). Therefore, "[*mā*'s government] is detached on account of the weakest accidental factor" (*inʿazalat li-ʾadnā ʿāriḍin*). For instance, one of things that prevent the grammatical government of the Ḥijāzī *mā* is the appearance of *ʾin* after it. Although it is a redundant particle, it formally resembles the negating *ʾin*. Overtly it therefore seems that in this case the negating *mā* joins another negating particle, and a combination of two negating particles creates a positive meaning. Given the fact that the only reason for the grammatical government of *mā* is its semantic resemblance to *laysa*, which disappears once the sentence becomes positive, it is understandable that *ʾin* cancels *mā*'s government[150] (RDA also says explicitly that the reason for *mā*'s government is the negative meaning[151]). The conclusion is that the redundant *ʾin* resembles *ʾillā* that abrogates the negation (and also *mā*'s government) in *mā Zaydun ʾillā munṭaliqun* 'Zayd is nothing but departing'.[152]

In this discussion the term *ʿāriḍ* refers to an element that affects the rule (namely, prevents *mā* from exerting grammatical government), but the pur-

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149   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 106.
150   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 185.
151   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 190.
152   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 185.

pose of RDA's choice of words is to present that element as insignificant in order to stress the relative weakness of the affected rule: the reason that allows the Ḥijāzī *mā* to exert government is so weak that even an accidental factor as small as a redundant particle prevents that government.[153]

4.3 An Example of a Complex Discussion Combining Terms from Both Groups

The example appears in a discussion of the surprising behavior of the numerals 3–10, in which the *tāʾ marbūṭa* that usually functions in Arabic as a feminine marker is attached to the masculine forms, whereas the feminine forms do not take that ending.[154]

RDA starts presenting his preferable explanation as follows:

> *mā fawqa l-iṯnayni min-a l-ʿadadi mawḍūʿun ʿalā l-taʾnīṯi fī ʾaṣli waḍʿihi wa-ʾaʿnī bi-ʾaṣli waḍʿihi ʾan yuʿabbara bihi ʿan muṭlaqi l-ʿadadi*

> A numeral denoting a number above 2 is originally coined in a feminine form (i.e., with the ending *tāʾ marbūṭa*). I mean by the original coinage [the state] in which [the numeral] is used to refer to an absolute number.[155]

Here RDA has in mind numbers used in isolation (i.e., without the counted noun) in order to name the numbers or to count in the abstract,[156] as is clearly evident from the example *sittatu ḍiʿfu ṯalāṯata*[157] 'six is the double of three'. In such cases the numeral with the feminine ending is used (one does not say **sittun ḍiʿfu ṯalāṯin*). According to RDA, such usages are primary, in contrast to numerals used to count things, such as in the sentence *jāʾanī ṯalāṯatu rijālin* 'Three men came to me'.[158] At this point he has to explain why the original coinage of the numerals was in the feminine form:

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153   See RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 135, 138 for interesting examples of terminology derived from the root ʿ-r-ḍ that refers to factors that affect the rules in discussions on numerals denoting the numbers 11–19.

154   See the discussion in Wright 1896–1898:I, 253–256. See Druel 2015 for a discussion of a syntactic behavior of the counted noun in various constructions.

155   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 286.

156   Such numerals are discussed in Taine-Cheikh 2008:448–450.

157   The masculine numbers are diptote when used as "mere abstract numbers". See Wright 1896–1898:I, 421.

158   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 286.

wa-ʾinnamā wuḍiʿa ʿalā l-taʾnīṯi fī l-ʾaṣli li-ʾanna kulla jamʿin ʾinnamā yaṣīru muʾannaṯan fī kalāmihim bi-sababi kawnihi dāllan ʿalā ʿadadin fawqa l-iṯnayni, fa-ʾiḏā ṣāra l-muḏakkaru fī naḥwi rijālin muʾannaṯan bi-sababi ʿurūḍi hāḏā l-ʿaraḍi, fa-taʾnītu l-ʿaraḍi fī nafsihi ʾawlā

[The numerals] were originally coined in the feminine form, since each plural form becomes feminine in the language [of the Arabs], as it signifies a number above two. If a masculine noun [in the plural], such as *rijāl* 'men' may be treated as feminine, because of that accidental factor, *a fortiori* it is appropriate to use the feminine form in [the word that signifies] that accidental attribute (i.e., in the numeral).[159]

In speaking about plural forms that are treated as feminine, RDA probably has in mind the possibility to mentally substitute nouns in the plural by the word *jamāʿa* 'group', a feminine noun. If the plural meaning that accidently joins the word may allow speakers to treat as feminine words whose singular form is masculine,[160] it is only natural for the numeral in the basic form which signifies that accidental meaning to appear in the femimine form.

The plural meaning determines the grammatical rule regarding plural nouns, so we would have expected to find terms derived from the root *ṭ-r-ʾ* (rather than *ʿ-r-ḍ*) in this context. However, RDA wants to create a link between the plural form and numerals used in isolation. Since these numerals are presented as more basic than other numerals, one cannot use the notion of 'pouncing' to refer to it. But notion of accidentality can be used, "since [such a numeral] signifies quantity, which is an accidental attribute" (*li-ʾannahu min bābi kam, wa-huwa ʿaraḍun*).[161] Quantity is one of the types of accidental attributes recognized by the logicians,[162] so that RDA is forced to speak of the plural meaning of nouns such as *rijāl* in terms of accidentality.

RDA goes on with his explanation:

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159   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 286.
160   According to Wright (1896–1898:II, 290), if a subject is a noun in a sound plural form or in a broken plural form denoting persons of the male sex, the preceding verb is usually put in the masc. sing.; however, if the subject is a broken plural form, the preceding verb may be either masc. or fem. (even if the subject denotes persons of the male sex).
161   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 286.
162   For instance, Fārābī (*Manṭiq* I, 90) recognizes 10 categories that include all possible genera and species. Only one of them is entity (*jawhar*), and the rest, including quantity, are attributes (*ʿaraḍ*). See Fārābī, *Manṭiq* I, 93–99 for a detailed discussion of the category of quantity.

ṯumma ʾinnahu ġalaba ʿalā ʾalfāẓi l-ʿadadi l-taʿbīru bihā ʿalā l-maʿdūdi, fa-ṭaraʾa ʿalayhā ʾiḏan maʿnā l-waṣfi llaḏī huwa maʿnā l-ʾasmāʾi l-muštaqqati, ʾiḏ ṣāra maʿnā rijālun ṯalāṯatun rijālun maʿdūdatun bi-hāḏā l-ʿadadi, lākin-na maʿa ġalabati l-waṣfi ʿalayhā kāna stiʿmāluhā ġayra tābiʿatin li-mawṣūfi-hā ʾaġlaba, fa-stiʿmālu naḥwi ṯalāṯatu rijālin ʾaġlabu min-i stiʿmāli rijālun ṯalāṯatun, wa-ʾin kāna l-ṯānī ʾayḍan kaṯīra l-istiʿmāli, wa-ḏālika li-ʾajli mu-rāʿati ʾaṣli hāḏihi l-ʾalfāẓi fī l-jumūdi, wa-li-qaṣdi l-taḫfīfi ʾayḍan ʾiḏ bi-ʾiḍāfa-tihā ʾilā maʿdūdātihā yaḥṣulu l-taḫfīfu bi-ḥaḏfi l-tanwīni

Then (i.e., after the basic coinage of an isolated numeral in the feminine form) the use of the numerals to count things (rather than in isolation) became dominant. [The numerals] were pounced on by the meaning of an adjective, which is [characteristic] of morphologically derived nouns. Thus the meaning of *rijālun ṯalāṯatun* 'three men' is *rijālun maʿdūdatun bi-hāḏā l-ʿadadi* 'men that are counted by this number'. Although the [function] of adjective became dominant [in the case of numerals], their use not as a head noun's *tawābiʿ* is more common [than their use as *taw-ābiʿ*]. Thus the use of [structures such as] *ṯalāṯatu rijālin* 'three men' (in annexation) is more common than the use of [structures such as] *rijālun ṯalāṯatun* 'three men' (head noun+adjectival qualifier)—in spite of the fact that the latter is also common. [The wider distribution of annexation structures in the numbers 3–10] can be explained by taking into account the basic [coinage] of those expressions (i.e., the numerals) as underived, and by seeking lightness—since annexing [the numeral] to the counted noun achieves lightness by omitting the *tanwīn*.[163]

Here RDA presents the meaning/function of an adjective as something that becomes dominant in relation to the numerals. He does not say explicitly what is necessitated by that meaning, but it can be deduced that he has in mind an adjective's syntactic properties, such as the potential to function as an adjectival qualifier that agrees with the head noun in gender, case etc. The paraphrase *rijālun ṯalāṯatun = rijālun maʿdūdatun ...* is needed since *ṯalāṯa* ori-ginally did not function as an adjectival qualifier.

RDA demonstrates that the adjectival meaning became common in numer-als and they frequently function as qualifiers. Thus they can behave as mor-phologically derived adjectives in terms of *tāʾ marbūṭa* as a marker that dis-tinguishes between the masculine and the feminine forms—a phenomenon

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163 RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 287.

that is rare in underived nouns.[164] That being the case, although the use of numerals as qualifiers is less common than their other usages, it is still common enough to allow their adjectiveness to 'dominate': this adjectiveness is a pouncing factor, and indeed determines the grammatical rule that operates on numerals. This is the reason why numerals should agree in gender with the counted noun (had the numeral not had the meaning of an adjective such agreement would not have existed). One could call this analogical leveling of a kind: the agreement in gender is required throughout the system of numerals (and not only when they function as qualifiers).

Two important points that were raised in the discussion so far are: (1) the most basic form of numerals is an isolated form with the ending *tāʾ marbūṭa*; (2) gender agreement between the numeral and the counted noun stems from the adjectival meaning that pounced on the numeral. RDA uses these two points to explain why the numeral that refers to a counted masculine noun is the one that takes the *tāʾ marbūṭa*: he says that the numeral that refers to a masculine noun stays "in the feminine form in which it was coined" (*ʿalā taʾnīṯihā l-mawḍūʿati hiya ʿalayhi*). *Tāʾ marbūṭa*, which should signify the feminineness of the word which it joins, signifies in these cases the feminineness of the phrase's head noun.[165]

RDA notes that one can treat a noun in the plural as a feminine form, but one cannot treat it as a masculine singular or dual form. In other words, a head noun in the plural cannot take an adjectival qualifier in the masculine singular or dual, whereas speakers say *rijālun ṯalāṯatun* 'three men' (with *tāʾ marbūṭa* in the numeral) just as they say *rijālun ḍāribatun* 'hitting men' (with *tāʾ marbūṭa* in the adjective). Even when the numeral functions as the head noun in an annexation (not as a qualifier), e.g., in the phrase *ṯalāṯatu rijālin* 'three men', the numeral appears in the feminine form, since the counted noun comes in the same form whether it functions as the head noun in relation to an adjectival qualifier or as the governed element in an annexation (RDA refers here to the governed element as *mumayyiz* 'distinguishing constituent').[166] Once again an argument of leveling type is used: structures in which the numeral functions as the head noun in an annexation behave analogously to structures in which the numeral functions as an adjectival qualifier. In both cases a numeral in feminine form (i.e., with *tāʾ marbūṭa*) refers to a counted noun in the masculine plural.

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164   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 287–288.

165   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 288.

166   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 288.

After explaining why the numeral that refers to the masculine takes a feminine form, RDA still has to explain why the numeral that refers to the feminine takes a masculine form (i.e., without *tāʾ marbūṭa*). He says that if the *tāʾ marbūṭa* were to join numerals that refer to both masculine and feminine counted nouns, it would resemble the ending of underived nouns, such as *ġurfa* 'room'. The reason for omitting that ending when the numeral refers to a counted noun in the feminine is:

> *li-ʾanna taʾnīṯahu ḫafiyyun, fa-ka-ʾannahu muḏakkarun, bi-l-nisbati ʾilā taʾnīṯi jamʿi l-muḏakkari, wa-ʾinnamā qultu ḏālika li-ʾanna taʾnīṯa jamʿi l-muʾannaṯi l-muʿtabara huwa l-ʿāriḍu bi-sababi l-jamʿiyyati ka-taʾnīṯi jamʿi l-muḏakkari, lā llaḏī kāna qablahā*

> Because the feminineness [of the feminine plural] is hidden, it is as if [the word] was masculine, in comparison to the masculine plural. I argue thus because the feminineness of the feminine plural, which is taken into account [for the sake of agreement], is the one that appears accidentally due to the plural form, not that [feminineness] that existed [in the noun] before [it became plural].[167]

That is to say, in the case of nouns in the plural, the original feminineness of the singular form is not taken into account. A noun in the plural can be treated as if it were feminine singular, because it can be replaced by the word *jamāʿa* 'group' (which is feminine singular), and this is true equally for plural forms whose singular is masculine and feminine. RDA adds that if the original feminineness were taken into account for the sake of agreement in nouns in the plural, one would not be able to treat those nouns as masculine singular and say *wa-qāla niswatun* Q. 12/30: 'and [certain] women [that were in the city] said' (with the verb in masc. sing.)—just as one cannot say *qāla mraʾatun 'a woman said' (with the verb in masc. sing.).[168] RDA has thus explained why plural forms of feminine nouns may be treated as masculine. It is now also clear why he uses the term 'accidental' to speak of the feminineness of plural forms, although it frequently affects the grammatical rule—since that feminineness is not taken into account in some cases.

The explanation continues:

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167   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 290.
168   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 290.

kamā ʾazāla l-taʾnīṯu l-ʿāriḍu l-taḏkīra l-ʾaṣliyya fī rijālin wa-ʾayyāmin, ʾazāla
l-taʾnīṯa l-ʾaṣliyya ʾayḍan fī niswatin, lākinna hāḏā l-ṭāriʾa ẓāhirun mašhū-
run fī rijālin ḫafiyyun fī niswatin, li-ʾanna l-šayʾa lā yanfaʿilu ʿan miṯlihi
nfiʿālahu ʿan ḍiddihi

The accidental feminineness removed the original feminineness in nouns
such as *niswa* 'women' (the plural form of *imraʾa*, fem.) just as it removed
the original masculineness in *rijāl* 'men' and *ʾayyām* 'days' (the plural
forms of masc. *rajul* and *yawm*, respectively). However, that pouncing
[feminineness] is overt and prominent in *rijāl*, but hidden in *niswa*, as
a thing is not affected by something similar to it as much as it is affected
by its opposite.[169]

In other words, there is a difference between numerals related to a counted
noun whose singular form is feminine, and numerals related to a counted noun
whose singular form is masculine. Since numerals have taken on an adjectival
meaning, which necessitates agreement in gender with the counted noun (as
demonstrated above), and since what counts in this case is not the original
gender of the counted noun's singular form, but the pouncing feminineness
of the plural (i.e., the possibility of replacing the plural form with *jamāʿa*), the
numeral chosen to refer to plural forms whose singular is masculine is the fem-
inine numeral (with *tāʾ marbūṭa*). This is so because in those plural forms the
effect of the pouncing feminineness is stronger—since it allows to refer to a
masculine plural form as if it were feminine. In contrast, in plural forms whose
singular is feminine the effect of the pouncing feminineness is 'hidden'—since
virtually nothing changes, and one could think that the original feminineness
(and not the pouncing one) is still taken into account. Thus a word such as
niswa, whose feminineness is 'hidden' may behave as if it were masculine—in
its agreement with a numeral, and sometimes in its agreement with a verb (see
the abovementioned Qurʾānic example *wa-qāla niswatun*). Therefore speak-
ers say *rijālun ṯalāṯatun* 'three men' (with a feminine numeral that reflects the
pouncing feminineness, which is dominant), and *nisāʾun ṯalāṯun* 'three women'
(with a masculine numeral, that was chosen for the sake of differentiation from
the *rijāl* case, and because the pouncing feminineness in *nisāʾ* is less prominent
than in *rijāl*). The *tāʾ marbūṭa*, that originally marked the feminineness of the
isolated numeral, now marks the feminineness of the counted noun.[170]

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169   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 290.
170   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 290. In contrast to this elaborate argumentation, Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 791)
      says that the numeral *ṯalāṯa* 'three' can be replaced with the word *jamāʿa*. The masculine

The entire abovementioned discussion applies to numerals that refer to nouns in the broken plural (RDA states elsewhere that replacement by *jamāʿa* is irrelevant for sound masculine plural forms[171]). The broken plural forms are the ones that are taken into account while discussing the numerals 3–10, since in nouns that are counted by these numerals the broken plural is more frequent that the sound plural.[172]

The various examples discussed in this chapter show that RDA is not entirely consistent in his use of terms derived from the roots *ṭ-r-ʾ* and *ʿ-r-ḍ*. This is not surprising, since the two sets of terms share salient features: both roots denote an element that is secondary, impermanent, and which is not part of the essence of the thing in question. However, in most cases the terms from the first set refer to elements that affect the grammatical rule, whereas the terms from the latter set usually refer to elements that do not affect the rule.[173] In the infrequent cases where the accidental element is presented as affecting the rule, that formulation serves to demonstrate the weakness of the rule in question that allows it to be affected by such a negligible element.

In the section dealing with terms derived from the root *ṭ-r-ʾ* the material was arranged according to the types of rules affected by the pouncing elements. The conclusion is that the main affected rules are those related to *ʾiʿrāb/bināʾ* endings in the three parts of speech, to the grammatical definiteness and to the agreement.

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is prior to the feminine, thus the feminineness of *jamāʿa* determines the form of numerals that refer to the masculine. Numerals that refer to the feminine take the masculine form, although they also can be replaced with the word *jamāʿa*—in order to distinguish between the masculine and the feminine in cases when the distinguishing constituent (*al-mumayyiz*) does not appear. An alternative explanation of the masculine form of numerals that refer to the feminine is that this helps avoid combining two feminine markers in two constituents that are equivalent to a single one (since together they signify the same group). A phrase such as **ṯalāṯatu niswatin* would include two *tāʾ marbūṭa*s, which would be problematic. See Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 791. This last argument seems artificial, since in broken plurals the *tāʾ marbūṭa* is not a feminine marker. The evidence is its appearance also in broken plural forms of masculine nouns, e.g., *jawāb*—*ʾajwiba* 'answer—answers'. A numeral that refers to *ʾajwiba* must take the *tāʾ marbūṭa*. Unlike RDA, Ibn al-Ḥājib in his discussion does not use terms derived from the roots *ṭ-r-ʾ* or *ʿ-r-ḍ*.

171 See pp. 145–146 above for a discussion.

172 RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 291.

173 ʾAsadī (2014:44) also reaches the same conclusion. In addition, he puts stress on a logical contradiction between the pouncing element and the one pounced on—see, e.g., ʾAsadī 2014:51, 59–60. He (2014:47) holds that with the accidental element such a contradiction does not exist, and this is yet another method to distinguish between terms derived from the roots *ṭ-r-ʾ* and *ʿ-r-ḍ*. At least in RDA's case, ʾAsadī's claim does not seem justified.

In the section dealing with terms derived from the root *ʿ-r-ḍ* the material was organized according to the realm in which the accidental element appears (the type of grammatical rule discussed in each example is less relevant here, since the element in question is not expected to affect the rule). The conclusion is that an accidental element can appear in the realms of morphology, syntax and semantics. At the morphological level the accidental element is usually a morpheme that can be detached from the word (in contrast to an undetachable morpheme) or a constituent used in non-basic/non-primary usage. At the syntactic level the accidentality is usually manifested as a non-basic or non-permanent position of the constituent. In the chapter dealing with the semantic level the examples are the most numerous and diverse. It can be inferred that semantic phenomena that have no formal manifestation are less liable to affect the rule than morphological/syntactic phenomena. This hypothesis is supported by the examples from the chapter dealing with cases in which the accidental element does affect the rule: the rule affected by such an element is usually based on semantic considerations (positive/negative meaning of the sentence, semantic resemblance between *mā* and *laysa*, etc).

Terms Related to the Form-Meaning Relation

Kouloughli (1983:55) claims that the variety of semantics-related tems in the medieval Arabic grammatical literature was very limited. He uses this claim as evidence for his argument that the interest of medieval grammarians in semantic and pragmatic aspects of the language was relatively low. Kouloughli's claim does not seem justified in the case of RDA or earlier grammarians.[1] RDA uses a wide assortment of terms to refer to the linguistic signs' denotation/signification: *maʿnā*, *dalāla/madlūl*, *musammā* and *maḍmūn*.[2] In addition, the verb *waqaʿa ʿalā* lit. 'fell on' is used to speak of a meaning that a linguistic element can have in some of its appearances (or of a referent to which an element can refer in some of its appearances).

It can be expected that differentiating among these terms would not be easy. For instance, Ġazzālī in the beginning of his book on God's attributes presents terms derived from the roots *d-l-l* and *s-m-w* as synonymous in the context of signifying a meaning. He explains:

> *iʿlam ʾanna kulla mawḍūʿin li-l-dalālati fa-lahu wāḍiʿun wa-waḍʿun wa-mawḍūʿun lahu, yuqālu li-l-mawḍūʿi lahu musamman wa-huwa l-madlūlu ʿalayhi min ḥaytu ʾinnahu yadullu ʿalayhi, wa-yuqālu li-l-wāḍiʿi l-musammiya wa-yuqālu li-l-wāḍiʿi l-tasmiyata*

> Know that any [expression] that was coined to signify [a meaning] has a coiner, a coinage and the one for which it was coined. The one for which [the expression] was coined is called *musammā* 'a named one', and it is *al-madlūl ʿalayhi* 'the one signified [by the expression]', as [the expression] signifies it. The coiner is the name giver, and the [act of] coinage is the name giving.[3]

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1 See Sheyhatovitch 2012 for various examples of semantic and pragmatic discussions in the works of grammarians from the 3/9–5/11th centuries.

2 RDA also uses terms derived from the roof *f-y-d* to refer to denotation/signification; however, those terms are not treated here, since they have already been thoroughly dealt with in a previous study—see Sheyhatovitch 2012, and *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* offers no essential innovations in the use of that terminology.

3 Ġazzālī, *Maqṣad*, 12.

However, it seems useful to study the abovementioned terms in the various contexts in which they are used, at least in RDA's writings, since they differ—in the intentions regulating their choice, the kinds of meaning represented by them, the types of linguistic expressions to which they refer, etc.

5.1   *Ma'nā*

Kouloughli (1983) and Frank (1981) dedicated papers to the term *ma'nā*; however, they concentrated on earlier stages of medieval Arabic grammatical theory, and did not intend to distinguish between that term and others referring to the form-meaning relation. Therefore, most of their conclusions are irrelevant for the current study. Versteegh (1997a) surveys the development of semantics in the medieval Arabic tradition with a special focus on the term *ma'nā*, which, in his view, is a notion that is both broader and narrower than 'meaning'. Some of his findings are relevant for RDA, especially *ma'nā* as "abstract notion" and *ma'nā* as "the function of a morphological or syntactic category".[4] Kouloughli (2008) focuses on the relationship between *lafẓ* and *ma'nā* as perceived by various Muslim scholars, stressing in this context the contribution of Jurjānī (d. 471/1078).

The word *ma'nā* appears in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* more than 800 times. I translate it in most cases as 'meaning'[5] (save for one use of the term, which will be presented later).

RDA defines the expression *ma'nā l-lafẓ* 'the meaning of a linguistic expression' as "something that is meant, i.e., intended by [the expression]" (*mā yu'nā bihi 'ay yurādu*).[6] Several characteristics of use of the term *ma'nā* in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* can be discerned. First of all, it usually refers to a relatively abstract meaning. In some cases the term refers to a meaning that exists (or does not exist) in an element; sometimes it refers to a component of the meaning (and not to the meaning as a whole); sometimes it refers to the element's function. The term occasionally refers to the meaning of units that are larger or smaller than a word—although in most of its appearances it refers to a meaning of a word. These points help to distinguish between *ma'nā* and other terms related to the form-meaning relation.

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4   Versteegh 1997a:231.

5   Frank (1981:262) also maintains that although the term is complicated, it can be translated in the context of grammatical literature as 'meaning'. Kouloughli (1983:46) argues that in early sources the term is closer to 'intention' than to 'semantic meaning', but this statement does not seem to fit RDA's usage (although it does fit his own definition of the term).

6   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 22.

5.1.1 Ma'nā *as Abstract Meaning*

The term *ma'nā* refers mostly to abstract ideas[7] (rather than to concrete entities—unlike the terms *dalāla/madlūl* and *musammā* that will be discussed below). In other words, it usually refers to second- and third-order, not to first-order entities.[8]

To give some examples, RDA speaks of "the meaning of the conditional" (*ma'nā l-šarṭ*) created in a sentence by a conditional word;[9] "the meaning of [the particles] *li-/min*" (*ma'nā l-lām/min*) that exists in the governed element in an annexation;[10] the meaning created in a nominal sentence by factors that cancel the mutual grammatical government of the subject and the predicate (RDA, unlike most other grammarians, holds that the subject and the predicate assign the *raf'* case to each other[11]), such as *kāna* 'he was', *ẓanna* 'he thought', *kāda* 'he was on the point of (doing sth.)',[12] whose meaning is clearly abstract; "the meaning of the sentence" (*al-ma'nā l-kalāmī*) signified by *na'am* 'yes';[13] "the predicative meaning" (*ma'nā l-ʾisnād*);[14] "the meaning of time/place expressions" (*ma'nā l-ẓarfiyya*);[15] etc.

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7   According to Versteegh (1997a:250) the use of *ma'nā* in the sense of "abstract notion" may be related to the Stoic grammar, where the term *prãgma* was used to indicate abstract notions. The idea of abstractness that is usually linked to *ma'nā* can probably explain another use of the term—to speak of an element that has no formal manifestation, or a non-formal consideration in determining the grammatical rule, or an analysis based on non-formal considerations. In this use the term *ma'nā* is frequently contrasted with *lafẓ* lit. 'form/expression' (in some contexts—'a formal consideration in determining the rule/an analysis based on formal considerations'). See, e.g., RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 269, 277, 521; II, 7, 43, 45, 113. Kouloughli (1983:45–46) demonstrates that the terms *lafẓ* and *ma'nā* in their original senses are not opposites: according to his interpretation, *lafẓ* is equivalent to "linguistic sign" in modern terminology (rather than "signifier", as one would intuitively think), and *ma'nā* is equivalent to "the speaker's intention".

8   This distinction is accepted in modern semantics. First-order entities are physical objects (people, animals and inanimate objects; the ontological status of states and places is unclear); second-order entities are events, processes, etc., that exist in time and place; third-order entities are abstract entities that do not exist in time and place (such are, e.g., propositions). See Lyons 1977:II, 442–445 and Borochovsky 2001:36.

9   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 63; II, 139; III, 187, 200; IV, 44, 89, 102, 410.

10 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 64; II, 207.

11 See pp. 38–39 above for a discussion on this topic.

12 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 67. The meaning of doubt, characteristic to cognitive verbs, is mentioned also in RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 166; the meaning of *kāna* is mentioned also in RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 215, 222.

13 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 201. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 337) does not use the term *ma'nā* in this context. He says: "[that particle] can convey its meaning [completely] only together with a nominal or verbal clause" (*lā yufīdu ʾillā ma'a jumlatin fiʿliyyatin ʾaw-i smiyyatin*). Thus, if a clause is not mentioned, it should be reconstructed.

14 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 255.

15 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 279; II, 202.

Cases in which the term refers to less abstract ideas (first- and second-order entities) are much less frequent. For instance, RDA speaks of "the dominance of the words *al-jumʿa* and *al-sabt* in the sense of days [of the week] (i.e., in the sense of 'Friday' and 'Saturday', respectively)" (*ġalabatu l-jumʿati wa-l-sabti fī maʿnā l-yawmayni*)—although the original meanings of these verbal nouns are 'meeting' and 'rest', respectively.[16] In addition, in the context of discussing the meaning of personal pronouns the term *maʿnā* refers to a meaning whose level of abstraction is relatively low.[17]

It can be concluded from the examples presented in the current section that the term *maʿnā* in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* refers to ideas or mental representations (and not to objects in the external world). While discussing proper nouns shared by several referents in comparison to homonyms, RDA says explicitly that a proper noun always has the same meaning (*maʿnā*).[18] It may have multiple various referents, but it always corresponds to the same mental representation—a human being (or something else, if it is a proper noun characteristic to something other than human beings) named by that noun.

In Islamic philosophy *maʿnā* is perceived as an idea that underlies the linguistic expression or as a mental representation of that expression. For instance, Ibn Sīnā defines *maʿnā* as "something grasped by the mind using things grasped by the senses, whereas [the *maʿnā*] itself is not grasped by the senses" (*al-šayʾu llaḏī tudrikuhu l-nafsu min-a l-maḥsūsi min ġayri ʾan yudrikahu l-ḥissu*), whereas al-Šarīf Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) defines *maʿānī* (pl. of *maʿnā*) as "mental images [...] for which the linguistic expressions were coined" (*al-ṣuwaru l-ḏihniyyatu* [...] *wuḍiʿa bi-ʾizāʾihā l-ʾalfāẓu*).[19]

5.1.2   Maʿnā *as a (Non-)existent Meaning of an Element*
Sometimes RDA uses the term *maʿnā* to speak of a meaning that exists (or does not exist) in a linguistic element. This distinction is necessary since, according to his approach, not every element has a meaning, as some elements' function is formal only.

For instance, *ʿadl* 'anomaly' (this phenomenon is mentioned by Ibn al-Ḥājib as one of the nine factors a combination of any two of which is supposed to

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16   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 254.
17   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 409–410.
18   The relevant passage is discussed on p. 97 above.
19   Those two definitions (from *Kitāb al-Najāt* and *Kitāb al-Taʿrīfāt*, respectively) are cited without a translation in Afnan 1964:115 in the context of a discussion on the Greek origins of the term *maʿnā*.

render a noun dipotote)[20] means, according to RDA, "removing the noun from its basic form without mutation,[21] neither for the sake of lightening, nor for the sake of appending,[22] nor for [creating a new] meaning" (*ʾiḫrāǧu l-ismi ʿan ṣīġatihi l-ʾaṣliyyati bi-ġayri l-qalbi, lā li-l-taḫfīfi, lā li-l-ʾilḥāqi wa-lā li-maʿnan*).[23] The change in the form of the word meant here is one that is not determined by morpho-phonological processes and its purpose is not to create a new meaning. Thus, a change in a word's form to create a broken plural or a diminutive is not considered *ʿadl*.

Another example: the accusative pronoun of the 1st person singular must be preceded by *nūn al-wiqāya* in all forms of perfect verbs, whereas in an imperfect verb that pronoun must be preceded by *nūn al-wiqāya* in all forms except those that have the *n* of the indicative (*nūn al-ʾiʿrāb*),[24] namely the 2nd person sing. fem., 2nd person pl. masc., 3rd person pl. masc., and both dual forms.[25] The *n* of the indicative can substitute for *nūn al-wiqāya*, unlike the pronominal *n* (the ending of the 2nd person pl. fem. and 3rd person pl. fem. in an imperfect verb) and both *n*'s of the energetic imperfect verb, "the light and the heavy" (*al-ḫafīfa wa-l-ṯaqīla*[26]). The explanation for this difference in behavior is: if we are to add *nūn al-wiqāya* after the *n* of the indicative, "it would be a sequence of two similar things inside one unit" (*kāna ǧtimāʿu l-miṯlayni fī l-kulli ḥāṣilan*). That is because the *n* of the indicative has no semantic meaning (*maʿnā*), just like *nūn al-wiqāya*, since, according to the Baṣran approach, "the *ʾiʿrāb* of the verb has no meaning (i.e., no semantic function)" (*ʾiʿrābu l-fiʿli laysa li-maʿnan*[27]). In the

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20 See RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 100–101. 'Anomaly' is Carter's translation. He explains (1981:76–79) that it refers to words that appear to be a deviation from more common patterns.

21 This is the translation chosen by Bohas et al. (1990:21) for the term *qalb*.

22 This translation is taken from Baalbaki (2008:147 ff.), who considers "appending" as "the most important technique which Sībawayhi applies in order to limit the enormous number of Arabic words to a 'manageable' set which includes only the 'basic' ones, and to consider the less frequent or apparently anomalous ones as modified versions of the main patterns to which they belong [...] *ʾIlḥāq* according to Sībawayhi is a parallel process which can explain a large number of words whose augments make them congruent, in their number of radicals and metric measure (*wazn*)". See Baalbaki 2008:147–152 for a further discussion.

23 See RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 113.

24 I choose to translate *nūn al-ʾiʿrāb* as '*n* of the indicative', instead of the more literal '*n* of the *ʾiʿrāb*/mood', as this morpheme is characteristic of the indicative.

25 Wright (1896–1898:I, 102) describes this phenomenon as omitting the *n* in the ending of imperfect verbs, in the 2nd person sing. fem., 2nd person pl. masc., and 3rd person pl. masc. before the accusatival bound pronouns -*nī/nā* (i.e., he does not link this omission to the *nūn al-wiqāya*).

26 See Wright 1896–1898:I, 61 for a discussion of these two endings.

27 This opinion is presented alongside the opposing Kūfan view in RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 17–18.

framework of that view, the function of the *n* of the indicative is formal only, unlike the pronominal *n* and the *n* of the energetic verb.[28]

RDA notes that this explanation suits the position of grammarians who maintain that the morpheme omitted in the abovementioned cases is *nūn al-wiqāya*—e.g., Juzūlī holds this opinion.[29] According to Sībawayhi, the *n* of the indicative is the one omitted—since it is omitted also in the subjunctive and jussive, and since it has no semantic meaning.[30] In addition to omitting the *n* of the indicative because of the *nūn al-wiqāya*, there is an option of *ʾidġām*[31] and of leaving the sequence of *n*'s as is.[32]

Elsewhere RDA explains that *yāʾ al-nisba* cannot be combined with a broken plural in a single word. Thus one cannot say **rijālī* 'menly', but only *rajulī* 'manly'. If one wishes to create a broken plural form from a word suffixed with *yāʾ al-nisba*, the latter is omitted and replaced by *tāʾ marbūṭa*. Thus, the plural form of *ʾašʿaṯī* 'a descendant of al-ʾAšʿaṯ'[33] is *ʾašāʿiṯa*, and the plural form of *mašhadī* 'related to Mashhad' is *mašāhida*. *Tāʾ marbūṭa* can replace the geminated *yāʾ* because these morphemes resemble each other: both may signify a single individual that belongs to some species, e.g., *tamra* '(a single) date fruit' and *rūmī* 'a Byzantine'; both can signify intensity of some attribute, e.g., *ʿallāma* 'a great scholar' and *dawwārī* 'a one that spins a lot'; and both can be "additions not for the sake of meaning" (*zāʾidatayni lā li-maʿnan*), e.g., *ẓulma* 'darkness' and *kursī* 'chair'.[34]

5.1.3   Maʿnā *as a Component of Meaning*
The term *maʿnā* in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* frequently refers to a component of the meaning of a linguistic expression. For instance, in a discussion concerning the three

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28   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 450.

29   Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 700–701) also maintains that in the aforementioned cases the omitted morpheme is *nūn al-wiqāya*—since the *n* of the indicative can replace *nūn al-wiqāya*, but not *vice versa* (Ibn al-Ḥājib does not explain why), and also because *nūn al-wiqāya* joins the word after the *n* of the indicative and causes "heaviness", thus its omission is more appropriate.

30   I have not found such a discussion in *Kitāb*. RDA may have used a different version of the treatise (or an inaccurate citation by another grammarian).

31   The shift intended here is *yuẓlimāninī > yuẓlimānnī* 'both of them made me dark'. See Danecki 2007 for a list of phenomena that can be denoted by the term *ʾidġām* in Arabic grammatical theory. Interestingly, Danecki (2007:299) claims that Sībawayhi views the shift *yuẓlimāninī > yuẓlimānnī* as obligatory, whereas in fact he presents the shift as acceptable but optional (see Sībawayhi, *Kitāb* I, 456), similarly to RDA.

32   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 450–451.

33   Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān* II, 323.

34   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 327.

parts of speech RDA states that "a meaning of a noun and a verb, as single words, is found in themselves (i.e., in the noun and the verb, respectively)" (*al-maʿnā l-ʾifrādī li-l-ismi wa-l-fiʿli fī ʾanfusihimā*), whereas the meaning of a particle, as a single word, is found in another constituent.[35] RDA here uses the adjective *ʾifrādī* to stress that he has in mind the individual meaning of the word: in context, each word affects others and is also affected by them; however, only in the case of a particle a basic meaning can be defined only in relation to other words. Naturally, the meaning of the particle can be found in other words only as a component of their meaning, since these words have their own basic meanings.

One may claim that an adjective such as *ṭawīl* 'tall' in a sentence such as *jāʾanī rajulun ṭawīlun* 'A tall man came to me' also should be included in the definition of the particle, as it "creates its meaning" (*mūjidun li-maʿnāhu*), i.e., the meaning of tallness, in its head noun, so that the head noun now also contains that meaning.[36] RDA rejects this argument:

> *maʿnā ṭawīlin ḏū ṭūlin, fa-huwa dāllun ʿalā maʿnayayni ʾaḥaduhumā qāʾimun bi-l-ʾāḫari, ʾiḏ-i l-ṭūlu bi-ḏū, fa-maʿnāhu: l-ṭūlu wa-ṣāḥibuhu, lā mujarradu l-ṭūli llaḏī fī rajulin, wa-ʾinnamā ḏukira l-mawṣūfu qablahu li-yuʿayyina ḏālika l-ṣāḥiba llaḏī dalla ʿalayhi ṭawīlun wa-qāma bihi l-ṭūlu lā li-yaqūma bihi l-ṭūlu*

> The meaning of *ṭawīl* 'tall' is 'the possessor of [the attribute of] tallness'; thus, [this adjective] signifies two components of meaning, one of which exists in another, i.e., the tallness exists in its possessor. Therefore, the meaning [of *ṭawīl*] is: the tallness and its possessor, not simply the tallness that exists in *rajul* 'man' (the head noun in relation to *ṭawīl* in the abovementioned example *jāʾanī rajulun ṭawīlun*). The head noun is mentioned before [the adjective] in order to specify that possessor which is signified by *ṭawīl*, in which the [attribute of] tallness exists; not in order for the tallness to exist in it.[37]

In other words, RDA is of the opinion that the substance in which the attribute exists is signified by the adjective itself (and not by the head noun). The adjective signifies the substance vaguely, whereas the function of the head noun is to clarify that substance.

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35   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 37.
36   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 37–38.
37   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 38.

This discussion aims to demonstrate that, unlike the particle, the adject-
ive does not create a meaning in another element. It signifies simultaneously
an attribute and an object in which that attribute exists (the use of the verb
qāma bi- reminds us of the logicians' and theologians' distinction between
a substance, *ḏāt/jawhar/ʿayn*,[38] that does not need anything else in order to
exist, and a property/attribute, *ʿaraḍ*, that does need something else in order to
exist[39]). The noun described by the adjective clarifies the vague substance sig-
nified by it, and this does not contradict the fact that an adjective has its own
independent meaning.

In this discussion the term *maʿnā* refers to each of the two components of
meaning of the adjective *ṭawīl*, and also to the word's meaning as a whole.

Another example appears in a discussion on diptoteness. RDA addresses
the question of why the effect of feminineness on determining diptoteness is
stronger than the effect of the word's foreign origin, i.e., why masculine proper
nouns of foreign origin, such as Lūṭ and Nūḥ, take all case markers, whereas a
feminine name such as Hind, whose origin is Arabic, can behave as a diptote
noun. All these names include three letters, the second of which is vowelless.[40]
The only differences between the first two and the third are their origin (for-
eign vs. Arabic) and their gender (masculine vs. feminine). Feminineness and
foreign origin appear in the list of factors affecting diptoteness,[41] thus the dif-
ference between the names' morpho-syntactic behavior calls for additional
explanation.

RDA explains:

> *fa-l-taʾnīṯu lahu maʿnan ṯubūtiyyun fī l-ʾaṣli, wa-lahu ʿalāmatun muqad-*
> *daratun taẓharu fī baʿḍi l-taṣarrufāti wa-huwa l-taṣġīru, bi-ḫilāfi l-ʿujmati,*
> *fa-ʾinnahu lā maʿnā lahā ṯubūtiyyun, bal maʿnāhā ʾamrun ʿadamiyyun,*
> *wa-huwa ʾanna l-kalimata laysat min ʾawḍāʿi l-ʿarabi, wa-lā ʿalāmata lahā*
> *muqaddaratun, fa-l-taʾnīṯu ʾaqwā minhā*

> Feminineness has a meaning that in principle should have a positive
> [manifestation]. It has a reconstructable marker that appears in some
> forms [of the noun], viz., in the diminutive. It differs from foreign ori-
> gin, which is a meaning that does not have a positive [manifestation]. Its

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38   See Afnan 1964:99–102 for a discussion on similar uses of these terms in Arabic philosoph-
      ical texts and on their Greek origins.
39   See p. 148 above.
40   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 144.
41   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 101.

> meaning rather has a negative [manifestation], namely, the fact that the name was not coined by the Arabs. It does not have any reconstructable marker, thus feminineness is stronger [than foreign origin].[42]

Here, feminineness and foreign origin are called *ma'nā*, in the sense of a component of a word's meaning (the foreign origin may be viewed as a component of meaning because it has semantic implications, i.e., a lack of meaning in Arabic). There is no word whose entire meaning consists of feminineness or foreignness (besides the words 'feminineness' and 'foreignness' themselves). The difference between these components of meaning is that feminineness should have its own distinctive marker (*tā' marbūṭa*, *'alif maqṣūra* or *'alif mamdūda*), which can be reconstructed even in words such as Hind, in which it does not appear overtly (RDA notes that in such cases it is visible in the diminutive). In contrast, a word of foreign origin has no distinctive marker. It can be recognized by elimination: it has no meaning in Arabic, its form does not fit Arabic patterns, etc. A component of meaning that has a formal manifestation is "stronger" than a component that has no such manifestation, thus feminineness is "stronger" than foreignness in determining diptoteness.[43]

5.1.4   Ma'nā *as Functional Meaning*

In some of its appearances in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* the term *ma'nā* comes close to the sense of 'function'—usually when RDA speaks of the *ma'nā* of some part of speech or of a syntactic constituent. However, since in these cases a term related to the form-meaning relation was chosen (instead of one of the terms related to syntactic position or function), it seems appropriate to translate it as 'functional meaning' (to distinguish it from lexical meaning).

For instance, RDA says that *tanwīn* signifies (*dāll*) the end of the noun and the fact that it has no governed element. He adds that "despite that functional meaning [of the *tanwīn*]" (*ma'a 'ifādatihi hāḏā l-ma'nā*), there are five types of *tanwīn*.[44] This differs from the *n* in the ending of the masculine sound plural and of the dual—that morpheme does not have those five usages (although it is also considered as *tanwīn* of a kind). This is the reason why the latter *n* is not omitted either when the noun is preceded by the definite article (since it does not have the meaning of indefiniteness) or after the vocative *yā* or *lā l-nāfiya li-l-jins*—although in these two structures the noun takes a *binā'* ending and thus

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42   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 144.

43   See RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 149–150 for another discussion related to diptoteness, in which the term *ma'nā* refers to plurality and adjectiveness as components of meaning of proper nouns.

44   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 87. See RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 45 for a discussion of the five types of *tanwīn*.

loses the regular *tanwīn*, the *n* in question does not have a meaning of syntactic plasticity, and thus is not omitted.[45]

The term *maʿnā* refers to syntactic function also when RDA speaks of "a functional meaning of an essential/optional constituent of the sentence" (*maʿnā kawnihi ʿumdata l-kalāmi/faḍlatan*).[46] Elsewhere RDA presents the Baṣran approach to the governor that assigns the *naṣb* case to the direct object. He says that the governor is the verb or a constituent that resembles it. He explains: "because of [the verb or a verb-like constituent] a functional meaning is created that necessitates the *rafʿ*, i.e., the function of the subject of the verbal sentence, or the function that necessitates the *naṣb*, i.e., the function of the object" (*bihi yataqawwamu l-maʿnā l-muqtaḍī li-l-rafʿi ʾay-i l-fāʿiliyyatu,*[47] *ʾaw-i l-maʿnā l-muqtaḍī li-l-naṣbi ʾay-i l-mafʿūliyyatu*).[48]

In two other examples the term *maʿnā* refers to a function characteristic of one part of speech, performed in the cases in question by another part of speech. The first example is taken from a discussion of cases where the verbal predicate must be omitted. Here RDA follows Ibn al-Ḥājib in presenting Q. 9/6 *wa-ʾin ʾaḥadun min-a l-mušrikīna stajāraka* 'And if any of the idolaters seeks of thee protection' as a case in which the verbal predicate was omitted obligatorily. The grammarians reconstruct this sentence as *wa-ʾin-i stajāraka ʾaḥadun min-a l-mušrikīna stajāraka*.[49] Such a reconstruction is required, because there must be a governor that assigns *rafʿ* to *ʾaḥadun*. The latter cannot be the subject of a nominal sentence, since *ʾin* must be followed by a verbal clause. The verb *istajāraka* that originally followed the conditional particle was omitted, as it is unnecessary, because of the second appearance of the same verb that "clarifies" the omitted one.[50]

RDA proceeds to explain the purpose of the abovementioned step (i.e., using the "clarifying" verb that allows omitting the first appearance of the same verb), which he calls "obscuring followed by clarification" (*al-ʾibhām ṯumma l-tafsīr*[51]):

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45   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 87.

46   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 62. The relevant fragment is discussed on p. 34 above.

47   See RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 236 for another discussion that includes the expression *maʿnā l-fāʿiliyyati*.

48   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 335. Interestingly, RDA himself prefers the Kūfan approaches to the abovementioned questions—see RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 335–336.

49   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 199.

50   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 199.

51   This is a rhetorical device that RDA mentions several times. The "obscuring" does not have to be related to omission; in some cases it means using a general expression that is clarified by another constituent in the context. For instance, RDA presents the *ḍamīr al-ša'n* as *al-ʾibhām ṯumma l-tafsīr*—see RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 465. The term *ʾibhām* deserves a separate study.

"to create an impression in the [addressees'] minds" (*ʾiḥdāṯu waqʿin fī l-nufūsi*). When the person hears something vague, his mind desires to know what is intended. Additionally, when something is mentioned twice, first vaguely and then explicitly, there is an emphasis that cannot be achieved by a single mention.[52]

The constituent that clarifies a reconstructable verb may be an explicit verb (as in the abovementioned Qurʾānic verse), or "a particle that conveys the functional meaning of a verb" (*ḥarfun yuʾaddī maʿnā l-fiʿli*), such as *ʾanna* "that was coined to denote certainty and fulfillment" (*al-mawḍūʿa li-l-ṯubūt wa-l-taḥqīq*), and indeed denotes the meanings 'was certain' and 'was fulfilled'. In order for the particle to convey the meaning of a reconstructable verb, the predicate of the clause that follows that particle must be a verb in the past tense, and the combination of the two (i.e., the particle and the verbal predicate) must be equivalent to an explicit verb. This happens particularly after *law* 'if (introducing counterfactual conditional clauses)', e.g., Q. 39/57 *law ʾanna llāha hadānī* 'If only God had guided me', which is equivalent to *law ṯabata wa-taḥaqqaqa ʾanna llāha hadānī* 'If only it was certain and true that God had guided me'. *ʾAnna* "together with [the constituents] in its domain" (*maʿa mā fī ḥayyizihā*[53]) functions as the subject of that reconstructable verb.

Elsewhere RDA states that a verbal noun "can appear only in the position of a verb preceded by *ʾan*, and conveys the meaning of only such a verb" (*lā yaqaʿu mawqiʿa l-fiʿli wa-lā yufīdu fāʾidatahu ʾillā maʿa ḍamīmatin wa-hiya ʾan*)—unlike an adjective, that can "convey a functional meaning of a verb that has no supplement" (*tuʾaddī maʿnā l-fiʿli bi-lā ḍamīmatin*). For instance, in the sentence *ʾaʿjabanī ḍarbu Zaydin ʿAmran* 'I liked Zayd's beating of ʿAmr' the phrase *ḍarbu Zaydin ʿAmran* (whose head is a verbal noun) is equivalent to *ʾan ḍaraba Zaydun ʿAmran*, whereas in the sentence *Zaydun ḍāribun ʿAmran* 'Zayd is hitting ʿAmr', *ḍāribun ʿAmran* (an adjectival phrase whose head noun is an

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52   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 199.

53   RDA probably has in mind the entire clause that follows *ʾanna*. The term *ḥayyiz* in RDA's *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* calls for additional study. An analysis of that term may help us to better understand the development of the notions of phrase/clause in medieval Arabic grammatical theory. The grammarians usually do not divide a sentence into phrases, but rather assign each word its own syntactic function. However, RDA sometimes uses the term *ḥayyiz* while speaking about units consisting of several words but smaller than a sentence—e.g., constituents that are "in the domain" of *ʾillā* (RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 351); "in the domain" of *ʾinna* (RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 160), "in the domain" of positive meaning (RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 245). See Owens' (1984) study on the noun phrase in Arabic grammatical theory (which includes no reference to the term *ḥayyiz*).

active participle) is equivalent to *yaḍribu ʿAmran* (a verbal clause, including an imperfect verb without *ʾan*).[54]

5.1.5   Maʿnā *as a Meaning of Units Larger/Smaller than a Single Word*

Kouloughli (1983:45) claims, admittedly on the basis of early sources, that one cannot speak of the *maʿnā* of a single word, since the term always refers to an utterance that expresses the speaker's intention.[55] However, in RDA's *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* the term *maʿnā* frequently refers to the meaning of a single word, though it can also refer to the meaning of smaller or larger units.

Units smaller than a word: RDA uses the term *maʿnā* to refer to the functional meaning of *tanwīn*,[56] to the (non-)existent meaning of various kinds of the ending *n* in verbs[57] and to the ending *-ka* that adds "the meaning of the 3rd person" (*maʿnā l-ġaybati*) to the demonstrative pronoun.[58]

Units larger than a word: one such example appears in a discussion of *ʾafʿāl al-muqāraba* 'verbs of appropinquation'. The subject of the clause that functions as a predicate in a clause that follows such verbs should be a pronoun whose antecedent is the subject of the main sentence. This is the reason why one cannot say **kāda Zaydun yaḫruju ġulāmuhu* 'Zayd was on the point of his lad's departing'. The subject of the clausal predicate can be an explicit noun only if it is semantically related to the subject of the main sentence, "so that predicating [the verb] to a noun that is semantically related [to the subject of the main sentence] would have the same meaning as predicating the verb to a pronoun [that refers back] to the noun [functioning as the subject of the main sentence]" (*ʾan yakūna l-musnadu ʾilā sababihi bi-maʿnā l-fiʿli l-musnadi ʾilā ḍamīri l-ismi*). For instance, the sentence *kāda Zaydun taḫruju nafsuhu* 'Zayd was on the point of his soul's departing' has the same meaning as *kāda*

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54   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 224. See also RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 375.
55   This claim is based mostly on a citation from *Kitāb al-Furūq fī l-Luġa* by ʾAbū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī (d. 395/1005), who says, in a discussion of the term *maʿnā*: "God Almighty can be the one intended, but He cannot be the intention" (*allāhu taʿālā huwa l-maʿniyyu wa-laysa l-maʿnā*). The passage is cited in Kouloughli 1983:44. Kouloughli (1983:45) believes that the word *allāh* is used here as an example of a single word, with the intention of demonstrating that one cannot speak of a *maʿnā* of a single word. However, it seems more appropriate to interpret ʿAskarī's use of the word as having the sense of accidental attribute, given the fact that some theologians used *maʿnā* as a synonym of *ʿaraḍ*. It was important for those theologians to stress that one cannot speak of God in terms of *maʿnā*. See, e.g., Frank 1967:250.
56   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 87 (the passage is discussed on pp. 177–178 above).
57   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 450 (the passage is discussed on pp. 173–174 above).
58   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 478.

Zaydun yamūtu 'Zayd was on the point of dying'.[59] Here the term * maʿnā* refers to the combination of two constituents between which there is a predicative relation.

In several other places RDA speaks of clauses that have "a meaning [identical to the meaning of] phrases" (*maʿnā l-mufradi*) and thus can fill various syntactic positions;[60] he also mentions "the meaning of the clause" (*maʿnā l-jumliyyati/l-jumlati*).[61]

Frank (1981:292–295) mentions that the early grammarians frequently present the meaning of a sentence as another sentence, equivalent to the first (rather than the state of affairs in the world or some mental entity); however, in some cases one can deduce that they intend to say that the first sentence has the same meaning as the second (and the meaning is external to both).[62] This analysis seems to be true also for RDA, in cases when he presents the meaning of the sentence/phrase as its paraphrase.

5.2   Terms Derived from the Root *d-l-l*

In this context two main terms will be discussed: *dalāla* 'signification, sense, meaning' (the verbal noun of the verb *dalla*[63]) and *al-madlūl ʿalayhi* lit. 'the one signified [by the expression]' (impersonal passive participle derived from *dalla*, and usually shortened to *madlūl*[64]). Since Arabic verbal nouns can also be used in the sense of passive participles,[65] the terms *dalāla* and *al-madlūl*

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59 RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 219. "The meaning of predication" (*maʿnā l-ʾisnād*) is mentioned also in RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 256.

60 See, e.g., RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 18; IV, 242, 243.

61 See, e.g., RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 51; IV, 242, 341.

62 See Frank 1981:298–299.

63 Frank (1981:286) translates *dalāla* as 'signification'. Tahānawī (*Kaššāf* I, 787) defines it as "[a situation] when knowing one thing necessitates knowing another thing" (*ʾan yakūna l-šayʾu bi-ḥālatin yalzamu min-a l-ʿilmi bihi l-ʿilmu bi-šayʾin ʾāḫara*). He distinguishes between four patterns of *dalāla* (according to the types of things that fill the slots mentioned in the definition). In the context of the form-meaning relation, I discuss uses of *dalāla* that correspond to the pattern in which "the first thing" is a linguistic expression and "the second thing" is not a linguistic expression.

64 Peled (1999:286) translates *madlūluhu* as "the [extralinguistic concept] it signifies".

65 RDA (*Šarḥ* I, 20) is also aware of this point: he notes that the tem *lafẓ* 'expression' as a verbal noun of the verb *lafaẓa* should in principle refer to the action of expressing; however, it is used in the sense of *al-malfūẓ bihi* '[the thing] expressed', just like the noun *qawl* 'saying' should refer to the action of saying, but is used in the sense of 'the thing that was said'.

ʿalayhi are almost indistinguishable. Sometimes the verb dalla itself is also relevant for a better understanding of terminology related to the form-meaning relation in Šarḥ al-Kāfiya.

In addition to the basic difficulty of distinguishing among the various terms related to the signification/denotation of a linguistic expression, dealing with terms derived from the root d-l-l presents an additional challenge, since the basic meanings of the verb dalla are 'led, guided, indicated', and some of the uses of terms derived from d-l-l are related to those meanings rather than to signification/denotation. This is the case in discussions where RDA explains the possibility (or necessity) of omitting a constituent due to "the strength with which it is indicated" (quwwatu l-dalālati ʿalayhi) by another constituent (or other constituents) in the context[66] or by the claim that other constituents "indicate it completely, so that it is made unnecessary" (dalāla tāmma muġniya ʿanhu).[67] To summarize this point, one can say that cases in which terms derived from the root d-l-l refer to constituents that allow reconstructing other constituents, or to linguistic expressions (or processes) that express general intentions,[68] are not relevant to the current discussion.

The verb dalla and its derivatives are translated here in terms of 'signification'.[69]

5.2.1   Dalāla/madlūl versus maʿnā
Similarly to maʿnā, the terms dalāla/madlūl may refer to:
1.   Something signified by a single word. For instance, RDA says that "a numeral that represents a large number (in the hundreds and thousands) signifies a large quantity, and thus makes unnecessary the plural form of the counted noun" (fī lafẓi l-ʿadadi l-kaṯīri dalālatun ʿalā l-kaṯrati, fa-staġnā bi-tilka l-dalālati ʿan jamʿi l-mumayyizi);[70] elsewhere he speaks of

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66   See, e.g., RDA, Šarḥ III, 12, 192.

67   See, e.g., RDA, Šarḥ I, 319. Here RDA speaks of constituents that "indicate" other constituents (i.e., allow reconstructing them). Thus, this use of the term dalāla does not fit into Tahānawī's definition (see fn. 63 above), according to which the signified thing should not be a linguistic expression.

68   For instance, RDA (Šarḥ II, 160) presents the omission of tanwīn as "signifying compoundness" (dalāla ʿalā l-tarkīb); the tāʾ marbūṭa that joins some patterns of the broken plural as "signifying that their singular form takes an ʾiʿrāb ending" (dalāla ʿalā ʾanna wāḥidahā muʿrabun; RDA, Šarḥ III, 327); the change in a constituent's form as "signifying a change in meaning" (dalāla ʿalā l-taġyīr fī l-maʿnā; RDA, Šarḥ IV, 257).

69   Frank (1981:266–267, fn. 20) chooses to translate dalla in most of its appearances as 'signify'.

70   RDA, Šarḥ III, 157. Druel (2015:87) presents a similar idea from Mubarrad.

"something signified by a proper noun/demonstrative pronoun" (*madlūl al-ʿalam/ism al-ʾišāra*).[71]

2. Something signified by units larger than a single word. For instance, RDA speaks of "a complex [expression's] signifying each one of its parts" (*dalālatu l-murakkabi ʿalā kulli juzʾin min ʾajzāʾihi*).[72] In his discussion of a *mafʿūl muṭlaq* that "emphasizes something else" (*muʾakkid li-ġayrihi*), such as *ḥaqqan* 'really', RDA says that this constituent is used if the speaker assumes that the addressee mistakenly thinks the opposite of what is stated by the clause that precedes the *mafʿūl muṭlaq* and "the thought dominates [the addressee's mind] that this [clause's] signification is false" (*ġalaba fī ḏihnihi kiḏbu madlūlihā*).[73]

3. Something signified by units smaller than a word. For instance, while discussing the case markers RDA speaks of "signifying a meaning by a vowel" (*dalālatu l-ḥarakati ʿalā l-maʿnā*).[74] Elsewhere he says that the form of the sound masculine plural is created by adding the suffix -*ūna* to the singular form, "in order to signify [a number] bigger than two" (*dalālatan ʿalā mā fawqa l-iṯnayni*).[75]

Similarly to *maʿnā*, the terms *dalāla/madlūl* may refer to a component of a word's meaning. For instance, RDA explains that the verbal form itself signifies time (in addition to an action), whereas other elements that are logically required by the verb's meaning are mentioned afterwards, according to the speaker's intention. Some verbal forms signify also the agent, e.g., *ʾaḍribu* 'I (will) hit' and *naḍribu* 'we (will) hit',[76] but, this notwithstanding, since most verbal forms do not signify it explicitly, in the forms that do signify the agent

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71 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 312.

72 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 31.

73 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 328. Larcher (1991b) discusses several types of *mafʿūl muṭlaq* mentioned by the grammarians, and concludes that the distinction between a *mafʿūl muṭlaq* that "emphasizes itself" and one that "emphasizes something else" is not completely clear. He proposes to speak instead of *mafʿūl muṭlaq* that denotes the illocutionary act performed by producing the utterance, and of *mafʿūl muṭlaq* that describes that illocutionary act.

74 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 69.

75 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 94.

76 The prefixes of the imperfect verb are perceived by Arab grammarians as *ḥurūf al-zawāʾid* and not as *kalim*. In other words, they are considered as letters that are attached to the word's root without being morphemes in their own right. See Levin 1986:431–432. In contrast, the suffixes of the singular forms of the perfect verb are considered independent morphemes—see Levin 1986:426. Apparently, a verb whose agent is manifested by *ḥurūf al-zawāʾid* is considered as signifying its agent, whereas one whose agent is manifested by *kalim* is not considered as signifying its agent (since the agent in these cases is signified not by the verb itself, but by the bound pronoun attached to it).

"[this component of meaning] signified by the form [of the verb] is extended after [the verb] in order to make [the verbal system] consistent" (*istamarra hāḏā l-madlūlu ʿalayhi bi-l-ṣīgati ʾaydan baʿdahā ṭardan li-l-bābi*). Therefore, the existence of implicit personal pronouns *ʾanā* 'I' and *naḥnu* 'we' is assumed after *ʾaḍribu* and *naḍribu*, respectively.[77]

In other words, although *ʾaḍribu* and *naḍribu* signify the agent, a following independent subject pronoun is still assumed. Since most verbal forms do not signify the agent, those that do behave analogously to the rest. The term *al-madlūl ʿalayhi* refers to one of the components of the verb's meaning, since agent is a component of the abovementioned verbs' meaning, in addition to action and time.[78]

Unlike the term *maʿnā*, which refers, in the vast majority of its appearances in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*, to abstract ideas, *dalāla/madlūl* in many cases refer to entities whose level of abstraction is relatively low. For instance, in the discussion on adjectives RDA mentions "signifying an entity together with the meaning linked to it" (*al-dalāla ʿalā l-ḏāti maʿa l-maʿnā l-mutaʿalliqi bihā*).[79] An entity, as it was understood by logicians and theologians, is something which exists independently, and does not need anything else in order to exist—in contrast to attributes or actions.[80] Therefore, it can be concluded that RDA here refers to an entity with a low level of abstraction (probably of first-order). Similarly, when speaking of "something signified by Zayd" (*madlūl Zayd*),[81] RDA has a concrete entity in mind.

Elsewhere RDA compares the degree of specificity of things signified by the head noun and its qualifier in the nominal phrase *al-rajul al-ʿāqil* 'the reasonable man'. He speaks of *madlūlayhimā* 'what is signified by the two [constituents]'.[82] Later on in the same discussion he says:

> *wa-ʾinnamā kāna l-ʿalamu ʾaḥaṣṣa wa-ʾaʿrafa min-i smi l-ʾišārati, li-ʾanna madlūla l-ʿalami ḏātun muʿayyanatun maḥṣūṣatun ʿinda l-wāḍiʿi kamā ʿinda l-mustaʿmili, bi-ḫilāfi smi l-ʾišārati fa-ʾinna madlūlahu ʿinda l-waḍʿi ʾayyu ḏātin muʿayyanatin kānat, wa-taʿyīnahā ʾilā l-mustaʿmili bi-ʾan yaqtarina bihi l-ʾišāratu l-ḥissiyyatu*

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77   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 403.
78   See RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 179 for another example in which the term *al-madlūl ʿalayhā* refers to a component of a word's meaning (in the context of a discussion on diptoteness).
79   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 284.
80   See pp. 147–148 above.
81   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 384. This fragment is discussed on p. 187 below.
82   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 312.

> The proper noun is more specific and more definite than the demonstrative pronoun, since the proper noun's signification is a particular entity that is specific for the coiner just as it is for the user [of the name]. This is different from the demonstrative pronoun, which, [as determined by] the coinage, signifies any concrete entity, whereas the user [of the pronoun] makes [that entity] concrete by joining it with sensory pointing.[83]

Although we know that demonstrative pronouns can modify not only concrete nouns (since one can say, e.g., *hāḏā l-qitālu* 'this fight' or *ḏālika l-iḥtifālu* 'that celebration'), it is clear that RDA means that in their basic usage these pronouns are associated with concrete nouns. In fact, he adds that "the addressee knows the signification of the demonstrative pronouns both in his eye and in his heart" (*al-muḫāṭabu yaʿrifu madlūla smi l-ʾišārati bi-l-ʿayni wa-l-qalbi maʿan*).[84] The mention of the "eye" infers that the signification meant here is related to concrete objects—since one can only see concrete objects with one's eyes.

An example of a discussion that combines the terms *maʿnā* and *madlūl*: while discussing the definition of a particle, RDA says that the meaning (*maʿnā*) of the particle *min* 'from' is ostensibly identical to the meaning (*maʿnā*) of the noun *ibtidāʾ* 'beginning', because one of the main senses of *min* is 'the starting point'.[85] The difference between the two words is:

> *lafẓu l-ibtidāʾi laysa madlūluhu maḍmūna lafẓin ʾāḫara, bal madlūluhu maʿnāhu lladī fī nafsihi muṭābaqatan, wa-maʿnā min maḍmūnu lafẓin ʾāḫara yanḍāfu ḏālika l-maḍmūnu ʾilā maʿnā ḏālika l-lafẓi l-ʾaṣliyyi*

> The signification of the word *ibtidāʾ* is not included in another expression, but a meaning that corresponds to [the word *ibtidāʾ*] itself, whereas the meaning of *min* is included in another expression, as that included [meaning] joins the original meaning of that expression.[86]

This discussion includes several terms related to signification/denotation— *maʿnā* (that was discussed in section 5.1 above), *madlūl* and *maḍmūn* (the latter is a passive participle derived from the root *ḍ-m-n*, and discussed in sections 5.2.5.2 and 5.4 below). *Maʿnā* seems more general than *madlūl* since *min*

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83 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 312. Here we see again the distinction between coinage and usage, presented in section 3.4.3 above.

84 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 312.

85 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 37. See RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 265–266 for a discussion on various senses of *min*.

86 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 37.

and *ibtidāʾ* are similar only from a very superficial perspective, that does not take into account the function of the linguistic constituents or the purpose for which they exist. In the case of *ibtidāʾ* the *maʿnā* and the *madlūl* are identical, i.e., the meaning of the word equals its signification. In contrast, *min* is discussed in terms of *maʿnā* and *maḍmūn* instead of *madlūl*. From this it can be inferred that *madlūl* is something that is characteristic of words that exist for their own sake (rather than for adding a meaning to other constituents).

5.2.2   Dalāla *versus Denotation*

Dalāla is not equivalent to the denotation of an object in the world. This can be deduced from RDA's discussion of *ʿaṭf al-bayān* and emphasizer. Ibn al-Ḥājib defines emphasizer as "a *tābiʿ* that affirms the matter of the head noun in ascription and inclusiveness" (*tābiʿun yuqarriru ʾamra l-matbūʿi fī l-nisbati wa-l-šumūli*).[87] RDA explains: the constituent in question affirms the head noun "in its being [a constituent] to which [another constituent] is ascribed, and in the ascription's including all parts [of the referent of the head noun]" (*fī bābi kawnihi mansūban ʾilayhi wa-fī bābi kawni l-nisbati šāmilatan ʿāmmatan li-ʾafrādihi*).[88] After clarifying the various parts of the definition, RDA presents Ibn al-Ḥājib's statement from his own *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*, according to which the part of "affirms the matter of the head noun" includes *ʿaṭf al-bayān*, while the rest of the definition excludes this constituent.[89]

RDA responds as follows:

> *ʾin kāna maʿnā l-taqrīri mā ḏakartu wa-huwa taḥqīqu mā ṯabata fī l-lafẓi l-ʾawwali wa-dulla ʿalayhi, fa-laysa jamīʿu mā huwa ʿaṭfu l-bayāni madlūlan ʿalayhi bi-lafẓi l-matbūʿi*

> If the meaning of affirmation is as I mentioned [before], i.e., confirming what is stated and signified by the first expression[90]—then [it must be noted that] not everything that constitutes *ʿaṭf al-bayān* is signified by the head noun.[91]

His intention is clarified by examples, one of which is *jāʾanī l-ʿālimu Zaydun* 'The knowledgeable man, Zayd, came to me'. RDA notes that "'the knowledge-

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87   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 357.

88   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 359. See section 5.2.5.2.2 below for other parts of discussion on this definition.

89   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 362. The relevant discussion appears in Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 649.

90   RDA refers here shortly to his own explanation from RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 357.

91   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 362.

able' does not signify 'Zayd'" (*lā dalālata li-l-ʿālimi ʿalā Zaydin*)[92]—although it is clear that in this example *al-ʿālim* and *Zayd* are co-referential, and the latter constituent clarifies the former.[93] In light of this example, the intention behind "not everything that constitutes *ʿaṭf al-bayān* …" may be that the head noun signifies part, but not all, of what signifies *ʿaṭf al-bayān*: in our example *al-ʿālim* signifies a masculine human being (components of meaning that are included also in *Zayd*), but does not imply that the speaker has Zayd specifically in mind. Therefore, the term *dalāla* here is not associated with the denotation of a referent in the real world, but rather with the word's signification in a given context.

A similar conclusion can be drawn from the discussion on another type of substitution, "a full substitution" (*badal al-kull*). Ibn al-Ḥājib says about this constituent that "it signifies the same thing as the head noun" (*madlū-luhu madlūlu l-ʾawwali*).[94] RDA criticizes this formulation: if in the prepositional phrase *bi-Zaydin ʾaḫīka* 'by Zayd, your brother' "the signification of *ʾaḫīka*" (*madlūl ʾaḫīka*) was "identical to the signification of *Zayd*" (*ʿayn madlūl Zayd*), the structure would be that of emphasis, not of substitution. *ʾAḫūka* 'your brother' actually "signifies being the addressee's brother, whereas *Zayd* does not signify that" (*yadullu ʿalā ʾuḫuwwati l-muḫāṭabi wa-lam yakun yadullu ʿalayhā Zaydun*). RDA explains that Ibn al-Ḥājib has in mind that "[the head noun and the substitution] refer to the same entity [in the external world], although one of them signifies a meaning [that exists] in that entity, which is not signified by the second one" (*ʾannahumā yuṭlaqāni ʿalā ḏātin wāḥidatin, wa-ʾin kāna ʾaḥaduhumā*[95] *yadullu ʿalā maʿnan fīhā lā yadullu ʿalayhi l-āḫaru*).[96] Thus, RDA agrees that the head noun and the substitution are co-referential; however, he does not agree that their signification is identical (therefore, it is not appropriate, in his opinion, to use the term *madlūl* to speak of their co-reference).

5.2.3 Dalāla *versus Dictionary Meaning*

It is important to stress that *dalāla* is not identical to a word's dictionary meaning. This can be deduced from the abovementioned examples dealing with the emphasis: according to RDA, the signification of emphasizer is identical to the

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92   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 362.

93   See Wright 1896–1898:II, 286–287 for a discussion of *ʿaṭf al-bayān*.

94   See Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 660.

95   Although the word is spelled as *ʾaḥaduhā* in both editions (see RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 384; RDA, *Šarḥ*² II, 402), it must be a mistake.

96   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 384.

signification of the head noun. There are two main types of emphasis: repetition of the head noun and the use of words such as *nafsuhu* and *ʿaynuhu* 'himself'.[97] In the former type the dictionary meaning of the emphasizer is obviously identical to the dictionary meaning of the head noun, whereas in the latter type the situation is different (although the speaker intends for the two constituents to convey the same meaning): e.g., in the phrase *Zaydun nafsuhu* 'Zayd himself' both constituents signify the same thing, as if it had been formulated as *Zaydun Zaydun* 'Zayd, Zayd'. In contrast, the signification of *ʿaṭf al-bayān* and *badal al-kull* is not identical with the head noun (although these constituents are co-referential with it)—because the speaker, when using these constituents, intends for them to signify something else related to the same referent, but different from the idea signified by the head noun.

5.2.4   *The Terms* dalāla/madlūl *in Discussions on Meta-linguistic Usages*

The distinction between regular and meta-linguistic usages is important also in modern linguistics—for instance, Lyons (1977:I, 5–10) at the very beginning of his book makes a distinction between an element's use and its mention ("use" refers to regular usage, and "mention" is meta-linguistic usage). Above we have already seen an example of a discussion that includes such distinction,[98] and in the current section additional examples are presented.[99]

Annexation constructions such as *Saʿīdu Kurzin* 'Saʿīd 'The Bag'',[100] in which the annexed element is a proper noun and the governed element a nickname, merit discussion, because the two constituents of an annexation in principle should not be co-referential.[101] RDA explains the phenomenon as follows:

> *al-murādu bi-l-muḍāfi l-ḏātu wa-bi-l-muḍāfi ʾilayhi l-lafẓu, wa-ḏālika ʾannahu kamā yuṭlaqu l-lafẓu wa-yurādu bihi madlūluhu, yuṭlaqu ʾayḍan maʿa l-qarīnati wa-yurādu ḏālika l-lafẓu l-dāllu*

> The intention behind the annexed element is the entity, and the intention behind the governed element is the linguistic expression. That is because

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97   See p. 109 ff. above for a discussion on various types of emphasizer.
98   The relevant fragment is discussed on pp. 53–54 above.
99   See Versteegh 1997a:267–268 for an analysis of a fragment from Ibn Jinnī's *Kitāb al-Ḫaṣāʾiṣ*, where a distinction is drawn between regular and meta-linguistic uses of the word *sayf*. In this context Ibn Jinnī uses the terms *ism* and *musammā*.
100   This is the original meaning of the word *kurz*. ʿUmar assumes that this nickname may refer to someone who is sharp/agile or wicked. RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 239, fn. 2.
101   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 238.

a linguistic expression can be used with its signification in mind, and can also be used, in certain contexts, with the signifying expression itself in mind.[102]

His examples for those different usages are: in *jāʾanī Zaydun* 'Zayd came to me', the speaker has in mind the entity signified by the word *Zayd*, whereas in *takallamtu bi-Zaydin* 'I said: Zayd' the speaker has in mind the word itself. *Jāʾanī Saʿīdu Kurzin* 'Saʿīd 'The Bag' came to me' means 'Saʿīd, whose nickname is 'The Bag', came to me'. This analysis cannot be reversed, i.e., the former constituent cannot be analyzed as referring to the signifier (*dāll*) nor the latter as referring to its signification (*madlūl*) so that *Saʿīdu Kurzin* would mean "The name of that named one" (*ismu hāḏā l-musammā*). "That is because [speakers of Arabic] ascribe to the former constituent [ideas] that cannot be ascribed to linguistic expressions" (*li-ʾannahum yansibūna ʾilā l-ʾawwali mā lā yaṣiḥḥu nisbatuhu ʾilā l-ʾalfāẓi*) by saying, e.g., *ḍarabtu Saʿīda Kurzin* 'I hit Saʿīd 'The Bag'' and *qāla Saʿīdu Kurzin* 'Saʿīd 'The Bag' said'.[103] In these examples the head of the noun phrase must refer to the named person and not to the name itself, since a name cannot be hit and cannot speak.

Later on in the same chapter on annexation RDA discusses verses some of whose words were considered by the grammarians to be "redundant/canceled" (*zāʾida/mulġāt*), i.e., words that apparently should be ignored in order to interpret the text correctly.[104] One of these verses is:

lā yanʿašu l-ṭarfa ʾillā mā taḥawwanahu
dāʿin yunādīhi bi-smi l-māʾi mabġūmu[105]

Nothing will make it open its eye, save for what it is used to—the voice calling it by producing the sound *māʾ*[106]

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102   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 240.

103   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 240. Ibn al-Ḥājib's explanation of the phenomenon is similar to RDA's, and he also uses the term *madlūl* in this discussion; however, he uses *lafẓ* instead of *dāll* and does not use the term *musammā* in this context. See Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 608.

104   See RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 241–243.

105   The last word appears in RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 242 as *mabʿūm*, but this must be a mistake. The correction is based on RDA, *Šarḥ²* II, 272 and Baġdādī, *Ḫizāna* IV, 344.

106   This verse, taken from a poem by Ḏū l-Rumma (d. 117/735), speaks of a sleeping fawn that opens its eyes only when it hears the call of its mother. For a discussion see Baġdādī, *Ḫizāna* IV, 344–347.

RDA maintains that in this verse and in some other verses that he cited beforehand the word *ism* has a meaning (*maʿnā*), contrary to the views of other grammarians. In such cases *ism* is used "in order to express unequivocally that the linguistic expression itself is intended, not its signification" (*li-l-tanṣīṣ ʿalā ʾanna l-murāda huwa l-lafẓu, lā l-madlūlu*). He supports his statement with the fact that there are no sentences such as **jāʾanī smu Zaydin* 'Zayd's name came to me'. *Ism* can be part of the utterance only in the context of reported speech, e.g., in the vicinity of the verbs *tadāʿaw* 'they called each other' and *nādā* 'he called'.[107] If *ism* could function as a redundant word whose meaning can be ignored, it would have been possible for it to appear also in other contexts.

When discussing proper nouns, RDA explains that if a word is used with the linguistic expression (*al-lafẓ*) rather than the meaning (*maʿnāhā*) in mind, the word functions as a proper noun. For instance, in *ʾayna kalimatu stifhāmin* ''Where' is an interrogative word' or *ḍaraba fiʿlun māḍin* ''He hit' is a perfect verb' *ʾayna* and *ḍaraba* function as proper nouns. That is because in these cases the word "is coined for the particular thing and does not refer to anything else" (*mawḍūʿun li-šayʾin bi-ʿaynihi ġayru mutanāwilin ġayrahu*; this is the definition of a proper noun[108]). A word that is used meta-linguistically "is transferred, that is, it was transferred from one signification, which is its meaning, to another, which is the linguistic expression" (*manqūlun, li-ʾannahu nuqila min madlūlin huwa l-maʿnā ʾilā madlūlin ʾāḫara huwa l-lafẓu*).[109]

5.2.5   *Types of* dalāla

The most prominent difference between *dalāla* and other terms related to the form-meaning relation is the fact that the former is frequently accompanied by a specification of how the constituent signifies a certain idea. This is somewhat similar to the notions discussed in the context of the distinction between a meaning that originates in coinage and a meaning whose origin is different. In that context terms derived from the root *d-l-l* are also used.[110] However, in addition to that distinction (which constitutes part of RDA's theory of coinage), two other important distinctions are found in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*: between formal and non-formal signification (*dalāla lafẓiyya/ġayr lafẓiyya*)

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107   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 243.
108   Ibn al-Ḥājib formulates his definition of a proper noun similarly to the citation above. See RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 245 for discussion.
109   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 255.; cf. Larcher's (2005:111–112) discussion of this excerpt.
110   See section 3.4.4 above.

and between three types of signification: by correspondence, by inclusion and by entailment (*muṭābaqatan*[111]/*taḍammunan*/*iltizāman*).[112] Both distinctions seem to have their origin in logic and *ʾuṣūl al-fiqh*.

5.2.5.1   Formal Signification versus Non-formal Signification

Ibn al-Ḥājib speaks of formal and non-formal singnification in the beginning of his *Muntahā l-Wuṣūl*. He identifies two types of formal signification: "[a linguistic constituent's] formal signification in its full sense is signification by correspondence, [and formal signification] in its partial sense is signification by inclusion" (*dalālatuhu l-lafẓiyyatu fī kamāli maʿnāhā dalālatu muṭābaqatin wa-fī juzʾihi dalālatu taḍammunin*). He explains that "non-formal signification is signification by entailment" (*ġayru l-lafẓiyyati dalālatu ltizāmin*).[113] He does not link those notions to the idea of coinage, although they are mentioned in a chapter dealing with "things that were coined in the language" (*al-mawḍūʿāt al-luġawiyya*[114]).

RDA says that a verb can assign *naṣb* to all types of time expressions because some times, viz., past, present and future, are "signified [by the verb]" (*madlūluhu*). Consequently, "the *naṣb* became consistent [in time expressions referring to times] signified [by the verb], and also in other [time expressions]" (*fa-ṭurida l-naṣbu fī madlūlihi wa-fī ġayrihi*).

Following that, the different behavior of place expressions is explained:

> *ʾammā l-makānu fa-lammā lam yakun lafẓu l-fiʿli dāllan ʿalā šayʾin minhu, bal dalālatuhu ʿalayhi ʿaqliyyatun lā lafẓiyyatun, li-ʾanna kulla fiʿlin lā budda lahu min-a l-makāni, naṣaba min-a l-makāni mā šābaha l-zamāna lladī huwa madlūlu l-fiʿli, ʾay-i l-ʾazminata l-ṯalāṯata*

> As for places, the verb's form does not signify any kind of them. [The verb's] signification of [place] is rational, not formal—since each action must happen in some place. Therefore, [the verb] assigns the *naṣb* only

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111   The term *muṭābaqa* and its derivatives appear in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* also in another sense— 'grammatical agreement', which can be, e.g., in number—see RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 228; II, 67; in definiteness—see RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 300, etc.

112   Weiss (1985:618) translates *dalāla* as "signification *qua* correspondence", *iltizām* as "implication" and *taḍammun* as "inclusion". Afnan (1964:28) translates *taḍmīn* as "expression by implication", but his interpretation does not reflect the distinction between *taḍammun*/*taḍmīn* and *iltizām*.

113   Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Muntahā*, 12.

114   Some parts of this chapter are discussed on p. 83 above.

to those place expressions that resemble the time that is signified by the verb, i.e., the three times.[115]

In short, a verb formally signifies one of the three times, and thus can assign the *naṣb* to any time expression. The verb's signification of place is not formal (although a verb logically necessitates the idea of place, since it signifies an action that must happen in some place). Thus, a verb's ability to assign *naṣb* is restricted to expressions that represent places that somehow resemble things signified by the verb formally. A case in point are place expressions that signify directions and distances, which resemble the three times because they are related to "change and exchanging two types of place" (*al-taġyīr wa-l-tabaddul fī nawʿay al-makān*).[116] In other words, directions and distances resemble times since they are relative just like times: the exact place denoted by the word *farsaḫ* depends on points of departure and destination, and the exact place denoted by the words north/south depends on one's point of view—just as the exact time denoted by the words past/present/future depends on one's point of view.

Another example appears in the discussion of assertive and performative (*ʾinšāʾiyya*) sentences.[117] RDA says that an assertive sentence refers to something external that exists regardless of that sentence, and the speaker intends for that sentence to correspond to that external thing. If the correspondence exists, the sentence is true; if the correspondence does not exist, the sentence is false.[118]

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115   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 491.

116   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 491. See pp. 123–124 above for another part of this discussion.

117   Larcher (1991a:251) speaks of *ḫabar* (in the meaning of the opposite of *ʾinšāʾ*) as of "assertive" (translating *ʾiḫbār* as "acte dʾ assertion"). Bohas et al. (1990:56) translate the term *ʾinšāʾ* in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* as "performation". Larcher (1991:252) views the translation of *ʾinšāʾ* and *ʾinšāʾī* as "performance" and "performatif" as adequate (but mostly leaves *ʾinšāʾ* untranslated, considering it a complex term used in several language-related disciplines with a meaning that varied over time—see Larcher 1991a, Larcher 1992, Larcher 2007). The use of *ḫabar* (*ʾiḫbār*) and *ʾinšāʾ* as opposites can be found in the *ʾuṣūl al-fiqh* literature starting from the beginning of the 7/13th century (Larcher 1991a:250), although this relatively late terminology probably reflects a systematization of ideas that existed earlier. That opposition is reminiscent of Austin's distinction between constatives (utterances produced in order to describe the state of affairs in the world) and performatives (utterances produced in order to perform certain actions). Those ideas are summarized in Briggs 2001:38. Austin's theory was further developed by Searle, who distinguished between six types of speech acts—see Briggs 2001:51.

118   In the Muslim tradition there are several approaches to the meaning of true/false (*ṣādiq/kāḏib*). The most widely accepted one is similar to the one presented by RDA (a sentence is true if its content corresponds to something in the real world). The other views, ascribed to the Muʿtazilites, are that a sentence is true if its content corresponds to the speaker's

"An assertive sentence can be referred to as true or false; an expression can be referred to as true on account of its [formal] signification, whereas falsehood is something that can be ascribed to an [expression] without being signified by its form" (*ʾinna l-ḫabara muḥtamilun li-l-ṣidqi wa-l-kiḏbi, fa-l-ṣidqu muḥtamalu l-lafẓi min ḥayṯu dalālatuhu ʿalayhi, wa-l-kiḏbu muḥtamaluhu wa-lā dalālata li-l-lafẓi ʿalayhi*).[119] In other words, a false sentence does not include any formal indication of its falsehood; falsehood is something inferred by the addressee, who compares the sentence's content to external reality. In contrast, a performative sentence does not refer to any external reality, since the very production of such a sentence affects external reality. Therefore, categories of truth and falsehood are not relevant for such sentences.[120]

RDA states that a performative (*ʾinšāʾiyya*) sentence can be either requestive (*ṭalabiyya*)[121] or executive (*ʾīqāʿiyya*);[122] this is known, he says, "by induction" (*bi-l-istiqrāʾi*).[123] He adds that neither type can function as a *ḥāl* clause. His argument in relation to requestives is: "[in these sentences the speaker] is not sure that the content will take place, so how can he specify the content of the governor by the time when the [requestive's] content takes place?" (*lasta ʿalā yaqīnin min ḥuṣūli maḍmūnihā, fa-kayfa tuḥaṣṣiṣu maḍmūna l-ʿāmili bi-waqti*

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inner belief (regardless of the situation in reality), or if its content simultaneously corresponds to reality and is believed by the speaker (i.e., if the speaker does not believe in the content of the sentence, the sentence would be false, even if it does correspond to the situation in reality). See Weiss 1985:608–609.

119   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 12. The possibility to judge a sentence as false is mentioned also in RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 326, where the function of *ḥaqqan* 'truly' is discussed. Ibn Hišām (as cited in Larcher 1991a:254) defines *ḫabar* in terms of *taṣdīq* and *takḏīb*. See Larcher 1991a:254, fn. 16 for a discussion of the difference between *taṣdīq/takḏīb* and *ṣidq/kiḏb*.

120   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 12.

121   In the context of classification of utterances, Larcher (1991a:254) translates *ṭalab* as "jussion"; however, I reserve "jussive" for a translation of *jazm*.

122   This is the only appearance of the term *ʾīqāʿiyya* in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*. Elsewhere RDA (*Šarḥ* II, 299) uses a different formulation and divides non-assertive (*ġayr ḫabariyya*) sentences into performative (*ʾinšāʾiyya*) and requestive (*ṭalabiyya*) sentences. Examples of the former category are *biʿtu* 'I sell/I buy' (as a formal confirmation of a transaction), *ṭallaqtu* 'I divorce' (as a formal confirmation of divorce) and *ʾanta ḥurrun* 'You are free!' (as a formal confirmation of manumission); the latter category includes commands, prohibitions, questions, wishes and proposals. Bohas et al. (1990:56) note that this distinction between two types of non-assertive sentences is innovative in comparison to other grammarians (including Ibn Yaʿīš). Bohas et al. present the distinction between *ʾinšāʾ* and *ṭalab* without mentioning the term *ʾīqāʿ*. See Larcher 1991a:257 for a scheme that shows various senses of *ʾinšāʾ* and relations between them and *ḫabar*, *ṭalab*, *tanbīh* and *ʾīqāʿ*.

123   See Tawfīq 1978:150–153 for a discussion of this term and its place in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*.

ḥuṣūli ḏālika l-maḍmūni[124]). As for executive sentences, the speaker who produces utterances such as *biʿtu* 'I sell/I buy' (as a formal confirmation of a transaction) and *ṭallaqtu* 'I divorce' (as a formal confirmation of divorce) does not take into account the time in which their content takes place; his sole focus is on "executing their content" (*ʾīqāʿ maḍmūnihā*), and not on the action's time. RDA adds: "it is known by means of reason, not by formal signification, that the time of producing an executive expression is the time when its content takes place" (*yuʿrafu bi-l-ʿaqli lā min dalālati l-lafẓi ʾanna waqta l-talaffuẓi bi-lafẓi l-ʾīqāʿi waqtu wuqūʿi maḍmūnihi*).[125]

The term "formal signification" (*dalāla lafẓiyya*) appears to be very close to "signification by coinage" (*dalāla waḍʿiyya*). It can be assumed that the difference between the two may lie in the focus: when RDA speaks of formal/non-formal signification, he focuses on the linguistic expression itself and the way the addressee understands it, whereas when he mentions signification by coinage/by reason, he focuses on the hypothetical coiner and his plans/intentions. It is not clear whether RDA views the two terms as synonymous, as he does not juxtapose them. It should be noted that Tahānawī, on the base of relatively late sources, distinguishes between formal and non-formal *dalāla* (not necessarily in a linguistic context), and says that each one of those can be divided into signification "by nature", "by reason" and "by coinage". Alternatively, one can first distinguish between *dalāla* "by nature", "by reason" and "by coinage", and then divide each one of these three into formal and non-formal.[126] However, I have not found such distinctions either in RDA's book or in earlier grammatical literature.

5.2.5.2 *Muṭābaqa/taḍammun/iltizām*

This distinction probably starts with Ibn Sīnā, who states in his *al-ʾIšārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt* that a linguistic expression can signify a meaning in three ways:

a. "By correspondence, which means that the linguistic expression is coined for the sake of that meaning and face-to-face with it" (*ʿalā sabīli l-muṭābaqati bi-ʾan yakūna l-lafẓu mawḍūʿan li-ḏālika l-maʿnā wa-bi-ʾizāʾihi*)—e.g., the word 'triangle' signifies a figure bounded by three vertices.

b. "By inclusion, which means that the meaning constitutes part of the meaning to which the expression corresponds" (*ʿalā sabīli l-taḍammuni bi-ʾan yakūna l-maʿnā juzʾan min-a l-maʿnā llaḏī yuṭābiquhu l-lafẓu*)—e.g.,

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124   The term *maḍmūn* is discussed in section 5.4 below.

125   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 40.

126   Tahānawī, *Kaššāf* I, 788.

'triangle' signifies the idea of a geometrical figure, not by being a name for it, but by signifying a meaning that includes the idea of a figure.

c.   "By subordination and entailment; the linguistic expression signifies a certain meaning by correspondence, and that meaning entails another one. [That other meaning] resembles an external companion [of the meaning signified by correspondence], not a part of that meaning; it accompanies [the meaning signified by correspondence] and adheres to it" (*ʿalā sabīli l-istitbāʿi wa-l-istilzāmi bi-ʾan yakūna l-lafẓu dāllan bi-l-muṭābaqati ʿalā maʿnan wa-yakūna ḏālika l-maʿna yalzamuhu maʿnan ġayruhu ka-l-rafīqi l-ḫārijiyyi lā ka-l-juzʾi minhu bal huwa muṣāḥibun mulā-zimun lahu*). This is how 'ceiling' signifies the idea of 'wall', and 'human being' signifies the idea of 'being able to write'.[127]

Tahānawī presents signification by inclusion and by entailment as types of 'signification by reason';[128] I have not seen such divisions in early sources.

   In many of the examples that will be presented below the terms *muṭābaqa/taḍammun/iltizām* do not appear in close proximity to terms derived from the root *d-l-l*; however, one can infer from the cases in which they do appear, and from the sources outside the grammatical literature in which the distinctions originate, that those terms refer to various ways in which the linguistic element signifies a meaning—i.e., to various types of *dalāla*.

5.2.5.2.1   *Using the Notions of 'Correspondence' and 'Inclusion' to Elucidate an Element's Meaning*

RDA follows Ibn al-Ḥājib in viewing particles as a part of speech that "signifies a meaning in another constituent".[129] Thus, he has to explain what kind of rela-

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127   Ibn Sīnā, *ʾIšārāt* I, 139. This fragment is translated into English in Inati 1984:50–51. See Versteegh 1997a:264 for a discussion on Sakkākī's use of these notions in relation to metaphors.

128   Tahānawī, *Kaššāf* I, 790–791. He ascribes this approach to *ʿilm al-bayān* (see Schaade and Grunebaum 1960 for a discussion on this discipline). 'Signification by reason' is discussed in section 3.4.4 above. Interestingly, Tahānawī (*Kaššāf* I, 789–790) also mentions the view that 'signification by inclusion' and 'signification by entailment' are also related to coinage, as well as another, that 'signification by inclusion' originates in coinage, whereas 'signification by entailment' does not originate in it. It can be inferred from here that some scholars did not see a contradiction between 'signification by reason' and 'signification by coinage' (whereas RDA did view these types of signification as mutually incompatible). One can clearly see the link between a comprehensive approach to coinage, presented by Tahānawī, to the view according to which language is a fixed entity, each component of which is coined once and forever. This view is characteristic of theology, jurisprudence and *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. See Weiss 1966:1–5 and also pp. 112–113 above.

129   Ibn al-Ḥājib (RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 30) states that a word either does, or does not, signify a meaning

tionship exists between the meaning of the particle and the original meaning of another expression, to which the particle is linked:

> *al-ʾakṯaru ʾan yakūna maʿnā l-ḥarfi maḍmūna ḏālika l-lafẓi, fa-yakūna mutaḍamminan li-l-maʿnā lladī ʾaḥdaṯa fīhi l-ḥarfu maʿa dalālatihi ʿalā maʿnāhu l-ʾaṣliyyi, ʾillā ʾanna hāḏā taḍammunu maʿnan lam yadulla ʿalayhi lafẓu l-mutaḍammini, kamā kāna lafẓu l-bayti mutaḍamminan li-maʿnā l-jidāri wa-dāllan ʿalayhi, bal-i l-dāllu ʿalā l-maḍmūni fī-mā naḥnu fīhi lafẓun ʾāḫaru muqtarinun bi-l-mutaḍammini*

> The meaning of the particle is usually included in the expression [joined by the particle], so that [the expression] includes the meaning created in it by the particle, besides its original meaning. The including expression, however, does not signify that included meaning, unlike the word 'house' that includes the meaning of 'wall' and signifies it. In our case (i.e., in the case of another expression that includes the particle's meaning) the one signifying the included [meaning] is another [constituent] that is related to the including [expression] (i.e., the particle).[130]

Here RDA presents an interesting situation: the meaning of the particle is included in the meaning of another expression, whereas that expression by itself includes no indication of this additional meaning (unlike other cases of signification by inclusion, in which the word itself indicates that included meaning). His examples are: *al-rajul* 'the man'—*rajul* "includes the meaning of definiteness" (*mutaḍammin li-maʿnā l-taʿrīf*) created in it by the definite article that joined it; *hal ḍaraba Zaydun* 'Did Zayd hit?'—*ḍaraba Zaydun* "includes the meaning of question" (*mutaḍammin li-maʿnā l-istifhām*), since *ḍaraba Zaydun* is the constituent about which a question is asked, and such a constituent must include the meaning of a question, created in it by *hal*.[131] In short, the meaning of the particle is amalgamated into the meaning of another expression, so that the particle functions as an external sign of a kind, that points to a meaning included in another expression.

RDA adds that "sometimes another [expression] signifies a particle's meaning by correspondence" (*qad yakūnu maʿnā l-ḥarfi mā dalla ʿalayhi ġayruhu muṭābaqatan*). This happens when that other expression is "one that must

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by itself. If it does not, it is a particle. He (RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 259) defines a particle as "[a word] that signifies a meaning in another [constituent]" (*mā dalla ʿalā maʿnan fī ġayrihi*).

130   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 36.
131   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 36–37.

be suppressed" (*lāzim al-ʾiḍmār*).[132] For instance, the ʾ- of *ʾaḍribu* 'I (will) hit' and the *n*- of *naḍribu* 'we (will) hit' signify (*tadullu*) "the meaning of two obligatorily suppressed personal pronouns" (*ʿalā maʿnā l-ḍamīrayni l-lāzimi ʾiḍmāruhumā*).[133] In order to comprehend this discussion, one must keep in mind that the prefixes of imperfect verbs are not considered pronouns (although they do signify the person). That is because of the famous principle that "a verb must have a subject",[134] and a subject in a verbal sentence must, by definition, follow the verb.[135] Thus, in cases where no constituent in *rafʿ* is found after the verb, the grammarians speak of a suppressed pronoun in that position. In RDA's view the prefixes of *ʾaḍribu* and *naḍribu* are particles that signify the meaning of the suppressed pronouns *ʾanā* and *naḥnu*, respectively. Unlike the meaning of most particles, which is included in the meaning of the constituents joined by them, the meaning of those particular particles corresponds to the meaning of the pronouns *ʾanā* and *naḥnu* (thus making their suppression possible).[136]

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132   The term *ʾiḍmār* may mean 'suppressing', cf. Carter and Versteegh (2007:300), who define it as "the mental act of suppressing an element at what might now be called the deep-structure level, independent of any phonological realization, and not necessarily producing an incomplete untterance", or 'pronominalizing'. See Carter and Versteegh 2007. The second possibility may seem tempting, since the fragment deals mainly with pronouns; however, this interpretation would not make sense in the phrase *al-ḍamīrayni l-lāzimi ʾiḍmāruhumā*.

133   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 37.

134   Already Sībawayhi (*Kitāb* I, 30) says: *al-fiʿlu lā budda lahu min fāʿilin*, and, elsewhere, with the same intention: "the verb needs a noun, as the former cannot constitute an actual sequence of speech without the latter" (*al-fiʿlu lā budda lahu min-a l-ismi wa-ʾillā lam yakun kalāman*; Sībawayhi, *Kitāb* I, 5). RDA mentions this principle several times—see, e.g., *Šarḥ* I, 219; IV, 188, 243, 408. My rendering of *kalām* as "an actual sequence of speech" is inspired by Talmon (1988:88–89), who criticizes contemporary scholars' and medieval grammarians' claim that Sībawayhi used *kalām* in the sense of "sentence" and "utterance". Talmon's conclusion is that the term has only one meaning in *al-Kitāb*, which is "speech", and "its denotations vary according to the contexts of its occurrence". See Talmon 1988:83–84 for a discussion on the occurrences of *lam yakun kalāman*.

135   See, e.g., Jurjānī, *Muqtaṣid* I, 327 (where it is stated that a subject cannot precede its verbal predicate, since the former is equivalent to a part of the latter); Ibn Yaʿīš, *Šarḥ* I, 74 (where it is stated that the verbal predicate must precede its subject, because it assigns *rafʿ* to the latter, and if the word order is reversed, the verbal predicate+subject would turn into subject+nominal predicate); RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 229 (the argument was explained above—see p. 69 above).

136   Levin (1986) demonstrates that Arab grammarians view the imperfect prefixes as *ḥurūf zawāʾid* 'augmentative letters', and pronominal suffixes as *kalim*. He explains that the main difference between these two groups of morphemes is that the former do form an integral part of the verb pattern and the latter do not. Syntactically speaking, the pronominal suf-

The next example is taken from a discussion on sentences such as *ʾa-tamī-miyyan marratan wa-qaysiyyan ʾuḥrā* 'Are you sometimes Tamīmī and sometimes Qaysī?' (i.e., 'How can you sometimes behave as if you belong to the Tamīm tribe, and sometimes as if you belong to Qays?!'), in which the constituents in *naṣb* are "underived nouns that include [a meaning of] reprimand for the inappropriate change in the [addressee's] circumstances" (*ʾasmaʾ jāmida mutaḍammina tawbīḫan ʿalā mā lā yanbaġī min-a l-taqallubi fī l-ḥāli*), and the omission of the element that assigns them the *naṣb* is obligatory. Sīrāfī and Zamaḫšarī view those constituents in *naṣb* as circumstantial modifiers, whereas RDA explains their grammatical case "by their being *maṣdars*" (*ʿalā l-maṣdariyyati*), i.e., he perceives them as *mafʿūl muṭlaq*. The rationale behind this analysis is: the speaker means not the situation in which the change takes place, but the type of change.[137] RDA ascribes this view to Sībawayhi. Interestingly, the latter does not use the term *mafʿūl muṭlaq*,[138] but discusses the phenomenon in a chapter entitled "This is a chapter on nouns that were not derived from a verb, but behave analogously to nouns that were derived from a verb" (*hāḏā bābu mā jarā min-a l-ʾasmaʾi llatī lam tuʾḫaḏ min-a l-fiʿli majrā l-ʾasmaʾi llatī ʾuḫiḏat min-a l-fiʿli*).[139]

Subsequently RDA speaks of "adjectives that include [a meaning of] a reprimand for inappropriate [behavior] in a certain circumstances" (*ṣifāt taḍammanat tawbīḫan ʿalā mā lā yanbaġī fī l-ḥāli*). He has in mind cases such as *ʾa-qāʾiman wa-qad qaʿada l-nāsu* 'Do you stand, while the people are already sitting?!' and *ʾa-qāʿidun wa-qad sāra l-rakbu* 'Do you sit, while the riders are already gone?!'.[140] The underlying structure of the first example is *ʾa-taqūmu qāʾiman*. Sīrāfī views those cases as *ḥāl muʾakkida* 'a strengthening *ḥāl*',[141] whereas Sībawayhi, Mubarrad and Zamaḫšarī maintain that they contain an adjective that replaces the *maṣdar* (i.e., *ʾa-qāʾiman* is produced instead of *ʾa-taqūmu qiyāman*).[142]

In a discussion of time/place expressions, RDA states that when these are detached from an annexation structure they are also called *ġāyāt* 'ends'. That

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fixes are analyzed as subjects, and the imperfect prefixes do not have a syntactic function of their own (and only signify the meaning of agent).

137   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 48. Wright (1896–1898:II, 120) presents the abovementioned sentence as an example of a circumstantial modifier whose governor is not mentioned explicitly. Unlike RDA, Wright describes the governor omission in this case as optional.

138   See Peled 1999:62.

139   Sībawayhi, *Kitāb* I, 143–146.

140   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 48.

141   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 49. This phenomenon is discussed in Wright 1896–1898:II, 115–116.

142   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 49.

is because originally they were not supposed to signify ends, "since they [originally] include a meaning [relative to a point of] reference, whereas the end is the point of reference" (*li-taḍammunihā l-maʿnā l-nisbiyya, bal takūnu l-ġāyatu hiya l-mansūbu ʾilayhi*).[143] The relation meant here is probably a logical one: time/place expressions, e.g., *qabla* 'before', *baʿda* 'after' and *ḫalfa* 'behind' represent a logical relation between two things, whereas the end is something to which other things are related. RDA explains his idea as follows:

> *fa-lammā ḫuḏifa l-mansūbu ʾilayhi wa-ḍumminat maʿnāhu, stuġriba ṣayr-ūratuhā ġāyatan li-muḫālafati ḏālika li-waḍʿihā, fa-summiyat bi-ḏālika l-ismi li-stiġrābihi*

> Since [the governed element in the annexation that signifies] the point of reference is omitted, and [the time/pace expression] is made to include its meaning, [the time/place expression's] becoming the end is perceived as unusual, as it deviates from the coinage [of this expression], and [the expression] receives the name ['the end'] according to this unusual [meaning].[144]

No examples are given at this point; however, it is clear that a word such as *qabla* in its regular usage precedes a governed element, as the idea of 'before' is relative, i.e., A can be 'before' only in relation to B (and B can be thus considered a point of reference). If the speaker, however, chooses to omit the governed element of *qabla*, *qabla* would be read as *qablu* and include the meaning of the governed element. Logically it would function as the point of reference. For instance, this is what happens in the sentence *raʾaytuhu min qablu* 'I have seen him before' (actually, the meaning is 'before now'; the point of reference whose meaning is included in *qablu* is 'now').

From this example and from another that will be discussed later[145] it can be inferred that the difference between *taḍammun* (*maṣdar* of the Form V) and *taḍmīn* (*maṣdar* the Form II) is that the former refers to the inclusion of meaning in general, whereas the latter refers to the inclusion of a meaning that is conditioned by certain circumstances (in the abovementioned example the condition is the omission of the governed element, and in another example it is the verb's being used in a certain sense).[146]

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143   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 169.
144   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 169.
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146   See RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 143 for another example in which the idea of inclusion is used to elucidate an element's meaning.

5.2.5.2.2 *Using the Notions of 'Correspondence' and 'Inclusion' to Distinguish between Syntactic Functions*

Ibn al-Ḥājib defines emphasizer as follows: "a *tābiʿ* that affirms the matter of the head noun, in ascription and inclusiveness" (*tābiʿun yuqarriru ʾamra l-matbūʿi fī l-nisbati wa-l-šumūli*).[147] RDA cites Ibn al-Ḥājib's *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*, to the effect that the phrase *nafḫa wāḥida* 'a single blast' (Q. 69/13) may contradict this definition: *wāḥida* affirms the meaning of singleness that exists in *nafḫa*, and thus should be considered its emphasizer[148] (whereas it actually fuctions as an adjectival qualifier). Ibn al-Ḥājib's position on this point, as presented by RDA, is:

> *nafḫa wa-ʾin dallat ʿalā l-waḥdati, lākinna ḏālika dalālatu taḍammunin lā muṭābaqatin, li-ʾanna madlūlahā bi-l-muṭābaqati nafḫun mawṣūfun bi-l-waḥdati, fa-mujarradu l-waḥdati madlūlu hāḏihi l-lafẓati taḍammunan lā muṭābaqatan*

> *Nafḫa* signifies the idea of 'single';[149] however, this signification is by inclusion, not by correspondence. [The meaning] signified [by *nafḫa*] by correspondence is 'blasting that is described [as occurring] a single time', whereas the abstract idea of 'single' is signified by that word by inclusion, not by correspondence.[150]

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147 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 357. For Ibn al-Ḥājib's own discussion of this definition see Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 649.

148 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 359.

149 That is because *nafḫa* is *ism al-marra*, a form that signifies a single occurrence of an action; it takes the pattern *faʿla* in Form I, and is created in other forms by suffixing the *tāʾ marbūṭa* to the verbal noun. Wright 1896–1898:I, 122–123.

150 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 359–360. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 650) formulates this idea as follows: *nafḫa* "was not coined to signify the independent [idea of] 'single', it was coined to signify blasting. The signification of 'single' is by inclusion, as ['single'] was not intended at the time of the composed word's coinage. After that there was an intention [to use] an adjectival qualifier that would signify [the meaning of 'single'] deliberately and more clearly than a signification by inclusion, so [the adjective *wāḥida*] was coined for this purpose" (*lam tūḍaʿ li-l-dalālati ʿalā l-waḥdati ʿalā ḥiyālihā, wa-ʾinnamā wuḍiʿat li-l-dalālati ʿalā nafḫin, wa-l-dalālatu ʿalā l-waḥdati ḍimnun lā maqṣūdun bi-waḍʿi l-lafẓi l-murakkabi lahu, fa-qaṣadū ʾilā ṣifatin tadullu ʿalā l-maʿnā qaṣdan fa-yakūnu ʾablaġa min dalālati l-ḍimni, fa-waḍaʿū ḏālika lahu*). 'Composed word' in this context probably means the combination of the root and the morphological pattern. In this discussion the notion of 'coinage' is prominent (in addition to the notion of 'inclusion'). This argumentation serves as one of the explanations of why *nafḫa wāḥida* cannot be viewed as head noun+emphasizer, whereas the second explanation is: *wāḥida* here fits into the definition of adjectival qualifier, and does not fit into the definition of emphasizer. See Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 649–650.

RDA responds as follows:

> *al-madlūlu ʾaʿammu min-a l-madlūli bi-l-muṭābaqati fa-kullu madlūli l-*
> *matbūʿi huwa ʾamru ḏālika l-matbūʿi wa-šaʾnuhu, sawāʾun kāna ḏālika mu-*
> *ṭābaqatan ʾaw taḍammunan ʾaw-i ltizāman*

> [The term] signification is broader than 'signification by correspondence'.
> Everything signified by the head noun can be considered as its mat-
> ter, whether it is signified by correspondence, by inclusion or by entail-
> ment.[151]

Here RDA demonstrates that Ibn al-Ḥājib fails to exclude the adjectival quali-
fier *wāḥida* from his definition of emphasizer: the meaning of *wāḥida* is indeed
included in the meaning of the head word (instead of corresponding to it),
but Ibn al-Ḥājib's formulation "affirms the matter of the head noun" does not
require the meaning of the emphasizer to correspond to the meaning of the
head noun. Moreover, *ʾajmaʿūna* in *jāʾanī l-rijālu ʾajmaʿūna* "affirms [the mean-
ing] that *al-rijāl* signifies by inclusion, not by correspondence" (*yuqarriru mad-
lūla l-rijāli taḍammunan lā muṭābaqatan*). That is because the fact that the men
came together without exception is signified (*madlūl*) by the word due to its
being a plural form preceded by a definite article that points to particular men;
it is not "the word's original signification" (*madlūl ʾaṣl al-kalima*). The original
signification is: assembled men. Similarly, *kilāhumā* 'both of them' also affirms
a meaning that the head noun signifies by inclusion.[152]

RDA's conclusion is that the proper method for distinguishing between
emphasizer and adjectival qualifier, when dealing with a *tābiʿ* that refers to
the number of objects signified by the head noun (i.e., singular/dual/plural)
is, contrary to Ibn al-Ḥājib's claim, not related to the way in which the head
noun signifies the meaning affirmed by the *tābiʿ*, but rather to the speaker's
intention to affirm the syntactic relation between the head noun and the verb
(which is also mentioned in Ibn al-Ḥājib's definition of emphasizer, where it
is called 'ascription'). When there is no such intention, an adjectival qualifier
is used, and the structure is, e.g., *jāʾanī rajulun wāḥidun/rajulāni ṯnāni/rijālun
jamāʿatun* 'A single man/two men/a group of men came to me'.[153] When there
is such an intention, an emphasizer or a *ḥāl* can be used.[154]

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151 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 360.

152 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 360. See Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 651 for his attempts to explain why *kilāhumā* is
     considered as an emphasizer (instead of an adjectival qualifier).

153 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 360.

154 See RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 361–362 for a discussion of *ḥāl versus* emphasizer.

RDA then notes that an affirmation achieved by emphasizer can be of two types:

1. "Affirmation of the ascription's inclusiveness" (*taqrīr šumūl al-nisba*). This can be done "by means of semantic repetition[155] of [the meaning that] is understood from the head noun by inclusion, not by correspondence" (*bi-ʾan yukarraru min ḥaytu l-maʿnā mā fuhima min-a l-matbūʿi taḍammunan lā muṭābaqatan*). Here words such as *kilā* 'both', *kull*/*ʾajmaʿ* 'all' and *ṯalāṯatuhum* 'three of them' are meant.[156] Those words and the meaning of inclusion in their context were discussed above.

2. "Affirmation of the basic ascription" (*taqrīr ʾaṣl al-nisba*). This can be done by repeating the head noun, or by "repeating [the meaning] that the head noun signifies by correspondence" (*bi-takrīri mā dalla ʿalayhi l-matbūʿu muṭābaqatan*)—using the words *nafs*, *ʿayn* and their derivatives.[157]

5.2.5.2.3   *'Inclusion' Used to Explain a Constituent's Syntactic Behavior*

RDA says that verbs such as *kasā* 'he covered' and *ʾaʿṭā* 'he gave', which take two non co-referential objects, are literally (*ḥaqīqatan*) doubly transitive; however, the first object is "the receiver of the action[158] signified by the explicit verb" (*mafʿūl hāḏā l-fiʿl al-ẓāhir*)—in *kasawtu Zaydan jubbatan* 'I covered Zayd with a garment' and *ʾaʿṭaytu Zaydan jubbatan* 'I gave Zayd a garment' Zayd is the one who is covered and the one who is given, respectively. The second direct object is "the semantic object of [the action] that complies [with the action signified] by the [explicit] verb" (*mafʿūl muṭāwiʿ hāḏā l-fiʿl*), as the garment is the one that covers and the one that is received.[159]

As for the term *muṭāwiʿ* 'complying', Mubarrad dedicates a chapter of his *al-Muqtaḍab* to "complying verbs" (*ʾafʿāl al-muṭāwaʿa*) that "express [the action] that is wanted from [the referent] of their subject" (*ʾiḫbār ʿammā turīduhu min fāʿilihā*),[160] i.e., signify the action that results from an action signified by a caus-

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155 That is, by using words that emphasize the constituent's meaning. Such emphasis is called "semantic emphasis" (*al-tawkīd al-maʿnawī*), in contrast to "formal emphasis" (*al-tawkīd al-lafẓī*), that consists of a repetition of the constituent. See Wright 1896–1898:II, 282–283.

156 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 363.

157 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 363.

158 Here I have chosen to translate *mafʿūl* as a semantic term (although in the rest of the excerpt I translate it as 'object'). The syntactic term is not appropriate in this case, since, from a syntactic point of view, the verbs in question take two objects whose status in relation to the governing verb is the same. The difference between the two objects, mentioned by RDA, lies at the semantic level.

159 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 335.

160 Mubarrad, *Muqtaḍab* II, 104. Mubarrad (*Muqtaḍab* II, 104–106) also presents the ways of

ative verb. RDA appears to consider the one who covers Zayd or who gives him something as directing his action towards Zayd, whereas the thing that is given to Zayd or is used to cover him, is affected by an action that is consistent with covering/giving, i.e., from being covered/receiving. This claim may appear arbitrary, since the agent's interaction with the covering/given object seems even more direct and significant than his interaction with the covered/receiving person. Modern case grammar theory distinguishes between a thing that undergoes some change because of the action, and the live participant that receives the action, experiences it or suffers from it; the former is called Object, and the latter is called Beneficiary.[161] The motivation behind RDA's analysis is probably the assumption that the agent performing the actions represented by the verbs 'cover'/'give' intends to somehow affect the Beneficiary that is usually human (and not to perform something with the inanimate object). The agent is primarily interested in the Beneficiary.[162]

RDA further presents the sentence *ʾaḥfartu Zaydan-i l-nahra* 'I attempted to make Zayd dig the river', in which "Zayd is the one who is made to dig, and the river is the thing that is dug" (*Zaydan muḥfarun wa-l-nahra maḥfūrun*). The *naṣb* of the second object in such cases "[is not assigned] by a reconstructable complying [action]" (*bi-l-muṭāwiʿi l-muqaddari*), in contrary to some grammarians' claim. The underlying structure is not *ʾaḥfartuhu wa-ḥafara l-nahra* 'I attempted to make him dig and he dug the river', since one can say also 'I attempted to make him dig but he did not dig' (in other words, with a verb such as *ʾaḥfara* the occurrence of the complying action is not certain, and this refutes the claim that the second object takes its *naṣb* from an implicit verb signifying that complying action). "Both objects take their *naṣb* from the explicit verb, since [that verb] includes the meaning of inducing the complying action" (*intiṣābu l-mafʿūlayni bi-l-fiʿli l-ẓāhiri li-ʾannahu mutaḍamminun li-maʿnā l-ḥamli ʿalā ḏālika l-fiʿli l-muṭāwiʿi*).[163]

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building "complying verbs" parallel to verbs from various forms. Taha (2009) explores the notion of "compliance" in the context of grammarians' approach to transitivity.

161 See Borochovsky-Bar Aba 2001:52–56 for a discussion of the semantic cases Object and Beneficiary. See Borochovsky-Bar Aba 2001:55 for a semantic analysis of the sentence "David gave Rachel a flower", that is analoguous to RDA's examples mentioned above.

162 This may be related to the principle that a human being instinctively tends to view himself as central (see Borochovsky-Bar Aba 2001:83). This is probably also the rationale behind Ibn al-Sarrāj's claim (*ʾUṣūl* I, 176) that in verbs such as *ʾaʿṭā* the second object (but not the first) can be omitted. See Sheyhatovitch 2012:55 for a discussion of the relevant fragment from Ibn al-Sarrāj.

163 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 335.

In RDA's view, the fact that ʾaḥfara assigns naṣb to a constituent signifying a thing that should be dug requires explanation, because there is no obvious logical connection between the two (a logical connection between a governor and its governed constituent is one of the conditions for the existence of grammatical influence[164]). That is because a person who makes another person dig, has no interaction with the thing that should be dug; he only interacts with the person who should dig (in contrast to kasā and ʾaʿṭā, where the agent does have an interaction with the covering/given object, although that interaction is less significant than his interaction with the covered/receiving person). RDA maintains that it would be far-fetched to explain the case markers in ʾaḥfartu Zaydan-i l-nahra by the paraphrase ʾaḥfartuhu wa-ḥafara l-nahra—since the action of digging is not necessarily performed in this case. Unlike the actions signified by kasā and ʾaʿṭā, which automatically bring about being covered and receiving, the action signified by ʾaḥfara does not automatically bring about digging; the action of digging must be actively performed by someone, whereas ʾaḥfara merely signifies the agent's attempt to make someone dig. Therefore, RDA prefers to explain that the idea of digging is included in the meaning of ʾaḥfara (rather than by the reconstructable verb ḥafara).

Another example where the notion of inclusion is used to explain constituents' syntactic behavior occurs in a discussion of cognitive verbs whose grammatical government is "suspended" (muʿallaq), i.e., unmanifest due to certain elements that act as barriers to government.[165] According to RDA, an interrogative clause following a cognitive verb is in the naṣb position. That naṣb can be explained by an omitted particle—this is the case after a verb that signifies doubt. For instance, the meaning of šakaktu ʾa-Zaydun fī l-dāri ʾam ʿAmrun 'I doubted whether Zayd was in the house or ʿAmr' is šakaktu fī hāḏā l-ʾamri 'I had doubts on this matter'. In other cases the naṣb can be explained by the grammatical government of the verb itself—"because the verb requires [an object] by its coinage, or because the verb includes the meaning of something that requires [an object]" (ʾimmā li-qtiḍāʾi l-fiʿli ʾiyyāhu waḍʿan wa-ʾimmā li-taḍammuni l-fiʿli mā yaqtaḍīhi).

Cognitive verbs that require a direct object by their coinage are verbs that explicitly signify knowledge.[166] Such verb may require a single object, e.g.,

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164   See Levin 1995:225.

165   Peled (1992a:154–155) demonstrates that Ibn Yaʿīš (similarly to some other later grammarians) views taʿlīq as a special case of ʾilġāʾ, which explains why this phenomenon is restricted to cognitive verbs. See Rybalkin 2009 for a summary of cases in which the grammatical government of cognitive verbs is suspended.

166   RDA, Šarḥ IV, 166.

ʿaraftu hal Zaydun fī l-dāri 'I knew whether Zayd was in the house', where "the clause [that the verb] is suspended from [governing]" (*al-jumla l-muʿallaq ʿanhā*) takes the position of the object; in other words, the meaning is *ʿaraftu hāḏā l-ʾamra* 'I knew this matter'.[167] Alternatively, such a verb may require more than one object, in which case the inerrogative clause would occupy the position of the first and second object, or of the second and third, or of the second object only.

Cognitive verbs that require a direct object because of the meaning they include are verbs that signify the seeking of knowledge. For instance, *fakkartu hal Zaydun fī l-dāri* 'I was thinking whether Zayd was in the house'. The verb *fakkara* "is intransitive by its coinage; however, it may take a direct object when it is made to include the meaning of *taʿarrafa* 'he discovered'" (*lāzimun waḍʿan lākin yataʿaddā ʾilā mafʿūlin li-taḍmīnihi maʿnā taʿarrafa*).

In other words, *fakkara* may behave as a transitive verb when it implies the meaning 'I discovered something because I thought about it'. Similarly, in the sentence *unẓur ʾilayhi ʾa-qāʾimun huwa ʾam qāʾidun* 'Look whether he is standing or sitting' the verb *unẓur* behaves analogously to cognitive verbs, because the meaning is 'Discover the matter by looking at him'.

RDA moves to another type of cognitive verbs:

> *ʾin kāna l-fiʿlu l-maṭlūbu bihi l-ʿilmu mutaʿaddiyan bi-l-waḍʿi, tuʿṭīhi min-a l-mafāʿīli mā qtaḍāhu waḍʿuhu, ṯumma tajīʾu bi-l-jumlati l-muʿallaqi ʿanhā fī mawḍiʿi l-mafʿūli l-zāʾidi lahu bi-sababi taḍmīnihi maʿnā l-taʿarrufi*

> If a verb that signifies seeking knowledge is transitive by its coinage, [the speakers] supply [that verb] with objects that its coinage requires, and then add a clause that [the verb] is suspended from governing. [That clause occupies] the position of an additional object [that the verb takes] because [that verb] was made to include the meaning of discovering.[168]

This is an analysis of cases in which an originally monotransitive verb is followed by a noun phrase and an interrogative clause, both of which function as objects. This expansion of the verb's transitivity is explained by the fact that in these contexts the verb includes the meaning of 'discover', which allows it to behave analogously to doubly transitive cognitive verbs. For instance, the meaning of *imtaḥantu Zaydan hal huwa karīmun* 'I tested Zayd whether he is

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167 RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 166–167.
168 RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 167.

generous' is 'I discovered his generosity by testing him' (*imtaḥana* is interpreted here as 'discovered by testing', and thus includes the meaning of 'discovering'), and the meaning of *ʾabṣartu Zaydan hal huwa fī l-dāri* 'I saw Zayd whether he is in the house' is 'I discovered that Zayd is in the house by seeing him' (*ʾabṣara* is interpreted as 'discovered by seeing', and thus includes the meaning of 'discovering').[169]

5.2.5.2.4   Using the Notion of 'Inclusion' to Explain a Resemblance between Elements

In many cases RDA explains *bināʾ* endings in nouns as due to the fact that they include a meaning characteristic of particles. For instance, he says that most grammarians agree that demonstrative pronouns take *bināʾ* endings for the following reason:

> *li-taḍammunihā maʿnā l-ḥarfi wa-huwa l-ʾišāratu, li-ʾannahā maʿnan mina l-maʿānī, ka-l-istifhāmi, fa-kāna ḥaqquhā ʾan yūḍaʿa lahā ḥarfun yadullu ʿalayhā, wa-ḏālika ʾanna ʿādatahum jāriyatun, fī l-ʾaġlabi, fī kulli maʿnan yadḫulu l-kalāma ʾaw-i l-kalimata ʾan yūḍaʿa lahu ḥarfun yadullu ʿalayhi*

> [The ending is *bināʾ*] because [the demonstrative pronouns] include the meaning of a particle, which is pointing. [Pointing] is an [abstract[170]] meaning, just like questioning, and thus a particle should have been coined to signify it. This is because [Arabic speakers] usually coin for each [abstract] meaning that joins a sentence or a word a particle that signifies it.[171]

RDA gives several examples of such abstract meanings for which particles were coined: *ʾa-* (a particle that introduces yes/no questions)—for the meaning of questioning; *mā* and other negation particles—for the meaning of negation; *layta* 'if only' for the meaning of wishing, *laʿalla* 'maybe'—for the meaning of

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169   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 167. See RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 290–291 for a discussion in which the notion of inclusion is used to explain the syntactic behavior of *rubba* 'many a …'. See RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 410 for a discussion in which the notion of inclusion is used to explain the verb's behavior in clauses preceded by *sawāʾun/mā ʾubālī* 'I do not care whether …'.

170   It has been demonstrated in section 5.1.1 above that the term *maʿnā* in most of its appearances in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* refers to an abstract meaning. Here the adjective 'abstract' seems necessary, because otherwise it would not be clear why the meaning should be represented by a particle (and not by any other part of speech).

171   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 471.

hoping, etc.[172] For some abstract meanings "[elements] are coined that behave analoguously to particles, in terms of lack of independency" (*yūḍaʿu lahā mā yajrī majrā l-ḥarfi fī ʿadami l-istiqlāli*)[173]—for instance, "the case markers that signify various meanings" (*al-ʾiʿrāb al-dāll ʿalā l-maʿānī l-muḫtalifa*), the changes in the basic word pattern that create the broken plural and the diminutive, the changes of the pattern in words derived from a verbal noun, e.g., *ḍaraba* 'he hit', *yaḍribu* 'he (will) hit', *ḍārib* 'hitting one', *maḍrūb* 'hit one'.

In contrast to the abovementioned cases, "the demonstrative pronouns include an [abstract] meaning, but no particle was coined for this meaning" (*fī ʾasmāʾi l-ʾišārati maʿnan wa-lam yūḍaʿ li-hāḏā l-maʿnā ḥarfun*). Thus they should have been like "nouns that [denote] condition and question" (*ʾasmāʾ al-šarṭ wa-l-istifhām*), as was mentioned in the discussion on the definition of the term 'noun'.[174] RDA means that a noun that has a meaning of condition/question signifies a meaning simultaneously in itself and in another constituent. For instance, in *ʾayyahum ḍarabta* 'Which of them did you hit?' the interrogative meaning is related to the sentence's content, since a question is asked about the identity of the one hit by the addressee. In *ʾayyahum taḍrib ʾaḍrib* 'Whoever of them you hit I [also] will hit', the meaning of conditional exists in the protasis and the apodosis. In addition to signifying a certain meaning related to the entire clause(s), in both examples *ʾayy* signifies some entity.

In principle, a noun should not signify a meaning in another constituent; this function is reserved for particles. To resolve the theoretical problem presented by nouns signifying a question/condition, RDA adopts Sībawayhi's approach: a noun that signifies a question originally should have been preceded by the particle *ʾa-*, and a noun that signifies a condition originally should have been preceded by the particle *ʾin*; however, these particles were necessarily omitted because of multiple use.[175] Unlike question and condition, the meaning of pointing has no corresponding particle, but this fact does not prevent the demonstrative pronoun from being viewed as including a meaning characteristic to a particle, which explains its *bināʾ* ending.

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172   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 471.

173   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 471–472.

174   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 472. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 715) offers another explanation for the *bināʾ* ending in demonstrative pronouns: he says that some of them "were originally coined in the particles' coinage" (*waḍʿuhā bi-l-ʾaṣālati waḍʿu l-ḥurūfi*; here the demonstratives that consist of two letters only are intended), whereas the rest behave analogously to the former, since they belong to the same category.

175   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 41. A statement closest to the abovementioned that I found in Sībawayhi (*Kitāb* I, 240) is that the interrogatives *ʾayna* 'where' and *kayfa* 'how' behave analogously to *ʾa-*/*hal* because they replace them.

Another case in which a *binā'* ending of a noun is explained as due to the included meaning of a particle appears in a discussion on "assertive *kam*" (*kam al-ḫabariyya*), whose meaning is 'how many ...!'.[176] 'Andalusī and Ibn al-Ḥājib claim that the *binā'* ending of this noun can be explained[177] "by the fact that it includes a performative meaning that is usually [represented] by particles" (*li-taḍammunihā maʿnā l-'inšā'i llaḏī huwa bi-l-ḥurūfi ġāliban*)[178]—e.g., by the interrogative *'a-*, or by the instigative particle (*ḥarf al-taḥḍīḍ*).[179] According to this line of thought, *kam* resembles nouns that include the meaning of a particle, and thus should take a *binā'* ending.

However, in the light of his own definitions of assertive and non-assertive sentences,[180] RDA says that it appears that "the speaker [who produces a sentence that opens with *kam* or *rubba*] necessarily intends [for the sentence] to correspond to extralinguistic reality" (*lā budda fīhi min 'an yaqṣida l-mutakallimu muṭābaqatahu li-l-ḫāriji*). For instance, to a sentence such as *kam rajulin laqītuhu* 'How many men have I met!' one may reply *mā laqīta rajulan* 'You met no man'. The fact that the sentence may be said to be true or false proves that it is assertive; thus the position of Ibn al-Ḥājib and 'Andalusī (who explained the ending of assertive *kam* by its performative meaning) seems problematic.

This notwithstanding, RDA does state that the abovementioned *kam* includes a performative meaning, namely that of "considering [some objects] as multiple" (*al-istikṯār*), whereas in the case of *rubba* there is a meaning of "considering [some objects] as few" (*al-istiqlāl*). His explanation is:

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176   Wright translates the term *ḫabariyya* in this expression as "assertory/predicative/exclamatory". See Wright 1896–1898:II, 125–127 for a discussion on the two uses of the word *kam*, in assertive sentences and in questions.

177   Another possible explanation for the ending of "the assertive *kam*" is its resemblance to "interrogative *kam*" that should take a *binā'* ending because it includes the meaning of an interrogative particle; constituents that include the meaning of a particle should take a *binā'* ending (see p. 105, fn. 150 above for another application of this principle). RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 149.

178   RDA (*Šarḥ* III, 157) uses the same idea to explain why the basic position of *kam* (and also of *rubba*) is at the beginning of the sentence. Interestingly, Ibn al-Ḥājib mentions an additional explanation for the *binā'* ending of "assertive *kam*"—see Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 762.

179   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 149. See RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 442–444 for a discussion on instigative particles, which Mughazy (2008:573) views as a type of performative particles.

180   The main difference between the two, according to RDA, lies in the fact that an assertive sentence refers to extralinguistic reality; the truth value of such a sentence is tested according to that reality. In contrast, a non-assertive sentence does not refer to extralinguistic reality, but rather creates that reality (therefore, it cannot be said to be true or false). See pp. 192–193 above.

lā yaqṣidu l-mutakallimu ʾanna li-l-maʿnayayni ḫārijan, bal huwa l-mūjidu lahumā bi-kalāmihi, balā yuqṣadu ʾanna fī l-ḫāriji qillatan ʾaw kaṯratan, lā stikṯāran wa-lā stiqlālan

The speaker does not mean that these two meanings (i.e., considering something as multiple/few) have an extralinguistic [counterpart]; he creates [these meanings] by [producing] his utterance. The idea is that there are multiple and few objects in extralinguistic reality, but considering objects as multiple or few does not exist [outside the speakers' minds and their speech].[181]

RDA gives an example to elucidate his reasoning: when someone says *kam raju-lin laqītuhu*, his intention is actually "I consider the men I met as many", so one cannot appropriately respond "You are wrong, you do not consider the men you met as many". Similarly, when someone says *mā ʾakṯarahum* 'How many they are!', it is acceptable to respond "No, they are not many", but not "No, you were not surprised by their large number".[182] In other words, *rubba* and the assertive *kam*, similarly to the surprise pattern, create utterances that perform an act of expressing a personal attitude. The addressee can argue with the speaker regarding the state of affairs in reality, but one cannot argue with the speaker's expression of his perception (since such an expression, like any performative utterance, has no truth value).

RDA adds that the abovementioned cases are different from the sentence *mā qāma Zaydun* 'Zayd did not stand' that "does not convey the message" (*lā yufīdu*)[183] that the speaker, while producing the utterance, considers Zayd's standing as negated—because the speaker expresses his judgment that Zayd's standing does not exist in extralinguistic reality (i.e., the speaker presents the

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181   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 150.

182   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 150. According to Vanderveken's classification (1990:197), sentences that are used to express speaker's psychological states are "exclamatory sentences". Vanderveken (1990:200–201) discusses various "directions of fit" between the language and the world; illocutionary acts whose main point consists in expressing propositional attitudes of the speaker about a state of affairs have "the null or empty direction of fit", because their point is not to represent the state of affairs as actual or to try to get it to be actual in the world. Larcher (1991a:263) notes that RDA's approach differs from that of modern linguists' in that he speaks of an "objective" element inserted in an essentially "subjective" frame, instead of just adding a non-assertive dimension to an assertion. Larcher's observation is based on the expression *ʾinšāʾ juzʾuhu l-ḫabar* that appears in RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 238 and refers to exclamative utterances.

183   This use of *yufīdu* is related to one of the main senses of the term *fāʾida*, which is "meaning/message". See Sheyhatovitch 2012: chapter 5.

content of the sentence as a fact rather than an opinion). In contrast, the sentence *kam rajulin laqītuhu* "conveys the message" (*'afāda*) that the speaker, in producing the sentence, considers the meetings as being numerous.[184] According to this approach, the performative element included in assertive *kam* makes that noun resemble a particle (since performatives are usually marked by particles[185]), and this is the reason for its *binā'* ending.

Another example where the notion of inclusion is used to explain a resemblance between elements appears in a discussion on defective verbs. RDA says that the list of the sisters of *kāna* is "not closed" (*ġayr maḥṣūra*), because "multiple full [verbs] can be made to include the meaning of defective ones" (*qad yajūzu taḍmīnu kaṯīrin min-a l-tāmmati maʿnā l-nāqiṣati*). For instance, the sentence *tatimmu l-tisʿatu bi-hāḏā ʿašaratan* 'The nine are compeleted by this to ten' is equivalent to *taṣīru ʿašaratan tāmmatan* '[They] become a complete ten'; *kamula Zaydun ʿāliman* 'Zayd was perfect as a knowledgeable person' is equivalent to *ṣāra ʿāliman kāmilan* '[He] became perfectly knowlegeable'.[186] That is to say, the verbs *tamma* and *kamula*, widely known as regular predicative verbs, include in those examples the meaning of *ṣāra*, a clearly defective verb, and thus behave as defective verbs (i.e., are followed by a nominal clause, whose predicate takes *naṣb*).

Additionally, the notion of inclusion is used to explain why the verb *ʿasā* 'maybe, perhaps' has only a partial conjugation;[187] why *ʿasā* can behave analoguously to *kāna* 'he was';[188] and why the verbs *ṭafiqa*, *'aḫaḏa*, *jaʿala*, *'anša'a* etc. can behave analoguously to *kāna* when they signify the beginning of an action.[189]

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184   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 150.

185   Of course, Arabic performatives can be constructed as regular assertive sentences, which have no characteristic particles, e.g., *biʿtu* 'I (hereby) sell!' (see fn. 122 above). However, RDA may claim that in principle performatives should be realized with characteristic particles, and explain the other cases by means of semantic shift or particle omission. For instance, in RDA's view imperative verb originally should have been preceded by the particle *li-* (that precedes the jussive to express order/invitation), but this particle was omitted because of the frequent use of imperative verbs. See RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 85. Curiously, this is a "Kūfan" view—see Ibn al-'Anbārī, *'Inṣāf* II, 524–549 for a discussion.

186   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 183.

187   See RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 213–214.

188   See RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 215.

189   See RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 221.

5.2.5.2.5   *Signification by Entailment*

Signification by entailment is mentioned in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* in two discussions only, where it is referred to by derivatives of the terms *iltizām* and *istilzām*. It should be mentioned that words derived from the root *l-z-m* often appear in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* in the senses of 'adhere (e.g., to a certain syntactic position)'[190] and 'be necessitated by (speaking of a causative relation between clauses/sentences/ideas)',[191] but these cases are irrelevant for the current discussion.

The first example occurs in a discussion of anaphora. RDA follows Ibn al-Ḥājib in distinguishing between formal and abstract anaphora. The latter type is divided according to whether whatever clarifies the pronoun is signified by the preceding phrase by inclusion or by entailment.[192] The entailment (*istilzām*) may be "close" (*qarīb*) or "remote" (*baʿīd*). RDA's example of close entailment: Q. 4/11 *wa-li-ʾabawayhi li-kulli wāḥidin minhumā l-sudsu* 'And to his parents to each one of the two the sixth [of what he leaves]', in which "the context of mentioning the legacy signifies the legator by entailment" (*siyāqu ḏikri l-mīrāṯi dāllun ʿalā l-muwarriṯi dalālatan-i ltizāmiyyatan*).[193] Although the word *mīrāṯ* is not mentioned explicitly either in this verse or in preceding ones, the clause *mā taraka* 'what he leaves' is mentioned, which is equivalent to the noun *mīrāṯ*.

As for remote entailment (i.e., cases in which a relatively complicated mental process is needed to infer from the preceding context something that clarifies the pronoun), the examples are:

1. Q. 38/32 *Ḥattā tawārat bi-l-ḥijābi* 'Until [the sun] was hidden behind the veil',[194] in which the referent of the pronoun in *rafʿ*, hidden in the verb *tawārat*, is unclear. RDA explains that *al-ʿašī* 'the evening' (a word from the previous verse) "signifies [by entailment] the disappearance of the sun" (*yadullu ʿalā tawārī l-šamsi*).

2. Q. 97/1 *ʾinnā ʾanzalnāhu fī laylati l-qadri* 'Behold, We sent it down on the Night of Power',[195] in which the referent of the bound pronoun in *naṣb* in *ʾanzalnāhu* is unclear. RDA explains that "being sent down during the Night of Power in Ramaḍān signifies [by entailment] that the thing sent down is the Qurʾān" (*al-nuzūlu fī laylati l-qadri llatī hiya fī šahri Ramaḍāna, dalīlun ʿalā ʾanna l-munzala huwa l-Qurʾānu*); he probably has

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190   See, e.g., RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 125, 459; II, 230, 449; III, 460; IV, 366.
191   See, e.g., RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 445; II, 35, 299, 473; III, 131, 185; IV, 29.
192   See pp. 64 ff. above for a detailed discussion.
193   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 405.
194   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 405.
195   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 405.

in mind the mention of "[the Night of] Power" in the title of the *sūra* (*sūrat al-Qadr*). RDA's statement is based on another verse, *šahru Ramaḍāna llaḏī ʾunzila fīhi l-Qurʾānu* 'The month of Ramaḍān, wherein the Qurʾān was sent down' (Q. 2/185).[196]

3.   Q. 35/45 *Mā taraka ʿalā ẓahrihā min dābbatin* 'He would not leave a living creature on the surface [of the earth]',[197] in which the referent of the bound possessive pronoun in *ẓahrihā* is unclear. RDA explains that mentioning the living creatures beside "the surface" "signifies [by entailment] that the intention is the surface of the earth" (*dāllun ʿalā ʾanna l-murāda ẓahru l-ʾarḍi*).[198] He probably means that among all the words that can function as a governed element of *ẓahr* 'back, surface' (i.e., among all the words whose referents are such that one can speak of their back/surface), the only one whose referent can carry living creatures is the earth. This makes it possible to infer the referent of the abovementioned possessive pronoun. Such an inference is based on a combination of linguistic and extra-linguistic knowledge.

This discussion is reminiscent of modern pragmatics: according to Grice's cooperative principle, speakers assume that their interlocutors cooperate with them in the communication process, and thus observe some maxims in order to allow proper communication. If one of these maxims is violated, the addressee strives to bridge the gap and to infer the speaker's intention. This process is called implicature.[199] In cases discussed by RDA pronouns that apparently have no antecedent violate the maxim of manner (that requires speakers to be clear) and this makes the addressee infer the meaning. Scholars after Grice studied the various types of textual clues that allow the addressee to decipher the meaning, employing linguistic and extra-linguistic knowledge.[200]

The second example, in which the notion of entailment appears beside the notions of correspondence and inclusion, occurs in the discussion of emphasis.[201]

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196   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 405.
197   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 405. This translation of the verse is from Pickthall n.d.
198   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 405.
199   See Grice 1975.
200   See, e.g., Dascal and Weizman 1987.
201   See p. 201 above.

5.3 *Musammā*

The central meaning of the term *musammā* in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* is 'the named one'.[202] In discussing diptote proper nouns, RDA says that names such as Muḥammad lit. 'praised one' could have been expected to be diptote because they have an adjectival meaning and function as proper nouns;[203] "however, since the most important and general intention in the coinage of proper nouns is to specify those named by them" (*ʾillā ʾanna l-maqṣūda l-ʾahamma l-ʾaʿamma fī waḍʿi l-ʾaʿlāmi lammā kāna taḥṣīṣa l-musammā bihā*), the original adjectiveness of proper nouns is not taken into account as a factor determining their diptoteness. Therefore, a name such as Muḥammad is not diptote.[204]

When discussing *tarḥīm*, RDA says that it is possible in proper nouns, because "the named one's being well known by its name usually removes the vagueness" (*ištihāru l-musammā bi-ʿalamihi mimmā yuzīlu l-labsa fī l-ġālibi*).[205] Therefore, in proper nouns there is no risk that *tarḥīm*-related omission of letters will hinder the addressee's understanding of the speaker's intention. When discussing lamentation RDA states that usually in this structure *ʾalif* is added; however, if a noun has a *bināʾ* ending, and adding the *ʾalif* may result in ambiguity, a quiescent letter is added that agrees with the final vowel of the noun. For instance, "if someone named Minhu lit. 'from him' [is lamented, the structure is] *wā-Minhūh*—so that the name would not be confused with Minhā lit. 'from her'" (*wā-Minhūh fī l-musammā bi-Minhu li-ʾallā yaltabisa bi-l-musammā bi-Minhā*).[206]

In cases where the term *musammā* is not related to proper nouns it seems appropriate to translate it as 'referent'. For instance, when discussing place expressions that can be assigned *naṣb* by the verb if they signify a 'vague' (*mubham*) place, RDA needs to define the term 'vague'. Some grammarians claim that it means an indefinite phrase; however, RDA rejects this interpretation, because in *jalastu ḥalfaka/ʾamāmaka* 'I sat behind you/in front of you' the place expressions take *naṣb* in spite of their definiteness. According to another

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202 Versteegh (1997a:266 ff.) translates *musammā* as "nominatum"; he links the distinction *ism/musammā* to Muʿtazilite theology. Peled (1999:52) translates *musammā* as "the named".

203 Adjectiveness and definiteness are mentioned by Ibn al-Ḥājib (RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 100–101) among the nine conditions, any two of which are expected to render a noun diptote.

204 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 149.

205 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 405.

206 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 415. For additional examples in which the term *musammā* appears in the sense of 'the named one' see RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 239–240 (in a discussion on the phrases of the type *Saʿīd Kurz*, see pp. 188–189 above). See also RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 263.

approach, 'vague' means "not restricted" (*ġayr al-maḥṣūr*). RDA prefers this interpretation to the former; however, the problem is that it unjustly excludes from the definition of 'vague' place expressions denoting measures of length, such as *farsaḫ* 'parasang' and *mīl* 'mile', although grammarians are in unanimous agreement that such words take *naṣb* as adverbials of place.[207]

RDA says that according to Ibn al-Ḥājib, "'vague' (when referring to places) is something that received its name because of something that is not a part of its referent" (*al-mubhamu mā ṯabata lahu smuhu bi-sababi ʾamrin ġayri dāḫilin fī musammāhu*).[208] This definition includes measures of length—"since a place does not become a parasang because of its essence, but because of the area measurement that is external to the referent [of the place expression]" (*fa-ʾinna l-makāna lam yaṣir farsaḫan bi-l-naẓari ʾilā ḏātihi, bal bi-sababi l-qiyāsi l-misāḥiyyi llaḏī huwa ʾamrun ḫārijun ʿan musammāhu*). In contrast, a "delimited" (*muwaqqat*) place is "a one that received its name because of something that is a part of its referent" (*mā kāna lahu smuhu bi-sababi ʾamrin dāḫilin fī musammāhu*).[209] This is true for the names of places that were given to them while taking the places themselves into account. Similarly, words such as *balad* 'city' and *sūq* 'market' refer to places because of the things found in these places—a city has its buildings, a market its shops, etc.[210]

Words such as *ḫalfa* 'behind' and *quddāma* 'in front of' "are used to refer to places, taking into account [the referents of] their governed elements" (*tuṭlaqu ʿalā hāḏihi l-ʾamākini bi-ʿtibāri mā tuḍāfu ʾilayhi*).[211] That is to say, a place can be referred to as "behind x", taking into account the referent of the governed element x, not the place itself. Thus, according to Ibn al-Ḥājib's definition, it is a 'vague' place, and a word that signifies it should take *naṣb*.

RDA notes that Ibn al-Ḥājib should have excluded from his definition of 'vague' place expressions the word *jānib* 'side' and its synonyms, phrases such

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207   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 488.

208   Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 485) says that many grammarians consider 'vague' place expressions as those that refer to "the six directions" (*al-jihāt al-sitta*), whereas place expressions that take *naṣb* as adverbials of place, although they do not refer to the six directions, are anomalous. Ibn al-Ḥājib ascribes the view that a 'vague' place "receives its name because of something that is not a part of its referent" to other grammarians. He explains that this definition includes the six directions together with things that the first approach presents as anomalous. He adds (*Šarḥ*, 486) that places that received their names because of something that is not a part of their referent, and that are not considered as anomalous in the framework of the first approach, are controversial.

209   This explanation appears in Ibn al-Ḥājib, *ʾĪḍāḥ* I, 317.

210   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 489.

211   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 489.

as *jawf al-bayt* 'the interior of the house' and *ḫārij al-dār* 'outside the house', as well as some nouns of place of the pattern *mafʿal*. Nouns of the pattern *mafʿal* are included in Ibn al-Ḥājib's definition, "since such a name is given to a place, taking into account the action that occurs there, whereas an action is not a part of the referent of the place [expression]" (*li-ʾannahu ʾinnamā yaṯbutu miṯlu hāḏā l-ismu li-l-makāni bi-ʿtibāri l-ḥadaṯi l-wāqiʿi fīhi, wa-l-ḥadaṯu šaʾnun ḫārijun ʿan musammā l-makāni*). However, there are nouns of the pattern *mafʿal* that cannot take *naṣb* as an adverbial of place: e.g., the sentences **nimtu maḍraba Zaydin* 'I slept where Zayd was beaten' and **qumtu maṣraʿahu* 'I stood where he was killed' are unacceptable[212] (they should be formulated instead as *nimtu fī maḍrabi Zaydin* and *qumtu fī maṣraʿihi*). In other words, nouns of the pattern *mafʿal* are included in Ibn al-Ḥājib's definition of 'vague' place expressions, and thus should be capable of being used as adverbials of place (unpreceded by a preposition and in *naṣb*); however, this is not true for all actual uses of those nouns. Therefore, Ibn al-Ḥājib's definition is not accurate.

In this context RDA proposes to distinguish between words of the pattern *mafʿal* that are derived from a verbal noun signifying staying/being in a place, and words of the same pattern that are not derived from such a verbal noun. *Mafʿal* of the latter category, such as *maḍrab* 'a place of beating', *maqtal* 'a place of killing', *maʾkal* 'a place of eating' and *mašrab* 'a place of drinking', can take *naṣb* only from a verb that can assign *naṣb* "to a specific place [expression]" (*al-muḫtaṣṣ min al-makān*)—such as *daḫaltu* 'I entered', *nazaltu* 'I descended' and *sakantu* 'I resided'. *Mafʿal* from the former category can take *naṣb* from a verb derived from the same root, e.g., *qātaltu mawḍiʿa l-qitāli* 'I fought in the place of fighting', *naṣartu makāna l-naṣri* 'I helped in the place of help', *qumtu maqāmahu* 'I stood where he stands' and *jalastu majlisahu* 'I sat where he sits',[213] and also from any verb that has the meaning of staying in a place, even if that verb is not derived from the same root as the noun of the pattern *mafʿal*—e.g., *jalastu mawḍiʿa l-qiyāmi* 'I sat in the place of standing', *taḥarraktu makāna l-sukūni* 'I moved in the place of resting', *qaʿadtu mawḍiʿaka* 'I sat in your place'. A verb that does not have the meaning of staying in a place cannot assign *naṣb* to such place expressions; thus one cannot say **katabtu l-kitāba makānaka* 'I

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212   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 489–490.

213   Here RDA combines examples of nouns of place derived from the same root as the governing verb (in line with his own description of the structure) with examples in which a name of a general place (e.g., *mawḍiʿ/makān*) in *naṣb* is annexed to the verbal noun derived from the same root as the governing verb. Although RDA does not explain this point, it is clear that the annexation structure *mawḍiʿ al-qitāl* is equivalent to the noun *maqtal*, and hence it stands to reason that the annexation takes the same position as the noun of the pattern *mafʿal*.

wrote the letter in your place' or *ramaytu bi-l-sahmi mawḍiʿa Bakrin 'I shot the arrow in Bakr's place'[214] (instead, one says katabtu l-kitāba fī makānika and ramaytu bi-l-sahmi fī mawḍiʿi Bakrin).

The most important element in this discussion is the formulation of an accurate definition of the term 'vague place' (which is essential for determining the types of phrases that can take naṣb as an adverbial of place, and distinguishing them from other place expressions, which must be preceded by a particle). Ibn al-Ḥājib bases his definition on the term musammā, and RDA in principle accepts his definition (however, he also raises some points of criticism). The term musammā in this context appears to refer to an object in extra-linguistic reality (and not to its mental representation), since the discussion deals with concrete places, that contain buildings or shops, occupy a certain position in relation to other places, and can be measured. It is not stated explicitly but can be inferred that the term musammā is closer to the meaning 'an extra-linguistic object denoted by the linguistic expression' than the terms maʿnā and madlūl that were discussed above.

When discussing the word allāh 'God' RDA links the special behavior of this linguistic element to the uniqueness of its referent. According to the Baṣran approach, a preposition's grammatical government should vanish together with the preposition's omission, save for the case of the oath allāhi '[I swear by] God!', where the noun takes jarr, although the oath paticle wa- is omitted. In contrast, the Kūfans permitted each word that represents the thing by which one swears to behave analoguously to allāhi—for instance, they accepted the sentence al-muṣḥafi la-ʾafʿalanna '[I swear by] the copy [of Qurʾān], I will do!'.[215] The Baṣran grammarians disagree with this approach; they accept allāhi "because the word allāh has exclusive attributes that no other [word] has, due to the exclusive arrtibutes of its referent" (li-ḫtiṣāṣi lafẓati llāhi bi-ḫaṣāʾiṣa laysat li-ġayrihā tabaʿan li-ḫtiṣāṣi musammāhā bi-ḫaṣāʾiṣa).[216]

RDA lists several exclusive characteristics of the word allāh: the vocative yā can precede the definite article in yā llāhu 'O God!' (whereas in all other cases this particle cannot directly precede the definite article, and thus ʾayyuhā is inserted between the vocative particle and the definite noun);[217] one can say yā ʾallāhu/ʾa-fa-ʾallāhi/hā ʾallāhi, with a consonantal ʾalif in ʾallāhu/ʾallāhi

214   RDA, Šarḥ I, 490. Ibn al-Ḥājib (Šarḥ, 487) explains that makān can receive naṣb as an adverbial of place from any verb "because of [makān's being] widespread [in the language]" (li-kaṭratihi), but RDA disagrees with him. See also RDA, Šarḥ I, 492.

215   RDA, Šarḥ IV, 296.

216   RDA, Šarḥ IV, 296–297.

217   This phenomenon is discussed in Wright 1896–1898:II, 89.

(whereas in all other cases the *ʾalif* of the definite article takes *waṣla* in the middle of the sentence);[218] *allāh* can take *jarr* when the preposition is omitted, either with no compensation, or with *hāʾ al-tanbīh*/interrogative *ʾa-* as compensation—*hā llāhi*/*ʾā-llāhi*; *m* compensates for an implicit vocative particle in *allāhumma*; the *l* of the word is pronounced as emphatic after the vowels *u* and *a*, and non-emphatically after *i*.[219]

5.4 *Maḍmūn*

The term *maḍmūn* 'content' appears in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* more than 200 times. It is derived from the root *ḍ-m-n*, as are the terms *taḍammun*/*taḍmīn* that were discussed in section 5.2.5.2 above, which dealt with types of signification. *Maḍmūn* is also associated with a meaning included in a linguistic element; however, there the focus is different.

5.4.1 Maḍmūn *as the Content of a Clause*
In most appearances in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya maḍmūn* refers to the content of a clause. For instance, when speaking of *fa-* that precedes a nominal predicate,[220] RDA states that this particle does not necessitate the thing mentioned before it to be the cause of the thing mentioned after it, but rather "necessitates [the content of the constituent] that follows it to necessarily follow the content [of the constituent] that precedes it" (*al-lāzimu ʾan yakūna mā baʿda l-fāʾi lāziman li-maḍmūni mā qablahā*), similarly to the situation in all types of conditional sentences. For instance, in Q. 62/8 *qul ʾinna l-mawta llaḏī tafirrūna minhu fa-ʾinnahu mulāqīkum*: 'Say: Surely death, from which you flee, shall encounter you', death necessarily follows the fleeing (one cannot flee death, everyone dies eventually), but fleeing is not the cause of death.[221]

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218 The vocative particles *yā* and *hā* are discussed in Wright 1896–1898:I, 294–295. Interestingly, Wright (1896–1898:II, 89) mentions the retention of *hamza* after *yā*, but not after *hā*. Fischer (2002:182–183) says that *hā* in *hā ʾallāhi* functions as "oath particle". As for the expression *ʾa-fa-ʾallāhi* 'And do you swear by God?', it is a combination of the interrogative *ʾa-*, the coordinative *fa-* and an oath expression. The *wa-* of the oath cannot follow the *fa-*; thus, the former is omitted, and the *hamza* of *ʾallāhi* compensates for it. See Sībawayhi, *Kitāb* II, 148.

219 RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 297. Some of these phenomena are mentioned also in RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 302. The idea that the special syntactic behavior of *allāh* stems from the referent's uniqueness is raised also in RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 383. See Bakalla 2009:422–423 for a discussion of emphatic *l*.

220 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 267.

221 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 269.

It is not quite clear why RDA feels the need to stress that the paricle *fa-* has no causative meaning: other grammarians also agree that the basic meaning of *fa-* is "putting [the content of the constituent that follows it] after [the content of the constituent that precedes it]" (*ʾitbāʿ*), and do not speak of it in terms of causality.[222] In fact, RDA here argues against the approach according to which the protasis of a conditional sentence is the cause of its apodosis. He even adds: "do not be tempted by the saying of some [grammarians]" (*lā yuġurrannaka qawlu baʿḍihim*), who adopt such approach.[223] In order to stress that this is not true for conditional sentences, RDA notes that this is also not the case in a nominal sentence composed analoguously to the conditional.

RDA appears to hold a similar opinion with respect to a *fa-* that follows a clause that is imperative/prohibiting/negative etc.[224] and precedes a subjunctive verb. Although he names this particle *fāʾ al-sababiyya* lit. 'fa- of causality' (a widely-accepted grammatical term) and even uses the term *sababiyya* several times in his discussion,[225] it seems that in his view this particle creates a structure with a meaning close to the meaning of a conditional sentence (and thus is not causative). He says that constituents that precede and follow *fa-* are equivalent to the protasis and apodosis of a conditional, respectively. His example is *mā taʾtīnā fa-tuḥaddiṯanā* 'You did not come to us, so that you would speak with us', which is equivalent to *ʾin taʾtinā tuḥaddiṯnā* 'If you come to us, you speak with us'. The speaking is negated by negating its condition, which is the coming; however, it does not mean that the coming causes the speaking.[226]

Another example occurs in a discussion of the circumstantial modifier, where RDA uses the term *maḍmūn* to refer to the content of the main clause, and also to the content of the circumstantial modifier (which can occur as either a phrase or a clause). Unlike Ibn al-Ḥājib, RDA chooses not to formulate a single definition of the circumstantial modifier, but instead distinguishes between two types of *ḥāl*, each with its own definition.[227]

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222 See, e.g., Jurjānī, *Muqtaṣid* II, 941–942; Ibn Yaʿīš, *Šarḥ* VIII, 95–96; Ibn al-Ḥājib, *ʾĪḍāḥ* II, 206.
223 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 269. For instance, when explaining why *law* should be viewed as a conditional particle, Ibn Yaʿīš (*Šarḥ* VIII, 156) says that its protasis is "a cause and an explanation" (*sabab wa-ʿilla*) of its apodosis; Ibn al-Ḥājib (*ʾĪḍāḥ* II, 241) defines a conditional particle as "every particle that joins two verbal clauses and renders the first [clause] to be the cause of the second" (*kullu ḥarfin daḫala ʿalā jumlatayni fiʿliyyatayni fa-jaʿala l-ʾūlā sababan li-l-ṯāniyati*).
224 See RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 63–66 for a discussion of sentence patterns that can precede *fāʾ al-sababiyya*; see also Sadan 2012:135–164.
225 See, e.g., RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 67–68.
226 RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 69.
227 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 10.

The first type is *ḥāl muntaqila* 'a *ḥāl* [expressing] a transitory [state]'.[228] RDA defines this as follows: "a sentence constituent that the time of its content's occurrence sets the bounds on the connection between the action mentioned in the sentence and the agent, or the object, or something that behaves analogously to these two" (*juzʾu kalāmin yataqayyadu bi-waqti ḥuṣūli maḍmūnihi taʿalluqu l-ḥadaṯi llaḏī fī ḏālika l-kalāmi bi-l-fāʿili ʾaw-i l-mafʿūli ʾaw mā yajrī majrāhumā*).[229] In other words, the logical connection between the action mentioned in the sentence and the agent/object should take place only at the time in which the content of the *ḥāl* takes place. RDA explains the function of each part of his definition: "a sentence constituent" excludes from the definition the second coordinated constituent in sentences such as *rakiba Zaydun wa-rakiba maʿa rukūbihi ġulāmuhu* 'Zayd rode, and, at the time of his riding, his lad rode', if we do not consider it as a *ḥāl* clause.[230] If the *wa-* is construed as *wāw al-ḥāl* that precedes a *ḥāl* clause, the structure would fit into RDA's definition, but if the *wa-* is construed as a coordinating particle, the words that follow it cannot be considered as a constituent of the preceding sentence. That is because the coordinating *wa-* links between constituents with the same syntactic function; since the first *rakiba* opens an independent sentence, the second *rakiba* that is coordinated to it also opens an independent sentence (and thus should not be considered as a *ḥāl*, although it signifies an action that takes place simultaneously with the action signified by the first *rakiba*).

The phrase "its content's occurrence" in the definition would exclude the phrase *al-qahqarā* in the sentence *rajaʿa l-qahqarā* 'Retreated in a backward movement' (which is thus *mafʿūl muṭlaq*, not *ḥāl*), "because the 'retreating' is bound by itself, not by the time of the occurrence of the content [of *al-qahqarā*]" (*li-ʾanna l-rujūʿa yataqayyadu bi-nafsihi, lā bi-waqti ḥuṣūli maḍmūnihi*).[231] This formulation seems somewhat vague; however, RDA most probably means that in this example (and also in other cases of *mafʿūl muṭlaq*) there is only one action (or 'content', to use his terminology), instead of two. *Mafʿūl muṭlaq* refers to the action signified by the verbal predicate, and specifies (or emphasizes) it. Thus, the action mentioned in the sentence is "bound by itself". In contrast, a sentence that includes *ḥāl* includes two actions ('contents'), one of which 'binds' the other. It can be said that the time of the sentence is the time of the overlap between the two actions.

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228 See Wright 1896–1898:II, 114 for the distinction between *ḥāl muntaqila* and *ḥāl ġayr muntaqila* '[*ḥāl* expressing] a non-transitory (i.e., a permanent) state'.

229 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 10.

230 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 10.

231 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 10.

The part of the definition that reads: "sets the bounds on the connection between the action ... and the agent, or the object ..." excludes the adjectival qualifier, "because the connection [between the action mentioned in the sentence and the agent/object] is not bound by the time of occurrence of the [adjectival qualifier's] content" (*fa-ʾinnahu lā yataqayyadu bi-waqti ḥuṣūli maḍmūnihi ḏālika l-taʿalluqu*).[232] It is well known that an adjectival qualifier can signify a permanent attribute—unlike *ḥāl muntaqila* that cannot signify a permanent attribute.[233] Therefore, it can be assumed that the 'content' of the qualifier takes place during a time span longer than the time of the action mentioned in the sentence. Thus, it is impossible for the connection between the agent/object and the action to be bound by the qualifier's content.

Consequently, the qualifier is excluded from the definition of this type of *ḥāl*.

The phrase "or something that behaves analogously to these two" "makes [the definition] include *ḥāl* [that describes the state of] an agent or object that are such semantically (though they do not appear as such overtly)" (*yudḫilu ḥāla l-fāʿili wa-l-mafʿūli l-maʿnawiyyayni*), e.g., in Q. 11/72 *wa-hāḏā baʿlī šayḫan* 'And this is my husband, an old man';[234] the *ḥāl* that describes the state of the governed element in an annexation structure, which, semantically speaking, is not an agent or an object in relation to the annexed element—e.g., in Q. 2/135 *qul bal millata ʾIbrāhīma ḥanīfan* 'Say (unto them, O Muḥammad): Nay, but (we follow) the religion of Abraham, the upright';[235] and the *ḥāl* of the type that occurs in the following verse by Ṭarafa ibn al-ʿAbd:

> *yaqūlu wa-qad tarra l-waẓīfu wa-sāquhā*
> *a-lasta tarā ʾan qad ʾatayta bi-muʾyidin*

> 'He says, after the ankle and the shin [of the she-camel] were sliced: don't you see that you have done a grave thing?'[236]

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232   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 10.

233   Ibn al-Sarrāj (*ʾUṣūl* I, 213–214) says, e.g., that *ḥāl* should signify a non-permanent (*ġayr lāzima*) attribute, and thus one can say neither **jāʾanī Zaydun ʾaḥmara* 'Zayd came to me red-headed', nor **jāʾanī ʿAmrun ṭawīlan* "Amr came to me tall'.

234   This translation is from Usmani n.d. Darwīš (1988:IV, 398–399) cites Zajjājī, according to whom the *ḥāl* in *hāḏā Zaydun qāʾiman* 'This is Zayd, standing' (a sentence that is built analogously to the abovementioned Qurʾānic verse) is assigned its *naṣb* by "calling for attention" (*tanbīh*), as the meaning is "Pay attention to Zayd while he is standing" or "I point to Zayd while he is standing". Such a sentence should not be produced when addressing someone who does not know who Zayd is. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 502) says similar things regarding the same example.

235   This translation is from Pickthall n.d.

236   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 10. The complete verse is given in RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 8, where it is stated that this

As for the second type of *ḥāl*, *ḥāl muʾakkida* 'strenghthening *ḥāl*',[237] RDA defines it as follows: "a noun that is not a verbal noun and that affirms the content of the sentence" (*ismun ġayru ḥadaṯin yajīʾu muqarriran li-maḍmūni jumlatin*).[238] He explains that the phrase "not a verbal noun" in the definition excludes the constituent in *naṣb* in cases such as *rajaʿa rujūʿan* 'He indeed returned' (although *rujūʿ* affirms the content of the sentence, it is a verbal noun, and thus should be construed not as *ḥāl* but as *mafʿūl muṭlaq*).[239] Elsewhere RDA notes that 'strenghthening *ḥāl*', in contrast to '*ḥāl* that expresses a transitory state', does not bind the content of its governor. He formulates its semantic function as "to affirm and strenghthen the content of the [nominal] predicate, or to serve as an evidence of its content's [validity]" (*ʾimmā li-taqrīri maḍmūni l-ḥabari wa-taʾkīdihi, wa-ʾimmā li-l-istidlāli ʿalā maḍmūnihi*).[240] RDA's examples of the former case are *ʾanta l-rajulu kāmilan* 'You are the man, being perfect', where the "content" is "glorifying others" (*taʿẓīm li-ġayrika*); *ʾanā l-Ḥajjāju saffākan li-l-dimāʾ* 'I am al-Ḥajjāj, being a blood-shedder',[241] where the "content" is "a threat" (*tahdīd*); *hāḏihi nāqatu llāhi lakum ʾāyatan* Q. 11/64 'This is the she-camel of God, to be a sign for you'. His examples of the other case (where the strenghthening *ḥāl* serves as an evidence of the predicate content's validity) are *ʾanā ʿabdu llāhi ʾākilan kamā yaʾkulu l-ʿabdu* 'I am a God's slave, eating as a slave eats', where the "content" is "self-diminishing" (*taṣāġur li-nafsika*); *huwa l-maskīnu marḥūman* 'He is the miserable one, being pitiful'.[242]

In the abovementioned discussion on the two types of *ḥāl* the term *maḍmūn* is used multiple times, and refers mostly to the content of a clause.

The term *maḍmūn* is also used in a discussion of *lām al-ibtidāʾ*. RDA explains that this *lām* cannot be directly preceded by a negating particle, although it can emphasize a sentence whose nominal predicate includes a negating particle. In other words, one can say *la-Zaydun mā huwa qāʾimun* 'Indeed Zayd—he is not

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example represents "a *ḥāl* which is a clause preceded by a governor that is unaccompanied by *ṣāḥib al-ḥāl*" (*al-ḥālu llatī hiya jumlatun baʿda ʿāmilin laysa maʿahu ḏū ḥālin*). See Baġdādī, *Ḥizāna* III, 151–153 for a discussion of the meaning of the verse and its grammatical structure.

237 See Wright 1896–1898:II, 115–116 for a discussion.

238 This definition appears to be inspired by a condition for a 'strenghthening *ḥāl*' formulated by Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 520), which is: "it should affirm the content of a nominal clause" (*ʾan takūna muqarriratan li-maḍmūni l-jumlati l-ismiyyati*).

239 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 11.

240 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 49.

241 The reference is to al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf (d. 95/714), the most famous governor of the Umayyads. He was hated by the ʿAbbāsids, who attributed to him mass executions and other atrocities. See Dietrich 1971.

242 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 50.

standing', but not *la-mā Zaydun qāʾimun. The latter sentence is not acceptable, since the meaning of lām is confirmation and emphasis, whereas the meaning of a negating particle is annulment and negation. Thus, the meaning of those particles is contradictory. This notwithstanding, la-Zaydun mā huwa qāʾimun and ʾinna Zaydan lam yaqum 'Indeed Zayd is not standing' are acceptable, since la- and ʾinna "affirm the negative content of the sentence [that follows them]" (ʾaṯbatā nafya maḍmūni l-jumlati) and do not directly precede the negative particle.[243]

In cases that will be discussed below the term maḍmūn does not explicitly refer to the content of a sentence/clause, but the idea of predication is usually present at some level of the analysis: in at least 10 cases the term refers to the content of a verb (which always functions as the predicate of a clause), in about 15 cases to the nominal predicate, and in a few cases to direct objects that originated from a subject and a nominal predicate.

5.4.2   Maḍmūn *as Content of a Verb*

Ibn al-Ḥājib defines an adverbial of time/place as follows: "the time or the place in which the action/verb mentioned [in the sentence] was performed" (mā fuʿila fīhi fiʿlun maḏkūrun min zamānin ʾaw makānin).[244] Since the word fiʿl in Arabic means both 'verb' and 'action', RDA feels the need to explain that the phrase fiʿlun maḏkūrun should be interpreted as "an occurrence included in the verb mentioned [in the sentence], not as the verb that is the partner of the noun and particle" (al-ḥadaṯu llaḏī taḍammanahu l-fiʿlu l-maḏkūru lā l-fiʿlu llaḏī huwa qasīmu[245] l-ismi wa-l-ḥarfi).[246] In other words, the definition uses fiʿl not as a grammatical term (namely, the verb as a part of speech), but in a non-technical sense. That is because a speaker who today says ḍarabtu ʾamsi 'I hit yesterday' performs the word ḍarabtu today (i.e., says it today). "'The hitting', which is the content [of the verb ḍarabtu] is the thing performed yesterday" (al-ḍarbu llaḏī huwa maḍmūnuhu faʿaltahu ʾamsi). Therefore, the adverbial ʾamsi signifies the time when the hitting was performed, not the time when ḍarabtu was produced.[247] Subsequently RDA reaches the conclusion that a more appropriate definition of adverbials of time/place would be: "a time or a place in which the

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243   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 309. See RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 324–327 for a discussion on mafʿūl muṭlaq where maḍ-mūn refers to the content of a sentence.

244   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 487. See Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 484 for Ibn al-Ḥājib's own discussion of his defin-ition.

245   See section 2.4.1.5 above for a discussion of the term qasīm.

246   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 487.

247   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 487.

content of its governor was performed" (*mā fuʿila fīhi maḍmūnu ʿāmilihi min zamānin ʾaw makānin*).[248]

Adverbials of reason/purpose are also defined in terms of content. Ibn al-Ḥājib's definition is: "the one for the sake of which/because of which the action mentioned [in the sentence] was performed" (*mā fuʿila li-ʾajlihi fiʿlun maḏkūrun*); however, RDA offers a different formulation: "the one for the sake of which/because of which the content of its governor was performed" (*mā fuʿila li-ʾajlihi maḍmūnu ʿāmilihi*).[249] Similarly to the discussion on adverbials of time/place, RDA here also emphasizes that he has in mind the reason/purpose of the action signified by the verb (and not of the verb itself). Additionally, his definition stresses that he refers specifically to the action signified by the verb which governs the adverbial in question (and not just any action mentioned in the sentence). This is important, since in a sentence such as *ḍarabtu wa-qad ʾaʿjabanī l-taʾdību* 'I hit, and I liked that chastisement'[250] *al-taʾdīb* does not signify the purpose of the action signified by its governor (i.e., by *ʾaʿjabanī*). Thus it is not considered to be an adverbial of purpose, although it signifies the purpose of the action signified by *ḍarabtu* (since hitting is usually performed in order to discipline).

Another example occurs in the discussion of subjunctive verb. Ibn al-Ḥājib states that a verb that follows *ḥattā* 'until, in order to' is in the subjunctive mood "if [the verb] signifies the future in relation to [the time of the clause] that precedes [*ḥattā*]" (*ʾiḏ kāna mustaqbalan bi-l-naẓari ʾilā mā qablahu*). RDA explains that in the case of sentences such as *sirtu ḥattā ʾadḫulahā* 'I walked in order to enter it' or 'I walked until the point of entering it',[251] the act of entering is not necessarily "an expected future" (*mustaqbalan mutaraqqaban*) at the moment the sentence was produced; the condition is "that the content of the verb that follows *ḥattā* should be in the future in relation to the content of the verb that precedes [*ḥattā*]" (*ʾan yakūna maḍmūnu l-fiʿli l-wāqiʿi baʿda ḥattā mustaqbalan bi-l-naẓari ʾilā maḍmūni l-fiʿli llaḏī qablahā*). For instance, in the abovementioned example the act of entering is necessarily in the future in relation to the act of walking, since when the walking is being performed the entrance is definitely expected. Therefore, the verb must be in the subjunctive, regardless of whether the entrance takes place in the past, the present or the future in rela-

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248   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 506.

249   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 507. See Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 491–492 for Ibn al-Ḥājib's own discussion of his definition.

250   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 507.

251   See Sadan 2012:201, fn. 22 for a critical discussion of various translations of this sentence.

tion to the moment of speech,[252] or even in none of these times—if the speaker started walking, in order to enter (if *ḥattā* is used in the sense of 'in order to') or until the point of entering (if *ḥattā* is used in the sense of 'until'), and then something happens that prevents the entrance, then the entrance takes place in none of the three times.[253]

RDA then speaks about the option of using the indicative mood in the verb that follows *ḥattā*. In order for such a verb to be indicative, the verb that precedes *ḥattā* must be positive, "so that it would be possible for the occurrence of the content [of the verb that precedes *ḥattā*] to lead to the occurrence of the content of the [verb] that follows *ḥattā*, regardless of whether the content of the preceding [verb] is linked to the content of the following [verb]" (*bi-ḥayṯu yumkinu ʾan yuʾaddiya ḥuṣūlu maḍmūnihi ʾilā ḥuṣūli maḍmūni mā baʿda ḥattā sawāʾun-i ttaṣala maḍmūnu l-ʾawwali bi-maḍmūni l-ṯānī*), as in the sentence *sirtu ḥattā ʾadḫuluhā*[254] 'I walked [so much] that I can enter it' (the entering immediately follows the walking), or not, as in the sentence *raʾā minnī l-ʿāma l-ʾawwala šayʾan ḥattā lā ʾastaṭīʿu ʾan ʾukallimahu l-ʿāma bi-šayʾin* 'He experienced from me last year such a thing, that I cannot speak with him this year about anything' (the situation this year does not immediately follow the events of last year).[255]

If the speaker intends "that the content [of the verb] that follows *ḥattā* takes place after the moment of speech" (*ʾanna maḍmūna mā baʿda ḥattā sa-yaḥṣulu baʿda zamāni l-ʾiḫbāri*), the verb that follows *ḥattā* must take subjunctive.[256] Similarly, such a verb must take the subjunctive if the speaker does not intend the content of that verb to take place or not to take place in any of the three times, "but intends [the content of that verb] to be an expected future when the content of the verb that precedes *ḥattā* starts to take place" (*bal qaṣada kawnahu mutaraqqaban mustaqbalan waqta l-šurūʿi fī maḍmūni l-fiʿli*

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252   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 56.

253   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 56–57. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 870–871) also says when discussing *ḥattā* that this particle assigns the subjunctive to the following verb if that verb signifies an action that is "in the future in relation to [the constituent mentioned] before [*ḥattā*]" (*mustaqbalan bi-l-naẓari ʾilā mā qablahu*), and not in relation to the moment of speech. Ibn al-Ḥājib's example is *sirtu ʾamsi ḥattā ʾadḫula l-balada* 'I walked yesterday in order to enter the town', whose intention is to inform of the entrance that was expected during the walking, even if the act of entering did not ultimately materialize. Ibn al-Ḥājib does not use the term *maḍmūn* in this discussion.

254   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 57–58.

255   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 58. The translation of these two examples (which were used also by Sība-wayhi) is taken from Sadan 2012:204. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 871–872) discusses these cases without using the term *maḍmūn*.

256   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 58–59.

l-mutaqaddimi), regardless of whether the content of the second verb eventually took place in one of the three times, or something prevented it from taking place.[257]

5.4.3   Maḍmūn *as Content of a Nominal Predicate*

The term *maḍmūn* may refer to the content of a nominal as well as a verbal predicate. For instance, RDA says that "the content of the auxiliary verbs qualifies the content of the nominal predicate [that follows them]" (*maḍmūnu l-ʾafʿāli l-nāqisati ṣifatun li-maḍmūni ḫabarihā*).[258] The intention can be understood in light of RDA's previous statement, according to which auxiliary verbs are used "in order to affirm that [the referent of] the subject [in the clause that follows the auxiliary verb] has some attribute that can be described by the verbal noun [of the auxiliary verb]" (*li-taqrīri fāʿilihā ʿalā ṣifatin muttaṣifatin bi-maṣādiri l-nāqisati*). In other words, *kāna Zaydun qāʾiman* 'Zayd was standing' means that Zayd has the attribute of standing, and standing in turn has the attribute of *kawn*, i.e., of occurrence and existence. The meaning of *ṣāra Zaydun ġaniyyan* 'Zayd became rich' is that Zayd has the attribute of richness that in its turn has the attribute of *ṣayrūra*, i.e., of coming into existence.[259] Elsewhere RDA uses the term *maḍmūn* to speak of the function of the verb *ṣāra* 'became' (whose verbal noun is *ṣayrūra*): he says that *ṣāra* "adds to the sentence the meaning of existence of the content of the predicate [of the clause that follows *ṣāra*], after [that content] did not exist" (*tufīdu ṯubūta maḍmūni ḫabarihā baʿda ʾan lam yaṯbut*).[260]

Similarly, RDA says that the meaning of *ʿasā* 'perhaps' is "a wish for the content of the predicate [of the clause that follows the verb]" (*rajāʾ maḍmūn al-ḫabar*);[261] about *ṭafiqa* 'he started (doing)' and its likes (which he, following Ibn al-Ḥājib, considers to be the third type of *ʾafʿāl al-muqāraba* 'verbs of appropinquation'[262]) he says that they "add to the sentence the meaning of

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257   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 59. Sadan (2012:224) sums this fragment up as saying that the subjunctive can indicate two kinds of actions: (1) one which has not yet occurred (i.e., absolute future); (2) one of which the speaker wants to say that it is meant to occur, without implying whether is has indeed occurred or not. In contrast, the indicative mood is used to indicate that the action has indeed occurred or is currently occurring.

258   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 188.

259   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 182.

260   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 193.

261   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 213.

262   The first type is represented by *ʿasā*, and the second type—by *kāda* 'he nearly (did sth.)'. See RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 213. Wright (1896–1898:II, 106–109) presents the first two types as 'verbs of appropinquation', whereas about the third type he says that the grammarians call it *ʾafʿāl al-šurūʿ* or *ʾafʿāl al-ʾinšāʾ* 'the verbs of beginning', and link it to the former two.

beginning the content of the predicate [of the clause that follows the verb in question] by [the referent] of the subject [of that verb]" (*yufīdu maʿnā šurūʿi fāʿilihi fī maḍmūni l-ḫabari*).[263] As for *layta* 'if only' and *laʿalla* 'perhaps', these particles are used "to ask for the content of the predicate" (*li-ṭalabi maḍmūni l-ḫabari*), and for this reason the predicate in the clause that follows these particles cannot be a requestive.[264] RDA formulates his explanation as follows: "an additional request cannot target the same content, as two requests cannot refer to a single requested thing simultaneously" (*fa-lā yatawajjahu ʾilā ḏālika l-maḍmūni ṭalabun ʾāḫaru, ʾiḏ lā yajtamiʿu ṭalabāni ʿalā maṭlūbin wāḥidin*).[265]

Some grammarians claim that "the negation [of *kāda* creates] a positive meaning" (*ʾinna nafyahu ʾiṯbātun*), and *vice versa*. RDA responds by saying that if by this they mean that in a sentence such as *kāda Zaydun yaqūmu* 'Zayd was nearly standing' the use of positive *kāda* is a negation, then this is a grave mistake, because a positive formulation cannot be a negation. According to RDA, there is no doubt that this sentence positively informs about the proximity of the standing. Alternatively, if the grammarians' intention is that the use of a positive *kāda* "signifies negation of the content of the nominal predicate [in the clause that follows it]" (*dāllun ʿalā nafyi maḍmūni ḫabarihi*), then their claim is correct. One can be close to an action only when one does not actually perform that action; if one does perform the action, it is inappropriate to say that one is close to it.[266] It can be inferred from this excerpt that RDA distinguishes between negating the sentence and negating the content of the predicate: the speaker who produces a sentence such as *kāda Zaydun yaqūmu* stresses the positive meaning of Zayd's being nearly standing (although the addressee can understand from this sentence that Zayd was not standing at the time referred to in the sentence). If the speaker had intended to stress the negative meaning of the sentence, he could have said, e.g., 'Zayd was not standing'.

RDA continues with the same line of thought: if the grammarians who claim that the negation of *kāda* creates a positive meaning have in mind that the negation of proximity in a sentence such as *mā kidtu ʾaqūmu* 'I was not nearly standing' creates a meaning of "presenting the content as positive" (*ʾiṯbāt li-*

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263   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 225. See Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 924 for Ibn al-Ḥājib's discussion of these verbs, where he says that their fuction is "to [signify] the approaching of the predicate, [by signifying] the start [of the action performance]" (*li-dunuwwi l-ḫabari ʿalā sabīli l-ʾaḫḏi*). He does not use the term *maḍmūn* in this context.

264   See fn. 122 above for a discussion on the term "requestive" (*jumla ṭalabiyya*).

265   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 337.

266   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 223.

ḏālika l-maḍmūn; the content intended here is probably the content of *kāda*,
i.e., proximity), this is a very severe mistake, since a negation of something can-
not amount to presenting it as positive. If these grammarians intend to say that
"the negation of the proximity of the content of the predicate presents [this
content] as positive" (*nafyu l-qurbi min maḍmūni l-ḫabari ʾiṯbātun li-ḏālika l-
maḍmūni*), this is an even graver mistake,[267] because negating the proximity to
the action conveys even a stronger negation of the action than the negation of
the verb that signifies that action. For instance, *mā qarubtu min-a l-ḍarbi* 'I was
not close to hitting' stresses the negation of hitting even more than *mā ḍarabtu*
'I did not hit'.[268]

RDA explains what may have led some grammarians to claim that the nega-
tion of *kāda* creates a positive meaning, and then presents his own opinion:

> *qad tajīʾu maʿa qawlika mā kāda Zaydun yaḫruju qarīnatun tadullu ʿalā
> ṯubūti l-ḫurūji baʿda ntifāʾihi wa-baʿda ntifāʾi l-qurbi minhu, fa-takūnu tilka
> l-qarīnatu dāllatan ʿalā ṯubūti maḍmūni ḫabari kāda fī waqtin baʿda waqti
> ntifāʾihi wa-ntifāʾi l-qurbi minhu, lā lafẓu kāda. Wa-lā tanāfiya bayna ntifāʾi
> l-šayʾi fī waqtin wa-ṯubūtihi fī waqtin ʾāḫara, wa-ʾinnamā l-tanāquḍu bayna
> ṯubūti l-šayʾi wa-ntifāʾihi fī waqtin wāḥidin, fa-lā yakūnu ʾiḏan nafyu
> kāda[269] mufīdan li-ṯubūti maḍmūni ḫabarihi, bal-i l-mufīdu li-ṯubūtihi tilka
> l-qarīnatu, fa-ʾin ḥaṣalat qarīnatun hā-kaḏā, qulnā bi-ṯubūti maḍmūni ḫa-
> bari kāda baʿda ntifāʾihi*

> A sentence such as *mā kāda Zaydun yaḫruju* 'Zayd did not almost go out'
> may appear next to a contextual clue that signifies that the going out took
> place after its negation and after the negation of the proximity to it. In
> such a case this contextual clue signifies that the nominal predicate [of
> the noun that follows *kāda*] took place after it had not taken place at some
> time beforehand, and the affinity to it also had not taken place. There is
> no contradiction between negating [the occurrence of] something at one
> time and presenting it as positive at some other time, as the contradiction
> can be only between presenting something as positive and negative at the
> same time.[270] The negating of *kāda* thus does not create a positive mean-

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267 RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 223.
268 RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 224.
269 The actual word that appears in both editions is *kāna* (see RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 224; RDA, *Šarḥ*²
     IV, 224), but that is in error (as the fragment deals with *kāda* instead of *kāna*).
270 Fārābī (*Manṭiq* II, 14–15) states that two propositions, one of which includes an expression
     that signifies time and one of which does not, or two propositions each of which signifies

ing of the predicate [that follows *kāda*]. [In cases where the predicate that follows *kāda* is interpreted as positive] a positive meaning is created by a contextual clue [and not by *kāda*]; if there is such a clue, it can be inferred that the content of the predicate [that follows *kāda*] takes place, after it had not taken place [beforehand].

An example of cases in which the positive meaning is inferred from the context (and not from the negation of *kāda*) is Q. 2/71 *fa-ḏabaḥūhā wa-mā kādū yafʿalūna* 'So they sacrificed her, though almost they did not'.[271] RDA's interpretation, according to which the people, before they sacrificed the cow, were not close to that action, is based on the preceding verses Q. 2/67–70, which state:

> *wa-ʾiḏ qāla Mūsā li-qawmihi ʾinna llāha yaʾmurukum ʾan taḏbaḥū baqaratan qālū ʾa-tattaḫiḏunā huzuwan [...] qālū dʿu lanā rabbaka yubayyin lanā mā lawnuhā [...] qālū dʿu lanā rabbaka yubayyin lanā mā hiya*

> And when Moses said to his people, 'God commands you to sacrifice a cow'. They said, 'Dost thou take us in mockery?' [...] They said, 'Pray to thy Lord for us, that He make clear to us what her colour may be'. [...] They said, 'Pray to thy Lord for us, that He make clear to us what she may be'.

According to RDA, these stubborn questions suggest that the speakers, at that point, were not performing the action of sacrifice, and, in fact, were not even close to performing it.[272]

If the context includes no clues suggesting that the action was performed, e.g., in the sentence *māta Zaydun wa-mā kāda yusāfiru* 'Zayd died, after he nearly did not travel', "one can say that the content of the nominal predicate [that follows *kāda*] remained with its negation, besides the negation of the affinity to it" (*qulnā baqiya maḍmūnu ḫabari kāda ʿalā ntifāʾihi wa-ʿalā ntifāʾi l-qurbi minhu*). The grammarians who claim that the negation of *kāda* creates a positive meaning were probably led astray by cases in which the negation

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a different time, are not "opposite" (*mutaqābilatāni*), and so the question of contradiction in such cases is irrelevant (since only opposite propositions may be contradictory). For instance, there can be no contradiction between *Zaydun kāna ʾamsi ʿalīlan* 'Zayd was sick yesterday', on the one hand, and *Zaydun laysa bi-ʿalīlin* 'Zayd is not sick' or *Zaydun-i l-yawma laysa bi-ʿalīlin* 'Zayd is not sick today', on the other hand.

271   This translation is from Pickthall n.d.
272   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 224.

of *kāda* is associated with a contextual clue suggesting that the content of the nominal predicate was actually performed.[273]

5.4.4 Maḍmūn *as a Content of Objects*

In a discussion of transitivity RDA says that cognitive verbs assign *naṣb* to one object only, "which is the content of the second part (i.e., of the second overt object) that is annexed to the first part (i.e., to the first overt object)" (*wa-huwa maḍmūnu l-juzʾi l-ṯānī muḍāfan ʾilā l-ʾawwali*). Thus, in the sentence *ʿalimtu Zaydan qāʾiman* 'I knew that Zayd was standing' the thing known is "the standing of Zayd" (*qiyām Zayd*).[274] The verb, however, assigns *naṣb* to both objects, "as it is linked to the content of both together" (*li-taʿalluqihi bi-maḍmūnihimā maʿan*). This explains why one of the two objects of a cognitive verb is omitted without the second in a very few cases—since they originated in a subject and its nominal predicate, and the omission of one of them is equivalent to omitting part of a single word.[275] As for verbs that take three objects, e.g., in the sentence *ʾaʿlamtuka Zaydan muntaliqan* 'I informed you that Zayd is going out', they take two 'real' objects, which are not co-referential, like the objects in *ʾaʿṭaytu Zaydan dirhaman* 'I gave Zayd a dirham'. The second 'real' object in triply transitive verbs is actually "the content of a nominal clause" (*maḍmūn jumla ibtidāʾiyya*). The two constituents that originated in a subject and predicate of the clause are called (when positioned after a triply transitive verb) "the second object" and "the third object". They both take *naṣb* together, "since the real object is the content of them both, and not the content of one of them" (*li-ʾanna mā huwa l-mafʿūlu fī l-ḥaqīqati maḍmūnuhumā maʿan, lā maḍmūnu ʾaḥadihimā*).[276]

RDA explains that a passive participle of a triply transitive verb can be used to refer to two things: to the verb's first object and "to the content of the second and third [objects]" (*maḍmūn al-ṯānī wa-l-ṯāliṯ*), i.e., to a verbal noun derived from the third object, annexed to the second object. For example, in the sen-

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[273] RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 224. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 920) says that *kāda* behaves like any other verb in terms of positivity and negativity. In other words, without the negative particle its meaning "is according to [the meaning] for which [the verb] was coined" (*ʿalā ḥasabi mā wuḍiʿa lahu*), and when joined by the negative particle, "[the particle] negates that meaning from the one to which [that meaning] is ascribed" (*kāna nāfiyan li-ḏālika l-maʿnā ʿamman nusiba ʾilayhi*). According to this line of thought, the negation of *kāda* should negate the proximity to the predicate's content in relation to the subject's referent. See Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Šarḥ*, 920–923 for a semantic discussion of various examples that include the negation of *kāda*. Ibn al-Ḥājib does not use the term *maḍmūn* in this discussion.

[274] RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 334.

[275] RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 334–335.

[276] RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 429.

tence *ʾaʿlamtuka Zaydan muntaliqan* the passive participle *muʿlam* can refer to the addressee (in which case its meaning would be 'the informed one'), and also to *inṭilāq Zayd* 'Zayd's going out', in which case the meaning of *muʿlam* would be 'the one about which [someone was informed]'.[277]

A doubly transitive verb cannot be transformed into triply transitive by conversion from Form I into Form II[278] (whereas some can be transformed into triply transitive verbs by conversion into Form IV[279]). In other words, one cannot say **ʿallamtuka Zaydan qāʾiman* (instead of *ʾaʿlamtuka Zaydan qāʾiman*). As the second object of *ʿallamtu* one can only use "the content of the first and second [objects] of *ʿalimtu*, or the content of the third [object of *ʾaʿlamtu*, which is a triply transitive variation][280] of *ʿalimtu*" (*mā huwa maḍmūnu l-ʾawwali wa-l-ṯānī ʾaw maḍmūnu l-ṯāliṯi li-ʿalimtu*). That is to say, *ʿalimtu Zaydan munṭaliqan* 'I knew that Zayd was going out' can be converted into *ʿallamtu ʿAmran-i nṭilāqa Zaydin* 'I informed ʿAmr about Zayd's going out' or *ʿallamtu ʿAmran-i l-intilāqa* 'I informed ʿAmr about the going out'.[281]

5.4.5   *Other Uses of the Term* maḍmūn *as 'Content'*

Our first example is taken from a discussion of the vocative, in which the term *maḍmūn* refers to the content of an adjective. RDA addresses the question of why an adjectival qualifier of a noun that follows the vocative particle cannot take a *bināʾ* ending, whereas an adjectival qualifier of a noun that follows *lā l-nāfiya li-l-jins* can take such an ending—in other words, why one can say *lā rajula ẓarīfa* 'There is no nice man', but not *yā Zaydu l-ẓarīfu* 'O the nice Zayd!', (at least not if one analyzes the ending of *al-ẓarīfu* as *bināʾ*; it should be noted that grammarians consider both *yā Zaydu l-ẓarīfu/ l-ẓarīfa* as acceptable,[282] but regard the ending of the adjective as *ʾiʿrāb*). RDA compares nouns that follow the vocative particle and nouns that follow *lā l-nāfiya li-l-jins*, since grammarians usually draw analogies between these two structures.[283]

RDA explains that a qualifier of a noun that follows *lā l-nāfiya li-l-jins* can take a *bināʾ* ending, because that particle actually negates the qualifier rather

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277   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 429.

278   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 142.

279   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 141.

280   This addition is necessary, since it is well known that *ʿalimtu* takes two direct objects (instead of three). It seems that RDA menions here the third object to stress the analogy between the second object of *ʿalima* and the third object of *ʾaʿlama*.

281   RDA, *Šarḥ* IV, 142.

282   See Wright 1896–1898:II, 91–92.

283   These analogies are discussed in Baalbaki 2006a.

than the head noun,[284] and thus can be viewed as directly preceding the qualifier. That is because the meaning of the sentence *lā rajula ẓarīfa fīhā* 'There is no nice man in it' is *lā ẓarāfata fī l-rijāli llaḏīna fīhā* 'There is no niceness in the men that are in it'. The negated element is "the content of the adjective" (*maḍmūn al-ṣifa*). The *lā* in *lā rajula ẓarīfa fīhā* negates the existence of nice ones rather than the existence of men, as if the sentence stated *lā ẓarīfa fīhā* 'There are no nice ones in it'. In contrast, in the vocative sentence *yā Zaydu l-ẓarīfu* the addressee is represented by the head noun (rather than by the qualifier), formally and semantically. This is the difference between vocative and *lā l-nāfiya li-l-jins* structures.[285]

In another case the term *maḍmūn* refers to the content of a participle. RDA states that the resumptive pronoun that should appear in the constituent governed by the active/passive participle can be moved to the participle itself, and consequently the governed constituent (which originally should have taken *rafʿ*) can take *naṣb*/*jarr*.[286] The shift described here is from *ḫabar sababī* (or *naʿt sababī*)[287] structures (in which the constituent that follows the participle takes *rafʿ*) to *tamyīz* and unreal annexation structures (in which that constituent takes *naṣb*/*jarr*, respectively). Thus, the sentences *Zaydun ḫārijun ġulāmuhu*/*šāmiḫun nasabuhu* 'Zayd—his lad is going out'/ 'Zayd—his lineage is proud' can be transformed into *Zaydun ḫāriju l-ġulāmi*/*šāmiḫu l-nasabi* 'Zayd owns a lad that is going out'/ 'Zayd possesses a proud lineage'.[288] According to RDA, such a transformation is possible "if the referent of the constituent described [by the phrase in question], that is mentioned before [that phrase], can be described by describing the constituent that takes its *rafʿ* [from the participle] with the content [of the participle]" (*ʾiḏā kāna yaḥṣulu li-ṣāḥibihimā l-mutaqaddimi waṣfun bi-ttiṣāfi marfūʿihimā bi-maḍmūnihimā*). Thus, one cannot say **Zaydun qāʾimun ʾaban* 'Zayd is standing-fathered' or **Zaydun qāʾimu bni l-ʿammi* 'Zayd is standing-cousined'.[289] Such constructions are impossible, since the fact that Zayd's father (or cousin) is standing does not render Zayd himself standing. In contrast, the phrase *rajulun jamīlun wajhuhu* 'A man whose

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284   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 364.

285   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 365.

286   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 443.

287   Diem (1998) designates these constructions as "adjektivischer Satz"; he notes (1998:7) that they can fulfill the same syntactic functions as adjectives or participles, namely, function as adjectival qualifier, predicate or circumstantial modifier, and also be substantivized. See, e.g., Diem 1998:13 for examples.

288   The examples with an unreal annexation structure appear in RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 443, whereas the examples with *ḫabar sababī* are my own, based on RDA's description.

289   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 443–444.

face is beautiful' can be transformed into *rajulun jamīlun wajhan* and *raju-lun jamīlu l-wajhi* 'A beautiful-faced man'.[290] These tranformations are possible since the fact that the man's face is beautiful renders the man himself beautiful. The semantic link between the adjective and the preceding noun, which should be indirectly described by that adjective, is not as clear in every case of *tamyīz* and unreal annexation as it is in 'A beautiful-faced man';[291] however, in any case that link should be more prominent than in the two unacceptable examples.

It is not clear why there is a difference in acceptability between *Zaydun ḫāriju l-ġulāmi* (acceptable in RDA's view) and **Zaydun qāʾimu bni l-ʿammi* (unacceptable in his view). After all, the lad's going out no more implies that Zayd can be described as going out than the cousin's standing implies that Zayd can be described as standing (we should therefore expect both constructions to be unacceptable). Perhaps the first sentence is acceptable because it presents the lad as related to Zayd directly (thus, it can be imagined that the lad's action somehow affects Zayd), whereas the second sentence presents the cousin (lit. 'the uncle's son') as related to Zayd's uncle (and not directly to Zayd). Thus, it may be that it is more difficult to imagine the possible effect of the participle's content (i.e., the cousin's action) on Zayd.

Another example, in which the term *maḍmūn* refers to the content of a noun, appears in a discussion of adverbials of place. RDA states that nouns such as *maqʿad* 'a place of sitting' and *makān* 'place' can take *naṣb* as adverbials of place of a verb that signifies a staying in a place, since they include a verbal noun "whose meaning is staying in a framework" (*maʿnāhu l-istiqrāru fī ẓarfin*). "The content [of the word] implies that it functions as a *ẓarf* (lit. 'framework', in grammar: 'time/place expression') for an action that has a meaning of staying in a place, just like the word itself is a framework of its content" (*fa-maḍmūnuhu mušʿirun bi-kawnihi ẓarfan li-ḥadaṯin bi-maʿnā l-istiqrāri, kamā ʾanna nafsahu ẓarfu l-maḍmūni*).[292]

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290   In fact, there are other possible variations of this construction—see RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 434–445. Ġaḍḍāb (2008:105–106) summarizes these possible constructions in tables.

291   See Wright 1896–1898:II, 221–222 for various examples. Ibn al-Ḥājib (*Šarḥ*, 847) says that the sentence *Zaydun ḥasanun ʾaban* 'Zayd is good in terms of his father' is acceptable, whereas **Zaydun qāʾimun ʾaban* 'Zayd is standing in terms of his father' is unacceptable, since one can be described as good due to the goodness of his father, but cannot be described as standing due to the standing of his father. Ibn al-Ḥājib neither uses the term *maḍmūn* in this context, nor tries to formulate a general rule to distinguish between the two cases.

292   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 491. See pp. 123–124 above for another part of the same discussion.

In another discussion the term *maḍmūn* refers to the content of a constituent that takes its *jarr* from the preposition *bi-*.[293]

To sum up, one can say that the term *maḍmūn* in most of its appearances in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* refers to the content of a clause (or of two objects of a cognitive verb, which maintain a predicative relation), or, alternatively, to a nominal/verbal predicate of a sentence/clause. *Maḍmūn* never refers to a concrete meaning. In all cases in which RDA explicitly mentions the content of a constituent, he uses the verbal noun derived from a word that actually appears in the example. When he intends to speak of the content of two constituents together he uses an annexation structure, in which the annexed element is a verbal noun derived from the predicate (or of a constituent analogous to the predicate), and the governed element is the subject (or a constituent analogous to it). It seems that RDA uses the term *maḍmūn* in order to focus on the idea of action/occurrence/attribute (sometimes together with the performer of the action or the owner of the attribute), at the expense of other components of meaning (such as time, in the case of verbs).

Paraphrases that represent 'contents', consisting of verbal nouns and annexations, reveal the logical nucleus common to various syntactic structures (verbal and nominal clauses, objects of cognitive verbs and phrases consisting of noun+adjectival qualifier), which is ascription of an attribute to something. It is reminiscent of the idea of *nisba* 'ascription'. This idea, although found already in RDA's *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* (where it usually refers to the predicative relation,[294] but sometimes also to annexation structures[295]), was fully developed only by later scholars. Taftāzānī defines *nisba* as "a connection between one of two things and the other" (*taʿalluqu ʾaḥadi l-šayʾayni bi-l-ʾāḫari*). From this perspective, there is no difference between the basic meanings of *al-waladu ṣaġīrun* 'The boy is small' (a nominal sentence) and *al-waladu l-ṣaġīru* 'the small boy' (a nominal phrase), because both ascribe the attribute of smallness to the boy (it can be surmised that RDA would formulate the content of both examples as "the boy's smallness"). The difference lies in the representation of that ascription: the sentence presents the ascription as the main content of the communicative act (such an ascription is called "complete" in the late

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293 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 108 (the discussion is mentioned on p. 93 above).

294 See section 2.4.1.1 above.

295 See, e.g., RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 64, where it is stated that a *tamyīz* may remove vagueness from "an ascription [found] in a sentence" (*nisba fī jumla*), or in a phrase that resembles a sentence, or from "an ascription found in an annexation" (*nisba fī ʾiḍāfa*). The last case is demonstrated by the example *ʾaʿjabanī ṭībuhu nafsan* 'I liked the goodness of his heart'.

grammatical literature), whereas the phrase presents the ascription as part of something bigger, and thus the ascription is not "complete".[296]

5.5 The Verb *waqaʿa ʿalā* and Its Derivatives

Versteegh (1978:256) offers a translation of the verb *waqaʿa* lit. 'fell, occured' that should be appropriate to all cases in which the subject of the verb is "a word": "to be used, to be pronounced in a concrete instance". I have found in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* about a dozen loci in which the verb combined with the preposition *ʿalā* refers to the signification of meaning by a linguistic constituent (whereas in significantly more cases the verb and its derivatives refer to a constituent's appearance in a certain position[297] or form[298]). When the verb appears in a sense relevant to the form-meaning relation I translate it as 'referred to'.

In a discussion of case endings RDA says that *rafʿ* is in a sense a more general term than *ḍamm* "because it can refer to *ḍamm*, *ʾalif* and *wāw*" (*li-wuqūʿihi ʿalā l-ḍammi wa-l-ʾalifi wa-l-wāwi*).[299] That is to say, the *rafʿ* case can be represented in various forms: in the singular and the broken plural the case marker is *ḍamma*, in the dual the case marker is *ʾalif*, and in the sound masculine plural it is *wāw*. This notwithstanding, the term *rafʿ* may be also viewed as more specific than *ḍamm*, since the former refers to the marker of an essential sentence constituent only, whereas the latter refers to a vowel that may appear as such marker, but also in other contexts.[300]

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296 Weiss 1985:606–607.

297 See, e.g., RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 246, where it is stated that a clause does not have to be paraphrasable by a phrase in order to have a syntactic position, since it is enough for it "to appear in a position characteristic to phrases" (*wuqūʿuhā mawqiʿa l-mufradi*); RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 276, where it is mentioned that "everything that appears in a position that is not characteristic to it is considered unknown" (*kullu wāqiʿin fī ġayri mawqiʿihi yunkaru*), and thus should be accompanied by a marker that would help to identify it; RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 25, where it is argued that time/place expressions "can appear in positions where other constituents cannot appear" (*jāza ʾan taqaʿa mawqiʿan lā yaqaʿu ġayruhā fīhi*).

298 See, e.g., RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 329, where the *mafʿūl muṭlaq* that "appears in the dual" (*waqaʿa muṯannan*) is discussed; RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 36, where it is stated that a subject in a nominal sentence "appears frequently as a personal pronoun" (*kaṯrat waqūʿihi ḍamīran*); RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 306, where "the appearance of the constituent that clarifies [the numeral] in plural" (*wuqūʿ al-tamyīzi jamʿan*) is discussed. See Versteegh 1978:265–268 for a discussion of terms derived from the root *w-q-ʿ* that are used to speak of a constituent's position/form in certain contexts (a usage found already in Sībawayhi).

299 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 71.

300 RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 71.

In a discussion of adjectiveness as a factor that determines diptoteness, Ibn al-Ḥājib says that the relevant trait is original adjectiveness, not one due to "dominance" (*ġalaba*).[301] RDA explains the term "dominance" as follows:

> *ʾan yakūna l-lafẓu fī ʾaṣli l-waḍʿi ʿāmman fī ʾašyāʾa, ṯumma yaṣīra bi-kaṯrati l-istiʿmāli fī ʾaḥadihā ʾašhara bihi bi-ḥayṯu lā yuḥtāju li-ḏālika l-šayʾi ʾilā qar-īnatin, bi-ḫilāfi sāʾiri mā kāna wāqiʿan ʿalayhi*

> In the original coinage the expression is general and [refers] to several things, and then, because of a frequent use in referring to one [of these things], [the expression] becomes better known in relation to that [one thing], so that there is no need for a context in order to understand that meaning [from that expression], unlike the other meanings that [the expression] may have [for whose comprehension there is a need for context].[302]

For instance, the name Ibn ʿAbbās was originally a general expression that "could refer to any of ʿAbbās' sons" (*yaqaʿu ʿalā kulli wāḥidin min banī l-ʿAbbāsi*), but then it became better known as ʿAbdallāh's nickname, so that there was no longer any need for a context in order to understand it in this way[303] (in other words, at some point, when people mentioned Ibn ʿAbbās with no further elab-oration, it came to be understood that this name referred to ʿAbdallāh, rather than any of his brothers). RDA gives additional examples: the word *al-Najm* lit. 'the stars' became well known as denoting the Pleiades; *al-Bayt* lit. 'the house' became well known as denoting the Kaʿaba; the adjective *ʾaswad* lit. 'black' used to be general and refer to any black thing, and then was frequently used to refer to a black snake, so that there was no longer any need to mention the noun 'snake' or to use any other contextual clue in order for the intention to be clear.[304]

In his chapter on annexation RDA recalls that the Baṣran grammarians accept neither "annexing an attribute to its owner" (*ʾiḍāfat al-ṣifa ʾilā l-maw-ṣūf*[305]), nor *vice versa*. This is so because an adjective that signifies an attrib-

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301   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 126.

302   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 127.

303   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 127–128.

304   RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 128. These are actually "predominant proper nouns"—see pp. 148–149 above for a discussion. See RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 133, 151–152 for other examples of terms derived from the root *w-q-ʿ* used in a discussion of diptoteness.

305   Here I have chosen to translate *ṣifa* and *mawṣūf* as semantic terms (although they are the

ute and a noun that signifies the owner of that attribute "refer to the same thing" (*wāqiʿāni ʿalā šayʾin wāḥidin*); therefore, annexing one of these two to the other is equivalent to annexing a thing to itself.[306] Annexing a thing to itself should not be acceptable since the function of a real annexation is to render the annexed element either definite (in the case of a definite governed element, since a definite governed element renders the whole phrase definite) or specific (in the case of an indefinite governed element).[307] A thing obviously cannot render itself definite or specific.

Naturally, RDA cannot ignore unreal annexation constructions such as *jamīl al-wajh* 'beautiful of face'. He argues that co-referential constituents are problematic also in unreal annexation, since real annexation is the basic structure in relation to the unreal one (and thus the latter should behave analoguously to the former). RDA explains how the phrase *jamīl al-wajh* comes into being, as follows: the speakers first "transform the constituent that should receive *rafʿ* [from the adjective][308] into the form of an object" (*jaʿalū l-marfūʿa fī ṣūrati l-mafʿūli*).[309] This intermediate stage allows them to ignore the co-reference of the constituents at some level of the analysis, since in the usual case adjectives assign *naṣb* to nouns that are not co-referential with them, e.g., in *Zaydun ḍāribun ġulāmuhu ʿAmran* 'Zayd—his lad hits ʿAmr' *ḍāribun* and *ʿAmran* are not co-referential. Thus, in the cases in question the *naṣb* is "a preparation for the *jarr*" (*tawṭiʾat al-jarr/tamhīd li-l-jarr*).[310] It can be inferred that, according to RDA, a structure such as *jamīl al-wajh* is created by a transformational process in two stages: first, *jamīlun wajhuhu* turns into *jamīlun wajhan* (as preparation for the annexation), and then the latter turns into *jamīl al-wajh*. The final goal of the process is to attain maximal 'lightness'.[311]

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standard technical terms for 'adjectival qualifier' and 'head noun'), because there is no mention of the structure head noun+adjectival qualifier in this discussion, which deals with annexation.

306   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 244.

307   RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 206.

308   Frank (1981:295, fn. 104), on the basis of Ibn al-Sarrāj's (*ʾUṣūl* II, 6–10) treatment of unreal annexation, reaches the conclusion that such a construction is not "a single descriptive term", because there is a predicative relationship between the adjective and the noun (which explains why RDA maintains that the governed noun in such constructions originates in a constituent in *rafʿ*).

309   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 438.

310   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 438.

311   Various structures that can be created out of an adjective+noun combination, where the noun signifies the owner of the attribute signified by the adjective, are discussed in RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 434–445 (the structures vary in terms of using the definite article, personal pronouns and different cases). See also Ġaḍḍāb 2008:100–107.

Another example appears in a discussion of dual/plural forms. RDA presents Zajjāj's approach, according to which dual and sound plural forms take *binā'* endings, because they include the coordinating *wāw*, just like *ḫamsata 'ašara* 'fifteen'.[312] According to this line of thought, the changes in these forms' endings (*-āni/-ayni, -ūna/-īna*) are not caused by a case assigner, but each form (e.g., *muslimūna* and *muslimīna*) is independent.[313]

RDA rejects this view and argues that the case of compounds such as *ḫamsata 'ašara* is different from the case of dual/plural forms. In *ḫamsata 'ašara* the second coordinated element is not omitted; the only thing omitted is the coordinating particle, and the second coordinated element includes that particle's meaning and thus takes a *binā'* ending (the two constituents consequently become equivalent to a single word, which causes the first one to take a *binā'* ending, as it is unimaginable for an *'i'rāb* marker to appear in the middle of a word[314]). In contrast, in dual/plural forms the second coordinated element is omitted together with the coordinating particle (if we are to accept the assumption that these forms replace a repetition of the same word, i.e., *muslimāni = muslim wa-muslim*). In such a case there is no overt word that would include the meaning of the particle and consequently take a *binā'* ending.[315]

At this point Zajjāj's opinion can still be defended by claiming that the singular form being joined by the ending of dual/plural includes the meaning of a coordinating particle, "because it refers to two things or more" (*li-wuqū'ihi 'alā l-šay'ayni 'aw-i l-'ašyā'i*). According to this argument, the dual ending is a marker signifying that the singular form includes one coordinating *wāw*, and the ending of plural signifies that the singular form includes more than one coordinating *wāw*.[316] RDA responds that if we were to accept this argument, the meaning of coordination would be annulled, and "the singular form [integrated] in the dual form would be perceived as referring to two things as a single expression, not as an [implicit] coordination [between two words]" (*ju'ila l-mufradu fī l-muṯannā wāqi'an 'alā šay'ayni bi-lafẓin wāḥidin lā 'alā wajhi l-'aṭfi*). This analysis would render the dual similar to the word *kilā* 'both' that does not have a meaning of coordination. However, the difference between *kilā* and dual forms is that *kilā* "never refers to one thing [only], and thus a marker of

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312 Nouns that include the meaning of a particle should take a *binā'* ending. See p. 105, fn. 150 above, and also section 5.2.5.2.4.

313 RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 351.

314 RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 138.

315 RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 351.

316 RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 351.

duality is unnecessary in its case" (*lam yaqaʿ ʿalā l-mufradi fa-yaḥtāja ʾilā ʿalām-ati l-muṯannā*).[317] In contrast, when a word such as *Zayd* refers to two things, a marker of duality is necessary, so that the word would not appear as if it refers to one thing only. The same holds for sound plural forms: according to the approach refuted by RDA, "the singular form [integrated] in the sound plural form would be perceived as referring to multiple things" (*juʿila l-mufradu fī l-majmūʿi jamʿa l-salāmati wāqiʿan ʿalā ʾašyāʾa*). Thus it would be similar to the word *kull* 'every'; however, in "regular" plural forms a marker of plurality is necessary in order to prevent ambiguity, unlike *kull*, which never refers to one thing only, and consequently does not need a plural marker in order to prevent ambiguity.[318]

RDA sums up his position on dual/plural forms by stating that not every word that signifies something consisting of more than one element includes the coordinating *wāw*. If any word "that refers to something consisting of elements" (*yaqaʿu ʿalā ḏī ʾajzāʾin*) included this particle, numerals such as *ʿašara* 'ten (masc.)' and *ḫamsa* 'five (masc.)', and also words such as *kull/jamīʿ* 'every' and *rijāl* 'men' also should have taken *bināʾ* endings, contrary to the actual situation in Arabic. Therefore, RDA suggests a distinction between two ways in which "a linguistic expression can refer to two elements or more that are equal in the predicate's ascription to them" (*wuqūʿu l-lafẓi ʿalā l-juzʾayni l-mutasāwiyayni fī nisbati l-ḥukmi*[319] *ʾilayhimā ʾaw ʿalā l-ʾajzāʾi l-mutasāwiyati fīhā*):

a.   Using the coordinating *wāw*, either explicitly, as in *jāʾanī Zaydun wa-ʿAmrun* 'Zayd and ʿAmr came to me', or in a way that is implicit but recon-structable, as in *jāʾanī ḫamsata ʿašara* 'Fifteen came to me'. These are cases in which "no single word was coined to refer to the group" (*lam tūḍaʿ kalimatun wāḥidatun li-l-majmūʿi*).

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317   The ending of *kilā/kiltā* 'both masc./ both fem.' does not change unless these words are annexed to a personal pronoun, in which case the ending is *-ā* in *rafʿ* and *-ay* in *naṣb* and *jarr*, similarly to the ending of a dual noun. See the examples in Wright 1896–1898:II, 212–213. According to the "Kūfan" approach *kilā/kiltā* are dual semantically and formally, i.e., on the semantic level each of them usually signifies two referents, and, formally speaking, the *ʾalif* in their ending originates in the dual ending *-āni* (the *nūn* is omitted because these words always function as annexed elements). In contrast, "Baṣran" grammarians maintain that the words are dual semantically but not formally, and the *ʾalif* in question resembles the *ʾalif* of *ʿaṣā* 'stick' and *raḥā* 'mill-stone'. See Ibn al-ʾAnbārī, *ʾInṣāf* II, 439–450 for a fur-ther discussion.

318   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 352.

319   See section 2.4.2.1 above for a discussion on the term *ḥukm*. The reason why RDA uses this term here rather than a syntactic one is probably due to the fact that it enables him to speak of logical relations regardless of sentence type.

b. If "a word is appropriate by its coinage to refer to the group" (*kalima ṣāliḥa li-l-majmūʿ waḍʿan*), there are two possibilities:

– "The word was coined to refer to the group, after it was coined to refer to one thing" (*ʾan tūḍaʿa l-kalimatu li-l-majmūʿi, baʿda waḍʿihā li-l-mufradi*). This is the case with dual and plural forms.

– The word "was coined from the outset to refer to a group" (*tūḍaʿu li-l-majmūʿi ʾawwalan*). This is the case with *kilā*, *jamīʿ* and the numerals 2–10.[320]

It can be concluded from the examples presented in this section that the subject of the verb *waqaʿa*, when it refers to the form-meaning relation, is always a single word. Whenever RDA explicitly states what a certain word 'falls' on, it is always something concrete (the person named by a certain name, the Kaʿaba, a snake), whereas in other cases *waqaʿa* is used for stating that one word refers to the same thing (or not to the same thing) as another, or to speak of several things to which a word can refer. The relatively infrequent occurrences of the verb and the nature of the examples make it impossible to determine whether the 'things' on which the verb 'falls' are objects in the real world or ideas; however, the concrete character of the 'things' that are mentioned explicitly facilitates interpreting them as concrete objects in the real world.

Words whose meanings are close but not identical are said to 'fall' on the same thing (e.g., Hāšim and Hāšimī);[321] some words are said to 'fall' on several unrelated things (e.g., the term *rafʿ* 'falls' on *ḍamma*, *ʾalif* and *wāw*, whereas the term clearly may not refer to these three meanings simultaneously, but only in different contexts). These two facts lead us to the conclusion that use of the verb *waqaʿa* is related to the word's potential to refer to something (or, stated differently, to various possible meanings that the word may have).

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320   RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 352.

321   See RDA, *Šarḥ* I, 133, where it is stated that the name, despite *yāʾ al-nisba*, "continues to refer to [referent/s] for which it was coined" (*baqiya … wāqiʿan ʿalā mā kāna mawḍūʿan lahu*); however, a word such as Hāšimī is not considered a proper noun.

Summary and Conclusions

This book studies the distinctive terminology in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* by Raḍī l-Dīn al-ʾAstarābāḏī (RDA) and the tangible influences which Islamic sciences other than grammar excercised on it, especially logic.

In scholarship the 4/10th century is usually represented as a period when logic greatly influenced Arabic grammatical theory.[1] But RDA seems to represent another stage in the integration of logic into the grammatical literature—a stage in which grammatical texts are difficult to understand by anyone not familiar with logic. This differs from the situation in the 4/10th century, when grammarians aspired to set themselves apart from logicians (although they did in fact use the latters' methods), as exemplified in the famous debate between Mattā ibn Yūnus (d. 328/940) and Sīrāfī, in which the latter took pains to demonstrate the difference between grammar and logic and the grammar's supremacy.[2] Another example of grammarians' tendency to establish their autonomy can be found at the beginning of Zajjājī's *Kitāb al-ʾĪḍāḥ*, where the author states that a certain definition of a noun fits logic, but does not fit grammar.[3] It may be assumed that in the 4/10th century grammarians still felt the need to establish their discipline's autonomy,[4] whereas in the later period there was no reason to worry about its position. The integration of logic into later grammatical literature can be possibly related to the influence of Ġazzālī, who justified the use of logic in Islamic sciences.[5]

The following general tendencies can be discerned in RDA's terminology:
- A tendency towards accurate formulations, which can be linked to logic, a discipline that stresses the methodology of scientific writing.
- A tendency towards abstract terminology, frequently created by the addition of the suffix *-iyya* to less abstract grammatical terms or to non-technical words. The intensive use of abstract terms can be viewed as evidence of an

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1 Muḥassab (2007), for instance, stresses this point. This claim is also prominent in Carter's (1990:129–130) description of the development of Arabic grammatical theory.
2 See Mahdi 2007 for a detailed discussion of this debate. Muḥassab (2007:18–26) also views this episode as evidence of the rivalry between grammarians and logicians at that period (he gives additional examples that reflect the relationship between the two disciplines).
3 Zajjājī, ʾĪḍāḥ, 48.
4 See Suleiman 1999a for a discussion on the tendencies for autonomy and for interaction with other disciplines in medieval grammatical theory.
5 See Montgomery Watt 1965.

interest in studying topics that exceed the formal aspects of the language. Interestingly, studies have also shown a gradually expanding use of terms with the suffix -*iyya* in the philosophical literature in Arabic.

– The use of terms that are usually viewed as Kūfan, testimony to RDA's wide erudition that allows him to freely use less well-known terms and ideas. This tendency can also be viewed as an evidence of his non-conformism and eagerness to challenge the reader.

– Using terms from other disciplines.

Logical and philosophical terms:

– *mansūb ʾilayhi-mansūb-nisba* '[something to which something else] is ascribed'-'something which is ascribed [to something else]'-'ascription'. These terms, which originated in logic, refer to the basic idea of ascribing two terms to each other, which can be realized in an independent sentence or otherwise;

– *mawḍūʿ* '(logical) subject' is sometimes used, instead of the regular syntactic terms for 'subject', in discussions imported directly from logic;

– *muqaddima* 'premise', each one of the two propositions from which a conclusion is derived in a syllogism;

– *jawhar* 'substance/essence', that can refer to (a) a word (that is substantial, as opposed to an accidental syntactic function), (b) the consonants of a word's root (that are substantial, as opposed to an accidental morphological pattern), (c) the essence of some sound;

– *qasīm* 'partner', a category placed on an equal level with another in the categorical division.

Juristic terms:

– *maḥkūm ʿalayhi-ḥukm* '[something upon which] a judgment is given'-'judgment'. These are sometimes used instead of the regular syntactic terms for 'subject' and 'predicate' to present a sentence as providing the addressee with new information about something;

– *istiḥsān* 'preference', referring to linguistic phenomena which are not dictated by the basic principles of the theory but by speakers' preferences;

– *mansūḫ* 'abrogated', referring to an element from an underlying structure which is not relevant to some derived structure.

In addition to general tendencies in RDA's use of terminology, there are specific terms worthy of discussion. One of them is *waḍʿ* (which I translate as 'coinage') and its derivatives. This refers to the hypothetical act of creating a linguistic expression for a certain meaning/function. It plays an important role in Muslim philosophy, theology and jurisprudence, and although some instances of its usage can be found in early grammarians' writings, RDA seems to have been the first to develop what can be called a *"waḍʿ* theory", in which

the concept is defined, applied to different kinds of linguistic elements, and arguments are based on it.

He defines *waḍʿ* as "the first assignment of a linguistic expression to a meaning, with the intention that it become conventional between people", and distinguishes between lexical coinage (creation of a word for a certain meaning/function), morphological coinage (creation of a prefix/suffix/pattern for a function and/or with a certain behavior), and syntactic coinage (creation of an element for a certain syntactic position, or creation of a syntactic structure for a certain meaning/function). An element's coinage determines its form, meaning, categorical identity, syntactic functions, etc.

Unlike other Muslim scholars, RDA does not show much interest in the coiner's identity (although it can be inferred that he views language as a convention between speakers). Instead he concentrates on various linguistic elements' features that are determined by their coinage. RDA mostly presents coinage-related statements as axioms (although in some cases he feels the need to prove them).

Most linguistic phenomena are explainable by the coiner's intention, but in certain cases RDA points out a mismatch between the coiner's intention and actual usage. Some constituents are originally coined in a way that gives some freedom of action to their user (for instance, in the case of personal pronouns the coiner could not foresee their specific referents in the course of usage); in other cases the constituent's usage deviates from the coiner's original intention (for instance, although nouns were coined in order to function in a syntactic context, they are sometimes used outside any context). It also happens that an existing constituent is linked by additional act of coinage to a different meaning/referent; the oucome of such cases is homonymy.[6] RDA views language as a dynamic entity: he not only speaks of multiple acts of coinage, but also recognizes deviations from characteristics dictated by the element's coinage (although with certain limitations).

In addition to signification by coinage (which is how most linguistic elements are created and given meaning), RDA mentions signification "by nature" (*bi-l-ṭabʿi/ṭabʿan*), in which a natural connection exists between the signifier and the signified (that is the case with onomatopoeic words), and signification "by means of reason" (*ʿaqlan*), in which meaning is inferred independently of coinage. An element can signify a meaning by means of reason, as well as require other elements on the grounds of reason (and not by coinage)—i.e.,

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6 Later grammarians' treatment of homonymy, synonymy and metaphoric usages seem to deserve additional study, in light of the theory of coinage and *ʾuṣūl al-fiqh*.

even if the coiner did not intend that some element be necessarily accompanied by others, that element can nonetheless require other elements that are logically entailed by its meaning.

Two other terms essential for understanding *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* are *ṭaraʾān* 'pouncing' (that was used in the juridical literature as early as in the 4/10th century) and *ʿurūḍ* 'accidentality' (a logical term). Both terms refer to factors/elements which are secondary and/or transient in comparison to others. However, they differ from each other in that the first is usually reserved for the factor that suppresses the others and determines the rule for the element/structure, whereas the second mostly refers to a factor that is suppressed by others and does not influence the rule. Although an 'accidental' factor is sometimes presented as influencing the rule, it seems that the term 'accidental' is then chosen to stress the weakness of the rule that ends up being influenced by a factor that is not supposed to be taken into account. The main disscussions in which the idea of 'pouncing' appears in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* are on *bināʾ*/*ʾiʿrāb* endings, definiteness, grammatical agreement, and also semantic discussions. I arrange the material on the notion of 'accidentality' according to the levels where the 'accidental' factor may appear, i.e., morphological, syntactic and semantic. The discussion on the endings of the numerals 3–10 is presented as an example of a complex discussion that combines terms from both groups.

Šarḥ al-Kāfiya is abundant with semantic discussions, and consequently contains many terms referring to the form-meaning relation. None of these terms is unique to RDA, but their frequency and diversity in his book allow studying the differences between them. The conclusions are as follows:

Maʿnā 'meaning' refers in the vast majority of cases to a meaning which is relatively abstract. RDA uses the term to refer to a meaning which may or may not exist in a linguistic element (when it is not the nature of an element's meaning that is under discussion, but the question of whether it has a meaning beside its formal function). Sometimes the term *maʿnā* refers to a component of a word's meaning. There are contexts in which *maʿnā* refers to an element's function in a sentence (in which case it is appropriate to translate it as 'functional meaning'). Although RDA mostly uses the term to refer to the meaning of a single word, it sometimes refers to the meaning of units which are larger or smaller than a word.

Another important group of terms in the context of the form-meaning relation is *dalāla*/*madlūl* 'signification/ signified [meaning]' and their derivatives. These terms are similar to *maʿnā* in that they may also refer to something signified by a single word or by larger/smaller units, and to components of a word's meaning. However, unlike *maʿnā*, which almost always refers to abstract ideas, *dalāla*/*madlūl* are often used to speak of a mental representation of a concrete

object signified by linguistic elements. It is worth mentioning that RDA does not use derivatives of the root *d-l-l* to refer to an existing (or non-existing) meaning or to a syntactic function (for this purpose he only uses derivatives of the root *ʿ-n-y*). There is evidence in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya* that *dalāla* is not equivalent to denoting an object in the external world, or to a linguistic element's dictionary meaning.

RDA uses only derivatives of the root *d-l-l* in discussing meta-linguistic usages (e.g., when pointing out that the speaker has in mind the actual word rather than something signified by it). However, the most prominent usage unique to the term *dalāla* is in distinguishing among different types of signification. In this context two important distinctions are made:

1.   The distinction between formal and non-formal signification (i.e., between something signified by the expression itself and something that can be inferred from it), which is found also in a juristic treatise by Ibn al-Ḥājib. The relation between formal/non-formal signification and signification by coinage/by means of reason (which I discuss in the context of coinage) is not made very clear in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*. The difference between the terms may lie in their focus: when RDA speaks of formal/non-formal signification, the focus is on the linguistic expression itself and the way the addressee understands it, whereas his focus when speaking of signification by coinage/by reason is on the hypothetical coiner and his plans/intentions.

2.   The distinction between signification "by correspondence" (*muṭābaqatan*), in which a concept corresponds entirely to the meaning for which the element was coined; "by inclusion" (*taḍammunan/ḍimnan*), in which a concept is included in the meaning for which the element was coined; and "by entailment" (*iltizāman*), in which a concept is entailed by the meaning for which the element was coined. These terms were already used by Ibn Sīnā. Among the three, the idea of 'inclusion' is the most prominent in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*—RDA explains constituents' syntactic and morphological behavior, and also their meaning by their inclusion of the meaning characteristic of other constituents.

The term *musammā* 'the named one' is used to refer to an entity denoted by a proper noun. In cases where the discussion does not presuppose a proper noun, *musammā* seems to refer to an object in the outer world for which the linguistic sign stands (unlike the terms *maʿnā* and *dalāla/madlūl*, which refer to a mental representation of reality).

The term *maḍmūn* 'content' mostly refers to the content of a clause (or a clause-like element) or of a predicate in a sentence/clause. The meaning intended by the term is never concrete. Paraphrasing an element's content, RDA uses

the *maṣdar* derived from an element. To paraphrase the content of a clause he uses an annexation construction in which the *maṣdar* derived from the predicate (or a predicate-like element) serves as an annexed element of the subject. One can say that such paraphrases of 'contents', which contain *maṣdar*s and annexations, reveal the logical nucleus that is common to various syntactic constructions (such as verbal/nominal clauses, objects of a cognitive verb and noun+adjective phrases), namely, ascribing something a property.

The verb *waqaʿa ʿalā* lit. 'fell on' can be translated, when used in the context of the form-meaning relation, as 'referred to'. Its subject is always a single word (unlike the terms *maʿnā/dalāla/madlūl*, which often refer to the meaning/signification of units larger/smaller than a word, and unlike the term *maḍmūn* that frequently refers to the content of sentences/clauses). When it is stated explicitly what some word 'refers' to, it is always something concrete. It can be assumed that the verb is used to speak of denoting an object in the outer world, but one cannot know for sure, as the author does not say so explicitly.

We conclude that RDA uses Ibn al-Ḥājib's text as a platform for developing his own ideas; clarifying the basic text is not the main objective of his work.

The influence of logic, theology and jurisprudence can be seen not only in RDA's terminology, but also in his examples. For instance, the example "God is capable of everything but the impossible" (given in a discussion of exception constructions)[7] has a theological flavor, and the sentence "The water is pure" (exemplifying generic definiteness)[8] is taken from jurisprudence.

In sum, my work attempts to elucidate central issues in the distinctive terminology in *Šarḥ al-Kāfiya*. It also serves to show how other Islamic sciences can be used for gaining a better understanding of a grammatical text. My approach, based on a close and comprehensive reading of the treatise as a whole, makes it possible to recognize and study features recurring in various chapters and at various levels of analysis, and may provide a method for discovering distinctive traits of the writings of other, especially relatively late, grammarians.

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7 RDA, *Šarḥ* II, 101.
8 RDA, *Šarḥ* III, 237.

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