The Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society

Edited by
Michael Winter and Amalia Levanoni

THE MAMLUKS IN EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN
POLITICS AND SOCIETY

THE

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PEOPLES, ECONOMIES AND CULTURES, 400-1500

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PREFACE

This volume on the Mamluks of Egypt and Syria grew out of an international conference, which took place in May 2000 at the Universities of Haifa and Tel-Aviv. This conference was a sequel of a similar symposium that had convened in 1994 at Bad Homburg, Germany, which resulted in the volume entitled *The Mamluks in Egyptian politics and society*, edited by Thomas Philipp and late Ulrich Haarmann (Cambridge University Press, 2001).

The conference at Haifa and Tel-Aviv (and subsequently this book) differs from the previous project in one significant aspect. The first book was limited to Egypt; the present volume includes the history of the Mamluks in Syria as well. Egypt was the center of the Mamluk Empire (1250–1517); the provinces known as Greater Syria (*Bilād al-Shām*) were wholly dependent on the capital Cairo, the seat of the sultan and the caliph, and was politically and strategically of a secondary importance. In addition, while Mamluks assumed a central role in the politics of Ottoman Egypt (1517–1798; particularly in the eighteenth century), they all but disappeared from Syria after the Ottoman conquest.

The editors would like to extend their gratitude to the persons and departments at the Haifa and Tel-Aviv Universities for their assistance in financing and organizing the Mamluk conference and the present volume.

We would like to thank Mrs. Genoveba Breitstein for efficiently and thoughtfully preparing the text for publication.

M.W.   A.L.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANSMN	*American Numismatic Society Museum Notes*
AS	Annales Islamologiques
BIFAO	Bulletin de l'Institut Français d'Archèologie Orientale
BRIJMES	British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
BSOAS	Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies
CNRS	Centre National de Recherche Scientifique
EI²	Encyclopaedia of Islam (new edition)
IFD	Institut Francis de Damas
IFAO	Bulletin de l'Institut Français d'Archèologie Orientale
IJMES	International Journal of Middle East Studies
JAOS	Journal of the American Oriental Society
JESHO	Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient
JRAS	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
JSS	Journal of the Semitic Studies
MSR	Mamluk Studies Review
REI	Revue des etudes Islamiques
SI	Studia Islamica

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INTRODUCTION

The nineteen articles that have been collected in the present vol-
ume cover the politics and society of the Mamluks from 1250, when
the Mamluk Sultanate was established in Egypt until the end of the
eighteenth century, when the French invasion of Egypt announced
the end of the three centuries long, direct Ottoman rule of Egypt.
The Syrian provinces were an integral part of the Mamluk Empire,
and despite the strong union between Egypt and Syria during the
Mamluk Empire (stronger than in any period before or since), there
were different conditions in Syria in certain respects. Therefore, Parts
IV and VII discuss respectively the conditions in Mamluk Palestine,
a part of Greater Syria at the time, and Syria.

Part I, "The formative stage of the Mamluk state", consists of two
quite different studies. Hannah Taragan describes the portal to the
Red Mosque in Safed, discussing its artistic themes and political
messages, comparing that specific portal to other monuments com-
missioned by Sultan Baybars, the architect of the Mamluk Empire.
Reuven Amitai looks at the meaning of loyalty among Mamluk amirs
against the background of the Mongol occupation of Damascus in
1300, when several amirs crossed the lines to the Mongols and back.

It is well known that despite the richness of literary sources of the
period, the archival documents from the Mamluk chanceries did not
survive. In Part II, Frédéric Bauden uncovered at the University of
Liége a unique manuscript. It is an imperial decree dating from the
mid-fourteenth century. The document was used by the al-Maqrīzī, the
famous historian, as scrap paper to write a passage from one of his
chronicles. Complementing historical sources with Mamluk chancery
documents, Bauden constructs more accurate pictures of political
events in mid fourteenth century. Using the Ḥaram al-Sharif docu-
ments in Jerusalem, Donald Richards suggests first hand information
on Mamluk material culture.

Turning to the military aspects of the Mamluk society in Part III,
Amalia Levanoni uses the study of Mamluk regal titles (alqāb) dur-
ing the Circassian period to look at factional politics within Mamluk
society. She challenges the model of Mamluk factionalism prevalent
in research literature and shows that the Mamluks developed instead

a bi-polar political system in which regal titles were used as symbols uniting various Mamluk groups through the generations. Robert Irwin challenges the theory of the late David Ayalon, arguably the founding father of Mamluk studies, that the Mamluks did not adopt firearms for social and psychological reasons despite the fact that they knew the technology. Irwin examines carefully all the relevant evidence of the Arabic chronicles and the technical pros and cons of the effectiveness of firearms of the time and concludes that not only did the Mamluks not reject firearms, but also "they could not get enough of them".

The two articles of Part IV are concerned with society and administration in Mamluk Palestine. Donald Little offers new facts and fresh perspectives on Mamluk Jerusalem. Little describes the administration of the city under Qāytbāy, the most powerful sultan in the fifteenth century. Joseph Drory's study of Safed describes the considerations, which caused the Mamluk government to turn Safed from a small and politically insignificant town into a *mamlaka*, a province in Greater Syria. Drory surveys in some detail the officeholders in Safed, giving a list of the military and administrative personnel under the Mamluks.

In Part V, Yossef Rapoport gives an analysis of the significance of the attacks on divorce oaths by Taqī al-Dīn b. Taymiyya, the most famous and original theologian and polemicist of the Mamluk period. His rulings about this matter got him into trouble with the authorities, as did other things he said or wrote. Rapoport explains that divorce oaths were widely practiced throughout society, by commoners and the ruling elite alike. By attacking them on religious grounds Ibn Taymiyya challenged some basics of families and households, such as authority and control.

Part VI consists of three articles on the economy. Warren Schultz discusses the circulation of silver coins in the Baḥri (or Turkish) period of Mamluk history (1250–1382). He rejects Balog's assumption that Mamluk *dirham*s passed by count and argues that the Mamluks minted silver coins of changing alloys and weight and that their value was determined in the market in comparison to the money of account. Jonathan Berkey takes a close look at an ancient Islamic institution, the *muḥtasib* (market inspector) in the Mamluk environment. He shows that there was transformation in the character and functions of the office; from a position of an ethical and religious

character, filled in by men from the religious-legal establishment in
the early Mamluk period, it turned into a political and administra-
tive office of the state, subordinate to the ruler's interests. Carl Petry
describes the estate and the economic activities of a woman, a royal
spouse, who had been widowed several times and amassed consid-
erable fortune. This study is based on archival documents that are
relatively abundant for the last decades of the Mamluk Sultanate.

Part VII, "the Mamluks in Syria", consists of three different stud-
ies. Nimrod Luz combines field research in Jerusalem and written
historical and topographical sources to examine Mamluk residential
houses planning as reflecting Islamic culture in specific towns dur-
ing the Mamluk period, thus contributing to the ongoing scholarly
debate about "the Islamic city". Michael Winter uses *waqf* and *milk*
(charitable endowments and private estates) documents from the
Istanbul archives to examine Mamluk amirs—their religiosity, their
families, households, and women, as well as some demographic data
about family size and number of wives and children. The article is
an example how early Ottoman documents can be used for late
Mamluk social and economic history. Thomas Philipp describes the
Mamluk household and military forces of Aḥmad Pāshā al-Jazzār,
the ruler of Acre in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
turies. The article proves that the Mamluk phenomenon did not van-
ish entirely from Syria after the Ottoman conquest.

In Part VIII, "Mamluks in Ottoman Egypt", André Raymond
describes the wealth of the Egyptian amirs at the end of the seven-
teenth century, basing his study on the documents of legal bequests.
He illustrates the economic differences among the various military
units and ranks and between the military grandees and the civilian
wealthy men. As he does in his previous studies, Raymond also pre-
sents the economic geography of Cairo. Daniel Crecelius discusses
the political problems of leadership of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā,
an outstanding military and political figure in eighteenth century
Cairo. The study is based on contemporary Arabic chronicles. Jane
Hathaway challenges the notion, prevalent in the research literature,
of "Mamluk revival" in Ottoman Egypt, after their defeat by the
Ottoman in 1517. Hathaway strongly calls to differentiate between
the historical realities of Ottoman politics that were based on house-
holds and had no relation to the defunct Mamluk Sultanate and the
nostalgia that evoked Mamluk historical memories, often used for

political purposes, as to gain historical legitimacy. Finally, Reuven Aharoni compares the similarities and differences between the two warlike societies, Mamluks and the Bedouin Arab tribes of Egypt. He shows how they often needed each other, but also how they could be fierce rivals.

PART ONE

THE FORMATIVE STAGE OF THE MAMLUK SULTANATE

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CHAPTER ONE

DOORS THAT OPEN MEANINGS: BAYBARS'S
RED MOSQUE AT SAFED*

Hanna Taragan

Eight years after Baybars had conquered the Citadel of Safed from
the Templar Crusaders in July 665/1266, he restored it and turned
it into a new Mamluk stronghold that dominated the entire Galilee
and functioned as a rear base for attacking Acre and the coastal
region. Subsequently, having laid the foundations for the new Muslim
city of Safed, which became the center of Mamluk rule in the Galilee[1]
Baybars built the so-called Red Mosque (al-Jāmiʿ al-Aḥmar), not far
from the citadel.[2] In spite of the fact that the mosque as seen today
was repeatedly damaged by the earthquakes that wreaked havoc on
Safed, the various renovations it has undergone over the years, and
the pilfering of its *minbar* and the marble panels that decorated the
*miḥrāb*s, it can still be studied both as a work of art and as a doc-
ument reflecting the religious and political outlook of its Mamluk
builders.

   [1] Nicola A. Ziadeh, *Urban Life in Syria*, Beirut, 1970, 11–14.
   [2] According to al-Nuwayrī, after the conquest of Safed Baybars built a mosque
in the Citadel and another one in the suburbs (*rabaḍ*). It is quite possible that the
'other' one is the Red Mosque. See: Al-Nuwayrī, Aḥmad b. ʿAbd-al-Wahhāb Shihāb
al-Dīn, *Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab*, Cairo, 1990, vol. XXX, 290. See also: Muḥyī
al-Dīn Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, *al-Rawḍ al-Ẓāhir fī Sīrat al-Malik al-Ẓāhir*, al-Riyad, 1986,
263. According to Arab sources, Baybars also built in Safed (and in its citadel) tow-
ers, markets, khans, a public bath (*ḥammām*) and a residence for the governor. See:
Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Yūsuf Abū al-Maḥāsin. *al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī mulūk Miṣr wa'l-Qāhira*,
Cairo, 1972, vol. VII, 195. See also: Ibn Shaddād, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī, *al-Aʿāq al-
khaṭīra fī dhikr umarāʾ al-shām wa'l-Jazīra*, Damascus: al-Maʿḥad al-Faransī li'l-Dirāsāt
al-ʿArabiyya bi-Dimashq, 1952, 150.

The Red Mosque, which has a fortress like appearance (fig. 1.1) was built in 674/1274–5 of high quality limestone, surrounded by massive outer walls of ashlar masonry, which have been preserved to a height of 7 meters. In certain sections, the walls reach a thickness of 3.4 meters.[3]

The plan of the mosque is rectangular, measuring 40.5 × 28.3 meters (fig. 1.2). A deep, rectangular portal niche is set into the wall of the northern facade, crowned with a vault whose upper part contains an elaborate, four-tiered *muqarnaṣ* of the 'Syrian' type, topped by a gored conch design, only part of which has been preserved (fig. 1.3). The portal, built of reddish-orange limestone, was once higher than the wall, as evidenced by the broken fragments on both sides of the conch. It is flanked by the stone benches characteristic of Mamluk portals. An inscription can be seen on a marble panel in between the doorway and the *muqarnaṣ* vault.

The portal leads into the inner open courtyard, and is surrounded on three sides by cross-vaulted arcades, supported by piers (fig. 1.4). In the north corner of the western arcade it is still possible to distinguish the flight of stairs leading to the now-collapsed minaret. The western arcade opens southward on to a small, slightly raised grass-covered garden that adjoins the main courtyard. To the south, behind the garden wall, is another courtyard with two gates opening to the street. A side entrance leads from here to the mosque itself.

The prayer hall is located on the southern side of the complex. Its interior—as seen today, is of square dimensions, measuring 15.5 meters wide and 15.1 meters deep. The *qibla* contains two *miḥrab*s (fig. 5). Four pillars with flat capitals, looking like "a rudimentary *muqarnaṣ* element"[4] divide the hall into nine equal-sized bays. Seven of the bays, on the north, west and east sides are cross-vaulted and reach a height of 5.30 meters. The central bay is likewise cross-vaulted, and its four folded grooves, meeting at its center, create a rosette design. This bay leads into the ante-*miḥrāb* which features a dome on pendentives, reaching a height of about 8 meters. Seen from the side, the two bays, with their stepped vaults, form a rhyth-

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[3] L.A. Mayer, I. Pinkerfeld and J.W. Hirshberg, *Some Principal Muslim Buildings in Israel*, Jerusalem, 1950, 44–46, figs. 46–51.

[4] Cf. M.H. Burgoyne, *Mamluk Jerusalem*, London, 1987, 140, note 40.

mically graded axis that conducts the eye from the hall entrance toward the *mihrāb* and serves to make the square hall appear oblong.

An expedition to the site in 1950 under the auspices of Israel's Ministry for Religious Affairs, conducted by L.A. Mayer, I. Pinkerfeld, and J.W. Hirschberg—the only modern source to document the building—found the wooden *minbar*, which has since been lost, in place, measuring 5 meters high.

Mayer's claim that the prayer hall as seen today dates from the nineteenth century, and that it was then covered with a single, central dome, is to my mind, inaccurate,[5] since the mosque clearly features architectural and decorative elements from three different phases.

The first phase is characteristic of the period of Baybars and comprises the main portal with its inscription, also the general layout of the hypostyle mosque (fig. 6). I believe that the prayer hall originally extended to the west toward the outer wall and contained five aisles running from north to south, toward the *qibla* with its' present western *mihrāb*. If this was indeed the case, it follows that Baybars had the *mihrāb* placed in the central aisle exactly opposite the middle entrance, where it is usually located in this type of mosque.

The second phase, still Mamluk, but probably dating from the first half of the fourteenth century, can be seen in the present, small prayer hall (fig. 2), with the eastern *mihrāb* and vaulted bays, which attests to a decline in artistic quality compared to the portal of Baybar's period. Since the overall style of this latter phase of the Mamluk period is not covered in this article, only several of its major features will be mentioned below.

The third phase is characteristic of the Ottoman period, although the mosque clearly underwent repeated restorations in the course of the last two centuries. However, the photograph that appears in Mayer's report—and which was certainly not taken after 1950— would seem to document what is no longer found in situ: the huge Ottoman decorated *minbar* and the *ṭughrā* which appears above the *mihrāb* (see fig. 7).[6]

Today, the mosque contains two inscriptions. The one which has already been mentioned, appearing on the portal, is a foundation inscription (fig. 8), written by Baybars, reading:[7]

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[5] Mayer, Pinkerfeld and Hirshberg, 45.
[6] *Ibid.*, fig. 49.
[7] *Ibid.*, 46.

bi-ism Allāh al-raḥmān al-raḥīm amara bi-inshā'i hādhā al-jāmiʿ al-mubārak mawlānā al-sulṭān al-Malik al-Ẓāhir (al-sayyid al-ajall al-kabīr al-ʿālim al-ʿādil al-mujāhid al-murābiṭ al-muʾayyad al-muẓaffar) al-mānṣūr rukn al-dunyā wa'l-dīn ( ) (sulṭān al-Islām wa'l-Muslimīn) qābil al-kafara wa'l-mushrikīn qāhir al-khawārij wa'l-mutamarridīn Baybars al-Ṣāliḥī (qasīm Amīr al-Muʾminīn) wa-dhālika fī sanat arbaʿ wa-sabʿīn wa-sittamiʾa.

In the name of Allāh the merciful and compassionate.
    The building of this blessed Friday-mosque was ordered by our lord the Sultan al-Malik al-Ẓāhir (the venerated, the great lord, the learned, the just, the wager of *jihād* against the unbelievers, the frontier warrior whom God supports and renders victorious, the pillar of the world and faith ( ), the sultan of Islam and the Muslims, the fighter against the infidels and politheists, the oppressor of the transgressors and rebels, Baybars al-Ṣāliḥī (co-ruler with Amir of Believers [the Abbasid Caliph] in the year of 674 [1274/5).

The second inscription (fig. 5), which dates from the first half of the 14th century (our second phase), is an endowment inscription that is located above the eastern *miḥrāb*.[8]

bi-ism Allāh al-raḥmān al-raḥīm innamā yaʿmuru masājida Allāhi man āmana bi-Allāhi wa'l-yawmī al-ākhiri wa-aqāma al-ṣalawāta wa-ātā al-zakawāt wa-lam yakhshā illā Allāha fa-ʿasā ūlāʾika an yakūnū mina al-muhtadīna amara bi-inshāʾi hādhā al-masjid al-mubārak wa'l-turba allatī dākhilihi al-ʿabd al-faqīr ilā Allāh taʿālā Najm al-Dīn Fayrūz al-Mālikī al-Nāṣirī wa-waqafa ʿalayhimā wa-ʿalā ʿasharat nafar imām wa-muʾadhdhin wa-qayyim wa-qurrāʾ wa-farsh wa-tanwīr jamīʿ al-ṭabaqatayn wa'l-iṣtabalāt allatī ilā jānibihā wa-nisf al-bustān al-maʿrūf bi'l-rashīdī wa'l-ḥammām allatī anshaʾahā bi'l-ʿaṭṭarīn yuṣraf min ujrat tilka mā yuḥtāj ilayhi kamā dhukira fī kitāb al-waqf wa-mā faḍala ʿan dhālika fa-li-awlādihi wa-ʿqbihi wa-naslihi.

In the name of God the merciful and compassionate.
    None should visit the mosques of Allāh except those who believe in Allāh and the Last Day, attend to their prayers and pay the alms-tax and fear none but Allāh. These shall be rightly guided.
    The building of this blessed mosque and the tomb inside it was ordered by the humble servant of Allāh, Najm al-Dīn Fayrūz al-Mālikī al-Nāṣirī and he endowed a *waqf*, for [their maintenance] and for [salaries] of an *imām*, a muezzin, an acting manager and Qoran reciters, and for the carpets and illumination, [consisting of] all [the following]: the adjacent two barracks and stables, half of the fruit gardens known as al-Rashīdī and the bath that he had built in al-ʿAṭṭārīn [the drug-

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[8] *Ibid.*, 45–46.

gist market]. Expenditures [on the mosque and tomb maintenance] will be paid from the rent of those [the aforementioned properties] as was specified in the *waqf* document and the remaining [of the rental income] should go to his children, grandchildren and descendants.

This inscription, which provides an illuminating document for the study of the local history of Safed, raises questions that fall beyond our present context. I will confine myself to some details that are important for our purpose here.

After citing verse 18 of Sura 9, (which is highly popular for inscriptions chosen for mosques),[9] it states that the mosque and the *turba*, or tomb therein[10] were built by Najm al-Dīn Fayrūz, officer of al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, who made waqf (*waqafa*) in favor of ten mosque functionaries, among them Qoran reciters. Mention of the latter may point to the funerary nature of the complex at that time.[11] In any case, today the site contains no *turba*. Emanuel Damati, the Israel Antiquities Authority archeologist of Safed, has identified the still-remaining podium, attached to the *qibla* wall by means of a door that was blocked by Damati, as the *turba*. However, Mayer and his colleagues in the 1950 expedition, while referring to the inscription and its location above the *miḥrāb*, made no mention of a *turba*.

It is also worth noting that Evliya Tshelebi, who recorded his visit to the mosque in 1649, said nothing about the *turba* and the endowment inscription but did mention Bayabars's portal inscription,[12] as well as an additional, contemporaneous inscription; the latter must also have been lost during one of the restorations of the mosque. In

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[9] See S.S. Blair, I*slamic Inscriptions*, New York, 1998, 68: "... Undoubtedly chosen because it is one of the only three Qur'anic references to God's mosques (*masājid Allāh*) a special term distinct from any *masjid* or place of prayer." See also W.M. Thackson, "The Roll of Calligraphy" in M. Frishman and H.-U. Khan (eds.), *The Mosque*, London, 1994, 43–44. For different opinion see: R. Hillenbrand "Qur'anic Epigraphy in Medieval Islamic Architecture" in *REI* (Melanges Domique Sourdel), vol. LIV (1986) 171–84, esp. 171–4.

[10] Integration of tombs in madrasas or mosques, also as a later addition, was quite usual in Ayyubid and Mamluk Syria, in the framework of religious popular institutions. See: Y. Tabbaa, *Constructions of Power and Piety in Medieval Aleppo*, Pennsylvania 1997, 156. Humphreys explains it as "The inward-looking face of the *Jihād*". See: R.S. Humphreys, "Ayyubids, Mamluks, and the Latin East in the Thirteenth Century" in *Mamluk Studies Review*, vol. II (1998), 8–9.

[11] Blair, 71.

[12] Evliya Tshelebi, "Travels in Palestine 1648–1650", in *Quarterly of the Department of Antiquities in Palestine*, vol. V (1936), 1 & 2, 159–60 (tr. From the Turkish by S.H. Stephan).

any case, I believe that if the building indeed comprised a *turba*, built in the second phase, in the early years of the 14th century, it would have been located in the western part of the prayer hall.

Baybars ostensibly built the mosque as a place of prayer and as part of the development plan for a new neighborhood on the outskirts of Safed, which was designed to attract numerous inhabitants and thus strengthen the Muslim settlement of the city. Indeed, we know that he encouraged the civil population from Damascus and the villagers of Galilee to move to the city. He also sought to attract religious dignitaries, and absorbed refugees that were in flight from the Mongols. We should also bear in mind that Safed was close to the fertile agricultural heartland and enjoyed a proportionally large part of its produce.[13] However, above all, it would appear that Baybars built the mosque as a monument of the victory to Islam over the Crusaders, thus commemorating his own glorious conquest of the Citadel.

Examining the "expressive intent" of Mamluk architecture in Cairo, Humphreys analyzes its structure, function, and metaphorical or symbolic quality.[14] This inherent quality—which is 'beyond' structure and function—relates to values and ideas that the patron seeks to convey to the viewer, and it is independent of the building itself. It should be noted that Medieval rulers, were fully conscious of the symbolic level of architecture, employing it deliberately and shrewdly, exploiting the building's various elements, such as the dome and the portal, to convey overt as well as covert messages. Furthermore, in Medieval Islam a ruler who built solely for functional purposes would be suspected of putting his faith in the everlastingness of material things and hence be accused of self-aggrandizement. Even the Qoran admonished against edifices that were intended only to glorify the builder.[15] Hence, investing the building with a symbolic significance

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[13] J. Prawer, "Safed ba-tequfa ha-tsalbanit," *Yediʿot ha-Hevra le-Heqer Eretz Israel va-ʿAtiqoteha*, vol. XXIII (1959) (Hebrew), 90–92. Prawer quotes Benoit d'Alignan, Bishop of the city of Marseille who initiated construction of the Citadel of Safed. The bishop describes the fertile agricultural areas in the vicinity of Safed.

[14] R.S. Humphreys, "The Expressive Intent of the Mamluk architecture of Cairo: A Preliminary Essay" *SI*, 1972, 74.

[15] Qur'ān 26: 128–129. And see Aḥmad Y. Ghabin "The Qur'ān Verses as a Source for Legitimacy or Illegitimacy of the Arts in Islam", *Der Islam*, vol. LXXV (1998), 204.

gave it justification as the embodiment of a truth upheld by the society that had produced it.

Baybars indeed enlisted both the verbal and the visual media to relay political and religious messages with the aim of institutionalizing the power apparatus of Mamluk rule in general, and to legitimize his own rule as a defender of Islam and protector of the Muslims in particular. After all, we should bear in mind that al-Malik al-Ẓāhir Baybars al-Bunduqdārī (658–677/1260–1277), and all other Mamluks, were not born Muslims but had been purchased as slaves, converted to Islam, and conscripted into the army, from where some succeeded in rising to power or to senior positions. Their rule was justified primarily by presenting themselves not only as devout Muslims but also as *Jihād* warriors and guardians of Islam. It appears that "The concept of *Jihād* is a plastic one, which can be employed in widely varying ways for varying ends . . . For thirteenth-century Muslim rulers, there was a happy and all too rare marriage of values and interests."[16]

I intend to examine to what extent the portal of the Red Mosque at Safed reflects Baybars's ambitious aims. This will be done by making a stylistic analysis of the portal with its decorative elements and its inscription; by investigating his ambitious use of stone and stone *muqarnaṣ* and by considering the portal and the mosque generally in the context of the regional art that evolved in Syria and its environs.

Baybars's emphasis on the portal of his monumental buildings is evinced both in written sources and in the actual examples familiar to us. Our knowledge of the portal of the Great Mosque in Cairo for example, relies on two biographies of Baybars, which were written in his lifetime and under his patronage, one by Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn 'Abd al-Ẓāhir[17] (died in 692/1292), the other by Ibn Shaddād 'Izz al-Dīn[18] (died in 684/1258), and on a third record, written two centuries later by al-Maqrīzī[19] (died in 845/1442). They all dwell on Baybars's special request, prior to his destruction of Jaffa, in 666/1268,

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[16] Humphreys, "Ayyubids, Mamluks and the Latin East in the Thirteenth Century" 4.

[17] Ibn 'Abd al-Ẓāhir, Muḥyī al-Dīn, *al-Rawḍ al-Ẓāhir fī Sīrat al-Malik al-Ẓāhir*, edited and translated by S.F. Sadeque, *Baybars I of Egypt*, Oxford-Dacca 1956.

[18] Ibn Shaddād, Muḥammad b. 'Alī, *Ta'rīkh al-Malik al-Ẓāhir*, ed. A. Ḥuṭayt, Wiesbaden, 1983, 346.

[19] Al-Maqrīzī, Aḥmad b. 'Alī, *Kitāb al-Mawā'iẓ wa'l-i'tibār bi-dhikr al-khiṭaṭ wa'l-āthār*, 1967–1968, 299–300.

that the portal of his new Great Mosque be identical to the portal
of the Ẓahiriyya *Madrasa* at Bayn al-Qaṣrayn in Cairo, built by
Baybars himself in 660/1262–63, and that the dome match that of
Imām al-Shāfʿī, built by the Ayyubids in 1211. In all other respects,
Baybars gave the architect a free hand. From the said texts we thus
learn that the elements of the portal and the dome were of central
importance to Baybars.

     Another example is provided by an inscription in the mosque of
Ramla commemorating Baybars's victory over Jaffa. In their survey
of inscriptions found in this area (the *R.C.A.*) Combe, Sauvaget, and
Wiet claim that the inscription was located in the White Mosque at
Ramla.[20] Rosen-Ayalon has it that the inscription is located on the
minaret to the north of the ruined White Mosque, and suggests that
Baybars had restored the dome over the now-ruined prayer hall.[21]
Although literary *amara bi-inshā'* means that he ordered the estab-
lishment of the dome, according to S. Blair restoration texts gener-
ally used the same form as foundation texts.[22] According to another
source, the inscription came from the Great or 'al-ʿUmarī' Mosque,
a former Crusader church situated in the market of Ramla[23] (inci-
dentally, I have found no trace of such an inscription at either site).

     The inscription opens with verse 18 of Sura 9—one of the most
common Qur'anic inscriptions, being one of three references in the
Qur'an ran to the mosques of God (*masājid Allāh*), as distinct from
any earthly *masjid* or place of prayer. It continues:

> *Bi-ism Allāh al-Raḥmān al-raḥīm wālammā arāda Allāhu jalāluhu infādh ḥukim-
> ihi limā sabaqa fī ʿilmihi adhina li-ʿabdihi al-faqīr al-mutawakkil ʿalayhi wa-
> tāʿib fī umūrihi ʿalayhi al-mujāhid fī sabīlihi al-nāṣir li-dīn nabiyihi wa-ḥabībihi
> wa-khalīlihi al-sulṭān, al-ajall al-kabīr al-mujāhid al-murābiṭ al-muthāghir al-
> ghāz (ī) rukn al-dunyā wa'l-dīn sulṭān al-Islām wa'l-muslimīn Baybars bin
> ʿAbdallāh qasīm amīr al-muʾminīn amtaʿa Allāh bi-baqā'ihi fa-kharaja bi-jayshihi
> al-manṣūr fī al-ʿāshir min[shah]r Rajab al-fard min al-diyār al-Miṣriyya ʿāqi-
> dan niyyat al-jihād ghāziyan ahl al-shirk wa'l-ʿinād fanazala bi-thaghr Yāfā*

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[20] Et. Combe, J. Sauvaget et G. Wiet, *Repertoire chronologique d'epigraphie Arab*, Le
Caire, 1943, 123–24.
     [21] M. Rosen-Ayalon, "Between Cairo and Damascus: Rural Life and Urban
Economics in the Holy Land during the Ayyubid, Mamluk and Ottoman Periods"
in: ed. T.E. Levy, *The Archaeology of the Society in the Holy Land*, London, 1995, 516.
     [22] S. Blair, 32.
     [23] J. Drory, "*Peney ha-tqufa ha-mamlukit*," in Amnon Cohen (ed.), *Ha-historiya shel
Eretz Israel*, Jerusalem, 1981 (Hebrew), 20.

bukrat al-nahār wa-fataḥahā bi-idhni Allāhi fī thālith sāʿa minhu thumma amara bi-inshāʾ hādhihi al-qubba fawq al-manara al-mubāraka wa-hādhā al-bāb ʿalā hādhā al-jāmiʿ al-mubārak ʿalā yad al-faqīr al . . . . [sanat sitta wa-sittīn] wa-sittimiʾa ghafara Allāh lahu wa-li-wālidayhi wa-li-jamīʿ al-muslimīn.

In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate.

None should visit the mosque of Allāh except those who believe in Allāh and the last day, attend their prayers and pay the alms tax and fear none but Allāh. These shall be rightly guided.

When Allāh may his greatness be exalted, wanted to carry out his decree because of his foresight, he allowed his humble servant, trustful in Him, labouring on [carrying out] His orders, wager of His holy war, supporter of the religion of His prophet, beloved and true friend, the sultan, the venerated, the great, the wager of Holy War, the frontier warrior, the raider in the name of Islam, the pillar of the world and faith, Sultan of Islam and Muslims, Baybars b. ʿAbd Allāh, co-ruler with the Amir of Believers, may Allāh [bring] enjoyment by his longevity. He departed with his victorious army from the land of Egypt on the 10th of Rajab resolved to wage Holy War, raiding the politheists and infidels. He camped early that morning in the port-city of Jaffa and conquered it with Allāh's will, in the third hour of the day. Then he ordered the establishment of this dome above the blessed minaret and this gate of this blessed Friday-mosque by the humble al . . . [in the year] of six hundred [and sixty-six] may God forgive him his parents and all the Muslims.

Whereas the two aforementioned examples demonstrate how the construction of a portal was intended to symbolize Baybars's triumphs over the Crusaders, the two that follow show how the transfer of an extant portal likewise connoted his victory by appropriating enemy property as part of the spoils of war. This was decidedly the very purpose of Baybars's transfer of Bāb al-ʿĪd from the Fatimid palace in Cairo, as recorded by Mujīr al-Dīn:[24]

Wa-lahu biʾl-Quds ḥasanāt minhā: innahu iʿtanā bi-ʿimārat al-masjid wa-jaddada fuṣūṣ al-ṣakhra al-sharīfa allatī ʿalā al-rukhām min al-ẓāhir wa-ʿammara al-khān al-kāʾin bi-ẓāhir al-Quds al-Sharīf min jihat al-gharb ilā al-shamāl al-maʿrūf bi-Khān al-Ẓāhir wa-kāna bināʾuhu fī sanat ithnatayn wa-sittīn wa-sittmiʾa.

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[24] Mujīr al-Dīn, Abū al-Yaman al-Qāḍī al-Ḥanbalī, *Al-Uns al-jalīl bi-taʾrīkh al-Quds waʾl-Khalīl*, Miṣr, 1973, vol. II, 87. See also: al-Maqrīzī, Aḥmed b. ʿAlī, *Kitāb al-Sulūk li-maʿrifat Duwal al-Mulūk*, eds. M.M. Ziyāda and S. ʿAshour, Cairo, 1936, vol. I, 491.

*wa-naqala ilayhi bāb qaṣr al-khulafāʾ al-Fāṭimiyyīn wa-waqafa ʿalayhi nisf
qaryat Liftā wa-ghayrihā min al-qurā bi-aʿmāl Dimashq wa-jaʿala bi'l-khān fur-
nan wa-ṭāḥūnan wa-jaʿala li'l-masjid alladhī fīhi imām wa-sharaṭa fīhi ashyāʾ
min fiʿl al-khayr min tafriqat al-khubz ʿalā bābihi wa-iṣlāḥ ḥāl al-nāzilīn bihi
wa-aklihim wa-ghayr dhālika.*

He did in Jerusalem charity acts among which are the following.
He . . . took care to establish the *khān* [caravansary] outside noble
Jerusalem, to the north-west, known as al-Ẓāhir's khān. Its establish-
ment was in the year six hundred and sixty two. He transferred the
portal of the Fatimid Caliph's palace. He endowed half of the village
of Liftā and other villages in the provinces of Damascus as a *waqf* [for
its maintenance]. He set up a bakery and a mill in the *khān*. He nom-
inated an *imām* in the mosque which is inside [the khān] and stipu-
lated that acts of charity be carried out there such as distributing bread
at its gate and improving the conditions of its guests and their food
and the like.

Finally, we are told that when Baybars recaptured Aleppo from the
Mongols, he removed the iron plates and nails from the portal of
Qinnaṣrīn at Aleppo and took them to Damascus and Cairo for
some purpose. If this transfer from Aleppo may seem to be primarily
utilitarian, the aforementioned Cairo transfer appears to be at least
partly symbolic.[25]

In these chronicles, I believe, the portal figures as a metonym for
a comprehensive idea. Indeed, generally the medieval chroniclers do
not investigate art or architecture according to aesthetic criteria. Any
ruler would be extolled for his building activity for contributing to
the prosperity and civilized existence of his subject;[26] for architec-
ture that rivaled that of other nations in order to glorify Islam: "*wa-
inshāʾi maḥāsin yubāhūna al-umam bi-bahāʾihā*";[27] or for his self-reflection
as a great builder.[28] This is of course not contradicted by the fact

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[25] L.A.A. Sherif, Layers of Meaning: An Interpretive *Analysis of Three Early Mamluk
Buildings*, Ph.D. Diss., 1988.
[26] D. Behrens-Abouseif, *Beauty in Arabic Culture*, Princeton 1999, 169.
[27] These words were written by the judge Khālid b. ʿĪsā al-Balawī who spent
the years 1336–1240 on pilgrimage to Jerusalem. The record is contained in B.M.
Or. 9252 and Paris (B.N.) 2286. See: A.S. Triton, "Three Inscriptions from Jeru-
salem" *BSOAS*, vol. XX (1957), 539.
[28] See, for example, Muḥammad b. ʿAbdus al-Jaḥshiyārī, *Kitāb al-Wuzarāʾ waʾl-
kuttāb*, Cairo, 1938, 48, where al-Jaḥshiyārī (d. 942) describes the reasons for the
foundation of al-Ramla by Sulaymān. See also: N. Luz, "The Construction of an
Islamic City in Palestine. The Case of Umayyad al-Ramla", *JRAS*, vol. VIII/i, 47.

that Mamluk rulers also built religious edifices and charitable institutions under the auspices of the *waqf* in order to secure their descendants' income and circumvent the *iqṭāʿ* system. Thus, when the portal element is mentioned by the chronicles as a separate and emphasized item in Baybars's building activity—sometimes in conjunction with the dome and/or minarets—it is afforded a special role among the other elements of the building, signifying, in our case, the victory of Islam, and of Baybars himself, over their enemies. It should be borne in mind that portals and gateways had constituted a declaration of the patron's power and victory already in the Eastern and Western Roman and Christian Empires, and from the early Islam period on. We already find clear examples of this in the monumental entrance gates to the Umayyad palaces as well as to the prayer hall of the Great Mosque of Damascus, in the city gates of Baghdad, Fatimid portals, etc.

The importance assigned by Baybars to the portal element is likewise evinced by the *mashhad* of Abū Hurayra at Yavne, also known as the tomb of Raban Gamliel—where the cushion *voussoir* frieze adorns the arches of the portal in the same way as on the main portal of Baybars' Great Mosque in Cairo.[29] This element was deliberately borrowed by Baybars from Crusader buildings such as the Holy Sepulcher on the one hand, and the Fāṭimid gate Bāb al-Futūḥ on the other as well as from other monuments. Both buildings—in Safed and in Yavne—also feature inscriptions commemorating Baybars's victory over his enemies.

If the portal is indeed a bearer of Baybars's political and religious message, its inscription declares this publicly. Even if the foundation inscription is often a "banal formulation,"[30] it perpetuates both the metaphorical quality of the mosque portal and the name of the ruler inscribed on it, and automatically establishes a link between the two. Anyone passing by or through the portal would have to read it, and the name of Baybars would be impressed on his mind.[31] In a culture

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[29] H. Taragan, "Politics and Aesthetics: Sultan Baybars and the Abū Hurayra/Rabbi Gamliel Building in Yavne", in (ed.) A. Ovadiah, *Milestones in the Art and Culture of Egypt*, Tel-Aviv, 2000, 117–45.

[30] J. Bloom, "The Mosque of Baybars al-bunduqdari in Cairo", *Annales Islamologiques*, vol. XVIII (1982), 51. See also S. Blair, 29–42.

[31] L. Siedel, "Images of the Crusades in Western Art: Models as Metaphors" in V.P. Goss and C.V. Bornstein (eds.), *The Meeting of Two Worlds*, Kalamazoo, 1986, 79.

that could not present a visual image of the ruler or patron who had endowed the building, unlike the custom in Christian edifices and portals, the written word—that is, in our case, the name of the ruler—became a surrogate means of magnifying his deeds. The Mamluks in Syria kept up this practice, which originated in the Ayyubid period with Nūr al-Dīn (541–569/1146–1174). The later, in the wake of the battles against the Crusaders at Edessa, Antioch, and Tripoli, had his epithets as a warlord of the *jihād* inscribed in Arabic on the portals of the buildings that he erected, emphasizing his dedication to the holy war against the infidels as well as his affirmation of Sunni orthodoxy.[32]

The foundation inscription appearing on the portal of a mosque or other edifice thus clearly proclaims the agenda of the ruler. Sheila Blair even singles out this type of inscription as an insignia of ruling power, similar to the mandatory *khuṭba* in the Great Mosque.[33]

It is no coincidence that Baybars built a hypostyle mosque of the arcades open courtyard type in Safed, repeating the plan of his Great Mosque in Cairo. We should keep in mind that mosques of this type were predominant in the Umayyad period, with the Great Mosque of Damascus constituting a likely prototype. The open courtyard mosque soon turned into a symbol and, throughout the Middle Ages, such mosques would be erected wherever Islam made a new conquest and its victorious presence was to be declared.[34] The legitimacy of rule is founded, *inter alia*, on the continuity of a glorious past. Thus, just as the Umayyads had fought against Byzantine Christianity, the Mamluks fought against the Crusaders; this historical memory is clearly manifested in the Red Mosque.

Baybars's mosque at Safed is built and decorated entirely in stone. The use of stone had been prevalent in Syria and Palestine already in the Roman-Byzantine period. However, the Ayyubids and Mamluks

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[32] Y. Tabbaa, "Monuments with a Message: Propagation of Jihād under Nur al-Din" *ibid.*, 223–24. See also other opinion by: C. Hillenbrand, "Jihād Propaganda in Syria from the Time of the First Crusade until the Death of Zengi: The Evidence of Monumental Inscriptions" in K. Athamina and R. Heacock (eds.), *The Frankish Wars and Their Influence on Palestine*, Birzeit, 1994, 60–70.

[33] Blair, 68.

[34] O. Grabar, "The Iconography of Islamic Architecture" in P.P. Soucek (ed.), *Content and Context of Visual Arts in the Islamic World*, Pennsylvania and London, 1988, 55. See also: B. O'Kane, "Monumentality in Mamluk and Mongol Art and Architecture", *Art History*, XIX/iv (1996), 514.

most probably chose stone because masonry, being both strong and workable, can be used to great effect to make even the functional elements of a building look grand and imposing. Hence, cut and dressed stone would be almost exclusively employed both inside and outside mosques for walls, piers, columns, and vaults, and their decorative motifs. Furthermore, the stone *muqarnas* ornamentation of portals and vaults called for the best limestone and for the most highly-skilled masons and craftsmen, since the stone had to be cut with great precision in order to coordinate elements of structure, color and geometry. More than a technical feat, then, the *muqarnas* was an exquisite work of art, which only rulers could afford to commission as a symbol of their status and patronage.[35] Hence, it is not surprising that this type of portal was also adopted for palatial architecture.

Most of the preserved Mamluk buildings in the area have a portal niche of the type seen at Safed (although each portal is unique and there are hardly two examples with the same structure or decoration), and their decorative elements—quite frequently only the *muqarnas*—are concentrated in, if not restricted to the portal section. The portal through which the monument is entered thus becomes one of the most ambitious elements of the building.

In the Red Mosque at Safed, as in other Mamluk mosques in Syrian cities, the facade is plain and devoid of decoration, apart from the monumental portal, so prominent in its height and warm reddish limestone shade. It was the latter that gave the mosque its name, first mentioned by al-ʿUthmānī in 1372 who described the mosque as a resplendent source of grace.[36]

Apparently this reddish stone was brought from elsewhere, since the stone quarry near the entrance to the city provided a white stone, as it does to this day.

The portal, with its stone *muqarnas* vault, is 7.20 meters high, rising some 20 cm above the wall, 1.50 meters deep and 3 meters wide. It is thus twice as wide as deep. According to Terry Allan's "Muqarnas Questionnaire"[37] these became the standard proportions

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[35] Y. Tabbaa, "Construction of Power", 81–83.
[36] Al-ʿUthmānī, *Taʾrikh Ṣafad*, 1372–1376, in B. Lewis, "An Arabic Account of the Province of Safed-I", *BOAS*, vol. XV/iii (1953), 487.
[37] T. Allen, *Ayyubid Architecture*, California, 1999, Appendix A: "Muqarnas Questionnaire".

for any vaulted portal in Damascus built after Nūr al-Dīn. There are still remnants of the stone benches on either side. The doorway is topped by a plain monolithic lintel, that rests on two corbels (fig. 8). Although this is a feature rarely found in Ayyubid Syria, it can be seen in Damascus in the Madrasa Ṣāliḥiyya al-Murshidiyya (654/1253)[38] and in the early Mamluk period, in the portal built by Ashraf Khalīl in 692/1292 at Yavne.[39]

In the portal of the Red Mosque at Safed, between the monolithic lintel and the *muqarnaṣ* vault above, a framed slab panel with five lines of inscription appears in the center (fig. 3). This is a typical Damascus *tabula ansata* (inscription cartouche).[40] The *muqarnaṣ* vault springs from corner brackets (fig. 8) and can be compared for example, to the corner brackets in the al-Ṣāliḥiyya al-Ṣāḥiba madrasa in Damascus (630–643/1233–1245) (fig. 9).[41]

The vault in our portal rises up steeply through four tiers of *muqarnaṣ* terminating in a big scalloped shell. The back corners of the vault form an "arch". These back corners are developed in the second tier into two recessed squinch-like domelets whose inner apexes contain little globular pendants carved with a floral pattern (fig. 10). Each tier alternates cells of the 'Syrian' type (somewhat triangular in profile), with dominating branched massive brackets. In the first tier the central cells are divided into two. In the second tier they are divided into three-petaled "conch-like" flowers (fig. 11). Three-petaled flowers like those we find within the cells are not common, perhaps because of the difficulty in carving the stone. However, we can find similar examples from the late Ayyubid period on the portals of al-Farafra khānaqāh (635–8/1237)[42] and Kamāliyya Madrasa (639–649/1241–1251)[43] in Aleppo, as well as on the entrance portal to the mausoleum of Baybars (676–680/1277–1281) which is the only part that remains of the original Madrasa al-Ẓāhiriyya in Damascus (fig. 12).[44]

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[38] E. Herzfeld, "Damascus: Studies in Architecture-III", *Ars Islamica*, vol. XI/xii (1946), 65, Fig. 87.

[39] Targan, Fig. 13.

[40] Allen, *Ayyubid Architecture*, 20. See also: T. Allen, "Five Essays", 102.

[41] Herzfeld, "Damascus III", 12, Fig. 11.

[42] E. Herzfeld, *Materiaux pour un Corpus Inscriptions et Monuments d'Alep*, Le Caire, 1954, tome II, Pl. CXXXIV/a.

[43] *Ibid.*, CXXXVI/a.

[44] K. Wulzinger and C. Watzinger *Damaskus II: die Islamische Stadt*, Berlin and

The third tier is lower and the cells vary in height and depth. The fourth tier is flat, with fluted cells functioning as a "base" to the tall gored half conch above. Because of the crude cement filling applied in the modern period to repair the cracks, it is difficult to detect the boundaries between the tiers.

The portal of the Red Mosque is an impressive artistic feat indeed. Its complexity is expressed not only in the virtuosity of the stonework, but also in the relationship between the units: the geometry, the light and shade effects, the rhythm of the protrusions, the proportions of the three-dimensional forms, and the numbers of tiers. Baybars's portal thus masterfully demonstrates what T. Allen observed, referring to Ayyubid architecture: "This is what geometry means. . . . the display of skill and the harnessing of the abstract in the service of a patron or institution."[45]

It is worth mentioning here that notwithstanding the repeated restorations and repairs that it has undergone over the centuries, the Red Mosque at Safed manifests elements of a well-defined regional style in type, scale and ornamentation that characterized the artistic centers of both Damascus and Aleppo and, from 1293 on, also of Tripoli, which was rebuilt by Qalāwūn after the Crusaders were repelled.

The stylistic characteristics that we find in the Red Mosque from the second phase, i.e., the first half of the fourteenth century, link it to the above-mentioned local tradition[46] The architecture stresses the interior and as in Aleppo the mosque in Safed also tended to vault all interior bays with cross vaults after Crusader models, which remained the basic type of vaulting system in Syria throughout the Mamluk period (fig. 5). The arcades are supported by piers, and the vaults in the hall are supported by columns with *muqarnaṣ* capitals, dividing the prayer hall into bays, with the line of cross vaults meeting in a central concave rosette, a feature commonly seen in buildings in Tripoli. Another element deriving from Tripoli is the dome

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Leipzig, 1924, Tafel 5/a. I would like to thank Mr. Hans-Ulrich Kuhn, Tubingen, friend and colleague, for the photograph.

[45] Allen, *Ayyubid Architecture*, 47–48.

[46] M. Meinecke, "'Mamluk' Architecture, Regional Architectural Traditions: Evolution and Interrelations" in: *Damaszener Mitteilungen*, vol. II (1985), 164–75. See also: H. Salam-Liebich, *The Architecture of the Mamluk City of Tripoli*, Harvard, 1983, 207–25.

on pendentives in the ante-*miḥrāb*. These and other elements which
are typical of the second phase will be discussed in a separate article.

We should now address the question of why Baybars chose to
adorn the portal of the Red Mosque with *muqarnaṣ*. After all, it would
indeed have been possible to ornament it differently.[47] For example,
Baybars could have installed gates like those at Yavne, intended to
remind the local population of the Great Mosque—his "coronation"
mosque—in Cairo. This question brings us back to an additional
aspect of the discussed metaphorical quality, namely, the believer-
beholder, to whom the patron and ruler sought to impart his mes-
sage: How, could the viewer be made to grasp the ruler's message,
as formulated in architectural terms?

We know that the manner in which a building conveys a mes-
sage or connects with a community relies on special, fixed codes
crystallized in the textual and visual collective memory which that
community has itself established.[48] Innovations are confusing whereas
stability is reassuring. A portal that looked familiar to the local pop-
ulation thus signified continuity, and so facilitated identification with
the ruler who built it. Hence, it was mandatory to effect a visual
experience common to the ruler or architect and the viewer.

In other words, by stressing the link with the local population
while concomitantly dominating it with the sheer impact of over-
powering architecture, the sultan's right to rule was underlined. The
portal of the Red Mosque indeed constituted a dominant element
in the architectural vernacular evolved by Baybars. Whereas the stone
muqarnaṣ portal featured in Cairo only from 1298,[49] and in Jerusalem

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[47] O. Grabar, "The Iconography of Islamic Architecture", 57–59. For the tech-
nical aspects of the *muqarnaṣ* (on portal, dome or squinch) see: J. Rosintal, *Pendentifs,
trompes et stalactites dans l'architecture Orientale*, Paris, 1928. See also: D. Jones and
G. Michele, "Squinches and Pendentives, Problems and Definitions", *Art and Archeol-
ogy Papers (AARP)*, vol. I (1972), 9–25. For 'Geometry', see: I.I. Notkin "Decoding
Sixteenth-Century Muqarnas Drawings", *Muqarnas*, vol. XII (1995), 148ff. See
also: Mohammad al-Asad, "The Muqarnas: A Geometric Analysis" in G. Necipoglu,
The Topkapi Scroll-Geometry and Ornament in Islamic Architecture, Santa Monica, 1995,
349–59. For meanings, or visual metaphors (cosmological, theological and anthro-
pological etc.), see, for example, Y. Tabbaa "The Muqarnaṣ Dome: Its Origin and
Meaning", *Muqarnas*, vol. III (1985), 61–74; and O. Grabar, *The Alhambra*, London,
1978.
[48] Serageldin, "Introduction: Regionalism" in M. Frishman and H.-U. Khan (eds.),
The Mosque, 72–76. T. Allen, *Five Essays*, 91–110.
[49] Only in the Zāwiya of Zayn al-Dīn Yūsuf, see: *ibid.*, 107. See also Behrens-
Abouseif, *Islamic Architecture in Cairo*, 112.

from 1295,[50] it had appeared in Aleppo as early as 589/1193 in the *madrasa* of Sadbaht, and in Damascus in 1213,[51] subsequently becoming prevalent throughout Syria. In other words unlike Cairo, which adapted earlier architectural elements—e.g. Fāṭimid at least in the early Mamluk period—to express and enhance the intent of the imperial patrons, Syria's prevailing architectural style perpetuated the patterns set by local tradition.

This conclusion goes counter to the view of Creswell, who, on the basis of Cassas and Roberts's drawings from the early 19th century, claimed that the portal of the al-Ẓāhiriyya Madrasa built by Baybars at Bayn al-Qaṣrayn in 660/1260, was the first *muqarnaṣ* portal in Cairo, and that it was destroyed or disappeared soon after being visually represented by Roberts.[52] Creswell was aware of, but did not explain, the time lapse between the alleged appearance of the *muqarnaṣ* portal of the *madrasa* in 1260 and its actual appearance in Cairo in the early 14th century.[53] However, as we have seen above, according to the chronicles, Baybars wanted the portal of his Great Mosque, built in the years 1266–69, to reproduce the portal of his *madrasa*— which is not a *muqarnas* portal, but features arches elaborately decorated with *cushion voussoir* and zigzag patterns, which were chosen because of their association with the architecture of their enemies

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[50] Burgoyne, *Mamluk Jerusalem*, 92: "the earliest and one of the most remarkable is the Dawādāriyya (695/1295) which is of a particular type developed earlier in Damascus . . . In a series of fine eighth/fourteenth-century portals (at the Saʿdiyya, Bāb al-Qaṭṭanīn, Kilāniyya, Manjakiyya, Ṭashtamuriyya and Palace of Sitt Tunshuq) the recesses are covered by semidomes carried on three, four or five tiers of *muqarnaṣ* corbelling". See also, K.A.C. Creswell, *The Muslim Architecture of Egypt (MAE)*, Oxford, 1952–1960, vol. II, 146–47.

[51] T. Allen, *Five Essays*, 101.

[52] Creswell, *MAE*, 146–7. See also: J. Bloom and T. Allen, who concur with Creswell in his state of mind J. Bloom, "The Mosque of Baybars", 64. T. Allen, *Five Essays*, 105–108. Allen claims that Syrian artists were imported to Cairo and built this portal.

[53] Creswell, Bloom and Allen thought that Roberts and Cassas painted the portal exactly as they had seen it in Cairo. I believe that European painters who came to the 'Orient' in the 19th century saw visions or sites exactly in the way they were expected to: "Specific objects to be seen in specific ways by specific audiences". See: D. Gregory, "Scripting Egypt-Orientalism and the Culture of Travel" in J. Dancen and D. Gregory (eds.), *Writes of Passage—Reading Travel Writing*, London, 1999, 114–50. I believe that they identified '*muqarnaṣ*' with terms like 'typical Islamic Cairo', 'exotic Egypt' etc. and not with the desire to paint the 'truth' or to be 'realistic'. We should therefore be very cautious in using these paintings as a scientific document. See my forthcoming article on Roberts and "his" Mamluk Cairo paintings.

the Crusaders and/or the Fātimid Ismāʿilis. Moreover, had Baybars indeed built a *muqarnaṣ* portal in his *madrasa*, it is possible that other sultans would have been likely to imitate him and this did not occur. In the final analysis, therefore, Baybars would have appealed to a local model for his Ẓāhiriyya *Madrasa*, familiar to the population of Cairo, rather than a *muqarnaṣ* portal.

According to al-Nuwayrī and in the (now lost) wall inscription of the Citadel, Baybars pledged to replace the Crusader bell tower with the *adhān* (the call for pryaer by *muʾadhdhin*), and the Gospel with the Qoran.[54] Eight years after capturing the citadel Baybars announced the fulfillment of this oath by founding a Muslim city in Safed, in the center of which he constructed the Red Mosque, whose unique and prestigious portal proclaims not just Baybars' power and might as a patron, but also his wielding of an ideology of religious guardianship.

The *muqarnaṣ* in this portal, as we have seen is not a 'functional' element. Its semiotic or symbolic ingredients pose a complex interpretative challenge. Being a kind of ornament,[55] the *muqarnaṣ* "refuses" to receive any iconographic interpretation unless there is an accurate inscription that implies a specific meaning.[56] However, we may conclude that in a region in which the Christian memory—in the form of Byzantine churches and Crusaders fortresses—was so dominant, the *muqarnaṣ* portal constitutes a kind of bearer and signifier not only of Muslim presence but also of the victory of its patron Baybars over the infidels.

Today no Muslims live in Safed as most of its Arab inhabitants fled the city during the war in 1948. The Red Mosque currently serves as a wedding and banquet hall. While this metamorphosis may seem to flaunt the cynical, postmodern *Zeitgeist*, it also highlights, if ironically, the fact that throughout history, architectural constructions have conveyed the ideological message of the establishment.

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[54] Al-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab*, vol. XXX, 137–8.
[55] Grabar, *The Iconography*.
[56] Grabar, *The Alhambra*.

CHAPTER TWO

THE MONGOL OCCUPATION OF DAMASCUS IN 1300:
A STUDY OF MAMLUK LOYALTIES*

Reuven Amitai

The direct inspiration for this paper is an article by Jürgen Paul which recently appeared in a collection of studies dealing with Iran during the period of Mongol rule. In this article, entitled "The Mongol invasion as a 'revealer' of Iranian society," Dr. Paul suggests that the examination of times of crisis can be a useful opportunity to analyse aspects of a society.[1] When things are running normally or at least quietly, the sources are often apt to pass over interesting phenomena, be they social, political or otherwise: why write about something that is working or obvious? It is during a crisis that various hitherto unnoticed matters become noteworthy, and thus recorded by contemporaries for posterity.

In the present case, the crisis in question is that of the Mongol occupation of Damascus following their victory over the Mamluks at the battle of Wādī al-Khaznadār near Homs on 22 December 1299. The Mongols, led by the Īlkhān Ghāzān, completely trouced the Mamluks under the titular command of the young sultan al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn.[2] Not only were the Mamluks, under the real command of the viceroy (nā'ib al-salṭana) Salār, ultimately unsuccessful on the battlefield, they behaved less than commendably in the aftermath of their defeat. In the words of the contemporary historian, the Ayyūbid scion Abū al-Fidā':

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[1] J. Paul, "L'invasion mongole comme 'révélateur' de la société iranienne," in D. Aigle (ed.), *L'Iran face à la domination mongole* (Teheran, 1997), 37–53, esp. 37–38.

[2] This battle is discussed in detail in R. Amitai, "Whither the Ilkhanid Army?: Ghāzān's First Campaign into Syria (1299–1300)," in N. DiCosmo (ed.), *Inner Asian Warfare* (Leiden, 2002, 221–264; a review of previous research on the battle is found there in note 7. See also the short discussions in R. Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early Mamluk Sultanate 1250–1382* (London, 1986), 100; R. Amitai, s.v. "Wādī al-Khaznadār," *EI*², vol. XI, 18.

> The Muslim forces fled pall-mall in utter rout to Egypt the divinely
> protected. The Mongols pursued them. They occupied Damascus, and
> pressed after the fugitives to Gaza, Jerusalem and the territory of al-
> Karak, robbing and plundering much from the fugitives.[3]

Before proceeding to the actual Mongol occupation of Damascus,[4]
it is worth noting the presence in the Mongol army of a group of
Mamluk renegades, led by the former governor of Damascus, Sayf
al-Dīn Qipchaq al-Manṣūrī. Since Qipchaq and company are one
of the test-cases of Mamluk loyalty examined in this paper, it is
important to review, even briefly, the circumstances in which they
abandoned the Sultanate for the Īlkhānate: In the fall of 1298, dur-
ing the reign of Sultan al-Manṣūr Lāchīn (1296–9),[5] word had been
received that the Mongols were planning an offensive to Syria. Orders
had been sent to Damascus dispatching the governor, Qipchaq, to
the north along with the local army. There is some disagreement
among the sources as to the exact sequence of events, but there is
agreement about the end result: a group of senior Mamluk amirs,
accompanied by at least some of their personal mamluks and under
the leadership of Qipchaq, fled to the Īlkhānate in order to escape
their arrest ordered by the then viceroy Mengü-Temür al-Ḥusāmī.
Originally Qipchaq himself appears to have had nothing to fear per-
sonally from this over-weening personality, but his attempts to pro-
tect other amirs—most notably Bektemür al-Siḥlādār and Elbegi—put
him in the viceroy's bad graces. Realizing that his own arrest and
possible execution were imminent, Qipchaq along with the others
fled to the north-east, soon crossing the Euphrates into Mongol ter-
ritory. In the meantime, a number of amirs in Cairo formed a con-

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[3] Abū al-Fidā', 'Imād al-Dīn Ismā'īl, *al-Mukhtaṣar fī ta'rīkh al-bashar* (Istanbul,
1286/1869–70), vol. IV, 43; the translation is from P.M. Holt, *Memoirs of a Syrian
Prince: Abū al-Fidā', Sultan of Ḥamāh (672–732/1273–1331)* (Wiesbaden, 1983), 35.
For the Mongol raids to the south, see R. Amitai, "Mongol Raids into Palestine
(A.D. 1260 and 1300)," *JRAS*, 1987, 243–47.
[4] A short account of this occupation is offered by Muria Tora, "The Salihiyya
Quarter in the Suburbs of Damascus: Its Formation, Structure and Transformation
in the Ayyubid and Mamluk Periods," *Bulletin d'études orientaltes*, vol. XLVII (1995),
161–63. Muria, however, gives a misleading rendition of Qipchaq's joining the
Mongols, implying that it was just before Ghāzān's occupation of Damascus; he
does not mention Qipchaq's desertion to the Mongols months before their 1299
offensive to Syria.
[5] For his reign, see P.M. Holt, "The Sultanate of al-Manṣūr Lāchīn (696–8/1296–9),
BSOAS, vol. III/VI (1973), 521–32.

spiracy against Sultan Lāchīn, and murdered him and his *nāʾib*, set-
ting up a temporary junta until matters could be sorted out. Given
the cruelty of Mengü-Temür, the conspirators appear to have under-
stood the fears and actions of Qipchaq and friends, but not fully to
have comprehended the extent that they were willing to go. When
news of the coup reached Qipchaq, he thought it was a trick to get
him to return, and then be arrested. When the news was finally
confirmed, it was already too late for him to turn back, since he
was already deep in Mongol territory; to his great sorrow, he real-
ized that his desertion had been unnecesary.[6] The Īlkhānid *wazīr*
and historian, Rashīd al-Dīn, also writes that Qipchaq, upon receiv-
ing news of Lāchīn's deposition, regreted his decision to desert, but
that it was too late to go back.[7]

Qipchaq and his friends were well received by the local Mongol
commander and then sent on to Īlkhān.[8] Upon reaching the *ordo*
(the mobile camp of the ruler), Ghāzān himself went out to meet
them, showing the importance which he attributed to the desertion
of such senior personalities. The Mamluk amirs and their entourages
(there were ten amirs altogether and 500 soldiers) were well received,
the senior amirs receiving grants of money in accordance with their
ranks. Qipchaq is reported to have received Hamadān as an *iqṭāʿ*,

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[6] For these events see the anonymous chronicle published in K. Zettersteén,
Beiträge zur Geschichte der Mamlūkensultane (Leiden, 1919), 52; Quṭb al-Dīn Yūnīnī in
Li Guo, *Early Mamluk Syrian Historiography: al-Yūnīnī's Dhayl Mirʾāt al-zamān* (Leiden,
1998), vol. I, 107–13 (translation); vol. II, 48–56; Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb
Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab fī funān al-adab*, vol. 31, ed. al-Bāz al-Arīnī (Cairo, 1412/1992),
352–56; Aḥmad b. ʿAlī Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-sulūk li-maʿrifat duwal al-mulūk*, ed. M.M.
Ziyāda and S. ʿA.-F. ʿĀshūr (Cairo, 1934–73), vol. I, 872; Yūsuf Abū al-Maḥāsin
ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī mulūk Miṣr wa'l-Qāhira* (rpt. [n.d.] of Cairo,
1930–56), vol. VIII, 129, writes that Qipchaq, after he returned to the Mamluk
fold, requested forgiveness for his actions from the senior amirs, since the knowl-
edge of the Lāchīn's assassination reached him when he was at Ghāzān's camp,
and had already told him of the unsettled conditions in Syria (thereby whetting his
appetite to invade that country).
[7] Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh*, in Karl Jahn, *Geschichte Ġāzān-Ḫān's aus dem
Taʾrīḫ-i-mubārak-i-ġāzānī* (London, 1940), 122; this is translated in W.M. Thackston
(tr. and ann.), *Rashiduddin Fazlullah's Jamiʿu't-tawarikh: Compendium of Chronicles. A History
of the Mongols* ("Sources of Oriental Languages and Literature," 45) (Cambridge,
MA, 1994), 643.
[8] On their way they passed by Mārdīn, where the local Artuqid ruler—a Mongol
vassal—received them well. This prince feared the Qipchaq would reveal that he
had maintained secret contact with the Mamluks, a fear which was evidently not
realized; Zettersteén, 49; Abu Bakr b. ʿAbdallāh ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar
wa-jāmiʿ al-ghurar*, vol. 8: *al-Durra al-kanziyya fī akhbār al-dawla al-turkiyya* (*Die Bericht
über die frühen Mamluken*), ed. U. Haarmann (Freiburg-Cairo, 1971), vol. VIII, 375.

although it is not clear if this refers to a Mamluk-type appanage, a
local governorship or something else.[9] The various amirs were granted
Mongol spouses, Qipchaq receiving the sister of one of Ghāzān's
wives. The sources note that Qipchaq, who was of Mongol origin,
found his father and brothers among the Mongol officers.[10] Ibn Ḥajar
reports that Qipchaq actually encouraged the Īlkhān to launch his
campaign into Syria.[11] This possibility cannot be completely rejected,
but given Qipchaq's behaviour in the long run (discussed below), it
is perhaps more likely that it was the news of the fractured state of
politics in the Sultanate that Qipchaq brought which strengthened
Ghāzān's growing resolve to invade Syria.[12] A more measured judge-
ment, with less direct blame attributed, is provided by Ibn Abī al-
Faḍāʾil: "[Qipchaq's desertion] was one of the reasons which propelled
Ghāzān to attack Syria . . ."[13]

The question of Qipchaq's origins is of some interest in the pre-
sent context, as it may tell us something of how Mamluk loyalties,
or rather the loyalties of Mamluks, were shaped. The young Qipchaq
had been captured at the battle of Abulastayn in 1276 (together with
Salār, it might be added),[14] and was subsequently enrolled in the
personal mamluk unit of Qalāwūn. This was not a unique occurence:
the future sultan al-ʿĀdil Kitbughā was also a Mongol, captured in
1260 in the first battle of Homs, eventually also becoming a Mamluk
of Qalāwūn.[15] Some writers tell that Qalāwūn sensed that Qipchaq,

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[9] Ibn al-Dawādārī, vol. VIII, 375, reports that when Ghāzān gave the *iqṭāʿ* to
Qipchaq, the latter refused it, so as to remain in the Īlkhān's presence. On this
case, and the larger question of Ghāzān's later granting of *iqṭāʿāt* to his army, see
R. Amitai, "Turco-Mongolian Nomads and the *iqṭāʿ* System in the Islamic Middle
East (1000–1400 A.D.)," in A. Wink and A. Khazanov (eds.), *Nomads in the Sedentary
World* (London: Kegan, Paul, in press).
[10] Ibn al-Dawādārī, vol. VIII, 375–76; Zetterstéen, 49–50; Aḥmad b. ʿAlī Ibn
Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, *al-Durar al-kāmina fī aʿyān al-miʾa al-thāmina* (Hyderabad, 1348–
50/1929–32), vol. III, 214; Maqrīzī, vol. I, 871–2; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, vol. VIII,
97–98.
[11] Ibn Ḥajar, vol. III, 214.
[12] See the evidence cited in note 5 above.
[13] Mufaḍḍal Ibn Abū al-Faḍāʾil, *al-Nahj al-sadīd waʾl-durr al-farīd fīmā baʿda Ibn
al-ʿAmīd (Histoire des sultans mamlouks)* ("Patrologia orientalis," vols. XII, XIV, XX),
ed. and tr. E. Blochet (Paris, 1919–28), 445 (of continuous pagination); see also
Maqrīzī, vol. I, 872. For a more detailed discussion of the causes behind Ghāzān's
campaign, see my paper cited in note 2 above.
[14] R. Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Īlkhānid war, 1260–81*
(Cambridge, 1995), 174.
[15] *Ibid.*, 51.

whom he greatly liked, was still not to be completely trusted. Supposedly that Sultan had a hunch that this mamluk, were he to be stationed in Syria, would avail himself of the opportunity to flee to the Mongols and "sow the seeds of great discord (*fitna kabīra*)." This, of course, is what eventually happened.[16] The non-comptemporary nature of these sources, and the fulfilled prophecy lend it a post-facto air, but it does give expression to the perception that some mamluks of Mongol origin might have had divided loyalties. How Qipchaq was to resolve this in the end will be discussed below.

Qipchaq and the other amirs accompanied Ghāzān on the campaign into Syria in late 1299, and were present at the battle of Wādī al-Khaznadār, in which he played a certain role. First, it is reported that he convinced Ghāzān not to flee during the battle, when the Mongols initially suffered a setback; later on, he explained this action as a means by which he hoped that the Īlkhān would be taken prisoner.[17] Secondly, in the aftermath of the battle, Qipchaq was instrumental—so he claimed in retrospect—in dissuading the Īlkhān from pursuing the retreating Mamluks, and thus a complete rout and much larger Mamluk casualties were prevented.[18] It is not unlikely that Qipchaq, who eventually returns to the Mamluk fold, was engaged in some urgent damage control: not only was he attempting to minimalize the impact of his desertion, he was also hoping to show that in reality he had assisted the Mamluk cause. In this vein, it is noteworthy that the comtemporary Armenian writer Het'um, who describes in some detail the campaign (in which an Armenian contingent participated), reports that Qipchaq secretly sent messages to the Mamluks before the battle.[19]

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[16] Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Raḥman Ibn al-Furāt, *Ta'rīkh* [= *Ta'rīkh al-duwal wa'l-mulūk*], vol. VIII, ed. Q. Zurayk and N. 'Izz al-Dīn (Beirut, 1939), 94–95, where this mamluk's name is given as Qunjāq/Qunjaq, which of course is a corruption of Qibjāq/Qibjaq (<Qipchaq). This author writes that this information was attained by Qalāwūn during a scapulamancy ceremony. On this whole matter, see Linda S. Northrup, *From Slave to Sultan: The Career of al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn and the Consolidation of Mamluk Rule in Egypt and Syria (678–689 A.H./1279–1290 A.D.)* (Wiesbaden, 1998), 67.

[17] Nuwayrī, vol. XXXI, 385; Maqrīzī, vol. I, 887.

[18] Ibn Ḥajar, vol. III, 214.

[19] Het'um [Hayton/Hethoum], "La Flor des estoires de la Terre d'Orient," in *Recueil des histoirens des Croisades: Documents arméniens*, 2 (Paris, 1906), vol. II, 192. Het'um's evidence does not have to be accepted at face value. Although he provides a fairly detailed account of the battle of Wādī Khaznadār, he apparently arrived at the scene at the end of the fighting, together with the Armenian contingent (see Amitai, "Whither the Ilkhanid Army," 251). Qipchaq was certainly a

We are now in position to deal with the Mongol occupation of
Damascus. My intention, however, is not to provide a detailed ren-
dition of the hundred days or so during which the local population
suffered under Mongol depredations and exactions, but rather to
examine how three cases—two Mamluk amirs and one civilian
notable—behaved "under fire," i.e. how they weathered this period
of disruption and uncertainty, and how this tested their traditional
loyalties and identities. As can be ascertained from the previous dis-
cussion, one of these military case studies will be Qipchaq al-Manṣūrī;
the other will be ʿAlam al-Dīn Sanjar Arjuwāsh al-Manṣūrī, com-
mander of the Damascus citadel, who throughout this period led a
spirited resistance against the Mongols, holding out until the end of
their occupation. The civilian figure to be examined is no less than
Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya, a well-known personality in the religious
and social life of Damascus (and beyond) both before and after this
episode.

While the civilian population of Damascus is not my main con-
cern here, it is useful and not without interest to present briefly the
reaction of the civilian leadership to the Mamluk defeat, the immi-
nent arrival of the Mongols and the subsequent occupation. Our
main source for the Mongol occupation in general, and the experi-
ences of the civilian population in particular, is an account found in
several contemporary Damascene works, which according to the
researches of Li Guo are all evidently based on the original report
given by al-Birzālī in his *Muqafā*.[20] Since the latter is not readily
available,[21] I will base the following discussion on the version given
by al-Yūnīnī, now presented in a well-edited edition (accompanied
by a good translation) prepared by Li Guo.[22]

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convenient scapegoat for the lack of a decisive victory. On the general bias of
Hetʿum's writing, see P.- Jackson, "The Crisis in the Holy Land in 1260," *English
Historical Review*, vol. XCV (1980), 486–6.

[20] Li Guo, *Early Mamluk Syrian Historiography*, vol. LV, n. 78; 75–77.

[21] Birzālī, *al-Muqafā li-taʾrīkh al-shaykh Shihāb al-Dīn Abī Shāma*, MS. Topkapı Sarayı,
Ahmet III 2951/1–2. For the poor state of this manuscript, see the comments in
Little, *Mamlūk Historiography*, 46–7; Northrup, *From Slave to Sultan*, 41.

[22] For the relevant events in 699/1299–1300, see: Yūnīnī, in Li Guo, *Early Mamluk
Syrian Historiography*, vol. I, 132–65 (trans.); vol. II, 97–126. See also J. Somogyi,
"Adh-dhahabī's Record of the Destruction of Damascus by the Mongols in 699–
700/1299–1301," in S. Löwinger and J. Somogyi (eds.), *Ignace Goldziher Memorial Volume*,
vol. 2 (Budapest, 1948), 353–86, a not always accurate translation of Dhahabī, *Taʾrīkh
al-Islām*, MS. British Library, Or. 1540, fols. 123a–131a. The corresponding section

Bardala River

Bab
al-Faradis

Citadel

Umayyad
Mosque

Governor's
Palace

Christian
Quarter

Jewish
Quarter

0   100   200 m

Jabal
Qasiyun

Yazid River

al-Salihiyya

Thawra River

al-Salihiyya

al-Marj

Damascus

al-Ghuta

Road to the Sea

Pilgrimage Road

0   10 km

0   1 km

Tamar Soffer, Cartographic Laboratory, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

from Jazarī's *Ḥawādith al-zamān* has been lost. Henceforth, I will mainly cite the
Arabic of Yūnīnī's account, adding from other sources which contain unique evi-
dence. The sources for the events of this year have been thoroughly and conve-
niently analyzed by D.P. Little, *An Introduction to Mamlūk Historiography* (Wiesbaden,
1970), chapter 1, *passim*; this is supplemented by the discussion in Li Guo's intro-
ductory chapters, 54–80.

As news, often confused, arrived in Damascus about the Mamluk
defeat, there was terrible confusion and disorder in the city, includ-
ing the breakout of several prisoners from jail. On one hand, there
were reports that Ghāzān was a good Muslim, and that the major-
ity of his troops had converted, and therefore, there was no reason
to worry. On the other hand, the Shāfiʿī and Mālikī judges, the
muḥtasib, the prefects of the city and the countryside (military posi-
tions), and many civilians—both notables and lesser folk, fled from
the city. Damascus, however, was not bereft of leaders: prominent
citizens, including the army judge (*qāḍī al-ʿasākir*), the Shāfiʿī Najm
al-Dīn Ibn Ṣaṣrā,[23] and the Ḥanbalī Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya,
soon gathered to discuss the dispatch of a delegation to Ghāzān to
ask for an *amān*, a formal guarentee of safety.[24]

After this delegation had set off,[25] Sanjar Arjuwāsh, commander
of the Citadel, the one important military figure who remained in
the city, issued an announcement: "Not a single item of army equip-
ment is allowed to be put on sale! Your sultan is still in power."
His call seems to have been pretty much ignored. Equipment was
indeed sold, and the first Mongol representatives who arrived were
well received. On Friday, 1 January 1300, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's
name was omitted from the *khuṭba*, although the Īlkhān's was still
unmentioned. The next day, the first substantial group of Mongol
soldiers arrived, bringing with them Ghāzān's *farmān*; Yūnīnī and
others give the text of this document *in extenso*.[26] Basically, the peo-
ple of Damascus were promised security of life and property by
Ghāzān, who emphasized his own commitment to Islam, and the
tyranny and misgovernment of the Mamluks.

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[23] He was to become chief Shāfiʿī judge only in 702/1302; see W. Brinner, "Ibn
Ṣaṣrā," *EI*², III, 930b.
[24] Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 97–100. Muria, "Saliḥiyya Quarter," 162, writes that only
the leaders of all the schools but the Ḥanbalīs fled the city, and only the last men-
tioned played a role in the submission of the city to Ghāzān. This statement is
belied by the list provided by Yūnīnī (ed. Li Guo, 99–100) of notables—including
the above-mentioned Shāfiʿī Najm al-Dīn Ibn Ṣaṣrā—who participated in the con-
sultation in Damascus.
[25] The meeting with Ghāzān, on the march from Homs, is reported in Yūnīnī,
ed. Li Guo, 138.
[26] Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 102–4; see also Zetterstéen, 62–4; Nuwayrī, reproduced
as an appendix in Maqrīzī, vol. I, 1011–12. Somogyi did not translate this docu-
ment, found in Dhahabī, fols. 125a–126a.

The emptiness of these words would soon be fully revealed to peo-
ple of Damascus, especially those living outside the walls in the vil-
lages of the Ghūṭa, and particularly in the suburb of al-Ṣāliḥiyya.
This, however, was not obvious at the very beginning. But, even
had the full extent of the Mongol exactions, as well as the depre-
dations executed by them (especially those of the Armenians who
were found in their army),[27] been known ahead of time by the
remaining notables, it is doubtful that they would have or could have
behaved any differently. They had been abandoned by the Mamluk
army, which bypassed it on its retreat south to Egypt. The job of
the notables was to protect themselves and their fellow townspeople,
which was best accomplished by an orderly submission to the new
powers that be. It certainly was not their business to engage in hope-
less resistance for the sake of a sultan or military caste which had
proven themselves incapable on the field and had deserted them
without further ado. The fact that the Mongols were now ostensi-
bly Muslims made this submission that much more palatable. The
policy of surrender to the Mongols, first revealed in 1260,[28] was *a
fortiori* applicable in 1300.[29]

The notables of Damascus, those that remained that is, generally
kept a low profile during the months of Mongol occupation. They,
like the rest of the population, were candidates for expropriations,
including "mugging" in the streets (the expression is used by Li Guo)
by either Mongols or local ruffians taking advantage of the unset-
tled situation.[30] Perhaps not surprisingly, the one notable example to
this admittedly understandable meekness is Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya,
who more than once sets out from the city walls—certainly at great

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[27] For these activities, see Yūnīnī, vol. II, 105, 108, 109, 110–11, 113–5, etc.
For the role of the Armenian troops in the despoilation of Ṣāliḥiyya, see Baybars
al-Manṣūrī al-Dawādārī, *Zubdat al-fikra fī taʾrīkh al-hijra: History of the Early Mamluk
Period*, ed. D.S. Richards (Beirut, 1998), 332.
[28] On this, see Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, 29–31.
[29] A similar policy was adopted by the notables of Damascus in 1400, when
Tamerlane threatened the city; see Muira, "Ṣāliḥiyya Quarter," 163–64. The sub-
mission of local notables to conquerors was an honored tradition in the Islamic
world: It is reported that Maḥmūd of Ghazna admonished the civilian leaders of
Balkh for having resisted an invader, and thus causing unnecessary destruction.
Resistance was to be left to the military class. C.F. Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids*, 2nd
edn. (Beirut, 1973), 253. My thanks to Dr. Peter Jackson for this reference.
[30] See the passage of Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, vol. II, 114, lines 21–115, line 6
(= vol. I, 153 of translation).

risk to his life—to confront the Mongols, even seeking an audience
with the Īlkhān. He first sought out Ghāzān's *shaykh al-mashāʾikh* in
the city,[31] but this was to no avail. Ibn Taymiyya then left the city
for Ṣāliḥiyya; supposedly, the Mongol troops engaged there in loot-
ing withdrew upon his arrival.[32] This was on 12 January. Two days
later, having returned to Damascus, Ibn Taymiyya set out again for
Ghāzān's camp (*ordo*)[33] near Tall Rāhiṭ. He was introduced to the
Īlkhān's presences, but could not speak with him, having to make
due with a short prayer for his sake and to leave quickly. Ibn
Taymiyya was shunted aside with the excuse that Ghāzān was indis-
posed.[34] Besides, if Ibn Taymiyya complained, the Īlkhān would exe-
cute some Mongols in rage, and this in turn would lead to only
greater confusion and suffering. The Shaykh, however, did have a
chance to talk with Ghāzān's two *wazīr*s, Saʿd al-Dīn Sawajī and
Rashīd al-Dīn, the latter the well-known historian. They told him
that if he wanted the Mongols to desist from their detrimental activ-
ities, the senior officers would have to be satisfied, i.e. paid off with
large bribes. This being said, Muslim prisoners were released to Ibn
Taymiyya, who returned to Damascus two days later.[35] Later, we
have Ibn Taymiyya's account of this adventure, transmitted person-
ally to Birzālī. This story includes a report of the Shaykh's inter-
view with Quṭlu(gh)-Shāh, the senior general in the Īlkhān's army,
which contains *inter alia* some important and unique information
showing how the newly converted Mongols understood Islam.[36] This,

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[31] This was Niẓām al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. ʿAlī al-Shaybānī; see Yūnīnī, 109, line 8.
On him, see: Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh*, ed. Jahn, index, s.v. "Maḥmūd,
Shaykh al-Mashāyikh." Muira, "Ṣāliḥiyya Quarter," 162, appears to think that this
individual was one of the Damscene notables, and not an official who arrived in
the city with the Mongols.

[32] Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 108.

[33] Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 109, line 10 has *irdiwāʾ*, which in the translation (1:147)
is rendered "al-Ardawāʾ," as if it were a place-name; any doubts to its true mean-
ing is cleared up by the parallel passage in Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī, *ʿIqd al-jumān fī
taʾrīkh ahl al-zamān*, vol. IV, ed. M.M. Amīn (Cairo, 1312/1992), 34, line 13.

[34] Yūnīnī (and others) write that Ghāzān suffered from a sore leg and was pre-
occupied with other matters. Cf. Maqrīzī, vol. I, 892, who writes that Ghāzān was
occupied with drinking. Since this latter report is both late and unique, its credi-
bility can be doubted. Little, *Introduction to Mamluk Historiography*, 79, first noted this
incongruity.

[35] Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, vol. II, 109.

[36] Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 119; here the version in Dhahabī, fols. 129b–130a, is
slightly different; cf. the translation in Somogyi, 377–8. In Yūnīnī, Rashīd al-Dīn

however, is a subject beyond the present concerns. What does inter-
est us is that even such an uncompromising figure as Ibn Taymiyya,
who in his famous *fatwā* was to call for the waging of *jihād* against
the Mongols even after their embracing of Islam[37]—half-baked in his
eyes—was now willing to find a *modus vivendi* with the conquerors.
His brave and forthright manner towards the new masters of the
city had nothing to do with lingering loyalty to the Sultan or his
kingdom, but rather was meant to protect the local Muslims for
whom he felt responsible. We will soon see another example of this
Ibn Taymiyya's realistic approach.

But whereas Ibn Taymiyya's loyalty was to his fellow Muslims and
Islam at large, Sanjar Arjuwāsh, commander of the citadel, from the
beginning of the Mongol occupation made clear that his allegiances
were somewhat different, or at least in part could be interpreted
differently. As will be remembered, Arjuwāsh, as he will henceforth
be called, had announced to the townspeople that "Your sultan is
still in power!" Not only was he not to surrender, he maintained a
spirited resistance to Mongol attempts to capture the citadel, even
launching raids into the city to destroy Mongol positions and dis-
rupting their plans. No less important, he unequivocally rejected
every call from the local notables to surrender for the sake of the
local population. His actions, which initially must have appeared to
have been hopeless, reveal great bravery, fortitude, presence of mind
and the ability to command men—not necessarily all professional
soldiers—under the most difficult conditions.[38] The uniqueness of his
story demands a somewhat detailed rendition.

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is described as *al-ṭabīb*, while in Dhahabī, he is called Rashīd al-Dawla, hinting
thus at his non-Muslim origin. For these passages, and the matter of Rashīd al-
Dīn's presence at Damascus at this time, see R. Amitai-Preiss, "New Material
from the Mamluk Sources for the Biography of Rashid al-Din," in J. Raby and
T. Fitzherbert (eds.), *The Court of the Ilkhans, 1290–1340* (= *Oxford Journal of Islamic
Art*, vol. XII) (Oxford, 1996), 28.
    [37] For a thorough analysis of this *fatwā*, see the important study, regrettably hard
to obtain, by Thomas Raff, *An Anti-Mongol Fatwā of Ibn Taymiyya* (Leiden: privately
printed, 1973).
    [38] Short appreciations of his personality, which only briefly mention his actions
in 1299–1300 are found in the biographical dictionaries: Ibn al-Ṣūqāʿī, *Tālī kitāb
wafayāt al-aʿyān*, ed. and tr. J. Sublet (Damascus, 1974), 91–92 (no. 133); Khalīl b.
Aybeg al-Ṣafadī, *al-Wāfī biʾl-wafayāt*, ed. H. Ritter et al. (Wiesbaden, 1931–), vol.
VIII, 338–9 (no. 3766); Ibn Ḥajar, vol. I, 371 (no. 865). We know little of Arjuswāsh's
early career beyond that he was one of Qalāwūn's early personal mamluks and

The first efforts to get Arjuwāsh to surrender were made by
Qipchaq and his associates, saying that the "blood of the Muslims
was on his hands," i.e. if he did not give up, Muslims would be
killed. Arjuwāsh rebuffed them thus: "It is you that are responsible
for the shedding of Muslim blood. You are the ones who have caused
all this. It is because of you that it happened."[39] This was on 4
January. The next morning, at the instigation of a senior Mongol
commander, a group of 'ulamā', righteous people (ṣulaḥā'), shaykhs
(mashā'ikh), and leaders (ru'asā') were ordered to talk Arjuwāsh into
surrendering. If he did not submit, the Mongols would enter the city
and wreak much havoc. The notables complied and were joined by
ṣūfīs. Arjuwāsh treated this group with contempt, calling them "lying
hypocrites that are traitors to the Muslims (munāfiqūn kadhdhābūn al-
khā'inīn li'l-muslimīn), who had surrendered the city to the enemy."
He further related that he had received a notice (biṭāqā) via pigeon
post that the Mamluk forces had regrouped and defeated at Gaza
the Mongols who were pursuing them. Nothing more was to come
of this parleying, or that of the next day.[40]

Arjuwāsh's resolve was not only expressed verbally. He worked to
strengthen the citadel.[41] That he meant business was shown a few
days later, when two Mongol mangonel operators were killed, evi-
dently by men from the citadel.[42] Arjuwāsh seemingly ignored a call
from Ghāzān, now extremely annoyed, to surrender or bring destruc-
tion upon the city.[43] A couple of weeks later, at the beginning of
Jumādā I/25 January, the siege of the citadel began in earnest. The
Mongols began taking up positions around the citadel, setting up
mangonels in the precincts of the grand mosque. No details of actual
combat are given at this time;[44] it appears that the Mongols were
hoping to starve out the defenders, and were primarily preoccupied
with looting and extorting the local population.

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during his reign was first appointed commander of the citadel of Damascus; he had
a run in with Sultan al-Ashraf Khalīl (1290–3), for which he was briefly punished
before being reinstated as commander of the citadel. See also: Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya
wa'l-nihāya fī al-ta'rīkh (rpt., Beirut, 1977), vol. XIV, 20; Baybars, Zubda, 176; 'Aynī,
vol. IV, 40–41.
    [39] Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 105.
    [40] Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 105–6.
    [41] Dhahabī, fol. 126b. This is not in Yūnīnī's account.
    [42] Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 110, lines 7–8.
    [43] Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 110, lines 18–19.
    [44] Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 113.

Twelve days later (12 Jumādā I/5 February), Ghāzān himself left the city with part of his army, leaving Quṭlugh-Shāh in charge together Qipchaq who was the titular governor. The reasons for this sudden withdrawal back across the Euphrates are interesting but need not detain us here.[45] Mongol forces in the city were reduced, but a light force (al-yazak, literally "scouts" or "advanced force") kept a watch on the citadel. Mangonels from inside the citadel lobbed stones at them, and the defenders launched a sortie, in which some Mongols were killed; the Mamluk troops returned safely to the citadel.[46]

Up to now, we have been following Yūnīnī. The impression gained is one of resolution shown by Arjuwāsh and his men, but this in the face of a somewhat desultory siege carried out by relatively small Mongol forces. A greater appreciation of Arjuwāsh's actions can be gained by studying additional material found in the al-ʿAynī's ʿIqd al-jumān. Al-ʿAynī, it may be mentioned, initially renders a slightly shortened version of much of the same account found in Yūnīnī,[47] but at some point[48] begins a somewhat different account, based to some degree on the short report in Baybars al-Manṣūrī's Ẓubda,[49] but with additional material whose source is not yet clear.

For example, Baybars al-Manṣūrī—and thus al-ʿAynī—report explicitly that Arjuwāsh destroyed buildings by fire around the citadel, including the Dār al-Saʿāda, so that the Mongols would have difficulty seeking cover, especially for their mangonels.[50] Al-ʿAynī notes that Mongols responded by a concerted effort to build more mangonels, placing them in the Umayyad mosque. When Arjuwāsh learnt this, he sent out a force at night, who fell upon the mangonels with nafṭ (Greek fire); the Mongol guards fled at this time, and the fires continued for two days.[51]

This particularly annoyed Ghāzān, who entered the city to inspect the matter at first hand.[52] He ordered that the moat around the

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[45] See the comments in Amitai, "Whither the Ilkanid Army?" (note 2) and references there.
[46] Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 115, lines 10–16.
[47] ʿAynī, vol. IV, 29–40.
[48] This would be around Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 114.
[49] Baybars, Ẓubda, 332–33.
[50] Baybars, Ẓubda, 332–33; ʿAynī, 41.
[51] ʿAynī, vol. IV, 41–2.
[52] This was evidently the second time Ghāzān was in the city. The first time he

citadel be filled in, an order which does not appear to have been
carried out. Meanwhile Qipchaq and others approached to speak to
Arjuwāsh, promising him the Īlkhān's favor. The latter, in fairly
harsh language, basically told them to jump in the proverbial lake,
reserving some choice phrases for the Īlkhān himself. Qipchaq *et alia*
ran off in a barrage of arrows, *nafṭ* and other objects. Arjuwāsh
thereupon bid his time until new mangonels were almost ready. Then
he sent down again at night a specially prepared squad, who killed
the mangonel specialist and others and set the machines on fire with
nafṭ.[53] In short, this parallels the information in Yūnīnī, but this
report is more detailed, and we gain a greater appreciation of
Arjuwāsh's activities and initiatives.

An additional anecdote can be recounted: Sometime late in the
siege, the *khaṭīb* Badr al-Dīn Ibn Jamāʿa and Ibn Taymiyya approached
the citadel and tried to mediate a ceasefire (*sulḥ*) between Arjuwāsh
and the Mongol commanders. Arjuwāsh, not surprisingly, does not
agree, and the matter was left to rest.[54] We see here that Ibn
Taymiyya's activities were not limited to trying to mitigate Mongol
excesses and release Muslim prisoners, but to end the siege of the
citadel, which was causing so much suffering to the people of
Damascus, not the least since the Mongols were taking out their
anger by demanding more money.[55] Ibn Taymiyya, as we know, was
a tough character, willing to take on Sultans, the majority of *ʿulamāʾ*,
*ṣūfī*s, etc., and even the Mongols about their excesses. But at the
same time, in the interest of avoiding bloodshed of Muslims, he was
willing to tell the citadel commander, who he perhaps admired for
his resistance, to desist. There were limits even for Ibn Taymiyya.[56]

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was accompanied by Rashīd al-Dīn and other members of his entourage; ʿAynī,
vol. IV, 40.

[53] ʿAynī, vol. IV, 43. His source may be Mūsā b. Muḥammad al-Yūsufī, *Nuzhat
al-nāẓir*, which is cited on the next page. For this important writer, widely cited by
ʿAynī, see: D.P. Little, The Recovery of a Lost Source for Baḥrī Mamlūk History:
al-Yūsufī's *Nuzhat al-Nāẓir fī Sīrat al-Malik al-Nāṣir*," *JAOS*, vol. XCIV (1974), 42–54;
idem, Introduction to Mamlūk Historiography, 80–87.

[54] Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 123; Ibn al-Dawādārī, vol. IX, 35.

[55] On these additional extortions, see ʿAynī, vol. IV, 43–44.

[56] This description would seem to be contradicted by information in Ibn Kathīr,
vol. XIV, 7–8, who writes that early on in the siege, Ibn Taymiyya had actually
written to Arjuwāsh to encourage him to continue resistance, as long as he had
"one rock left". There are reasons to doubt the veracity of this statement: firstly,
it seems to be unsubstantiated by any other source; secondly, it is not contempo-

Having reviewed Arjuwāsh's actions in some detail, we can see in hindsight that his resolute and cool-headed behaviour enabled him to resist successfully all Mongol attempts—verbal, psychological or military—to gain possession of the citadel. This successful result, however, was not at all obvious at the beginning of the Mongol occupation, or during most of the siege. It should be noted initially that Arjuwāsh was under no compulsion whatsoever to remain in the city and resist. As mentioned above two of his colleagues, the perfect of the city and perfect of the countryside had absconded right after receiving news of the Mamluk defeat at Wādī al-Khaznadār. Arjuwāsh could easily have done the same, without fear of reprimand or reprobation. Likewise, he could have easily submitted to Mongols, joining his *khushdāsh* (comrade)[57] Qipchaq, looking forward to a warm reception by the Īlkhān, and a cushy life ahead. Yet he chose neither of these options, but rather a third route, fraught with difficulties, dangers and uncertainties. Of his tenacity there can be no doubt, but his motivation is not obviously clear. I think that we can do best by looking at his statements, especially during his repartee with the local notables or Qipchaq. Even before hand, he sends out an announcement that "Your sultan is still in power" as Yūnīnī and others put it.[58] The intention is clear: loyalty is to be rendered to the Mamluk sultan, even if he is far away. True, this loyalty appears to be conditional on the correct behavior, or at least the absence of overtly incorrect conduct. Arjuwāsh is reported to have said to Qipchaq relatively late in the siege: "O hypocrite, who is drawing close to the citadel? By God, even if my patron al-Malik al-Manṣūr (Qalāwūn) drew close, he would have received an arrow in the breast. Tell Ghāzān to come forth so to see what will happen to him."[59] Yet it would seem that this statement is a rhetorical devise to emphasize his resolve in the face of Mongol threats, Mamluk traitors and local dithering. I doubt whether Arjuwāsh really thought that his *ustādh*

rary; and, third, Ibn Kathīr had been a student of Ibn Taymiyya and was greatly influenced by him (see *EI²*, vol. III, 817b). He may have thus been hoping thus to portray Ibn Taymiyya's behavior during the Mongol occupation in a more positive manner. It is possible that Ibn Taymiyya is himself the source of this account.

[57] Between *khushdāshiyya* (plural of *khushdāsh*), mamluks of the same patron, there was a bond of loyalty, at least in principle. See D. Ayalon, "Mamlūk," *EI²*, vol. VI, 314a.

[58] Other sources write: "Your sultan is the ruler of Egypt."

[59] ʿAynī, vol. IV, 42.

(patron) Qalāwūn would have done anything like calling on him to surrender to the Mongols.

Arjuwāsh's use of terminology is interesting and probably not a coincidence. In his first parley with the Damascene notables he states that Qipchaq *et alia* are "lying hypocrites, that are traitors to the Muslims, who have surrendered the city to the enemy."[60] *Munāfiqūn* is, of course, an emotionally packed word. The falseness of Qipchaq's and his associates' loyalty to Islam—or at least the lack of full commitment—is contrasted to that of Arjuwāsh, willing to fight the enemy, who in spite of his recent embarrassment of Islam does not even rate the name *munāfiq*.

We see then that two motives have combined here: loyalty to the Sultan, and perhaps by extension, the Mamluk state which he led; and, willingness to fight the enemy in the name of Islam. As a corollary, there is no truck with backsliders and those who were faint of heart. Sultan and Islam (and the Muslims in an abstract way) appear as two of the foci of the loyalty of this mid-ranking Mamluk officer, who was willing to wager all in their name. An even cursory look at the events surrounding Wādī al-Khaznadār clearly shows that not all Mamluk officers and troopers were cut from the same cloth as Arjuwāsh (but he was not alone in the Citadel either). But between a willingness to fight to the end for ideals, and a total lack of principles and ideology there is a large distance. I am suggesting that Arjuwāsh's attitude, albeit extreme, was somehow representative of Mamluk identity, or rather the identity of many of the Mamluks, at least in principle.

Principles are all well and good, but they become much more readily applicable when backed up by force, or at least the hope of such. Arjuwāsh and his companions may have been alone up in the citadel, but they were not completely cut off. Mention has been made of a message which he received early on from Gaza, telling that the Mamluks had regrouped there, and even defeated a Mongol advanced force. This may have been nothing more than wishful thinking on the part of the Mamluk authorities, but it seems to have succeeded in raising Arjuwāsh's spirits. More important may have been subsequent messages which he may well have received. Baybars al-Manṣūrī, who was stationed at Ṣāliḥiyya in Egypt with a Mamluk

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[60] Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 106.

advanced force, writes that secret couriers (*quṣṣād*) were sent out to the commanders of the fortresses in Syria with messages encouraging them and reporting that the Mamluk army was organizing to return to Syria. This, according to our source, emboldened the commanders, and thus not one fortress—including the citadel of Damascus we might add—fell during the entire period of Mongol occupation.[61]

The interplay of resolution, personal capabilities, ineffectual attacks and the knowledge that help was on the way combined to enable Arjuwāsh to hold out in the citadel until the last of the Mongols left Damascus in March 1300.

Another example shows the complexity of loyalties among high ranking Mamluks. This is the story of Qipchaq, whose earlier history has already been reviewed, and whose actions in Damascus during the Mongol occupation have been briefly alluded to. During much of the Mongol period, Qipchaq acted as a sort of commissar *cum* ombudsman: on one hand representing the Mongols to the local population, and on the other hand, trying to mitigate some of the more drastic measures adopted by the Mongols. Certainly, as a former governor of Damascus and of Mongol origin, he was apparently well suited to this job. We find him trying to convince Arjuwāsh to surrender the citadel, to absolutely no effect as has been seen. He collects money from the local population for the Mongols, but here and there makes an effort to restrain Mongol avarice.[62] In other words, he is the "human face" of the Mongol occupation. On the whole, however, it cannot be stated that he was particularly successful in this role, if the actual suffering of the local population is any indication.

With the withdrawal of Ghāzān from Damascus in early February, he is appointed governor of Damascus, as is Bektemür al-Silādār of Aleppo; and Elbegi of the coastal region.[63] This arrangement, however, was under the clear tutelage of the Mongol commander Quṭlugh-Shāh. The last mentioned withdrew from Damascus with part of the Mongol army less than a month later, and he was followed by Mulai (also called Bulai)—who had led the Mongol forces raiding in Palestine—with the remaining Mongols. Around this time Ibn Taymiyya

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[61] Baybars, *Zubda*, 344–5.
[62] Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 106–25, *passim*.
[63] Ghāzān's *farmān* to Qipchaq making him governor is found in Baybars, *Zubda*, 340–1.

met with this officer in order to negotiate the release of prisoners.[64] Baybars al-Manṣūrī reports that Qipchaq may have encouraged Quṭlugh-Shāh's withdrawal with a timely gift of a large sum of money.[65] What is significant, to my mind, is that Qipchaq himself did not return to the east. There are reports that he even briefly displayed some of the signs of sovereignty,[66] perhaps indicating that he toyed with the idea of some type of local rule along the lines attempted earlier by Sanjar al-Ḥalabī (1260) and Sonqor al-Ashqar (1279).[67] Whatever Qipchaq's local aspirations, they were soon abandoned, and he and his comrades left Damascus in early April 1300 to meet the Mamluk army then making its way into Palestine.[68]

No explicit evidence has come down to us to explain Qipchaq's actions, so I admit that the following may be somewhat speculative. One could ask, what was to prevent him from accompanying Quṭlugh-Shāh or Mulai back across the Euphrates and continuing to enjoy the *dolce vita* with the Mongols, where he had family and even a new wife? At the same time, was he not heading back to reproach, punishment and even death at the hands of his former Mamluk peers? One initial thought, perhaps a little tongue in cheek, is that Qipchaq's brief stay in the Īlkhānate had shown him that life at the *ordo* could be even rougher and less secure than that in the upper echelons of Mamluk society.

The answer, however, is to be found elsewhere.[69] Qipchaq had decided to throw in his lot with his Mamluk comrades. In spite of his Mongol origins, family ties and the fine treatment which he had received from the Īlkhān, Qipchaq's Mamluk loyalties were to predominate in the long run. It is difficult to say which component or components of these "Mamluk" loyalties were the most decisive: was

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[64] Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 125; at this time Ibn Taymiyya had a "wide ranging discussion" (Li Guo's translation) about Islam with this Mongol general.

[65] Baybars, *Zubda*, 345.

[66] Ibn al-Dawādārī, vol. IX, 63; Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 122; see the editor's comments on vol. I, 161, note 322.

[67] Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages*, 45, 63; Northrup, *From Slave to Sultan*, 92–3.

[68] Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 125.

[69] These ideas were first briefly expressed in R. Amitai-Preiss, "Northern Syria between the Mongols and Mamluks: Political Boundary, Military Frontier and Ethnic Affinity," in N. Standen and D. Power (eds.), *Frontiers in Question: Eurasian Borderlands c. 700–1700* (London, 1999), 147–48.

it fidelity to the Sultan, to his Mamluk comrades, to Islam as rep-
resented by the Sultanate, or perhaps longing for his family in Syria?
Or perhaps it was to the whole structure of "Mamlukdom," the com-
plex of identities and loyalties which had been inculcated since his
youth which overcame any residual loyalty to the Mongols due to
birth and family connections?

The behavior of both Arjuwāsh and Qipchaq during the above-
described events each show in its own way an underlying commit-
ment to certain ideals, which can be called "Mamluk ideology,"
combining on one hand vague principles of loyaty to the sultan as
well as to the Muslim faith, with notions of fidelity to comrades—
primarily *khushdāshiyya*—and family. One is reminded of a formula-
tion by Robert Irwin, where Mamluks, albeit the Mu'ayyadīs of the
fifteenth century, operated "within a single ideology, a one party
state, whose leader is the Sultan and whose ideology is Islam."[70] This
seems to apply equally to the Mamluk Sultanate in the "heroic age."
Further research may yet reveal that other ideals were also held by
members of the Mamluk elite at this time.

Of course, loyalty would go only so far, without some knowledge
how his return to the Mamluk fold would be received. Feelers had
been sent out before the actual meeting took place, even before
Qipchap even left Damascus. There are indications that the senior
amirs were not of one mind about receiving him, but eventually
decided to absolve him.[71] Qipchaq and company met with Salār and
Baybars al-Jāshnakīr on their way to Damascus. The former suffered
a certain admonishment, but considering their ostensibly traitorous
activities, they got off rather easy: He and his companions were sent
off to the Sultan, camped not far from Cairo, and were well received.[72]
Qipchap himself was sent off to the governorship of Shawbak, and
subsequently played a certian role in Mamluk affairs.[73] One might
have expected that he would have received a harsher treatment.[74]

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[70] R. Irwin, "Factions in Medieval Egypt," *JRAS*, 1986, 237; see the discussion
on 235–37.

[71] Ṣafadī, vol. VIII, 184; Abū al-Fidā', vol. IV, 43.

[72] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, vol. VIII, 129.

[73] Ṣafadī, vol. VIII, 184.

[74] For the harsh punishment—including execution—of local collaborators with
the Mongols, see Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 129. These collaborators included both non-
Muslims and some Muslim notables.

How can we explain the relative equanimity of the Mamluk elite
to Qipchaq at this stage? I think it derives from two reasons. The
first is the understanding that he and his companions had fled to
the Īlkhānate under duress: Sultan Lāchīn and his viceroy Mengü-
temür had unjustifiably persecuted these officers, and they had no
choice but to flee for their lives. This understanding of Qipchap's
actions is seen by the attempts to return him to the Mamluk fold
immediately after that Sultan's assassination (but to no avail). When
he had met the senior Mamluk amirs after the Mongol occupation,
they further admonished him for his contribution to Ghāzān's cam-
paigns. He was able to extradite himself by saying that he had no
alternative, given what Lāchīn had attempted to do to him.[75] The
second reason is that Qipchaq appears to have been playing a dou-
ble game all along. We have seen that the Armenian historian Het'um
accused Qipchaq of secret contacts with the Mamluks early on, and
this contributed to Ghāzān's initial difficulties at Wādī al-Khaznadār.
This may be taking things too far, but there appears to be a whiff
of truth in this. Qipchaq himself says he tried to maneuver Ghāzān
during the battle for the advantage of the Mamluks. Baybars al-
Manṣūrī, who certainly was in a position to know, reports that
Qipchaq bribed Quṭlugh-Shāh to encourage him to leave Damascus.
Finally, there is a particularly important piece of evidence transmit-
ted by al-Ṣafadī: "He secretly communicated (*yubāṭinu*) to Arjuwāsh
not to surrender the citadel."[76]

   Thus, to the mind of the Mamluk elite, Qipchaq was not such a
bad fellow, and he could thus be taken back into the fold and reha-
bilitated, albeit he would not return to the high position which he
had previously held. In other words, the Mamluk grandees recog-
nized the prevailing nature of Qipchaq's Mamluk loyalties and the
secondary characteristics of his ties to the Mongols.

   And what of Arjuwāsh, the true hero of this story? With the with-
drawal of the Mongols and Qipchaq's departure to the south, he
did his best to restore order until the arrival of Mamluk forces.[77]
Meeting Salār and Baybars al-Jāshnakīr and the other senior amirs
when they arrived at Damascus, he was praised for his actions, given

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[75] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, vol. VIII, 129.
[76] Ṣafadī, vol. XXIV, 183.
[77] Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 125–26.

a robe of honor and reinstated in his command of the citadel.[78] With
this, he drops out of the limelight and high Mamluk politics, and is
mentioned again only at his death at the end of 701 (summer of
1302). In many ways, he had saved the honor and perhaps more of
the Mamluk Sultanate in 1299–1300, but he was now shunted aside
and forgotten. One might use this as an opportunity to mediate on
the nature of fame and real achievement, as opposed to opportunism
and posturing, and not only in the Mamluk Sultanate.

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[78] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, vol. VIII, 130. Neither Yūnīnī nor Baybars al-Manṣūrī men-
tion Arjuwāsh's reception by the Mamluk commanders, indicative how unimpor-
tant this was in the eyes of the Mamluk elite.

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PART TWO

MAMLUK ARCHIVAL EVIDENCE

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GLIMPSES OF PROVINCIAL MAMLUK SOCIETY FROM THE DOCUMENTS OF THE ḤARAM AL-SHARĪF IN JERUSALEM

Donald S. Richards

As is well recognized, our view of Mamluk society and institutions is mostly an indirect one, mediated to us by literary sources. We lack large quantities of archival material in brute form. Most of our information has passed through a selective and re-shaping process. Furthermore, such collections as are extant largely represent the non-Muslim *dhimmī* communities. That is why the documents now generally known as the Ḥaram documents are so important.[1] With particular concentration on a range of years towards the end of the 14th century A.D. they offer a broad picture of social, economic and cultural life in a minor but also special part of the Mamluk state, Jerusalem. What is more, the picture is not confined, as the literary sources so often are, to the higher echelons of society but illuminates lower levels. The people of whom we catch a glimpse in the Ḥaram documents do not generally leave any trace elsewhere, although two of those whom we shall mention were connected with individuals known through the major literary sources.

The documents which provide the bulk of the collection are those which in a small variety of forms give notification of a death and list the effects of the deceased or which list a person's effects during an illness and apprehension of death, or which are concerned with the appointment of executors (sing. *waṣīy*). (For present purposes I am not interested in the formal differences in the documents but in the general subject matter they cover.) Testamentary bequests are often specified as are the identities and relationships of heirs. It is generally accepted that, apart from any quite natural desire to

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have such matters clearly and legally stated for family or internal
purposes, one aim from the authorities' point of view was to estab-
lish whatever rights the public Treasury (*bayt al-māl*) might have had
as an inheritor of last resort. However, in none of the small selec-
tion I have looked at is the *bayt al-māl* expressly named as an "heir"
although it is in others in the whole collection.

These inventories and allied documents have been very usefully
studied in bulk for a broad picture by Huda Lutfi.[2] There is still
scope, I hope, to look at a small group in greater detail and I have
isolated a small number (fourteen in all). The persons who feature
in these appear to belong to what I believe can be characterised as
"Mamluk society" in the widest sense. They do so by the nature of
their service, by their affiliation, kinship or marital status. To what
extent this view is justified will become clear later. Not all the indi-
viduals had an essential association with Jerusalem, as it is often the
case that people who appear in the Ḥaram inventories were visiting
or passing through Jerusalem when illness or death struck them.
However, the non-residents of Jerusalem among the fourteen are
generally associated with Syria or Palestine and do not represent the
centre at Cairo. One of the strengths of the Ḥaram documents is
that they provide a corrective to the Egyptian bias of so many Mamluk
sources and studies.

I am certainly not going to pretend that a selection of fourteen
documents will provide a meaningful statistical basis. In the long run
not even the whole collection does that. As has been stressed before,
the collection is not a complete and organised archive but a mass
of random survivors and therefore at its best it is suggestive and illu-
minatory—and that is the way in which I approach this selection.

The documents in question are the following: nos. 56, 141, 193,
242, 256, 284, 331, 411, 525, 533, 540, 544, 593 and 757. All
remain unedited, as far as I am aware, except for no. 331, which
has been published by Kāmil al-ʿAsalī.[3] Their dates fall between
Shawwāl 793 and Ṣafar 797, that is, September 1391 and December
1394, a period of a little over three years. As it happens, not one
falls in 1392. Of those we may call the "principals" in the docu-

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[2] Huda Lutfi, *al-Quds al-mamlūkiyya. A History of Mamlūk Jerusalem based on the Ḥaram documents*, Berlin, 1985.

[3] K.J. al-ʿAsalī, *Wathāʾiq maqdisiyya taʾrīkhiyya*, Beirut, 1985, vol. II, 59–60.

ments nine were male (three of them already deceased) and five female. None of the females had yet died when the documents were drawn up.

Who were the individuals we are concerned with and why are we connecting them with Mamluk society, even in the broadest possible definition? Amongst the men, firstly, only two principals are qualified as *al-amīr*. Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Salā (no. 256) is described as *al-amīr al-kabīr*. Normally a resident of Damascus, he is here said to be ill in a stable block (*isṭabl*) of someone or something illegible in Jerusalem. Even if the title "amir" is an inflation, a mere courtesy, the further information is given that he was the *ustādār* of Āqbulāṭ, one of the amirs of Damascus. His wife, Asin, was at home in Damascus with their two sons, Muḥammad and Aḥmad.

Otherwise, name and *nisba* and mention of a manumitter may serve as a good indication. We have a Sayf al-Dīn Tulaktimur b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Manjakī (no. 525). One would love to think that this man was a freedman of the famous Manjak, who had connections with Damascus. However, two daughters (Umm ʿUmar and Umm Faraj), resident in Damascus, are said to be the heirs of his deceased *muʿtiq* and the well-known Manjak had sons. The *nisba* al-Manjakī appears again in the name (Arghūn b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Manjakī) of the husband of the Ḥājj Malik who is the subject of no. 56.

Alṭunbughā b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Shihābī (no. 533) was probably a mamluk in legal status but whether he was a military man is perhaps doubtful as his manumitter is named as the Shaykh Fūlādh. No. 544 gives us an ʿIzz al-Dīn Aybak al-Ḥusāmī and no. 593 a Quṭlūbughā b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Damurdāshī, who had been the husband of Sitt al-ʿAysh, herself, as it happens, a daughter of *al-amīr al-ajall* ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn ʿAlī b. ʿUthmān b. Bakhtiyār, whose *iqrār* (dated in Rajab 795/May 1393), made during an illness, constitutes no. 193. The latter served as a member of the Ḥalqa in Damascus. His wife, Sutayt, was made his executor under the oversight (*naẓar*) of an Amir Mubārak Shāh b. ʿAbd Allāh.

No. 331 contains legal arrangements in the event of death made by, as ʿAsalī has it, a Sayf al-Dīn Qabaqjī b. ʿAbd Allāh. The personal name has probably not been correctly read in my view but no alternative springs to mind.[4] Nevertheless, he had connections

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[4] Little, *A Catalogue*, 232, gives (in Arabic script) ṣ-ṣ-ḥ-y.

with past great men in that his detailed and involved *nisba* shows
him to have been a freedman of the Amir Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad
b. Baktimur al-Sāqī, who along with his father had been high in
the favour of al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad and then fell cata-
strophically.

Of the two remaining men, the nature of one, called Yalbughā
b. ʿAbd Allāh, must remain in question, at least until the details of
his quite extensive inventory (no. 284) can be made to give a clue.
In no. 540 we meet Urunbughā b. ʿAbd Allāh, known as al-Ḥājj
Mūsā, who died in the *zāwiya* of Muḥammad Beg.[5] He was the
freedman of the deceased Amir Sayf al-Dīn Yalbughā al-Khāṣṣakī,
whom it is tempting to identify with the amir who was the effective
ruler of the state until he was killed in 768/1366. The money from
the sale of Urunbughā's effects was received by Ṭaybughā b. ʿAbd
Allāh in the presence of other officials. This ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Ṭaybughā[6]
was *raʾs nawba* of Shihāb al-Dīn b. Yalbughā al-ʿUmarī and acting
as his agent (*wakīl*). It is equally tempting to take it that only one
Yalbughā is involved, i.e. Yalbughā al-ʿUmarī al-Khāṣṣakī, who indeed
did have a son Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad. This son was *amīr majlis* in
791/1389[7] and died in Shaʿbān 802/April 1400.[8] If this identification
is correct, then Shihāb al-Dīn received the proceeds of the estate as
Urunbughā's heir, being the son of Urunbughā's deceased *muʿtiq*.

We now come to the women, the better half of Mamluk society,
associated with it as daughters and wives, or as both. We have
already met Ḥājj Malik bint al-Sayfī. . . . (?), who was the wife of
Arghūn al-Manjakī (no. 56). In no. 141 a Bint ʿAbd Allāh al-Turkiyya
(her given name is illegible) was ill in the Bāb Ḥiṭṭa quarter. She
was wife to *al-amīr al-kabīr* Ṭulbughā al-Qashtimūrī. A comparable
case is that of Quṭlūmalik bint Yāllū b. ʿAbd Allāh (no. 757), who
was the wife of *al-amīr al-kabīr* Sayf al-Dīn Qarābughā al-Ruknī, in
the service of (*min aṣḥāb . . .*) a one-time *nāʾib* of Jerusalem, Sayf al-

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[5] A summary from Ḥaram no. 643 of the three *waqfiyya*s (dated 748–754/1348–53)
of Amir Muḥammad Beg b. Zakariyyāʾ's foundation is in M. Burgoyne and D.S.
Richards, *Mamluk Jerusalem*, British School of Archaeology in Jerusalem, 1987, p. 72b.
[6] See Ḥaram, no. 331 and ʿAsalī, *Wathāʾiq maqdisiyya taʾrīkhiyya*, vol. II, 37–39.
[7] Ibn Taghribirdī, Yūsuf Abū al-Maḥāsin, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī mulūk Miṣr waʾl-
Qāhira*, Cairo, 1930–72, vol. XI, 280.
[8] Al-Sakhāwī, Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, *al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ li-ahl al-Qarn al-
tāsiʿ*, Cairo, 1353–5 A.H., vol. II, 246.

Dīn Jantimur.[9] In no. 411 the principal is an Armenian woman, Yāsmīn bint ʿAbd Allāh, whose *muʿtiq* was an Amir ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn ʿAlī al-Ḥalabī. The last of the women is a Khadīja bint Muḥyī al-Dīn b. Shihāb al-Dīn (no. 242), "weak [and ill] in the Ribāṭ of Sallār", whose interest for us arises from the fact that her husband, Zayn al-Dīn Ṣadaqa b. Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ʿAlam al-Dīn Sulaymān, is described as the *naqīb al-ṭulb* in the service of the *nāʾib* of Jerusalem Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Yaghmūrī. To the best of my understanding this would mean that the husband was an officer of the *nāʾib*'s personal body of troops,[10] responsible for their marshalling and discipline. It should be noted that the woman Khadīja herself is said to be known as "*bint naqīb al-zayt . . .*",[11] but the significance of this escapes me.

Out of the fourteen principals three name no spouse: Alṭunbughā (no. 533) and Urunbughā (no. 540) and the Armenian Yāsmīn (no. 411). There are no children to inherit, so in these cases, as there are no agnate or collateral relatives, the manumitter or, if deceased, the children of the same, may be named as heirs. Of the remaining eleven persons, as halves of couples, five have no offspring to name among their heirs and in these cases children of the *muʿtiq* are again mentioned alongside the spouse and, in two instances, brothers. Children are distributed as follows: no. 56—one son (Amīr ʿAlī), no. 256—two sons, no. 284—three sons and one daughter (the latter absent in Damascus), no. 544—three sons, no. 595—a son and a daughter, and no. 193—four sons and four daughters. For what it is worth, the average number of children per couple was 1.27. It is as well to remember, when thinking of apparent single status and also lack of children in a marriage, that hardly anywhere in the Ḥaram documents is there any indication of a person's age.

Potentially the interest of these document resides in the detail of the inventories, although I have to admit that they are a little less interesting than I hoped. Those that designate executors do not deal

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[9] It would be rash to suggest that Quṭlūmalik was the daughter of the Yallū, who had himself been *nāʾib* of Jerusalem. A Yallū was given an appointment in Damascus in 798/1394 and is described as "a former *nāʾib* of Jerusalem" (*Taʾrīkh Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba*, ed. ʿAdnan Darwish, Damascus, 1977, vol. I, 574). He is perhaps behind the Bulūwā in Little, *A Catalogue*, see index, 434.

[10] Note that I read *ṭulb* and not *ṭalab* (Little, *A Catalogue*, 89).

[11] Little (*loc. cit.*) fills this gap with ". . . al-Maġribī (?)".

with property details and in those cases the interest lies in the family details or the affiliations. It should also be remembered, as mentioned already, that some persons involved were not permanent residents of Jerusalem and therefore their full possessions are not represented.

Two documents record the sale of effects and therefore give monetary values in dirhams. Qutlūbughā's property (no. 593) was sold for 4,783 dirhams and that is property that was expressly "at Jerusalem in particular (*khāṣṣatan*)". It included a quantity of wheat and a horse. Against the latter is written "in the name of Sayf al-Dīn Abū Bakr al-Dawādārī", the significance of which is not immediately clear, unless it indicates the purchaser. The Amir Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Salā, normally resident in Damascus (see no. 256), had two horses (*farasayn ikdīshayn*) with him in Jerusalem. Qutlūbughā, apart from personal apparel, had other typical equipment, which included a saddle, boots, spurs, sword, quiver and arrows. It is of course gratifying actually to find weapons in the belongings of several principals, whom we are interpreting as members of the military society. Oddly, in the case of Qutlūbughā I can see no mention of a bow but bows appear in other lists. Our member of the Damascus *ḥalqa*, 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Alī b. 'Uthmān b. Bakhtiyār (no. 193) had with him a bow, a leather quiver (called *tarkash burghālī*, otherwise *bulghārī*), arrows and a mace (*dabbūs*). From Qutlūbughā's 4,783 dirhams a large proportion (1,375) was deducted for administrative expenses (quite a lot for the storing and brokering of the wheat) and for funeral expenses, including "readings of the Koran and cost of food according to the contents of his *waṣiyya*." The last are items regularly found. This left 3,408 for his heirs. His wife received her eighth or 3/24 (that is, 426 dirhams) and his son, *al-amīr al-ajall* Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad got 1996 dirhams (i.e. 14/24) and his daughter Baykhātūn 986 (i.e. 7/24).

The other *makhzūma* (sale of effects) is no. 540. Unfortunately in this document the items sold from the estate of Urunbughā are not specified and the global sum was only 425 dirhams, from which thirty-seven were deducted for administrative expenses. This left 388 dirhams, which, as we have said, perhaps went to the treasury.

One notable feature is the provision made for freedmen and freedwomen through bequests or through their being named amongst the heirs as part of an "extended" family. The woman Ḥājj Malik, wife of Arghūn al-Manjakī, set out her bequests in document no. 56. Her

heirs were her husband and her son, Amīr ʿAlī. However, she made bequests to various people she had freed and to Bulāṭ, her son's *lāla*, which totalled 8,300 dirhams. Since no more than a third of an estate can be given in bequests, this means that the minimum value of her whole estate was 24,900 dirhams. In document no. 544 ʿIzz al-Dīn Aybak al-Ḥusāmī bequeathed 1000 dirhams to a freedwoman Qamarī, 500 to his freedman Sunqur and 100 to the latter's wife Ṭughāy, which makes 1,600 dirhams altogether.

The inventory (no. 242) of the woman whose husband was *naqīb al-ṭulb* for the *nāʾib* of Jerusalem, provides a rather full list of apparel and other effects, if only all could be reliably deciphered and identified. A gold object of some sort, weighing six *mithqāl*s, was on pawn (*marhūna*) with a woman and it was her will that a ten year-old slave girl called Mubāraka should be freed after her death and that 400 dirhams should be held by the Shāfiʿī Qāḍī to pay for a surrogate *Ḥajj* performed for her benefit.

In the document published by ʿAsalī (no. 331) the person who is making the *waṣiyya*, himself described as *al-amīr al-kabīr*, appointed three people as his executors, the Amir Shihāb al-Dīn Khanjar, a Shaykh ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn, a servitor at the shrine of Moses (*khādim sayyidnā Mūsā*), and al-Qāḍī ʿAlam al-Dīn, who was the clerk (*dīwān*) of the testator's former master, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Baktimur al-Sāqī. In addition to the testator's wife, called Zumurrud and absent in Cairo, the two sons of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad are named as the legal heirs (again in the absence of other kin). Apart from an inventory of possessions, which has no surprises, the declaration is made that the testator has received his allowance (*murattab*) of fodder (*ʿalīq*) for the two preceding months from Shihāb al-Dīn Khanjar, one of his executors, and also from the same man his pay (*maʿlūm*), that is, 300 dirhams for one preceding month. In addition, and puzzlingly, he has also received his *jāmakiyya* (how is this different?) from another of his named executors, ʿAlam al-Dīn. That amounted to 360 dirhams for the current month. Can one perhaps guess that our man was on some official duty in Jerusalem? Or was it private business for the family of his *muʿtiq*?

In no. 525 we find Tulaktimur al-Manjakī ill in a house in the Jerusalem quarter of al-Ghawānima, a house which he had previously made a *waqf*. The house could therefore no longer be considered among his personal assets. Real estate is mentioned in only one other of these selected documents (no. 284, see below). There

the person involved must have been in rented accommodation, because, although he died *fī dār saknihi*, the property is not recorded as one of his assets. Amongst Tulaktimur's personal clothing, items of interest include "a black Turcoman fur", and two cotton *takhfīfa*s, the characteristic head-dress of a mamluk. He also has a bow, a quiver with arrows and a chest (*ṣundūq buqja*) containing 200 dirhams. All the household furnishings and chattels are said to be the property of his wife, as is the Abyssinian slave girl (a Muslim), called Nasīm, who was purchased by his wife's own money. Tulaktimur also had some interest in the *sūq al-khilaʿ* in Jerusalem (which is not fully understood) and was due the next two months' rent for a shop.

The Alṭunbughā b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Shihābī, whose background we queried as being a freedman of a Shaykh Fūlādh, was a military man to the extent that his inventory (no. 533) contained "a Damascened iron sword, a quiver with nineteen arrows and a bow." He also had to his credit *matājir* (commercial interests) in the villages of Bayt Unya and Bayt ʿArīk from his salary as *mushidd* (enforcer) over those two places (60 dirhams worth) and an allowance (*jirāya*). Does this mean that he had *matājir* because his salary was in kind and the cash value had to be realised or had he invested his salary in local undertakings?

The last person to consider is Yalbughā b. ʿAbd Allāh (no. 284), the one whose status is perhaps also in doubt. He lacks the affiliating *nisba* of the others. He died in his place of residence in Jerusalem (*dār saknihi*), given no precise location. His inventory stands out, firstly because he is the only man to have had, as it appears, two wives, neither of whom is named, and secondly because he possessed books. They comprise two Korans, a book of [dream] interpretation (*taʿbīr*), a Ḥadīth book, two books of sermons, a collection of *qiṣaṣ*, a book on eschatological signs (*malḥama*), a law book and another expressly on the Ḥanbalī *madhhab*, a book on arithmetic (*ḥisāb*), two miscellanies, and a book in Persian (*bi'l-ʿajamī*). He also had the following titles: *Riyāḍ al-ṣāliḥīn*,[12] *Sayf al-mulūk*,[13] *Mukhtaṣar al-taysīr*, *Faḍāʾil al-Quds*[14]

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[12] Probably the work by al-Nawawī (631–676/1233–1278), see C. Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*, Leiden, 1943–9, vol. I, 397.

[13] The document date rules out the *Sayf al-mulūk wa'l-ḥukkām* of al-Kāfiyajī (788/879/1386–1474), see Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*, vol. II, 138ff. & Suppl. II, 141.

[14] Perhaps this is the work of Ibn al-Jawzī (510–597/1116–1200), see Brocklemann, *op. cit.*, vol. I, 506 and Suppl. I, 920.

and *Kashf al-asrār*.[15] The list of his effects, much of which is obscure (as is the case with all the documents considered), mentions some other intriguing items. He seems to have owned some sort of time-piece (*ālāt li-maʿrifat al-waqt*) and *arbaʿa shukhūṣ dhahab miṣrī*, which I initially took to be, rather unusually, four gold figurines but, as has been suggested to me, possibly means four Egyptian gold coins.

There follows the transcription of document no. 593, as complete as it can be made at the present, and a reproduction of the original text. *Siyāqa* numerals do present problems, despite many years of struggling to decipher them. I am confident about the numerals for the main figures, that is the total value of the estate, the total of the deductions and then the residue to be distributed among the heirs and its detailed breakdown, especially as one can apply arithmetic based on the Koranic shares. However, the details of the deductions, as I have read them, cannot be reconciled with the stated total. The fact that some items cannot be deciphered is an obstacle. A very useful note by Little on Mamluk *siyāqa* should be consulted.[16]

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[15] There are several titles that begin thus, see Brockelmann, *op. cit.*, Suppl. III, Index, 935.

[16] D.P. Little, "Documents related to the estates of a merchant and his wife in late fourteenth century Jerusalem," *MSR*, vol. II, 1998, 93–193. See Appendix B: Notes on the Mamluk *siyāqah*, 178–80.

Verso:

٠١. وصار المـاصل بعد ذلك للورثة   ٣٤٠٨

٠٢. يخص الزوجة بحق الثمن مما تسلمته بحضرة شهوده ٤٢٦

٠٣. يخص اليتيمين الباقى مما تسلمه الوصي المذكور بحضرة شهوده ٢٩٨٢

٠٤. احمد الذكر ١٩٨٨ بيخاتون الانثى [٩٤]٩

٠٥. (   )

٠٦. ان شا الله تعالى

٠٧. الحمد لله رب العالمين وصلى الله على محمد واله وصحبه وسلم

٠٨. حسبنا الله ونهم الوكيل

a) far left

٠١. مخزومة

٠٢. بما تحصل من تركة المرحوم قطلوبغا

٠٣. المخلفة بالقدس الشريف خاصة

٠٤. فى مدة اخرها تاسع عشر المحرم سنة اربع وتسعين وسبعماية

b) written vertically:

٠١. حضرت بيع ذلك على ما شرح فيه وشهدت

٠٢. على (المعين بقبضه؟)

٠٣. وكتبه على بن حسن(؟) [ ] [

٠١. حضرت

٠٢. بيع ذلك على ما شرح فيه وشهدت

٠٣. على الوصى بقبض ما عين باطنا

٠٣. كتبه عبد الله [[

٠١. حضرت

٠٢. بيع ذلك على ما شرح فيه

٠٣. وشهدت على الوصى بقبض

٠٤. ما عين باطنها

٠٥. كتبه خليل بن موسى

٠١. حضرت

٠٢. بيع ذلك علي ما شرح فيه

٠٣. وشهدت على الوصى بتسلم ما [[

٠٤. كتبه [ ] الشافعى

Recto:

١. بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وهو حسبي وكفى وصلوته علي سيدنا محمد وصحبه وسلامه

٢. مخزومة

٣. بما تحصل من ثمن تركة المرحوم قطلوبغا ابن عبد الله الدمرداشى

٤. المخلفة عنه بمدينة القدس الشريف خاصة المتوفي بالقدس الشريف

٥. الي رحمة الله تعالي في يوم عرفة المبارك سنة ثلاث وتسعين وسبعماية

٦. المباع ذلك بعد وفاته في تواريخ اخرها يوم تاريخه

٧. المنحصر ارثه في زوجته ست العيش بنت الامير الاجل

٨. علا الدين علي بن عثمان بن بختيار الوصى علي الايتام الاتي

٩. ذكرهما والمربيٰ وولديه من الزوجة المذكورة وهما الامير الاجل

١٠. شهاب الدين احمد وبيخاتون مما تولي بيع ذلك خلا القمح

١١. الوصي المذكور وللقمح امين الحكم العزيز بالقدس الشريف

١٢. في مدة اخرها تاسع عشر شهر الله المحرم الحرام عام اربعة وتسعين وسبعماية

١٣. [   ] [   ] من الدراهم   ٤٧٨٣+٣/٤

١٤. بيعات قمح   ٣٧٩٦   بيعة [   ]   ٢٠ [

١٥. [   ]

١٦. فرس باسم سيف الدين ابى بكر الدواداى   ٤٥٠   سيف باسم [١٠٥

١٧. كبـر   ٢٢+١/٢   قبا سلارى عتيق   ١٩

١٨. كـبر ايضا   ٢٢+١/٢   ملوطة بيضا عتيقة   ١٠

١٩. ملوطة بيضا ايضا   ١٠   خلق [٣٦ [

١. جبة اخضر صوف عتيق   ٢٧+١/٢   خف ومهماز ومشامة(؟)   ٣٠

٢. شاش عتيق دشت   ٧+١/٤   سروال وطاقة   ٧

٣. خلق قبا جوخ بوجهين   ٣٠   سرج كامل برغالى عتيق   ٢٤

٤. تركاش ونشاب   ٣١   سفرة جلد   ٥

٥. انصرف

٦. من ذلك فيما يذكر بحضرة شهوده   ١٣٧٥

٧. اجرة دلالى القمح وسمسارة الفرس والقماش   ٣١

اجرة تخزن القمح [   ] ونسخ الوصية ٥٦

٨. اجرة صيرفى ٤   اجرة قاصد الي الوصي [   ] وحق ٣٥

٩. اجرة شهود بيعة(؟) قمح ٦   فى ثمن كفن ومونة التجهيز ٦٤

١٠. في عمل ختمات وثمن طعام حسبما تضمن كتاب وصية صرفه بالقدس الشريف ٤٠٠

عوض عن موخر صداقه وحق النايب(؟) [   ] حسبما تضمن الوصية ٦٢٠

قرا ٤

ثمن طعام بقية ذلك ١

مصارفه عن ذهب ٣١

فى (   ) الوصى ٣٦

بحضور شاهد [   ] ٣٢٤

Haram no. 593, verso

Haram no. 593, recto

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE RECOVERY OF MAMLUK CHANCERY DOCUMENTS IN AN UNSUSPECTED PLACE

Frédéric Bauden

I

The discovery of an unknown manuscript of al-Maqrīzī (d. 845/1441) has always to be considered as an important event. When it proves to be a specimen of his note-books, which necessarily implies that it is a holograph copy, it becomes even more exciting and fascinating.[1] Specialists of the history and historiography of Islam, particularly during the last decades, have considered the question of the working method of the medieval historians. Al-Maqrīzī's unpublished note-book represents a missing link between the moment when a historian hit upon the idea of writing a book and the final result, and so will help to fill a gap which hitherto has puzzled us.[2] The discovery is all the more important as the author acquired such a reputation that he is better known as *shaykh al-muʾarrikhīn.*

[1] The manuscript was discovered in the holdings of the library of the University of Liège/Belgium, where it is preserved under the shelf-mark 2232. For an accurate description of the contents of the manuscript and its history, see my "Maqriziana I. Discovery of an autograph manuscript of al-Maqrīzī. Towards a better understanding of his working method. Description: Part 1", *Mamlūk Studies Review* vol. VIII (2003) (to appear). The present writer is currently preparing a critical edition of this note-book, which should be published by the Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale in Cairo.

[2] This theme will be the subject of a paper to be presented at a conference on the legacy of the medieval Egyptian historian al-Maqrīzī, to be held at Notre Dame University on 29–30 September 2001. It should be published in the proceedings of this conference under the title "Maqriziana II. Discovery of an autograph manuscript of al-Maqrīzī. Towards a better understanding of his working method. Analysis".

Moreover, texts such as the manuscript in question shed new light
on matters which are only imperfectly known through other sources.
Some of the epitomes made by al-Maqrīzī as well as his notes pre-
serve the unique versions of texts which are otherwise lost, or, at
least, of which we had merely brief excerpts thanks to the quota-
tions of later historians, like al-Maqrīzī himself. These resurrected
texts finally deal with historical facts sometimes unknown. And so
any historian should be delighted when new data come to light as
a result of the discovery and analysis of texts such as that under
investigation here. However, the manuscript in itself, I mean as a
codex and in the frame of codicology, can bring us much more than
is conceivable.[3]

II

When I discovered the manuscript in question, I became deeply
intrigued by some inscriptions in larger characters than those of al-
Maqrīzī's script, sporadically written at different places on various
folios. These had nothing to do with al-Maqrīzī: on the pages where
such inscriptions appear, it is clear that he endeavored to fill in the
blanks, writing around them as closely as possible (see picture at the
end of this study). This demonstrates conclusively that the paper had
already been used for another purpose prior to al-Maqrīzī and that,
at some stage of its history, it was treated as, in effect, scribbling
paper. But what had this paper been before? After some time, it
became clear to me that the script was a chancery one, and that
therefore I had found fragments of chancery documents utilized by
al-Maqrīzī as scrap paper. It remained to be determined what kind
of documents these were (either *marsūm*, or *amān*, or *tawqīʿ*, or *man-
shūr*, or *ʿahd*, etc.) and to which period they belonged. As al-Maqrīzī
lived most of his life in Egypt, it seemed logical to surmise that they
were most likely issued by the Egyptian chancery. But from which

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[3] A codicological analysis of the manuscript has permitted me to understand its
internal organization and particularly how it was constituted with time by al-Maqrīzī.
The results were presented in a paper at the 3rd International Conference on
Palaeography and Codicology of Middle Eastern Manuscripts (Bologna, 4–6 October
2000) and will appear in the proceedings of the conference under the title "Maqriziana
IV: Le carnet de notes d'al-Maqrīzī: l'apport de la codicologie à une meilleure
compréhension de sa constitution", *Manuscripta orientalia* (to appear).

period: the Fāṭimid, Ayyūbid, or Mamluk? I was not at all sure, due to the complexity of the task, that I could reach a satisfying result, i.e., reconstruct a consistent text and afterwards date it exactly or even approximately.

III. *Method developed for the reconstruction of the documents*

First, it was necessary to put the manuscript back in order, on the basis of both textual analysis and external evidence. Quires were not at all in the right places; some folios that had become detached over time had been inserted at the wrong places. Once this chore was completed, it was still necessary to reconstruct the inscriptions. For this, I used a scanner which allowed me to put the beginning of each inscription appearing on a folio together with its end, which, of course, is not to be found on the immediately opposite leaf, but rather on the opposite leaf in the second half of the quire. I then produced a list of reconstructed sentences, which demonstrated that there are such inscriptions in only nine quires of the manuscript.[4]

At this stage, in order to reconstruct the text as coherently as possible, it was necessary to analyze the script. Of course, it was easier to discern various scripts once each line had been reconstructed. A thorough study of them led me to differentiate five distinct groups: nine lines for group I, twenty-one for group II, five for group III, five for group IV, and finally three for group V. It thus became easier to reconstruct each document, through comparison with examples in the preserved chancery manuals.[5] However this task could not have been successfully carried out without taking into account other important factors, such as the space left blank when the documents were originally written (in other words the size of the space between the lines), and also the width of the right margin.[6] As the

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[4] The ms. is composed of 21 quires.

[5] For the Mamluk period, these are: Ibn Nāẓir al-Jaysh, *Kitāb Tathqīf al-taʿrīf biʾl-muṣṭalaḥ al-sharīf*, R. Vesely (ed.), Cairo, 1987; Ibn Faḍl Allāh, Al-ʿUmarī Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā, *al-Taʿrīf biʾl-muṣṭalaḥ al-sharīf*; al-Qalqashandī, Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā fī ṣināʿat al-inshāʾ*, Cairo, 1913–1919.

[6] It is a well known fact that the space between two lines as well as the width of the right margin, which was left blank too, varied in chancery practice according to the importance of the person for whom the document was issued. See al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*, VI, p. 196.

original documents had been cut in smaller pieces of paper, it was necessary to be satisfied with the measurement of the space between the top edge of the leaf and that of the inscription, as well as that separating the bottom of the inscription from that of the leaf. These measurements have stood me in good stead for the reconstruction, since an average value could be established for each document. Any significant big discrepancy compared with this average value might indicate that the proposed ordering of the leaves was not the correct one; alternatively, I had to consider the possibility that there were sometimes lacunae and that some parts of a document were missing in the manuscript.[7]

Considering all these factors, my textual and physical analysis suggests that the following reconstruction is accurate.[8]

IV. *Reconstruction of the documents*

A. *Group I*

1. *Text*

(1) *al-majlis al-sāmī al-amīr al-ajall al-kabīr al-mujāhid* (2) *al-ghāzī al-muḥibbī al-mukhtār al-aʿazz al-akmal al-murtaḍā* (3) *ḥusām al-dīn majd al-islām bahāʾ al-anām nuṣrat al-mujāhidīn* (4) *[zayn al-qabāʾil . . . ʿumdat al-mulū]k [wa] al-[salā]ṭ[īn]* (5) *Bāligh ibn Yūsuf ibn [. . .]* (6) *jazīl hādhā al-isʿāf fa-li-dhālika kharaja al-amr* (7) *al-sharīf al-ʿālī al-mawlawī al-sulṭānī al-malakī* (8) *al-Ṣāliḥī al-ʿImādī lā bariḥa yuʿṭī jazīlan wa-yū[lī maʿrūfan?].*[9]

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[7] For instance, in group IV, the extreme values for the spacing between the lines are 12–13.8 cm. We could not imagine that the inscription on ff. 187b–1a would come after the one on ff. 188b–195b, just because the value obtained in this case would have been of 21.5 cm, which is completely inconsistent with the preceding extreme values.

[8] For reasons of space, only documents I, II and III are transcribed and analyzed in this paper. Documents IV and V are by far less consistent and could not be linked to a particular event, even though their contents gives some indications which permit us to guess why their were issued. The most interesting ones are indeed the first three documents which seem to be closely connected to the same historical fact, as I shall try to prove it. The texts of the five documents in Arabic characters will be found in the full version of this paper.

[9] Line 9 consists only in the article followed by a *kāf* and a *rāʾ*.

2. *Translation*

[When] (1) his eminence, the most splendid and the grand amir, the fighter, (2) the conqueror, the lover, the favorite, the mightiest, the most perfect, the appreciated, (3) the sword of the Faith, the glory of Islam, the splendor of mankind, the aid of the fighters, (4) [the ornament of the tribes, the support of the] Kings and the Sultans, (5) Bāligh b. Yūsuf ibn [. . .].

(6) [. . .] the abundance of this assistance, that is why the (7) noble and exalted order of our Lord, the Sultan, the King (8) al-Ṣāliḥ ʿImād [al-dīn]—he never ceases to give profusely and to [do favor?]—, was decreed (9) [. . .].

B. *Group II*

1. *Text*

(1) *wa-jaʿala ḥarama-nā al-ghālib manṣūran bi'l-muʾminīn min [. . .]* (2) *la-hu shahāda yazīd ikhlāṣuhā al-qulūb yaqīnan* (3) *wa-yahdī tikrāruhā ahl al-walāʾ ilā al-ʿamal al-nājiḥ [. . .]* (4) *wa-shayyada ṣallā Allāh ʿalayhi wa-ʿalā ālihi wa-ṣaḥbihi* (5) *alladhīna lam yazālū fī imtithāl amr Allāh wa-amrihi ʿalā* (6) *amr jāmiʿ wa-alladhīn qāmū bi-nuṣrat dīnihi fa-malaʾū bi-faḍlihim* (7) *al-qulūb wa-aqarrū al-ʿuyūn wa-shannafū al-masāmiʿ [. . .]* (8) *man hajara al-awṭān wa'l-awlād fī maḥabbat abwābinā al-sharīfa* (9) *bi-ḥamd al-surā fī ṣabāḥ al-najāḥ ūlāʾika lahum ʿuqbā [. . .]* (10) *udkhilū bāb man sajada [. . .]* (11) *[. . .] wa-lahum lisān al-ʿafw [. . .]* (12) *maʿāqid al-maʿāqil al-islāmiyya bi-ṭāʿat imām al-mahdiyyīn [. . .]* (13) *al-kabīr al-ghāzī al-naṣīr al-akmal al-muqaddam* (14) *al-awḥad al-naṣīr ḥusām al-dīn majd al-islām* (15) *bahāʾ al-anām zayn al-qabāʾil ʿumdat al-mulūk wa'l-salāṭīn* (16) *Bāligh ibn Yūsuf ibn Ṭayyiʾ—adāma Allāh taʿālā iqbālahu* (17) *huwa alladhī shahadha sayf al-naṣr wa-shahara [. . .]* (18) *wa-badhala nafsahu fī marāḍī Allāh wa-marāḍīnā al-sharīfa [. . .]* (19) *ʿal[ā] al-ṭāʿa min birrinā ḥazzahu wa-nūfiru [. . .]* (20) *fa-hājara li-abwābinā wa-li-awṭānihi hajara fa li-dhālika* (21) *kharaja al-amr al-sharīf al-ʿālī al-mawlawī [. . .]*

2. *Translation*

(1) [. . .] and He let triumph our victorious sacred precinct with the help of the believers from [. . .].

(2) [and we testify that there is no god but God alone, without associate, that] being a creed which, when faithfully observed, increases

the heart in certainty and, (3) when frequently uttered, guides those who are loyal to act successfully [. . .].

(4) [. . .] and he erected (?), God bless him, his family and his companions (5) who never ceased complying with God's command and his one [of the Prophet] on (6) a gathering matter,[10] and who attended to support His Faith, thus pleasing, (7) comforting and delighting their merit [. . .].

(8) [. . .] Those who abandon their homes and their children for the sake of our noble portals, (9) with patient endurance, those will be rewarded [. . .].

(10) [. . .] They were let in [through] the door of whom prostrate himself [. . .].

(11) [. . .] apologizing [. . .].

(12) [. . .] of the fortresses of Islam by obeying the leader of the rightly guided [. . .].

[When his eminence], (13) the most splendid and grand amir, the conqueror, the defender, the most perfect, the commander, (14) the unique, the supporter, the sword of the Faith, the glory of Islam, (15) the splendor of mankind, the ornament of the tribes, the support of the Kings and the Sultans, (16) Bāligh b. Yūsuf ibn Ṭayyi'—may God, how exalted He is!, make lasting his welfare—(17) was the one who whetted the sword of victory and unsheathed [the scimitar. . .].

(18) [. . .] and sacrificed himself for God's favors and our noble favors [. . .].

(19) [. . .] the obedience . . . his prosperity and we give abundantly [. . .].

(20) [. . .] Thus he emigrated to our portals and left behind him his home, (21) and that is why the noble and exalted order of our Lord, [. . .], was decreed [. . .].

C. *Group III*

1. *Text*

(1) *li-yuthbat bi-dīwān al-naẓar ʿalā al-mamlaka al-Karakiyya wa ʾl-Shawbakiyya in shāʾa Allāh taʿālā* (2) *uthbita al-ḥamd li-Allāh liʾl-mustaḥiqq al-ḥamd* (3) *akhṣaba li-awliyāʾ dawlatinā al-marām wa-aksa[ba] [. . .]* (4) *ṣallā Allāh*

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[10] Cf. Koran XXIV, 62.

ʿalayhi wa-ʿalā ālihi wa ṣaḥbihi alladhīna af[rada] (5) Allāh minhum al-sāda al-ghurr al-amjād wa [. . .] (6) wa-baʿdu fa-inna awlā man sajaʿat hamāʾim al-niʿam] [. . .] (7) mulḥid fa-mā ʿadala ʿan nuṣrat hādhā al-dīn wa-mā ḥa[basa ʿan?]

2. *Translation*

(1) Let it be registered in the Office of Supervision on the District of al-Karak and al-Shawbak, if God, how exalted He is!, wills.

(2) It has been registered, praise be to God! Praise be to Him who deserves it.

(3) He made the desire abundant for the friends of our state and let gain (?) [. . .].

(4) God bless him, his family and his companions from among whom (5) God set aside the generous and illustrious lords and [. . .].

(6) Now then, he who deserves the more that the doves of favors coo [for him . . .].

(7) [. . .] a heretic for he did not turn away from supporting the Faith and did not withhold from (?) [. . .].

V. *Analysis*

Let us now proceed to the analysis of these documents. Just a few lines have survived for the first document, but these nonetheless provide us with two titles. The first one is royal (ll. 7–8): *al-sulṭānī al-malakī al-ṣāliḥī al-ʿimadī*. The last two words are the only ones that can help us to identify the ruler. This ruler must have had as ruling name al-Ṣāliḥ and as *laqab* ʿImād al-dīn. In the complete list of all the rulers of Egypt, there were only two who bore these two elements: either the Ayyūbid al-Ṣāliḥ ʿImād al-dīn, who reigned from 635/1237 to 635/1238 and from 637/1239 to 643/1245,[11] or the Mamluk sultan Ismāʿīl, son of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn,[12] whose complete titulature was al-Sulṭān al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ ʿImād al-dīn Abū al-Fidāʾ Ismāʿīl.[13] He ruled only for three years, from

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[11] C.E. Bosworth, *The Islamic Dynasties*, Edinburgh, 1980, 59.
[12] *Ibid.*, 63.
[13] Al-Ṣafadī, Khalīl b. Aybak, *al-Wāfī biʾl-wafayāt*, J. Van Ess (ed.), Damascus-Wiesbaden, 1931–1983, vol. IX, 219–20.

743/1342 to 746/1345, the date of his death. Thus the first docu-
ment could be dated quite precisely to one of two periods. But to
which ruler did the text refer? For this, the document provides us
a major clue. In the chancery manuals, titles such as those found
in this document typically end with a name. On line 5 of the pre-
sent document, this name is almost illegible; yet we can barely deci-
pher the name "Ibn Yūsuf ibn". Here document II, for which
twenty-one lines are preserved, provides further evidence. We find
in ll. 13–16 almost the same royal titles as in document I, but this
time, the name is clearly legible: Bāligh b. Yūsuf b. Ṭayyiʾ. This
name is rarely attested in the sources. However, this same name
appears in some chronicles of the Mamluk period, during the reign
of the sultan Ismāʿīl.

   Before going further, we must study the political events that fol-
lowed al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's death, events soundly described as
"ceaseless power struggles".[14] Indeed, we remark that between al-
Nāṣir Muḥammad's death (741/1341) and 762/1361, no fewer than
eight of his sons succeeded him to the throne. Aḥmad, being twenty-
four years old in 742, was the eldest of his sons. His accession to
the throne followed the short reigns of two of his brothers: Abū Bakr
(twenty years old) and Kujuk (seven years old).[15] But unlike his two
brothers, Aḥmad was not merely a puppet in the hands of the emirs.
He had spent most of his life since the age of eight in al-Karak, fol-
lowing the customs of the local Bedouin, dressing himself like them
and hunting with them. Informed that he had been chosen as sul-

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[14] A. Levanoni, *A Turning point in Mamluk history: the third reign of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad
ibn Qalāwūn (1310–1341)*, Leiden, 1995, 81. The presentation of these events is
based on the following primary sources: al-Shujāʿī, Shams al-Dīn, *Taʾrīkh al-Malik
al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn al-Ṣāliḥī wa-awlādihi*, B. Schäfer (ed.), Wiesbaden,
1978, Part I; al-Maqrīzī, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī, *al-Sulūk li-maʿrifat duwal al-mulūk*, M.M.
Ziyāda (ed.), Cairo, 1941, vol. II; *Idem, al-Muqaffā*, M. Yaʿlāwī (ed.), Beirut, 1991,
vol. I, 627–36 (biography of Sultan Aḥmad); al-Ṣafadī, Khalīl b. Aybak, *al-Wāfī
biʾl-wafayāt*, vol. VIII, 86–90 (biography of Sultan Aḥmad); *Idem, Aʿyān al-ʿaṣr wa-
aʿwān al-naṣr* (facsimile by F. Sezgin), vol. I, 114–16 = ff. 57b-58b); Ibn Ḥajar al-
ʿAsqalānī, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī, *al-Durar al-kāmina fī aʿyān al-miʾa al-thāmina*, M.S. Jād
al-Ḥaqq (ed.), Cairo, n.d., vol. I, 314–16 (biography of Sultan Aḥmad); Ibn Taghrī
Birdī, Abū al-Maḥāsin Yūsuf, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī mulūk Miṣr waʾl-Qāhira*, Cairo,
1963–1972, vol. X, 68 sqq; *Idem, al-Manhal al-ṣāfī waʾl-mustawfī baʿda al-wāfī*,
M.M. Amīn (ed.), Cairo, 1984, vol. II, 158–64 (biography of Sultan Aḥmad); Ibn
Ḥabīb, al-Ḥasan b. ʿUmar, *Tadhkirat al-nabīh fī ayyām al-Manṣūr wa-banīhi*, M.M.
Amīn (ed.), Cairo, 1976–1986, vol. III (*ḥawādith wa-tarājim* 741–70).
[15] A. Levanoni, *op. cit.*, pp. 81–82.

tan by some emirs, he took his time before coming to the capital in order to receive the oath of allegiance. He did not leave al-Karak without his faithful Bedouin. The struggles for influence made him change his mind quickly, and two months later he decided to return to al-Karak, where he intended to rule, taking with him the main dignitaries of the dīwān together with all the money and the treasures kept in the citadel of Cairo. Under such conditions, having declined the offer to come back to Cairo, his position as sultan was clearly untenable. His brother Ismāʿīl, then seventeen years old, succeeded him. However, he could not rule peacefully, since his brother Aḥmad at al-Karak refused to return the treasury and scoffed at him. During the short reign of Ismāʿīl (743/1342–746/1345), the outstanding event was the siege of al-Karak, for which successive expeditions (seven or eight, according to the sources), in which all the emirs of Egypt and Syria took part, were necessary.[16] Indeed, the city and the fortress of al-Karak were reputed to be impregnable, as long as food was supplied to the inhabitants, a task generally fulfilled by the local Bedouin, and this was still the case during this siege. When the city was built, a network of cisterns was developed in order to collect rainwater, so the defenders had a steady supply of water.[17] Even though the Mamluk troops surrounding the city succeeded in imposing a more or less efficient blockade, the siege was brought to an end only by perfidy of some of the most trusted persons in Aḥmad's entourage, in other words of those he considered as his loyal friends and fellows: the Bedouin and the local Arabs.

The best historical source for the period that has come down to us is the chronicle of al-Shujāʿī (adhuc viv. 756/1356–7), who was an eyewitness of the events in question.[18] The following passage,

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[16] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol. X, 71.

[17] For a general history of the city of al-Karak under Mamluk rule, see M.ʿA. al-Bakhīt, *Mamlakat al-Karak fī al-ʿahd al-mamlūkī* (1976); translated in German by A. Scheidt, under the title *Das Königreich von al-Karak in der mamlukischen Zeit* (Frankfurt am Main, 1992).

[18] Another contemporary source must have been even more accurate: Mūsā b. al-Shaykh Yaḥyā al-Yūsufī (d. 759/1358), who wrote *Nuzhat al-nāẓir fī sīrat al-Malik al-Nāṣir*. This history covered, as it seems, the years that followed al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's reign. Unfortunately, the fragments preserved deal only with the years mid-733 to mid-738. See on this D.P. Little, "The Recovery of a Lost Source for Baḥrī Mamluk history: al-Yūsufī's *Nuzhat al-nāẓir fī sīrat al-Malik al-Nāṣir*", *JAOS*, vol. XCIV (1974), 42–54. For al-Shujāʿī's indebtedness to al-Yūsufī, see B. Schäfer, *Beiträge zur*

quoted in full because of its importance for my analysis of the chancery text, refers to an event dating to 744, a few months before Aḥmad's surrender to his brother's troops.

> The Sultan [Ismāʿīl] had corresponded with Bāligh, the *muqaddam* of the foot soldiers who was at al-Karak, making him promises and tempting him because it was he who led the prince Aḥmad to resistance. So he tried to win his confidence and wrote him. He answered favorably to this and betrayed the prince Aḥmad. He left al-Karak, fleeing Aḥmad, and he presented himself to the noble portals on Monday 6th *Dhū al-Qaʿda* of that year [744/21st March 1344]. The Sultan honored him and rewarded him and those of his friends who came with him. He guaranteed to the Sultan the capture of al-Karak saying: "O Lord! All the people in the fortress of al-Karak are my friends and those in the city are my family and my kinfolk. No one among them contradicts me. Send with me whom you trust and I will surrender him al-Karak". The Sultan sent with him eight mamluks chosen from among the royal ones and they set out on Thursday [9th *Dhū al-Qaʿda* 744/24th March 1344].[19]

This passage must be compared to the following one, from the same source:[20]

> Al-Karak could not be seized because those who were in al-Karak were, for the greater part, Arabs and Jabaliyya, and their *muqaddam* was Bāligh b. Ṭayyiʾ and Masʿūd.

These texts identify Bāligh as the *muqaddam*[21] of the soldiers (Arabs and Jabaliyya) of al-Karak.[22] Incidentally, al-Maqrīzī describes him as "[Aḥmad's] most important confidant among the people of al-Karak".[23] At first he set his hopes on his master, hoping upon the return of Aḥmad to the throne to obtain a reward for his loyalty. However, he must have changed his mind as Aḥmad's position became more fragile.[24] In 744, Bāligh took the decision to betray his master on

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mamlukischen Historiographie nach dem Tode al-Malik an-Nāṣirs (Freiburg, 1971); D.P. Little, "An Analysis of the Relationship between Four Mamluk Chronicles for 737–45", *JSS*, vol. XIX (1974), pp. 252–68.

[19] Al-Shujāʿī, *Taʾrīkh*, 264. Cf. al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. II, 654 and 661.

[20] Al-Shujāʿī, *Taʾrīkh*, 258.

[21] One must understand here that his title was probably *muqaddam al-ḥalqa*. On this title and its implications, see D. Ayalon, "Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army", *BSOAS*, vol. XV/iii (1953), 448–51.

[22] See D. Ayalon, "The Auxiliary-Forces of the Mamluk Sultanate," *Der Islam*, vol. LXV (1988), 31–32.

[23] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. II, 661 (*ajall thiqātihi min al-Karakiyyīn*).

[24] This is confirmed by al-Maqrīzī (*ibid.*) who says "due to the abundance of his

behalf of the legitimate sultan. First he wrote a letter to the emirs besieging the fortress, in which he promised that he would facilitate their capture of the town; but before doing so he requested to be allowed to go to Cairo and speak to the sultan Ismāʿīl. The sultan agreed and gave an order for an *amān* to be delivered to him. Bāligh escaped from al-Karak and went to the capital where he arrived on the 6th *Dhū al-Qaʾda* 744[25] with other dignitaries of the city. As a reward for his treason and his help, he solicited *iqṭāʿs* and lands with an average revenue of 450,000 dirhams per annum, while his fellow conspirators received a similar amount (these details are not provided by al-Shujāʿī). They all left Cairo three days later and went back to al-Karak, which surrendered on the 22nd *Ṣafar* 745 [/5th July 1344].[26]

Here are the facts. What links can we establish between these and documents I and II? The Bāligh b. Yūsuf b. Ṭayyiʾ who is mentioned there is undoubtedly the same as the one about whom the sources speak concerning the aforementioned events, even though these sources simply name him as Bāligh or Bāligh b. Ṭayyiʾ. The period in question (the first document clearly indicates now that it goes back to sultan Ismāʿīl's reign) and the singular name of Bāligh, rarely found in chronicles and biographical dictionaries, make this identification certain. It remains to be determined what kind of documents these are? Here again, it is al-Maqrīzī who helps us as he indicates[27] that Bāligh and his fellows received from the sultan *manshūr*s for the *iqṭāʿs* they asked for. Originally, the word *manshūr* meant in the chancery terminology an unsealed document, an open decree.[28] For the Mamluk period, the use of this term was reserved for documents issued on the occasion of the grant of *iqṭāʿ*, or land tenure.[29]

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expenses, al-Nāṣir Aḥmad's wealth came to depletion and a cruel need for money was rife. Bāligh began to work upon him".

[25] According to al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. II, 654, they arrived in Cairo on the 8th of the same month [23rd March 1344] and that they set out for al-Karak the 11th [26th March 1344].

[26] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. II, 660–62; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol. X, 71.

[27] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. II, p. 661.

[28] See S.M. Stern, *Fāṭimid Decrees: Original Documents from the Fāṭimid Chancery*, London, 1964, 85–90 and 116.

[29] See al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*, vol. XIII, 157; S. Imamuddin, "Dīwān al-inshāʾ (Chancery in Later Medieval Egypt)", *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*, vol. XXVIII (1980), 76.

Several elements prove that documents I and II are these famous *manshūr*s which were given to Bāligh in exchange for his betrayal and his assistance for the surrender of the fortress.

First, there is the textual evidence, mostly in document II. Lines 8–9 and 20 and even 12 seem to be as a direct allusion to the role played by Bāligh, his flight from al-Karak to Cairo, and his submission to the authority of sultan Ismāʿīl: "Those who abandon their homes and their children for the sake of our noble portals with patient endurance, those will be rewarded" (ll. 8–9); "Thus he emigrated to our portals and left behind him his home" (l. 20).

Secondly, there are the rigid rules of the chancery, as they are described in the manuals and other sources:

(1) In the Mamluk period, the formula "*fa li-dhālika kharaja al-amr al-sharīf*" was exclusively reserved to the *manshūr*s.[30]

(2) As we have seen, Bāligh received *iqṭāʿ*s annual revenue of which was 450,000 dirhams. The sources do not tell us what title he received on that occasion, except al-Ṣafadī[31] who simply indicates that he received an *imrat miʾa*, which means the title of *amīr miʾa* and *muqaddam alf*. However, everything leads us to believe that this information provided by al-Ṣafadī is erroneous.[32] On the one hand, it is known that the highest title received by the emirs of Arab tribes was the rank of *ṭablkhāna*.[33] Now, there is no doubt that Bāligh was an Arab Bedouin, but certainly not an emir of his tribe.[34] On the other hand, the revenue of an *amīr miʾa* was by far superior to the rev-

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[30] Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-ʿUmarī Aḥmad b. Yāḥya, *Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār*, A.F. Sayyid (ed.), Cairo, 1985, 45; al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, Būlāq, 1270/1853, vol. II, 211.

[31] Al-Ṣafadī, *al-Wāfī bi'l-wafayāt*, vol. VIII, 90.

[32] This is even more curious when one thinks that he was working at the *dīwān al-inshāʾ* in 745 and that he must have been well aware of the affairs of the state. See D. Little, "al-Ṣafadī as biographer of his contemporaries," in *Essays on Islamic Civilization presented to Niyazi Berkes* (Leiden, 1976), 208–9.

[33] See M.A. Hiyari, "The Origins and Development of the Amirate of the Arabs," *BSOAS*, vol. XXXVIII (1975), 523.

[34] The occurrence of the *ism* Ṭayyiʾ in his name seems to indicate that he was a member of the Rabīʿa tribe which was part of the Ṭayyiʾ. They were divided into two major clans: the Faḍl and the Mirā. So far, I have not been able to determine to which clan Bāligh belonged. It must be noted that the Arabs who lived around al-Karak up to the borders of Ḥijāz were the Banū ʿUqba. See A.S. Tritton, "The Tribes of Syria in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries," *BSOAS*, vol. XII (1947–8), 567.

enues obtained by Bāligh.[35] So, we must prefer the title of *ṭablkhāna*. Indeed, according to al-Maqrīzī,[36] the bearer of such a title received an *iqṭāʿ* the value of which was 40,000 dinars per annum, in proportion of 10 dirhams for one dinar (that means 400,000 dirhams), if he was a *khāṣṣakī*, or if this was not the case an *iqṭāʿ* the value of which was 30,000 dinars per annum, in proportion of 8 for 1 (that means 240,000 dirhams). Bāligh was not a Mamluk. So he could not have received a revenue superior to 30,000 dinars per annum. Notwithstanding, we know that the values mentioned by al-Maqrīzī refer to a given period and that these values are not valid for the whole Baḥrī period. For instance, we know that there was inflation and an exaggeration in the value of the *iqṭāʿ*s during the reign of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad.[37] My hypothesis is confirmed by the chancery manuals. The width of the sheet of paper used in the chancery varied according to the hierarchical position of the person for whom the document was issued.[38] The more important he was, the wider the sheet of paper was. The width reserved for an *amir ṭablkhāna* was half a cubit (*niṣf dhirāʿ*).[39] The value of the Egyptian cubit (also known as the cloth cubit, *dhirāʿ al-qumāsh*)[40] being of about 58 cm.,[41] a document issued in favor of an *amīr ṭablkhāna* could not be wider than about 29 cm. The width of two leaves in al-Maqrīzī's note-book is 27.4 cm, but it must not be forgotten that part of it was trimmed when the documents were cut into pieces, and once more when the manuscript was bound. Moreover, the titles (*alqāb*) reserved to an *amīr ṭablkhāna* who was not a *khāṣṣakī*, or who did not exercise a function (*waẓīfa*), were the following: *al-majlis al-sāmī* followed by epithets (*alqāb*) devoid of the emphatic final *yāʾ*.[42] This is exactly what we have in documents I and II. On the other hand, a *manshūr* did

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[35] The value of the *iqṭāʿ*s attributed to an *amīr miʾa* ranged from 85.000 to 100.000 *dīnār jayshī*, that is to say from 1 million to 850.000 *dirhams* per annum. See S. Tsugitaka, *State and Rural Society in Medieval Islam: Sultan, Muqtaʿs and Fallahun*, Leiden, 1997, 154.

[36] Al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, vol. II, 218; S. Tsugitaka, *ibid.*

[37] See A. Levanoni, *op. cit.*, 53 sqq.

[38] Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*, vol. VI, 313.

[39] Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*, vol. VI, 191.

[40] Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*, vol. III, 443 and VI, 190.

[41] See W. Hinz, *Islamische Masse und Gewichte*, Leiden, 1955, 56.

[42] Ibn Nāẓir al-Jaysh, *Tathqīf al-taʿrīf*, 190.

not begin with the *ḥamdala* unless it was issued for an *amīr miʾa* or
an *amīr ṭablkhāna*.[43] Document II contains part of the *ḥamdala*, as it
is attested by the presence of the end of *shahāda* (l. 2).[44]

To conclude, all the collected elements clearly indicate that Bāligh
received the title of *amīr ṭablkhāna* in reward for his treason, that the
value of the *iqṭāʿs* he received on that occasion was about 450,000
dirhams per annum, that documents I and II must be identified as
two *manshūrs* in relation with his obtaining this title. I would like to
stress the fact that, until now, we have possessed a single example of
a *manshūr iqṭāʿī* from Egypt. This unique item goes back to the reign of
Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī (916/1511) and concerned an *amīr ṭablkhāna* too.[45]
So, the two documents that I have reconstructed and analyzed perfect
our knowledge of this kind of document, considering that they are
more ancient than the one preserved hitherto. They will give us the
opportunity to study what differences may be detected between them
and how the chancery evolved between the Baḥri and Burji periods.[46]

What happened to Bāligh after this? Maqrīzī quotes his name
once more for the year 745 (*Rabīʿ* II/init. 12th August 1344), but
for a murder case:[47] a certain Ḥasan b. al-Radīnī, a camel mer-
chant, was found murdered in his house in the horse-market, in
Cairo. His son charged a ʿĪsā b. Ḥasan, who was responsible for
the sultan's camels, and Bāligh al-Aʿraj, in other words Bāligh the
lame, because of enmity between them and his father. The *nāʾib*
ordered that they be arrested and stripped, and he planned to basti-
nado them, but they succeeded in deferring the punishment for some
days, while the *nāʾib* was supposed to make investigations in order
to discover the murderer. They took advantage of this to exercise
influence on some emirs and to be released only a few days later,
against the *nāʾib*'s opinion. Was this Bāligh the same person? I think

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[43] *Manshūrs* issued in favor of the sons of the Sultan, the *amīr miʾa* and *muqad-
dam alf*, and *amīr ṭablkhāna* were to begin by the *ḥamdala* (al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-
aʿshā*, vol. XIII, 167, 169 and 184). Inferior titles received *manshūrs* beginning by
ammā baʿdu and in case of the lowest titles, these began by *kharaja al-amr al-sharīf*.
Bedouin could receive *manshūrs* of the three types according to their function (al-
Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*, vol. XIII, 198).

[44] The *ḥamdala* section comprised three elements: the *ḥamdala* itself, followed by
the *shahāda* and beginning by *naḥmaduhu*, then the *baʿdiyya* (*wa-baʿdu*). See, for instance,
al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*, vol. XIII, 168.

[45] M.M. Amīn, "Manshūr bi manḥ iqṭāʿ min ʿaṣr al-Sulṭān al-Ghawrī," *AI*, vol.
XIX (1983), 2–22.

[46] This comparison will be treated in the full version of this article.

[47] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. II, 668.

so. On the one hand, his name was quite rare, and on the other hand, al-Maqrīzī mentions him only a few months later after the facts in connection with al-Karak.[48] This time, however, he is described as lame, and this is not unlikely. It is again thanks to this historian that we learn that during the fourth expedition an intense fight took place between the people of al-Karak and the Mamluk army, on the 8th *Rabīʿ* II 744 (/30th August 1343), a fight during which a lot of people were injured and killed. Maqrīzī gives no name, except that of Bāligh, who, he says, was injured. This happened exactly one year before he was arrested as an accessory to a crime, and we may surmise that he had been hurt in the leg the preceding year. This is the last occurrence of Bāligh in the historical sources. After all these events, in which he played a central role, the chronicles send him back to anonymity.

Let us now proceed to document III. The text of this document can be reconstructed acceptably, despite its many lacunae, especially in those essential parts which might allow us to identify its destination more clearly. That is, it lacks any mention of titles or names. However, the spacing between the lines (18,3 cm) and the width of the document seem to indicate that it was issued for a person of the same rank as documents I and II (*qaṭʿ al-niṣf*). The preserved text in itself is quite vague and we could not date it with certainty, were it not for a very important registration mark. This one is to be found at the head of the first leaf and must be read like this: *li-yuthbat bi-dīwān al-naẓar ʿalā al-mamlaka al-karakiyya wa'l-shawbakiyya in shāʾa Allāh taʿālā*, and just below: *uthbita al-ḥamd li-Allāh li'l-mustaḥiqq al-ḥamd*. These notes require a commentary. It is well known that once written, a document went through the different services of the chancery, where it had to be registered by secretaries. The order was given by a high dignitary who wrote it on the document itself. Once fulfilled, the clerk indicated, just below the order, that it had been executed (*uthbita* in our case) and then he added his personal motto/*ʿalāma*[49] (here, *al-ḥamd li-Allāh li'l-Mustaḥiqq al-ḥamd*). So, document III was clearly registered at the *dīwān al-naẓar*, that is the

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[48] Moreover, ʿĪsā b. al-Ḥasan and his tribe were among those Bedouin who brought their support to al-Nāṣir Muḥammad when he was at al-Karak (see A. Levanoni, *op. cit.*, p. 182). This link brings us clear evidence that Bāligh al-Aʿraj must be identified as the Bāligh who betrayed al-Nāṣir Aḥmad.

[49] See S.M. Stern, "Petitions from the Mamluk Period: Notes on the Mamluk Documents from Sinai," *BSOAS*, vol. XXIX (1966), 248–49.

Office of Supervision, in the department responsible for the affairs of the *mamlaka* (the *mamlaka* being a region administered by a *nāʿib*) of al-Karak and al-Shawbak (Montréal). Now then, it may be surmised that document III, is certainly linked to documents I and II and that it must have been a *manshūr iqṭāʿī* probably issued in favor of one of Bāligh's fellows.

6. Now we must ask ourselves how al-Maqrīzī had access to these documents and why he used them as writing material. As ever, it is the protagonist himself whom we must consult. It is indeed al-Maqrīzī who gives us the answer in his *Khiṭaṭ*,[50] where he declares that he worked at the *dīwān al-inshāʾ* as a secretary until about the year 790/1388. Still it is not this passage which is important for us, because we can hardly suspect him to have taken for himself documents in the chancery during this period; however, the following sentence is fundamental for our purpose:

> When the reign of al-Ẓāhir Barqūq came to an end and was afterwards re-established, many things went in confusion. Among them, there was the affair of the room of [the *dīwān*] *al-inshāʾ* at the Citadel [. . .] and the documents (*awrāq*) that it kept were taken, sold by weight (*bi'l-qinṭār*) and the information they contained was forgotten (*nusiya rasmuhā*).

Thus it was during a particularly terrible period (791–2/1389–90) during the reign of sultan Barqūq (784/1382–791/1389 and 792/1390–801/1399), when this sultan had to abandon temporarily Cairo because of a coup d'état organized by certain emirs, that the documents preserved in the room of the *dīwān al-inshāʾ* were sold by weight, probably to the paper merchants.[51] Indeed, some of the documents issued by the chancery in medieval Egypt took the form of rolls (*darǧ*) made up of several sheets of paper (*waṣl*) pasted one to

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[50] Al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, vol. II, 225–26; M. Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *La Syrie à l'époque des Mamelouks d'après les auteurs arabes*, Paris, 1923, LXXI.

[51] We are aware that original documents were normally given to their beneficiaries and that only copies of them were kept in registers. However, we don't understand what use the paper merchants could have made of such registers as these were not suitable for their purposes once filled (see a unique example of these registers, although from the Fāṭimid period, in G. Khan, "A copy of a decree from the archives of the Fāṭimid chancery in Egypt", *BSOAS*, vol. XLIX (1986), 439–453). Moreover, al-Maqrīzī clearly states in the passage quoted above that these *awrāq* were documents and not just blank paper. It remains to be proven if original documents could be kept by the chancery, as it seems to be implied by those studied here.

the other on a margin of about 1–2 cm.[52] The secretaries of the chancery had to leave spacing between the lines, which spacing varied according to the width of the sheet, and so according to the person for whom the document was issued. This waste of paper was the sultan's prerogative.[53] The *warrāqūn* made haste to cut the documents at the most convenient size in order to transform them into scraps of paper,[54] which they offered for sale in the shape of quires of 5 sheets.[55] This could explain why documents connected to the same event and period are to be found in our manuscript. During the critical period mentioned, it may be presumed that paper had become a luxury product. In this respect, Qalqashandī informs us that the price of paper had risen during the 8th/14th century.[56] It was clearly after these events that al-Maqrīzī took in a supply of scribbling paper in order to write down on it his reading notes, but also his personal works, because the Liège manuscript is not the only one to contain such paper. It is possible that other autograph manuscripts of al-Maqrīzī were written on the same kind of paper.[57] So,

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[52] See Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *La Syrie*, LXX–LXXI.

[53] See St. Heidemann, Chr. Müller and Yū. Rāġib, "Un décret d'al-Malik al-ʿĀdil en 571/1176 relatif aux moines du Mont Sinaï", *AI*, vol. XXXI (1997), 84.

[54] In the case of our documents I to III, the spacing between the lines was of at least 18 cm.

[55] This is proven by the internal organization of al-Maqrīzī's note-book. See our article entitled "Maqriziana IV: Le carnet de notes d'al-Maqrīzī: l'apport de la codicologie à une meilleure compréhension de sa constitution", *Manuscripta orientalia*, to appear.

[56] Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*, vol. XI, 132 (it must have taken place sometime after al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn, as the text seems to imply it). E. Ashtor (*Histoire des prix et des salaires dans l'Orient médiéval*, 366) dates also this increase of the price of paper from the beginning of the 15th c. A.D. He noticed that this price doubled in the lapse of one century (early 14th–early 15th c. A.D.).

[57] At this time, I have identified such fragments of chancery documents, the Liège ms. apart, in the following autograph mss. of al-Maqrīzī: 1) *al-Khabar ʿan al-bashar*, Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi (ms. Fātiḥ 4340), see F. Tauer, "Zu al-Maqrīzī's Schrift *al-Ḫabar ʿan al-Bašar*", *Islamica*, vol. I (1925), 359; 2) *Musawwadat al-Mawāʿiz wa'l-iʿtibār*, Istanbul, Topkapı Saray (ms. Ahmet III 1472), Ayman Fuʾād Sayyid (ed.), London, 1995; 3) *al-Muqaffā*, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale (ms. 2144), see G. Wiet, "Kindī et Maqrīzī" (*BIFAO*, vol. XII (1915), 61–73), 62 (note 1), Leiden, University Library, mss. or. 1366a, 1366b, 3075, 14533. To date, this kind of scrap paper has not been found for the Islamic world but in the autograph manuscripts of al-Maqrīzī. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that a link between the genre of inscriptions and chancery documents could not be established prior to my discovery, although it was already noticed almost a hundred years ago (G. Wiet, *ibid.*) that some leaves found in an autograph manuscript of al-Maqrīzī had been used for another purpose before this author scribbled them.

one would only have to gather the inscriptions preserved on the leaves, sort them out, and analyze them, as I have been doing, in order to reconstruct documents coming from the Mamluk chancery, documents, it is needless to say, that historians terribly miss. These would allow us to throw a new light on this institution, but also on historical facts sometimes reported in the chronicles. These scraps of paper would then come to the rescue of History.

PART THREE

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE MAMLUK ARMY

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THE SULTAN'S *LAQAB*—A SIGN OF A NEW ORDER IN MAMLUK FACTIONALISM?

Amalia Levanoni

I

The regnal title, or *laqab* (pl. *alqāb*) first came into use during the Abbasid period. From the outset, it was designed to convey the image that a new ruler sought to accord himself.[1] While we are unable to examine the motives of the sultans of the Turkish Mamluk period (648–784/1250–1382) in choosing particular *laqab*s when they took the throne, it appears that we can discuss these intentions in the Circassian period (784–923/1382–1517), and show the new order in Mamluk factionalism that was undergirded by the *laqab*s they chose. All the sultans who came to power from within the ranks of the Mamluk army, rather than inheriting power from their fathers (with the exception of al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh and Ṭūmanbāy), bore one of two regnal titles: al-Ẓāhir or al-Ashraf.

Behind the systematic recurrence of these two regnal titles lies, in fact, a political reality that differs from the model of Mamluk factionalism to which we have become accustomed. According to this model, the Mamluk sultan ensured his rule by fostering a faction of his own mamluks, purchased, trained and emancipated by him during his period of rule. The unity of the faction was based upon the mamluks' loyalty to their master, *ustādh*, and on solidarity among them, *khushdāshiyya*, throughout their master's life and afterward. The sultan's authority was assured when, in the course of his rule, he

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[1] Jere L. Bacharach, "*Laqab*" for a Future Caliph: The case of the Abbasid al-Mahdi", *JAOS*, vol. CXIII (1993), 273–74. See: al-Qalqashandī, Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad, *Kitāb Ṣubḥ al-a'shā fī ṣinā'at al-inshā'*, Cairo, 1913–1919, vol. V, 477, 486–88; Ibn Khaldūn, 'Abd al-Raḥmān, *Kitāb al-'Ibar wa-dīwān al-mubtada' wa'l-khabar fī ayyām al-'Arab wa'l-'Ajam wa'l-Barbar wa-man 'āṣarahum min dhāwī al-sulṭān al-akbar*, Beirut, n.d., vol. I, 227–28.

placed his mamluks in the highest echelons of the army and in key
government positions in place of mamluks from his predecessor's fac-
tion. The unity of the Mamluk faction after the sultan's death ensured
both its durability and its ability to continue holding the reins of
power by supporting the sultanate of one of the amirs from within
its own ranks. The cyclical nature of this process—the rise of new
Mamluk factions triggering the fall of their predecessors—stood at
the centre of the system of Mamluk factionalism.[2]

   During the Circassian period, however, there were practices that
did not fall into line with this model. Mamluks of the ruling sultan
were promoted only minimally during his lifetime and, at the zenith
of their power, were generally unable to unseat old factions from
the higher echelons of the army. In reality, old Mamluk factions
continued to be politically active long after the deaths of their founders,
and as a result, fragments of factions, yesterday's allies and rivals,
and individual mamluks could unite in coalitions in struggles for
power through relationships that crossed factional boundaries. This
perpetual relationship between old and new factions that extended
through generations of mamluks created a new order in Mamluk
factionalism. This new order necessitated general and permanent
symbols that went beyond the *khushdāshiyya* of a specific faction in
order to unite the Mamluk factions through the generations. One
such symbol, perhaps the most important, was the sultan's regnal
title. The aim of the present article is to clarify the new pattern of
Mamluk factionalism in the Circassian period and the place of the
sultan's *laqab* in it.

                                II

During the Circassian period there was a recurring phenomenon
in the way in which the sultans built up their armies. Even sultans
like al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh (815–824/1412–1421), al-Ashraf Barsbāy

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[2] David Ayalon, "Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army", *Bulletin of the
School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. XVI/i (London, 1953) (hereafter—Ayalon,
"The Mamluk Army"), 206–10; idem, "l'Esclavage du Mamelouk", *Oriental Notes and
Studies*, Jerusalem, 1951 (hereafter—Ayalon, "l'Esclavage"), Introduction, IV–V; idem,
"The System of Payment in Mamluk Military Society", *JESHO*, vol. I/i (Leiden,
1958), 43–45.

(824–841/1422–1438) and al-Ẓāhir Jaqmaq (841–857/1438–1453), whose periods of rule were sufficiently long for them to build up Mamluk units of their own, promoted only a few of their *julbān*,[3] the new mamluks they had purchased and trained during their rule. This was because they maintained separation between the commanding levels and the rank-and-file mamluks. They filled the ranks of the amirs mainly with veteran mamluks who had not grown up in their own Mamluk households, while the *julbān* were hardly ever granted amirate ranks.

After sixteen years of rule al-Ashraf Barsbāy left behind a class of amirs holding the rank of *muqaddam alf* (commander of a thousand), of whom only two were Ashrafi (that is, members of Barsbāy's personal household): Jānim al-Ashrafī and Qarājā al-Ashrafī, whose entry into the ranks of the senior amirs came after long periods of service. Jānim was a relative of Barsbāy who reached Egypt with some other relations at the beginning of Barsbāy's rule, and was an Amir of Forty (*amīr arbaʿīn*) for many years until, in 836/1432, he was awarded the rank of *muqaddam alf*.[4] Qarājā was purchased by Barsbāy while the latter was still an amir, and was awarded the rank of *muqaddam alf* only in 838/1436.[5]

Throughout the period of Jaqmaq's rule, there was not a single amir from his *julbān* among those holding the rank of *amīr miʾa* (Amir of a Hundred) and *muqaddam alf*. At his death in 1453, there were only three of his mamluks among the amirs of lower rank: Qarājā served as keeper of the sultan's treasures (*khāzindār*) and held the rank of Amir of Forty, Lājīn was head of the royal armoury (*zard-kāsh*) with the rank of Amir of Ten (*amīr ʿashara*) and Timurbughā was second executive secretary (*dawādār thānī*) with the rank of Amir of Ten.[6]

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[3] *Julbān* often appear in the sources also as *ajlāb* or *mushtarawāt*.
[4] Al-Sakhāwī, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥman, *al-Dawʾ al-lāmiʿ li-ahl al-qarn al-tāsiʿ*, Beirut, n.d., vols. I–X (hereafter—al-Sakhāwī, *Dawʾ*), vol. III, 63–64; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Jamāl al-Dīn Yūsuf Abū al-Maḥāsin, *al-Manhal al-Ṣāfī waʾl-mustawfī baʿda al-wāfī*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥammad Amīn, Cairo, 1985–1999, vols. I–VIII (hereafter—Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*), vol. IV, 217–18.
[5] Al-Sakhawi, *Dawʾ*, vol. VI, 214.
[6] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Jamāl al-Dīn Yūsuf Abū al-Maḥāsin, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī mulūk Miṣr waʾl-Qāhira*, Cairo, 1963–1972, vols. VII–XVI (hereafter—Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*), vol. XV, 450–51; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 304.

The custom of filling the ranks of the amirs with senior mamluks explains the fifteenth century phenomenon of numerous mamluks reaching a ripe old age and passing away while they still held senior positions. Jaqmaq rose to power when he was sixty-six years old and died at the age of eighty.[7] Sultan Īnāl was a mamluk purchased by al-Ẓāhir Barqūq (784–801/1382–1399) and emancipated by Barqūq's son, al-Nāṣir Faraj. He was elevated from the post of commander-in-chief (atābakiyya) to rule in 857/1453, when he was seventy-two years old.[8] Sultan Yalbāy, who was one of al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh's mamluks, was elevated from the atābakiyya to rule in 872/1467, when he was eighty years old.[9] Al-Ashraf Barsbāy appointed Sūdūn min ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, one of al-Ẓāhir Barqūq's veteran mamluks, governor of Syria in 837/1433 because he was ill and weak.[10] Qānim min Ṣafar Khujā died at the age of seventy while still serving as commander-in-chief (atābak al-ʿasākir).[11] Taghrī Birdī al-Baklamūshī died in 846/1442 at the age of eighty, while he held the rank of muqaddam alf.[12] Amir Tānibak al-Burdbakī, also one of al-Ẓāhir Barqūq's mamluks, held prominent posts consecutively under Barsbāy, Jaqmaq and Īnāl and died in 862/1457 at the age of ninety, still holding the office of atābak al-ʿasākir.[13] The chronicles and biographical dictionaries that address the Circassian period contain numerous other examples like these.[14]

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[7] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Jamāl al-Dīn Yūsuf Abū al-Maḥāsin, Mawrid al-laṭāfa fī man waliya al-salṭana wa'l-khilāfa, ed. Nabīl Muḥammad ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Aḥmad, Cairo, 1997, vol. II (hereafter—Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Mawrid al-laṭāfa), 162; al-Sakhāwī, Ḍaw', vol. III, 71–72; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, vol. XV, 454; Ibn Iyās, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad, Badā'iʿ al-zuhūr fī waqā'iʿ al-duhūr, Cairo, 1982–1984, vols. I–V (hereafter—Ibn Iyās, Badā'iʿ), vol. II, 451, 456; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Manhal, vol. IV, 295.

[8] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, vol. XVI, 60, 157; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Mawrid al-laṭāfa, 269; al-Sakhāwī, Ḍaw', vol. II, 329; Ibn Iyās, Badā'iʿ, vol. II, 367.

[9] Al-Sakhāwī, Ḍaw', vol. X, 288; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, vol. XVI, 371; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Mawrid al-laṭāfa, vol. II, 179.

[10] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, vol. XV, 20, 40.

[11] Ibid., vol. XVI, 351.

[12] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Manhal, vol. IV, 56.

[13] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, vol. XVI, 195–96.

[14] Al-Sakhāwī, Ḍaw', vol. II, 269, 272, 273, 275, 311, 312, 315, 317, 330; vol. III, 2, 8, 26, 34, 36, 39, 42, 45, 56, 59, 60, 61, 67, 73, 75, 78, 174, 176, 177, 210, 276, 280, 285, 287, 306, 322; vol. IV, 7, 12, 13; vol. VI, 194, 195, 197, 198, 201, 216, 222, 223, 228, 229, 230, 231; vol. X, 164, 206, 269, 275, 280, 288, 292, 346; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Manhal, vol. II, 329–32, 327, 434, 437–40, 449, 479; vol. III, 7–8, 80, 82, 83–84, 198, 216, 278, 493, 505; vol. IV, 13–16, 212, 215, 256–58, 259–60; vol. V, 10–12, 210–11, 213, 214, 286, 329, 330–31; vol. VI, 86, 140–49,

The recurrence of this separation between the amirs and *julbān* during the Circassian period indicates that it was an intentional policy which was designed to safegard the sultan's position and rule from both his mamluks and the amirs. The *julbān*, whose power gradually increased and eroded the sultan's authority and the status of the amirs as early as the fourteenth century, were prevented from establishing a leadership of their own that would threaten the sultan's position. To the same extent that the alienation of the amirs from the *julbān* enabled the sultan to curb the latter, the *julbān* constituted a guarantee of his security from the aspirations of the senior, office-holding amirs. The terror sown by the *julbān*, with almost no intervention on the part of their master, cast fear into the hearts of the amirs and assured their submissiveness to the sultan.[15]

In 832/1428, the riots that the *julbān* staged against their master al-Ashraf Barsbāy and the amirs reveal the political balance achieved by the sultan in separating the command level from his rank-and-file mamluks. The riots began when the *julbān* learned of a consultation held between the sultan and his prominent amirs on ways and means of dealing with the *julbān*'s constant violations of public order and abuse of office-holders, which caused agitation among the senior mamluks. At this meeting, the *atābak al-'asākir*, Amir Jār Quṭlū, advised the sultan to deal with the *julbān* rioters with an iron fist and to destroy them. His reasoning was that at any time of his choosing, the sultan could bring new mamluks into his service and that the veteran mamluks were preferable, for a hundred veteran mamluks were better than a thousand from the *julbān*. When the sultan tended

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166, 172–73, 174, 175, 177–78, 180, 186–87, 345; vol. VII, 16, 17; idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 155, 198; vol. XV, 40, 151, 157, 160–61, 179, 200, 470, 477, 525, 526, 551; vol. XVI, 19, 20, 162, 163, 174, 176, 183, 188, 189, 192, 196, 199, 200, 205, 207, 211, 213, 312, 315, 316, 330, 332, 335, 338, 339, 343, 351; idem, *Ḥawādith al-duhūr fī madā al-ayyām wa'l-shuhūr*, ed. Muḥammad Kamāl al-Dīn 'Izz al-Dīn, Cairo, 1990, vols. I–II (hereafter—Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Ḥawādith*), vol. II, 391, 466, 473, 474, 507, 550, 554, 601; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. II, 66, 322–23, 341, 342, 345, 348, 351, 360, 388, 389, 393, 403, 411, 417, 422, 431, 433, 434, 435–36, 438, 441, 443, 446, 470; vol. III, 18, 35, 41, 42, 55, 92, 116, 125, 148, 150, 152, 176, 177, 178, 183, 192, 193, 194, 199, 207, 318, 321,411–12, 414, 421, 433.

[15] Amalia Levanoni, "The Mamluk Conception of the Sultanate", *IJMES*, vol. XXVI (1994) (hereafter—Levanoni, "Sultanate"), 386; idem, *A Turning Point in Mamluk History: The Third Reign of al-Nasir Muḥammad ibn Qalawun 1310–1341*, Leiden, 1995 (hereafter—Levanoni, *A Turning Point*), 93–132. For examples see: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XII, 92; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. II, 407, 411.

to accept Jār Quṭlū's opinion, Baybughā al-Muẓaffarī, who was then
supervisor of the royal council chamber (*amīr majlis*), explained the
importance of the *julbān*, even at the cost of compromise with their
rebellious conduct, in these words: "By God, had it not been for the
mushtarawāt mamluks, no one of us would have obeyed you" [*wa-
allāhi lawla al-mamālīk al-mushatrawāt mā aṭā'aka wāḥid minnā*].[16]

When the *julbān* got wind of the meeting and its content, they
attacked one of Jār Quṭlū's mamluks; he was able to repel them and
managed to reach his master's house, which was promptly attacked
by the *julbān*. Jār Quṭlū and his mamluks, who had fortified them-
selves in the house, succeeded in defeating the *julbān* and putting
them to flight. The defeat of the *julbān* despite their large number
[*ma'a kathratihim*][17] stemmed, so the historian Yūsuf Ibn Taghrī Birdī
(d. 874/1470) tells us, "from the lack of unanimous agreement among
them and the flight of most of them" [*li-'adm ijtimā' kalimatihim wa-
li-firār aktharihim*].[18] Their defeat also stemmed from "their lack of
experience in wars, lack of training and weapons" [*li-'adm ma'rifati-
him bi'l-ḥurūb wa-li-qillat durbatihim wa-silāḥihim*].[19] Next day the *julbān*
demanded that the sultan hand over their enemies from among Jār
Quṭlū's mamluks, but the sultan was at a loss and decided not to
accede to this demand but to punish Jār Quṭlū's mamluks himself,
a solution that would not arouse the ire of the amirs. And so he
"flogged them, but not with the necessary seriousness" [*wa-ḍarabahum
ḍarban laysa bi-dhāka*].[20] The *julbān*, who realized the significance of
the previous day's defeat, viewed this solution as a reasonable fulfillment
of their demands. This incident created tension between the amirs
and the sultan. The latter was unable to ignore the amirs' anger
and again found himself at a loss until he managed to make peace
between the *julbān* and the amirs.

This revolt by the *julbān*, like numerous other cases of their breaches
of public order, highlights their weakness despite their great power.
Their military experience was limited in the extreme, and this might

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[16] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 327.
[17] *Ibid.*, 328; al-Jawharī, 'Alī b. Dāwud al-Ṣayrafī, *Nuzhat al-nufūs wa'l-abdān fī
tawārīkh al-zamān*, ed. Ḥasan al-Ḥabashī, Cairo, 1970–1994, vols. I–IV (hereafter—
al-Jawharī), vol. III, 158.
[18] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 329.
[19] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 328; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 158.
[20] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 329.

well have been part of the sultan's intentional policy of limiting their power. We learn from the sources that although their numbers were great, their weapons were limited in quantity.[21] The sultans also avoided sending them on military campaigns, possibly because they feared risking the investment they had made by purchasing and training them, and perhaps because they feared the possibility of any relationship emerging among the *julbān*, the amirs and the senior mamluks, who almost exclusively bore the brunt of the wars.[22] David Ayalon believes that the sultans did not send the *julbān* out of Cairo for fear that if they did, they would be overthrown.[23]

A result of the sparse representation of the *julbān* in the ranks of the amirs was that they lacked political experience, too, and they were deprived of a mature leadership which could have unified them and initiated them in the political secrets of the mamluks' interfactional struggles after the deaths of their masters. Barsbāy purchased numerous mamluks during his reign; their number reached two thousand at one point, but some died in the epidemics of 833/1429 and 841/1437.[24] After his death he apparently left some fifteen hundred *julbān*.[25] Despite their numbers, the majority were left in disarray after the death of their master in 842/1438, when they failed to unite around his son, al-'Azīz, and secure his rule from the threat of the veteran Mamluk coalition led by Jaqmaq, one of al-Ẓāhir Barqūq's mamluks. First, a group of *julbān* led by a non-senior amir, Īnāl al-Abū Bakrī, broke away from the main body of *julbān* as a result of internal strife and joined Jaqmaq.[26] The remainder of the Ashrafiyya mamluks, who were the majority, enjoyed a number of advantages that enabled them to defeat their opponents. The Abbasid shadow-caliph was at the Citadel, Qal'at al-Jabal, with al-'Azīz, thus lending legitimacy to his rule. They were fortified in the

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[21] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 328; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 158.

[22] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 231.

[23] Ayalon, "The Mamluk Army", 205; Idem, "The Plague and Its Effects upon the Mamluk Army", *JRAS* (London, 1946) (Reprinted in *Studies on the mamluks of Egypt (1250–1517)*, London, Variorum Reprints, 1979), 72.

[24] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 108; idem, *Mawrid al-laṭāfa*, 154; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 192, 194, 416.

[25] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 240; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 440.

[26] Al-Jawharī, vol. III, 438–39, 424–25; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 234, 241; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. II, 193; al-Maqrīzī Aḥmad b. 'Ali, *Kitab al-Sulūk li-ma'rifat duwal al-mulūk*, ed. Muṣṭafā Ziyāda and Sa'īd 'Abd al-Fattāḥ 'Ashūr, Cairo, 1930–1973, vols. I–IV (hereafter—al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*), vol. IV, 1094.

Citadel, which commanded the surrounding area and protected them
from the senior mamluks at the foot of the hill. And most impor-
tant, they controlled the treasury and the sultan's arsenal. Yet after
a short battle they surrendered.[27] Ibn Taghrī Birdī estimates that
their failure stemmed from the fact that "they were ignorant of the
stratagems of conflicts . . . They had no experience and they had not
practiced wars. And what is more, they never brought close any one
of the veterans or the experienced. Therefore they went astray [*illā
annahum juhhāl li-makāʾid al-akhṣām . . . lam tamurrā bihim al-tajārib wa-
lā mārasū al-waqāʾiʿ wa-aʿzam min hādhā annahum lam yuqarribū aḥadan
mina al-akābir wa-arbāb al-maʿrifa fa-ḍallū*]".[28]

    Jaqmaq had no difficulty in overcoming the Ashrafi mamluks. In
the negotiations he held with them after the battle, with the medi-
ation of the chief judges, they displayed no political sophistication.
Their inexperienced leaders submitted to the terms laid down by
Jaqmaq in return for peace, evacuated their barracks (*ṭibāq*, sing.
ṭabaqa) in the Citadel, and went down to their dwellings in Cairo.
Approximately fifteen hundred mamluks left the Citadel.[29] The attempts
at revolt by the Ashrafiyya mamluks against Jaqmaq that came after
their expulsion from the Citadel were likewise unsuccessful, again
because of their inexperience and the dissension among them.[30] On
the other hand, in 857/1453, a short time after the death of Jaqmaq,
these same Ashrafiyya mamluks were already well-acquainted with
the intrigues of the inter-factional power struggles, both political and
military.[31]

    The young mamluks, the *julbān*, of al-Muʾayyad Shaykh were also
expelled from their barracks in the Citadel and sent down into
Cairo.[32] After they were dispersed, leaving them to their own devices,
Amir Ṭaṭar, who administered government matters on behalf of al-
Muʾayyad's son, began to conciliate them and calm their fears until

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    [27] Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1074, 1076.
    [28] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 235–36, 253; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV,
1074–76; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 438.
    [29] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 240, 241; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 439, 440,
443; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1074–76; al-ʿAynī, Badr al-Dīn Maḥmūd, *ʿIqd al-
jumān fī taʾrīkh ahl al-zamān*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥammad Amīn, Cairo, 1988 (here-
after—al-ʿAynī, *ʿIqd*), 511.
    [30] Al-Jawharī, vol. III, 440, 433–48; Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, vol. II, 386–87.
    [31] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 31, 35–37, 38, 40, 44, 227, 229, 234.
    [32] Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, vol. II, 73.

"each of them joined one of Ṭaṭar's followers [*'alā anna kull wāḥid minhum intamā li-shakhṣ min ḥawāshī Ṭaṭar*]".[33] The *julbān* of al-Ẓāhir Jaqmaq suffered the same drawbacks; there was no agreement among them [*ārā'uhum maflūka wa-kalimatuhum ghayr munḍabiṭa*].[34] As in previous cases, they were in the Citadel with their master's son, al-Manṣūr 'Uthmān, and despite their large number and the weapons they had at their disposal, they were passive and did not plan their battle against the multi-faction mamluk group that formed against them. Despite their awareness of the strategic importance of the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan, which commanded the approach to the Citadel, they did not go out and place guards on it.[35] On the last day of the battle, when their opponents burst into the hippodrome at the foot of the Citadel, the *julbān* fled the Citadel, leaving its gates open wide for no reason.[36] Once again, their failure stemmed from "their being young and inexperienced; they had no practice in wars and did not know which deception or stratagem to employ against their enemies, and they had no amirs . . . who understood these things . . . [*li-kawnihim shabāban lam tamurra bihim al-tajārib, wa-lā lahum mumārasa bi'l-ḥurūb, wa-lā ya'rifūna naw'an min anwā' al-khadī'a wa'l-makr bi-akhṣāmihim wa-ayḍan lam yakun 'indahum mina al-umarā' . . . mimman lahu khibra bi-hādhihi al-anwā'*]".[37]

Neither did the *julbān* of al-Ashraf Īnāl succeed in defending the rule of his son, al-Mu'ayyad Aḥmad, which would have been in their interest. Once they saw that they would be unable to withstand a battle with the veteran mamluks, they became indifferent and "each one cared only for his own interest [*wa-akhadha kull wāḥid . . . fī maṣlaḥat nafsihi*]".[38]

These examples, and many others, of *julbān* who, at the beginning of their careers, were inexperienced and lost in the Mamluk political maze, but who became wily foxes in the army and in politics after they had achieved seniority in the system, confirms the impression that the sultan had every intention of limiting the *julbān*'s experience.

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[33] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 196.
[34] *Ibid.*, vol. XVI, 41.
[35] *Ibid.*, 42, 46.
[36] *Ibid.*, 51–52; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Ḥawādith*, vol. II, 420.
[37] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 49; idem, *Ḥawādith*, vol. II, 420.
[38] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 247, see also 240, 242, 246.

The breakup of the *julbān* and their departure from the Citadel, which became a matter of routine during this period,[39] left the political and military arena empty of the biggest and strongest Mamluk faction. However, the sultans' practice of filling the ranks of the commanding class with senior mamluks granted the amirs a position in government. That status, albeit monitored, in the face of the *julbān*'s inexperience and disintegration, accorded the minority factions an advantage and power that under the circumstances were sufficient for them to take power.

III

In the interim phase between the expulsion of the *julbān* from their barracks in the Citadel and their return to the political-military arena united as a minority faction, they were absorbed into new frameworks. Some of those expelled from the Citadel were reinstated in the Mamluk sultan's household (known as sultani), usually after they had been carefully screened and classified.[40] The employment possibilities that faced the majority of the *julbān* were in the Mamluk households of the amirs in Egypt and Syria. We learn from the sources that in 805/1402, two hundred and thirty sultani mamluks were left unemployed.[41] As mentioned earlier, the majority of al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh's *julbān* entered the service of the amirs who were followers of Ṭaṭar on an individual basis.[42] After the death of Sultan Barqūq (801/1399), Ṭaṭar himself was one of the *julbān* who fled from al-Nāṣir Faraj and wandered from place to place in Syria. Ṭaṭar joined the Mamluk household of Amir Jakam min ʿAwḍ, and with the latter's death he joined up with the two rebel amirs in Syria, Nawrūz al-Ḥāfiẓī and Shaykh al-Maḥmūdī, who later became sultan. Later, when these two fought each other for rule, Ṭaṭar chose to join Shaykh al-Maḥmūdī, and when the latter came to power, Ṭaṭar returned to the Sultani household, gaining continuous promotion until he attained the rank of Amir of a Hundred.[43] In con-

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[39] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 197 see also, *ibid.*, vol. XVI, 368.
[40] See for example: *ibid.*, vol. XIV, 204; Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, vol. II, 73.
[41] Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. III, 1103.
[42] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 196.
[43] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. VI, 397–98; idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 35, 56, 64, 103; idem, *Mawrid al-laṭāfa*, 144; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʾ*, vol. IV, 7. See also page 105 of this article.

trast, Yashbak al-Sāqī joined Nawrūz, and this choice cost him years of incarceration during the period of al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh's rule.[44] A similar fate awaited Taghrī Birdī al-Maḥmūdī al-Nāṣiri.[45] After the death of his master, Sultan al-Nāṣir Faraj, Qānī Bāy al-Abū Bakrī served various amirs, such as Arghūn Shāh al-Nawrūzī and Bardbak al-Jakamī al-'Ajamī, finally entering the service of Ṭaṭar, who promoted him when he rose to power.[46]

It is worthy of note that with the death or removal of amirs by the sultan, their mamluks, too, moved into new mamluk households. Some were taken by the sultān and made sultani mamluks, while others sought positions with the amirs. Īnāl al-Jakamī was one of Amir Jakam min 'Awḍ's mamluks, and when his master died he entered the service of Amir Sūdūn Buqjā al-Ẓāhirī. He later moved into the service of al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh when the latter was still an amir. As a result, he was advanced during al-Mu'ayyad's rule.[47] Qānī Bāy al-Ḥamzāwī was one of Tanam al-Ḥasanī's mamluks, and after his master's death he was purchased by Sūdūn al-Ḥamzāwī during the rule of al-Nāṣir Faraj. After Sūdūn's death, Qānī Bāy consecutively served a number of amirs and finally entered the service of al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh, who, on taking the throne, awarded him an amirate. Qānī Bāy's case was not exeptional, for he was one of a large group of Ḥamzāwī mamluks who served al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh for a long while after their master's death.[48] Al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh held the opinion that the *sayfiyya*, i.e., the amirs' mamluks, were experienced soldiers, and therefore he employed and promoted many of them.[49]

The sources note the entry of mamluks into the service of the amirs, using terms like *ittaṣala bi . . .*, *inḍamma ilā . . .*, *intamā li . . .* and

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[44] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 151; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 140; al-'Aynī, *'Iqd*, 347; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍaw'*, vol. X, 276; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. III, 205, 206; Ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī, Aḥmad b. 'Alī, *Inbā' al-ghumr bi-abnā' al-'umr*, HaydarAbad, 1974–1975 (hereafter—Ibn Ḥajar), vol. VIII, 166. For more examples see: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 157, 179, 180–81.

[45] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 179. See also 130; idem, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 52.

[46] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 520–21. For more examples see: *Ibid.*, 339; idem, *Manhal*, vol. II, 476; vol. IV, 91–92; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍaw'*, vol. III, 39, 53; vol. VI, 194, 220–21; vol. X, 275.

[47] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. III, 197.

[48] Al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍaw'*, vol. VI, 195; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 201–2. See also al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍaw'*, vol. II, 319, 328; vol. III, 39, 77, 277, 279, 283, 284; vol. X, 165; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. II, 438; vol. IV, 21, 257; vol. VI, 167; idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 195, 240; vol. XV, 130, 161, 184, 239, 240; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍaw'*, vol. X, 275; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Ḥawādith*, vol. I, 195, 238, 305, 308; vol. II, 351, 394, 465, 550–51.

[49] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 112.

others.[50] These terms indicate the voluntary relationship between the
mamluk and the amir. The entry of the sultani mamluks into the
service of the amirs was based on the mutuality required by a rela-
tionship between free men. This was because these mamluks were
already emancipated when they were expelled from the Citadel.
Those mamluks who were included in the *kuttābiyya* at the deaths of
their masters, were still in training and retained the status of slaves.
Therefore they were left in the barracks and purchased by the new
sultan. While the master was alive, the master-mamluk relationship
was binding. The only way the mamluk could break this tie was to
desert his master even when, *prima facie*, he was already a free man.[51]
In contrast, there was no such obligation in the relationship between
emancipated mamluks and amirs, who were not their masters. The
relationship could be severed whenever one of the parties wished,
and we have indeed found that these mamluks moved from the ser-
vice of one amir to another without limitation.

The status of mamluks who joined the amirs' households was, no
doubt, also different from that of mamluks who were purchased by
the amirs. The sources define their status as *atbāʿ* (s. *tābiʿ*), in the
sense of 'followers', i.e., those who were only attached to the house-
hold and were not part of its nucleus. The different status of the
brothers Ḥasan and Ḥusayn, who both served in an amir's house-
hold, explains the difference between the status of the *atbāʿ* and that
of the amirs' own mamluks. The two brothers fled their hometown
of Bahasnā (a fortress in Aleppo province) when Timur invaded
Syria, and reached Egypt some years later. Ḥasan, the older of the
two, served Amir Qarā Sunqur al-Ẓāhirī under terms defined by
Ibn Taghrī Birdī as *tabaʿan*, i.e., he had the status of a *tābiʿ*.[52] Mubārak
Shāh al-Muẓaffarī, too, was employed by Sultan Barqūq under the
same conditions while the latter was still a rank-and-file mamluk and
certainly could not purchase mamluks of his own.[53] Therefore the
historian Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Sakhāwī (d. 902/1497)

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[50] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 239, 244; vol. XV, 150, 170; al-Sakhāwī,
Ḍawʾ, vol. VI, 194; vol. X, 165, 345.
[51] See for example: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. IX, 104–5; idem, *Manhal*, vol.
IV, 59; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. II, 356.
[52] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 471–72; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1152;
Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 51–52. For further examples see: al-Sakhāwī,
Ḍawʾ, vol. II, 312; vol. III, 71; vol. IV, 12; vol. VI, 197; vol. X, 289.
[53] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 125.

defines Mubārak Shāh as one of Barqūq's *atbā'*.[54] To return to Ḥasan's brother, after working as a tailor's apprentice in Cairo he, too, entered the service of a Mamluk amir, Īnāl Ḥaṭab al-ʿAlāʾī, but as a mamluk of his *kuttābiyya*. On the death of the amir, he was transferred to Amir Taghrī Birdī, who changed his name from Ḥusayn to Taghrī Barmish and continued his training as one of his mamluks in the barrack; Ḥasan, by contrast, had no need to change his name. It should be remembered that in the Mamluk elite it was customary for the mamluks' names to be Turkish or Circassian as this was a marker of their status.[55] Another indication of a strong bond between Ḥusayn and his master is that when the former fled with two other mamluks, it caused their master and instructor great sorrow, and steps were taken to bring them back and punish them. The case of Ḥasan and Ḥusayn, then, shows clearly that the status of the *tābiʿ* was inferior to that of the amir's mamluk.

Not by chance, the expressions that became commonplace in the sources for describing the *julbān*'s moving from one Mamluk household to another also reflect their hardship and humiliations during this period. Examples of such expressions are "He suffered the various vicissitudes of fate after the death of his master [*qāsā khuṭūb al-dahr alwānan baʿda mawt ustādhihi*]",[56] "His life was spent in remote places [*inqaḍā ʿumruhu fī ashtāt*]",[57] "Later, fate humiliated him after the death of his master and he served a number of amirs [*thumma haṭṭahu al-dahr baʿda mawt ustādhihi wa-khadama ʿinda jamāʿa mina al-umarāʾ*]".[58]

[54] Al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʾ*, vol. VI, 237. There is a clear difference in the sources between the amir's mamluks and his *ḥawāshī*, see for example: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 44; vol. XV, 117; Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, vol. II, 322.

[55] David Ayalon, "The Mamluk City and the Mamluk Military Aristocracy", *Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities*, vol. II (Jerusalem, 1968), 322; idem, "Names, Titles and 'Nisbas' of the mamluks", *Israel Oriental Studies*, vol. V (Tel-Aviv, 1975) (Reprinted in idem, *The Mamluk Military Society*, Variorum Reprints, London, 1979), 193; See also: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 354.

[56] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 237; vol. VII, 13, 15; idem, *Ḥawādith*, vol. II, 551; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 324; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 953, 1061; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʾ*, vol. III, 7, 8, 45, 62, 63, 279, 285; vol. VI, 199, 201, 225, 231; vol. X, 170, 205, 276, 279; Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, vol. II, 467; vol. III, 51, 91.

[57] Al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʾ*, vol. X, 276; see also *ibid.* vol. IV, 93, 149; vol. VI, 220–21, 222; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 140, 206, 340; al-ʿAynī, *ʿIqd*, 347.

[58] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 520. For additional examples see: idem, *Mawrid al-laṭāfa*, 183; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʾ*, vol. II, 197, 327; vol. X, 272–80; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 239; idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 316; idem, *Ḥawādith*, vol. II, 452, 466; Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, vol. II, 4, 62, 71, 417; vol. VI, 174.

The conditions of the *atbāʿ* in the amirs' households were, per-
haps, the reason for their great mobility, for it might well be that
they sought to improve their lot. The mamluks' mobility in the ser-
vice of the amirs created a dynamic and intricate system of rela-
tionships that connected various Mamluk factions and blurred the
boundaries of the *khushdāshiyya*. The network of personal relation-
ships created by the mamluks during this phase of their career was
based upon friendships in far smaller and more intimate frameworks
than those of the sultanic factions of *julbān* housed in the Citadel
barracks; these factions consisted of thousands of mamluks. The
above-cited examples of the mamluks' service to the amirs, and par-
ticularly of those who later rose to power and promoted their fol-
lowers, show the importance of this system of personal relationships
in the building of the amir stratum in the Mamluk regime. It was
also important for the formation of coalitions that supported the gov-
ernment, for behind the amirs stood Mamluk households that extended
the factional fabric. As a research case of this system of relation-
ships, I will later show the networks of personal friendships of the
sultans Ṭaṭar, Barsbāy and Jaqmaq prior to their rise to power, and
the role these networks played in filling the ranks of the amirs dur-
ing their regimes.

IV

The entire picture of the network of personal relationships in the
Mamluk system is incomplete without an examination of the frame-
work in which the mamluks were trained to be soldiers. During the
training period, there were certain practices which, by their very
nature, fostered deeper personal relationships among the *julbān* than
the somewhat abstract *khushdāshiyya* that was supposed to unify them
in the *ṭibāq*, or barracks, into a consolidated Mamluk faction. We
shall limit ourselves here to two practices. The first is the custom of
dividing the *julbān* into groups, each of which lived in one of the
Citadel's barracks.[59] The *ṭibāq* classification system was usually based
on the *julbān*'s ethnic origins.[60] Thus, for example, mamluks who had

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[59] Ayalon, "l'Esclavage", 9–12; Levanoni, *A Turning Point*, 12–13.
[60] Al-Maqrīzī, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī, *Kitāb al-Mawāʿiz wa'l-iʿtibār fī dhikr al-khiṭaṭ wa'l-*

been brought from al-Ghūr (in today's Afghanistan) were housed in the Ṭabaqat al-Ghūr.[61]

The second custom was to bind fresh mamluks, *inyāt* (sing. *inī*), with senior mamluks, *aghāwāt* (sing. *aghā*),[62] in an apprenticeship bond so that the latter would guide the former during the training period, aside from the curriculum, which was the responsibility of the *ṭibāq*'s professional staff. Thus, for example, during Barqūq's rule Qaṣrūh min Timrāz was one of Jāribāsh al-Shaykhī's *inyāt* and Tānibak al-Burdbakī was one of Taghrī Birdī's.[63] Yashbak al-Jakamī had *inyāt* from among the mamluks of Sultan al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh.[64] Taghrī Birdī, Qaṣrūh's relative, was Khushqadam's *aghā*.[65] Tanibak al-Bijāsī and Sūdūn al-Māridānī were Jār Quṭlū al-Ẓāhirī's *inyāt*.[66] During Barsbāy's period of rule, Khujā Sūdūn had *inyāt* in the Ṭabaqat al-Ṭāziyya and Īnāl in Ṭabaqat al-Ashrafiyya.[67]

The division of the mamluks purchased by the sultan in the course of his rule into groups housed in different barracks, and the special relationships that existed between the trainees and their instructors from among their elder colleagues, quite naturally created hierarchical categories of loyalty and solidarity among the *julbān* that can be described simply in terms of circles of affiliation. In the inner, nuclear circle stood the relationship between the *inyāt* and the *aghāwāt*

āthār, Cairo, 1987, vol. II, 213; al-Ẓāhirī, Ghars al-Dīn, Khalīl b. Shāhin, *Zubdat kashf al-mamālik wa-bayān al-ṭuruq wa'l-masālik*, ed. Paul Ravaisse, Paris, 1894, 27; Ayalon, "l'Esclavage", 9–12; Robert Irwin, "Factions in Medieval Egypt", *JRAS*, 1986 (hereafter—Irwin, "Factions"), 239–40.

[61] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 504.

[62] The word *aghā* is used in the sources to define the veteran Mamluks, see for example: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIII, 116; vol. XIV, 200, 243; idem, *Manhal*, vol. III, 262; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍaw'*, vol. X, 272. Eunuchs serving as instructors and supervisors of the mamluks in the sultani barracks were often called *aghāwāt*: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 399; vol. XVI, 117. Sometimes sultans and amirs were approached out of respect with the title of *aghā*: ibid., vol. XVI, 47; idem, *Ḥawādith*, vol. II, 416; idem, *Manhal*, vol. II, 501; vol. IV, 262.

[63] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 199; vol. XVI, 196. See also: idem, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 149.

[64] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 217.

[65] Idem, *Mawrid al-laṭāfa*, 173.

[66] Idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 38; vol. XV, 120–21, 188; idem, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 212, 213.

[67] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. VI, 169. For other examples see: idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 201; vol. XVI, 255, 260, 267; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍaw'*, vol. II, 329; vol. III, 26; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. III, 6, 169, 279; vol. IV, 59; vol. VII, 12; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. I/ii, 665; vol. II, 81; vol. III, 197, 246, 284, 308; vol. IV, 247, 296, 308, 399; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 437.

that was the most personal and intimate. In the second circle, there
was the bond among the mamluks from the same *ṭabaqa*. The outer,
widest circle contained all the sultan's mamluks, the *khushdāshiyya*. In
contrast to the Mamluk system model, whereby the Mamluk faction
is shown as a single unified collective, this order of affiliation of the
julbān presents different levels in the *khushdāshiyya* and endows it with
a more qualified meaning.

An example illustrating the three circles of mamluk affiliation can
be found in the division of the *julbān* after the death of Sultan al-
Ashraf Barsbāy in 842/1438. The Ashrafiyya split into two groups
that fought each other for power. The first was consolidated around
the mamluks' identification with their *ṭabaqa* and *aghā*. Its members
were defined in the sources as the *inyāt* and brothers of their leader,
Īnāl al-Abū Bakrī from the Ṭabaqat al-Ashrafiyya [*min inyāt Īnāl wa-
ikhwatihi*].[68] The second group consisted of *julbān* defined as their
khushdāshiyya, i.e., their colleagues from other barracks. With regard
to the measure of solidarity in each of the groups, Īnāl al-Abū Bakrī's
group was smaller and more consolidated and knew how to negotiate
with veteran Mamluk factions, though eventually their demands were
not met due to their weakness. The rival faction, however, consisted
of the majority of al-Ashraf Barsbāy's *julbān*, but due to the great
schism among them [*ikhtilāf arā'ihim*],[69] they were easily dispersed by
the senior mamluks and even easily driven out of their *ṭibāq* in the
Citadel, despite the strategic and political advantage they held.[70]

The importance of the *ṭabaqa* as a place enabling the consolida-
tion of the mamluks housed in it into an organized group with its
own specific interests, which did not fall into line with the *khushdāshiyya*
of the whole Mamluk faction, is borne out by the skirmish among
the mamluks of the *ṭibāq* in the Citadel that took place in Dhū al-
Ḥijja 920/February 1515. The mamluks from Ṭabaqat al-Ṭāziyya
attacked those from Ṭabaqat al-Zammāmiyya with clubs because the
latter had backed down from their demands to Sultan Qānṣūh al-
Ghawrī (906–922/1500–1516) for a wage increase in order to curry
favour with him and thus gain an advantage over their fellows. The

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[68] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 235. For another example see: al-Sakhāwī,
Ḍaw', vol. X, 272; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 437.
[69] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 236; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1049.
[70] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 236, 239–40; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV,
1074, 1076.

Ṭabaqat al-Ṭāziyya mamluks felt that the mamluks from all the bar-
racks should unite in their demand for a raise of a hundred dinars
for each mamluk. When each party maintained its position, a split
opened among the sultan's mamluks between those who sided with
the sultan and those who opposed him. The crisis was resolved when
the sultan promised all the mamluks a raise of fifty dinars per per-
son, with payment being deferred for two months.[71]

The relationship between the *aghā* and the *inī* took on the char-
acteristics of patronage that was bound up in moral commitment
throughout their careers.[72] There were even mamluks who were
named after their respective *aghā*s. One such mamluk was Ṭūkh
Māzī, who was one of al-Nāṣir Faraj's mamluks and was named
after his *aghā*, Māzī al-Ẓāhirī.[73] Similarly Sūdūn al-Qāḍī was named
after his *aghā*, Tanibak al-Qāḍī.[74]

As was mentioned earlier, Sūdūn al-Māridānī and Tanibak al-
Bijāsī were Jār Quṭlū's *inyāt*, and much later, when both had sur-
passed their *aghā*'s status, Ibn Taghrī Birdī tells us, Tanibak al-Bijāsī
was grateful to him for the education he had given him and con-
tinued to honour and respect him in recognition of days gone by.[75]
On the recommendation of Sūdūn al-Māridānī, Sultan Barqūq enrolled
Jār Quṭlū into his bodyguard, or *khāṣṣakiyya*.[76] Normally, it was the
aghā who was the *inī*'s advocate with the sultan and was concerned
with his promotion and advancement.[77] In his youth, Sultan al-Ẓāhir
Khushqadam was made a *khāṣṣakī* in Barsbāy's bodyguard on the
recommendation of his *aghā*, Taghrī Birdī.[78]

The bond between the *aghā* and the *inī* stood also at the center
of the friendships among the *inyāt* who were affiliated to the same
aghā, thus forming exclusive groups within the *ṭabaqa*. Mamluks who
belonged to such groups felt very close and preserved their friend-
ship many years after their manumission. Thus Asandamur was one

[71] Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. IV, 430–31; for another example see: idem, *Badā'i'*, vol.
III, 147.
[72] Ayalon, "l'Esclavage", 31–34.
[73] Al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. IV, 9; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. VII, 12.
[74] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 159.
[75] Idem, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 212. For another example see: idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV,
200.
[76] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 212, 213.
[77] *Ibid.*, 213. For other examples see: *Ibid.*, vol. II, 338–39; al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol.
III, 30, 281.
[78] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 255.

of Jārikas al-Muṣāriʿ's *inī*s in the Ṭabaqat al-Zammāmiyya (see also later). Many years after they left the *ṭabaqa*, Asandamur and his friends were described by Ibn Taghrī Birdī as Jārikas' band [*rifqa*].[79]

The special relationship between the *inyāt* and the *aghāwāt* in the barracks and the solidarity that the mamluks had with their colleagues of the same *ṭabaqa* explain the phenomenon, which was common during the Circassian period, of the confusion felt by *kuttābiyya* mamluks who were purchased by the new sultan from the estate of his predecessor. These mamluks lacked a sense of solidarity and often even felt alien to the *julbān* purchased during the rule of their new master. All were formally the sultan's mamluks as they had been purchased, trained and emancipated by him. However, the *kuttābiyya* mamluks were of two minds. They identified with the previous sultan's veteran mamluks, with whom they had been trained during their first period of *kuttābiyya*. It is not difficult, therefore, to imagine the crisis they underwent when their masters changed. This was because the custom of an ascending sultan during this period was, as mentioned above, to dispose of their predecessor's *julbān*, and so, quite suddenly, the *ṭibāq* were emptied and the *kuttābiyya* were bereft of their older colleagues. Furthermore, in many cases they had to adapt to a new professional staff.[80] Therefore, despite the advantage of their status as the ruling sultan's *julbān*, they often rebelled against their new master and even joined their older colleagues, with whom they really identified.

The revolt which broke out in 859/1455, some two years after Sultan al-Ashraf Īnāl rose to power, brought to the surface the solidarity between the mamluks of the *julbān* the sultan had purchased from the *kuttābiyya* of his predecessor, al-Ẓāhir Jaqmaq, and their senior colleagues from the Ẓāhiriyya. It is worthy of note that there was no prior liaison between the *julbān* and Jaqmaq's Ẓāhiri mamluks. The *julbān*'s protest began because of their demand for higher wages, or *jawāmik*. In order to further their claims they surrounded Amir Yūnus, the sultan's ink bearer (*dawādār*) at the time, as he left the Citadel and asked him to intercede with the sultan on their

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[79] Idem, *Manhal*, vol. II, 448. On the place of old friendship for the Mamluk see: Abū Ḥāmid, Muḥammad b. Khalīl al-Qudsī, *Kitāb Duwal al-Islām al-Sharīfa al-bahiyya*, Ṣubḥī Labīb and Ulrich Haarmann (eds.), Beirut, 1997, 114.

[80] See for example: al-Jawharī, vol. III, 440; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 203–4; vol. XV, 248; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1076.

behalf. When it appeared to Yūnus's mamluks that the *julbān* intended to harm their master, they attacked them, wounding several. As a result, the *julbān* rioted and demanded that Yūnus be handed over to them. When this did not happen, they moved to his house to loot it and burn it down, but there, too, Yūnus's mamluks beat them off. Sultan Īnāl tried to appease the *julbān* by compensating their wounded, but they were not to be conciliated and stood in the Horse Market throughout the night, albeit they were unarmed. When the sultan sent four amirs to negotiate with them, the amirs were taken hostage. An expeditionary force was, coincidentally, to have set out to engage the Bedouin in al-Buḥayra (a western province in the Nile Delta), and in the force were Jaqmaq's Ẓāhiri mamluks. This force, however, refused to go to al-Buḥayra as the mamluks had not been given camels, as was customary before a military campaign. Initially the Ẓāhiri mamluks stood aloof and watched the *julbān*, but once it became clear that the latter were rebelling against their master, they joined them in order to avenge the injustice they believed he had done them. The Ẓāhiri mamluks instructed the *julbān* to recruit the Abbasid caliph to their cause in order to improve their position in the struggle. Once the caliph took their side, they were joined by numerous mamluks from various factions and a large mob from the civilian population. In the end, the size of the camp mustered against the sultan frightened the *julbān* and they fled the scene, one by one. The *julbān*, then, intended to protest against the sultan but not to depose him.[81] The sources tell us that from that time the schism within the *julbān* was clear-cut. They split into two groups, one consisting of those mamluks bought by Sultan Īnāl from the *kuttābiyya* of al-Ẓāhir Jaqmaq and his son (the latter had ruled for only one month), and the second composed of the *julbān* Īnāl had purchased during his period of rule.[82]

Whereas the above case shows that the *julbān* "of two minds" got cold feet and eventually backed down from their revolt for fear of losing their status as a privileged Mamluk faction, with the downfall of their new master, in a period of changing rule, they had no compunction about identifying entirely with their colleagues from

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[81] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Ḥawādith*, vol. II, 528–32; idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 87–90.
[82] Idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 91; idem, *Ḥawādith*, vol. II, 532; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. II, 326–28.

their initial training period. The same two *julbān* groups of al-Ashraf
Īnāl openly faced one another after his death in 865/1461. At the
side of his successor, al-Muʾayyad Aḥmad, who ruled for only a few
months (February–June 1461), stood the *julbān* purchased by Īnāl
during his rule, their number reaching one thousand mamluks, while
those he had purchased from the estate of al-Ẓāhir Jaqmaq and his
son joined the Ẓāhiriyya at the instigation of Amir Jānībak, who
supported the candidacy of one of its number, Khushqadam, for the
throne. Apart from the attractive benefits he granted to them, Khush-
qadam played on their group affiliation, saying, "You are Ẓāhiriyya
and your purchase by al-Ashraf is not right [*antum Ẓāhiriyya wa-shirāʾ
al-Ashraf lakum ghayr ṣaḥīḥ*]".[83] It should be noted that the problem
of the technical transfer of the *kuttābiyya* mamluks from one sultan
to another had arisen earlier in the above-mentioned revolt of these
julbān against Īnāl. After this revolt, Īnāl had arrested a number of
Ẓāhiri mamluks and driven a large number of the *julbān* out of the
Citadel barracks into Cairo, when the following words of one of his
julbān from the *kuttābiyya* of al-Ẓāhir Jaqmaq came to his ears: "We
are the emancipated slaves of al-Malik al-Ẓāhir and were trained by
him. I cannot be an emancipated slave of al-Ashraf Īnāl [only] by
a piece of paper . . . [*naḥnu ʿutaqāʾ al-Malik al-Ẓāhir wa-tarbiyatuhu wa-
lā aṣīr ʿatīq al-Malik al-Ashraf Īnāl bi-qiṭʿat waraqa*]".[84]

Towards the end of al-Ashraf Qāytbāy's reign (900/1494), a conflict
broke out between two groups of Ashrafi mamluks that ultimately
encompassed the entire army and threatened the sultan's rule.[85] One
group was led by Āqbirdī, who was not only one of Qāytbāy's mam-
luks but also his brother-in-law.[86] The second was headed by Qānṣūh
Khamsmiʾa. According to Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Ibn Iyās (d. 931/
1524), one version has it [*yuqāl*] that Qānṣūh Khamsmiʾa was pur-
chased from the *kuttābiyya* of al-Ẓāhir Khushqadam.[87] At a consul-
tation held by Qāytbāy it became clear that most of the army had
in fact gathered around Uzbak,[88] who was then commander-in-chief,

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[83] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 242.
[84] Idem, *Hawādith*, vol. II, 538.
[85] Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, vol. III, 311. In fact this conflict between these two groups
of Mamluks goes back as early as 892/1486; see: *ibid.*, 237, 285, 309, 311–12.
[86] *Ibid.*, 178, 421.
[87] *Ibid.*, 354.
[88] He was the founder of Uzbakiyya quarter west to Fāṭimid Cairo; *ibid.*, 116–18.

or *atābak al-ʿasākir*. Further information gathered from the sources shows that he had joined the rebels because Qānṣūh Khamsmi'a was his son-in-law[89] and that Uzbak, like Qānṣūh, was a Ẓāhirī. He was identified with al-Ẓāhir Jaqmaq and close to him also because he had married two of his daughters.[90] After Qāytbāy's death (902/1496) the *julbān* were again split according to the lines drawn in this revolt.[91]

It should be noted that the daring of the *julbān* from the previous sultan's *kuttābiyya*, who did not form a majority among the *julbān* of the ruling sultan, and their open identification with their senior colleagues stemmed from the new factional order that had been created in the Circassian period. In this new order, there was room for the Ẓāhiriyya or Ashrafiyya veteran mamluks to take part in Mamluk politics for a very long time after their masters death and it was from among them that the new sultan came to power. Therefore, when the *julbān* were driven out of the *ṭibāq* and dispersed after the death of their master, there was an advantage in the *kuttābiyya* identifying with their senior colleagues as this could rapidly bring them closer to the new regime and winning offices in it. I will expand on this in the last part of this article.

<div align="center">V</div>

The mamluks' personal relationships during their training period in the barracks and those created during their service in the amirs' Mamluk households were intertwined, forming a network on which Mamluk politics were based. This network determined the movements of mamluks between the government's coalition and opposition on which the stability of the regime actually depended. To illustrate the way in which this network of personal relationships worked, I will focus on the way in which Sultans Ṭaṭar and Barsbāy filled the ranks of their amirs and the implications of this strategy on the constituents of the coalition that supported their rule.

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[89] *Ibid.*, 241, 242, 311.
[90] *Ibid.*, 412.
[91] *Ibid.*, 342–51.

Fortunately, the sources have left us sufficient information on the history of these sultans from the beginning of their training in the barracks to their rise to power. Al-Ẓāhir Ṭaṭar was originally from Sultan Barqūq's *julbān*, and like Barsbāy and Jaqmaq was trained in the Ṭabaqat al-Zammāmiyya, but he was more senior by one intake, or *kharj*.[92] Clearly, the three knew one another in their *ṭabaqa* during their training in the *kuttābiyya* and this relationship was the centre of personal connections which, in one way or another, continued throughout their lives. Ṭaṭar and Barsbāy were very close friends.[93] Thus Ṭaṭar protected his friend when al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh wanted to imprison him, and then facilitated his promotion in Damascus, far away from al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh's eyes. When Ṭaṭar took the reins of rule and became the *de facto* ruler on behalf of al-Mu'ayyad's son (824/1421), Barsbāy was appointed *dawādār kabīr* with the rank of *muqaddam alf* [94] after being redundant in Damascus.[95] Barsbāy was sent to Syria as Ṭaṭar's trusted right arm to settle a disagreement with the latter's opponents, and as a result of his blandishments they came to Damascus, where they were liquidated, thus paving Ṭaṭar's way to rule.[96] A short time after Ṭaṭar's rise to power, he fell ill and on his deathbed he willed his rule to his son, who was a minor, with Barsbāy as his legal guardian and Jānībak al-Ṣūfī responsible for management of rule.[97]

"There was a firm friendship [*ṣuḥba akīda*]" between Barsbāy and Amir Ṭarabāy.[98] This amir returned from Iraq immediately after hearing that Ṭaṭar was the man making the decisions in government.[99] Ṭaṭar was unable to give him an office immediately, but promised him that he would do so when he took the throne. Upon his ascension, he appointed Ṭarabāy grand chamberlain (*ḥājib al-ḥujjāb*).[100] Later, when Barsbāy rose to power he appointed Ṭarabāy

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[92] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. III, 256; idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 199.

[93] Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 583; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. II, 72, 81; al-'Aynī, *'Iqd*, 502.

[94] Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. II, 72; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 201; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍaw'*, vol. III, 8; al-'Aynī, *'Iqd*, 503.

[95] Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 581.

[96] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol XIV, 192; idem, *Manhal*, vol. III, 207–8.

[97] Idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 206; idem, *Manhal*, vol. III, 258–59; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 587; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. II, 74.

[98] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 277; vol. XV, 195.

[99] Idem, *Manhal*, vol. III, 260; vol. VI, 374–75; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. II, 72.

[100] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. VI, 375; idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 201.

atābak al-'asākir, the most senior position in the mamluk army. Ṭarabāy helped Barsbāy overcome Jānībak al-Ṣūfī, who vied with Barsbāy for rule.[101] Even later, when Ṭarabāy wanted power for himself and openly opposed him,[102] Barsbāy did not forget their friendship. He released Ṭarabāy from prison in 827/1423, granted him a thousand dinars and sent him to Jerusalem "to stay there without being in a plight [*li-yuqīma bihi ghayr muḍayyaq 'alayhi*]".[103] Those around Barsbāy thought that Ṭarabāy's release ran counter to any political logic, but Barsbāy paid them no heed because of "the old affection and friend-ship they had from their early days [*limā kāna baynahumā mina al-wudd al-qadīm wa'l-ṣuḥba min mabādi' amrihimā*]".[104] In 831/1427, Barsbāy appointed Ṭarabāy governor of Tripoli, an office he held until his death in 838/1434. Ibn Taghrī Birdī estimates "that had it been anyone else he would not have treated him this way".[105]

With regard to Ṭaṭar's relationship with Jaqmaq, once Ṭaṭar's sta-tus had risen, he appointed Jaqmaq prefect of the Citadel with the rank of *muqaddam alf*[106] and named him his deputy when he went to quell a rebellion in Syria.[107] There was also a close friendship between Barsbāy and Jaqmaq as both were *inyāt* of Jārikas al-Muṣāri', who was Jaqmaq's older brother. As Jārikas was one of Barqūq's favourite mamluks of the *khāṣṣakiyya*, it was due to the latter's request that Jaqmaq came to the Ṭabaqat al-Zammāmiyya and became Jārikas' *inī*.[108]

Another of Jārikas al-Muṣāri's *inī*s was Asandamur al-Nūrī.[109] This relationship gained the latter access to Ṭaṭar's coterie and the

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[101] Idem, *Manhal*, vol. III, 259, 260; vol. VI, 375–76; idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 211–20, 230; al-Jawharī, vol. II, 517, 518; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 591.

[102] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 226–31; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. II, 76.

[103] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 277.

[104] *Ibid.*

[105] *Ibid.*, vol. XV, 195; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 952; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 324. For another friend of Barsbāy see: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 224.

[106] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 212; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. II, 119, 140.

[107] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 203; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. II, 66–67; al-Jawharī, vol. II, 503.

[108] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 258, 260; idem, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 211, 275–76; idem, *Ḥawādith*, vol. II, 461; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. II, 81; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍaw'*, vol. III, 71; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Mawrid al-laṭāfa*, 152; idem, *al-Dalīl al-shāfī fī al-Manhal al-ṣāfī*, ed. Fahīm Muḥammad Shaltūt, Cairo, 1983 (hereafter—Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Dalīl al-shāfī*), vol. I, 234.

[109] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. II, 447–48. See also: Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. II, 77.

appointment of amir with the rank of *muqaddam alf*. When Barsbāy took power, he first appointed Asandamur governor of Alexandria, leaving him with his rank. Later, when one of Barsbāy's opponents escaped from the Alexandria jail, Asandamur's negligent and selfish life style was brought to the surface. Yet Barsbāy pardoned him after a short time and even gave him the rank of *muqaddam alf* in Damascus. When Jaqmaq rose to power (841/1437), Asandamur expected promotion as he was his close colleaque and his brother's *inī*.[110] Because of his commitment to Asandamur, neither Jaqmaq got rid of him, but awarded him a monthly salary of five thousand dirhams until his death at seventy in 848/1444.[111] Asandamur was out of the ordinary because of his problematic character. In fact, Jaqmaq promoted during his reign many of his brother's *inyāt* and his company [*rifqatuhu*].[112] Thus, for example, Qānī Bāy al-Jārikasī, who was also a relative of Ṭaṭar, was included at the beginning of his career in the latter's *khāṣṣakiyya*. Later, during Jaqmaq's reign, due to his family ties, he was rapidly promoted to the highest rank in the army and nominated consecutively as *shādd al-sharāb khāna* (supervisor of the royal buttery), *Dawādār kabīr* and *amīr ākhūr kabīr* (grand supervisor of the royal stables).[113]

Taghrī Barmish was a mamluk who was given to Jārikas al-Muṣāri' as a gift by his brother Jaqmaq. With the removal of Jārikas by al-Nāṣir Faraj for joining a revolt against him, Taghrī Barmish was taken from his estate into Faraj's *kuttābiyya*. With the elimination of Faraj, he was again moved to al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh's *kuttābiyya*. When Jaqmaq demanded ownership of him with the claim that he was his brother's legal heir, al-Mu'ayyad did not give him up, arguing that Taghrī Barmish was an asset to his household because he was well-versed in the Koran and knew fiqh. Al-Mu'ayyad compensated Jaqmaq with money and another mamluk. When Ṭaṭar rose to power and Jaqmaq had free access to him, he returned Taghrī Barmish to him because Ṭaṭar had sought legal grounds for his return and made him his own *khāṣṣakī*. Barsbāy, however, banished this Taghrī Barmish

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[110] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. II, 448.
[111] *Ibid.*, 448–49.
[112] *Ibid.*, 448.
[113] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 198; vol. XVI, 316; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍaw'*, vol. VI, 194. See also: al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍaw'*, vol. X, 288; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 170; idem, *Ḥawādith*, vol. II, 349, 390, 507.

to Qūṣ, apparently because of his coarse behaviour, and for the same reason, Jaqmaq did not accede to Taghrī Barmish's requests for a senior amirate. Yet, because of his commitment to Taghrī Barmish, Jaqmaq did grant him an *iqṭāʿ* and an Amirate of Ten in 844/1440. Then he appointed him vice regent of the Citadel, a post he held until 851/1447.[114] In the same way, Jaqmaq's commitment to ʿAlī b. Īnāl al-Yūsufī—his master before he moved to Barqūq's household at his brother's request—ultimately made him include ʿAlī's two sons, Aḥmad and Ṭūmān Bāy, among his amirs.[115]

A gift sent to Sultan Barqūq by Amir Duqmāq al-Muḥammadī, who at the time was governor of Malaṭya, included eighteen mamluks, among whom were Barsbāy and Timrāz al-Qurmushī. The friendship between the two, which had begun in Duqmāq's Mamluk household, continued throughout Barsbāy's life and brought him into the close circle round Jaqmaq. When Barsbāy rose to power Timrāz became one of the amirs who were closest to him [*muqarraban ilā al-ghāya*][116] and maintained this status until Barsbāy's death. When Jaqmaq rose to power Timrāz became one of the senior office-holders in his regime, with the rank of *muqaddam alf*. A short time later he was appointed *amīr silāḥ*, or the sultan's arms bearer, a position he held for a long period until his death in the epidemic of 853/1449.[117]

Qaṣrūh min Timrāz, Timrāz al-Qurmushī's mamluk, was another of the stalwarts of Barsbāy's rule. When Ṭaṭar rose to power, Qaṣrūh was given the office of *raʾs nawba* (head of the royal guard) and, after a short time, served as *amīr ākhūr* with the rank of *muqaddam alf*. He was very active in preparing the ground for Barsbāy's rise to power. Barsbāy kept him in this position and later appointed him *amīr ākhūr* and governor of Tripoli, Aleppo and Damascus consecutively.[118]

Qaṣrūh min Timrāz and Uzbak al-Muḥammadī were *inī*s of Barsbughā al-Muẓaffarī at the Ṭabaqat al-Rafraf. This connection brought Uzbak close to Ṭaṭar and Barsbāy. Upon Ṭaṭar's rise to power, Uzbak was promoted to an amirate of Forty and later to an

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[114] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 68–70; idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 530–32; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʾ*, vol. III, 33; al-Jawharī, vol. IV, 133–34.

[115] Idem, *Ḥawādith*, vol. II, 352, 501–2.

[116] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 149; vol. V, 310; al-ʿAynī, *ʿIqd*, 500–2.

[117] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 460, 536–37; idem, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 149. For another example see: idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 213–14.

[118] Al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʾ*, vol. VI, 222; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 202; vol. XV, 199.

amirate of a Hundred and *taqdimat alf*. When Barsbāy rose to power
he served as *ra's nawbat al-nuwwāb* and later as *dawādār kabīr*. In
831/1427 he was removed from office as a result of a false accu-
sation that he wanted to rebel against the sultan.[119]

Barsbāy's forgiveness towards Ṭarabāy and that of Jaqmaq towards
Taghrī Barmish and Asandamur al-Nūr, in contrast to his severity
towards Uzbak al-Muḥammadī, show the existence of different lev-
els of personal connections within the same Mamluk household. The
relationship between Ṭarabāy and Barsbāy and that between Jaqmaq,
Taghrī Barmish and Asandamur al-Nūrī were closer and therefore
more binding than relationships among mamluks from different bar-
racks, even if they were all affiliated to one master.

It is worthy of mention that during the Circassian period it was
customary to recruit relatives into the Mamluk army, and special
envoys were often sent by sultans and dominant amirs to bring them
to Egypt from the Caucasus. Amirs and mamluks also entered the
sultans' families by marriage. These familial relations by both birth
and marriage were also instrumental in the formation of the sultan's
coterie. Thus Ḥasan b. Sūdūn, Ṭaṭar's brother-in-law, was appointed
Amir of a Hundred and *muqaddam alf*.[120] Yashbak, Barsbāy's eldest
brother, reached Egypt when Barsbāy was already sultan and died
in 833/1429, holding the rank of *muqaddam alf*.[121] Jānim, too, was a
relative who was brought to Egypt by Barsbāy in 828/1425. Initially
he was one of Barsbāy's *khāṣṣakiyya*, and by 836/1432 he already
held the rank of *muqaddam alf*.[122]

Another way in which the mamluk network of personal relationships
became stronger was, as mentioned earlier, through the mamluks'
service in the amirs' Mamluk households after the deaths of their
masters. During the civil war that lasted for some twelve years after
the death of Barqūq, Ṭaṭar, like many other mamluks, moved from

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[119] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 201; vol. XV, 157–58.

[120] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. VI, 164. For further example see: idem, *Ḥawādith*,
vol. II, 471; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. II, 472–73; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍaw'*, vol. II, 274, 275,
312, 315; vol. III, 4, 7, 8, 21, 37, 53, 64, 65, 220, 284, 286, 287; vol. VI, 196,
221–22, 223, 227; vol. X, 166, 270, 271, 280, 336; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol.
IV, 101, 217–18.

[121] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 291; vol. XV, 165.

[122] Al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍaw'*, vol. III, 63. For further example see: Ibn Taghrī Birdī,
Ḥawādith, vol. II, 476; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. II, 309, 319, 367, 369, 423, 430, 469;
vol. III, 104, 107, 110, 145, 153, 171, 175, 190, 213, 249, 276, 288, 298; al-
Jawharī, vol. III, 258; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. II, 346; vol. V, 15, 327; vol.
VI, 164–65, 186; Ibn Ḥajar, vol. VIII, 396.

the service of one amir to another. He first deserted from al-Nāṣir Faraj b. Barqūq's army, finding refuge with Jakam min ʿAwḍ, who rebelled in Egypt in 804/1401 and who later, in 809/1406, occupied Syria with the support of Nawrūz al-Ḥāfiẓī, declaring himself an independent sultan.[123] It is worthy of note that in 807/1404, Jakam's rebel camp in Syria included Jārikas al-Mūṣāriʿ and Qarā Yūsuf, the Turcoman ruler of Iraq who had fled before Timur's invaders.[124] When Jakam was defeated and murdered by the Turcomans in Syria, Ṭaṭar moved into the service of Nawrūz al-Ḥāfiẓī in Syria.[125] After the removal of al-Nāṣir Faraj from the Egyptian throne, Nawrūz did not recognize al-Muʾayyad Shaykh's sultanate too and rebelled in Syria.[126] With Nawrūz's defeat, his mamluks and amirs and those who had joined him were pursued by al-Muʾayyad Shaykh.[127] In contrast, Ṭaṭar found a way of entering al-Muʾayyad Shaykh's service,[128] advancing to the rank of *muqaddam alf* and serving in senior positions such as *raʾs nawba* and *amīr majlis*.[129] Before his death, al-Muʾayyad bequeathed the throne to his son Aḥmad, who was then only one year old, and appointed Ṭaṭar as Aḥmad's legal guardian until the return of Alṭunbughā al-Qirmishī, the *atābak al-ʿasākir*, from a campaign in Syria.[130]

Prior to Ṭaṭar's rise to power, during the short period in which he ruled in the name of the young al-Muẓaffar Aḥmad, the sources indicate that mamluks from the Jakamīyya and the Nawrūziyya, i.e., mamluks of Jakam min ʿAwḍ and Nawrūz al-Ḥāfiẓī respectively, were already in his service.[131] Yashbak al-Jakamī was one of Jakam's

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[123] Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, vol. III, 1084–85; vol. IV, 13, 17–18, 20–21, 35, 41; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 314–17; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Abū Bakr b. Aḥmad, *Taʾrīkh Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba*, ed. ʿAdnān Darwīsh, Damascus, 1997 (hereafter—Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba), vol. IV, 266–67; al-Jawharī, vol. II, 140–42, 229–31, 513–14; Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, vol. II, 71.

[124] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 317; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. III, 1159–60; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʾ*, vol. III, 76.

[125] Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 45–46; Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, vol. II, 71–72.

[126] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 6–7; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 246–50; Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, vol. II, 71–72; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, vol. II, 318.

[127] See for example: Taghrī Barmish al-Maḥmūdī: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 179; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʾ*, vol. IV, 9. See below also the amirs that found asylum in Iraq.

[128] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. VI, 397; al-Jawharī, vol. II, 513.

[129] Al-Jawharī, vol. II, 353, 393, 415.

[130] Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, vol. II, 64, 71–73; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. VI, 398; idem, *Mawrid al-laṭāfa*, 140.

[131] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujum*, vol. XIV, 208.

mamluks who had fled from al-Mu'ayyad and found refuge with
Qarā Yūsuf, who in the meantime had returned to rule Baghdad
and Tabriz. When he heard that Ṭaṭar had taken power, he returned
from Iraq and was immediately appointed *amīr ākhūr kabīr*.[132] Jānibak
al-Jakamī was another mamluk of Yashbak al-Jakamī; he served as
a *khāṣṣakī* during the rule of Barsbāy, and during Jaqmaq's rule, he
was first the sultan's cupbearer (*sāqī*) and later was awarded an ami-
rate. Among the positions he filled were *ra's nawba*, *wālī* (prefect) of
Cairo and *ḥājib* (chamberlain).[133] Qānī Bāy al-Abū Bakrī was one of
al-Nāṣir Faraj's mamluks who first served Burdbak al-Jakamī, i.e.,
one of Jakam's mamluks, and later served Ṭaṭar during the period
of his amirate.[134] On his rise to power, Ṭaṭar appointed him *ra's
nawba* and awarded him an amirate of forty.[135] During the rule of
Barsbāy and Jaqmaq he was among the amirs with the rank of
Muqaddam alf. He served as vice regent of Malaṭya, and *atābak* in
Aleppo and Damascus, among other positions.[136] Shād Bak al-Jakamī,
Sūdūn al-Jakamī, Qānī Bāy, Burdbak al-Jakamī and Īnāl al-Jakamī
were all Jakam's mamluks who were promoted by Ṭaṭar, Barsbāy
and Jaqmaq.[137]

Yashbak al-Sāqī, known as al-A'raj, was one of Barqūq's mam-
luks, serving first in the *khāṣṣakiyya* and later as Barqūq's *sāqī*. Yashbak
was a close friend of Ṭaṭar since their training period [*wa-kāna min
ikhwat Ṭaṭar*]. They both served in Jakam min 'Awḍ's and Nawrūz
al-Ḥāfiẓī's households. Because he had served Nawrūz, Yashbak was
exiled to Mecca by al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh. From the outset al-Mu'ayyad
intended to exile him to Yemen because he was concerned that he
would incite the mamluks when they made the pilgrimage, or *ḥajj*.
Ṭaṭar, however, begged al-Mu'ayyad for mercy and succeeded in
having Yashbak's punishment commuted to exile in Mecca rather
than in Yemen. In the same way, Ṭaṭar later facilitated Yashbak's

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[132] *Ibid.*, 201; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. II, 72; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍaw'*, vol. X, 275.
[133] Al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍaw'*, vol. III, 61–62; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 242.
For another example see: al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍaw'*, vol. II, 330.
[134] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 520.
[135] *Ibid.*, vol. XIV, 202; vol. XV, 520.
[136] Al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍaw'*, vol. VI, 194.
[137] *Ibid.*, vol. III, 56; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. III, 196–200, 252–53, 263;
vol. IV, 242; idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 469, 511, 547; vol. XVI, 196; idem, *Ḥawādith*,
vol. II, 512–13; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍaw'*, vol. III, 7. Jakamiyya and Nawrūziyya mamluks
joined Jaqmaq's camp in 842/1438. See: al-Jawharī, vol. III, 437.

transfer from Mecca to Jerusalem. When Ṭaṭar rose to power, he brought Yashbak back to Egypt and made him his close adviser. When Ṭaṭar went to Syria to quell a rebellion, he left Yashbak in the Citadel to guard his wives.[138] Ṭaṭar died before he could award Yasbak an amirate, but Barsbāy did so, awarding him the ranks of Amir of a Hundred and *muqaddam alf* in one fell swoop [*dafʿatan wāḥidatan*] and appointing him *amīr silāḥ*. From this rank he moved to the highest office, *atābak al-ʿasākir*, serving in this capacity until his death in 831/1427.[139]

Uzbak al-Ṭūmān Bāyī was one of Barqūq's mamluks who was promoted by Nawrūz al-Ḥāfiẓī, al-Muʾayyad's rival in Syria, to the most senior amirate rank. After Nawrūz's rebellion had been suppressed, Uzbak was imprisoned for a number of years in Marqab (a fortress in Syria near the Bāniyās). He was released by al-Muʾayyad in 822/1419 and was awarded an insignificant amirate, Amir of Five, in Damascus. When Ṭaṭar came to power, Uzbak became one of his confidants. He was awarded the rank of Amir of a Hundred and *muqaddam alf*, and with the death of Ṭaṭar, Barsbāy awarded him the office of *raʾs nawbat al-nuwwāb*. In 827/1423 he was appointed to the office of *dawādār kabīr*, which he filled most admirably until 831/1427.[140] Qānṣūh al-Nawrūzī, Arghūn Shāh al-Nawrūzī, Arkamās al-Nawrūzī, Sūdūn al-Nawrūzī, Īnāl al-Nawrūzī and Jānibak al-Nawrūzī were all Nawrūz al-Ḥāfiẓī's mamluks who were promoted during the rule of Ṭaṭar and Barsbāy, and part of them even during Jaqmaq's.[141]

A clear illustration of the interweaving of personal relationships within the *khushdāshiyya* and outside it into a single network that influenced the mamluks' decisions as to which faction to join during power conflicts over rule, can be found in the power struggle between Barsbāy and Jānībak al-Ṣūfī after the death of Ṭaṭar in 824/1421.

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[138] Al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʾ*, vol. X, 276–77; al-ʿAynī, *ʿIqd*, 346–47; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 140–41; Ibn Ḥajar, vol. VIII, 166–67.

[139] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 225; vol. XV, 151; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʾ*, vol. X, 277. See also Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. II, 207–8; vol. IV, 51–52.

[140] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. II, 338–40; idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 157. For another example see: al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʾ*, vol. III, 7.

[141] Al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʾ*, vol. III, 61; vol. VI, 199; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. II, 324–27, 334; vol. IV, 248; vol. VI, 166, 172–73, 177; vol. VII, 16; idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 220; idem, *Ḥawādith*, vol. II, 472; al-Jawharī, vol. II, 437, 509; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1074.

Ẓāhiri amirs like Ṭarabāy, Jānibak al-Ḥamzāwī, Sūdūn min ʿAbd
al-Raḥmān, Qurmush al-Aʿwar, Mūsā al-Karkarī and others, were
khushdāshiyya of Ṭaṭar and Barsbāy. They were honoured and awarded
offices by Ṭaṭar on their return from Iraq, and likewise by Barsbāy
immediately after the death of Ṭaṭar. However, they joined Jānibak
al-Ṣūfī against Barsbāy because they felt closer to him.[142] When
Barsbāy asked Qurmush al-Aʿwar to leave Jānibak al-Ṣūfī's group
and join him, Qurmush replied: "How can I not be with him, for
I bore him on my shoulders in the land of Jarkas and raised him
like a child [*Kayfa lā akūnu maʿahu wa-qad ḥamaltuhu ʿalā kitfayya fī bilād
Jarkas wa-rabbaytuhu kaʾl-walad*]".[143] Thus Barsbāy was unable to com-
pete with Qurmush's commitment to Jānibak, but this commitment
of friendship and the recognition of Jānibak's leadership and senior-
ity by these amirs did not prevent them from eventually leaving him
and joining Barsbāy.[144] Their hatred of Yashbak al-Jakamī, who was
in their camp, tipped the balance. He had treated them with a lack
of respect when they were with Qarā Yūsuf in Iraq, and they could
not bear the idea that Jānibak, too, had made him one of his close
companions, just as Qarā Yūsuf had done, and demanded that he
be sent to Syria. Jānibak al-Ṣūfī, however, found it difficult to renounce
Yashbak al-Jakamī because he had recruited his *inī*, Dūlāt Bāy al-
Muʾayyadī, into his camp, bringing with him his colleagues from
among the Muʾayyadiyya mamluks. It should be noted that Yashbak
al-Jakamī entered the service of al-Muʾayyad Shaykh when the latter
was still an amir, and it was during this period that Dūlāt Bāy was

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[142] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 36–37, 69, 164, 201, 212, 214, 215, 224;
vol. XV, 120, 157, 179, 180–81; idem, *Manhal*, vol. VI, 274–75; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʾ*,
vol. III, 275; vol. IV, 7; vol. VI, 153–54, 200; vol. X, 276. For other amirs who
came back from Iraq upon Ṭaṭar's rise to power see: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*,
vol. II, 297.

[143] Al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʾ*, vol. VI, 221; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 235–36.
See another example of personal commitment instrumental in promoting a mam-
luk: Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, vol. II, 69. It might well be that Qurmush al-Aʿwar's words
refer to the Circassian practice known as *ataliqate* wereby boys of noble families
were entrusted at an early age to vassals to be raised and trained in military fash-
ion. Amjad Jaimoukha, *The Circassians*, Richmond (England), 2001, 175–77. During
the Circassian period relatives were brought from the old country and at times
mamluks' offsprings born in Egypt were sent to the homeland to be raised tradi-
tionally. My thanks are due to Jane Hathaway for this information and her useful
comments on this issue.

[144] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 215.

his *inī*.[145] When the demands of these amirs were not met, they moved over to Barsbāy, thus deciding the power struggle in his favour. Ṭarabāy, who was Barsbāy's close friend, as was mentioned earlier, was also a member of this group of amirs. Quite naturally, he served as the mediator between these amirs and Barsbāy, and it was through his efforts that they moved over to Barsbāy's coalition.[146]

The above case illustrates the convergence of the various types of personal relationships discussed in this work, creating a network that activated Mamluk factionalism. We have seen that the *khushdāshiyya* was split into groups with disparate interests and that it did not remain united as required by the Mamluk system model. The way in which the *khushdāshiyya* sub-groups were reunited indicates the links of personal friendship and the relationship between the *aghā* and the *inī* as focal points in group unification. And finally, relationships that were formed in the amirs' Mamluk households crossed factional borders, binding sub-groups from different factions, like the Ẓāhiriyya and the Mu'ayyadiyya in this case, into new coalitions.

<div align="center">VI</div>

Against the background of the structure of Mamluk factionalism described here, not a single coalition (*ḥizb*) was found in the Circassian period that formed around a candidate for rule in which *khushdāshiyya* was the central and the only unifying factor. Instead, Mamluk groups and individuals integrated into coalitions through a multi-dimensional network of connections. These forms of Mamluk coalitions stemmed from the two above-mentioned common practices in Mamluk politics during this period. One was the filling of the amirs' ranks with veteran mamluks, the faction of the majority of whom had been dispersed many years earlier. The second practice was the removal of the *julbān* from the *ṭibāq* in the Citadel. These two practices created a situation in which the *julbān* and the senior Mamluks had to cooperate as, first of all, the latter were left active in the political arena

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[145] Al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍaw'*, vol. X, 275; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 217. Even though the sources call Timur's invaders Tatars, they were no longer Mongol speakers. My thanks are due to Reuven Amitai for this information.

[146] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 214–17, 226–27.

side-by-side with new generations of mamluks. Second, with their
removal from the barracks, a great number of *julbān* were forced to
move through the amirs' Mamluk households. This phenomenon
lessened the tension between senior and younger mamluks, thus mak-
ing their participation in a single *ḥizb* easier. This kind of coopera-
tion between the senior and younger mamluks called for new symbols
of unity that would allow the integration of various Mamluk groups
into a single coalition. The sultan's *laqab* became one of these symbols.
With his rise to rule, the new sultan bore the *laqab* of the master of
the coalition's dominant group, thus creating a new generation that
carried the same name. When, in time, there were a number of fac-
tions bearing the same name, the *laqab* became the symbol of party
allegiance.

   The precedent of using the *laqab* of the faction's founder was set
with the rise of Ṭaṭar to power in 824/1421. He took the *laqab* "al-
Ẓāhir", which was that of his master, al-Ẓāhir Barqūq.[147] His aim
was to gain legitimacy for rule as the Ẓāhiriyya were split and each
faction viewed itself as the legitimate political heir of their common
master, al-Ẓāhir Barqūq. Al-Ashraf Barsbāy's mamluks adopted the
laqab "al-Ashraf".

   Jaqmaq's ascent to power in 841/1438 was facilitated by a coali-
tion formed of Barqūq's Ẓāhiriyya mamluks (Ṭaṭar had not managed
to build up a Mamluk household of his own), Nāṣiriyya, Mu'ayyadiyya
and individuals from the amirs' households—that is to say, *sayfiyya*
mamluks—and even some Ashrafiyya mamluks of al-Ashraf Barsbāy.[148]
Lack of cunning on the part of the Ashrafiyya leader gave the
Ẓāhiriyya a dominant position in this coalition. Therefore, Jaqmaq
was called al-Malik al-Ẓāhir, like his master, al-Ẓāhir Barqūq [*wa-
talaqqaba bi'l-Malik al-Ẓāhir mithl laqab ustādhihi al-Ẓāhir Barqūq*].[149]

   Khushqadam, who rose to power in 685/1461, was one of al-
Mu'ayyad's mamluks. In the coalition that brought him to power
were mamluks from the Ẓāhiriyya, Nāṣiriyya, Mu'ayyadiyya, Ashrafiyya
and *sayfiyya*. The Ẓāhiriyya already included Barqūq's and Jaqmaq's
mamluks. The Ashrafiyya of this coalition included, as noted above,

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[147] *Ibid.*, vol. XIV, 198; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'iʿ*, vol. II, 71; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Mawrid
al-laṭāfa*, 146; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 582.
[148] Ibn Iyās, *Badā'iʿ*, vol. II, 198–99.
[149] Ibn Iyās, *Badā'iʿ*, vol. II, 198; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 246–47,
252–54; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1086, 1087–88; al-Jawharī, vol. IV, 19.

those mamluks who were purchased by Īnāl, the deceased sultan, from the *kuttābiyya* of Jaqmaq and therefore they regarded themselves as part of the Ẓāhiriyya.[150] As the Nāṣiriyya and Mu'ayyadiyya were by then small and very old minority factions, the Ẓāhiriyya formed the dominant majority in this coalition. In the negotiations with the rival Ashrafiyya party, Jānibak al-Ẓāhiri, the Ẓāhiriyya coalition leader, succeeded in persuading Īnāl's Ashrafiyya *julbān* to put Khushqadam in power until their candidate for the sultanate, Jānim al-Ashrafī, then the vice-regent of Damascus, returned from Syria, arguing that Khushqadam was weak and could be easily deposed. It is of importance to note that this case exposes the peaceful nature of Mamluk politics achieved by a factional system based on two parties only. Khushqadam's ascent to power was concluded by negotiations between the two rival parties which took place in his own dwelling.[151] Once the Ashrafiyya agreed on Khushqadam's election, his *laqab* became "al-Ẓāhir".[152]

In the struggle between the Ẓāhiriyya and the Ashrafiyya in 872/1467 that brought about al-Ẓāhir Yalbāy's rise to power, the Ẓāhiriyya already included two groups of mamluks. One was *al-Ẓāhiriyya al-kibār* (the elder Ẓāhiriyya) and the second was *al-Ẓāhiriyya sighār* (the younger Ẓāhiriyya). It is not entirely clear whether *al-Ẓāhiriyya al-kibār* included Barqūq's veteran mamluks in addition to those of Jaqmaq, for if they were still alive then, they would have been very old indeed. It is clear, however, that the *al-Ẓāhiriyya al-sighār* were Khūshqadam's freshest mamluks, who were dominant in this coalition.[153] A similar coalition brought Timurbughā to power a few months later, and therefore he also bore the *laqab* "al-Ẓāhir".[154]

Qānṣūh min Qānṣūh, who ruled for approximately two years, from Rabīʿ al-Awwal 904/October 1498 to Dhū al-Ḥijja 905/June 1500, was an Ashrafī who bore the *laqab* "al-Ẓāhir". His rule was backed by part of Qāytbāy's Ashrafiyya faction. This is, *prima facie*, the first

[150] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 40, 242.

[151] *Ibid.*, 237–40, 245, 253, 324; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'iʿ*, vol. II, 377–78, 381, 382, 387. See another example, Ibn Iyās, *Badā'iʿ*, vol. II, 465, 469; vol. III, 5, 6.

[152] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 237. On the dominance of the al-Ẓāhiriyya in this coalition see: Ibn Iyās, *Badā'iʿ*, vol. II, 410–11, 455, 458–59, 462.

[153] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 306, 356, 359; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍaw'*, vol. X, 288; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'iʿ*, vol. II, 455, 458–59.

[154] Ibn Iyās, *Badā'iʿ*, vol. II, 474; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍaw'*, vol. X, 288; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 383; idem, *Mawrid al-laṭāfa*, 181.

deviation from the custom of the sultan bearing the *laqab* of the
dominant faction in the coalition that brought him to power. As a
matter of fact, the leader of the faction that brought Qānṣūh to
power was Qānṣūh Khamsmi'a, who, it will be remembered, was
from al-Ẓāhir Khushqadam's *kuttābiyya* and who, on the latter's death,
was purchased by Qāytbāy.[155] This is also the reason why Tānībak
al-Jamālī, who was identified with Qānṣūh Khamsmi'a's group within
the Ashrafiyya, was the one who awarded him this *laqab*.[156]

The *laqab* "al-Ashraf" referred to al-Ashraf Barsbāy. Sultan Īnāl
was one of Barqūq's mamluks and was inherited by his son, al-Nāṣir
Faraj. He was elevated to the sultanate in 857/1457 by a coalition
of the Ashrafiyya, Mu'ayyadiyya and *sayfiyya* mamluks. The Ashrafi
mamluks forced him to become sultan because he was elderly and
would pose no problems for them, and thus his *laqab* was that of
their master, al-Ashraf Barsbāy.[157]

Qāytbāy rose to power (872/1468) with the help of a coalition in
which both senior and younger Ashrafiyya mamluks were dominant
[*al-Ashrafiyya al-kibār wa'l-Ashrafiyya al-ṣighār*], that is to say, mamluks
of Barsbāy and Īnāl.[158] Although Qāytbāy was formally a Ẓāhiri, he
had strong roots as Ashrafi because he was purchased by al-Ẓāhir
Khushqadam from al-Ashraf Barsbāy's *kuttābiyya*.[159] He was, there-
fore, quite naturally supported by the Ashrafiyya groups, and his
laqab was decided accordingly.[160] By the same principle Jān Balāṭ
(905/1499), Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī and Ṭūmānbāy min Qānṣūh al-Nāṣirī
successively bore the *laqab* of Qāytbāy[161] because Qāytbāy's long
period of rule left only some insignificant remnants of the Ẓāhiriyya.
It should be mentioned that many of the Ẓāhiriyya mamluks were

[155] Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. III, 353–54. See also note 87.
[156] Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. III, 404–5; Ibn Ṭūlūn, Muḥammad b. ʿAli, *Mufākahat al-khilān fī Hawādith al-zamān*, Beirut, 1998 (hereafter—Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahat al-khilān*), vol. II, 167.
[157] Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. II, 304, 305, 307; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 36, 38, 57.
[158] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 366, 367; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. II, 473–74, 475; vol. III, 3, 8.
[159] Al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. VI, 201; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 395; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. II, 307, 308.
[160] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 394; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. III, 3.
[161] Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. III, 439; vol. IV, 2; vol. V, 102; Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahat al-khilān*, vol. II, 186, 192.

decimated in the campaigns in Syria and the recurring plagues during Qāytbāy's reign.[162]

It is not entirely clear why Ṭūmānbāy, who ruled for approximately three months in 906/1500 and initially took the *laqab* al-Mu'ayyad with his ascension to power in Syria, changed it to al-'Ādil when he returned to Egypt.[163] The change of *laqab*, however, shows that he had some difficulty in bearing a *laqab* (namely, al-Mu'ayyad) inappropriate to the accepted custom.

The centrality of the *laqab* as a symbol of unifying identification among different generations of mamluk factions within the coalition is borne out by the fact that towards the end of the Mamluk period, even a sultan's son, like Qāytbāy's son Muḥammad, was compelled, on ascending to power, to consider the issue of the *laqab*. The rule of a sultan's son was perceived throughout the fifteenth century as an interim period aimed at preparing the transition from the rule of one Mamluk sultan to the next.[164] As a result, a son's period of rule was typically short, and the Mamluks did not expect the rise of a new Mamluk unit during this reign that would have to join one of the two Mamluk coalitions, the Ẓāhiriyya or the Ashrafiyya. Therefore there was no importance attached to a sultan's son bearing one of these two *alqāb*.

Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy's *laqab*, however, was changed twice. The first time was immediately after he was brought to power before the death of his father in 901/1495, when his *laqab* was changed from al-Manṣūr to al-Nāṣir.[165] In other words, those who brought him to power thought that his *laqab* should be changed but did not yet think that the new *laqab* should be either al-Ẓāhir or al-Ashraf. The problem arose when al-Nāṣir Muḥammad inaugurated his first intake of mamluks. As a result, some of his supporters were called Ashrafiyya in accordance with the *laqab* of Qāytbāy, his father, while others were known as Nāṣiriyya after his own *laqab*. When the new *laqab* threatened to split his camp, the rank-and-file mamluks demanded that the amirs change Muḥammad's *laqab* from al-Nāṣir to al-Ashraf

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[162] Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. III, 206, 210, 218; see for examples: *ibid.*, 289, 293, 325–26.

[163] Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. III, 465.

[164] Levanoni, "Sultanate", 385.

[165] Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. III, 333.

so that all the mamluks in his coalition would have the same name:
"Give the Sultan the *laqab* al-Ashraf so that all of us will be Ashrafiyya
[*laqqibū al-sulṭān bi'l-Ashraf, naṣīr kullunā Ashrafiyya*]".[166] Despite the
embarrassment involved, the mamluks' ultimatum brought about a
change in his *laqab*. Appointments had already been sent to Syria
and sermons had been delivered in the mosques under the old *laqab*.
The confusion was so great that some of the sermons were deliv-
ered in the name of al-Nāṣir and others in the name of al-Ashraf.[167]

At the end of the fifteenth century, then, the dichotomy of the Ẓāhiri
and Ashrafi parties in Mamluk politics was strongly established, to the
extent that when a third party, not even a dominant one but only
bearing a different name, was introduced into the military-political
arena, it threatened the regime's stability. To restore stability, steps
were immediately taken to change the party's name by changing its
master's *laqab* in order to facilitate its absorbtion into one of the two
"recognized" parties.

In conclusion, the dichotomy in Mamluk factionalism into Zahiriyya
and Ashrafiyya parties indicates that during the Circassian period
the Mamluk political system, in practice, underwent a change. It
moved from a one-generation and uni-factional structure to a multi-
generation and bi-party structure. This kind of political system in-
evitably imposed a change in the conception of *khushdashiyya*. Whereas
khushdashiyya had been understood—but not always practiced—as sol-
idarity shared strictly by mamluks who belonged to the same man-
umitter and formed a single cohort, in the political reality of the
Circassian period, *khushdashiyya* was generally extended to solidarity
among successive Mamluk factions by linking them to an ancient,
quasi-mythological ancestor by handing down the master's *laqab* from
generation to generation. The common framework created by the
laqab for Mamluk factions and individuals from different generations
and background created an atmosphere that blurred the traditional
factional borderlines. It not only curbed the tension between younger
and senior generations of sultani mamluks but also opened the way
for the integration of the amirs' households into the fabric of the
political system through the inclusion of individuals and groups of
mamluks of amirs in the coalitions. This heterogeneous makeup of

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[166] *Ibid.*, 351–52.
[167] *Ibid.*, 351.

the Circassian Zahiri and Ashrafi coalitions for power might well explain the relatively non-violent character of Mamluk politics after al-Nasir Faraj's reign; power struggles were now largely bloodless.

Finally, a word on the place of *khushdashiyya* in Mamluk political system. The model of Mamluk factionalism laid by the late David Ayalon some fifty years ago, is based on the assumption that the ideal of *khushdashiyya* was an indispensable factor in Mamluk politics reality. For, according to this model, it was *khushdashiyya*, the solidarity and loyalty of all mamluks who belonged to the same man-umitter, that determined who belonged to a Mamluk faction and who were excluded as their rivals or ad hoc allies. However, we have seen that, *khushdashiyya* included, at least in the Circassian period, a variety of categories of loyalty and solidarity among mamluks included in the same Mamluk faction and that coalitions for rule reflected, in fact, a wide network of relationships that crossed the "traditional" factional borderlines. In his study of the history of the Mu'ayyadiyya,[168] the Mamluk faction established during al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh's reign, Robert Irwin has concluded that *khushdashiyya* had never constituted a strong bond in Mamluk factions. Judging from the information scattered in the sources regarding the Bahri period about mamluks discarding factional solidarity bonds for more vital political interests, my impression is that during this period too *khushdashiyya* had never been such an essential requisite for Mamluk factional unity.[169] In light of these observations, it seems that the Mamluks' attitude to the idea of *khushdashiyya* was not different from the pragmatism they showed to other political or social issues they encountered. *Khushdashiyya* was essentially an idea liable to change in accordance with practice in Mamluk politics and not to inflexibly determine them. Seen from this angle, even the move from the traditional conception of *khushdashiyya* to the more pluralistic perception of solidarity of the Circassian coalitions for rule might appear to us not so revolutionary. These new perspectives on factional solidarity should, perhaps, encourage us to reexamine the validity of the "classical" model of Mamluk political factionalism throughout the Mamluk period.

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[168] Irwin, "Factions", 237–38.
[169] Levanoni, *A Turning Point*, 81–132.

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CHAPTER SIX

GUNPOWDER AND FIREARMS IN THE MAMLUK SULTANATE RECONSIDERED

Robert Irwin

David Ayalon's *Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom: A Challenge to a Medieval Society* was published in London in 1956. The argument of this important book has been summarized by Reuven Amitai as follows: "A more direct reason for the demise of the Mamluk Sultanate is the failure of the mamluks to adopt the use of firearms; thus they were not able to meet the challenge of both the Ottoman Empire and the Christian West. This inability to modernize the army was rooted in the social psychology of the mamluks. The adoption of firearms contradicted their training and vocation as mounted archers, as the use of primitive handguns required dismounting; this would have meant the transformation of the mamluks into infantrymen . . . it made inevitable the defeat of the mamluks by the Ottomans at Marj Dābiq in 1516 and their conquest of Egypt and Syria".[1] *Gunpowder and Firearms* in the Mamluk Kingdom presented a Toynbean model of the collapse of an empire, as the Mamluk Sultanate was presented with a challenge—new military technology—to which it failed to respond. In this failure to adapt, the Mamluks differed from the Ottomans and from the various European nations. *Mutatis mutandis*, Ayalon had offered a Middle Eastern version of the line taken in J.F.C. Fuller's *The Decisive Battles of the Western World* where, according to Fuller, "Gunpowder blasted the feudal strongholds and ideals of their owners. By changing the character of war, gunpowder changed the medieval way of life".[2]

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[1] Reuven Amitai, "The Rise and Fall of the Mamluk Institution; A Survey of David Ayalon's Works" in M. Sharon (ed.), *Studies Islamic History and Civilization in honour of David Ayalon*, (Jerusalem, 1986), 28.
[2] J.F.C. Fuller, *The Decisive Battles of the Western World 480 B.C.–1757* (London, revised ed. 1970), 323.

Ayalon's book has had a remarkable influence on other historians, among them Mamlukists like M. Holt and Carl Petry, and, outside the obsessively narrow field of Mamluk studies, also on such important figures as the historian of the Islamicate world, Marshall Hodgson, and on the wide-ranging military historian, John Keegan. That it should have had such an influence is hardly surprising. It was written by the leading historian in the field. Ayalon's establishment of the chronology of the introduction of *Gunpowder and Firearms* into the Sultanate was based on an extensive reading of the sources. He had a discriminating approach to the problems of terminology and translation, as well as a properly cautious attitude regarding the dating of technological firsts. On many key issues in chronology and terminology, it is most unlikely that Ayalon's monograph will ever be superseded.

However, there are grounds for unease with the more general portrait of the mamluks as an arrogant and obsolete military caste who were incapable of appreciating the usefulness of the cannon and musket (as it were the dinosaurs of the late medieval Levant.) First, if the Mamluk elite was indeed hostile to firearms, then this was an unusual attitude for a medieval military elite to take. In the medieval West, finely worked guns were produced specially for princes. Guns were christened in churches. Nobles and knights competed for the office of Master of the Ordnance. Fifteenth- century noblemen put guns on their blazons. Anthony the Great Bastard of Burgundy, one of the greatest jousters of the fifteenth century, chose a wooden barbican with gun ports as his emblem and Louis of Bruges chose a bombard as his blazon. Cannonades featured in the chivalric romance of Amadis de Gaule.[3] The Earl of Warwick lost the second Battle of St Albans in 1461 because of his enthusiastic over-reliance on guns and other bits and bobs of military gadgetry. The guns with their fixed emplacements fatally reduced the mobility of the Earl's forces and the gunners were overrun before they could fire their pieces off.[4] (I will return to the Battle of St Albans later.) The point is that in late medieval Christendom, the deployment of cannons and musketry were considered of as being an extension of chivalry rather than as its antithesis.

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[3] Maurice Keen, *Chivalry* (New Haven and London, 1984), 241–42; Malcolm Vale, *War and Chivalry*, (London, 1981), 155.

[4] John Goodman, *The Wars of the Roses: Military Activity and English Society*, (London, 1981), 171.

Again, in sixteenth-century Japan, the Samurai, elite horse-archers, were similarly enthusiastic. "Within months of the first guns being brought into Japan they were being copied and mass produced for the daimyo armies".[5] In China, the Ming were making use of artillery from the fifteenth century onwards.[6] Even in desolate, backward and impoverished Circassia with its illiterate kleptocracy, or robber-aristocracy, the noblemen rode about with guns slung over their back.[7] It is worth noting here that the Mamluk elite in the late Middle Ages were mostly recruited from the Circassians of the Caucasus. But it is perhaps also worth noting that Germans and Hungarians were also prominently represented in the ranks of the mamluks and such renegades or captured soldiers were also likely to be already familiar with firearms.[8]

Muslim regimes in the Near East and North Africa were not slow to adopt firearms. Indeed they may have been ahead of Europe in doing so. The first reference to cannon being used in Europe is in Florence in 1326. By the 1340s references to the deployment of cannons become common. The first unambiguous reference to the English using cannon is at Crecy in 1346. The earliest reference to European use of handguns is 1346. A fourteenth-century Swedish handgun still survives. By 1411 the matchlock was in use. However, the handguns of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were not of the sort that could be fired from the saddle. That sort of firearm only became available in the sixteenth century.[9]

According to Lisān al-Dīn ibn al-Khaṭīb, a fourteenth-century courtier and historian in the service of Granada, the Nāṣirid prince

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[5] Stephen Turnbull, *The Book of the Samurai: The Warrior Class of Japan* (London, 1989), 78.

[6] On the Chinese development of gunpowder technology, see Joseph Needham's classic work, *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. V, *Chemistry and Chemical Technology Part 7: Military Technology: The Gunpowder Epic* (Cambridge, 1986).

[7] Georgio Interiano, (1502) cited in Shauket Mufti, *Heroes and Emperors in Circassian History* (Beirut, 1972), 79.

[8] On Europeans in Mamluk service, see, for examples, Jacques Heers and Georgette de Groer (eds. and trs.), *Itinéraire d'Anselme d'Adorne en Terre Sainte (1470–1)*, (Paris, 1978), 199. Jacques Masson (ed. and tr.), *Voyage en Egypte de Felix Fabri, 1483* (Paris, 1975), vol. II, 431–4.

[9] On the early history of firearms in the West, see Claude Blair, *Pollard's History of Firearms* (Feltham, Middlesex, 1983), 25–61; O.F.G. Hogg, *English Artillery 1326–1716* (London, 1963), 10–49; William McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society since A.D. 1000* (Chicago, 1982), 81–8.

Abū Walīd Ismāʿīl I used cannon at the siege of Huesca in 1324.[10] Because of the overlapping use of the Arabic term naft to refer to both naphtha, or Greek fire, and to gunpowder, it is difficult to determine when precisely gunpowder was first used in warfare in the Mamluk sultanate. Ayalon argued that naphtha, or *naft*, ceased to used by the Mamluks in either battles or siege warfare at around the end of the Crusading period. The very word *naft* fell out of use for about a century or a century and a half. When the word did come back into circulation, it no longer meant naphtha, but rather referred to gunpowder. Therefore in the fifteenth century *naft* effectively means *bārūd*.[11] Professor J.R. Partington in his *History of Greek Fire and Gunpowder* (1960) doubted this. Ayalon replied that "*naft* cannot be the same as naptha, for the simple reason that in spite of its being used in fighting many hundreds of times, it never causes fire, it is never aimed at inflammable targets and none of the normal measures of protection work against it".[12]

But the matter is not so clear-cut. In 1400, when Tīmūr deployed a siege tower against the Damascus citadel, the garrison hurled *naft* at it and the tower burned down.[13] Also in factional fighting in Damascus in 1412, both sides were using arrows and naphtha, which set shops on fire. 14 Again in 1439 in a naval skirmish in the Delta a Mamluk boat was set on fire by "*midfaʿ naft*", they shot it but the fire blew back, burning some of the supplies and injuring some of the crew.[15] The conclusion seems inescapable. Greek fire was being used as late as the early decades of the fifteenth century.

The Burgundian traveller, Bertandon de la Brocquière, makes it clear beyond any shadow of doubt that in the 1430s the Mamluks and their subjects were still accustomed to deploy both cannons and naphtha-throwers. Bertrandon's sojourn in Beirut coincided with a Muslim festival, during which the garrison of the citadel fired off their cannons. At the same time "the people launched into the air,

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[10] I.S. Allouche, "Un texte relatif aux premiers canons", *Hesperis*, vol. XXXII (1945), 81–84.

[11] Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms*, 9–21.

[12] Ayalon, "A Reply to Professor J.R. Partington", *Arabica*, vol. X, (1963), 72.

[13] Abū al-Maḥāsin Yūsuf ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī mulūk Miṣr wa'l-Qāhira*, W. Popper ed., (Berkeley, 1926–29), vol. VI, 65; cf. 54.

[14] *Ibid.*, vol. VI, 266.

[15] Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-Sulūk*, M.M. Ziyāda, ed. (Cairo, 1934–58), vol. IV, 1165; Ibn Taghrībirdī, Nujūm, vol. VII, 106.

very high and to a great distance, a kind of fire larger than the greatest lantern I ever saw lighted. They told me they sometimes made use of such at sea, to set fire to the sails of an enemy's vessel". Bertrandon spent a ducat on acquiring recipe and he returned to France with the recipe, the ingredients and even the wooden moulds.[16] However, it is necessary to note that Ayalon was in general right to suggest that in the fifteenth century naft normally refers to gunpowder and Partington was wrong to doubt this.

Setting the *naft* problem aside, there are ambiguous references in Mamluk sources to the use of *makāḥil* (maybe handguns) and *madāāfiʿ* (maybe cannons) in the 1340s and 50s. In an untranslatable passage in al-ʿUmarī's chancery manual, *al-Taʿrīf bi'l-muṣṭalaḥ al-sharīf*, there is a reference to *makāḥil al-bārūd* (guns using gunpowder). (Al-ʿUmarī died in 1349.)[17] There are numerous and unequivocal references to Mamluk use of cannons from the 1360s onwards (which is earlier than we have evidence for Ottoman Turkish use of cannons). It is again difficult to be precise about the date of the introduction of the handgun into the Mamluk Sultanate, because of the looseness of usage of terms used to refer to firearms. For a long time *madāfiʿ* and *makāḥil* were used indiscriminately in the sources to refer to both cannons and handguns. For example when Ibn Taghribirdi discussed the fighting in Cairo between the Sultan Jaqmaq and rebellious mamluks in 854/1450, in the *Nujūm* he referred to Jaqmaq's warden of the armoury setting up *madāfiʿ* on the towers of the Citadel. However when Ibn Taghribirdi wrote up the same incident in the *Ḥawādith*, he reported that *makāḥil* were set up on the citadel.[18] Also, *bunduqiyya*, which in the early Mamluk period referred to the crossbow, in the later Mamluk period came to mean arquebus.[19]

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[16] "The Travels of Bertrandon de la Brocquière A.D. 1432, 1433", in Thomas Wright (ed. and trans.), *Early Travels in Palestine* (London, 1848), 296. Clearly it is not true as Guilmartin has claimed, that the secret of Greek fire was lost with the sack of Constantinople in 1204. (John Francis Guilmartin Jr, *Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing technology and Mediterranean warfare at sea in the sixteenth century* (Cambridge, 1974), 60 and n).

[17] Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā b. Faḍl Allāh al-ʿUmarī, *Al-Taʿrīf fī al-Muṣṭalaḥ al-Sharīf*, (Cairo, 1894), 208; cf. Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms*, 5n. and 41–42n.

[18] Ibn Taghribirdi, *Nujūm*, vol. VII, 192; *idem*, *History of Egypt, 1382–1469 A.D.*, (William Popper, tr.) University of California Publications in Semitic Philology (Berkeley, California, 1960), vol. XIX, 129 and note.

[19] The use of *bunduqiyya* to mean both crossbow and arquebus has led to occasion confusions in modern scholarshi In "The Problem of the *Bidaʿ* in the Light of

However, the Leningrad *furūsiyya* manuscript, entitled *Collection Concerning the Various Branches of the Art*, which is a late fifteenth-century (1474) copy of an early fourteenth-century manuscript, describes what is unambiguously a handgun, calls it a *midfaʿ* and has a picture of it.[20] Ayalon claims that the first unambiguous reference to use of the handgun in the Mamluk Sultanate dates from 1490. This was when Qāytbāy offered members of the *ḥalqa* extra pay if they managed to learn to handle the arquebus.[21] However, I have found an earlier reference, albeit a trivial one. In 1424 a Circassian mamluk captured in the raid on Cyprus turned out to be a considerable acrobat and marksman. He entertained Barsbāy's Cairo with displays of a *mukhala* and a bow while walking a tightrope.[22] Moreover, Western sources, which Ayalon did not use, suggest that the Mamluks were using handguns well before 1490. For example, Bertrandon de la Brocquière, who was in Mamluk Syria in the years 1432–3, noted how the pilgrim caravan returning from Damascus was provided with an escort some of whom carried "small harquebuses which they fired off every now and then".[23] Jacques Couer was accused by his enemies in 1451 of having supplied guns to the Mamluk sultan Barsbāy.[24] According to the traveller, Joos van Ghistele, Ferdinand of Naples sent the Sultan Qāytbāy a shipload of weapons including culverins, arabesques, serpentines and other firearms in 1482 and the Sultan was delighted by the gift. The following year, 1483, the

an Arabic Manuscript of the 14th century", in *JESHO*, vol. VII (1964), 191–96, Subhi Y. Labib erroneously deduced from certain passages in al-Turkomani's treatise on *bidaʿ* (1397) that the *shuṭṭār*, raffish huntsmen who specialised in targeting certain birds, were using arquebuses to do so. However, it is perfectly clear from the context that they were using crossbows. Al-Buduqiyya is also the Arabic for 'Venice' and this may have led the sixteenth-century historical romancer, Ibn Zunbul, to deduce erroneously that the gun was a Venetian invention. Aḥmad b. Zunbul al-Maḥallī, *Ākhirat al-Mamālīk: wāqiʿat al-Sulṭān al-Ghawrī maʿa Salīm al-ʿUthmānī*, A.T. ʿĀmir, ed. (Cairo, 1962), 58–59.

   [20] Leningrad, Institute of Asian Peoples Arabic MS C686. On the manuscript, see J.R. Partington, *A History of Greek Fire and Gunpowder* (Cambridge, 1960), 204–7; A. Rahman Zaki, "Gunpowder and Arab Firearms in the Middle Ages", *Gladius* (1967), 49–50; Needham, *Science and Civilization*, vol. V, pt. 7, 43–44.

   [21] Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms*, 59.

   [22] Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī b. Ḥajar, *Inbāʾ al-ghumr bi-abnāʾ al-ʿumr*, Ḥasan Ḥabashī, ed. (Cairo, 1969), vol. II, 348; cf. ʿAlī ibn Dāwud al-Jawharī, *Nuzhat al-nufūs waʾl-abdān fī tawārīkh al-zamān*, Ḥasan Ḥabashī, ed. (Cairo, 1974), vol. III, 73.

   [23] Bertrandon de la Brocquière, 301.

   [24] Eliyahu Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1983), 349.

pilgrim Felix Fabri in Egypt was escorted by an arquebus-bearing mamluk.[25]

However, it is, of course, useful to distinguish between the introduction of a weapon and the first instances of its effective deployment in a battle or a siege. When are guns used to do more than frighten the horses? In the West, cannons were used for siege warfare as early as the late fourteenth century.[26] But cannons on the battlefield were hardly more than noise-making machines until the mid-fifteenth century. It is true that artillery did play a crucial part at the Battle of Castillon in 1453, but the guns in question were not field guns, but siege guns in deeply entrenched positions deployed against densely packed infantry.[27] By common consent, the Battles of Ravenna (1512) and Marignano (1515) were the first European battles to be won by field artillery.[28] As for the handgun, the Swiss made effective use of them in the 1430s, as did the Hussites a decade or so earlier. Even so, the Italian wars of 1494–1559 were still largely fought by heavy cavalry with lances, even though the Spanish army in Italy had some arquebusiers.[29] Arquebuses only replaced the crossbow in France in 1567.[30] English armies were similarly slow to switch to the handgun.

Turning now to the Middle East, it is a mistake to think that it lagged behind Europe in the deployment of firearms in the battlefield. More or less contemporaneously with Marignano and Ravenna, artillery was playing some part in the battles of Chaldiran (1514), Marj Dābiq (1516) and Raydāniyya (1517). Moreover, somewhat earlier, Ottoman cannons and arquebuses seem to have played a decisive role in Mehmed II's victory over Ūzūn Ḥasan and the Āqqūyūnlū at the Battle of Bashkent in 1473.[31]

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[25] Rene Bauwens-Praux (ed. and tr.), *Voyage en Egypte de Joos van Ghistele 1482–1483* (Paris, 1976), 40–41: Jacques Masson (ed. and tr.), *Voyage en Egypte de Felix Fabri, 1483* (Paris, 1975), vol. III, 918.

[26] Goodman, *Wars of the Roses*, 164.

[27] Ross, Wars of the Roses, 112.

[28] Carlo M. Cipolla, *Guns and Sails in the Early Phase of European Expansion 1400–1700* (London, 1965), 28.

[29] Vale, *War and Chivalry*, 70.

[30] Vale, *War and Chivalry*, 136.

[31] John E. Woods, *The Aqquyunlu, Clan, Confederation, Empire: A Study in 15th/9th Century Turko-Iranian Politics* (Minneapolis, 1973), 132–4; Franz Babinger, *Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time*, Ralph Manheim tr., William C. Hickman ed. (Princeton, 1978), 315.

The Mamluk sultanate made significant use of handguns from the late fifteenth-century onwards and it was ahead of the Ottomans and Safavids in doing so. Qāytbāy had the *awlād al-nās* trained to fire *bunduq al-raṣāṣ*. (*Raṣāṣ* means lead or bullet. According to Ayalon, *bunduq al-raṣāṣ* can refer to both the arquebus and its ammunition.)[32] The musketeers received extra pay and were equipped with camels and were sent off to fight the Ottomans in 895/1490).[33] It was a remarkably successful campaign. The mamluks reached Kayseri and sacked its suburbs and the following year Bayezid II sued for peace. It has been suggested that it was Ottoman defeats in this war that persuaded Bayezid II to reform his army and equip it with firearms.[34] The earliest references to Ottoman troops having handguns dates from 1465. Spandugino, writing in 1510, says that the Janissaries had only recently learned the use of handguns.[35] Venetian consular reports of the Ottoman struggle against the Safavid Shah Ismāʿīl in the opening decades of the sixteenth century make it clear that only a minority, albeit a large minority, of the Janissaries were *schiopeteri* (marksmen). At that stage most Janissaries still carried bows and the maritime historian, John Guilmartin, is of the opinion that most of the Janissaries who fought at Lepanto (1571) were still bowmen.[36]

It is true Middle Eastern generals were slow to equip their infantry with handguns. However, there may have been good reasons for this. The handgun in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries offered very few advantages over the composite recurved bow used by the mamluks and the Janissaries.[37] The composite recurved bow, com-

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[32] Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms*, 59.

[33] Ibn Iyas, *Badāʾiʿ al-zuhūr fī waqāʾiʿ al-duhūr*, Muḥammad Muṣṭafā ed. (Cairo and Wiesbaden 1960–63), vol. III, 269; Ayalon, *Gunpowder*, 59, 63–64, 67; Shai Har-El, *Struggle for Domination in the Middle East: The Ottoman-Mamluk War, 1485–91* (Leiden, 1995), 201–2.

[34] Halil Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: the Classical Age 1300–1600* (London, 1973), 31, 33.

[35] Paul Wittek, "The Earliest References to the Use of Firearms by the Ottomans", Appendix II in Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms*, 143; cf. R.C. Jennings, "Firearms, Bandits and Gun Control", *Archivium Ottomanicum*, vol. VI (1980), 339.

[36] Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleons*, 251.

[37] On the composite recurved bow, see. J.D. Latham and W.F. Patterson, *Saracen Archery* (London, 1970), *passim*; Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleons*, 149–55; Aḥmad Y. Al-Ḥassan and Donald R. Hill, *Islamic Technology: An illustrated history*, (Cambridge, 1986), 98–9; Ulrich Haarmann, "The late triumph of the Persian bow: critical voices on the Mamluk monopoly on weaponry" in Thomas Philipp and Ulrich Haarman (eds.), *The Mamluks in Egyptian politics and society* (Cambridge, 1998), 174–87.

posed of layers of horn and sinew and a little over three feet long, was more accurate and had a longer range than the sixteenth-century handgun. An arrow, fired from such a bow, could hit a target 500 yards away. That arrow could pierce plate armour at fifty yards. In the hands of a trained archer a composite recurved bow fired six shots a minute (as against the one or two shots a minute that a man with a matchlock might manage). Unlike the early matchlocks, the recurved bow could be managed from the horse. A study of the seventeenth-century wars between the Tartars and the Poles and the Russians has shown that even at so late a date and after the adoption of the musket, the horse-archer still usually had the advantage of infantry using firearms. The bows of the Tartar cavalry had a longer range and fired faster than the Russian muskets and, of course, the horse archer had the additional advantage of mobility.[38]

The chief disadvantage of the composite recurved bow was that it was difficult to handle and it had a heavy drawing weight—heavier even than that of the famous English longbow. It took years to train the men who used these bows and it was expensive to maintain such a skilled force.[39] However, if one did actually possess such a skilled force, as the Mamluk sultans did, then plainly it would have been a regressive step to dismount those cavalry archers and give them guns. It made more sense to give these guns to low-grade infantry troops and that is precisely what Mamluk sultans in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries did. the sultans recruited sons of mamluks, Egyptian peasants, Maghribis and so forth and then gave them the small amount of training necessary.

In general, firearms gave no very clear advantage on the battlefie4ld in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The deployment of cannons on the field could actually contribute to defeat by creating a static defence line and making the troops less mobile. The Earl of Warwick's defeat at the second battle of St Albans has already been mentioned. Similarly, as we shall see, Ṭūmānbāy, the last Mamluk Sultan of Egypt, placed too much faith in fixed emplacements defended by

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[38] L.J.D. Collins, "The military organization and tactics of the Crimean Tatars during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries", in V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp (eds.), *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East* (Oxford, 1975), 257–76.

[39] On the training of the Mamluk horse-archer, see Hasanein Rabie, "The Training of the Mamluk Fāris" in Parry and Yapp, *War Technology and Society*, 153–63.

cannons, and it was this faith in gunpowder as some kind of victory-bearing talisman and this contributed to his decisive defeat at Raydāniyya in 1517.

The medieval cannon had several serious weaknesses, a few of which can be noted here. First, first because of poor casting techniques, the early cannons had a low life-expectancy. Sooner or later they blew up quite a few on their first trial—especially cannons cast from iron.[40] Secondly, they had a slow rate of fire. One reason for this was that the cannon needed cooling and washing with vinegar and water before it could be reloaded. If all went well, ten shots might be fired in an hour, but evidently, if the cavalry charged the guns, then the gunners would only be able loose off one shot before the attackers were upon the guns. Thirdly, the projectile force of a medieval cannon was not as great as it would become by the seventeenth century. Medieval gunners used serpentine powder. Modern gunpowder is nearly twice as strong. Corned (or granulated) powder was introduced in the West in the 1430s (at about the time the handgun began to be used in battles) and it was somewhere between the two in strength. However, one problem with corned powder is that it needed to be fired from stronger-cast barrels. Fourthly, in the case of the earliest guns, each shot needed individual ignition by the gunner and the gunner needed to keep a match alight for this purpose. (Matchlock ignition only began to appear in Europe in the mid-fifteenth century.) Fifthly, the early handgun, or arquebus, had a short range and its shots had relatively little penetrating power. Musket-shot had much greater range and penetrating power, but use of the musket only became general in the late sixteenth century. Sixthly, the stone balls fired by early guns were labour-intensive to make. There was no standardisation of calibre, so ammunition had to be specifically tailored to a specific gun. Seventhly, the recoil from early guns was such that it could break an unwary gunner's ribs. Eighthly, early cannons were cumbrous and it might take a long time to bring them to the field. It took twenty-four horses to pull a heavy gun and three to pull a light gun (or falcon). Once on the field artillery hampered the free movement of one's own cavalry.

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[40] See, for examples of guns exploding on trial during Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī's reign, Carl Petry, *Protectors or Praetorians? The Last Mamluk Sultans and Egypt's Waning as a Great Power* (Albany, N.Y., 1994), 192–3.

(When one considers these and other problems, it seems a miracle that gunpowder technology ever took off at all.) Probably the early guns were most effective in frightening the horses (and this may have been what happened at Chaldiran).[41]

However, though gun-carriages and munitions carts might slow the progress of an army, once they had arrived on the battlefield, they might, if disposed in a ring or some other line of defence, provide a cover quite independent of the fire of the guns themselves. One way of looking at Selīm's victory over the Mamluks is as the triumph of Turkish "wheel culture" over "Egypto-Syrian camel and mule culture".[42] The Ottoman ʿarabas (carts) were chained together and used as *Wagenburgs*, or *Lagers*, which could easily be defended against cavalry charges. This was also the practice of the Bohemian Hussites.[43] Such *Lagers* were defended by both cannons and bows The Ottomans were masters in the use of wagons for defence. When in 1516, the Damascan chronicler, Ibn Ṭūlūn went to visit the Janissaries camped outside Damascus, he was most impressed by the carts used to carry the big guns and which were chained together to form a line of defence. He said that he had never seen anything like that before. Safavid cavalry failed to penetrate the Ottoman line of wagons at Chaldiran.[44] Thereafter, they adopted the practice themselves and Shah Ṭahmāsp successfully deployed 700 ʿarabas and four cannons against the Uzbeks in 1528. Previously, the Mamluk Sultan Ṭūmānbāy had deployed wagons (less effectively, of course) at Raydāniyya—the wagons serving to defend his cannons as well as his Maghribi and Sudanese musketeers.[45]

It has been argued above that there were good military reasons for being cautious about the wholesale adoption of firearms, whereas Ayalon and others have suggested that the Mamluk elite resisted the

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[41] On the problems and disadvantages of firearms in general, see Cipolla, 27–28; John Francis Guilmartin, Jr., *Gunpowder and Galleons*, 157–75; Gillingham, *Wars of the Roses*, 19; Geoffrey Parker, "The Gunpowder Revolution" in Geoffrey Parker (ed.), *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare* (Cambridge, 1992), 107–9.

[42] On the relative rarity of carts in the Arab lands in pre-modern times, see Richard Bulliet, *The Camel and the Wheel* (Cambridge, Mass., 1975).

[43] Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleons*, 256n., 258; Christopher Allmand, "New Weapons, New Tactics", in Parker *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare*, 97.

[44] On Chaldiran, see *EI*² (2nd ed.), s.v. Čaldiran. [J.R. Walsh]; R.M. Savory, "The Sherley Myth", *Iran*, vol. V, (1967), 73–81; idem, *Iran under the Safavids* (Cambridge, 1980), 41–47.

[45] On the sources for the Battle of Raydāniyya and its outcome, see below.

adoption of firearms for psychological and chivalric reasons. However, evidence for a chivalric ethic or ideology attached to the science of *furūsiyya* (horsemanship and the related military skills) would appear to be very slight indeed. *Furūsiyya* manuals dealt with practical skills and did not waste any space on expounding a chivalric ethos.[46] It is perhaps worth noting that Faraj, who of all the Mamluk sultans was the one most praised for his *furūsiyya*, was also one of the most enthusiastic users of artillery (in his struggles against the Emir Shaykh).[47] At the very end of the Mamluk period, the Sultan Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī sought to revive the skills of *furūsiyya* and built a new maydān for the mounted exercises.[48] But Qānṣūh was also enthusiastic about guns. He had guns cast in Egypt. He bought guns from abroad. He raised an arquebus regiment to go and fight the Portuguese in the Red Sea.[49] As remarked above, since it would have been wasteful to issue arquebuses to the highly (and expensively trained force of extremely effective Mamluk horse archers, guns were customarily issued instead to *ḥalqa* troopers, Maghribis and other low grade footsoldiers.

I do not think that the Mamluks had a psychological problem regarding the acquisition of firearms. Their problem was rather material and logistical. Copper had to be imported from Europe for the most part. (The Tyrol was a major source of copper in the Middle Ages.)[50] The best source for wood (charcoal) and saltpetre, as well as iron was Ottoman-controlled Anatolia (and hence vulnerable to an embargo on the part of the Ottomans).[51] The Mamluks may also have had problems recruiting skilled gun-casters, for there was, of course, no tradition of casting church bells in the Middle East and the Mamluks were less well-placed than the Ottomans when it came to enslaving or recruiting skilled European workmen.

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[46] On Mamluk *furūsiyya* in general, see Ayalon, "Notes on the *Furūsiyya* Exercises and Games in the Mamluk Sultanate" in Myriam Rosen-Ayalon (ed.), *Studies in Memory of Gaston Wiet* (Jerusalem, 1977), 267–95; Rabie, "The training of the Mamluk Faris".

[47] On Faraj's *furūsiyya*, see Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, vol. VI, 271.

[48] 48. On the revival of *furūsiyya* under Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī, see Ayalon 'Notes on Furusiyya Exercises', 43–44, 45, 51–52; Petry, *Protectors or Praetorians*, 191.

[49] Petry, *Protectors or Praetorians*, 192–96; Petry, *Twilight of Majesty: The Reigns of the Mamluk Sultans al-Ashraf Qāytbāy and Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī in Egypt* (Seattle, 1993), 189–90, 205–6.

[50] Eliyahu Ashtor, *A Social and Economic History of the Near East in the Middle Ages* (London, 1976), 305, 325; Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, 157.

[51] On measures to preserve the Lebanese forest, see Bertrandon de la Brocquière, 297.

When he came to discuss Qāytbāy's alleged indifference to artillery, Professor Ayalon observed that "[h]is indifference is of special interest in the light of the costly and protracted battles which Qāytbāy waged against the Ottomans and their satellite Shāh Siwār. In none of these battles is there any reference to the Mamluk army using artillery, whereas we may deduce from a casual remark that the Ottomans and Shāh Siwār did".[52] However, this is not the case. In the years 1465–71 the Mamluks fought a war against Shāh Siwār, a rebellious Dhu'l-Ghadrid prince in south-west Anatolia, whom the Ottomans were covertly sponsoring as a thorn in the flanks of the Mamluks. Then again in the years 1488–91 the Mamluks fought a war with the Ottomans over the status of Qaramān beylicate. The first thing to note is that the Mamluks won both these wars. Secondly, in discussing these wars, Ayalon cites Ibn Taghrī Birdī and Ibn Iyās as sources for the first war and Ibn Iyās alone for the second war. (So he has relied on rather few sources.) Thirdly, if the Mamluks had in fact failed to use artillery in these late-fifteenth-century wars, this would have been strange, for the Mamluk prince Ibrahim used cannon against the Qaramānid town of Laranda as early as 1419.[53] A little later Barsbāy used cannons against the Cypriot fleet at sea in 1424.[54] Then again, after Barsbāy had failed to take Āmid from the Āqqūyūnlū ruler Qara 'Uthmān in 1433, he ordered the casting of a brass canon weighing 1,20 qintars.[55] Finally, when the Mamluk general Nawkar set out against Ibn Qaramān in 1457, he took with him naphtha gunners.[56]

In the light of these precedents it is not surprising to find that the Mamluks did in fact make decisive use of artillery in their war against the Dhū'l-Ghadirid Amir Shāh Siwār. Ibn Ajā's "History of the Amīr Bashtak" (sic), also known as *Riḥlat al-Amīr Yashbak* ("Journey of the Amir Yashbak") is the most detailed account to have survived of Yashbak min Mahdī's campaign in 1471 against Shāh Siwār. The Amir Yashbak min Mahdī was the Sultan Qāytbāy's leading general and the most powerful of all the amirs. While he lived, Yashbak

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[52] Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms*, 48.
[53] Jawharī, *Nuzhat*, vol. II, 438.
[54] *Ibid.*, vol. III, 80; cf. *ibid.*, 91.
[55] Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 906; Jawharī, *Nuzhat*, vol. III, 275; Aḥmad Darrag, *L'Égypte sous le règne de Barsbāy 825–841/1422–1438* (Damascus, 1961), 378–79.
[56] Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, vol. VII, 483.

seems to have been even more powerful than the Sultan himself. Since Ibn Ajā (d. 1476) was not only Yashbak's military *qāḍī*, but also his confidante, ambassador, and civilian aide-de-camp, he was in a position to know about what he wrote about.[57] It is important to note that in the course of this war the Ottomans did not use artillery, for the simple reason that they were not directly involved in the fighting. Indeed they sent what purported to be a friendly embassy to Yashbak.

Yashbak however did make use of artillery. In 1471 having marched north through Syria with a lot of infantry, he waited at Marj Dābiq for the *makāḥil* to catch up.[58] In the opening stage of the campaign, 'Ayntāb, intimidated by the Mamluk deployment of artillery and the subsequent nine days of bombardment, surrendered.[59] Thereafter the Mamluks used the city as their arsenal and the place where their gunpowder was stored.[60] Later on in the campaign the Mamluk general Īnāl, having invested Adana and demolished one of its towers through artillery, had to send for more gunpowder to finish off the operation.[61] Shāh Siwār himself did possess two cannons at Khirmān, but we only hear about these pieces when they were surrendered to the Mamluks. Indeed, they and the castle seem to have been surrendered to the Mamluks without a shot being fired and Yashbak subsequently used the captured guns against the fortifications of Zamanti. (It also seems, though the Arabic is not clear, that additional guns were cast for the siege of Zamanti.)[62] Zamanti was Shāh Siwār's final redoubt and, with its surrender in June 1472, the war was over. While it is true that artillery was not used by the Mamluks on the battlefield during this war, this was because Shāh Siwār never dared offer battle in the open field.[63] This was a war of sieges.

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[57] Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd b. Ajā, *Tārīkh al-Amīr Bashtāk al-Ẓāhirī*, ed. Aḥmad Tulaymat, (Cairo, 1974); on Ibn Ajā's life and writings, see Tulaymat's preface.

[58] Ibn Ajā, *Tarikh*, 74, 79–80.

[59] *Ibid.*, 79–83; Har-El, 93.

[60] Ibn Ajā, *Tarikh*, 123.

[61] *Ibid.*, 128.

[62] *Ibid.*, 140, 142.

[63] On the general progress of this campaign see Evrard, *Zur Geschichte Aleppos und Nordsyriens in letzen Halben Jahrhundert der Mamlukenherrschaft (872–924 AH) nach Arabischen and italeinischen Quellen* (Munich, 1974), 23–24; Har-El, 93–96.

It is indeed striking that in his account of the war against Shāh Siwār, Ibn Iyās, who was a Cairo-based civilian, makes no reference at all to the use of artillery. Neither for that matter does the *ḥadīth* expert and historian, Ibn Ḥajar, though he gave a much fuller account of the campaigning than Ibn Iyās's scrappy jottings. If we did not have Ibn Ajā's *Riḥla*, and we had to rely only on sources of the kind produced by Ibn Iyās and Ibn Ḥajar, then we might indeed conclude that the Mamluks ignored the potential of firearms and gunpowder. But the truth is that it was Arab, civilian, religious scholars who (not surprisingly) failed to register contemporary developments in military technology. Incidentally, this leads one to the broader reflection that the conventions, clichés and vocabulary employed by traditionally minded chroniclers of the Mamluk period similarly prevented them from registering other economic and technological changes. For one example among the many possible of this negative phenomenon—the numerous dogs that did not bark in the night—no Mamluk chronicler notes the rise of a luxury carpet industry in Cairo in the late fifteenth century, though that is what seems to have happened. But, to return to the firearms problem, Ibn Ḥajar, who was an admired literary stylist, may well have shrunk from such neologisms as *makāḥil al-nafṭ, zanburaq, bunduqiyya* and so forth. (Similarly, Froissart in his chronicling of the Hundred Years War omitted all reference to the English guns at Crecy, lest they be offensive to his cultivated French readers.)

As for the second war, that between the Mamluks and Ottomans, which was fought over the Tarsus-Adana region, this has been the subject of a well-researched and discriminating study by Shai Har-El, entitled *Struggle for Domination in the Middle East. The Ottoman Mamluk War, 1485–1491*.[64] The Egypto-Syrian army sent out to confront the Ottomans cast cannons at their camp at Ayas.[65] The Mamluks customarilly cast their cannons at Ayas, before proceeding further into Cilicia or Anatolia. Subsequently, the Mamluk general Uzbek, having defeated the Ottomans in the field, laid siege to Adana and attacked it, using cannons, mangonels and ballistas.[66] An Ottoman

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[64] For the campaign itself, see Har-El, 133–51; see also Evrard, *Zur Geschichte Nordsyriens*, 32–40.
[65] Jawharī, *Inbāʾ*, 263–64; Har-El, 139.
[66] Har-El, 140.

relief army engaged the Mamluk besiegers and succeeded in dis-
abling some of their cannons, before it was crushingly defeated.
Adana and Tarsus thereupon surrendered to the Mamluks.[67]

In renewed fighting in 1488, the Ottomans recaptured Cilicia and
they then tried to use naval artillery to block the Syrian pass of Bāb
al-Malik. However, strong winds sank some of the ships and dis-
persed the rest. The Mamluks advanced into the Cilician plain and
at the Battle of Aga-Çayiri defeated the Ottomans. This was a cav-
alry battle in which firearms do not seem to have played a significant
part. However, when, in 1490, fighting on a smaller scale continued
in the region, Qāytbāy sent a force of *awlād al-nās*, equipped and
trained to use the arquebus (*bunduq al-raṣāṣ*) as part of the Mamluk
force which ravaged Ottoman Anatolia.[68]

If the Mamluks did not neglect firearms, then why did they lose
to the Ottomans at the Battle of Marj Dābiq in Syria in 1516 and
then again at Raydāniyya in Egypt in 1517? According to Professor
Partington, a historian of *Gunpowder and Firearms* (and also one of
Ayalon's *bêtes noires*) ("In 1514 an Ottoman army of 12,000 com-
pletely routed a Mamluk army much larger through the use of hand-
guns.")[69] But nothing is correct in Partington's statement—not even
the date! I turn now to the causes for the Mamluks' defeat in bat-
tle and the termination of their Sultanate.

The Mamluk Sultan Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī, who was to command
the Mamluk army at Marj Dābiq, was crazy about guns. Gun cast-
ing was intensive throughout his reign.[70] He also raised an arque-
bus regiment (as indeed Qāytbāy had done before him). However,
it must be borne in mind that during the final crisis years of his
reign many (perhaps all?) of the arquebusiers that had been raised
in Egypt were actually campaigning in the Ḥijāz and Yemen where
they were deployed against the Portuguese.[71] As for the cannons cast

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[67] *Ibid.*, 141–42.
[68] See note 33.
[69] Partington, *A History of Greek Fire and Gunpowder*, 209.
[70] On Qānṣūh's gun foundry at Rajab, which after early difficulties, was casting
cannons from 1511 onwards, see Petry, *Twilight of Majesty*, 162–63; *Protectors or
Praetorians*, 192–93.
[71] On the despatch in 1513, of the Fifth Corps, equipped with muskets to the
Red Sea campaign, see Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms*, 73–83; L.O. Schuman, *The
Political History of the Yemen: Abu Makhrama's Account of 906–16/1500–21*, (Göttingen,
1960), 16–20, 69–78; Petry, *Protectors*, 60, 195; Halil Inalcik, "The Socio-Political

on al-Ghawrī's orders, many of those had been sent to defend the Delta ports, especially Alexandria, against an anticipated Ottoman naval attack (though no such attack ever came).[72]

In 1516, Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī led an army out of Egypt into Syria. His aim may have been the purely defensive one of defending Syria from a possible attack by the Ottoman troops led by Selīm the Grim. On the other hand, al-Ghawrī may have believed that Selīm was planning to invade Safavid Iran once more, in which case the Mamluk army might attack the Ottomans on the flank. Ghawrī's motives remain unclear.[73] The Mamluk Sultan, straining every resource, brought with him 5,000 royal mamluks from Egypt to the field at Marj Dābiq, but plainly his army was larger than that, for the royal mamluks were only an elite force within the larger body of the Sultan's army. In fact, the Venetian consul in Alexandria reported that the Sultan left Egypt with 15,000 mamluks and awlād al-nās, as well as between 25 and 30 pieces of artillery. (These last would pre-sumably have been relatively light pieces of field artillery, rather than large guns of the size used, for example by Mehmed II to bring down the walls of Constantinople in 1453.) He also reported that a vast number of camels had had their ears stopped up so that they could be sent against artillery. The Venetian added that the Sultan was alleged to be able to add 150,000 Arabs (that is to say bedouins) to his army. However, the consul doubted this figure.[74] Even so, it seems likely that the Sultan would have recruited some thousands of auxiliary troops from the Bedouins and others.

The Sultan would certainly have added to his forces as he passed through Syria. Syrian troops had previously borne the brunt of the fighting against the Turkomans, the Safavids and rebellious Bedouins. Apart from Mamluk elite forces garrisoned in the cities, the Syrian troops seem to have been predominantly foot-soldiers. Many of these

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Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-arms in the Middle East" in Yapp and Parry, War, Technology and Society, 202–3.

[72] Ayalon, Gunpowder and Firearms, 50, 112n., 113n.

[73] On the political and diplomatic background to Marj Dābiq, see H. Jansky, "Die Eroberung Syriens durch Sultan Selīm I", Mitteilungen zur Osmanischen Geschichte, vol. II (1923–26) 173–224; Jean-Louis Bacqué Grammont, Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins: Contribution à l'histoire des relations internationals dans l'Orient Islamique de 1514 à 1524, (Istanbul, 1987), esp. 187–209; Michael Winter, "The Ottoman Occupa-tion" in Carl Petry (ed.), The Cambridge History of Egypt, vol. I, Islamic Egypt, 640–1517 (Cambridge, 1998), 492–96.

[74] Marino Sanudo, Diarii (G. Berchet ed.), (Venice, 1877–1900), vol. XXII, 485–86.

would have been *ʿushrān*, semi-nomadic Arabs who usually fought as infantry—often as archers on foot. The highlands of Palestine and Lebanon were major recruiting grounds for such troops. Ibn Ajā's account of the earlier war fought by Yashbak against Shāh Siwār provides quite lot of detail about the recruitment of Syrian auxiliary forces. (Press-gang tactics, as well as promises of money were used to bring such men into the field.) Apart from Arab tribesmen, Kurds and Turkomans were regularly recruited for major campaigns.

It seems that likely that some of the Syrian troops, both from the towns and the countryside, possessed firearms. As early as 1498 Kurtbāy, the *Nā'ib* of Damascus, was training men to handle hand-guns and assigning uniforms and barracks to them.[75] Moreover, official initiatives apart, it would be surprising if the Druze, the Kurds and Arab tribesmen of Syria had not sought to acquire guns for their own use. The Banū Sakhr were using arquebuses in their attacks against Syrian villages as early as 1502–3.[76] (An Ottoman *firmān* for Palestine in 1527 sought to address the problem of Bedouin buying muskets—often muskets that were superior in quality to the ones that the Janissaries possessed—from ports like Acre. In that year there were already an estimated 7,000 muskets in the *Sanjak* of Safad alone. It seems that Italian and French merchants were trading guns for local cotton).[77]

Mamluk numbers had of course been depleted by the plagues of 1505 and 1513. According to Paolo Giovio, Qānṣūh brought 13,000 mamluks with him into Syria, though the total number of his army was much larger than that.[78] According to the sixteenth-century Syrian, Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī, Qanṣūh al-Ghawrī advanced north-wards out of Aleppo with 30,000 men.[79] However, Michael Winter believes that Qanṣūh's army may have numbered as few as 5,000–7,000 soldiers.[80] Selīm's army was certainly larger than the Mamluk one.

[75] Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahat al-khillān fī ḥawādith al-zamān*, Mohamed Mosṭafā, ed., (Cairo, 1962–64), vol. I, 201–02.

[76] Henri Laoust, *Les Gouverneurs de Damas sous les Mamlouks et les Premiers Ottomans (658–1156/1260–1744)*, (Damascus, 1952), 92–93.

[77] R.C. Jennings, "Firearms, Bandits and Gun Control", *Archivium Ottomanicum*, vol. VI (1980), 339–58.

[78] Paolo Giovio, *Historiarum Sui Temporis*, vol. I , (Paris, 1558–60), lxxxb–lxxxia.

[79] Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī, *Al-Kawākib al-sā'ira*, ed. Jibrāil Sulaymān Jabbūr, (Beirut, 1945–59), vol. I, 296.

[80] Winter, "The Ottoman occupation", 496, cf. 498.

When one thinks of Ottoman armies, one tends to think first and foremost of the famous Janissaries, or "New Troops". It is true that the Janissaries furnished an important part of the Ottoman army. However, they were, in a sense, the rejects of the Ottoman *devshirme* and palace school system. They did not furnish the bulk of Selīm's army, for they were outnumbered by the *sipahi* cavalry and by the *yaya*, or free-born infantry. In Selīm's reign they do not seem to have been a particularly well-disciplined force. They had mutinied soon after the Battle of Chaldiran. Then they mutinied again at their winter quarters in Amasya and had to be sent back to Istanbul for reorganisation. In the fifteenth century the Janissaries seem still to have been predominantly a force of infantry archers and it was only slowly that they were equipped with guns. However, as has been noted, it has been suggested that the process of re-equipping the Janissaries may have speeded up somewhat after Ottoman defeats at the hands of the Mamluks in the war of 1485–91. Even so, according to Guilmartin it was only by the end of the sixteenth century that most of the Janissaries were equipped with *tüfek*s, or muskets. At the naval Battle of Lepanto (1571) most of the Janissaries seem to have been archers.[81]

It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to determine how large a proportion of Selīm's army in 1516 consisted of Janissaries. However, various contemporaries offered guesstimates of the size of the Ottoman army as a whole. According to Contarini, who was based in Cyprus at the time, Selīm passed through the Taurus region en route for Syria with 200,000 men, though he added that Selīm's army was for the most part ill-disciplined and poorly equipped.[82] According to the Damascan chronicler, Ibn Ṭūlūn, the Ottoman army that entered Damascus after the Battle of Marj Dābiq numbered 130,000. He added that Selīm's army was a heterogenous lot, including Rūmis,

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[81] Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleons*, 251. The Turkish cavalry elite, like the Mamluk cavalry elite was reluctant to handle guns themselves, preferring to leave them in the hands of low grade infantry. Ogier de Busbecq reported that when, in 1552, Rustam Pasha prepared for the third campaign against the Persians, he armed his cavalry with muskets. However, many of the cavalrymen promptly broke or lost their guns and they all complained about the way gunpowder dirtied their uniforms and they successfully argued that they should revert to using bows and arrows. (*The Turkish Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, Imperial Ambassador at Constantinople 1554–1562*, tr. Edward Seymour Forster, Oxford, 1927, 123–24).

[82] Letter from Andrea Contarini in Sanudo, *Diarii*, vol. XXII, 659.

Armenians, Tatars, Siwāriyya (who were presumably troops formerly
in the service of Shāh Siwār?), Franks and others.[83] According to
Ibn Iyās, a renegade from the Ottoman army reported that the
Ottoman force that subsequently advanced on Egypt consisted of
60,000 men.[84] (It should be borne in mind that Selīm would have
left substantial garrisons in the main Syrian cities.) Thomas Venier
gave an even smaller figure. According to his contemporary report,
Selīm's forces, which subsequently fought against Ṭūmānbāy in Egypt,
numbered 25–30,000 horsemen and 8,000 Janissaries of which half
were schiopeteri (marksmen, presumably both gunners and archers)
and half were *ronchonieri* (pikemen).[85] (Several other European reports
confirm the estimate of half the Janissaries as being *schiopeteri*.) Returning
to the Battle of Marj Dābiq in 1516, Ibn Zunbul, in his account of
the battle, says that the Mamluk army was heavily outnumbered,
with 2,000 mamluks facing an Ottoman force of 150,000—for what
that is worth.[86] However, the historical testimony of Ibn Zunbul is
worth very little. (I will come back to him.)

One reason, then for the Mamluk defeats at Marj Dābiq and sub-
sequently was that they were outnumbered. Secondly, the Mamluk
commander, Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī, who was some eighty years old,
died of a fit (of apoplexy?) half way through the battle. Thirdly,
there were traitors in the Mamluk ranks, most notably the Emir
Khāyrbak, who led his section of the army off the battlefield. (Ibn
Zunbul placed particularly heavy stress on role of traitors in turn-
ing what had begun as a Mamluk victory into a defeat.) Fourthly,
there were tensions between the *qarāniṣa* (seasoned mamluks) and the
julbān (recent recruits). The former resented the fact that they were
being used in the charges on Ottoman positions, while the *julbān*
were held back. Fifthly, the ill-disciplined looting of Ottoman sup-
plies by Mamluk cavalry played a part in the Mamluks' ultimate
defeat.[87]

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[83] Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahat*, vol. II, 29.

[84] Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. III, 121.

[85] Sanudo, *Diarii*, vol. XXIV, 171.

[86] Ibn Zunbul, *Ākhirat al-Mamālīk*, 129.

[87] On the Battle of Marj Dābiq, see Ibn Iyās, *Bada'ī'*, vol. V, 66–70; Ibn Ṭūlūn,
Mufākahat, vol. II, 23–24; Ibn Zunbul, *Ākhirat al-Mamālīk*, 26–33; Sanudo, *Diarii*,
vol. XXIII, 107–36; Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms*, 60; Winter, "The Ottoman
Occupation", 498–99.

It is also possible that firearms contributed to the Mamluk defeat. But let us consider the matter carefully. Ibn Iyās mentions Ottoman firearms. Ibn Ṭūlūn writes of the Mamluks being driven off by men firing *bunduq al-raṣāṣ* (lead pellets?). However, what was used to fire off this sort of ammunition? One may be tempted to think that musketry fire is being referred to here. However, a subsequent mention of *bunduq al-raṣāṣ* by Damascan chronicler, Ibn Ṭūlūn, in the context of his account of Selīm's entry into Damascus, reveals that each *bunduq al-raṣāṣ* was as big as a fist and they were fired by field-guns on boxes mounted on wagons which could be chained together. Selīm entered Damascus with 30 of these guns. They were field cannon then rather than muskets or handguns.[88] As for artillery, it seems to have caused more panic than actual damage. What caused more of a problem for the Mamluk horsemen was their inability to break through the Ottoman Lager of chained wagons. Even so, Marj Dābiq was a close run affair. At noon it was still looking as though the Mamluks were going to win.[89] Venetian and Rhodian observers, as well as Ottoman informants, agreed that Selīm's losses had been heavy. Approximately 15,000 Turks had been killed. Mamluk losses were relatively light (500–1,000), as so many of them preferred to run away and fight another day.

Turning now to the second big battle, that fought at Raydāniyya, a little to the north of Cairo in 1517, no source, not even Ibn Zunbul, claimed that Raydāniyya was lost because the Mamluks failed to use artillery.[90] In fact, a contemporary letter by an Arab scribe in the Ottoman army reveals that Ṭūmānbāy's men collected guns from all over Egypt, including *makāḥil, kufiyāt, sabaqiyāt*, and *bunduqiyāt*.[91] According to Ibn Iyās, Ṭūmānbāy initially mustered more than thirty cannons mounted on carts, and more guns were deployed by gunners mounted on camels and others were carried by footsoldiers. (As Ayalon has noted, Ṭūmānbāy was extremely keen on guns.) By the eve of battle, Ṭūmānbāy had increased his firepower to more

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[88] Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahat*, vol. II, 29.

[89] *Ibid.*, 24.

[90] On the Battle of Raydāniyya, see Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. V, 142–3; Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahat*, vol. II, 43–47; Ibn Zunbul, *Ākhirat al-Mamālīk*, 50–52; Sanudo, *Diarii*, 162–63, 171; Paolo Giovio, *History of the Turks*, lxxxviia–lxxxixa; Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms*, 51–52, 83–85; Winter, "The Ottoman Occupation", 502–3.

[91] Quoted in extenso in Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahat*, vol. II, 45.

one hundred brass cannons on carts. Additionally, he had recruited 200 Turkoman and Maghribi artillerymen, plus black slave gunners (*ʿabīd nafṭiyya*). The Egyptian army dug ditches and raised screens at Raydāniyya and placed Frankish and other marksmen there. When the Egyptians attacked the Ottoman vizier, Sinān, on the right wing, they did so with guns and the Ottoman Turks drove them off with swords.

What happened at Raydāniyya was that Ṭūmānbāy's redoubts and entrenched positions were outflanked by the more mobile Ottoman troops who outflanked and attacked the gun emplacements from the rear. Ṭūmānbāy's faith in artillery had led him to adopt too inactive a role on the battlefield. (Moreover, according to report by the Grand Master of the Hospitallers at Rhodes, Ṭūmānbāy's flight from the field was provoked by reports of a Maghribi uprising in Cairo.)[92] The Ottoman victory at Raydāniyya proved to be decisive. Even so their losses had again been heavy.

From all the foregoing, it should be clear that the Mamluks' failure to appreciate fully the significance of firearms did not contribute significantly to their defeat by the Ottomans in the early sixteenth century. The only prejudice the Mamluk sultans had regarding firearms was a prejudice in their favour. The only problem they had with firearms was that could not get enough of them. The contrary view relies heavily on Ibn Zunbul's narrative of the struggle between the Mamluks and the Ottomans. Ibn Zunbul placed heavy emphasis on the role of gunpowder in bringing about the ruin and destruction of Mamluk chivalry. According to Ayalon, "The evidence gathered from Ibn Zunbul's work proves beyond any shadow of doubt that by far the most important cause of Mamluk defeat was the Ottoman use of firearms". But Ibn Zunbul's narrative of the Ottoman conquest of Egypt and Syria is not the sort of source on which one can rely for indubitable proof of anything whatsoever. Ibn Zunbul's background, chronology and literary aims are so far poorly explored and the issues raised by his various books are so complex, that I am publishing an article devoted specifically to his shadowy life and confusing writings.[93] For the time being, it suffices to remark that it is

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[92] Sanudo, *Diarii*, 171.
[93] Forthcoming, as "Ibn Zunbul and the Romance of History", to be published in *The Status of Medieval Arabic Literature*, Julia Bray and James Montgomery, eds.

not clear when Ibn Zunbul was born, or when he died, or when he produced the various versions of his story of the conflict between Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī and Selīm. On the other hand it is also clear that much of what Ibn Zunbul reports could not possibly have happened (unless, that is, one believes in telepathy, magic and witchcraft). It also seems probable that he was only a child at the time of the Ottoman occupation of Egypt. (He certainly was not Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī's court astrologer, as Benjamin Lellouche has recently claimed.)[94] Rather this fascinating writer, who flourished in the 1560s and 70s, has claims to be considered as the Arab world's first historical novelist. It is true that, in his romanticised version of the downfall of the Mamluks, (the correct title of which is *Kitāb infiṣāl dawlat al-awān wa'l-ittiṣāl dawlat Banī ʿUthmān*), he stressed the importance of gunpowder and firearms in bringing about the defeat of the Mamluks. However, he made use of this as an excuse to explain the downfall of his chivalrous Mamluk heroes. The speeches in which Mamluk officers denounce firearms and their effects are clearly fictitious. Moreover, though Ibn Zunbul did indeed stress the importance of firearms, he laid even greater stress on the role of traitors within the Mamluk ranks and, above all, he repeatedly observed that when God has decreed the end of a dynasty, that dynasty is indeed doomed.

While it is the case that the deployment of firearms brought with it certain problems, the fact that the Mamluk empire maintained so grand a presence in the eastern Mediterranean for so long was in some measure due to its adoption and deployment of firearms. Indeed, the Mamluk Sultanate may be regarded as the first, though one of the most short-lived, of the "gunpowder empires" of the Islamic world.

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[94] Benjamin Lellouche, "Ibn Zunbul, Un Égyptien Face à l'Universalisme Ottoman (Seizième Siècle)", *SI*, vol. LXXXIX (1994), 144–55.

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PART FOUR

PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION IN MAMLUK PALESTINE

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CHAPTER SEVEN

THE GOVERNANCE OF JERUSALEM UNDER QĀYTBĀY

Donald P. Little

Thanks to Carl Petry we have a clear and well documented under-
standing of the nature of Qāytbāy's long reign as sultan as seen by
contemporary historians from the Mamluk capital in Cairo, most,
but not all, of whom regard him with favor, the exception being
Ibn Taghrī Birdī, with his criticisms based on the early years of the
sultanate. Petry concurs in the majority judgment and depicts Qāytbāy
as "esteemed custodian . . .", "the principal monarch of Sunni
Islam . . .", who "radiated an aura of majesty that inspired many of
his subjects to revere their overlord as a conservator of grandeur
they recalled from days when Egypt's primacy was uncontested."[1]
Moreover, for Qāytbāy's sultanate we are fortunate to have an addi-
tional, non-Cairene source, written from a provincial point of view,
namely *al-Uns al-Jalīl bi-ta'rīkh al-Quds wa'l-Khalīl* written by Qāytbāy's
contemporary, the Ḥanbalī scholar and historian of Jerusalem, Mujīr
al-Dīn al-ʿUlaymī.[2] This source Petry did not use. In his desire to
record as much as he could about the merits and history of the city,
Mujīr al-Dīn divided *al-Uns* into sections discussing its Islamicity
within the monotheistic tradition, its shrines, and biographical notes on
its notables, both religious and political.[3] Unexpectedly, the work ends
with an annalistic account of the reign of Qāytbāy, beginning with
the year of his installation as sultan in 872/1468 and ending, con-
veniently but not conclusively, with 900/1495, even though Qāytbāy

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[1] Carl F. Petry, *Protectors or Praetorians? The Last Mamlūk Sultans and Egypt's Waning
as a Great Power* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 13, 16. Cf. his *Twilight of Majesty: The
Reigns of the Mamluk Sultans al-Ashraf Qāytbāy and Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī in Egypt* (Seattle
and London: University of Washington Press, 1993), 4–5.

[2] 2 vols. (ʿAmmān: Maktabat al-Muḥtasib, 1973).

[3] For a full study of this work see Little, "Mujīr al-Dīn al-ʿUlaymī's Vision of
Jerusalem in the Ninth/Fifteenth Century," *JAOS*, vol. CXV (1995), 237–47, and
"Mujīr al-Dīn al-ʿUlaymī's Vision of al-Quds around 900/1495," in *Research Papers
of the International Symposium on al-Quds* (Rabat: ISESCO, 1995), 182–205.

continued to rule for another year and Mujīr al-Dīn himself lived
until 928/1522. Somewhat surprisingly, Mujīr al-Dīn passes up the
opportunity to eulogize a reigning sultan in an introduction charac-
terizing his reign, stating merely that "He spread justice among his
subjects (al-raʿiyya) so that the people (al-nās) had confidence in his
reign. Jerusalem was decorated and the good news was proclaimed
when the report of his sultanate arrived."[4] But the titles that Mujīr
al-Dīn bestows on Qāytbāy give some indication of his admiration:
"Animator of Justice in the Worlds, Righter of the Oppressed against
the Oppressors, Fighter of Unbelievers and Polytheists, Destroyer of
Despots and Renegades, Uniter of the Faith, and Suppressor of
Tyranny and Aggression", even though these may well be stereotypes.[5]
This favorable impression in Jerusalem is confirmed for the most
part throughout the detailed annals that follow. These I will use to
reconstruct aspects of how the city was governed during Qāytbāy's
reign and at the end examine briefly its governance in the context
sketched by Petry for Qāytbāy's rule in Syria in general.

Appointment and dismissal of officials, both political and religious,
in Jerusalem figure prominently in the annals. Here I will focus on
the political. Not surprisingly, following the custom of his predeces-
sors, Qāytbāy initially retained the two Mamluk officials appointed
before he came to power, but not for long. These two held the titles
of Supervisor of the Two Shrines in Jerusalem and Hebron (Nāẓir
al-Ḥaramayn bi'l-Quds al-Sharīf wa'l-Khalīl) and Viceroy of the same
two places (Nāʾib al-Salṭana . . .). Although Mujīr al-Dīn never spells
out the distinction between the two offices, it would seem that the
viceroy acted as the sultan's deputy in all matters except oversight
of the endowments of the shrines of both cities. As might be expected
the two officials did not always work together in harmony. In fact,
the first two appointed after Qāytbāy's accession in 872/1468, had
a serious falling out that divided the city into two factions after the
Nāẓir Bardbāk al-Tājī was wounded in an attack by the Nāʾib
Damurdāsh al-ʿUthmānī. Amidst the resultant civil strife and the
nāẓir's poor management, supervision of Jerusalem's endowments
suffered so that theft and brigandage became rampant, to the extent

⁴ *Uns*, vol. II, 283.
⁵ *Ibid.*, 282.

that an envoy was sent from Cairo to investigate the matter.[6] As we shall see, this was the first of many incidents in which the sultanate intervened in the public affairs of Jerusalem. Otherwise, relations between the two representatives of Mamluk authority pass without Mujīr al-Dīn's notice, though there is mention of animosity between the viceroys of Jerusalem and Gaza in 896–900/1491–95.[7] Another element of ambiguity comes from the fact that we know from the Ḥaram documents that at an earlier period there were Shāfiʿī judges who bore the title of Supervisor of Pious Endowments (*Nāzir al-Awqāf al-Mabrūra*) in Jerusalem and Hebron,[8] but their relationship to the Mamluk *nāzir*s has not been defined. More vexing still is the scarcity of Mamluks in Jerusalem in Mujīr al-Dīn's pages, other than the two top officials. True, there is occasional mention of Mamluks who had retired in or been exiled to the city, and there are brief references to officers such as the *mutasallim*s and *dawādār*s in the service of the *nuwwāb* as well as the commanders of the citadel, but we know very little about these Mamluks, less, in fact, than about those sent on missions to the city from Cairo.

In any event for the twenty-eight of the twenty-nine years of Qāytbāy's reign recorded by Mujīr al-Dīn, three Mamluk amirs served as *nāzir* al-Ḥaramayn exclusively, as well as one *qāḍī* who in 873–75/1468–71 served as an interim appointee.[9] Twelve Mamluks served exclusively as viceroys. But in 893/1488 Qāytbāy for some reason decided to combine the two offices, and they remained so through 900/1495. From 893, after an interregnum when the *dawādār* of the viceroy of Gaza served until new appointments could be made, through 900, three amirs served in the dual capacity. Thus under Qāytbāy fifteen viceroys served a little less than two years on average, including Khaḍir Bāk, who served once in 891/1486 and was appointed to the two offices in 896/1491; in contrast, six *nāzir*s served for an average of four-and-a-half years. Whether or not these figures reveal anything significant about the stability of Mamluk rule in the

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[6] *Ibid.*, 285.

[7] *Ibid.*, 359, 367, 373.

[8] Huda Lutfi, *Al-Quds al-Mamlūkiyya: A History of Mamlūk Jerusalem Based on the Ḥaram Documents* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1985), 199; Little, A *Catalogue of the Islamic Documents from al-Ḥaram ash-Sharīf in Jerusalem* (Beirut: Orient-Institut DMG, 1984), 10.

[9] *Uns*, vol. II, 286.

city is problematic, since we have no comparative figures for other times and places. It is noteworthy, though, that one *nāẓir*, al-Amīr Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Nashāshībī, remained in office for almost eighteen years (875–93/1470–1487) until, exceptionally, he resigned rather than being dismissed. He is one of the few Mamluks singled out for praise by Mujīr al-Dīn, "for serving with decency and vigor, providing civility to the Holy Land through his presence. He held frequent sessions with the ʿulamāʾ and jurisprudents, whom he treated well, receiving them with a joyful countenance."[10] More specifically, he undertook to rebuild the endowments and to restore the serving of free meals in Hebron.

What were the circumstances of these appointments? Although there is disagreement as to precisely when the sultans, as opposed to the viceroys of Damascus, began naming the two officials in Jerusalem, whether 1391, 1394, or 1413,[11] there is no doubt whatsoever that during Qāytbāy's reign the positions were firmly in the hands of the sultanate. Occasionally, to be sure, there are indications that Qāytbāy's highest notables played an active role in the process, especially in depositions. Thus in 896/1491 Duqmāq Dawādār Īnāl al-Ashqar was dismissed as *nāʾib* and *nāẓir* by al-Amīr Āqbirdī al-Dawādār al-Kabīr while he was in the vicinity of Ramla on an official mission for the sultan.[12] This was the same powerful official of Qāytbāy's court whose support Duqmāq had previously bought the previous year against complaints lodged against him in Jerusalem.[13] It is clear that graft was an element in political and other appointments. When, for example, Duqmāq was appointed in Cairo to the two positions, he paid 10,000 dinars to the royal treasuries in addition to the gratuities he conferred on the pillars of the state ("*istaqarra . . . fī nazar al-Ḥaramayn al-Sharīfayn wa-niyābat al-salṭana bi'l-Quds al-Sharīf wa-balad Sayyidinā al-Khalīl . . . bi-badhl ʿasharat ālāf dīnār li'l-khazāʾin al-sharīfa ghayra mā takallafahu li-arkān al-dawla.*").[14] In 899/1494, one of

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[10] *Ibid.*, 288.

[11] Little, "Relations between Palestine and Egypt under the Mamluks according to Literary and Documentary Sources," in *Egypt and Syria: A Millenium of Association (868–1948)* ed. Amnon Cohen and Gabriel Baer (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), p. 75; Boaz Shoshan, "On the Relations between Egypt and Palestine: 1382–1517 A.D.," in *Egypt and Syria*, 97.

[12] *Uns*, vol. II, 358.

[13] *Ibid.*, 353.

[14] *Ibid.*, 342.

his successors, Jān Balāṭ, after being summoned to Cairo to answer
complaints lodged against him from Jerusalem, was allowed to remain
in office, like Duqmāq, after he had paid a sum of money.[15] Further
evidence of the prevelance of graft comes in a dispute between the
two viceroys of Jerusalem and Gaza during the same year over the
post of amirate of the Jurm Arabs. In any event, the viceroy of Gaza
wrote to the sultan, opposing the Jerusalem viceroy's candidate on
the grounds that he was not suitable for the post because "he could
not put up the donation (al-qawd) nor the amount specified for the
royal treasuries."[16] Accordingly the sultan instructed that a council
be convoked in which the two viceroys, their judges, and all the
candidates who were qualified for the post "and were satisfactory to
the subjects (al-raʿiyya) consider the stipulated amount and submit a
legal report (maḥḍar) to Cairo."[17] In the end the Jerusalem nominee
prevailed because its viceroy agreed to pay five hundred dinars in
excess of the customary donation and the stipulated amount. Other
than willingness and ability to pay the price, little is known about
the process of selecting political officials. According to al-Qalqashandī,
in 777/1376 the viceroyship of Jerusalem was established for an amir
of forty.[18] While it is evident from al-Uns that all the viceroys dur-
ing Qāytbāy's reign were Mamluk amirs (except for the one tem-
porary appointee), I have been unable to determine their ranks from
the biographical dictionaries. In addition we know that all the nāʾibs
and nāzirs were appointed in Cairo with a diploma (tawqīʿ) issued
by the sultanate. These designees then set out for Jerusalem, pre-
ceded usually by a mutasallim—an assistant or vice-governor. In at
least two instances when Mujīr al-Dīn provides names, it is evident
that these officers were also Mamluks. In fact, one of them, Khaḍir
Bāk, who represented al-Amīr Jānim Bāk upon the latter's appoint-
ment in 888/1483, later became viceroy himself, in 891/1486.[19]
Shortly after the mutasallim's arrival, the viceroy came to Jerusalem,
dressed in viceroy's robes, accompanied by his entourage and nota-
bles of Jerusalem who had come out to meet him, and was greeted

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[15] Ibid., 367–68.
[16] Ibid., 370.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā fī ṣināʿat al-inshāʾ (Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya, 1913–19), vol.
IV, 199.
[19] Uns, vol. II, 336.

by the populace. By custom the diploma of investiture was read on
the most public occasion possible, that is in al-Aqṣā Mosque, fol-
lowing the Friday prayers. Obviously the sultanate felt the need to
demonstrate the legitimacy of the appointment to the people, mak-
ing manifest his will in governing the city.

   What, precisely, did the two Mamluk officers do? Given the nature
of our one source, this is difficult to determine: annals, like news-
papers, rarely report routine activities but focus instead on the unusual.
In fact, in a section listing the governors of Jerusalem Mujīr al-Dīn
states that there is no advantage in discussing them at length but is
content to mention those who were known for good deeds.[20] Among
these meritorious acts, it can be deduced, are construction activities
in and around the city. The most notable building erected during
Qāytbāy's reign was, of course, the Ashrafiyya Madrasa. The com-
plicated history of the building/s has been written in detail.[21] Suffice
it to say here that the original building was built for Qāytbāy's pre-
decessor, Khushqadam, by the *nāzir*, al-Amīr Ḥasan al-Ẓāhirī, with
his own funds, but that when he was dismissed from office he per-
suaded Qāytbāy to accept it as his own, whereupon the sultan's
name was inscribed over the door.[22] Ḥasan's successor presided over
the finishing touches in 873/1468–69, installing the doors and fur-
nishing the building with carpets.[23] Later, when Qāytbāy decided he
did not like the *madrasa* and had it reconstructed, this was apparently
done at his own expense and under the supervision of one of his
elite Mamluks sent from Cairo for that purpose.[24] The fountain bear-
ing his name also dates from this reconstruction according to Mujīr
al-Dīn.[25] Other construction works at the Jerusalem Ḥaram are men-
tioned. In 877/1472–73, for example, the *Nāzir* Ibn al-Nashāshībī
rebuilt and enlarged one of the staircases leading to the Dome of
the Rock, and in 884/1479 he undertook to replace the old lead
on the Dome with new, like that recently installed on al-Aqṣā. But
he was vociferously opposed in this project by an official called

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[20] *Ibid.*, 269.
[21] Michael Hamilton Burgoyne and D.S. Richards, *Mamluk Jerusalem: An Architectural Study* (Great Britain: World of Islam Festival Trust, 1987), 589–605.
[22] *Uns*, vol. II, 284.
[23] *Ibid.*, 286.
[24] *Ibid.*, 325.
[25] *Ibid.*, 330.

Shaykh al-Ḥaram, who was not a Mamluk but a member of the religious notables. His insistence that the old lead was better than the new was confirmed by Mujīr al-Dīn's observation that it was still in use "until today."[26] Fourteen years later, in 895/1490, the Shāfiʿī Shaykh al-Islām al-Kamālī complained to Qāytbāy about the poor state of al-Aqsā and the need to repair and restore it; this was but one complaint lodged against the *nāʾib/nāzir* Duqmāq.[27] In 892/1487 the Nāʾib Khaḍir Bāk rebuilt the judgment seat at the Dār al-Niyāba (al-Jāwiliyya) in the Egyptian style, complete with a roof. Here I cannot resist pointing to Mujīr al-Dīn's sharp critical sense, for even though he relied heavily on documents and inscriptions, he notes that the date inscribed on the seat commemorating its completion was an error: 891 should read 892![28] Building projects outside the Ḥaram include repairs to waterworks such as the Qanāt al-Sabīl lying outside the city at Birkat al-Sulṭān, supervised by the *nāzir* in 873/1468–69, and to the Qanāt al-ʿArrūb and the Birkat al-Marjiʿ in 888/1483.[29] At Qāytbāy's instruction the ex-governor of Damascus, now resident in Jerusalem, was given four thousand dinars for expenses and a thousand as a fee for his supervision of the latter projects.[30] Upon completion of the work, the amir sent a report to Qāytbāy along with the plans he had used, reflecting, I think, the sultan's close interest in the project, having dispensed, Mujīr al-Dīn observes, "a large sum" on it.[31]

Besides attention given to public works and the Muslim shrines of Jerusalem, the Mamluks were also involved in the tumultuous controversies over the holy places claimed by the Dhimmis. I have written at some length about the fights during Qāytbāy's reign over a synagogue and Christian shrines on Mt. Zion.[32] These were waged primarily between Muslim legists on one side and representatives of the Dhimmis on the other but resulted in numerous investigations and interventions from the sultanate in Cairo that required convocation of councils in Jerusalem attended by the *nāʾib* and *nāzir*. The

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[26] *Ibid.*, 292.
[27] *Ibid.*, 349.
[28] *Ibid.*, 337.
[29] *Ibid.*, 285, 330.
[30] *Ibid.*, 330.
[31] *Ibid.*, 331.
[32] "Communal Strife in Late Mamluk Jerusalem," *Islamic Law and Society*, VI (1999), 69–96.

case of the synagogue developed into a public contest of will and
jurisdiction between the Mamluk state and its provincial judiciary,
involving as well Mamluks in both Jerusalem and Cairo. In the end
Qāytbāy prevailed of course, given his power of appointment, dis-
missal, and punishment of judges. The case of the shrines on Mt.
Zion was similar but ended with a touch of humor when the Muslims,
including the viceroy and Qāytbāy's own envoy, became convinced
that Qāytbāy was on his way to Jerusalem and upon entering the
city would forbid demolition of the Chrisitan monastery. Thereupon
they rushed to level the structure before the false alarm of the sul-
tan's arrival could materialize.

Of special interest might be the impact of Mamluk-Ottoman rela-
tions on Jerusalem, Ramla, and Nablus. What Mujīr al-Dīn char-
acterizes as a *fitna* between Qāytbāy and Sultan Bayazīd b. 'Uthmān
Malik al-Rūm began for these places in 888/1483, when a Mamluk
expeditionary force bound for battle against the Ottomans arrived
in Ramla. The viceroy of al-Quds, al-Amīr Jānim, accompanied by
semi-nomadic tribesmen (*'ashīr*) recruited from Jabal al-Quds, marched
to Ramla to meet the Egyptian troops.[33] A similar expeditionary
force, led by the Grand *Dawādār* Āqbirdī, arrived in Ramla the fol-
lowing year, where he enlisted men from the area under the juris-
diction of Shaykh Jabal Nābulus, but there is no mention of the
participation this year of Jabal Qudsīs.[34] Such was not the case in
893/1488 when an expedition led from Egypt by the grand *dawādār*
and the powerful *Kātib al-Sirr* Ibn Muzhir again reached Ramla. This
time they were met by the viceroy Duqmāq, a Shāfi'ī *qāḍī*, and other
notables of Jerusalem. The viceroy and the *qāḍī* were given five thou-
sand dinars from the royal treasuries for disbursement to the men
recruited from Jabal al-Quds and Hebron. When the viceroy fell ill,
responsibility for recruitment and pay fell upon the *qāḍī*, who deliv-
ered the men to the Mamluks at the staging ground in Ramla, where
they were joined by troops from Jabal Nābulus.[35] As is well known
these troops disgraced themselves on the battlefield in Anatolia by
deserting and returning to Palestine. There in 894/1489 the grand
dawādār demanded repayment of their disbursements from Duqmāq.

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[33] *Uns*, vol. II, 332.
[34] *Ibid.*, 335.
[35] *Ibid.*, 343.

Duqmāq set about retrieving these funds by force, flogging and jailing the deserters when they could be found along with their relatives, friends, and neighbors when they could not be. "The people were treated in a way unheard of since the Jāhiliyya," Mujīr al-Dīn comments, "to the extent that one man sold his daughter like a slave, and the people remained in dire straits and tribulation unparalleled in the Holy Land before that time."[36] Nevertheless, additional troops were levied the next year from Jabal al-Quds and Jabal al-Khalīl for still another expeditionary force, apparently without incident.[37] Finally, in 896/1491, the Mamluk-Ottoman strife ended, for Mujīr al-Dīn's purposes at least, with a visit to Hebron and Jerusalem by the Ottoman peace envoys, on their way back to Istanbul from Cairo. Thus ended the eight-year *fitna* in which men in the vicinity of Jerusalem and surrounding towns were conscripted to serve in the sultan's armies.[38]

So far, economic matters and government attempts to manipulate Jerusalem's resources have been touched upon only briefly, as in, for example, the payment of bribes, the expenditure of funds for construction, and the payment of troops recruited from around the city. In addition, however, we know from *al-Uns* that there were occasional attempts from Cairo to monitor the estates of persons who died in Jerusalem and elsewhere in Syria (as well as other resources) in an attempt to assign to *Bayt al-Māl* portions of estates that contained residues after distribution of shares to the legal heirs. Unfortunately, the Ḥaram collection of documents contains inventories conducted by the Bureau of Escheat Estates in conjunction with the Shāfiʿī and Ḥanafī courts for only a short period at the end of the fourteenth century.[39] As a result there are no inventories dating from the reign of Qāytbāy around a century later. Nevertheless, we can probably assume that the practice of making such inventories continued, especially since there are occasional references to them in *al-Uns*. Thus in 898/1493 a *khāṣṣakī* sent to Damascus to inspect its endowments and *madrasa*s stopped in Jerusalem where, in the presence of the political and juridical notables, had a royal edict

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[36] *Ibid.*, 345. Cf. Shai Har-El, *Struggle for Domination in the Middle East: The Ottoman-Mamluk War 1485–91* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 191.
[37] *Uns*, vol. II, 348.
[38] *Ibid.*, 359.
[39] Lutfi, *Al-Quds*, 12–13.

read relating to a totally different matter, namely, "inspection of the documents and proceeds of those who had died in the plague, earmarked for Bayt al-Mal."[40] Since there had been many plague deaths throughout the Mamluk empire, the government clearly felt obliged to reap such financial benefits as this pandemic bestowed. But the Mamluk envoy in Jerusalem also took the opportunity to extract around 1500 dinars from the *waqf*s of the city, "causing injury thereby to the poor and the jurists." As in similar trials and tribulations Mujīr al-Dīn remarks only that "Judgment belongs to God the Great and High."[41] Beyond the harvest from the estates of plague casualties in Jerusalem, there are at least three references to estates in which inventories were conducted on behalf of the state. The first reference is to the estate of a viceroy of Damascus, Jānibāk Qilqīs— conducted by a *qāḍī* sent from Cairo in 885/1480 for this purpose.[42] In fact, the only reason he appears in *al-Uns* is that he stopped off in Jerusalem, accompanied by one of Qāytbāy's elite Mamluks, to oversee the demolition and reconstruction of the Ashrafiyya Madrasa. In 888/1483 the assets of the Jerusalem viceroy Aḥmad Mubārak Shāh were inventoried after his dismissal and replacement by Jānim al-Ashrafī.[43] This, of course, was an exceptional case of an inventory made before death or even terminal illness, perhaps in an effort by the government to determine whether it had any entitlement to his assets. The third case does involve an estate inventory of an individual in Jerusalem, namely that of the viceroy Khaḍir Bāk, who died of plague in 897/1492 and was replaced by his brother Jān Balāṭ. When the estate had been itemized, seven hundred gold dinars were deposited in Jān Balāṭ's strongbox in al-Madrasa al-Arghūniyya along with other items.[44] When the box was produced in the presence of the viceroy, a *Shaykh al-Islam*, and *qāḍī*s, it turned out to be broken and the contents missing and never found. Be that as it may, the point is that the Mamluk authorities kept close tabs on any possible source of revenue in Jerusalem during Qāytbāy's reign.

In this respect the most detailed reckoning provided by Mujīr al-Dīn concerns the manipulation of the olive-oil market in the area—

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[40] *Uns*, vol. II, 365.
[41] *Ibid.*
[42] *Ibid.*, 325.
[43] *Ibid.*, 330.
[44] *Ibid.*, 364.

one of its chief business enterprises—to the benefit of the Cairo regime. This is a complicated story. In the good old days, according to Mujīr al-Dīn, oil was brought from Jabal Nābulus and sold in Jerusalem and Ramla at the market price "without any difficulty for anyone."[45] This continued until 890/1485 when a market middleman became involved and began cornering the oil and imposing its purchase on its consumers, namely the soap merchants in Jerusalem and Ramla, paying them a fixed amount, again "without bothering anyone else."[46] At first there was an amir present to accept payments. But, then, every year one of the mamluks in the service of the grand *dawādār* started coming to Jabal Nābulus and sequestered the oil, sold it to its consumers, and received payments. In other words, until 890 the olive-oil market had been free; thereafter the Mamluks began intervening and taking a cut, without, apparently, any complaint, since the soapmakers had a monopoly on its purchase. This arrangement changed, however, in 896/1490, when the viceroy in Jerusalem, Duqmāq, allegedly taking revenge for the complaints lodged against him in Jerusalem, persuaded the grand *dawādār* during one of his periodic visits to Ramla, to issue an edict imposing the forced sale of Nablus oil at fifteen gold dinars per *qinṭār* on all the people of Jerusalem, including "the elite and the general public, whether Muslims, Jews or Christians."[47] In collaboration with the *dawādār*'s agent, Duqmāq had lists of all the citizens of Jerusalem drawn up with a set number of *qinṭār*s of oil that each had to buy. Those who resisted were pursued without mercy. Those who did not appear were beaten and jailed, or, in their absence, their neighbors, relatives, and casual acquaintances, until the amount levied was paid. The necessity to procure gold resulted in a selling spree of clothing and other goods and a rise in the price of the dinar, with the result that oil purchased at the fixed price of fifteen dinars was sold for 250 silver dirhams worth only five dinars. According to Mujīr al-Dīn, Duqmāq imposed a similar levy in Hebron:

> This was a disgusting ordeal, unheard of in any era or in any religious community (*milla*), especially in this noble spot where one of the three mosques was frequently visited, at the sacred site of God's Prophet

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[45] *Ibid.*, 356.
[46] *Ibid.*
[47] *Ibid.*

and His friend, Abraham, peace be upon him. Judgment is God's, the
High and Great![48]

Ironically, when Duqmāq presented the approximately twenty-
thousand dinars he had extorted to the grand *dawādār* at Ramla, the
latter deposed him from his two offices and "drove him from the
Holy Land."[49] But two years later when al-Amīr Jān Balāṭ (who had
returned from campaigning in Anatolia in 897/1492), had become
viceroy and supervisor, the forced sale of Nablus oil was renewed,
this time by an edict from the Grand *Dawādār* Āqbirdī, who once
again had come to Ramla. In spite of the public proclamation that
the subjects were not to be molested, along with the promise of secu-
rity to the general public and the restriction of the forced sale of
oil, again for fifteen dinars per *qinṭār*, to soapmakers, the levy was
extended to others, including Jews and Christians.[50] Over a period
of forty days, money was extorted for 1340 *qinṭār*s in Jerusalem, 160
in Hebron, 1000 in Gaza, and an unspecified amount in Ramla.
Although people were again flogged and imprisoned during this
ordeal, they were not treated as badly as they had been before,
thanks to the intercession of Jān Balāṭ for the people of Jerusalem,
according to Mujīr al-Dīn. Further evidence for Cairo's exactions
from its provinces is the fact that before the grand *dawādār* left Ramla
he received delegations from the viceroys and amirs of Tripoli, Ḥamāh,
Ṣafad, al-Bīra, and Damascus bearing gifts of money and livestock.[51]
Two years later in 900/1494–95, the forced sales were renewed, this
time on the basis of a royal edict sent to Jerusalem. Because of the
intervention again of Jān Balāṭ, the inhabitants of the towns were
not molested as they had been in the past, but the poor still suffered,
Mujīr al-Dīn notes, because they lost almost half their money between
the purchase and sale of the oil imposed on them.[52]

   To conclude this survey of the Mamluk, as opposed to civilian,
governance of Jerusalem, let us look more closely at the relationship
of its officials to the sultanate in Cairo by focusing on the regimes
of two of the Mamluk officers characterized by Mujīr al-Dīn as

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[48] *Ibid.*, 358.
[49] *Ibid.*
[50] *Ibid.*, 365.
[51] *Ibid.*, 366.
[52] *Ibid.*, 373.

unjust and tyrannical and the measures adopted by the central gov-
ernment to deal with them. In Mujīr al-Dīn's opinion, Duqmāq was
the worst of the offenders. Appointed in 893/1488 as viceroy and
supervisor of Jerusalem and Hebron after paying his dues to the
royal treasuries and the pillars of the state, he retained these two
positions for about three years until his deposition in 896/1491, when
Mujīr al-Dīn says, God took revenge on him for his evil deeds. The
arrival in Jerusalem of this "wicked tyrant (al-ẓālim al-fājir), clothed
in his robes of office, was "among the most distasteful and offensive
of events,"[53] especially in contrast to the tenure of the benevolent
Nāẓir Ibn al-Nashāshībī. Duqmāq immediately incurred Mujīr al-
Dīn's ire when he took the unprecedented step of curtailing the prac-
tice of distributing free meals in Hebron for almost five months.
After recovering from illness, Duqmāq's "tyrannny increased so that
the conditions of social life were crushed and order was upset: thieves
multiplied and committed atrocious acts of banditry and murder on
the roads."[54] But in addition to being a poor administrator, Duqmāq
was also a public object of ridicule for his careless speech and
unseemly acts. More serious, however, was his brutalilty in reclaim-
ing the money that had been paid to the Palestinian recruits who
deserted in Anatolia, foreshadowing his ruthlessness in exacting the
olive-oil levies. In the meantime, his closing of the Hebron soup
kitchen elicited a royal edict from Cairo condemning him as an
accursed non-Muslim. This edict was read publicly at the Dār al-
Niyāba, in the presence of the common people and the notables, but
its only practical result was the temporary dismissal of an implicated
Ḥanafī qāḍī.[55] In the following year, 895/1480, the distinguished
shaykh of al-Madrasa al-Ṣalāḥiyya, the most prestigious educational
institution in Jerusalem, wrote to Cairo complaining of Duqmāq's
injustice and tyranny along with the sad state of al-Aqṣā and the
Christians' claim to institutions on Mt. Zion. In response Qāytbāy
sent one of his elite Mamluks, al-Khāṣṣakī Azbak, with a decree
authorizing him to look into and settle the many complaints of the
raʿiyya lodged against Duqmāq. Curiously, Duqmāq himself attended
a hearing held in Hebron in which Azbak heard the complaints. In

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[53] Ibid., 342.
[54] Ibid., 344.
[55] Ibid., 347.

Jerusalem the decree was read at al-Aqṣā, also in Duqmāq's pres-
ence, before the shaykhs of Islam and the general public.[56] Indignant,
the people addressed him with insults, and the next day at al-
Ashrafiyya attacked him before the *qāḍī*s with accusations, some of
which he denied and confessed to others. Thereafter the pressure on
him seems to have abated as he participated in the various coun-
cils convoked regarding Mt. Zion. Nevertheless, the *khāṣṣakī* eventu-
ally decided that the charges were serious enough to put him into
custody, and a report accusing him of misconduct and oppressing
the *raʿiyya*, signed by the notables of Jerusalem, was sent to Cairo.[57]
In secret Duqmāq's *dawādār*, Ṭurbāy, went to Cairo and won the
grand *dawādār*'s support by paying a bribe. The envoy from Jerusalem
entrusted with the report enumerating Duqmāq's sins was appre-
hended and prevented, temporarily, from meeting with the sultan.
In the meantime the investigation of Duqmāq continued in Jerusalem
for twenty-six days.[58] The whole affair now took a comic turn when
Ṭurbāy returned to Jerusalem with a royal edict, probably obtained
by bribing the grand *dawādār*, which denounced the *khāṣṣakī* for
detaining Duqmāq without authorization from the sultanate and sum-
moned the viceroy to Cairo. There he succeeded in retaining his
offices, again by a payment to the grand *dawādār*, as did the shaykh
of al-Ṣalāḥiyya, Ibn Jamāʿa, also summoned for interrogation, upon
payment of one thousand dinars. The *qāḍī* Ibn Nusayba, also impli-
cated, Qāytbāy sent into exile. This episode ends with a curious
anecdote concerning the envoy who had come to Cairo bearing the
official report of the proceedings against Duqmāq—the *imām* of al-
Ṣakhra. Placed in detention upon his arrival in Cairo, he eventually
succeeded in meeting with Qāytbāy. After giving him a tongue lash-
ing for interfering in matters that did not concern him, Qāytbāy
pardoned the *imām* and, for some unknown reason, invited him to
demonstrate his skill in archery. Pleased by his performance, Qāytbāy
ordered him "to wear his turban like those of the soldiers (*jund*), as
it had originally been."[59] More importantly, however, the sultan
confirmed him in his post of half the imamate of the Dome of the

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[56] *Ibid.*, 350.
[57] *Ibid.*, 353.
[58] *Ibid.*
[59] *Ibid.*, 354.

Rock and deposed the man whom Duqmāq "had appointed ille-gally, without a royal decree."[60] Back in Jerusalem Duqmāq contin-ued in his evil ways by arranging for the dismissal of the chief Ḥanafī *qāḍī* because of abusive language he had used against Duqmāq dur-ing the investigation, replacing him with the dismissed half-time *imām* of al-Ṣakhra as a reward for his support. Duqmāq was also respon-sible for having three more members of the religious establishment summoned to Cairo, where, after the usual payments, one of them succeeded in retaining his position.[61] Otherwise, Duqmāq sought revenge, as we have seen, through his strict enforcement of the sale of olive oil imposed from Cairo but was dismissed in 896, without any reason cited except God's revenge on malefactors.

A parallel case is that of al-Amīr Khaḍir Bāk, appointed viceroy of Jerusalem in 891/1486. According to Mujīr al-Dīn his regime was also marked by "tyranny, bloodshed, and seizure of the peo-pole's money," so that the shaykh of al-Madrasa al-Ṣalāḥiyya, Ibn Jamāʿa, wrote in protest to the sultan. Again Qāytbāy sent a *khāṣṣakī* to investigate the matter through public hearings. These lasted more than ten tumultuous days while people from Jerusalem and Hebron denounced Khaḍir Bāk in petitions. An official report of the viceroy's oppression, signed by ʿulamāʾ and *qāḍī*s was sent to the sultanate. But the issue was complicated by accusations lodged against the Mālikī *qāḍī*, charging him with taking bribes in return for support-ing Khaḍir Bāk.[62] In a dramatic confrontation during prayers con-ducted at al-Madrasa al-ʿUthmāniyya, the *Nāẓir* Ibn al-Nashāshībī accused the *qāḍī* of taking bribes in exhange for his judgments, and the latter accused the *nāẓir* of accepting bribes related to enownments. Furthermore, when the *nāẓir* produced a report from the Kātib al-Sirr Ibn Muzhir announcing the deposition of the *qāḍī*, the latter refused to recognize the *kātib*'s power to dismiss him in the absence of any authorization from the sultan. Nevertheless, faced with a vocal uproar from those in attendance and the argument that "the *kātib al-sirr* was the voice of the ruler in dismissals and appointments," the *qāḍī* was deposed, sent to Cairo, and shipped off to Yemen.[63]

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[60] *Ibid.*
[61] *Ibid.*, 356.
[62] *Ibid.*, 340.
[63] *Ibid.*, 341.

Reports of the hearings signed by dignitaries from Jerusalem and Hebron were sent to the sultanate. As a result the viceroy was summoned to Cairo. When he was unable to refute the charges brought against him, he was flogged, imprisoned, and required to repay those people he had fleeced. The *nāzir*, also questioned, was allowed to resign.[64]

Beyond this summary of two evil regimes, some generalizations regarding Mamluk rule in the city are warranted. First it is evident that Qāytbāy and his coterie carefully supervised and controlled the government of the city through appointments, investigations, recalls, confirmations, and dismissals of officials in both the political and the religious cadres. Although Mujīr al-Dīn's references to bribery and sweeters in these processes are only occasional, they are sufficient to indicate that the positions were certainly marketable. So far I have not reviewed the numerous instances in which officials and functionaries of all categories—*qāḍī*s, *shaykh*s, *imām*s, *mubāshirīn*, et al.— were summoned to Cairo, but they are frequent enough to warrant the suspicion that money was definitely an important factor in holding office. Moreover, the fact that there was special place where the "*ahl al-Quds*" were flogged (at least on one occasion by the sultan himself) as well as an official who kept "*ahl Bayt al-Maqdis*" in custody also indicates that their activities were closely monitored.[65] In addition to recalls, public investigations were conducted in Jerusalem with the participation of the *nā'ib/nāzir* and judicial and religious establishment of the city as well as occasional Mamluk and judicial envoys. Official reports of these proceedings, signed by the notables, were routinely submitted to Cairo. When the sultan was displeased with the progress or findings of these hearings, he convoked panels of his own in Cairo, and in the case involving the synagogue, overruled the provincial findings and recommendations. I find it interesting that these hearings were conducted in a variety of public places in al-Quds—al Madrasa al-Tankiziyya, al-Aqṣā, Qubbat Mūsā, Dār al-Niyāba, al-Madrasa al-Ashrafiyya, al-Madrasa al-'Uthmāniyya, Jāmi' al-Maghāriba—in the presence, moreover, of the populace (*al-khāṣṣ wa'l-'āmm*) as well as legists and notables (*al-fuqahā' wa'l-a'yān*) in addition to the official members of the panels. There was obviously, then,

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[64] *Ibid.*
[65] *Ibid.*, 314.

an attempt to get many people involved and spread the sessions among a number of public institutions. I was also surpised to learn that private citizens sometimes took the initiative in launching protests to the sultanate against perceived misdeeds of officials in Jerusalem. Thus, in 879/1474 in the synagogue dispute, an unidentified dervish sent a letter to Cairo by which he persuaded Qāytbāy to reopen the affair on a new legal basis.[66] Earlier, a commoner had actually gone to Cairo and through his complaint to the sultan was instrumental in the convocation of a deliberative council.[67] Moreover, as already noted, Mujīr al-Dīn sometimes refers to the welfare of the subjects during the reigns of different Mamluk officers. Besides convoking judicial councils, the central government also made use of periodic visits to the area, most notably by the grand *dawādār*, for the obvious purpose of implementing measures dictated by the sultanate: the forced sale of olive oil, conscription of troops, and collection of residues from escheat estates and pious endowments being examples. Sometimes these officials, acting presumably under the sultan's authority, intervened decisively in Jerusalem affairs, as in 895/1410, for example, when the amir Azbak, in Ramla, ordered Jerusalem notables to determine whether the Tomb of David on Mt. Zion was an asset of the Christians and, if so, to come to terms with them.[68]

But the clearest evidence for Qāytbāy's desire to control the administration of Jerusalem comes from his own visit to the city, and Hebron, in 880/1465. In both towns he took matters into his own hands. In Hebron he revoked the right of the viceroy of Jerusalem to appoint the *muḥtasib* and to collect the bribe imposed upon the designee. Instead, the *muḥtasib* was to be appointed thereafter by royal decree, without payment of a donation (*kulfa*). This measure proved to be temporary, however.[69] In Jerusalem Qāytbāy was accompanied by many of the leading officers of his state, including the Grand Amir Azbak; al-Amīr Yazbak al-Dawādār; al-Qāḍī Zayn al-Dīn Ibn Muzhir, *Kātib al-Sirr*; al-Amīr Khushqadam al-Ṭawāshī, *al-Wazīr*; and al-Qāḍī Tāj al-Dīn al-Maqdisī, *Nāẓir al-Khawāṣṣ*; as well as eminent judges.[70] Sitting in state at both Qubbat Mūsā in the

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[66] *Ibid.*, 305.
[67] *Ibid.*, 301.
[68] *Ibid.*, 348.
[69] *Ibid.*, 314.
[70] *Ibid.*, 315.

Ḥaram and in a window at his *madrasa*, he heard complaints and
received petitions from the people against the ruling viceroy, Jār
Quṭlī, that accused him of oppression and tyranny.[71] Summoning
him into his presence, Qāytbāy ordered him to come to terms with
his complainants, to pay his debts in full, and to repay half the
amount of the fines he had imposed. Assured by the *dawādār* that
Jār Quṭlī had complied with these demands, Qāytbāy bestowed a
robe of continuance (*khilʿat al-istimrār*) on him with the following
admonition: "Treat the people well and rule them with justice and
fairness by the *Sharīʿa*. If after today anyone complains about you,
I will cut you in half!"[72]

Writing in a different context but summing up, nevertheless, aspects
of Qāytbāy's character and career from a Cairo perspective, Carl
Petry concludes, "We are thus left with the impression of an indi-
vidual who was not only authoritative, resolute, and trustworthy, but
prudent as well."[73] Although Mujīr al-Dīn in Jerusalem has little to
say about the sultan's trustworthiness and prudence, his pages offer
ample corroboration of Qāytbāy's authoritativeness and resolution in
his determination to oversee the governance of the city. His piety is
also demonstrable through his construction of a major shrine in the
city and his determination to protect the Dhimmi holy places in
accordance with the *Sharīʿa*. "His fascination with judicial proceed-
ings, alternately appreciated and resented by judges, attests to his
familiarity with the *Sharīʿa* and his belief that a ruler's sworn oath
to uphold it meant more than mere enforcement of cases subordi-
nates had decided."[74] This concern for legal procedure and respon-
siveness to the expectations of the *raʿiyya* are also evident in Jerusalem.
Petry's observations on Qāytbāy's administration of Syria seen from
the vantage point of its two major cities, Damascus and Aleppo,[75]
are also applicable, with reservations, to the special case of Jerusalem
as a small but important town because of its religious status. The
apparent lack of a sizeable Mamluk garrison in Jerusalem meant
that it could not be used, like Damascus and Aleppo, as a center
of oppposition to the central government, and the appointment of

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[71] *Ibid.*, 316.
[72] *Ibid.*
[73] Petry, *Twilight*, 33.
[74] *Ibid.*, 31.
[75] Petry, *Protectors*, 35–37.

rather obscure, evidently low or medial ranking Mamluks to the *niyāba* and *nazar* militated against the building up of long-lasting households, especially since with one exception these officials were frequently changed by the sultanate. But the frequency of change did not prevent the development of rivalries among the officers in Jerusalem or between the viceroys of Gaza and Jerusalem, paralleling the situation elsewhere in Syria. Nevertheless efforts were made in Palestine to patch up these differences, so that they did not become so disruptive as in the major cities. Finally, though I have not dwelt on Qāytbāy's manipulation and control of the judiciary in Jerusalem, I can verify that his policy there is similar to that which Petry describes for Damascus and Aleppo. For al-Quds also "the sultan jealously guarded his prerogative of choosing the senior *qāḍīs*"[76] as well as lesser jurists and officials in other religious institutions. But it is my impression that Qāytbāy did not try to play off local appointees against Cairenes, relying instead, with exceptions, on "local 'ulamā' families" in Jerusalem. Control, then, was exerted not so much by encouraging regional rivalries but by constant monitoring of judicial and religious affairs in Jerusalem. Finally, Mujīr al-Dīn provides evidence for what Petry characterizes as the regime's tolerance of economic "exploitation in the provinces,"[77] which would include in the case of Jerusalem, and I suspect elsewhere, trafficking in public offices.

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[76] *Ibid.,* 36.
[77] *Ibid.*

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FOUNDING A NEW *MAMLAKA*: SOME REMARKS CONCERNING SAFED AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE REGION IN THE MAMLUK PERIOD

Joseph Drory

After undergoing a setback in his attempt to raid coastal Acre, the main Crusader stronghold and political focus in Palestine, in Ramaḍān 664 (June 1266), the Mamluk Sultan Baybars turned instead to subdue another Frankish bulwark, that of Safed in eastern Galilee. Forty days of siege ending in 18 Shawwāl 664 (July 1266) led to the conquest of that immense fortification.

The aim of the first part of this article is to demonstrate the distinctive local consequences of Baybars' success, which has generally been disregarded or not properly evaluated in scholarly literature. The second part reviews a variety of offices carried out in the province of Safed, a province which was established purely thanks to Baybars' feat. This is principally intended to present a view of everyday administration in a medieval Syrian district.

Evidence of any noteworthy urban settlement in Safed prior to its conquest by Baybars is scarce. No clear mention of Safed in antiquity can be cited. In a Geniza document, dated 1034—perhaps the earliest mention—a transaction involving the purchase of a shop in Tiberias was conducted by a trustee of a boy named Mūsā b. Hiba.[1] Mūsā, or one of his forefathers, was nicknamed "He who comes from Safed". The chapter allocated to Safed in the *Aʿlāq* of Ibn Shaddād (d. 1285) states that "formerly Safed was a flourishing village [*qarya ʿāmira*] beneath the 'orphan's castle' [*burj al-yatīm*] until

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[1] M. Gil, *A History of Palestine 634–1099* (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 213–14. In 1023 in the marriage deed of Hiba's wife, written in Tyre, her husband is referred to as "ha-Ṣefati" (coming from Safed). This leads M. Gil to determine: "There is no doubt, therefore, that there was a Jewish community in Safed . . ."

its occupation by the Crusaders in the twelfth century".[2] But this statement is undermined by a more insightful observation by the same author: "Safed [according to Ibn Shaddād] was not referred to in any of the books composed about early Islamic history."[3]

More apparent is the total omission of Safed by Jerusalem-born and local patriot Muqaddasī in his geographical work. Conversely, Muqaddasī's *Aqālīm* (assumed to have been written in 985) did not fail to record other minor settlements in the eastern Galilee (such as Farādhiyya, Qadas or Jesh).[4] Moreover, Yāqūt, the thirteenth-century composer of the geographical voluminous dictionary *Mu'jam al-buldān*, who visited Palestine and included tiny places (such as Yabrūd north of Jerusalem, Bayt Māmā in the Nablus district, or Bayt Nūbā east of Ramla on the road to Jerusalem) in his book, leaves Safed unmentioned.[5]

A year after the blow inflicted on the Franks by Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn (1187), he was able to conquer the fortress of Safed. He then placed a remote relative (a son of Saladin's niece) named Mas'ūd b. Mubārak[6] in charge of that place (d. 608/1211). This Mas'ūd bequeathed this position to Aḥmad, his son. No information on their activities as rulers is recorded in history books.

Some information regarding the existence of a Jewish community in 1211 comes from R. Samuel b. Samson who traveled from Tiberias and nearby Kfar Ḥanania to the eastern Galilee and preferred Safed as a resting-place on Sabbath.[7] Jehūda al-Ḥarīzī in his "Taḥkemōnī", believed to be written around 1215, mentioned a certain "righteous Ṣadōq", the head of the seminary of Jewish learning in Safed.[8]

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[2] 'Izz al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād, *al-A'lāq al-khaṭīra fī dhikr umarā' al-Sha'm wal-Jazīra (Ta'rīkh Lubnān wal-Urdunn wa-Filasṭīn)*, ed. S. Al-Dahhān (Damascus, 1962), vol. III, 146.

[3] *A'lāq*, vol. III, 146.

[4] Muqaddasī, *Aḥsan al-taqāsīm fī ma'rifat al-aqālīm*, ed. De-Goeje, BGA no. 3, Leiden 1906, 161, 162, 163 (trans. B.A. Collins under the title "The Best Divisions for Knowledge of the Regions", Center for Muslim Contribution to Civilization, 1994, 148, 149, 150).

[5] Safed does get a paragraph in Yāqūt's *Mu'jam*, but its erroneous location, "a city in Jabal 'Āmila, looking over Ḥimṣ, accounted from the Lebanon mountains", makes his observation and judgment totally incompetent and irrelevant. (Yāqūt al-Rūmī, *Mu'jam al-buldān*, Dār Ṣāder, Beirut 1957, vol. III, 412).

[6] 'Abd al-Qādir b. Muḥammad al-Nu'aymī, *al-Dāris fī ta'rīkh al-madāris*, ed. Ja'far al-Ḥusnī, 2 vols., Damascus 1948–1951, vol. I, 374.

[7] Ya'arī, *Igrōt Erez Israel*, Tel Aviv, 1943, [in Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv, 1943), 80.

[8] Al-Ḥarīzī, *Taḥkemōnī*, ed. Toporowski (Tel Aviv, 1952), 350.

The description of the castle of Safed, written in 1260 by Benedict of Alignan, the archbishop of Marseilles, attests to a "civic quarter on slopes of the citadel". Benedict even describes this undefended district as a "large town comprising a market and a large population".

Although the description of Baybars' siege in 1266 does not record contacts or friction with the civilian population in Safed, and given that Benedict's description is not devoid of tendentiousness—its aim being to augment the Templars' undertaking, even with regard to the non-combatants—it seems that we cannot categorically rule out the possibility that, alongside the Crusaders' castle, there did exist a permanent urban population of Jews and Moslems. This could entail an infrastructure of buildings, tenements, streets, alleys, water supply and markets, albeit in a limited scale and only in one district, namely: the western one. That puzzle, the extent of urban life in pre-Baybars' Safed, is far from solved.

In any event, a remarkable change was about to follow. Although the lists drawn up by Baybars' chroniclers, in the enumeration of their sultan's conquests, do not lend a special emphasis to Safed, this accomplishment was apparently characterized by a number of unique aspects.

Firstly, Safed—in contrast to other cities and castles mainly on the seashore, such as Arsūf and Caesarea (and later Jaffa)—was not razed to the ground. It would have been an enormous blunder for Baybars to fail to profit from Safed's splendid advantages. These may be outlined as follows: topography—the city is located on top of an insurmountable mountain; fortifications—whose power and endurance Baybars personally experienced; and environment, since there was no menacing Frankish town or castle within a periphery of at least 40 km.

Baybars, possibly as early as 664/1266, appointed a governor to the castle, ranked as *wālī*. Just less than two years later, Baybars paid a second visit to Safed (Rajab 666/March 1268), at which time he carefully took pains to reconstruct its Templar citadel. According to a contemporary biographer of Baybars,[9] these reconstructions consisted of establishing gateways to the fortress, construction of a reservoir with scales flanking its four sides and an extremely high tower

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[9] ʿIzz al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād, *Taʾrīkh al-Malik al-Ẓāhir*, ed. A. Ḥuṭayṭ (Wiesbaden, 1983), 353.

adjacent to the reservoir, deepening and widening the ditch which surrounded the fortress, constructing a (probably new) bath and transforming a former church into a mosque. In the inner (or forward) barbican [*bāshūra*]—a section rebuilt by Baybars after, atypically, demolishing this unsatisfactory Crusader post—he installed turrets, curtain walls [*badana*], machicolation [*ṭallāqa*], shooting stands, and a gateway together with a moveable bridge, and made arrangements for a permanent water supply from a nearby hill.

The next aspect—the reshaping of Safed's castle—was of further significance, apart from strengthening Safed's military perseverance and defensive valor. It spurred and promoted the development of a civilian city next to the castle, for the first time in the history of this site.

Baybars' activities in reconstructing the fortress were supplemented by other actions, destined to amplify the hitherto humble urban and civil nature of this newly-conquered site. These involved, to cite the author of *al-Aʿlāq*, constructing *khan*s, markets, baths and gardens. The plural form, while it might be exaggerated, points to the evident intention. In addition, Baybars set up a mosque in the city, second to that of the citadel, which was simply a church modified to comply with Muslim ritual requirements. The location of that city mosque, intact to this day, allows determination of the location of the residential core of thirteenth-century Safed.

All of this shows that Baybars' accomplishment consisted of transforming what had been primarily a military fortress into a prosperous civilian town.

The third distinctive dimension which characterizes Baybars' role in shaping the fortunes of Safed is its transformation into a bureaucratic territorial center. Safed and the neighboring region were entrusted to a *nāʾib*, ʿIzz al-Dīn Aybak al-ʿAlāʾī;[10] it is, however, hard to tell what his authority was and who yielded to his command. One can only speculate as to whether this was Baybars' abrupt decision immediately after his takeover; but in any event, the decision may be assumed to have been made not too much later and to have been based on weighty strategic grounds.

The Crusaders never ceased to constitute a military threat from the coastal area. Even if it were possible for Acre to be occupied

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[10] *Aʿlāq*, vol. III, 150.

and destroyed, a sudden sea-invasion could not be discounted. Safed offered a perfect location as a rear headquarters to carry on the struggle against the Franks, and its surrounding fertile districts could be awarded as compensation to Baybars' deserving warriors.

Expelling the Templars from Safed facilitated the annexation of areas in the eastern Galilee, previously cultivated and administered by the Franks. In his efforts to replenish the newly-annexed area with a trustworthy population, Baybars allocated portions of land to 54 of his Mamluks in the region.[11] At the head of this group of Mamluks, he placed several of his Amirs. The officer "responsible for the new allowances" [*iqṭā's*], 'Alā' al-Dīn Kundughdāy,[12] was an additional pillar of the new regional order. His nomination with these powers enhanced the chances of Safed—the probable residence of 'Alā' al-Dīn—to officiate, successfully, as the regional focus of the veteran residents.

The decisive factor in promoting the singling out of Safed as a center of *niyāba* (later to become an independent *mamlaka*) was its tenable citadel, which derived its might both from the Templar initiative phase—which Baybars had found difficult to subdue—and from Baybars' efforts of renovation. That citadel guaranteed the survival of a huge military garrison which could, if needed, endure a prolonged blockade by potential foes. As already mentioned, Acre and Tyre were not to be disparaged as active Frankish menaces. The existence of a defensible citadel and the lack of similar fortress in the region lent clear priority to Baybars' decision to designate Safed as the core of what would become a Galilean province.

It should be pointed out that, in all of the other conquests by Baybars, who styled himself the extirpator of castles from infidels'

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[11] Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad b. 'Alī al-Maqrīzī, *Kītāb al-sulūk li-ma'rifat duwal al-mulūk*, ed. M.M. Ziyāda & S. 'Abd al-Fattāḥ 'Āshūr, 12 vols., Cairo 1934–1973, affirms that people were summoned from Damascus to live in Safed, vol. I, 548. This could hardly be carried out without material incentives. Badr al-Dīn al-'Aynī, *'Iqd al-jumān fī tā'rīkh ahl al-zamān*, ed. M.M. Amīn, Cairo 1987, vol. I, 422 refers to this explicitly: "And he [Baybars] installed for them salaries and allotments." In an inscription from Khālid b. al-Walīd's mausoleum in Ḥimṣ, Baybars prides himself on his conduct following the victory over Safed, saying that he "allocated the country to the combatants [*mujāhidīn*]" and thus did justice towards living and dead alike. *R.C.E.A.*, vol. XII, 129, no. 4593.

[12] *A'lāq*, vol. III, 153. Also known as Aydughdāy, Ibn al-Furāt, *Ta'rīkh al-duwal wa l-mulūk*, ed. U. and M.C. Lyons, *Ayyūbids, Mamlukes and Crusaders* (Cambridge, 1971), 120.

seizure [*muqtaliʿ al-qilāʿ min aydī al-kuffār*][13]—i.e., taking over Frankish towns and fortresses, or seizing control over old Muslim towns in Syria, Asia Minor or Nubia—no new (annexed) town was assigned a Mamluk administrative center. Safed is an exception to the rule. (A similar, exceptional status awaited Tripoli, following its capture by Qalāwūn in 1289.)

The overall impact of Baybars' actions in Safed: conquest, reconstruction of the citadel, lending it an unprecedented administrative status, summoning men-of-capacity and apportioning land—thus fostering commitment—to loyal officers, is described by the historian in these phrases: "Safed turned out to be, owing to what [Baybars] established there, one of the prettiest and most defensible castles and best and most fertile regions (*fa-ṣārat bi-mā aḥdathahu fīhā min aḥsan al-qilāʿ wa-amnaʿihā wa-aṭyab al-biqāʿ wa-akhṣabihā*)."[14]

A more thorough appreciation of the Mamluk creativity in Safed must take into account additional factors: The administrative organization generated by the Mamluks was a completely new one. The Galilee—at least since its occupation by the Franks—could not have adhered to the Muslim secretarial tradition accountable for correspondence, taxation, justice procedures, land allocation or agricultural control. The Safed province officials had to start from scratch, bereft of any relevant local precedent which they could follow. Safed's former population was meager, lacking wealth or education. The site suffered from inconvenient weather (in the winter) and poor accessibility, which explains its having being overlooked during previous centuries; moreover, it could not claim any Islamic heritage and prestige whatsoever, due to past neglect and the desolate nature of the place.

These poor starting points notwithstanding, the Mamluk authorities were able to institute, within a short period of time (its exact duration cannot yet be determined)—a multifaceted executive structure constructed after the model of long-standing, well-established Syrian provinces. This administrative structure contributed to—and was certainly sustained by—the arrival and settling of a greater civilian population, which catered to the bureaucrats' needs.

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[13] As stated in the Nabī Mūsā inscription, *R.C.E.A.*, vol. 12, 142, no. 4612.
[14] *Aʿlāq*, vol. 3, 150.

The second part of the article will describe and evaluate the main functionaries in the *mamlaka* of Safed. Such a description portrays the routine outlines of an administrative province in Mamluk Syria with regard to officeholders: main positions, officers' ranks, their influence, survival, capacity and further stages of career. Studying Safed from a bureaucratic point of view helps to engender a wider outlook on Syrian towns in the Middle Ages.

Governors (Nuwwāb)[15] of Safed

We are able to trace the whereabouts of Safed's viceroys for the entire two and half centuries of the Mamluk period. Ample information is produced by Khalīl b. Aybak al-Ṣafadī in both of his books, *al-Wāfī bil-wafayāt* and *A'yān al-'aṣr*. Born in 1296 to a local family who later moved to Damascus, and operating in Safed at the beginning of his career, Ṣafadī was familiar with senior officeholders in the town and is thus qualified to supply extensive first-hand information concerning them. Even without consulting Ṣafadī's voluminous works, it is possible to compile a full list of Safed's governors, based upon the chroniclers' writings and the biographers' supplements.

If we review the biographies of the municipal governors, the following conclusions arise:

(One)   The ordinary duration of a governor's time in office shortened as time passed. From the establishment of the governorship (*niyāba*) in 1266 until the mid-fourteenth century, 26 governors were counted (i.e. an average term in office of more than three years for each governor). By contrast, during the period from 1347 to the last days of the Mamluk state, a

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[15] The *nā'ib* is a functionary also referred to, by and large, in official terminology, inscriptions and documents, as *kāfil*. *Nā'ib* could have meant deputy or representative of any officeholder including agents of the sultan in other Syrian towns and castles. *Kāfil*, less frequently in use (Ẓāhiri's constant use of the term *kāfil*—see e.g. Khalīl ibn Shāhīn al-Ẓāhirī, *Zubdat kashf al-mamālik*, facs. of P. Ravaisse edition (Paris, 1894) by F. Sezgin, Islamic Geography Series no. 79, Frankfurt 1993, 131–34—is an exception), was definitely a more prestigious term, used, for example, for Yashbak al-Ḥamzāwī as stated in Zāwiyat banāt Ḥāmid's inscription. This Yashbak served as governor of Safed between 1447 and 1451 and came to Safed, very typically, from the *niyāba* of Gaza.

time-span of 170 years, we have listed more than 100 governors—or, to be precise, more than 100 appointments, since several governors ruled more than once. Among those governors nominated for more than one term are Timurbughā al-Manjikī in 1400 and 1401; Timurbāy al-Dimurdāsh in 1376, 1380 and 1383; Alṭūnbughā al-'Uthmānī in 1399, 1406, 1409 and 1414 (four times); and Qurqumās b. akhī al-Dimurdāsh in 1408, 1410, 1411 and 1412. It means that each governor held his office—on average—for slightly more than one and a half years.

(Two)   The governor who remained in office for the longest period, Aruqṭāy al-Qipchaqi, officiated for more than 18 years. He is entitled to be considered the most eminent governor of Safed in the Mamluk period, the like of Tankiz in Damascus or Sinjar al-Jāwilī of Gaza. His long tenure of office might serve to mitigate some scholars' impression that al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's suspiciousness and ill-temper could not enable talented officers to hold a post for a long period of time. The days of Aruqṭāy in Safed constitute an example of perseverance and an expression of the trust bestowed on him by his Sultan.[16]

(Three)   Every now and then, mostly in the period following the Black Death—a pivotal point in the nature of provincial government in the state—some second-generation mamluks (*awlād al-nās*) managed to infiltrate to the highest post of power. Such were the cases of 'Umar b. Arghūn in 1363[17] and Mūsā b. Aruqṭāy in 1371,[18] to name but a few.

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[16] Aruqṭāy's accomplishment is even worthier of praise, considering the fact that Tankiz was not always in his favor and made several efforts to get rid of him. Sultan Nāṣir Muḥammad expressed his appreciation of Aruqṭāy's capacity for survival: "By God, you managed to escape him as a prey from his lion": *Muqaffā*, vol. II, 288.

[17] Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī, *al-Durar al-kāmina fī a'yān al-mi'a al-thāmina*, ed. M.S. Gad al-Hack, 5 vols. Cairo, sec. edition, 1966, vol. III, 229, no. 2984; Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i' al-zuhūr fī waqā'i' al-duhūr*, ed. Mohamed Mostafa, Wiesbaden 1974, vol. I, Part 2, 11.

[18] Jamāl al-Dīn Yūsuf ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī mulūk Miṣr wal-Qāhira* [English title: *Abu 'l Mahasin Ibn Taghri Birdī's Annals*] ed. W. Popper, 7 vols., Berkeley 1909–1929, vol. V, 273.

(Four)   It is hazardous to generalize where caretakers of Safed placed themselves on the political map, or to ascertain whether they demonstrated rebellious separatist inclinations, taking advantage of their almost impregnable castle. The chronicles of Safed's governors include manifestations of opposition to the Egyptian rule, a result of the ruling sultan's weakness or political energetic ambitions of a local ruler. They do, however, relate instances of co-operation with the Egyptian sultan vis-à-vis irredentist local political troopers and commanders in Syria.

The case of 'Alā' al-Dīn Aydughdāy[19] al-Kubakī in 1280 is an example of rebellious tendencies of governors in Safed. This Amir supported the disobedient ruler of Damascus, Sunqur al-Ashqar, against Sultan Qalāwūn.[20] When Qalāwūn managed to do away with Sunqur, he did not spare the governor of Safed from punishment. Another case is that of Arāq al-Fattāḥ in 1346, who supported the Damascene viceroy Yalbughā al-Yaḥyāwī against the weak Sultan of Egypt, al-Kāmil Sha'bān.[21]

Contrary examples are that of Baktamur al-Ẓāhirī (also referred to as Jilliq) who, in 1405, supported Faraj—or rather, the adherents of the ten-year-old Sultan—against insubordinate governors of Damascus and Aleppo,[22] or Shaykh al-Maḥmūdī—the future Sultan al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh—who backed Sultan Faraj in 1407 against the Amir Jakam, as the latter proclaimed himself Sultan [al-Malik al-'Ādil] in northern Syria.[23]

(Five)   The title of the governors of Safed was *muqaddam alf*—the highest of the officers' ranks in the Mamluk regime. A force numbering hundreds of *mamluk*s was at the governor's command. One unclear report illustrates his command over one[24]

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[19] On Aydughdāy, consult Khalīl b. Aybak al-Ṣafadī, *Kitāb al-wāfī bil-wafayāt*, various scholars, Istanbul, Wiesbaden in. al., 1931–, 29 vols., vol. IX, no. 4447.

[20] Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Zubdat al-fikra fī ta'rīkh al-hijra*, ed. D.S. Richards, Berlin 1998, 184.

[21] *Sulūk*, vol. II, 708–09.

[22] *Nujūm (Popper)*, vol. VI, 120.

[23] *Nujūm*, vol. XIII, 58 [= *Nujūm (Popper)*, vol. VI, 183].

[24] Other sources [*A'yān*, vol. 1, 707; Jamāl al-Dīn Yūsuf ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-ṣāfī wal-mustawfī ba'da al-wāfī*. Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, 8 vols., Cairo

hundred mamluks, a number resembling the amount of sol-
diers stationed regularly in Safed's castle. The routine oblig-
ations of this governor included the appointment of deputies
to enforce law and order in the district.

(Six)   A personal assistant [*dawādār*] escorted the governor in his
          main duties. Sometimes the *dawādār* was sent to the vil-
          lages as the governor's representative[25] and acting with his
          master's full approval. Analogous powers were conferred
          upon the private caretaker [*ustādār*]. In the only instance
          found, this *ustādār* was responsible for the hospital erected
          (not later than 1327)[26] by Tankiz.[27]

(Seven)   The rulers of Safed originally came from other Syrian ter-
          ritories, or were later sent to such territories for a further
          assignment. The main Syrian regions mentioned are that
          of Gaza or Tripoli; less frequent are those of Aleppo, Karak
          and Ḥamāt. There is a tendency to assume that, in this
          period, a civil servant's career followed certain common
          stages.[28] A "provincial" superintendent served at a given
          time in one of the Syrian cities mentioned above,[29] but was
          rarely promoted to a higher post, such as the governor of
          Damascus or a similar esteemed position in Egypt.

1980–, vol. III, 399; *Muqaffā*, vol. II, 460] mention eight hundred mamluks, a more
likely number.

[25] A *dawādār* named Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad won Ṣafadī's attention when he was
dispatched in 1352 together with the *ḥājib* Muḥammad b. al-Bakhātī (hence a civil-
ian, non-military *ḥājib*) to arrest an eccentric in the village of Ḥiṭṭīn who claimed
to be Mamluk Sultan, a descendant of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad [*Aʿyān*, vol. II, 25].

[26] *Aʿyān*, vol. IV, 478.

[27] Mūsā b. Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Yūsyufī, *Nuzhat al-nāẓir fī sīrat al-Malik al-
Nāṣir*, ed. A. Ḥuṭayṭ, Beirut 1986, 287.

[28] See the formula cited by Qalqashandī (*Ṣubḥ*, vol. VII, 199) of the regular pro-
cedure for the exchange of governors between the Syrian provinces. The references
to the Gaza-Safed or Safed-Tripoli track must be examples derived from genuine
documents.

[29] The career of Kumushbughā al-Ḥamawī may be viewed as typical. This mam-
luk, originally from Ḥamāt, carried out several important duties in Syria around
1380, until he was imprisoned. When freed, he was shipped off to Safed; after six
months, however, he was sent to Tripoli to replace its former amir. After some
vicissitudes in his occupation, he was again sent off to Safed where he served for
about a year. His next station was again Tripoli; this time he remained four and
a half years in office. *Muqaffā*, vol. V, 10. His is but a random case.

(Eight)   There are few indications of exclusive secessionist move-
ments in Safed. They differ from the above-mentioned exam-
ples [paragraph (d)] in that they were initiated and stimulated
in Safed. One of them occurred in the days of Tankiz.
Until 1314, Safed was administered directly by the Egyptian
head of state, at which point it was decided to subordinate
Safed, like other Syrian cities, to the dominion of Damascus;[30]
the Syrian viceroy Tankiz was empowered to operate as
a mediating link between Syria and Egypt. The erstwhile
governor of Safed, Balabān Ṭurnā, considered this reform
harmful and superfluous and let his mind be known. Tankiz,
the apparent protagonist of this administrative reshuffle, who
had an influential say in the court of his Sultan, al-Nāṣir
Muḥammad, recommended to arrest the incompatible gov-
ernor. This was eventually done. In the course of a visit to
Damascus, Balabān was jailed and spent a period of ten
years before returning to his former high status.[31]

A second incident is that of Aḥmad al-Sāqī, who revolted
in 751/1350, seized control over the castle and filled it with
provisions and ammunition. The reason he gave for the
revolt was an attempt on his life. The governor of Damascus,
who had to deal with this insurrection, sent military forces
to Safed which laid siege to the castle. When Aḥmad found
out that his ally, Baybughārūs, was confined, his willingness
to rebel dwindled. He later discovered that his other sup-
porter had transferred his loyalty, joined the government
and was now willing to arrest him. Aḥmad halted his mutiny
and proclaimed willingness to obey, but was arrested and
sent to the prison of Alexandria.[32]

(Nine)   The governors of Safed constructed considerable installa-
tions and buildings in Safed and the surrounding regions.
Among these were a public bath and a tomb edifice (by

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[30] *Muqaffā*, vol. II, 609.
[31] *Wāfī*, vol. X, 283; *Muqaffā*, vol. II, 487.
[32] *Sulūk*, vol. II, 826, 831; Abū al-Fidāʾ Ismāʿīl b.ʿUmar, Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya
wal-nihāya*, Beirut and Riyad, 1966, vol. XIV, 238; Khalīl ibn Aybak al-Ṣafadī, *Aʿyān
al-ʿaṣr wa-a ʿwan al-naṣr*, ed. A. Abū Zayd et al., 6 vols., Beirut and Damascus 1998,
vol. I, 178–81.

'Alā' al-Dīn Aydughday al-Aldakuzī [or: al-Ildikzī]),[33] the renovation of Jacob's cave (by Baktamur al-Jūkāndār),[34] a monumental tomb-edifice to the governor's wife, a primary school [*kuttāb sabīl*] and a high school [*madrasa*] (by Aruqṭāy),[35] the tomb of Sitt Sukayna in Tiberias (by Fāris al-Dīn Ilbakī),[36] two shops in the vegetable market[37] and a bath in the nearby village of 'Ayn Zaytūn[38] (by Balabān al-Jūkāndār), another bath (by Ṭashtamur al-Sāqī),[39] and a family tomb edifice (by Mūsā, son of Aruqṭāy) which remains standing to this day.

The governors—who functioned outside the castle in *dār al-niyāba*—molded a conventional administrative organization which included soldiers, communication clerks, correspondence writers, financial employees and personal assistants. They were answerable to the Syrian governor, and that subordination was often a source of tense frictions. Aytamish, Aruqṭāy's successor, refused to concede to Tankiz's orders, asserting "I am not your governor, but my sultan's".[40] A new governor was made to promise that he would not have to comply with Tankiz's regulations and that he should communicate with Egypt directly in all matters.[41]

(Ten)   The governors of Safed overshadowed the concurrent commanders of the castle in rank and command. While we can produce a full list of the city *nuwwāb*, we are less equipped and far less informed with regard to the castle commanders (*nuwwāb al-qalʿa*). Although much was invested in the castle during Baybars' reign, it played only a limited role in the history of the city. After the extirpation of the Crusaders in

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[33] *Wāfī*, vol. IX, 486.

[34] *Wāfī*, vol. X, 199.

[35] *Muqaffā*, vol. II, 33; mentioned in a *waqf* document written in 901/1496, Mehmed Ipşirli and Daoud al-Tamimi, *The Muslim Pious Foundations and Real Estates in Palestine*, Research Center for Islamic History, Art and Culture, Istanbul 1982, 70, doc. 48.

[36] *R.C.E.A.*, vol. XIII, 127, no. 4981.

[37] Y. Yadin, "Arabic Inscriptions from Palestine" [in: *L.A. Mayer Memorial Volume* (= *Eretz Israel*, vol. VII), Israel Exploration Society, Jerusalem 1964, in Hebrew], 116.

[38] *Aʿyān*, vol. II, 44.

[39] *Aʿyān*, vol. II, 591.

[40] *Yūsufī*, 319.

[41] *Yūsufī*, 321.

1291, the castle is referred to mostly as a prison for local Amirs who went astray or were suspected as such.

(Eleven) An appointment to Safed was at times an alternative to punishment. Arghūn-Shāh al-Ustādār was said to be haughty with his young Sultan, al-Muzaffar Ḥājjī, and talked to him in a vulgar manner. The sultan decided to arrest him. The then strong-man in Egypt, Aruqṭāy,[42] formerly a Safedi ruler, recommended mitigation of the punishment. Subsequently, Arghūn-Shāh was sent to be a governor in Safed.[43] This is a clear-cut indication of the limited importance placed upon Safed, from where no threat could come. Two other examples in the same vein which appear in the accounts of Safedi governors, during the rule of Barqūq and Faraj, support the same conclusion. The main rationale for sending officers to perform from Safed was to check their danger.

A certain Baktamur was given an appointment to Safed in 722/1322, since the Sultan considered it inappropriate that such an old officer should still be present in daily service [*khidma*]. By appointing him to a position in Safed, the Sultan aimed at relieving him [*qaṣada irāḥatahu*].[44] The supposition concerning Safed's limited significance remains unaltered.

Other officials in Safed

Following the choice of Safed, immediately after its conquest, to be the region's capital, an administrative establishment similar to that of other Syrian provinces was constructed in the town.

Within this establishment, the following main military officials operated on behalf of the Mamluk authority:

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[42] Aruqṭāy succeeded where most Safedi governors failed. He was summoned to Cairo, where he was given an influential position and authority. *Wāfī*, vol. 8, 362. Baktamur al-Jūkāndār was another example of a Safedi ruler who rose to prominence in Cairo.

[43] *Sulūk*, vol. II, 720.

[44] *Muqaffā*, vol. II, 458.

The ruler of the castle (*nā'ib al-qalʿa*). The earliest *nā'ib al-qalʿa*, Majd al-Dīn al-Ṭūrī,[45] was nominated by Baybars in 1266. He was then only a low-ranking *wālī*.[46] Years afterward, the officer in charge of the castle became *nā'ib* and was promoted to the rank of Amir of Forty.[47] The commander of the castle, apart from his obligation to maintain its various sections (e.g. moat, fortifications, towers, water reservoirs, warehouses, mosque and probably living rooms, ammunition and provisions for men and livestock), was also in charge of supervising the municipal governor.

Having received his mission directly from the sultan,[48] rather than the local or Syrian chief governor (*nā'ib al-Sham*), the castle-commander felt committed to him.[49] The officer of the castle was, consequently, entrusted with the control and supervision of the performance, initiatives and behavior of the local governor.[50]

In 905/1500, the Egyptian sultan al-Ashraf Qānṣūh directed the castle-governor to detain the city governor, whom he suspected of treason.[51] It should be noted here that a wing of the castle served as a prison where high-ranking inmates were confined.

Some of the castle commanders progressed to become local or territorial governors. Sinjār al-Kurjī (in 1280), Baylīk al-Ṭayyār (in the same year) and Arāq al-Fattāḥ[52] (in 1344) are a few examples.

The chamberlain (*ḥājib [al-ḥujjāb]*). This was a senior post frequently held by a *muqaddam alf* officer, but more often by an Amir

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[45] Ibn al-Furāt, *Ta'rīkh* (ed. Lyons, cited above in note no. 12), 120; *Aʿlāq*, vol. II, 150.

[46] The story of the soldier who caused damage to the castle's ammunition and whom Aydamur refrained, out of piety, from executing, mentions the officer who eventually slew the criminal, fearing the Sultan's rage. That officer was *wālī al-qalʿa*, and the affair could not have taken place later than 676/1277. *Muqaffā*, vol. II, 362.

[47] *Ṣubḥ*, vol. IV, 149; *Aʿyān*, vol. II, 630.

[48] *Ṣubḥ*, vol. IV, 150 "This castle has an independent governor . . . appointed by the sultan . . . and there is no rule of the region-governor upon him, but rather, he is independent."

[49] When Syrian amirs led by Yalbughā al-Yaḥyāwī plotted to wipe out Sultan al-Kāmil Shaʿbān, the Safed castle governor did not join this malicious initiative and was, when proved wrong, reprimanded for this loyalty. *Sulūk*, vol. II, 717.

[50] Although the name of *nā'ib al-qalʿa* is not mentioned, it may be assumed that the Safedi military force that routed the disloyal former ruler Baybars al-Aḥmadī was directed and led by the commander of the castle. *Muqaffā*, vol. II, 556; *Aʿyān*, vol. II, 82. However, the chief chamberlain (*ḥājib al-ḥujjāb*) was as likely a candidate to command the pursuit.

[51] Muḥammad Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Iʿlām al-warā*, ed. M.A. Dahmān (Damascus, 1964), 108.

[52] *Wāfī*, vol. 8, 332.

of Forty. The chief chamberlain (*ḥājib al-ḥujjāb*) was responsible for resolving disputes and arbitrating between amirs, or between amirs and soldiers. Actually this post was a non-religious judiciary organ. Two officers operated under the chief *ḥājib*; each of these was referred to merely as *ḥājib* (or: *amir ḥājib*) and was ranked an Amir of Ten.[53]

Those engaged as *ḥājib* or his aide, minor *ḥājib* (*ḥājib ṣaghīr*) were not exclusively mamluks. There are a few examples of civilian *ḥājib*s. Such is the case of ʿUthmān b. Ismāʿīl, dating from the first half of the fourteenth century,[54] or Rukn al-Dīn ʿUmar, who was reported to be wounded after chasing a mutinous Safedi ruler, Baybars al-Aḥmadī.[55]

A certain *ḥājib* named Aqṭuwān, alias ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Kāmilī, carried out several missions. He was a comptroller of the bureaus [*mushidd al-dawāwīn*], responsible for minor district counties [*wālī al-wulāt*], and commander of the castle [*nāʾib al-qalʿa*].[56] It is perhaps an irregularity in Safed's administrative organization that one person occupied various key duties. His son, Qurmushī, an adherent of Ibn Taymiyya who was on friendly terms with the governor Aruqṭāy, operated first as a *ḥājib*, and later ascended to the rank of commander of the castle.[57] This almost certainly reflects the genuine hierarchy.[58]

Atābik. This was an officer in charge of the army in the town and the district. Also called *muqaddam al-ʿaskar*, this function is well-known from the time of the establishment of this *niyāba*. Among the *atābik*s of Safed were: ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Aydughdāy [or: Kundughdāy, see above] in 1266,[59] Khalīl ibn Shāhīn al-Ẓāhirī, around 1440,[60] and Yūsuf b. Yaghmūr in 1452, who was designated shortly thereafter as commander of the castle.[61]

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[53] *Aʿyān*, vol. V, 38, 39.

[54] *Aʿyān*, vol. III, 215.

[55] *Aʿyān*, vol. II, 82.

[56] *Aʿyān*, vol. I, 557; vol. IV, 663.

[57] Ṣafadī himself, when in Egypt, wrote down the official promotion letter for Qurmushī, the embellished text of which he inserted into his *Wāfī*, vol. XXIV, 228.

[58] *Aʿyān*, vol. IV, 105, 106.

[59] Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, *al-Rawḍ al-zāhir fī sīrat al-Malik al-Ẓāhir*, ed. A.A. Khuwaiṭir (Riyad, 1976), 261; Quṭb al-Dīn al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl mirʾat al-zamān*, Hyderabad 1955, vol. II, 343.

[60] Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Sakhāwī, *al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ li-ahl al-qarn al-tāsiʿ*, ed. Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Qudsī, 12 vols., Cairo 1934–1936, vol. III, 195.

[61] *Ḍawʾ Lāmiʿ*, vol. X, 338.

A permanent force of 1000 *ḥalqa* troopers garrisoned in the castle was under the orders of the *atābik*. He could call into action—when needed—another 1000 soldiers, those obeying the castle ruler, the local governor or the Amirs. Their number varied according to circumstances. This high officer was also known as the *amir kabīr*.[62]

Wālī/Wālī al-wulāt. The *wālī* was a police officer in charge of keeping law and order in town. His rank: Amir of Ten. One should not confuse him with *wālī al-wulāt*, who was higher in authority and rank, being an Amir of Forty,[63] and who was responsible for the minor sub-sections (*wilāya*) of the entire region (*niyāba*). The number of the *wilāya*s, however, grew throughout the years from 10[64] to 11.[65]

This task was fulfilled either by mamluks[66] or civilians,[67] but was repeatedly coupled with the office of *mushidd al-dawāwīn* in a way which makes it difficult to distinguish the particular demands or qualifications of each duty.

Shādd [or: *mushidd*] *al-dawāwīn*. This was a high-ranking officer whose duty it was to check and observe the collection of the Sultans' dues and taxes from state estates. He took over the function of controlling the proper conduct of government offices. Quite often, the *wālī al-wulāt* operated as *mushidd al-dawāwīn*.[68]

An amir named Badr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā, a non-Mamluk officer in the *ḥalqa*, was recorded as a *shādd* (in Egypt) in the *dīwān* (government bureau) of Salār, the executive head of state around 1305–1310. He later gained importance and was promoted by Tankiz, in 1324, to become *mushidd al-dawāwīn* and *wālī al-wulāt*.[69]

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[62] Tūghān (d. 847/1443) is recorded as *amir kabīr*, *Nuʿaymī*, vol. II, 257. On the prospective *amir kabīr* in Safed see *Zubda*, 134; Ibn Jīʿān, *al-Qawl al-Mustazraf* [see note no. 123], 29. Perhaps the *malik al-umarāʾ* who is mentioned in *ʿUthmānī*, 485 as the officer in charge of spilling forbidden wine produced by the Druze in the village of Zābūd is another title for the *atābik*.

[63] *Aʿyān*, vol. II, 63.

[64] *ʿUthmānī*, 480.

[65] Ibn Faḍl Allah al-ʿUmarī, *Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār, Dawlat al-Mamālīk al-Ūlā*, ed. D. Krawulski (Beirut, 1986), 207; *Ṣubḥ*, vol. IV, 150–55.

[66] Documentation of mamluks operating as *wālī al-wulāt* can be found in the following sources: Aqṭuwān, *Aʿyān*, vol. I, 557; Bahādur, *Aʿyān*, vol. II, 63; Sinjar al-Sāqī, *Aʿyān*, vol. III, 116.

[67] The civilians included ʿUmar, *Aʿyān*, vol. I, 703 and ʿAlī b. Ḥasan, *Aʿyān*, vol. III, 232, 331.

[68] *Aʿyān*, vol. III, 116, 232, 331.

[69] *Ibid.*, vol. V, 303.

Another *mushidd al-dīwān*, Ibn Runqush (?) al-Turkumānī, is reported to have informed Tankiz in Damascus of apparent blunders made by the city governor. He is blamed for having caused the rift between Tankiz and Aruqṭāy, as well as later between Tankiz and Aytamish.[70]

Commander of the Post (*muqaddam al-barīd*). There are no exact data on the names or ranks of officials holding this post. However, their attendance in the center of a *niyāba* is more than likely. They are said to have managed a vast set-up of stables, road-stations,[71] horse riders, letter writers and scribes.

Treasurer of the Castle (*Khāzindār al-qalʿa*). This official was in charge of the castle's treasury, storerooms, household and ammunition stocks.[72]

Commander of the Tribes (*muqaddam al-ʿushrān*). This office-holder was honored with the rank of Amir of Forty. In all likelihood, he was a tribal leader acknowledged by the sultanate or the provincial governor. One report has it that such a commander, residing in Kafr Kannā (north of Nazareth), stemmed from *Qaysi* groups.[73] Members of the rival tribal group (the *Yamanis*) lived in Nazareth and in Lajjūn (Biblical Megiddo), the main village in Marj banī ʿĀmir (now known as the Jezreel Valley).[74]

It is very likely, though there is a lack of documentation, that other officials held esteemed posts in Safed. Such officials are usually to be found in neighboring provinces. The following posts and their revenue were traditionally assigned to mamluks: [a] the *mihmandār*, who was in charge of ceremonies and organized receptions to missions or honorable guests; [b] the *naqīb al-juyūsh*, who was accredited with land appanages pertaining to the army; [c] the *shādd al-awqāf*, an officer controlling religious endowments.

Among the bureaucratic officeholders in the *niyāba* of Safed, the chief functions were:

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[70] *Yūsufī*, 286, 318.

[71] *ʿUthmānī*, 483 writes that Jenīn has a *Barīd* center which is never vacant of post-staff (*barīdiyya*).

[72] Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, *Tashrīf al-ayyām wal-ʿuṣūr fī sīrat al-Malik al-Manṣūr*, ed. Murād Kāmil (Cairo, 1961), 57; Yūsufī gives an account of the *khāzindār* of Aytamish who, when his master passed away, cared for his private bequest, *Yūsufī*, 333.

[73] *ʿUthmānī*, 485.

[74] *Ibid.*, 483, 484.

Overseer (*nāzir*) of the region in charge of the routine financial management of government departments, money expenditure and the officials' salaries. Sometimes judges functioned as *nāzir*s, as in the case of Jamāl al-Dīn Sulaymān who executed both jobs in 1318–1323.[75] A certain Akram, who served in Egypt as the prestigious chief overseer [*nāzir al-dawla*], was blamed of having behaved improperly and was sent to Safed in 724/1324. There he did very well in improving the town's situation until he was confined and his wealth confiscated.[76] Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Yaʿqūb came from Damascus, where he filled the posts of both *nāzir* and *ṣāḥib dīwān* (head of a department), and visited Safed on official duty several times.[77]

Inspector (*kāshif*) of bridges, agricultural lands and irrigation canals. It is not certain whether this office was held continuously or only occasionally. It seems that not only scribes and clerks held this post, and that it was conferred upon Mamluk amirs as well.

That the *kāshif* was authorized with controlling rights is clear from the case of Baktamur, who was sent, as *kāshif*, to conduct an investigation of an Amir named ʿUmar who apparently filled the posts of both *mushidd al-dawāwīn* and *wālī al-wulāt*. His findings were recorded in a certain document by the *qāḍī* Muʿīn al-Dīn who escorted him.[78] This investigation aroused the rage of the chief scribe, even more so because Baktamur was himself formerly a governor of Safed (in 716/1316) and the scribe considered this decision wrong. He uttered his criticism against the wicked deed and faced the painful consequences.[79] The judge Ghāzī b. al-Wāsiṭī, an author of a notorious pamphlet directed against non-Muslims, was sent as a *kāshif* to Safed in Jumādā al-Ūlā 687/June 1288, together with other financial controllers, but a month later he was called back to Cairo.[80]

Market inspector (*muḥtasib*). This was a post common in every large Islamic town. It can be ascertained from Qalqashandī,[81] who

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[75] *Aʿyān*, vol. II, 427.
[76] *Ibid.*, vol. I, 583.
[77] *Ibid.*, vol. V, 194.
[78] *Ibid.*, vol. I, 703.
[79] *Ibid.*, vol. I, 703, 705.
[80] Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥīm Ibn al-Furāt, *Taʾrīkh Ibn al-Furāt*, ed. Constantine Zurayk and N. Izzedin (Beirut, 1938), vol. VIII, 67–68.
[81] *Ṣubḥ*, vol. IV, 240; on the other hand, he is not mentioned in the detailed books of Ṣafadī.

records the resemblance in posts between Safed and Tripoli,[82] that such a commissioner did operate in Safed at the time, but the lack of other evidence seems bewildering.

Chief secretary (*kātib al-sirr* or *kātib al-inshāʾ*). This was the highest executive with the duty of composing the governor's letters and documents and of reading incoming mail. As a senior scribe, the holder of this post was expected to have high linguistic capabilities and erudition in Arabic culture. We find at times a few judges who annexed this post to their judicial commitments. A local celebrity named ʿUmar b. Ḥalāwāt was given an official sultanic appointment letter [*tawqīʿ*]. He was then removed from Safed to Tripoli, following a row with Tankiz of Damascus whom he, ʿUmar, admonished and even tried to harm.[83] Below the chief secretary operated *kātib al-darj* (a minor correspondent); the best known among those who acquired literary fame for generations was Khalīl b. Aybak al-Ṣafadī, who launched around 723/1323 his stately career as *kātib al-darj* of a certain amir, originally from Anatolia, named Ḥusayn b. Abī Bakr.[84] Higher in the hierarchy was the *kātib al-dast*, and above him the *muwaqqiʿ* (ratifier), whose job it was to sign and confirm the accuracy, validity and eloquence of the governor's epistles, including their copies. A certain ratifier (*muwaqqiʿ*) is said to have served his master for nine years, a rare phenomenon.[85] Another *muwaqqiʿ* operated as preacher, probably in the castle mosque. The governor of Damascus took care to separate his duties.[86] Najm al-Dīn, Ṣafadī's admired teacher, was simultaneously *kātib inshāʾ* and *muwaqqiʿ*.[87] A dominant role in the correspondence-bureau was played by the Ibn Ghānim family: Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad (d. 1336), was head of the chancellery both in Gaza and in Safed, and Bahāʾ al-Dīn Abū Bakr filled this

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[82] Ẓāhirī points out the *muḥtasib*s of Karak, Aleppo and Tripoli (*Zubda*, 132, 133).

[83] *Aʿyān*, vol. III, 596.

[84] *Ibid.*, vol. II, 261–262; *Durar*, vol. II, 49, no. 1655.

[85] *Ibid.*, vol. II, 5.

[86] *Wāfī*, vol. XII, 256–257; *Aʿyān*, vol. II, 233. There are some examples of preachers who operated simultaneously as ratifiers, though this was not considered a most desirable state of affairs. *Aʿyān*, vol. II, 234.

[87] *Aʿyān*, vol. III, 611. Perhaps *kātib sirr* pertains to the official's authority while *muwaqqiʿ* reflects his professional quality. Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sharaf al-Dīn ʿĪsā served in Safed as *kātib sirr* after a period in Gaza as *muwaqqiʿ*, which might not reflect an enhancement in career. *Aʿyān*, vol. V, 43. ʿUmar b. Ḥalāwāt is another case of *muwaqqiʿ* and *kātib sirr, Aʿyān*, vol. III, 595.

post in Safed until 1327 (then removed to Tripoli).[88] Scribes of different ranks were not exclusively officials of the governor's court. Other high executives were assisted by scribes, whom they found reliable and sufficient enough to travel with from one site to another.[89]

Superintendent of fiefs (*nāẓir dīwān al-jaysh*). This was a civil position involving the supervision of fiefs allotted—as salary—to soldiers. This job was often carried out by judges.[90] In a unique incident, a man holding the post of *muqābil al-istīfāʾ* is also recorded as being the *nāẓir al-jaysh*. This is a rare instance in the regular Mamluk government offices. He was probably given financial authority and entrusted with the mission of tax collection and control of expenditures.[91] Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Dāwud, a descendant of Ayyūbid rulers from Baʿalbek, performed this duty in Safed but then moved to Tripoli, where he filled the same post.[92]

Financial controller (*nāẓir al-māl*). A *qāḍī* by education named Sulaymān b. Abū al-Ḥasan was appointed as *nāẓir al-māl* three times in Safed, where he stayed for a total of five years. He had previously operated as *nāẓir al-jaysh* in Aleppo and afterwards held the posts of *nāẓir* and *wakīl bayt al-māl*[93] in Karak.

In the category of religious functions (*al-wazāʾif al-dīniyya*) the following are the most outstanding functions:

Judges

Chief among these was *qāḍī al-quḍāt* of the Shāfiʿī school. The Shāfiʿī magistrate held his office from 1266. Other high judges of different rites were appointed later, the Ḥanafī around 1360 and the Mālikī and Ḥanbalī in 1384. These last two posts were not very active, and those who—through dubious means—were able to maintain them, could therefore not claim much esteem or public regard.[94]

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[88] *Aʿyān*, vol. V, 282.
[89] *Ibid.*, vol. III, 530. About ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn, ʿAlī b. Muḥammad, a *kātib al-darj* of the castle governor, it is related that he—surprisingly, one may assume—did not escort his superior when the latter was ordered to transfer to a remote place. *Aʿyān*, vol. III, 530.
[90] So the *qāḍī* Fakhr al-Dīn, *Aʿyān*, vol. IV, 101 or the *qāḍī* Muḥammad b. Dāwud, *ibid.*, vol. V, 9.
[91] *Ibid.*, vol. III, 530.
[92] *Ibid.*, vol. IV, 439.
[93] *Ibid.*, vol. II, 427.
[94] Though the following episode occurred in Gaza, it does seem typical and could

In the mid-fifteenth century, Ẓāhirī depicts four judges, one from each school, and each assisted by his deputies (*nuwwāb*), mainly in the villages.[95] The judges (probably not the chief ones, but rather, the ordinary *qāḍī*s), were forced—certainly due to poor income—to engage in other offices besides. Such were *nāẓir al-juyūsh*, as in the case of Shams al-Dīn b. al-Ḥāfiẓ in 1316; *kātib al-sirr*, as in the case of Ibrāhīm b. Aḥmad al-Biqāʿī (d. 840/1437);[96] or Jamāl al-Dīn b. al-Bāʿūnī, who held both offices in 1432 and 1435[97] as well as the office of *muwaqqiʿ*.[98]

An instructor of Ṣafadī, ʿAbd al-Qāhir b. Muḥammad (d. 740/1339), was appointed temporarily in provincial towns (ʿAjlūn, Salamiyya) before settling in Safed as *qāḍī al-quḍāt*.[99]

A prominent family of judges was that of Nihāwandī. The father, Jalāl al-Dīn, occupied the office from the Mamluk takeover in 1266 until his last days.[100] He was followed by his son, Sharaf al-Dīn, who officiated in ʿAjlūn, Tripoli and Nablus and returned in 1316 to Safed, not for the first time during his governmental career.[101] Jamāl al-Dīn al-Tibrīzī, another *qāḍī al-quḍāt*, relates in rhyme the details of his former stay in ʿAjlūn.[102] The provincial chief judges were subordinate to the *qāḍī al-quḍāt* of Damascus.[103]

A certain Nāṣir b. Manṣūr, a regular *qāḍī* (not *qāḍī al-quḍāt*), arrived in Safed after many other regional petty stations, such as Zuraʿ (in Ḥawrān), Adhruʿāt (the chief town in Ḥawrān), ʿAjlūn, Nablus, Ḥimṣ and Tripoli.[104]

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ostensibly have happened in Safed as well. A certain ex-official of Gaza, eager to return to a distinguished job, asked the chief *kātib al-sirr* of Egypt to be nominated as a Shāfiʿīte judge, and if this was not possible, then as a Ḥanafī *qāḍī*, and, should this also be impossible, then to the Mālikī magistracy, and if not, then to the Ḥanbalī job. The recipient of that letter could not avoid adding a personal comment to the pathetic request. *Nujūm*, vol. XIII, 40. Such undignified behavior was not unusual among aspiring officeholders.

[95] *Zubda*, 134; We came across Zayd b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān who officiated as *qāḍī* in a *nāḥiya* (village or a district) in the Safed province, *Aʿyān*, vol. II, 385.

[96] *Dawʾ Lāmiʿ*, vol. I, 13–14.

[97] *Dawʾ Lāmiʿ*, vol. X, 298.

[98] *Aʿyān*, vol. II, 5.

[99] *Ibid.*, vol. III, 124.

[100] *Ibid.*, vol. III, 218.

[101] *Ibid.*, vol. II, 683, vol. IV, 570. Sharaf al-Dīn married his daughter to a preacher in Jerusalem where he himself also served in a similar position; *Aʿyān*, vol. III, 635.

[102] *ʿUthmānī*, 480.

[103] *Aʿyān*, vol. III, 124, 125.

[104] *Ibid.*, vol. V, 495.

The regional judges were ordinary *qāḍī*s. One of them chose the Crusader castle of Mi'ilyā as his abode.[105]

There are frequent cases in which judges adhered to the governors with whom they moved to new administrative provinces.[106] The judges, like other public officials, were typified by the trend of local interchange, and those serving in Safed usually moved to Karak or Tripoli.[107]

The best known judge among the magistrates of Mamluk Safed was Shams al-Dīn al-'Uthmānī (d. 1378), author of the detailed local history *Ta'rīkh Ṣafad*, which is presumed to have been written in 1372 and has come down to us in only partial form.[108]

Muftī. A post assumed, by the afore-mentioned resemblance of functions in Safed and Tripoli, to include the office of supplying legal advice in Safed as well. 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Ṣafadī (d. 891/1485) and his tutor in Safed, Shams al-Dīn b. Ḥāmid, his father-in-law, both served as *muftī*s.[109]

Prayer leader (*imām*). In one note concerning a peculiar person called 'Alī b. Ismā'īl al-Ṣafadī, he is described as an *imām* and a Qur'ān reader (*muqri'*) in the Shayzarī mosque. He later disappeared and was rumored to have been seen in Yemen.[110] A *waqf* donation dating from 890/1485 registers the *imām* of Safed's mosque as one of its beneficiaries.[111]

Sermon preacher (*khaṭīb*). The sources signify two serving seats, in the town and in the castle. Najm al-Dīn, another teacher of Ṣafadī, was active as preacher in both duties.[112] His father, Kamāl al-Dīn, is named as the preacher only in the castle (*khaṭīb qal'at ṣafad*).[113] The often-mentioned 'Umar b. Ḥalāwāt is recorded as giving sermons in the castle,[114] a task which suited his many talents.

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[105] *'Uthmānī*, 484.
[106] *A'yān*, vol. II, 233.
[107] *Ibid.*, vol. II, 194. The above-mentioned 'Umar b. Ḥalāwāt, apart from his high scribal duties, was also a *qāḍī* serving in Safed and Tripoli. *A'yān*, vol. III, 592.
[108] *'Uthmānī*, 477.
[109] *Ḍaw' Lāmi'*, vol. IV, 338.
[110] *A'yān*, vol. III, 297.
[111] *Ipṣirli*, 69, doc. 38.
[112] *A'yān*, vol. II, 232, 235, vol. III, 627, vol. V, 498.
[113] *Wāfī*, vol. XII, 256–57; *A'yān*, vol. II, 233.
[114] *Wāfī*, vol. XII, 257; *A'yān*, vol. III, 594, 595.

Supervisor of the State treasury (*wakīl bayt al-māl*). This officer was held accountable for the moral and just supervision of the treasury (*bayt al-māl*) branch in Safed. This government department dealt mainly with the rights of orphan beneficiaries of the *waqf*, the validity of transactions where the State is involved (such as selling and buying public estates), and the disposition of wealth left with no heirs. This post was entrusted to a administrator (*wakīl*) of religious repute, and was considered a religious post. Two *wakīl*s are named in Ṣafadī's *Aʿyān*. One was ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Kaḥḥāl who was renowned for timidity and non-exploitation of his powerful authority.[115] A second one was ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn ʿAlī b. Muḥammad, who was one of Ṣafadī's instructors; he initially served as a teacher in the mosque of Baybars (the Red Mosque)[116] and was then promoted to the post of *wakīl*. This ʿAlī perished in the Black Death.[117]

A summary of this list of public officers might raise surprise due to its small number of teachers, Shaykhs, lecturers, educators or instructors common in other Syrian centers. This is related to the absence of *madrasa*s, an institution which characterizes the philanthropic and pietistic construction initiatives in the Mamluk state. Even Ṣafadī, who mentioned several of his instructors, fails to mention their "working" place. If there were educational endeavors, they were probably managed on a private, rather than a public, basis. In his criticism, though exaggerated and intended to amuse, an inhabitant of Safed grumbles that the town has "no *madrasa* and no *ribāṭ*".[118] It is true that al-Ẓāhirī, an authority on Safed, does mention, a century later than ʿUthmānī, *madrasa*s[119] (in the plural), among other merits of the flourishing city; even this, however, is done in a rather general way, with no specific establishments of study cited.

Teaching and learning were carried out in the Red Mosque, built by Baybars. It is even possible to name several scholars[120] who contributed to its daily tutoring activity. Nevertheless, the fact that the

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[115] *Ibid.*, vol. III, 455.
[116] See the statement by Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʾ Lāmiʿ*, vol. IV, 338, "The Ẓāhirī mosque, alias the Red".
[117] *Aʿyān*, vol. III, 520; *Durar*, vol. III, 179–180, no. 2867.
[118] ʿUthmānī, 486. Ṭ. Ṭarāwna in *Mamlakat Ṣafad fī al-ʿahd al-mamlūkī*, Beirut 1982, 258, points to the fact that the praiser of Safed, who had to refute the claims of the critic [referring to the same ʿUthmānī text], could not point out a single *madrasa*, but had to resort to other reputable edifices.
[119] *Zubda*, 44.
[120] Zayn al-Dīn ʿUmar b. Ḥamza, renowned as the "*muḥaddith* of Safed", who

Red Mosque[121] is almost the only institution which can be recorded as providing study services attests to the insufficiency and weakness of Safed in this domain of traditional education.

Summary

Safed, after its conquest in 1266 could look forward to promising opportunities. It had almost no urban infrastructure which could have enabled original state initiatives without encountering the veteran population or existing ancient monuments. Safed was subject to nearly no threats from surrounding foes. It was centrally located in the fertile region of the eastern Galilee, indisputably commanding the region (after the fall of Acre) as far as the Carmel and the coastal area, and was relatively distant from the inspection of Damascus, and certainly from that of Egypt.

The conferral of an administrative status to Safed and its consequent urban expansion could have animated a building surge initiated by local entrepreneurs, and encouraged immigration; this, in turn, could have resulted in a more significant demographic growth.

In post-1266 Safed, there was indeed a wave of establishing buildings, baths, markets and caravanserais. It may be assumed that people moved to Safed, or at least expressed their satisfaction with the lifestyle there.[122]

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was adored in his town (d. Ramaḍān 782/1380); Abū Bakr b. Aḥmad Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, *Ta'rīkh Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba*, ed. A. Darwich (Damascus, 1977), vol. 1, 50. Two others are 'Abd al-Laṭīf b. Muḥammad, *Daw' Lāmi'*, vol. IV, 338 and his father-in-law Shams al-Dīn b. Ḥāmid. The above-mentioned 'Alī b. Muḥammad al-Rassām is considered the man who enriched knowledge (this term is usually used to refer to *Ḥadīth*) in Safed, *Durar*, vol. III, 179–80, no. 2867. A man of knowledge who composed voluminous books was Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Mūsā, who turned down high posts and preferred to dwell in a village near Safed, where he could till the soil and thus earn his own living. *Durar*, vol. I, 343, no. 808.

[121] Other *madrasa*s mentioned in this article are those built by Governor Aruqṭāy (see "Governors of Safed", paragraph h) and the Jāmi' al-Shayzarī (see the paragraph on the *imām*). A certain Shaykh Sharaf al-Dīn Manṣūr gave lessons in two *madrasa*s at Safed (al-Shihābiyya and al-Shamsiyya), which later fell totally into oblivion: Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba [see note no. 120 above], vol. I, 126.

[122] An amir named Dirbās was sent from Safed to officiate in Damascus. There he composed a poem expressing longing for his former city. "There are my friends, family and abode [*waṭan*] . . . these do I cherish openly and secretly", *A'yān*, vol. II, 453. In the comical debate on the merits and drawbacks of Safed, the arguments in its favor (among others, the healthy air, delicate fruits for export, edifices enabling

At the same time, the subsequent shortcomings were apparent. These included inadequate transportation to and from Safed, a paucity of accommodation for temporary visitors (pilgrims or merchants), a dearth of institutions of learning and the rapid turnover of (mostly second-rate) ruling officials. Though a "new" town, conceived by an innovative and vital regime, Safed's significance never surpassed its territorial boundaries. Sultans rarely paid a visit there (Qā'itbāy's nocturnal stay[123] was exceptional), imperial building initiatives were limited and its appeal to population was debatable. Safed lacked indigenous holy sites (apart from that of Jacob's cave), and was passed over by scholars and students.

Its castle, which was the key reason for Baybars' decision to strengthen Safed, suffered from diminishing importance after the expulsion of the Crusaders, and its former value was reduced to a prison for mutinous elements.

The low status of Safed can be clarified by the essential topographic and climatic flaws which engendered its isolation prior to the thirteenth century, as well as by the determined resolution of the Mamluk rulers. Consequently, Safed, in the broad medieval context, remained a provincial center.

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a spacious sight, singing of the birds at dawn, technical achievements in the castle, healing virtues of Jacob's cave . . .) can count as evidence of (at least relative) local contentment: *'Uthmānī*, 487.

[123] In 882/1477; see: Abū al-Baqā' Ibn Jī'ān, *al-Qawl al-mustazraf* (tr. by R.L. Devonshire: "Relation d'un voyage du sultan Qāitbāy . . .", *I.F.A.O.* 20 (1922), 29.

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IBN TAYMIYYA AND MAMLUK SOCIETY

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CHAPTER NINE

IBN TAYMIYYA ON DIVORCE OATHS

Yossef Rapoport

I

Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya (661–728/1263–1328), arguably the most illustrious scholar of the Mamluk period, was brought to trial and imprisoned on account of his views regarding three theological and legal issues.[1] First, Ibn Taymiyya was convicted of anthropomorphism by several tribunals in Damascus and Cairo during the year 705/1305. In 726/1326, Ibn Taymiyya was imprisoned in Damascus for his attacks on the visitation of tombs. Less well known are his trials regarding his views on oaths undertaken on pain of divorce.[2] While the established doctrine was that oaths on pain of divorce were considered as conditional divorces, Ibn Taymiyya wrote in 718/1318 a short treatise in which he argued that the legal rules that apply to

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[1] There is no shortage in studies of Ibn Taymiyya, but the seminal works are probably still those by H. Laoust, *Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Takī-d-Dīn Aḥmad b. Taimīya* (Cairo: IFAO, 1939), and Muḥammad Abū Zahra, *Ibn Taymiyya: Ḥayātuhu wa-ʿAṣruhu—wa-Ārāʾuhu al-Fiqhiyya* (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, 1952). The most detailed biography of Ibn Taymiyya was composed by his disciple Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī (d. 744/1344), *al-ʿUqūd al-Durriyya fī Manāqib Shaykh al-Islām Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyya*, ed. Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Fiqī (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Ḥijāzī, 1938). Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Munajjid has compiled a useful collection of material about Ibn Taymiyya from contemporary chronicles, published as *Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya. Sīratuhu wa-Akhbāruhu ʿinda al-Muʾarrikhīn* (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1976). The trials of Ibn Taymiyya are described in detail by Ḥasan Q. Murad, "Ibn Taymiya on Trial: A Narrative Account of his *miḥan*", *Islamic Studies*, vol. XVIII (1979), 1–32; and D. Little, "The Historical and Historiographical Significance of the Detention of Ibn Taymiyya", *IJMES*, vol. IV (1973), 313–27 (reprinted in his *History and Historiography of the Mamluks* (London: Variorum, 1986)).

[2] The only separate treatment to date of Ibn Taymiyya's views on divorce oaths is H. Laoust's translation of Ibn Taymiyya's first treatise on the subject, which he prefaced by a short introduction ("Une risāla d'Ibn Taimīya sur le serment de répudiation", *Bulletin d'études orientales*, vols. VII–VIII (1937–8), 215–36). Discussions of Ibn Taymiyya's views on divorce oaths appear also in the general works of Laoust and Abū Zahra mentioned above (*Essai*, 424–34; *Ibn Taymiyya*, 414–37).

oaths in the name of God apply also to oaths under pain of divorce. Ibn Taymiyya reasoned that, since violation of an oath in the name of God requires the expiation prescribed in the Qur'ān, so too violation of a divorce oath requires expiation, not the actual dissolution of marriage.[3] After having been prohibited twice from issuing *fatwā*s on this subject, Ibn Taymiyya was eventually arrested for five months, until his release in 721/1321.

The debate over divorce oaths provides an insight into the social context of Ibn Taymiyya's intellectual work, mainly because this was a legal debate, not a theological one. It is not always easy to draw the line between Islamic theology and law, but there is little doubt that the question of divorce oaths had much more immediate implications than the abstract issue of the attributes of God, or even Ibn Taymiyya's attack on the visitation of tombs. Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 756/1355), the Shāfi'ī jurist who composed the most effective refutation of Ibn Taymiyya's views on divorce oaths, commented that Ibn Taymiyya's theological positions constituted an abominable heresy, but only the select few could grasp them. Ibn Taymiyya's innovative opinions on divorce oaths, however, have a far greater impact on the laymen, "who rely on his opinion and rush to endorse it, and as a result take lightly the laws of divorce".[4]

This essay will outline the development of Ibn Taymiyya's ideas on the issue of oaths under pain of divorce, and propose an explanation for the way state authorities responded to them. The debate over divorce oaths, I believe, reflects some of the basic structures of social organization during the Mamluk era. Since the debate over

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[3] In classical legal literature, the sentence 'If I do such-and-such my wife is repudiated' is discussed under the category of *ḥilf bi'l-ṭalāq*, but is considered as a conditional repudiation, the repudiation taking place upon the fulfillment of the condition specified. Norman Calder, who studied the early Islamic legal doctrine on oaths, suggested translating the Arabic *ḥilf bi'l-ṭalāq* as 'swearing on the basis of divorcing' ("Ḥinth, Birr, Tabarrur, Taḥannuth: An Inquiry into the Arabic Vocabulary of Oaths", *BSOAS*, vol. LI (1989), 215). For the purpose of this essay, and without any prejudice towards Ibn Taymiyya's position, I believe that 'an oath on/under pain of divorce', or simply 'divorce oath', reflect better the actual social use of these phrases by Ibn Taymiyya's contemporaries.

[4] Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī, *al-Rasāʾil al-Subkiyya fī al-Radd ʿalā Ibn Taymiyya wa-Tilmīdhihi Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya* (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1983), 151–52. Al-Subkī notes that Ibn Taymiyya has influenced in particular the peasants, the Bedouin, and the inhabitants of the peripheral lands (*al-bilād al-barrāniyya*), meaning probably the Jazīra and northern Syria.

divorce oaths was essentially about their violation and its appropri-
ate punishment, it was therefore a debate about the value of oaths
and their meaning in society. The debate prompted by Ibn Taymiyya
points also to a link between the means of effecting social bonds in
the public sphere and the relations of power in the domestic sphere.
In this essay I will try to show that this link between the internal
structure of households and the means of creating political and social
commitments was a cornerstone of social organization.

The organization of this essay is as follows. First, I will describe
the use of, and importance attached to, divorce oaths during the
early Mamluk period. The second section will analyze the writings
of Ibn Taymiyya on divorce oaths, as well as his work on the related
issue of triple divorces. The third section will focus on the response
of the state and the scholarly elite to Ibn Taymiyya's challenge, and
will examine the immediate reasons leading to his persecution. In
the last section I will attempt to explain the social significance of
the debate over divorce oaths by analyzing the link between the
domestic and the political spheres during the early Mamluk period.

II

Oaths on pain of divorce have had a long history in Muslim soci-
eties, going back to the early Islamic community. Oaths on pain of
divorce, along with oaths on pain of manumission, had a special
legal status, recognized by the earliest compendia of Islamic law.
They were considered as conditional phrases, the act of divorce or
manumission being contingent on the fulfillment of the condition.
Thus, when a man says 'If I do such-and-such my wife is divorced',
the divorce takes place immediately following the specified action.[5]
Oaths of divorce and manumission are therefore, according to most
Muslim jurists, distinguished from oaths in the name of God, which
are not construed as conditional phrases. The violation of oath in
the name of God requires legally prescribed expiation. They are also
distinguished from vows, which are conceived of as commitments

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[5] On oaths of divorce and manumission in the early compendia of Islamic law,
such as al-Shāfiʿī's *Kitāb al-Umm*, al-Shaybānī's *Kitāb al-Aṣl*, and Saḥnūn's *al-Mudawwana*,
see N. Calder, "Ḥinth", 216–23.

towards God. Oaths on pain of divorce and manumission were
included in the oath of allegiance (bayʿa) introduced by the Umayyad
governor al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf, and used by many Muslim rulers in
subsequent centuries.[6] Anecdotes regarding oaths on pain of divorce
are interspersed in early Islamic belles-lettristic and legal literature,
and reflect actual use of this kind of oath.[7]

The development and the spread of oaths on pain of divorce in
medieval Muslim societies are beyond the scope of this essay. There
is no doubt, however, that by Ibn Taymiyya's time divorce oaths
were conceived as the most solemn form of oaths. The importance
of divorce oaths is best exemplified by an anecdote concerning al-
Ẓāhir Baybars, the founder of the Mamluk state. In 661/1263 Baybars
conducted elaborate negotiations with the Ayyūbid ruler of Karak,
al-Malik al-Mughīth, promising not to cause him any harm. However,
when al-Malik al-Mughīth agreed to meet Baybars outside the citadel
of Karak, Baybars immediately arrested him and sent him to Cairo,
where he was duly executed. As al-Malik al-Mughīth was sent off
to Egypt, we are told by the Damascene chronicler Quṭb al-Dīn al-
Yūnīnī, 'signs of abhorrence appeared on the faces of several amīrs,
for he [Baybars] had undertaken forty oaths, including an oath on
pain of triple divorce from [his wife] the mother of al-Malik al-Saʿīd.
It has been said that she resorted to a taḥlīl marriage with a slave,
who was afterwards murdered'.[8]

Under Islamic law, after a husband has repudiated his wife three
times, the couple cannot re-marry until the divorcee contracts and

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[6] Several early Islamic oaths of allegiance, which include oaths on pain of divorce,
are cited in al-Qalqashandī's Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshā (Cairo, 1913–18), vol. XIII, 211–15. Al-
Qalqashandī ascribes the common form of the oath of allegiance to al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf,
as do Ibn Taymiyya and al-Subkī in their treatises. See also E. Tyan, "Bayʿa", EI².

[7] For a couple of examples out of many, dating from the third/ninth and
fourth/tenth centuries, see R. Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic
Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 152; Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī,
Rafʿ al-Iṣr ʿan Quḍāt Miṣr, ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad ʿUmar (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Khānjī,
1998), 178. The Ḥanbalī scholar Ibn Baṭṭa (d. 387/997) devoted a treatise to polemic
against ḥiyal circumventing oaths on pain of divorce, quoted by Ibn Taymiyya in
Iqāmat al-Dalīl.

[8] Al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl Mirʾāt al-Zamān (Hyderabad: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1954–5), vol. I,
532–3; vol. II, 192–94. Baybars' Baḥriyya regiment as a whole was accused by the
ruler whom they later deposed, al-Muʿizz Aybak, of being notoriously unfaithful to
their oaths (al-Maqrīzī, Kitāb al-Sulūk li-Maʿrifat al-Duwal waʾl-Mulūk, ed. Muḥammad
Muṣṭafā Ziyādah & Saʿīd ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ ʿĀshūr (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya,
1934–72), vol. I, 393.

consummates a marriage with a different man. It is lawful for the divorcee to re-marry her former husband only after the dissolution of this second marriage. At times, this second marriage would only be arranged with the intention and for the sole purpose of permitting the woman to her first husband, in which case it is called marriage of *taḥlīl* (making lawful) and the contracting man is called *muḥallil*. In spite of violating numerous other oaths, it was the violation of the oath on pain of divorce that most outraged the chronicler and Baybars' own allies. Whether Umm al-Malik al-Saʿīd did actually contract a *taḥlīl* marriage remains unverifiable, a rumor more than a fact. But for al-Yūnīnī and his contemporaries, a *taḥlīl* marriage must have followed such an overt violation of an oath on pain of divorce.

Members of the military elite considered oaths of divorce to supersede any other form of commitment. The biography of the *amīr* Sayf al-Dīn Karāy provides another example. According to the chronicler al-Ṣafadī, Karāy's only weakness was his addiction to sex. Karāy took his wives and concubines everywhere, even on his hunting journeys. In 711/1311–2, upon being appointed governor of Syria, Karāy made it publicly known that he had undertaken an oath, under pain of divorce, not to accept any gifts during his tenure of office. Shortly afterwards, Karāy married in Damascus the daughter of a former governor, not an unusual step for a new governor consolidating his power. In compliance with his oath, he refused to accept the customary wedding gifts, thus causing embarrassment to other *amīrs*, and especially to his *khushdāsh*s. When one of them sent a representative to urge the governor to accept his presents, Karāy instructed the emissary to tell his master: 'You know his [viz., Karāy's] nature, and his love (*maḥabbatihi*) for his wives and concubines; and that he has undertaken an oath, on pain of divorcing the wives and manumitting the concubines, not to accept anything from any human being during the tenure of this governorship. . . . My *khushdāsh*, if you wish to see his wives divorced and his concubines manumitted, the choice is yours (*fa'l-amru amruka*)'. The excuse was accepted.[9] The point of

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[9] Al-Ṣafadī, *Aʿyān al-ʿAṣr wa-Aʿwān al-Naṣr* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1998), vol. III, 1473–74. Karāy had also undertaken an oath of divorce to amputate the hand of any thief, in adherence with the strict letter of the law—an edict that Damascenes apparently considered excessively harsh.

the story, of course, is that an oath on pain of divorce superseded, at least for Sayf al-Dīn Karāy, the mutual friendship emanating from ties of *khushdāshiyya*.

Karāy's exceptionally powerful libido notwithstanding, it seems that other members of Mamluk social elites shared his respect for divorce oaths. Chroniclers often report oath-taking among the military elite without specifying the form of the oath taken. When they do wish to emphasize the binding power of an oath, they refer either to the taking of an oath on a copy of the Qur'ān,[10] or to an oath of divorce. In 735/1333–4, the chief bureaucrat Ibn Hilāl al-Dawla, under arrest and torture, denied on pain of triple divorce having any knowledge of the whereabouts of the money he was accused of embezzling.[11] In 742/1340–1, the vice-regent Ṭuquztimur had taken an oath on pain of divorce not to remain in office under the new sultan.[12] In 776/1374, the Sultan al-Ashraf Shaʿbān took an oath on pain of divorce not to accept the resignation of the chief *qāḍī* Burhān al-Dīn Ibn Jamāʿa, a resolute act that convinced the *qāḍī* to remain in his office.[13] The oath on pain of divorce was also part of the oath of allegiance inaugurating the reign of every new sultan.[14]

It would be a mistake to assume that oaths on pain of divorce were limited to the elites, military or civilian. The chronicles contain sporadic references to oaths on pain of divorce taken by commoners.[15] But it is the extant contemporary *fatwā* collections that

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[10] For an oath on a copy of the Qur'ān by an Ayyūbid ruler, see al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. II, 398–400; for an oath on a copy of the Qur'ān taken by a Mamluk amīr in 690/1291, see al-Ṣafadī, *Aʿyān al-ʿAṣr*, vol. III, 1432.

[11] Mūsā b. Muḥammad al-Yūsufī, *Nuzhat al-Nāẓir fī Sīrat al-Malik al-Nāṣir*, ed. Aḥmad Ḥuṭayṭ (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1986), 248.

[12] Shams al-Dīn al-Shujāʿī, *Taʾrīkh al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad Ibn Qalāʾūn al-Ṣāliḥ wa-Awlādihi*, ed. Barbara Schafer (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner Verlag, 1977–1985), vol. I, 139.

[13] Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, *Inbāʾ al-Ghumr bi-Abnāʾ al-ʿUmr*, ed. Ḥasan Ḥabashī (Cairo, 1971–76), vol. I, 73; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. III, 242.

[14] See, for example, the text of the *bayʿa* given to the Sultan Aḥmad in 742/1342, preserved in the contemporary chronicle of al-Shujāʿī (*Taʾrīkh*, 199). The texts of two oaths of allegiance to new caliphs, composed by al-Qalqashandī in the beginning of the ninth/fifteenth century, retain the same order of oaths, opening also with an oath on pain of divorce (*Ṣubḥ*, vol. IX, 312–13, 318–19).

[15] Muḥibb al-Dīn Ibn Daqīq al-ʿĪd (d. 716/1316), the son of the famous jurist and *qāḍī*, refused to begin a petition he composed on behalf of a commoner with the word '*al-Mamlūk*' (your slave). The commoner then took a divorce oath not to let Muḥibb al-Dīn send the petition without this customary symbol of humility, leaving the jurist no choice (*Aʿyān al-ʿAṣr*, vol. III, 1244; al-Udfuwī, *al-Ṭāliʿ al-Saʿīd al-Jāmiʿ li-Asmāʾ al-Fuḍalāʾ waʾl-Ruwāt bi-Aʿlā al-Ṣaʿīd* (Cairo, 1966), 404; a badly

leave little doubt about the prevalence of divorce oaths among all classes of society, as real-life problems arising from divorce oaths were brought before contemporary jurists. In a case undoubtedly originating from the lower classes, brought before Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (d. 643/1245), a man who had undertaken a divorce oath to make up for a debt by working for his creditor, eventually paid the debt in cash.[16] Al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277) was asked about a master-artisan who, when his apprentice excused himself from performing a certain job by claiming lack of competence, swore on pain of divorce that the apprentice knew the dwelling place of Satan himself.[17] Ibn Taymiyya was asked about a husband who warned his wife not to leave the house until he returned from a journey, on the pain of divorcing her three times. When he came back, the wife told him that she had to go out for a dire necessity (*ḍarūra*).[18] Jurists were often asked about divorce oaths undertaken by husbands during marital strife.[19] All in all, divorce oaths appear in the *fatwā* collections in a baffling variety of economic and social contexts.

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deformed version of the anecdote appears in Ibn Ḥajar, *al-Durar*, vol. III, 113). Ibn Daqīq al-ʿĪd himself was appointed as chief *qāḍī* as a result of the determination of a certain famous Sufi shaykh, who undertook a divorce oath to approach the sultan and bring about the nomination (*Aʿyān al-ʿAṣr*, vol. II, 821).

[16] In this case, Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ ruled that violation and divorce occurred if the oath-taker refused to continue to work for his creditor (Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ al-Shahrazūrī, *Fatāwā wa-Masāʾil Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ*, ed. ʿAbd al-Muʿṭī Qalʿajī (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, 1986), 687 (no. 1048). In another case brought before the same *muftī*, a creditor undertook a divorce oath not to allow the release of his debtor (*Fatāwā*, 445 (no. 399)). For other *fatwā*s of Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ on divorce oaths, *ibid.*, nos. 396, 399, 402. For another example of the use of divorce oaths in a commercial context, see Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmūʿ Fatāwā Shaykh al-Islām Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyya*, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad al-ʿĀṣimī al-Najdī (Riyadh, 1961–63), vol. XXX, 315–16. (A case of a man who lent something to another person, and then mistakenly took a third person to be the debtor, undertaking an oath of divorce to support his claim).

[17] The legal problem was, of course, whether the apprentice does or does not know where Satan lives (*Fatāwā al-Imām al-Nawawī al-musammā bi'l-Masāʾil al-Manthūra*, ed. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-ʿAṭṭār (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1982), 140). In other cases, al-Nawawī was asked about men who swore on pain of divorce that a certain *muftī* never errs, or that a certain school of law was the best and most noble of all schools (*ibid.*, 140–1, 146, 147).

[18] Ibn Taymiyya ruled that the oath was not violated, as necessity exempted the wife from strictly following her husband's instructions. Ibn Taymiyya also exempted from liability a husband whose wife claimed to have forgotten his warning against entering a certain house (Ibn Taymiyya, *Fatāwā al-Nisāʾ*, ed. Ibrāhīm Muḥammad al-Jamal (Cairo, 1987), 253–258; *Majmūʿ Fatāwā*, vol. XX, 205–6; vol. XXX, 315–6). All these *fatwā*s do not refer to the expiability of divorce oaths, and therefore date, most probably, before 718/1318.

[19] In fact, most of Ibn Taymiyya's preserved *fatwā*s on divorce oaths were responses

The collections of *fatāwā* provide evidence for the prevalence of divorce oaths in yet another way. Many of the questions sent to these jurists concerned the permissibility of *taḥlīl* marriages and other legal subterfuges designed to allow triply-divorced wives to return to their husbands. In those cases for which we have details, the need to use one of these legal devices arose as a result of a violation of an oath.[20] In addition, jurists discuss the permissibility of legal subterfuges specifically designed to circumvent the violation of divorce oaths, the most popular being a method called *khulʿ al-yamīn*. Under this legal device, the husband and his wife agree on a consensual divorce (*khulʿ*) just before the husband is about to violate an oath he has undertaken. When the oath is actually violated, the spouses are no longer married, and the triple divorce invoked upon the breach of the oath cannot take place. The spouses are therefore allowed to re-marry immediately.[21]

By the eighth/fourteenth century divorce oaths were used, apparently for the first time in the history of Islamic law, in judicial processes. Under Islamic procedural law, in certain circumstances one of the litigants, usually the defendant, is required to take an oath in the name of God in order to support his or her claim. Some jurists, in particular from the Shāfiʿī school, allow the *qāḍī* to bolster the sanctity of the oath (*taghlīẓ al-yamīn*) by adding to the oath formula certain attributes of God, or requiring the litigant to take the oath in the city's mosque after the Friday prayer. However, the chief Ḥanafī *qāḍī* of Damascus, Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭarsūsī (d. 758/1357), allowed the *qāḍī* to bolster the sanctity of an oath by requiring the litigant to take an oath on pain of divorce or manumission. Al-Ṭarsūsī acknowledges that this view has no precedent in legal literature, but comments that 'in our days, however, it is said that he

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to cases originating in marital conflicts (Ibn Taymiyya, *Fatāwā al-Nisāʾ*, 253–58). For other instances of the use of divorce oaths within marital strife, see Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, *Fatāwā wa-Masāʾil*, 443 (no. 395), 684 (1032); *Fatāwā al-Nawawī*, 140; Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī, *Fatāwā al-Subkī* (Cairo, 1936–38), 311.

[20] Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmūʿ Fatāwā*, vol. XXII, 97–101; *Fatāwā al-Nisāʾ*, 260.

[21] Shāfiʿī jurists at this period generally approved of *khulʿ al-yamīn*. The disadvantage of this method, as used by the Shāfiʿīs, was that it could only be used twice. *Khulʿ* separations, according to the Shāfiʿīs, counted as divorces and not as judicial dissolution of the marriage (*faskh*). Therefore, if this legal device is repeated three times, a triple divorce ensues. See Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, *Fatāwā*, 443 (no. 395); al-Nawawī, *Fatāwā*, 136, 139; Ibn Abī al-Dam (d. 642/1244), *Kitāb Adab al-Qaḍāʾ*, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā al-Zuhaylī (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1982), 671–4.

[viz., the *qāḍī*] can do that, if he considers it in the public interest (*maṣlaḥa*)'.[22] His contemporary, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, also refers to litigants swearing an oath on pain of divorce, at a *qāḍī*'s instigation, in order to acquit themselves of a debt.[23] The change in judicial procedure was a result of adaptation to social practices, and demonstrates again that oaths on pain of divorce had come to be considered the most solemn form of oath.

III

In 718/1318, Ibn Taymiyya wrote a short epistle, entitled *al-Ijtimā' wa'l-Iftirāq fī al-Ḥilf bi'l-Ṭalāq* (The Meeting and Parting of Ways concerning Oaths on pain of Divorce).[24] In this work, he propounded a novel doctrine regarding divorce oaths, contradicting not only established doctrine but also his own earlier views on the subject. Succinct and sometimes sloppy, this first treatise contained a rudimentary outline of a distinction between conditional divorces and oaths on pain of divorce. In the following years, Ibn Taymiyya composed many

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[22] G. Guellil, *Damaszener Akten des 8./14. Jahrhunderts nach at-Tarsusis* Kitāb al-I'lām. *Eine Studie zum arabischen Justizwesen* (Bamberg: aku, 1985), 276–7. In earlier legal manuals, the possibility of making a litigant take an oath of divorce is not even considered. See Ibn Abī al-Dam, *Kitāb Adab al-Qaḍā'*, 252–7 (Shāfi'ī); al-Simnānī, *Rawḍat al-Quḍāh*, ed. Ṣalaḥ al-Dīn al-Nāhī (Beirut: 1984), 282 (Ḥanafī).

[23] Ibn al-Qayyim describes an impermissible legal subterfuge used to circumvent this judicial divorce oath. He does not discuss the legality of requiring a litigant to take a divorce oath, which suggests it was common practice (*I'lām al-Muwaqqi'īn 'an Rabb al-'Ālamīn*, ed. Ṭāhā 'Abd al-Ra'ūf Sa'd (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1964), vol. III, 248). In the Ḥaram documents, originating from the *qāḍī*'s court in Jerusalem at the end of the eighth/fourteenth century, there are many examples of ancillary oaths taken by litigants, especially in cases of debt. To date, the documents have not been fully published, but according to D. Little's catalogue these oaths were taken solely in the name of God. Only in one case did the *qāḍī* order the defendant to undertake his oath in the city's mosque, al-Masjid al-Aqṣ'ā' (D. Little, *A Catalogue of the Islamic Documents from al-Ḥaram aš-Šarīf in Jerusalem* (Beirut: Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 1984), 47; for *taghlīz al-yamīn*, see no. 648).

[24] *Al-Ijtimā' wa'l-Iftirāq fī al-Ḥilf bi'l-Ṭalāq*, ed. Muḥammad 'Abd al-Razzāq Ḥamza (Cairo: al-Manār Press, 1346/1926–27). H. Laoust translated this epistle into French in "Une risāla", 221–36, suggesting the title 'Du serment de répudiation; rapports des deux notions'. The manuscript used for the published edition contains an *ijāza* by Ibn Taymiyya, dated 27 Rabī' I 718 (10 May 1318), and it can be assumed that he completed the treatise shortly prior to that date. There is little doubt that *al-Ijtimā' wa'l-Iftirāq* was his first elaboration of this doctrine, for Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī's response, written half a year later, refers only to this treatise.

more treatises and *fatwā*s on this issue, which seems to have occupied him until his final arrest in 726/1326. For the sake of clarity, the following exposition will generally be based on these later works, as well as the discussions by his disciple, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya.[25] It should be stressed, however, that it was *al-Ijtimāʿ waʾl-Iftirāq* that led to Ibn Taymiyya's trials in 718/1318 and 720/1320.

At the crux of Ibn Taymiyya's doctrine was his broad definition of intention. In his view, intentions supersede the explicit or formal meanings conveyed in speech; for speech has no significance in and of itself, but serves only to indicate the intention of the speaker. When a man says to his wife 'If you agree to forfeit your *ṣadāq*, you are repudiated', he has the intention to divorce her provided she absolves him of these debts. The conditional form of the sentence conveys the real intention of the speaker. Ibn Taymiyya argues, however, that when a man says 'If I do such-and-such, my wife is repudiated', he has no intention to repudiate his wife, even if he was to commit the specified action. The intention is merely to assert his determination, as in the sentence 'By God, I shall not do such-and-such'. Accordingly, when a man says 'If I do *not* take such-and-such action, my wife is repudiated', his real intention is to convey determination to perform the specified act, rather than to commit himself to a divorce. The same applies to testimonies on past events, such as 'May my wife be repudiated if this had happened'. When a man has the intention of either deterring (*manʿ*) or inciting (*ḥathth*) himself or someone else from or to a certain action, or attesting (*taṣdīq*) or denying (*takdhīb*) a certain information, he is in fact undertaking an oath.[26]

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[25] The most elaborate, and probably the latest, work of Ibn Taymiyya on oaths of divorce is found in the fifth and final chapter of his *Bayān al-ʿUqūd* (The Elucidation of Contracts), devoted to oaths and vows (*Majmūʿat Fatāwā*, vol. III, 349–84). A shorter treatise, called *Lamḥat al-Mukhtaṭif fī al-Farq bayna al-Ṭalāq waʾl-Ḥilf* (A Quick Glance on the Difference between Divorces and Oaths), as well as several *fatwā*s on the subject, were published in *Majmūʿat Fatāwā Ibn Taymiyya* (Cairo, 1326–29/1908–11), vol. III, 2–8, 27ff. Ibn Taymiyya's biographers list at least ten additional titles composed by Ibn Taymiyya on this subject (Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī, *al-ʿUqūd*, 214). Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's eloquent exposition of his master's views on divorce oaths is found in his *Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn*, vol. III, 50–80; vol. IV, 97–118; *Ighāthat al-Lahfān min Maṣāʿid al-Shayṭān*, ed. Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Fiqī (Cairo, 1939), vol. II, 87–97. It should be noted that the cause of Ibn Taymiyya's final trials, on account of his doctrine on the visitation of tombs, was a treatise he wrote seventeen years earlier (Murad, "Ibn Taymiya", 24–26). Thus it appears that he was occupied by divorce oaths until his final years.

[26] The litmus test distinguishing between divorce oaths and conditional divorces,

If a man pronounces a conditional divorce with the intention of undertaking an oath, the legal rules pertaining to oaths must apply. God commanded men to respect their valid oaths to the utmost of their ability, but also allowed men to violate them, provided they perform proper expiation.[27] The Divine legislation, argues Ibn Taymiyya, must apply to all oaths, including oaths on pain of divorce. According to the existing doctrine, a violation of an oath on pain of divorce is immediately penalized. Thus, a man who has taken such an oath has no way out, even if he had undertaken to commit an act of disobedience towards God. What Ibn Taymiyya proposes, therefore, is to allow men who had undertaken oaths on pain of divorce a way out, through an act of expiation.[28] A violation of an oath on pain of divorce, like the violation of any other oath, should be expiated, not punished. For example, he reminds his readers that oaths on pain of pilgrimage, charity, manumission and divorce were all customarily included in the oaths of allegiance (bay'a), and therefore should all be subject to the same rules. If oaths on pain of pilgrimage or charity included in the bay'a are expiable, the same should hold for oaths on pain of divorce and manumission. Ibn Taymiyya considers it a religious duty to abide by one's oaths, and even more so with regard to an oath of allegiance to the sultan. But

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according to Ibn Taymiyya, is whether the speaker finds divorce more repugnant than the action specified in the phrase. A more formal way to decipher the intention of a conditional sentence is to re-phrase it in the form of an oath. If the conditional sentence 'If I do such-and-such, my wife is divorced' can be re-phrased as an oath sentence, such as 'May my wife be divorced, I shall not do such-and-such', it follows that the speaker had the intention of undertaking an oath (Majmū'at Fatāwā, vol. III, 6). However, when a man says to his wife 'If you commit adultery you are divorced', there is little doubt that he finds the adultery more abhorrent, and will wish to divorce her once she has committed adultery (Majmū'at Fatāwā, vol. III, 6–7, 352–54; al-Ijtimā' wa'l-Iftirāq, 7–8).

[27] The rules of expiation for violation of oaths are laid down in Q 5:89, "God will not call you to account for what is futile (laghw) in your oaths, but He will call you to account for your deliberate oaths. For expiation, feed ten indigent persons, on the scale of the average for the food of your families; or clothe them; or give a slave his freedom. If that is beyond your means, fast for three days. That is the expiation for the oaths ye have sworn, but keep to your oaths."

[28] The outline of these ideas appears already in al-Ijtimā' wa'l-Iftirāq, 14ff. Ibn Taymiyya's opponents have argued that men who had undertaken an oath on pain of divorce do have a way out, for violation results only in divorce. According to Ibn Taymiyya, however, divorce should be considered as too severe a punishment, especially when the spouses are attached to each other and have had children together. Ibn Taymiyya goes on, somewhat taken by his own rhetoric, to say that experience shows that spouses would rather lose their property and be banished from their homeland than be separated (Majmū'at Fatāwā, vol. III, 364–69, 381).

oaths, whatever their form, can never supersede the obedience due
to God.[29]

Ibn Taymiyya view of conditional divorces was in agreement with
contemporary social practice. The one problem with this doctrine,
however, was that no one seems to have held it before—at least no
one who counted. The Ẓāhirīs, to be sure, hold that oaths on pain
of divorce are invalid, not even requiring expiation. But their argu-
ment was based on their fundamental rejection of any conditional
divorces, a methodology Ibn Taymiyya was not inclined to follow,
and they were, in any case, on the margins of orthodox Sunni Islam.
Neither could Ibn Taymiyya, the Sunni zealot, fully embrace the
Shīʿī-Imāmī doctrine, which rejects both conditional divorces and
the utterance of triple repudiations at any one time.[30] The established
Sunni legal doctrine did recognize oaths of divorce as a separate
legal category,[31] but held that these oaths are subject to the rules of
conditional divorces.[32] There was no precedent to Ibn Taymiyya's
position among the Sunni schools, and the established doctrine seemed
to rely on a consensus (*ijmāʿ*) of the jurists.

Ibn Taymiyya resorted to a subtle defense against the claims of
ijmāʿ. In his later works he claimed that there is no sound tradition
from the Companions on the issue of divorce oaths, and that all the
traditions supporting the doctrine of his opponents date from the
Umayyad period. This means, argued Ibn Taymiyya, that in the
Prophet's time no one undertook such oaths, and they were intro-

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[29] Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmūʿat Fatāwā*, vol. III, 28, 53, 351, 375; Ibn Qayyim al-
Jawziyya, *Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn*, vol. III, 73–80; Laoust, *Essai*, 287–88.

[30] On the Ẓāhirī and Shiʿī doctrines on divorce oaths, see *Majmūʿat Fatāwā*, vol.
III, 8–9. See also Abū Zahra, *Ibn Taymiyya*, 419, 427.

[31] The definition of divorce oaths varied slightly among the schools. The Ḥanafīs
considered all conditional divorces as divorce oaths, excluding divorces that depend
on the will of the wife (as these belonged to the separate legal category of *tamlīk*).
The Ḥanbalīs held that divorce oaths are defined as any conditional divorce con-
tingent on an action that can either be taken or avoided. The Shāfiʿīs held that
divorce oaths are any conditional divorce made with the purpose of either inciting
or desisting to or from an action, or confirming a certain item of information. The
Shāfiʿī definition of divorce oaths is practically similar to Ibn Taymiyya's definition
(Ibn Qudāma, *al-Mughnī*, vol. VIII, 335). However, this distinction between condi-
tional divorces and divorce oaths carried almost no practical legal consequences for
the orthodox schools.

[32] Earlier legal literature already contained references to an *ijmāʿ* in support of
the established doctrine on divorce oaths. See Ibn Qudāma (d. 620/1223), *al-Mughnī*
(Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1984), vol. XI, 220–21; Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198), *Bidāyat al-
Mujtahid wa-Nihāyat al-Muqtaṣid* (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, 1985), vol. I, 411.

duced only a generation after the Companions, in the time of the Followers. Thus, Ibn Taymiyya turned the absence of evidence into a useful weapon. If the Prophet and his Companions never resorted to oaths on pain of divorce, the practice itself is an innovation (*bidʿa*), and no *ijmāʿ* concerning it could be considered valid.[33] The evocation of the age of the Prophet came late in the development of Ibn Taymiyya's argumentation. One finds no trace of it in *al-Ijtimāʿ waʾl-Iftirāq*. Ibn Taymiyya, at least in this case, was not motivated by a *salafī* yearning to follow the practices of the Prophet. His doctrines were no idealist preaching. On the contrary, Ibn Taymiyya was consistently engaged with contemporary social issues. The reference to the age of the Prophet was not an end in itself, but rather a tool, used as a last resort to defend his heterodox doctrine against strong claims to an *ijmāʿ* to the contrary.

Some time after 718/1318, and perhaps as a result of the ban on his doctrines concerning divorce oaths, Ibn Taymiyya began to issue *fatwā*s on the invalidity of triple repudiations.[34] In these *fatwā*s, Ibn Taymiyya ruled that repudiation is valid only if it is made in the way recommended by the Prophet, so-called *ṭalāq al-sunna*. In Islamic law, a distinction is made between a *sunnī* divorce, that is a single revocable repudiation uttered when the wife is in a state of purity, and *bidʿī* divorces, that is acts of divorce made in any other way, including the utterance of a triple repudiation. While the orthodox schools unanimously agreed that *bidʿī* divorces are reprehensible yet valid, Ibn Taymiyya now argued that *bidʿī* divorces do not bind at all. For example, when a man says 'You are repudiated thrice', the established doctrine was that triple divorce follows; but Ibn Taymiyya ruled that the result is only one single revocable divorce, as the two other repudiations uttered are *bidʿī* divorces.[35] In effect this was

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[33] *Majmūʿat Fatāwā*, vol. III, 53, 59–60, 375; *Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn*, vol. III, 54.

[34] The debate on the expiability of divorce oaths must have preceded Ibn Taymiyya's *fatwā*s on triple divorces. Ibn Taymiyya's doctrine regarding triple divorces is not mentioned in his *al-Ijtimāʿ waʾl-Iftirāq*, nor in al-Subkī's refutation written shortly later. Were Ibn Taymiyya's *fatwā*s on triple divorces already issued by that time, both authors surely would have taken note of them.

[35] Ibn Taymiyya was, however, again holding views similar to those of the Ẓāhirīs and the Shiʿīs (Abū Zahra, *Ibn Taymiyya*, 419, 427). For Ibn Taymiyya's treatises on *bidʿī* divorces see *Majmūʿat Fatāwā*, vol. III, 13–27; Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmūʿat al-Rasāʾil* (Cairo, 1905–6), vol. II, 203–16. See also Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, *Zād*

another indirect attempt to mitigate the power of divorce oaths.[36]
Divorce oaths were usually undertaken on pain of triple repudiation.
When the oath was breached, re-marriage was possible only after
the woman had contracted a *taḥlīl* marriage and had had sexual
intercourse with another man. In contrast, the implication of Ibn
Taymiyya's position was that a breach of an oath taken on pain of
triple repudiation causes only a single, and revocable, divorce.

Ibn Taymiyya again had recourse to the model of the Prophet
and the Companions. According to a tradition attributed to Ibn
ʿAbbās (d.c. 68/687), during the age of the Prophet a triple repu-
diation issued in one utterance had been in fact considered only as
a single revocable divorce. The law, however, was changed by the
second caliph, ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb. ʿUmar was troubled by the
fickleness with which Muslim men were divorcing their wives, and
wanted to deter them from issuing unnecessary repudiations. He
therefore decided to hold men to their word, and ruled that the
utterance of a triple repudiation would, from now on, actually evoke
triple divorce. Ibn Taymiyya used this tradition to show that the
ijmāʿ reached by subsequent generations of jurists was based on
ʿUmar's legal reasoning (*ijtihād*) rather than on Divine legislation.
Moreover, Ibn Taymiyya argued that the tradition demonstrates the
need to adapt the laws of divorce to public interest (*maṣlaḥa*). In
ʿUmar's time *taḥlīl* marriages were either unknown or strictly pro-
hibited. In our days, says Ibn Taymiyya, the corruption resulting
from *taḥlīl* marriages overrides the need to deter husbands from fickle
divorces. Just as ʿUmar changed the laws of divorce in the interests
of the community, jurists must now revert to the practice of the

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al-Miʿād fī Hady Khayr al-ʿIbād, ed. Shuʿayb & ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Arnāʾūṭ (Beirut:
Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1979), vol. V, 218–71; *Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn*, vol. III, 30–50. Ibn
Taymiyya's argumentation has already been lucidly explained by Abū Zahra. At
the core of his argument lay the claim that divorce is in its essence (*aṣl*) a repre-
hensible act, and is therefore allowed only in a manner prescribed by the Lawgiver,
that is *sunnī* divorce. If a divorce is not done in the prescribed manner, it is nec-
essarily prohibited, and therefore invalid. See Abū Zahra, *Ibn Taymiyya*, 414–27.

[36] It is noteworthy that Ibn Taymiyya's biographers grouped together all his doc-
trines on divorce. In a list of Ibn Taymiyya's independent legal opinions, his biog-
rapher Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī singles out his master's doctrines on divorce as 'his well
known legal opinions, which caused him many tribulations, were that divorce oaths
are expiable, that a triple divorce effects only a single divorce, and that a forbid-
den (*muḥarram*) divorce is invalid.' (*al-ʿUqūd*, 214; cf. Ibn al-Wardī, *Taʾrīkh* (Najaf,
1969), vol. II, 411).

Prophet and the Companions, in order to combat the evil practice of *taḥlīl*.[37]

At the heart of Ibn Taymiyya's doctrines regarding divorce oaths and *bidʿī* divorces was his desire to eliminate *taḥlīl* marriages. Laoust, perceiving Ibn Taymiyya's concern about social mores, interpreted these doctrines as an attempt to limit husbands' unilateral power of divorce.[38] Ibn Taymiyya occasionally did condemn divorces in general, but it seems to be a rhetorical tool rather than an end in itself. He did not attack the institution of divorce as such, and—as Laoust has noted—claimed that, in contrast to Christian matrimonial laws, the possibility of divorce in Islam demonstrates God's clemency towards the believers.[39] In fact, Ibn Taymiyya was trying to tackle formalistic interpretations that lead to *taḥlīl* marriages and other legal subterfuges. For Ibn Taymiyya, the perils of *taḥlīl* furnish the ultimate confirmation of his doctrines. Let us concede, he argues, that the evidence with regard to divorce oaths in the Qurʾān and the Ḥadīth is contradictory and ambiguous. In that case, the correct analogy must lead us to support the expiability of divorce oaths, for this is in the interest (*maṣlaḥa*) of the Muslims. Otherwise, as happens in our day, the believers find themselves in a quagmire, having no way out other than *taḥlīl* marriages or other types of legal subterfuges.[40] In one of his later works, summarizing all his doctrines on divorce, Ibn Taymiyya offers the following rationale:

> When oaths on pain of divorce were innovated, many jurists believed that they were binding upon violation, with no possibility of expiation; subsequently, many jurists believed that forbidden (*muḥarram*) divorces

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[37] Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmūʿat Fatāwā*, vol. III, 22–3; *Majmūʿat al-Rasāʾil*, 206. Ibn Taymiyya argued that holding men liable for utterances of triple divorces should therefore be seen as a punishment for reckless husbands. On the need to adapt the law to changing circumstances, see Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, *Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn*, vol. III, 30–50; *al-Ṭuruq al-Ḥukmiyya fī al-Siyāsa al-Sharʿiyya* (Cairo, 1317/1898–9), 16–17.

[38] *Essai*, 422–34, esp. 428ff. Laoust claimed that Ibn Taymiyya had recognized the dangers posed by frequent divorces to the solidarity of the family institution, and, moreover, to wives' rights to justice. According to Laoust, "[c]ette dernière considération laisse déjà se dessiner, dans le doctrine d'Ibn Taimīya, un féminisme discret dont on trouverait aisément d'autres examples." ("Une risāla", 217). Ibn Taymiyya's 'feminism' seems to me purely wishful thinking.

[39] *Essai*, 429; "Une risāla", 218–19. Ibn al-Qayyim states that: "Sometimes divorces are a Divine grace (*niʿma*), by which a husband's collar and cuffs are removed. Not every divorce is a Divine retribution (*niqma*) . . ." (*Zād al-Maʿād*, vol. V, 239).

[40] *Majmūʿat Fatāwā*, vol. III, 5, 29, 375–78.

were valid, and some thought that it was not even forbidden to utter triple divorces; many of them believed that a divorce issued by a drunkard or under coercion was valid. Some of these questions were matters of dispute among the Companions and some were introduced later. The people have come to believe that divorces occur [in these cases], in spite of the immense harm and corruption, both in religious and in temporal affairs, that result from the separation of a husband from his wife.

When faced with divorces resulting from these controverted legal questions, men were divided into two groups. One group consisted of those who prohibited *taḥlīl*, in accordance with the example of the Prophet and the Companions, while at the same time also prohibiting what the Prophet himself did not [with regard to these questions of divorce]. Their legal rulings imposed heavy burdens and yokes (*al-aghlāl wa'l-āṣār*)[41] and immense oppression, which lead to corruption in religious and temporal affairs, not least the apostasy of those who are told by a *muftī* that [their pronouncement of divorce] is binding, shedding of innocent blood, loss of sanity, enmity between people, replacement of Islamic law with a multitude of sins, as well as many other evils of this kind.

The other group consisted of those who thought that they would remove this immense oppression by using legal subterfuges to allow the return of the wife to her husband. First, the marriage of *taḥlīl* was introduced, and some jurists even believed that God rewards those who contract *taḥlīl* marriages, for they permit the wife to her husband and remove the cause of corruption. This legal subterfuge was used to circumvent all other forms of binding divorce. Later, other legal subterfuges were introduced with regard to oaths [of divorce] . . . However, all past authorities and men of knowledge have denounced these legal subterfuges and their likes, regarding them as nullifying the wisdom of the Divine law and the true essence of the verses of the Qur'ān, and as nothing less than derision and mockery of the Divine word.'[42]

Through a new interpretation of Islamic history, Ibn Taymiyya's thought had come full circle. At the time of the Prophet, he argues, the Divine law must have been interpreted correctly. Divine clemency was apparent, and the believers were free from the shackles and fetters that bound followers of other religions. However, when the interpreters of the Divine law started following rigid and formalistic

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[41] Reference to Q 7:15, "He releases them from their heavy burdens and from the yokes that are upon them."
[42] *Majmū'at Fatāwā*, vol. III, 54–55.

doctrines, swerving from the correct path, they burdened the believers with intolerable yokes. Only then were legal subterfuges introduced, sometimes by well-meaning jurists, in order to relieve the believers of these burdens. But, since God could not have prohibited some-thing and then allowed it through trickery and deceit, these legal subterfuges are of no use, adding to the sources of corruption rather than reducing them. Legal subterfuges would not—indeed, could not—have been introduced to Muslim society if God's laws had been interpreted correctly, that is through the understanding of their divine cause rather than according to their formal meaning.

IV

As soon as Ibn Taymiyya began propagating his views on the expi-able nature of oaths on pain of divorce, leading jurists in Damascus and Cairo rushed to refute them. Among these jurists was Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn al-Zamlakānī, the most prestigious Shāfiʿī authority in Damascus. But it was the works of the much younger Cairene Shāfiʿī jurist Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī that made the most impact. Ibn Taymiyya himself, we are told, acknowledged that 'no jurist has refuted me except al-Subkī'.[43] Born in 683/1284 in lower Egypt, in 718/1318 Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī was still a relatively young and not particu-larly famous immigrant Shāfiʿī *muftī*. It was his refutations of Ibn Taymiyya that paved his way to higher offices. He was eventually appointed chief Shāfiʿī *qāḍī* of Damascus in 739/1338, gradually acquiring several other offices in the city, many of which he was able to transmit to his sons. Compared to Ibn Taymiyya, al-Subkī represents, as a Shāfiʿī Egyptian who amassed official appointments,

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[43] Al-Ṣafadī, *Aʿyān al-ʿAṣr*, vol. III, 1196. Al-Subkī's son notes that Ibn Taymiyya's counter-refutation was directed only against his father's work, disregarding the works of other detractors (Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyya al-Kubrā*, ed. Maḥmūd Muḥammad al-Tanāḥī and Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ al-Ḥilw (Cairo, 1964–76), vol. X, 183–84). On the treatise of Ibn al-Zamlakānī refuting Ibn Taymiyya's doc-trine on divorce, see *Aʿyān al-ʿAṣr*, vol. IV, 1769–88; Jackson, "Ibn Taymiyya on Trial", 48–49. The Ḥanafī jurist Aḥmad b. ʿUthmān Ibn al-Turkamānī (d. 744/1343) also composed a couple of treatises against the doctrines of Ibn Taymiyya regard-ing *taḥlīl* (see *Aʿyān al-ʿAṣr*, vol. I, 167–68). These authors' refutations of Ibn Taymiyya did not survive—another proof of al-Subkī's success.

the opposite end of the social spectrum of Mamluk *ʿulamāʾ*. Ironically, unlike the ever-celibate Ibn Taymiyya, al-Subkī was married to several wives, divorcing his first, who was also his paternal cousin, at the age of fifteen.[44]

Al-Subkī composed his first refutation of Ibn Taymiyya's doctrine on divorce oaths almost immediately following the appearance of *al-Ijtimāʿ waʾl-Iftirāq*, and later authored at least four more treatises about divorce oaths and triple divorces.[45] At the core of al-Subkī's refutation was his adherence to the established doctrine that considered divorce oaths as conditional divorces. It is true, al-Subkī admits, that laymen refer to conditional divorces as oaths, a term that was even accepted into the jargon of the jurists (*ʿurf al-fuqahāʾ*). The jurists, however, do not use the term in a literal sense, and the term has no bearing on the legal rules that apply to this action.[46] Even if, like Ibn Taymiyya, one assumes the primacy of the speaker's intention, this intention could only be inferred from social practice. And as is well known, the praxis is that no expiation is allowed in divorce

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[44] The most detailed biography of Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī was composed by his son, Tāj al-Dīn, and included in his *Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyya al-Kubrā*, vol. X, 139–338. In spite of being one of the most important legal thinkers of the Mamluk period, al-Subkī has not received the scholarly attention he deserves (see J. Schacht & C.E. Bosworth, "al-Subkī", *EI*²). For a detailed study of a *fatwā* by al-Subkī regarding commercial law, see Nissreen Haram, "Use and Abuse of the Law", in Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick & David Powers (eds.), *Islamic Legal Interpretation. Muftis and their Fatwas* (Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press, 1996), 72–86. For al-Subkī's legal opinions regarding non-Muslim minorities, see Seth Ward, "Dhimmi Women and Mourning", in *Islamic Legal Interpretation*, 87–97, and the sources cited there.

[45] Al-Subkī's first treatise on divorce oaths was *al-Taḥqīq fī Masʾalat al-Taʿlīq* (The Determination of Truth in Conditional Phrases), of which apparently only extracts survive in a Damascus manuscript (Brockelmann, *GAL*, S II, 103). A second treatise, *Naqd al-Ijtimāʿ waʾl-Iftirāq fī Masāʾil al-Aymān waʾl-Ṭalāq*, completed on 20 Ramaḍān 718 (15 November 1318), was a direct refutation of Ibn Taymiyya's first treatise. It was published in al-Subkī, *Kitāb al-Fatāwā* (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Qudsī, 1937), 303–9. At a later date, al-Subkī added a more detailed treatise, *al-Durra al-Muḍiyya fī al-Radd ʿalā Ibn Taymiyya* (The Shining Pearl on the Refutation of Ibn Taymiyya), which dealt with triple divorces as well as with divorce oaths. These last two, together with another extremely short treatise on divorce oaths completed in Muḥarram 725/January 1325, were published in *al-Rasāʾil al-Subkiyya*, 151–91. An abridgement of al-Subkī's first treatise, composed by al-Subkī himself and entitled *Masʾalat al-Ṭalāq al-Muʿallaq* (On Conditional Divorces), is found in the Princeton Manuscripts Collection (Yahuda 878, 135a–139a). After Ibn Taymiyya's death, al-Subkī composed a refutation of his opponent's doctrines on the visitation of tombs, entitled *Shifāʾ al-Siqām fī Ziyārat Khayr al-Anām* (published in Hyderabad, 1952).

[46] Al-Subkī, *al-Rasāʾil*, 179, 190; *Masʾalat al-Ṭalāq*, 136b–137a.

oaths. Therefore, argues al-Subkī, a man who undertakes a divorce oath consciously commits himself to a divorce upon violation of his oath; otherwise he would not have taken the oath in the first place.[47]

At the time al-Subkī was writing his refutations of Ibn Taymiyya's doctrines on divorce oaths, the state had already started to exert its coercive power. In Jumādā al-Ūlā 718/July 1318, no more than a couple of months after *al-Ijtimāʿ waʾl-Iftirāq* was completed, an edict of the sultan arrived from Cairo prohibiting Ibn Taymiyya from issuing *fatwā*s on the subject of divorce oaths.[48] The chroniclers tell us that the matter was brought to the attention of the sultan by his chief Ḥanafī *qāḍī*, the Syrian-born Shams al-Dīn al-Ḥarīrī. The edict, however, did not come as complete surprise, for the chief Ḥanbalī *qāḍī* of Damascus had already approached Ibn Taymiyya two weeks earlier and asked him to discontinue issuing *fatwā*s. The chroniclers suggest that Ibn Taymiyya complied with the sultan's edict for more than a year, but then returned to the subject, claiming that he was not permitted to conceal true knowledge.[49] Ibn Taymiyya received another royal reprimand in Ramaḍān 719/November 1319, and a council of the leading *amīr*s and jurists summoned by the local governor confirmed the earlier prohibition. Finally, in Rajab 720/August 1320, Ibn Taymiyya was summoned again to the governor's palace, this time to receive a sentence of imprisonment in the citadel of the city for his *fatwā*s on divorce. He remained in prison for five months until receiving a royal amnesty on the Day of ʿĀshūrāʾ 721/January 1321.

Modern scholars have been puzzled by the state's intervention in what was ostensibly a legal debate. Contemporary chroniclers explain the conflict between Ibn Taymiyya and the state in terms of persons rather than doctrines. Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, for example, explains that his shaykh's enemies 'found no way to refute his doctrines other than petitioning the sultan'.[50] Most modern scholars followed the

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[47] Al-Subkī, *al-Rasāʾil*, 155, 171, 190.

[48] This account mainly relies on the comparative study of the relevant chronicles by Ḥ. Murad, "Ibn Taymiya", 21–23. See also Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī, *al-ʿUqūd*, 214–16; Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya waʾl-Nihāya* (Cairo, 1932–39), vol. XIV, 93, 97–98; al-Ṣafadī, *Aʿyān al-ʿAṣr*, vol. I, 138; Laoust, *Essai*, 143–45.

[49] The chroniclers note that the first royal reprimand, in 718/1318, dealt specifically with Ibn Taymiyya's *fatwā*s on divorce oaths, while the trials in the following years dealt with questions of divorce in general (Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī, *al-ʿUqūd*, 214–16).

[50] *Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn*, vol. IV, 114; vol. III, 62. Another fascinating illustration of the personalized way in which Ibn Taymiyya's sympathizers perceived his trials

same path, and argued that the coercive power of the state was more
or less manipulated by Ibn Taymiyya's enemies from among the
ranks of the jurists and other members of the *ʿulamāʾ*.[51] I believe,
however, that it is misleading to accept uncritically contemporary
chroniclers' interpretations of Ibn Taymiyya's trials. Contemporary
chroniclers, at least before the breakthrough in the philosophy of
history made by Ibn Khaldūn and al-Maqrīzī in the ninth/fifteenth
century, understood history as the sum of individual personalities.
Events were almost always explained through the personal traits of
individuals. If we were to accept the analysis offered by medieval
chroniclers *en masse*, we would still believe that affairs of state were
dependent on the noble or ignoble character of the reigning sultan.
In the same way, while one should acknowledge that contemporary
chroniclers understood the trials of Ibn Taymiyya as being rooted
in individual rivalries and enmities, the subject matter of these trials
had some significance in its own right.

All the more so with regard to these particular tribulations, in
which personal enmities seem to have played little part. All of Ibn
Taymiyya's detractors in 718/1318—apart from al-Subkī, who was
too young—had stood by his side during previous trials. The Ḥanafī
qāḍī Shams al-Dīn al-Ḥarīrī, who instigated the first royal reprimand
in 718/1318, was previously deposed from his offices in 705/1305–6
because of his alleged support for Ibn Taymiyya.[52] Ibn al-Zamlakānī,

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is found in al-Bazzār's biography of Ibn Taymiyya. At the end of the extant man-
uscript, copied in the middle of the eighth/fourteenth century, the copyist made
for himself two lists, one of Ibn Taymiyya's friends and one of his enemies. Abū
Ḥafṣ ʿUmar al-Bazzār (d. 749/1348), *al-Aʿlām al-ʿAliyya fī Manāqib Shaykh al-Islām Ibn
Taymiyya*, ed. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Munajjid (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Jadīd, 1976), 79–87.
    [51] Laoust argued that the trials of Ibn Taymiyya on the issues of divorce and
visitation were instigated by opposition to his views among scholarly factions, espe-
cially the Mālikīs (*Essai*, 477). Little, more cautiously, noted that contemporary
chronicles stress the rivalry among the *ʿulamāʾ* as the leading factor in the arrests
of Ibn Taymiyya ("The Detention", 323–27). E. Ashtor also believed that the mil-
itary elite was acting at the behest of the scholarly elite. According to Ashtor, the
alliance between the military elite and the scholarly elite required that the Mamluks
act against any threat to the spiritual domination of their allies ("L'inquisition dans
l'état mamlouk", *Rivista degli Studi Orientali*, vol. XXV (1950), 14). M. Chamberlain
argued that in the trials of Ibn Taymiyya, as in other contemporary heresy trials,
the point was not only the doctrinal issues themselves, but rather the power to
determine true knowledge (*Knowledge and social practice in medieval Damascus, 1190–1350*
(Cambridge: Cambrige University Press, 1994), 167–73).
    [52] At the time, al-Ḥarīrī was the chief Ḥanafī *qāḍī* in Damascus (Murad, "Ibn
Taymiya", 14). Their mutual acquaintance went back even further. In 702/1302,

who would write a refutation of Ibn Taymiyya's doctrine on divorce oaths, was previously known as an admirer and close associate of the Ḥanbalī jurist. In his own copy of a work by Ibn Taymiyya he wrote verses of admiration for Ibn Taymiyya's unrivaled knowledge in all fields of science, and for acquiring all the conditions necessary for independent reasoning (*ijtihād*).[53] Although Ibn al-Zamlakānī joined Ibn Taymiyya's prosecutors in the Damascus trial of 705/1305, he was later summoned to Cairo to be reprimanded for his ties with Ibn Taymiyya, and eventually dismissed from his position as the administrator of the city hospital.[54] As for the reigning sultan, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, not only did he release Ibn Taymiyya from his Cairo imprisonment, he reportedly befriended Ibn Taymiyya during his sojourn in Egypt. Now, it is possible to speculate about shifts in factional politics that transformed allies into enemies, and such speculation was in fact made by the historian al-Ṣafadī, puzzled by the relationship between Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Zamlakānī.[55] But it makes much more sense to assume that al-Ḥarīrī, Ibn al-Zamlakānī, and the sultan himself were averse to Ibn Taymiyya's views on divorce rather than to any of his personal faults.

According to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, three specific accusations led to Ibn Taymiyya's arrest. First, the state authorities persecuted Ibn Taymiyya for his breach of the *ijmā'* on questions of divorce.[56] The

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they were both accused of corresponding secretly with the recently repelled Mongols, together with another future detractor of Ibn Taymiyya, Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn al-Zamlakānī. The accusations arose after the discovery of a letter written by the three jurists and directed to one of the Mongol generals. Later, however, the letter was proved to be a forgery (Murad, "Ibn Taymiya", 4; Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya*, vol. XIV, 22; *A'yān al-'Aṣr*, vol. I, 266).

[53] Ibn 'Abd al-Hādī, *al-'Uqūd*, 7–8. Ibn Rajab claims that he read this praise, in Ibn al-Zamlakānī's own handwriting, in a text dating from the 690s/1290s (*Dhayl Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, ed. Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Fiqī, vol. II, 391). See also Ibn al-Wardī, *Ta'rīkh*, vol. II, 411.

[54] On Ibn al-Zamlakānī's dismissal from this office as a result of his support (*intimā'*) for Ibn Taymiyya, see Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya*, vol. XIV, 41, 48–49; Murad, "Ibn Taymiya", 18; S. Jackson, "Ibn Taymiyya on Trial in Damascus", *Journal of Semitic Studies*, vol. XXXIX (1994), 48–49; Ibn Ḥajar, *al-Durar*, vol. IV, 193.

[55] Al-Ṣafadī quotes Ibn al-Zamlakānī's panegyric about Ibn Taymiyya, and then comments: 'I think that Kamāl al-Dīn wrote this poem when Ṣadr al-Dīn Ibn al-Wakīl [a Shāfi'ī jurist who headed Ibn Taymiyya's persecution in 705/1305] was still alive, for he had disagreements with him, and wanted to prevail over him through Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya. But God knows best.' (*A'yān al-'Aṣr*, vol. I, 143).

[56] This reference to Ibn Taymiyya's trials appears at the end of Ibn Qayyim

concern of jurists over Ibn Taymiyya's breach of the *ijmāʿ* is echoed also in the accounts of chroniclers.[57] Ibn Taymiyya's breach of the Sunni consensus takes up much of al-Subkī's refutations.[58] From a political point of view, however, a breach of *ijmāʿ* was not merely a methodological error, but also a threat to the increasing uniformity of the judicial system since al-Ẓāhir Baybars established the four chief *qāḍī*s in Cairo and Damascus, one for each school of law. *Qāḍī*s and their deputies were no longer allowed to render justice according to their own reasoning, but only according to the established and dominant (*mashhūr*) view of their school.[59] Ibn Taymiyya's *fatwā*s posed a threat to legal uniformity. Outside the centers of Damascus and Cairo, among nomads, peasants and inhabitants of small towns, *qāḍī*s were still scarce and the interpretation of the law was in the hands of local *muftī*s or shaykhs. The doctrine of *ijmāʿ*, the consensus of the community on a particular interpretation of the law, was the only way to impose some legal uniformity outside the urban centers. For this reason al-Subkī bemoans in particular the spread of Ibn Taymiyya's 'vile views' among the Bedouins, peasants and the inhabitants of the peripheral lands. The claim to *ijmāʿ* had social as well as

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al-Jawziyya's argumentation against the claim to *ijmāʿ*. After demonstrating the absence of *ijmāʿ* on divorce oaths, Ibn al-Qayyim laments: "How can anyone, who believes he is at God's mercy, declare a *muftī* to be a heretic, try to kill him and imprison him, and deceive kings, *amīr*s and commoners by claiming that an *ijmāʿ* has already been reached" (*Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn*, vol. III, 62).

[57] Ibn Rajab states that jurists, traditionists and pious men detested Ibn Taymiyya's support of weak opinions, which were already refuted by past authorities (*Dhayl*, vol. II, 394). Ibn Rajab probably refers here to the Ḥanbalī *qāḍī* Ibn Muslim, who requested Ibn Taymiyya to discontinue his *fatwā*s on divorce oaths in 718/1318. For similar remarks, see al-Ṣafadī, *Aʿyān al-ʿAṣr*, vol. I, 137. Following the chroniclers, modern scholars have also concluded that Ibn Taymiyya's alleged breach of *ijmāʿ* was partly responsible for his tribulations (Abū Zahra, *Ibn Taymiyya*, 79–82, 437–38, 451; Little, "The Detention", 326).

[58] Al-Subkī cites several scholars, including Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr (d. 463/1071) and Ibn Rushd, who had claimed that an *ijmāʿ* already existed on this question (al-Subkī, *al-Rasāʾil*, 156–57). For lists of Followers who supported al-Subkī's position, see *al-Rasāʾil*, 159–61; *Masʾalat al-Ṭalāq*, 136a–136b.

[59] In the appointment decrees for *qāḍī*s cited in al-Qalqashandī's manual for secretaries, the *qāḍī*s are almost always instructed to follow the dominant view of their school (*Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshā*, vol. XI, 95, 175–203; vol. XII, 40–58). Beginning in the seventh/thirteenth century, Shāfiʿī and Mālikī jurists agreed that *qāḍī*s must follow the leading view of their school, recognizing that a judge's freedom of interpretation severely undermines public confidence in the judicial system. (M. Fadel, "The Social Logic of *Taqlīd* and the Rise of the *Mukhtaṣar*", *Islamic Law and Society*, vol. III (1996), 213–14).

legal implications. By demonstrating that Ibn Taymiyya had breached the consensus of the jurists, al-Subkī was identifying a threat to the legal system, in which both the state and the jurists had a stake.

The problem was exacerbated because the breach of the *ijmāʿ* concerned a particularly sensitive branch of law. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya notes that Ibn Taymiyya was arrested also on account of 'the lowly and sheepish people who belittled him [viz., Ibn Taymiyya], and claimed that he prevented Muslims from divorcing their wives, and caused the number of bastards to grow. And those who have but a whiff of sense in them said that he prohibited conditional divorces altogether'.[60] Indeed, al-Subkī feared that Ibn Taymiyya's doctrines would lead laymen to disregard the laws of divorce and live in a state of sin.[61] As a practical result of the popularity enjoyed by Ibn Taymiyya's views, many husbands who had formally divorced their wives would be allowed to continue living together and having sexual relations with them—sexual relations that al-Subkī regarded adulterous. In that sense, al-Subkī refuted Ibn Taymiyya's views in order to protect the believers' children from becoming bastards. His friend, the historian and encyclopedist Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-ʿUmarī (d. 749), believed that one of al-Subkī's lasting achievements was safeguarding lineage and noble descent (*maḥfūẓ al-ansāb wa-maʾẓūz al-aḥsāb*) from the danger posed by the doctrines of Ibn Taymiyya.[62]

But there was another accusation that probably tipped the balance against Ibn Taymiyya. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya says that Ibn Taymiyya's opponents told their patrons from among the *amīr*s that 'he [viz., Ibn Taymiyya] has released those who had undertaken the oath of allegiance to the sultan from their obligations'.[63] The oath of allegiance was the most important sworn undertaking in the political sphere, and Ibn Taymiyya's doctrines posed a threat to this

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[60] *qad rafaʿa al-ṭalāq bayna al-muslimīn wa-kaththara awlād al-zinā fī al-ʿālamīn* (*Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn*, vol. IV, 115). The historian Ibn al-Wardī also thought that Ibn Taymiyya's contemporaries were simply too feeble-minded to follow his logic: "He has assisted his enemies by dealing with complicated questions with which neither the minds of our contemporaries, nor their learning, are incapable of coping, such as the expiation of divorce oaths, and [the view] that triple divorce affects only a single divorce, and that divorce during menstruation is invalid" (*Taʾrīkh*, vol. II, 411).

[61] Al-Subkī, *al-Rasāʾil*, 152.

[62] Cited by Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyya*, vol. X, 150.

[63] *hādhā ḥalla bayʿat al-sulṭān min aʿnāq al-ḥālifīn* (*Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn*, vol. IV, 115).

central symbol of the regime. If his views were to be accepted, a
violation of the oath of allegiance would require the violator only
to perform an act of expiation. Ibn al-Qayyim attempted to demon-
strate that these allegations were unfounded, and that Ibn Taymiyya
explicitly prohibited a breach of an oath of allegiance given to the
sultan. To a certain extent, Ibn al-Qayyim had it right. Ibn Taymiyya
tackled oaths of allegiance as a subsidiary issue, mainly because these
oaths included oaths on pain of divorce and on pain of manumis-
sion. And Ibn Taymiyya did rule that one should obey the sultan
as a moral obligation, whether this obedience is supported or not
by an oath. Unfortunately, however, Mamluk political authorities
were less interested in moral obligations. To Ibn Taymiyya's con-
temporaries, oaths of divorce were the principal way by which a man
could be made accountable for his sworn undertakings. Al-Subkī
hints at the political ramifications of the debate when he comments
that 'Ibn Taymiyya began his innovation with this issue [i.e., oaths
of divorce]. But his intention was to achieve, if he were to succeed,
a further goal'.[64]

IV

It is obvious, but nonetheless worth stating: only men could under-
take an oath on pain of divorce. From a legal point of view, oaths
on pain of divorce or manumission were interpreted as conditional
phrases because divorce and manumission caused changes in the sta-
tus of others. But this legal reasoning reflected social realities. A man
could affect these changes in status only towards those members of
his household who were under his authority. Divorce and manu-
mission were extreme manifestations of this authority, as well as its
symbols, precisely because they severed the ties that held a house-
hold together. The most common example of a divorce oath, appear-
ing already in the early Islamic legal literature, but also in numerous
fatāwā from the Mamluk period, is that of a husband threatening
his wife, 'If you leave the house without my permission, you are

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[64] *wa-hādhihi al-masʾala allatī ibtadaʾa Ibn Taymiyya bidʿatahu wa-qaṣada al-tawaṣṣul bihā
ilā ghayrihā in tammat lahu* (al-Subkī, *al-Rasāʾil*, 156).

divorced'.[65] In this example, the husband warns his wife against transgressing the spatial boundaries of the household, physical boundaries that serve also as a symbol of his authority. The warning is accompanied by a threat to use the extreme manifestation of this authority, the power to unilaterally sever the matrimonial ties. In the same way, a husband could threaten his wife with divorce in the event of other transgressions of his authority, like unauthorized meetings with her family and friends, pilfering his money, or refusal to have conjugal relations.[66] In the domestic sphere, divorce oaths were used as legally binding threats that owed their credibility to the husband's authority over his wife, to his mastery over his household.

Divorce oaths were borrowed into the public sphere, and employed in a variety of social contexts. However, their use in the public sphere continued to reflect, in several ways, their original use in the domestic sphere. First, because social power in early Mamluk society was located in the household over which a man held authority, the undertaking of a divorce oath was used to invoke this power. For example, when Sayf al-Dīn Karāy, the aforementioned governor of Damascus, wanted to impose severe punishments against bribery and theft, he undertook an oath on pain of divorce to execute these punishments. Instead of issuing his new policy in the form of edicts, deriving authority from his official position as governor, Karāy backed up the threats against bribery and theft with his authority as a head of a household.[67] The same logic underlined the use of divorce oaths in commercial or social contexts. When a man committed himself

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[65] Ibn Taymiyya, *Fatāwā al-Nisā'*, 253, 256–7; Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, *Fatāwā*, 443 (no. 395); al-Subkī, *Fatāwā*, 35–41, 642–44; *I'lām al-Muwaqqi'īn*, vol. III, 51. For discussions of the same question in early Islamic legal literature, see Calder, "Ḥinth".

[66] Ibn Taymiyya, *Fatāwā al-Nisā'*, 253–54, 257–58; al-Nawawī, *Fatāwā*, 140. A husband could use divorce oaths to impose upon himself obligations in the wife's interest, such as not to beat her, or to pay her maintenance on time—oaths that were equivalent to similar stipulations inserted in marriage contracts. For a divorce oath prohibiting the husband from beating his wife, see Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, *Fatāwā*, 684 (no. 1032). For an oath regarding the husband's payment of a debt to his wife, see al-Subkī, *Fatāwā*, 311.

[67] Official edicts were, of course, also used. A year later, when Karāy was no longer in office, a royal edict was sent from Cairo to Damascus, again prohibiting any form of bribery and laying down the implementation of the legal punishment in cases of murder (Laoust, ("Le hanbalisme sous les Mamlouks Bahrides (658–784/1260–1382)", *Revue d'études islamiques*, vol. XXVIII (1960), 27–29; cf. Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya*, vol. XIV, 66).

to perform a certain action in the political or public sphere, on pain
of divorce, he was attesting to his authority as head of a household,
and therefore to his ability to fulfill his commitment.

   Second, taking an oath on pain of divorce, both in the domestic
and the public spheres, was almost always construed as a threat or
an obligation. Threats and obligations were expressed through ref-
erence to the authority conferred on heads of households, just as
'positive' loyalties and alliances were expressed through the house-
hold language of intimacy and friendship.[68] When al-Ẓāhir Baybars
made a pledge on pain of divorce to the Ayyūbid prince al-Malik
al-Mughīth, he was expressing his commitment not to harm the
Ayyūbid prince. The same is true of other instances in which *amīr*s
undertook oaths on pain of divorce to maintain the safety of a rival
amīr, and for the use of divorce oaths in non-political contexts. Men
undertook oaths on pain of divorce not to marry off their daughter
to their brother's son, not to speak with their in-laws, not to eat
together with a fellow-traveler, or not to reside in a certain house.[69]
All these oaths were made with the purpose of deterring the oath-
takers from a certain action, in the same way that husbands tried
to deter their wives from leaving the house without their permission.

   Third, since the use of divorce oaths in the domestic sphere hinged
on the legal authority of husbands to divorce their wives, their use
in the public sphere also invoked a legally enforceable commitment.
When a husband threatened his wife with divorce, he was referring
to an authority enshrined in the law, and the credibility of his threat
emanated from his ability to exercise this legal privilege. In this
respect, undertaking an oath on pain of divorce differed from expres-
sions of love, which were always symbolic rather than legally enforce-
able. Betraying an alliance cemented with declarations of love and
friendship was morally reprehensible, but was not penalized by law.
Divorce oaths, on the other hand, were grounded in the husband's

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[68] This distinction between 'positive' loyalties, serving as a basis for cooperation,
and 'negative' commitments, is borrowed from Roy Mottahedeh's discussion of
loyalties in the Buyid period. However, in Mottahedeh's analysis of Buyid political
culture, 'negative' commitments were based on shared interests rooted in common
membership in an ethnic, geographic or professional group (*Loyalty and Leadership*,
40).

[69] Ibn Taymiyya, *Fatāwā al-Nisā'*, 255, 256; al-Nawawī, *Fatāwā*, 139, 140, 143,
145 (also an oath not to purchase or eat meat, and an oath not to allow someone
to use a certain shop).

legal privileges, and were therefore considered legally binding, lead-
ing to actual divorce upon violation of the oath. A failure to per-
form a commitment in the public sphere affected the domestic sphere
in a very real and direct way. Divorce meant the severing of the
matrimonial ties that constituted the cornerstone of the household,
the husband's source of social power—from Ibn Taymiyya's point
of view, too severe a punishment for merely violating an oath.

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MAMLUK ECONOMY

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THE CIRCULATION OF *DIRHAM*S IN THE BAHRI PERIOD

Warren C. Schultz

Introduction

Shortly after assuming rule in 658/1260, the sultan al-Ẓāhir Baybars had a new silver coin minted in the Mamluk domains.[1] These coins were known as *ẓāhirī dirham*s after Baybars's royal *laqab*. These *dirham*s differed from the Ayyubid-style silver coins of the first Mamluk rulers most notably in appearance. Unlike the square-in-a-circle format of most of those earlier coins, the *dirham*s of Baybars featured several horizontal lines of legend, surrounded by a circular border. The most distinctive aspect of these coins was the presence of a feline figure— likely the heraldic symbol of Baybars—in the exergue of one side of the coin.[2] This epigraphic design and format, minus the feline, would remain the norm for Mamluk silver coins for the next 150 years of the sultanate.[3] While this design was altered during the reign of al-Ẓāhir Barqūq—when coins were issued bearing the name of that sultan inscribed in a circle in the middle of the coin—even these coins did not represent any major change in Mamluk silver money. That came later in the early decades of the ninth/fifteenth century, when lighter, thinner silver coins of a higher alloy and more consistent

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[1] Paul Balog, *The Coinage of the Mamluk Sultans of Egypt & Syria* (New York: The American Numismatic Society, 1964), 89–103, henceforth *CMSES*. For corrective views of Baybars's coinage, see Michael Bates, "The Coinage of Mamluk Sultan Baybars I, Additions and Corrections," *American Numismatic Society Museum Notes* (henceforth *ANSMN*), vol. XXII (1977), 161–82; and Michael Broome, "The Silver Coins of Baybars I Without Mint Name," *ANSMN*, vol. XXIV (1979), 219–23.

[2] For the debate over the use of heraldic symbols on Mamluk coins, see Paul Balog, "New considerations on Mamluk Heraldry," *ANSMN*, vol. XXII (1977), 183–212; and J.W. Allan, "Mamluk Sultanic Heraldry and the Numismatic Evidence, A Reinterpretation," *JRAS* (1970), 99–112.

[3] After the death of Baybars, the only sultan to put a feline on precious metal coins was his son, Berke Khan; *CMSES*, types 105–111, 107–9.

weight were issued.[4] Those developments in the silver coinage of the ninth/fifteenth century lay outside the borders of this study.[5]

   The role of silver *dirham*s in the Mamluk monetary system to the end of the eighth/fourteenth century has been much debated. A widespread interpretation holds that these coins initially were the "standard" Mamluk money. The *dirham*s are thus said to have "supported" the irregular-weight Mamluk dinars (in actuality little more than ingots). The *dirham*s could then be exchanged with gold or copper coins at the varying exchange rates given in the chronicles. These exchange rates are often read as referring to actual coins of fixed weight and standards. By the end of the eighth/fourteenth century, however, silver is said to have become increasingly scarce. It therefore lost its role as the "monetary standard," being replaced by copper *fulūs*, which in turn "supported" the silver.[6]

   This view and its component parts are neither theoretically sound nor supported by the numismatic evidence. Thanks to the work of Hennequin and others, the inadequacy of such concepts as "standard coinage," "metallic standards," and "basis of system" for understanding the Mamluk or indeed other medieval monetary marketplaces has been firmly illustrated, and need not be repeated.[7] Here, based upon a meshing of the literary and numismatic evidence, I offer a

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   [4] Other than the design change, these *dirham*s of Barqūq are similar to those of the preceding sultans in their flan size, thickness, alloy, and irregular weight. There is some evidence suggesting a possible decrease in purity for these coins of Barqūq, but it is inconclusive. See Jere Bacharach and Adon Gordus, "Studies on the Fineness of Silver Coins," *JESHO*, vol. XI (1968), 298–317. And as Bacharach as pointed out, there is no other literary nor numismatic evidence to support the allegation by al-Maqrīzī that low quality "*ḥamawī*" *dirham*s caused problems in the year 781/1379. Bacharach, "Circassian Monetary Policy, Silver," *Numismatic Chronicle*, 7th series, vol. XI (1971), 267–81.
   [5] In addition to the work of Bacharach cited in the preceding note, see Boaz Shoshan, "From Silver to Copper, Monetary Changes in Fifteenth Century Egypt." *SI*, vol. LVI (1982), 97–116.
   [6] This interpretation is most explicitly stated in the works of Balog, but is also used by Hassanein Rabie, *The Financial System of Egypt. A.H. 564–741/A.D. 1169–1341.* London, 1972; and William Popper, *Egypt and Syria Under the Circassian Sultans, 1382–1468 A.D., Systematic Notes to Ibn Taghri Birdi's Chronicles of Egypt, University of California Publications in Semitic Philology*, vol. XV–XVI (1957–58). See Paul Balog, "The History of the *Dirham* in Egypt from the Fatimid Conquest until the Collapse of the Mamluk Empire," *Revue Numismatique*, vol. III (1961), 109–45.
   [7] See the discussion of these issues in Warren C. Schultz, "The Monetary History of Egypt, 643–1517," *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, vol. I, edited by Carl F. Petry (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), 319–24.

revised assessment of how Mamluk silver coins circulated in this
period. Mamluk *dirham*s were not the "standard" coinage of the sul-
tanate; they were but one currency circulating amongst others of
different metal, provenance, and fineness. Moreover, for all but the
smallest transactions they passed by weight and not by tale, their
value being determined by a money of account. The basic unit of
this money of account was also called a *dirham*, and was based on
the weight unit of that same name. Only in this latter context can
"*dirham*" be understood as a denominational value. By far its most
common meaning in the sources is generic, referring to a coin minted
in silver.

The essential elements of this argument are all found in the fol-
lowing passage, written sometime between 1302 and 1309 C.E. by
Eshtori Ha-Farhi, a Jewish traveler from Spain to Mamluk Jerusalem.
It makes several claims about Mamluk *dirham*s, claims which serve
as central reference points for an overview of how this coinage both
circulated and was valued.

> In the land of Israel we now use a coin that passes by weight; it is
> white and its name is *dirham nuqra*. It is round and its diameter is
> roughly one-half a thumb [breadth]. This coin is also current at the
> same rate in Amon and Moab, Sihon and Og, in Syria and the land
> of Egypt, and it is the Egyptian *drachmon* that Maimonides of blessed
> memory refers to. . . . Its weight never changes, it is sixteen grains of
> carob, which grain is called a *habba* or *kirat*. . . . for the *dirham* is always
> two-thirds pure silver and one-third copper.[8]

Metrology, "We now use a coin that passes by weight . . ."

The silver coinage of the first century and a half of the Mamluk
sultanate should be considered as one type of coin when it comes
to the question of how these *dirham*s circulated. As Ha-Farhi observed,
these coins passed by weight and not by count. This conclusion is
supported both by the numismatic and the literary evidence. I will
examine the numismatic data first. Mamluk silver coins of this period

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[8] Cited by Daniel Sperber, "Islamic Metrology from Jewish Sources, II," *Numismatic
Chronicle*, vol. XII (1972), 275–82. Eshtori Ha-Farhi lived 1282–1357. The passage
is excerpted from his *Caftor va-Perah*.

survive today in the thousands, the vast majority of which are unpublished. I have analyzed many of these *dirham*s by making use of frequency tables of coin weights. A frequency table plots the number of coins (of determined shared characteristics) which fall within set weight intervals, and the shape of the resulting graph can reveal much information about the coin sample plotted.[9] Although not without its limitations, the frequency table is a useful tool in revealing metrological tendencies and developments. As the frequency tables which follow illustrate, the weight of Mamluk *dirham*s varied considerably and it cannot be said that they were prepared to a specific weight standard. There can be little doubt that this variance in weight affected their use in the market place.[10]

Mamluk *dirham*s were struck with regularity in the mint cities of Cairo, Damascus, Tripoli, Ḥamāt and Aleppo.[11] While the hoard evidence (discussed below) indicates that mint of origin would seem to have had little impact on subsequent coin usage and circulation, for reasons of space, discussion is limited here to *dirham*s struck in Cairo.[12] Figure 1 plots the weights of 274 *zāhirī dirham*s minted in the Mamluk capital. Several comments are in order. The first concerns the shape of the graph. There is a prominent peak, but there is also a wide range of the weights. While the average weight of such a sample is sometimes said to represent a "weight standard" for the coinage, such a wide dispersal pattern renders such assertions meaningless. Next, the peak interval falls in the range of 2.70 to 2.79 grams. This is much less than any of the commonly encoun-

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[9] There is a wide literature on the use and the abuse of frequency tables. The basic starting point is G.F. Hill, "The Frequency Table," *Numismatic Chronicle* series 5, vol. IV (1924), 76–85. The tables here were first produced with a program prepared by David Sellwood, "A Basic Program for Histograms," *NC* (1980), 201–4, as modified by Michael Bates.

[10] The coins weighed for this study come from numerous public (chief among them the American Numismatic Society, the British Museum, the Ashmolean Museum, the Israel Museum, the Israel Antiquities Authority, and the L.A. Mayer Institute of Islamic Art) and private collections. I am indebted to the many curators and collectors who granted me access to the coins in their care.

[11] Very few silver coins have been identified from the other major mint of Alexandria. Limited numbers of Mamluk coins were also struck at certain times in the provincial cities of Lādhiqiyya, Malaṭya, and even the fortress of al-Marqab.

[12] The conclusions hold for the other cities as well; see my "Mamluk Money from Baybars to Barqūq, A Study Based on the Literary Sources and the Numismatic Evidence," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, the University of Chicago, 1995, 103–41.

tered values for the *dirham* weight unit, and it is doubtful that it could represent a standard value for that unit.[13]

What conclusions can be drawn from such a table? First of all, the table shows that a desire for precisely controlled weight was not a factor governing the minting of the coins. Second, in light of the high intrinsic value of silver, it is difficult to imagine that a silver coin that weighs less than another coin would not have been worth less than that heavier coin. These conclusions are further supported by the remaining graphs, all of which reveal the same characteristics to varying degrees. Figure 2 graphs 104 *dirham*s of al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn, Figure 3 graphs 65 *dirham*s of the period 741–784/1340–1382, all from the reigns of the descendants of al-Nasir Muḥammad.[14] Figure 4 plots 30 weights of the new design *dirham*s of al-Ẓāhir Barqūq. Finally, Figure 5 charts 715 *dirham*s from the reign of Baybars through that of Barqūq. This large sample amplifies the same characteristics of its component parts, most importantly the extremely wide dispersion of the weights. Coins weigh anywhere from less than one to more than six grams, although the majority are clumped in between those extremes.

Furthermore, in every graph, more than half of the coins lay outside the peak weight interval, shedding little light from the coins themselves on a possible value for the *dirham* weight unit. In addition, no sample exhibits a rapid drop-off in the number of specimens that weigh more than that peak range. Such a drop-off would be expected in a situation where coins circulated at a par value greater than the intrinsic value of their bullion content. That heavier coins did not disappear from circulation is another argument against the applicability of Gresham's Law to the Mamluk monetary situation.

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[13] The actual value of the *dirham* weight unit in the Mamluk era is not clear. Given their widely irregular weights, the surviving silver coins for this period give little help in this matter. However, the numerous glass weights from Mamluk Egypt, although beyond the scope of this study, when combined with other numismatic evidence, suggest a *dirham* of approximately three grams. I believe further precision is as yet not possible. See my "Mamluk Metrology and the Numismatic Evidence," *al-Masaq* 15.1 (2003), 59–75.

[14] This bundling is made necessary by a shortage of specimens sufficient for a statistically viable sample from any one reign.

Figure 1. Cairo, *Dirham*s of al-Ẓāhir Baybars (274 coins).

Figure 2. Cairo, *Dirham*s of al-Manṣur Qalāwūn (104 coins).

Figure 3. Cairo, *Dirham*s of the Descendents of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad (65 coins).

Figure 4. Cairo, *Dirham*s of al-Ẓāhir Barqūq (30 coins).

Figure 5. Cairo, Combined Mamluk *Dirham*s, Baybars to Barqūq
(715 coins).

As is apparent from these tables, Mamluk *dirham*s were not struck
with great accuracy in regard to weight standards.[15] Graphs similar
to these have been plotted before, but usually with far less data.[16]
The interpretations drawn from those tables have been varied. Some
have found the graphs "baffling."[17] Others have concluded that the
graphs do indeed indicated that the Mamluk *dirham* was indeed stuck
to a weight standard.[18] Given the wide weight distribution, these
*dirham*s must have circulated by weight. And once it became neces-

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[15] These tables confirm the suspicions raised by Michael Broome, *A Handbook of
Islamic Coins* (London, Seaby, 1985), 123–25.
[16] The exception is Saleh Khaled Sari, who plotted over 1400 silver coin weights
from the Karak Hoard. See "A Critical Analysis of a Mamluk Hoard from Karak,"
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1986.
[17] See John M. Smith, "Mongol Money and Medieval Trade, a Metrological
Investigation," *Studies in Islam*, vol. XVII (1980), 192–203.
[18] Sari, "Karak Hoard," 436–44. Sari has done monetary historians a great ser-
vice in his analysis of this hoard, but his metrological conclusions should be treated

sary to weigh coins used in transactions, it no longer was necessary for them to be prepared with any metrological precision.

But in the passage by Ha-Farhi, he went on to write that the weight of the silver coins "never changes." At first glance, this statement is difficult to reconcile with his first assertion, let alone the surviving numismatic evidence as seen in the frequency tables. Upon closer examination, however, a reconciliation is possible. The weight that "never changes" is not the weight of any actual coin, but that of an ideal silver coin, weighing exactly one *dirham*-weight unit. This unit is the basis of the money of account by which the actual coins were valued. The actual coins clearly vary tremendously in weight, but the money of account by which they are valued is fixed, and extrapolating from Ha-Farhi, is based on an ideal *dirham* weighing "sixteen grains of the carob."

Therefore, Mamluk silver coinage circulated in a fashion similar to Mamluk gold. Their primary value lay in the amount of bullion they contained. Coins passed by weight and not by tale, with their value determined by comparison to a money of account. The basic unit of this money of account for silver coins was also called the *dirham*, which has no doubt contributed to much of the confusion encountered regarding Mamluk silver. The following scenario illustrates how such a system would have operated. If a buyer contracted an obligation to purchase 30 *dirham*s worth of a commodity, he fulfilled that obligation with a payment of 30 *dirham*s worth of silver coins as determined by weight, regardless of the actual number of silver coins it took to reach that amount.[19]

Such a scenario not only fits the numismatic evidence cited above, but is also supported by the literary evidence. It is attested to in numerous written sources from the Mamluk era, ranging from the later *Geniza* material which mention the use of sealed purses of predetermined value, to anecdotal mention in the Mamluk literary sources. It is common, for example, to encounter in the chronicles the idiomatic expression *wazana lahu* ("to weigh out [in payment]")

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with caution. His graphs show the same dispersion of weights seen here. There are no sudden drop-offs after his peak values, and those peaks are not so prominent as to justify the confidence with which he announces exact values for the *dirham* weight unit and its fractions.

   [19] See, for example, al-Suyuti, *Husn al-Muhadarah*, Cairo, 1321 A.H., vol. II, 180, where gold and silver to the amount of 30,000 *dirham*s were distributed to the poor.

when commercial transactions are mentioned.[20] This expression is found in instances involving large and small amounts, ranging from the purchase of sweets to the payment of taxes.[21] In such a system, where the primary determinant of value was weight, a heavier coin was more valuable than a lighter coin, but only in proportion to its greater weight. The coins circulated side by side because there was no deceit in such a system, weight was easily determined.

Purity, "It is white . . ."

When Eshtori Ha-Farhi described the current silver coins as "white," he was referring to their silver content. Coins of high silver content stay lighter in color once they enter circulation, while low-content silver coins darken, and are thus frequently referred to as "black." Ha-Farhi returned to this matter of purity when he wrote that these *dirham*s were always two-thirds silver in content. This statement reinforces what is already known of the fineness of Mamluk *dirham*s from Baybars to Barqūq.

  Both the contemporary literary evidence and modern metallurgical analysis indicate that the *ẓāhirī dirham*s issued under Baybars contained approximately two-thirds silver, with the remainder being mainly copper.[22] In the literary sources two traditions exist, al-Maqrīzī wrote that the *ẓāhirī dirham*s were 70% silver;[23] while al-ʿUmarī gave

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[20] I am grateful to Amalia Levanoni for suggesting this line of research. A corollary is that the word *zinah* (verbal noun of the verb *wazana*) may often be translated as "value" and not "weight." See, for example, al-ʿAynī, *ʿIqd al-jumān fī taʾrikh ahl al-Zamān*, edited by Muḥammad Muḥammad Amīn, Cairo, 1987, vol. I, 201 where a candelabra is said to have a "value" of 1000 *dinar*s.

[21] See, for example, Yūsuf Abū al-Maḥāsim, Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Manhal al-ṣāfī waʾl-mustawfī baʿdā al-wāfī*, Muḥammad Muḥammad Amīn (ed.), Cairo, 1984–86, obituary no. 345, II, 277; al-Maqrīzī, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī, *Kitāb al-Mawāʿiḍ waʾl-iʿtibār fī dhikr al-khiṭaṭ waʾl-āthār*, Būlāq, 1270 (reprint), II, 393; idem, *Kitab al-Sulūk li-maʿrifat duwal al-mulūk*, Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Ziyādah and Sayyid ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ ʿĀshūr (eds.), Cairo, 1934–73, II, 420; Mūsā b. Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Yūsufī, *Nuzhat al-nāẓir fī sīrat al-Malik al-Nāṣir*, Aḥmad Ḥuṭayṭ (ed.), 1986, 313.

[22] The later round-flan silver coins of the Ayyubid were also two-thirds silver. See Balog, "The History of the Dirham," 128.

[23] Al-Maqrīzī, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī, *Shudhūr al-ʿUqūd fī Dhikr al-Nuqūd*, edited and translated by D. Eustache, "Etudes de numismatique et de metrologie musulmanes, II," *Hesperis Tamuda*, vol. X (1969), 96–189, 131.

the alloy as two-thirds silver.[24] Modern analysis has vindicated both authors, as the *dirham*s of Baybars and his successors have consistently tested in the 65% to 75% range for silver content.[25] This is true for both the Egyptian and Syrian mint issues, and irrespective of the size of the coin. While the possibility exists that this alloy dropped during the reigns of Barqūq, there is little evidence to suggest that the Mamluks, unlike their Ayyubid predecessors, minted silver coins of different alloys simultaneously. As Cahen pointed out, the issuance of coins of different alloys is not always done to deceive, but could also be done to provide for fractional money.[26] In light of the consistent 65–75% purity range of Mamluk *dirham*s in the Bahri period, and considering the metrological evidence discussed above, the Mamluks evidently met their need for smaller change by minting coins of widely variant weight.

Terminology, "Its name is dirham nuqra . . ."

Eshtori Ha-Farhi clearly stated that a Mamluk silver coin of two-thirds silver content was called a *dirham nuqra*, and this term is also encountered frequently in the Mamluk chronicles. It would seem that there is little problem in accepting that this was indeed what these coins were called. There is, however, contradictory evidence for the meaning of the term *nuqra*. This is yet another example of the familiar complaint that the terminology of money was not used consistently in the contemporary sources. As mentioned earlier, the basic term *dirham* can have different meanings depending on the context in which it is used.[27] Often the only clue as to what meaning was

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[24] Al-ʿUmarī, Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā, *Masālik al-Abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār*, A.F. Sayyid (ed.), Cairo, IFAO, 1985, 14–15.

[25] See especially Jere Bacharach, "Monetary Movements in Medieval Egypt," in *Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds*, J.F. Richards (ed.), Durham, NC, 1983, 178; and Bacharach and Gordus, "Studies on the Fineness of Silver Coins," *JESHO*, XI (1968), 298–317; and Andrew Ehrenkreutz, et al., "Contributions to the Knowledge of the Standard of Fineness of Silver Coinage Struck in Egypt and Syria During the Period of the Crusades," *JESHO*, vol. XXXI (1988), 301–3.

[26] Claude Cahen, "Monetary Circulation in Egypt at the Time of the Crusades and the Reform of al-Kamil," in *The Islamic Middle East, 700–1900*, A.L. Udovitch (ed.), Princeton, 1981, 317.

[27] Cf. George Miles, "Dirham," *EI²*, vol. II, 319–20.

intended is found in any accompanying adjectives. Some *nisba*s, such as *ẓāhirī*, have been assumed to refer to the ruler whose *laqab* appears in the coin's legend. Other modifiers, such as black, white, and *nuqra*, usually refer to the fineness of the coin. When silver coins of different alloys and hence value circulated in the market place, these terms are crucial to understanding what coin is being used in the transaction.

A discussion of this terminological problem for the money of the Mamluk Sultanate must begin with the silver coinage of the late Ayyubid period. As is clear from both the numismatic and literary evidence, it is known that coins of different silver alloy were struck by the Ayyubids and circulated throughout their domains. Three basic types of Ayyubid *dirham*s are known, coins of close to 100% silver usually referred to as *dirham nuqra; dirham*s of 50% silver usually called *dirham nāṣirī* since they were issued by al-Nāṣir Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn; and *dirham*s of one-third silver—*dirham kāmilī*—issued by al-Kāmil Muḥammad in 622/1225.[28] Exchange rates between gold and silver vary tremendously depending upon which silver coin was used in the transaction. Unfortunately, the important adjectives are not always found in the chronicles, and on occasion when they are, they are used incorrectly. In particular, this is the case with the term *kāmilī*.

This term has caused much confusion in modern analyses of Mamluk money, primarily due to the description and accounts of it found in the works of al-Maqrīzī. Writing more than 150 years after the *kāmilī* dirham was first issued, al-Maqrīzī alleged that it was both still in circulation well into the Mamluk period, and that its alloy consisted of two-thirds silver and one-third copper.[29] In the abstract, there is nothing inherently wrong with the first assertion, as it was quite common for coins to circulate well after their date of issue, as is supported by both literary and coin hoard evidence. In this case, however, it should be noted that no *kāmilī*-type *dirham*s have as yet

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[28] Andrew Ehrenkreutz, "Contributions to the Knowledge of the Fiscal Administration of Egypt in the Middle Ages. I," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. XVI (1954), 503. This typology of Ayyubid silver is confirmed by metallurgical analysis, see P. Balog, *The Coinage of the Ayyubids*, London, 1980, 36–38.

[29] Al-Maqrīzī, *Shudhūr al-ʿUqūd*, 130–31. Cf. Adel Allouche, *Mamluk Economics, A Study and Translation of al-Maqrīzī's Ighathah*, Salt Lake City, 1994, esp. 93, where Allouche rightly raises the question of what al-Maqrīzī meant when he used the term *kāmilī*.

been found in the numerous Mamluk silver hoards that have been found and studied.[30] His second assertion—that the *kāmilī dirham* was two-thirds silver—is clearly wrong however. Both Ayyubid era sources and modern chemical analyses indicate that the *kāmilī dirham* had an alloy of only one-third silver.[31] Thus when al-Maqrīzī wrote that these coins circulated in Egypt at the end of the eighth/fourteenth century, did he mean coins that he incorrectly said were two-thirds silver, or was he referring to the actual one-third silver coins issued by al-Kāmil Muḥammad? If the former is true, then it is possible that the meaning of the term *kāmilī* had changed, or even that it was then applied to a different coin type. If the latter allegation is accepted, then the contrary numismatic information must be acknowledged; not only are there no *kāmilī dirham*s in the available hoards, there are no lower alloy coins either. Of course, given that the supposed re-appearance of the *kāmilī dirham*s is mentioned only by al-Maqrīzī and not by other contemporary observers, it is possible that al-Maqrīzī was simply wrong. Until, if ever, this confusion is cleared up, conclusions about Mamluk silver based on al-Maqrīzī's passages about the *kāmilī* must be regarded cautiously.[32]

Similar difficulties are encountered with the term *nuqra*. Drawing upon the evidence in the Ayyubid-era mint manuals, many scholars have pointed out that *nuqra* in those contexts always refers to high-quality silver, approaching 100% fineness.[33] This meaning is also supported by the Geniza documents of the same period, where, as Goitein has pointed out, the word *dirham* alone refers to a low silver coins, but high silver coins are always described with a second term, usually *nuqra* or *fiḍḍa*.[34] Such usage would be expected for the Ayyubid era, since coins of different alloys were in circulation together. But the situation is somewhat different for the first 150 years of the

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[30] See pp. 236–242 below.

[31] Ehrenkreutz, "Contributions, I," 504.

[32] See Boaz Shoshan, "Exchange Rate Policies in Fifteenth-Century Egypt," *JESHO*, vol. XXIX (1986), 28–51.

[33] Ehrenkreutz, "Contributions, I," 501–4; Rabie, *Financial System*, 174; Christopher Toll, "Minting Techniques According to Arabic Literary Sources," *Oriental Suecana* vols. IXX–XX (1970–71), 138–39.

[34] S.D. Goitein, "The Exchange Rate of Gold and Silver Money in Fatimid and Ayyubid Times. A Preliminary Study of the Relevant Geniza Material," *JESHO*, vol. VIII (1965), 37. Despite the title, this article does contain several documents which date from the early Mamluk period.

Mamluk sultanate. From the *dirham*s of Baybars to those of Barqūq, the numismatic evidence indicates that only coins of two-thirds silver were struck. There is no evidence of any type to indicate that the Mamluks minted *dirham*s of a higher silver purity. Yet the term *nuqra* is still found in the sources. One possible explanation is that by the Mamluk period, a coin of two-thirds silver was considered as having a "high-enough" alloy to deserve the label.[35]

   Another possible nuance exists, however. Perhaps the term "*dirham nuqra*" refers not to the actual coins but to the money of account used to determine the value of those irregular weight coins. Eshtor Ha-Farhi did, after all, write that the weight of the *dirham nuqra* never changed. This meaning of the term *dirham nuqra* has been suggested before, and is endorsed here.[36] The question remains unanswered, however, whether this fixed-weight, money of account unit was assumed to be of pure or two-thirds silver content.

<center>*Appearance, "It is round . . ."*</center>

Eshtori Ha-Farhi mentioned that these silver coins were round and the size of a thumb. In the course of my research I found that this was not always the case. It is true that many of the thousands of Mamluk *dirham*s that have survived are circular in shape and approximately 20 millimeters in diameter. But there are many which are smaller and some that are larger. The thickness of these coins can also vary tremendously. In addition, it is evident from the appearance of these coins that the Mamluks utilized at least two methods for the preparation of blank silver flans to be struck by the coin dies. The first produced blank flans that yielded round coins after striking. The second evidently produced blank flans from cutting strips of silver. (It is clear that the cutting took place prior to striking.) The coins produced from these cut flans are immediately rec-

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[35] This would seem to be the usage in the following passage from Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-Durar*, vol. VIII, Ulrich Haarmann (ed.), Cairo, 1971, 305, which describes a large confiscation that took place in 689–1290. He wrote that 170 Egyptian *qinṭār*s of *dirham nuqra* were seized. The value of this amount can be calculated easily, at 100 *raṭl*s to the *qinṭār*, and 144 *dirham*s to the *raṭl*, the result is 2,448,000 *dirham*s' worth of silver.
   [36] Rabie, *Financial System*, 188, note 3; Goitein, "Exchange Rates," 42–43.

ognizable by their near-rectangular shape. While usually smaller in diameter than the round-flan *dirham*s, they are often thicker, but other than that, few conclusions are possible. Coins of either type are not consistently lighter or heavier, but exhibit the same wide variance in weight. They are found co-mingled in hoards. Nor was their any apparent difference in silver content. Examples have also been identified where the same dies were used on flans of both types.[37] While it is unknown why these two production methods were utilized, it is extremely unlikely that they represent any attempt at denominational differentiation.

This leads to a final repercussion of the circulation of these *dirham*s by weight. Just as these coins were not minted to a precise *dirham*-weight standard, neither were the minted to half- or quarter-*dirham* units as well. Such labels have meaning only in terms of the money of account, and not for the coins themselves, nor do these terms appear in any coin legends from the period under consideration. As the tables discussed above clearly indicate, the weight of Mamluk silver coins can vary from less than one to more than six grams. There are no clearly demarcated peaks to indicate the difference between a quarter-*dirham* and a half-*dirham*, or for that matter a third-*dirham*. The most precise label that could be applied to these coins is fractional, as their value was determined by their weight.

Therefore terms such as "half-*dirham*" should be used very care-fully in discussions of these Mamluk silver money. They should be used only when discussing amounts in terms of the money of account. And, as Figure 6 indicates, it is not accurate to use such labels for those Mamluk silver coins struck with special smaller dies.[38] These coins exist from the reigns of Baybars and his son Berke Khān.[39] Figure 6 plots the weights of 58 such coins minted in Cairo. The weights of these specimens vary from less than one gram to more than two. Despite the special smaller dies, this sample was struck

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[37] I have benefited from conversations with Stephen Heidemann on this topic.

[38] The terms may be used for the second period of Mamluk coinage, during which terms such as "half" and "quarter" were actually incorporated into the coin legend. This is yet another way in which these later dirhams differ from the coins under consideration here.

[39] These coins were struck in Cairo and Damascus, Balog, *CMSES*, 91–3, 98, 108. While many of the surviving specimens are technically "mint-missing" or "mint off flan," they can be attributed to either mint on stylistic grounds.

Figure 6. Cairo. Fractional *Dirham*s Struck with Smaller Dies
(58 coins).

with the same metrological imprecision seen in the *dirham*s struck
with larger dies. Thus they too can only be regarded as small-change
fractionals, and not possessing any denominational consistency.

Currency, "This coin is also current . . . in Amon . . ."

When Eshtor Ha-Farhi wrote that silver coin in use "in the land of
Israel" was also current at the "same rate in Amon and Moab, Sihon
and Og, in Syria and the land of Egypt," his meaning is clear despite
the use of Biblical place names. He was asserting that Mamluk *dirham*s
circulated throughout the Mamluk domains. Significantly, he made
no mention of the mint of origin of these *dirham*s, an omission that
raises the possibility that mint of origin played little role in how
Mamluk *dirham*s circulated. This possibility is further supported by
the numismatic evidence. Not only have the few modern metallur-
gical studies shown no differences in alloy between the various Mamluk

mints, the available hoard evidence also provides abundant proof that mint of origin did not affect the value or circulation of Mamluk *dirham*s of the period studied.

Table 1 provides a summary description of sixteen hoards of Mamluk *dirham*s. The table is not exhaustive but it does reveal three important observations. The first is that regardless of mint of origin, *dirham*s circulated throughout the sultanate. All but one of the hoards listed, regardless of provenance, contain *dirham*s from multiple mints. There is nothing to indicate that coins of Ḥamāt, for example, were not accepted in Damascus or Cairo. Secondly, the hoards clearly indicate that coins remained current long after their date of issuance. It is not at all uncommon to encounter the coins of a particular sultan in hoards with terminal dates decades after his reign. The objection might be made that hoards containing such widely dated coins might represent the bullion troves of jewelers and silversmiths, if it were not for the fact that such wide chronological dispersions are the norm and not the exception for Mamluk hoards. Thirdly, it is also the norm to find *dirham*s that are either partially or even completely effaced in such hoards. While such coins cannot always be linked to a sultan or a mint, their presence in the hoard is proof that they still had value, and that their anonymity did not affect their currency. (Hoard number 11 is especially noteworthy in this respect, as fully a quarter of the trove, or 545 out of 2244 coins cannot be linked to a specific sultan.) Leaving aside the wider issues of literacy of the money-using population and whether they would have been cognizant of the minute differences catalogued by modern numismatists, these effaced coins suggest that it did not matter where or when the Mamluk *dirham* originated as long as it had the acceptable two-thirds silver content. This is further evidence that the primary determinant of value for Mamluk *dirham*s was their bullion content.

Table 1. 16 Mamluk Silver Hoards

1. Bedoukian, "Some Armenian Coins Overstruck in Arabic," *Armeniaca, Melanges d'Études Armeniennes*, Venice, 1969, 138–47.

Number of coins,*	21
Description,	4 Mamluk, 17 Armenian
Terminal Date,	1374 (by the Armenian coins)
Sultans,	al-Ṣāliḥ Ismāʿīl, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad
Mints,	Ḥamāt, MM

Table 1 (*cont.*)

2. Hoard no. 231. *Coin Hoards* 4 (1978), 71.
   Number of coins,   74
   Description,   39 Ayyubid, 28 Mamluk
   Terminal Date,   658/1259
   Sultans,   al-Muʿizz Aybak, al-Manṣur ʿAlī
   Mints,   Cairo, Damascus, Aleppo

3. Hoard no. 2. Balog, "Three Hoards of Mamluk Coins," *ANSMN* 16
   (1970), 173–78.
   Number of coins,   367
   Description,   2 Ayyubid, 355 Mamluk, 10 Ilkhanid,
                                 1 Armenian
   Terminal Date,   741/1340
   Sultans,   al-Muʿizz Aybak to al-Nāṣir Muḥammad
   Mints,   Cairo, Damascus, Ḥamāt, MM

4. Hoard no. 3. Balog, "Three Hoards of Mamluk Coins," *ANSMN* 16
   (1970), 173–78.
   Number of coins,   30
   Description,   30 Mamluk
   Terminal Date,   801/1399
   Sultans,   al-Nāṣir Muḥammad to al-Ẓāhir Barqūq
   Mints,   Cairo, Damascus, Tripoli, Ḥamāt, Aleppo

5. Mitchell, "Notes on Some Mamluk *Dirham*s," *ANSMN* 16 (1970),
   179–84.
   Number of coins,   17
   Description,   17 Mamluk
   Terminal Date,   748/1347
   Sultans,   al-Ẓāhir Baybars to al-Muẓaffar Ḥajjī
   Mints,   Cairo, Damascus, Ḥamāt, Aleppo, MM

6. Miles, "A Mamluk Hoard of Ḥamāt," *ANSMN* 11 (1964), 307–9.
   Number of coins,   305
   Description,   305 Mamluk
   Terminal Date,   689/1290
   Sultans,   al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn
   Mints,   Ḥamāt

7. Rahmani and Baer, "A Fourteenth Century Hoard from Tiberius," *INJ*
   2 (1964), 47–55.
   Number of coins,   116
   Description,   90 Mamluk, 23 Venetian, 3 Armenian
   Terminal Date,   741/1340

Table 1 (*cont.*)

Sultans,	al-Manṣūr ʿAlī to al-Nāṣir Muḥammad
Mints,	Cairo, Damascus, Ḥamāt, Aleppo, MM

8. Kfar Vitkin Hoard. Porath, *Hadashot Arkheologiyot* (January, 1980).

Number of coins,	28
Description,	26 Mamluk, 2 Venetian
Terminal Date,	c. 1400 (from the Venetian coins)
Sultans,	Not identified, coins are extremely worn
Mints,	Not identified

9. Mayer, "A Hoard of Mamluk Coins," *QDAP* 3 (1933), 161–67.

Number of coins,	406
Description,	Ayyubid, Mamluk, and "effaced."
Terminal Date,	815/1412
Sultans,	al-Manṣūr ʿAlī to al-Nāṣir Faraj
Mints,	Cairo, Damascus, Ḥamāt, Aleppo, MM

10. The Broach Hoard. Codrington, "On a hoard of coins found at Broach," *JBBRAS* 15 (1882–83), 339–70.

Number of coins,	approximately 1200
Description,	approximately 1000 Mamluk, some Armenian, a few Rasulid, others
Terminal Date,	1382
Sultans,	Most are from reign of al-Ashraf Shaʿbān
Mints,	"Egyptian and Syrian"

11. The Karak Hoard. Sari, "A Critical Analysis of a Mamluk Hoard from Karak," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1986.

Number of coins,	2244
Description,	2244 Mamluk
Terminal Date,	696/1297
Sultans,	al-Muẓaffar Quṭuz to al-ʿÂdil Kitbughā, with 545 unidentifiable
Mints,	Cairo, Damascus, Ḥamāt, Alexandria

12. Hoard no. 1, unpublished. In the collection of the Forschungsstelle für islamische Numismatik, Tübingen.

Number of coins,	276
Description,	251 Mamluk, 24 Artukid, 9 Armenian, 1 Venetian
Terminal Date,	801/1399
Sultans,	al-Ẓāhir Baybars to al-Ẓāhir Barqūq
Mints,	Cairo, Damascus, Ḥamāt, Aleppo, al-Lādhiqiyya, MM

Table 1 (*cont.*)

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13. Mamluk Hoard AH 804, unpublished. Information courtesy of Stephen
    Album.
    Number of coins,   2301
    Description,   2261 Mamluk, 23 Armenian, 9 Artukid,
                                  "assorted miscellaneous"
    Terminal Date,   804/1402
    Sultans,   al-Muẓaffar Quṭuz to al-Nāṣir Faraj
    Mints,   Cairo, Damascus, Ḥamāt, Aleppo, Tripoli,
                                  Malaṭya, al-Lādhiqiya

14. Hoard, coins no. 220–366. Ploug et al., *Hama, Fouilles et Recherches
    1931–38*, vol. IV, *Les petits objets médiévaux sauf les verreries et poteries*.
    Copenhagen, 1969.
    Number of coins,   139
    Description,   122 Mamluk, 27 Venetian
    Terminal Date,   815/1412
    Sultans,   al-Nāṣir Muḥammad to al-Nāṣir Faraj
    Mints,   Ḥamāt, Aleppo, MM

15. Hoard, coins no. 477–538. Ploug et al., *Hama, Fouilles et Recherches
    1931–38*, vol. IV, *Les petits objets médiévaux sauf les verreries et poteries*.
    Copenhagen, 1969.
    Number of coins,   62, plus 84 uncatalogued and unidenti-
                                  fied Mamluk *dirham*s
    Description,   42 Mamluk, 18 Venetian, 1 Armenian,
                                  1 Timurid
    Terminal Date,   801/1399
    Sultans,   al-Ẓāhir Baybars to al-Ẓāhir Barqūq
    Mints,   Damascus, Ḥamāt, Aleppo

16. Hoard, coins no. 377–401. Ploug et al., *Hama, Fouilles et Recherches
    1931–38*, vol. IV, *Les petits objets médiévaux sauf les verreries et poteries*.
    Copenhagen, 1969.
    Number of coins,   25, plus 25 uncatalogued and unidenti-
                                  fied Mamluk *dirham*s
    Description,   23 Mamluk, 2 Armenian
    Terminal Date,   784–1382
    Sultans,   al-Ẓāhir Baybars to al-Ṣāliḥ Ḥajjī
    Mints,   Cairo, Damascus, Aleppo

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* Refers to number of silver coins only.

In such a system, therefore, it is not surprising that silver coins from neighboring states are commonly found in Mamluk hoards. I interpret their presence in these hoards not as a sign of a foreign victory in a battlefield of money, but as a recognition by the hoarder that once again, what determined the value of these coins was their bullion content. Silver was silver, after all, regardless of country of origin. That this was the case is most clearly indicated by the case of the Armenian silver coins found in half of the hoards listed above. These coins became common in the Mamluk sultanate in the first half of the eighth/fourteenth century courtesy of the large annual tributes paid by the rulers of Cilician Armenia.[40] They were frequently released into circulation right away, sometimes with Mamluk overstrikes, but often not. Their presence has often been interpreted as evidence of a silver shortage in the Mamluk domains, although that interpretation is not endorsed here.[41]

Nevertheless, the numismatic evidence proves that these coins circulated alongside Mamluk *dirham*s. Figure 7 plots the weights of 70 such Armenian silver coins, all of which either bear a Mamluk overstrike or were found in Mamluk contexts (hoards or archeological sites). The table clearly shows that these Armenian coins did not adhere to any known Mamluk metrological system. The peak weight interval of 2.10 to 2.19 grams, followed closely by the 2.20 to 2.29 range, is less than what was seen in the Mamluk tables above. Neither of these ranges is close to a possible range of value for the Mamluk *dirham* weight unit. Yet this did not affect the way these coins circulated in the marketplace for we may assume that they too circulated by weight and not by tale.

The key to this assumption is the fact that these fourteenth-century silver coins from Cilician Armenia were also two-thirds silver. This is known from contemporary Venetian sources.[42] Venetian merchants called these two-thirds silver coins *taccolino* to distinguish them from the earlier Armenian coin of higher silver content known as

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[40] Balog, *CMSES*, 146–47; Paul Z. Bedoukian, "Some Armenian Coins Overstruck in Arabic," *Armeniaca* (1969), 138–47.

[41] Balog, *CMSES*, 146–47; Cf. Eliyahu Ashtor, "Etudes sur le System monetaire des Mamluks circassiens," *Israel Oriental Studies*, vol. VI (1976), 264–87, esp. 273–74.

[42] Alan Stahl, "Italian Sources for the Coinage of Cilician Armenia," *Armenian Numismatic Journal*, vol. XV (1989), 59–66. Cf. Bacharach, "Monetary Movements," 178.

Figure 7. Armenian Trams found in Mamluk Contexts (70 coins).

the *tram*. The Armenian name for the two-thirds silver coin was apparently *takvorin*. They began to be minted around the beginning of the fourteenth century, or shortly before the massive tributes paid to the Mamluks. It is thus no wonder that they are frequently found in Mamluk contexts, for their fineness and weight-variance would have made them no different from any fractional Mamluk silver coins of that era.

The question of silver scarcity

While the passage from Eshtor Ha-Farhi does not address it, ultimately those interested in the history of Mamluk silver money must confront the topic of silver scarcity. Not only do the major numismatic collections frequently lack large numbers of Mamluk *dirham*s, but there are also passages in contemporary chronicles that refer to shortages of silver. The existence of a silver shortage is thus frequently encountered in modern discussions of Mamluk money.

But is this picture of silver scarcity completely accurate? Two objections must be raised. The first is that modern collections often do not reflect ancient reality as many scholars have stated. The choices made about what to include in a collection often tell us more about the collector than the objects collected.[43] Secondly, it must be pointed out that the Mamluk literary sources provide contradictory information on this matter. Throughout the accounts of the eighth/fourteenth century, for example, we frequently read of the huge amounts of silver money mulcted from imprisoned officials or confiscated from the estates of the deceased.[44] The amir Maḥmūd b. ʿAlī, for example, is said to have been mulcted of over one million *dirham*s shortly before his death in 799/1397.[45] Yet this event occurred after the date al-Maqrīzī asserted that silver *dirham*s had disappeared from Egypt.[46]

I believe that an accurate assessment of this matter falls between simplistic assumptions of either silver shortage or silver abundance. It must be remembered that coin scarcity *in the marketplace* can result from more that bullion shortages.[47] Silver could be used for things other than coins. But given the frequency with which personal treasuries are said to have contained large sums of *dirham*s, the greatest drain on silver from the marketplace in this period may have been thesaurization. It seems that those who held large amounts of silver chose not to advertise that fact by investing the money—and therefore risk confiscation should their status change—but rather hoarded it.[48] It is thus possible that increased hoarding contributed to the alleged scarcity of silver in the marketplace. In effect, the coins were there, but they were not all in circulation.

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[43] It is safe to assert, for example, that the nondescript appearance of Mamluk *dirham*s does not engender widespread collector appeal.

[44] In addition, in his *Les Metaux precieux et la balance des payements du proche-orient a la basse epoque*, Paris, 1971, Ashtor highlighted the large sums of money frequently given to leading amirs, 38.

[45] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm* (Popper translation), vol. XIII, 201–2. There are many such citations.

[46] Al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, vol. I, 110.

[47] Cahen, "Monetary Circulation," 20.

[48] Such hoarded coin would then be what Abraham Udovitch has called "unproductive money." See his "Bankers Without Banks, Commerce, Banking and Society in the Islamic world of the Middle Ages." *The Dawn of Modern Banking* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1979), 255–73.

Conclusion

It is worthwhile to compare this interpretation of the circulation of Bahri Mamluk silver *dirham*s to that of Paul Balog, who more than any other individual, laid the foundation for modern scholarship on Mamluk monetary history.

> It has often been said of the Mamluks that their gold and silver coinage does not belong to any weight system. Each specimen of a Mamluk gold or silver coin was supposed to have an individual, irregular, weight, and whenever two coins were of the same weight it was considered a coincidence. We now know that this is untrue . . . Though the weight of the individual silver pieces was not very accurate, it was close enough to the *dirham*, and the adhesion to the *dirham* system is clearly recognizable in the coinage. Although there are considerable deviations from the theoretical weight of the *dirham*, the figures are mostly within reasonable limits.[49]

Underlying this passage is the assumption that Mamluk *dirham*s passed by count. In light of the metrological evidence presented in part II of this paper, Balog's description of Mamluk silver must be rejected. The frequency tables clearly show that the most generous description that can be applied the weight of Mamluk *dirham*s is imprecise. In particular, his vague vocabulary cannot be defended. How close is "close enough" when talking about metrological standards and divisions? In graphs of samples where more than half of the coins weighed fall outside of intervals supposedly marking a full-*dirham*, a half-*dirham*, or a quarter-*dirham*, where are the limits between such distinctions drawn? If a coin of 1.70 grams is "close enough" to a half-*dirham*, what do you call a coin of 2.00 grams? Is it a heavy half-*dirham* or a lightweight full-*dirham*? It has been argued here that such coins are fractional *dirham*s, and that their value is determined only in comparison to the money of account. There is thus only one conclusion that fits the numismatic and literary data, Mamluk *dirham*s in the Bahri period circulated by weight and not by count.

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[49] Balog, "II. Observations on the Metrology of the Mamluk Fals," *NC* (7th ser.) vol. II (1962), 263.

THE *MUḤTASIB*S OF CAIRO UNDER THE MAMLUKS: TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF AN ISLAMIC INSTITUTION

Jonathan P. Berkey

The *ḥisba*, noted Gaudefroy-Demombynes many years ago, represented in the classical Islamic period "une notion assez vague."[1] Muslim tradition ultimately constructed an understanding of the *ḥisba* as a specifically Islamic institution, one tied to the familiar Quranic injunction to "order what is good and forbid what is evil," and the term *muḥtasib* derives from the verb *iḥtasaba*, which means "to seek God's favor by acting righteously." Of course reports attributing its origin to an act of the pious caliph ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb must be apocryphal.[2] But by the early ʿAbbasid period, at least, we have more reliable reports of individuals appointed to the office of the *muḥtasib*.[3] It must have been relatively easy to find religious inspiration for the office. The Quranic duty to "order what is good and forbid what is evil" is incumbent upon all Muslims, but it was also a duty which might, under certain circumstances, prove advantageous—that, at least, is the impression left by the complaint of a Jewish merchant from Alexandria from the mid-twelfth century. "Everyone in the city," he said, "behaves as if he were a *muḥtasib* set over us."[4] By virtue of his appointment, however, the *muḥtasib*

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[1] M. Gaudefroy-Demombynes, "Sur quelques ouvrages de ḥisba," *Journal Asiatique* 230 (1938), 449–50.

[2] For example, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā fī ṣināʿat al-inshāʾ*, in 14 vols. (Cairo, 1964), vol. V, 452.

[3] R.P. Buckley, "Introduction," in ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Naṣr al-Shayzarī, *The Book of the Islamic Market Inspector* (Oxford, 1999), 5; *idem*, "The Muḥtasib," *Arabica*, vol. XXXIX (1992), 59–117, esp. 65–7.

[4] S.D. Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza*, vol. 2: *The Community* (Berkeley, 1971), 369.

assumed a personal obligation for enforcing the *ḥisba* within the Muslim community.[5]

On the other hand, it has also been customary to search for the origins of the office in the Greek *agoranomos* or "market inspector." Although this view has recently been criticized,[6] it has a long history in Western scholarship: the Latin "*argumentum*" to the nineteenth-century edition of Ṭabari's history renders the term *muḥtasib* as *agoranomos*.[7] The approach of Emile Tyan, in his study of the administration of Islamic law, is typical of the older view in Western scholarship. Strip the office of the "porté exorbitante" with which, in view of its perceived religious foundations, doctrine invested it, and "the *ḥisba* appears as an administrative, municipal institution having, for its principal object, the supervision of markets and morals."[8] Others have been willing to associate the office of *muḥtasib* even more exclusively with the *sūq*, translating the term, for example, as "inspector of weights and measures."[9] The effect of these arguments is to bring the *muḥtasib* functionally within the sphere of the officials who supervised and regulated activities in the markets of the Hellenized Near East in Late Antiquity, whether we apply to them the term *agoranomos* or another.[10]

Nor is this manoeuvre entirely misleading. It may be, as Benjamin Foster argued, that it is "probably inaccurate" to assert that the *ḥisba* "derived" directly from the *agoranomia*, in part because it seems that there is no evidence that the Greek term *agoranomos* was in use, at least in Syria, in the centuries immediately preceding the Arab conquests.[11] But late Roman cities did nonetheless have officials who regulated affairs in the markets, even if they were known by other terms, and it is quite likely that the Muslim officer who came even-

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[5] Ibn Khaldūn, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, *The Muqaddimah*, trans. Franz Rosenthal in 3 volumes, 2nd edition (Princeton, 1980), vol. I, 462–3.

[6] Benjamin R. Foster, "Agoranomos and Muhtasib," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, vol. XIII (1970), 128–44.

[7] H.F. Amedroz, "The Ḥisba Jurisdiction in the Aḥkām Sulṭāniyya of Māwardī," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1916), 288.

[8] Émile Tyan, *Histoire de l'organisation judiciare en pays de l'Islam* (Leiden, 1960), 622.

[9] David W. Myhrman, "Introduction," in Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, *Muʿīd al-niʿam wa-mubīd al-niqam*, ed. David W. Myhrman (London, 1908), 45.

[10] See Foster, "Hisba Jurisdiction," 135 et *passim* for a discussion of the various terminology which was applied to the Greek "market inspector."

[11] Foster, "Agoranomos and Muhtasib," 145 et *passim*.

tually to be known as the *muḥtasib* exercised in some fashion the responsibilities of his pre-Islamic predecessors.[12] Moreover, there is some evidence for individuals who were appointed by the very earliest Muslim leaders to supervise the affairs of the markets, in Mecca, Medina, and elsewhere, individuals who were identified by the less ambiguous term *ṣāḥib al-sūq* (alternatively, *ʿāmil al-sūq*).[13] Moreover, as the *ḥisba* manuals and, as we shall see, the evidence of the medieval chronicles show, the focus of a *muḥtasib*'s attention did indeed lie in the activities of the *sūq*, broadly conceived as "all those things that constitute the entirety of social life," as Ibn ʿAbdūn's treatise on the *ḥisba* phrased it.[14] In Spain the *muḥtasib* lacked much of the religious orientation as a guardian of morals with which, at least theoretically, he was imbued in the central Islamic lands, and there the term *ṣāḥib al-sūq* remained the more common, perhaps because, under the Umayyads who fled to the west in the eighth century, the office retained its purely secular original character.[15] Indeed, the very nature of the *muḥtasib*'s jurisdiction, even as defined by religious scholars such as al-Ghazālī, al-Māwardī, and others, served to fill a gap left by Islamic jurisprudence, a gap which was felt most deeply in the urban markets. Ibn Taymiyya acknowledged as much when he described the *muḥtasib*'s jurisdiction as embracing "those spheres not reserved to the governors, the judges, the administrative officers [*ahl al-dīwān*]."[16] Several writers emphasized that the *muḥtasib*, *qua muḥtasib*, had no authority to exercise *ijtihād* in matters concerning the *Sharīʿa*.[17] But as they left much scope for "custom" in the law of sales, so the *fuqahāʾ* left the *muḥtasib* with a weapon far more significant in the context of the market, namely, the right to interpret custom, *ijtihād al-ʿurf*. Al-Māwardī defined the competence of the *muḥtasib*: "He may exercise independent reasoning [*ijtihād*] in matters pertaining to

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[12] Patricia Crone, *Roman, Provincial, and Islamic Law: The Origins of the Islamic Patronate* (Cambridge, 1987), 107–8.

[13] Buckely, "The Muhtasib," 59–62.

[14] ʿAbd al-Majīd Ibn ʿAbdūn, *Seville musulmane au debut du xiiᵉ siècle*, trans. E. Lévi-Provençal (Paris, 1947), 45.

[15] Tyan, *Histoire*, 621, note 1; M. Gaudefroy-Demombynes, "Un magistrat musulman: le mohtasib," *Journal des savants* (1947), 33–34; R.P. Buckley, "Introduction," 8.

[16] Ibn Taymiyya, ʿAbd al-Salām, *al-Ḥisba fī ʾl-Islām* (Cairo, 1318 A.H.), 9.

[17] Al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad, *Ihyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn*, in 5 vols. (Cairo, 1967), vol. II, 414; idem, *L'Obligation d'ordonner le bien et d'interdire le mal*, trans. Léon Bercher (Tunis, 1961), 38f.

custom, and not law, as, for example, rules of the marketplace."[18]
This judgment was not lost on those closer to the *ḥisba* as practiced
in the Mamluk state; Ibn al-Ukhuwwa's *ḥisba* manual *Maʿālim al-
qurba* reproduces al-Māwardī's comment to the letter.[19]

Despite its religious veneer, the institution as it developed acquired
more and more of what Emile Tyan described as a "praetorian
power."[20] By assigning to the *muḥtasib* the right to interpret, invali-
date or enforce custom, while denying to him *ijtihād* proper, the
fuqahāʾ had already, in a sense, removed him from the confines of
the *Sharīʿa*. In theory, this restricted a *muḥtasib* as much as it released
him. Al-Māwardī, for instance, wrote that a *muḥtasib* might prevent
the over-burdening of pack animals on his own initiative, because
this is not an interpretation of law but an "interpretation of custom
which derives from the custom of the people and their practices;"[21]
he could only prevent the over-burdening of a slave, however, if the
slave himself complained. The *muḥtasib*, too, was granted the author-
ity to inflict discretionary punishments (*taʿzīr*); the legal punishments
(*ḥudūd*), however, were outside the limits of his competence.[22] In
practice, we may question the consistency and effectiveness of these
restrictions. Certainly, as we will see below, the punishments inflicted
by a *muḥtasib* could prove very severe indeed. By the fourteenth cen-
tury, Ibn Khaldūn perceived that the *muḥtasib*'s principal objective
lay in ensuring "that people act in accord with the public interest
in the town."[23] That is a wide mandate; and in a world in which
the *muḥtasib* was responsible only to political authority, "public inter-
est" itself might have a very unstable character. It was public inter-
est which, according to Ibn Taymiyya, justified the *muḥtasib* in fixing
the prices of foodstuffs in the market, in times of dire need.[24] As we
shall see, this became one of the *muḥtasib*'s principal functions. But
the association with the vague concept of "public interest" also pushed
the *muḥtasib* further beyond the bounds of the *Sharīʿa*: a true *Ḥadīth*,

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[18] Al-Māwardī, Abū al-Ḥasan, *al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya* (Cairo, 1966), 240.
[19] Ibn al-Ukhuwwa, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad, *Maʿālim al-qurba fī aḥkām al-ḥisba*, ed.
Reuben Levy (London, 1938), 11.
[20] Tyan, *Histoire*, 648.
[21] Al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya*, 257.
[22] Ibn Taymiyya, *al-Ḥisba*, 38–9; al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya*, 240.
[23] Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddimah*, vol. I, 463.
[24] Ibn Taymiyya, *al-Ḥisba*, 15–16.

Ibn al-Ukhuwwa declared, grants the *muḥtasib* the prerogative to use threats not permitted in the law, on the basis solely of his own suspicion, if public necessity demands it.[25]

At the same time, we must acknowledge that medieval writers regularly described the post as a "religious position."[26] This is most evident in the writers' discussions of the qualities required of the *muḥtasib*,[27] which, in varying formulae, demand of him faith (*īmān*), legal competence (*taklīf*), and a sense of justice (*ʿadāla*). The high standards were retained by writers of the Mamluk period, even one with as practical a bent as al-Qalqashandī, who wrote of the ideal *muḥtasib*: "His attributes are erudition and virtue and integrity, firmness of determination, and strength of will, and rigor, and great dignity, for encouraging the ordering of the good and the forbidding of evil, and caring for the improvement of the Muslims."[28] Whether or not the *muḥtasib* was to be *mujtahid* in matters of the *Sharīʿa*, it is clear that ideally he was to have some understanding of the law,[29] so that he might know exactly what to order and what to forbid. On the other hand, such ideals did not have the same force as, say, the informal but nonetheless generally compelling system by which religio-legal scholars were trained and evaluated and which, therefore, provided some effective standards for those appointed to professorships or judge-ships. In comparison to that of a *qāḍī* or a *mudarris*, the office of the *muḥtasib* was considerably less "professionalized."

It is not my purpose here to explore in detail the *ḥisba* as it developed in the writings of the jurists; rather, my concern is to investigate the character of the office and the activities of its holders in Egypt between 1260 and 1517 C.E. Practical manuals for the *muḥtasib*, such as that of Ibn al-Ukhuwwa or the fourteenth-century Egyptian

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[25] Ibn al-Ukhuwwa, *Maʿālim al-qurba*, 219, English summary, 88.

[26] Al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya*, 258–9; Ibn *Khaldūn, Muqaddimah*, vol. I, 462; Ibn al-Ukhuwwa, *Maʿālim al-qurba*, 7, English summary, 4; Buckley, "Introduction," 2. For a survey of the medieval sources which discussed the *ḥisba*, including the practical manuals for the *muḥtasib*, see *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (2nd edition), art. "ḤISBA" (by Cl. Cahen and M. Tarbi).

[27] See, for example, al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya*, 241; al-Nuwayrī, *Nihayat al-arab fī funūn al-adab* (Cairo, 1928–), vol. VI, 291; al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyāʾ*, vol. II, 398–414, *L'Obligation*, 13–38.

[28] Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ*, vol. XI, 89; al-Maqrīzī, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī, *Kitāb al-Mawāʿiz waʾl-iʿtibār fī dhikr al-khiṭaṭ waʾl-āthār*, vol. II, 342.

[29] Ibn al-Ukhuwwa, *Maʿālim al-qurba*, 8; al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya*, 241.

writer Ibn Bassām,[30] provide a sort of bench mark for the contemporary understanding of the *muḥtasib* and his responsibilities. But this study is essentially a prosopographic one; moreover, its scope is fairly broad. Rather than investigating any one *muḥtasib* in depth, the goal is to see whether there is sufficient evidence in the chronicles and biographical dictionaries of the period to chart in broad outline the evolution of the office over the entire two and a half centuries of Mamluk rule.

My starting point is this: that the Mamluk *muḥtasib* was heir to the tensions which reflected the office's dual roots in a Quranic injunction and the custom of the market. Gaudefroy-Demombynes noted in 1947 that the *muḥtasib*'s responsibilities broke down naturally into two categories, first, matters regarding the *sūq*, its industry and commerce, and second, those with a more specifically "religious" character, such as the observance of prayer and fasting, and forbidding the sale and consumption of wine. The two charges—to encourage commerce and industry, and to enforce the Islamic moral code—gave the *muḥtasib* a somewhat schizophrenic character: "Il est probable," Gaudefroy-Demombynes wrote, "que l'agoranome ne se sent pas toujours à l'aise dans la peau du parfait mohtasib."[31] To be sure, we might object to Gaudefroy-Demombyne's characterization of the office, and insist that any distinction between commercial concerns and ethical/legal/religious ones is somewhat arbitrary, especially in the Islamic case. On the other hand, from a more general perspective, Gaudefroy-Demombynes may have had a point. Should a blurred dividing line obscure the almost palpable difference in tone and purpose between, say, enforcing the Muslim obligation to pray on the one hand, and on the other ensuring that sufficient wheat was available for purchase at a particular price? If we see the two constructs, not as absolute models of behavior, but as poles of a spectrum of activities associated at different times with the office of the *muḥtasib* because of its complex roots, can the ensuing tension between them help us to understand the evolving character of the office as it was actually practiced in the Mamluk state? Given the

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[30] Ibn Bassām, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad, *Nihāyāt al-rutba fī ṭalab al-ḥisba*, Baghdad, 1968.

[31] Gaudefroy-Demombynes, "Un magistrat musulman," 39–40; cf. Buckley "Introduction," 8–10; idem., "The Muḥtasib," 81f.

potential breadth of the *muḥtasib*'s power—guided by his own *ijtihād al-ʿurf*, or the more nebulous concept of "public interest"—it was perhaps inevitable that his ethical duties should be eclipsed by an increasing preoccupation with the marketplace. But the tension was never entirely resolved, and, combined with a growing pattern of patronage, corruption, and cooptation by the political powers, contributed to the complex development of the *ḥisba* in Mamluk Egypt.

The Ḥisba *as an institution*

By the Mamluk period, if not before,[32] the *ḥisba* had acquired a precise administrative structure. The chief *muḥtasib* had his seat in Cairo, from which he was responsible also for the district of Lower Egypt, to the exclusion of Alexandria, which had its own *muḥtasib*. Another *muḥtasib*, sitting in Fustat, was charged with the supervision of Upper Egypt, as well as his base city. (The cities of the Syrian provinces, too, had their own *muḥtasib*s).[33] Obviously the reponsibilities were too great for any one man; accordingly, each *muḥtasib* assigned agents or deputies, who assisted him in his regulatory and administrative duties.[34] Contemporary writers—for example, al-Qalqashandī, Ibn Khaldūn, and Ibn al-Ukhuwwa—agreed with their predecessors in seeing the *ḥisba* as a "religious office" (*wazīfa dīnīyya*). As al-Maqrīzī explained, the *muḥtasib*s of Cairo and Fustat would sit in the principal mosques of the two cities, al-Azhar and ʿAmr respectively, to hear complaints and administer their judgments.[35]

It is almost a commonplace to speak of a degeneration—political, social, and economic—in late Mamluk Egypt, a process linked to endemic power struggles among the *amīr*s and the resulting patterns of patronage, bribery, and extortion. Of course the notion of "decline" is psychologically seductive, and Carl Petry has now given us a far

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[32] Evidence for the Fatimid period is of course scantier; it seems, however, that under the Fatimids, the post of *muḥtasib* was periodically attached to that of the *shurṭa*. Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ*, vol. 4, 452.

[33] *Ibid.*, vol. 4, 37.

[34] Ira Lapidus, *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 277.

[35] Al-Maqrīzī, *Khitat*, vol. I, 463; see also Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Rāziq, "Le Hisba et le Muḥtatsib en Égypte au temps des Mamluks," *Annales islamologiques*, vol. XIII (1977), 121, note 2.

more nuanced understanding of the period.[36] Still, the Mamluk state
was certainly subject to extraordinary and ultimately crippling pres-
sures. The *muḥtasib* was no better insulated than any other official;
he, too, was affected by the chaos. Aḥmad Darrag has described
how, in the fifteenth century, the feuding Mamluks increasingly
secured the office for their own proteges and, ultimately, themselves,
and the destructive economic role played by these self-serving, mil-
itary-minded *muḥtasib*s.[37]

To speak simply of the degeneration of the official and his func-
tions, however, does not do justice to the gradual, but hardly sub-
tle transformation of the office, a transformation in the *muḥtasib*'s
activities, his relation to the state, and his perception in the popu-
lar mind—a transformation reflected in the unconscious witness of
the chronicles. The transformation was part of a longer-term process
of political evolution, one which picked up speed in the later Mamluk
period. Ibn Khaldūn, in the *Muqaddima*, had already noted how "in
many Muslim dynasties, such as the dynasties of the ʿUbaydid
(-Fatimids) in Egypt and the Maghrib and that of the Umayyads in
Spain, (the office of market supervisor) fell under the general juris-
diction of the judge, who could appoint anyone to the office at dis-
cretion. Then, when the position of ruler became separated from
the caliphate and when (the ruler) took general charge of all polit-
ical matters, the office of market supervisor became one of the royal
positions and a separate office."[38] Nonetheless, as we have seen, writ-
ers of the Mamluk period continued to see the *ḥisba* as a *wazīfa
dīnīyya*: the *muḥtasib* might be appointed by the Sultan, but was
thought of together with the *qāḍī al-quḍāt*, the *qāḍī al-ʿaskar*, and the
muftī dār al-ʿadl.[39] But by the time Ibn Taghrī Birdī wrote his chron-
icle in the mid-late fifteenth century, the popular conception of the
muḥtasib had changed. No longer did he list the position among
others of a specifically religious character. Rather, in his periodic

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[36] Carl F. Petry, *Protectors or Praetorians? The Last Mamluk Sultans and Egypt's Waning
as a Great Power* (Albany, 1994).
[37] Aḥmad Darrag, "al-Hisba wa-āthāruhā ʿalā al-Ḥayāt al-iqtiṣādiyya fī Miṣr al-
Mamlūkiyya," *al-Majalla al-taʾrīkhiyya al-Miṣriyya*, vol. XIV (1968), 116 et *passim*, repeated
in abbreviated form in Aḥmad Darrag, *L'Égypte sous le règne de Barsbay* (Damascus,
1961), 77f.
[38] Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddimah*, vol. I, 463.
[39] Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ*, vol. IV, 37.

lists of those holding important offices, Ibn Taghrī Birdī grouped it with political and military appointees in a carefully graded list, just above the *wālī* of Cairo, and just below the *nāẓir al-jaysh*.

The Muḥtasib*s and their careers*

From the prosopographical data on the *muḥtasib*s of Cairo in the Mamluk period available in the contemporary chronicles and biographical dictionaries,[40] patterns in the appointments to the post of *muḥtasib* of Cairo emerge which reflect the transformation in the character and functions of the office. For the purposes of clarity, the entire two and one-half centuries should be subdivided into six successive periods of unequal duration, each of which marked a stage in the development of the *muḥtasib*'s character and responsibilities.

(1) From 658/1260 until approximately the end of the seventh/ fourteenth century.[41] Particularly in the earliest period, the records are incomplete.[42] Nonetheless, some general conclusions can be drawn concerning the *muḥtasib*s of this period. In particular, the post was dominated by members of the *'ulamā'*; Cairo's *muḥtasib*s in this period included some of its best known scholars and religious functionaries, such as the Shāfi'ī jurist Ibn Bint al-A'azz. This is not to say that every *muḥtasib* was an accomplished *faqīh*, but they were almost all *'ulamā'*, often serving as *qāḍī*s of the Mālikī, Ḥanafī, and especially Shāfi'ī schools. This does not imply that *muḥtasib*s in this period were uniformly pious, incorruptible men: the first *muḥtasib* who the chronicles specifically mention paid a certain (unknown) sum for the post was a former *qāḍī* appointed in 793/1391.[43] Still, the dominant image of these men is one of scholarship and training in the law: a

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[40] A convenient starting point for research into Mamluk-era *muḥtasib*s can be found in the lists supplied by 'Abd al-Rāziq in "La ḥisba," 115–78, and *idem*, "Les muḥtasibs de Fosṭaṭ au temps des mamluks," *Annales islamologiques*, vol. 14 (1978), 127–46.

[41] Numbers 1 to 37 in 'Abd al-Rāziq's list.

[42] Cf. Linda Northrup, *From Slave to Sultan: The Career of al-Manṣūr Qalawun and the Consolidation of Mamluk Rule in Egypt and Syria (678–689 A.H./1279–1290 A.D.)* (Stuttgart, 1998), 237–8, who found little detail in the evidence of the chronicles and other sources for the period of Qalawun's reign.

[43] Al-Maqrīzī, Aḥmad b. 'Alī, *al-Sulūk li-ma'rifat duwal al-mulūk* (Cairo, 1934–72), vol. III, 748, 872.

sizeable number, for example, at one point or another taught *fiqh* in the various schools and *madrasa*s of Cairo. More importantly, the evidence suggests a consensus that the *ḥisba* was, indeed, a *wazīfa dīnīyya*, one to be filled by men with a training in the *Sharīʿa* and related disciplines.

(2) From approximately 798/1396 to 816/1413, i.e., shortly after the accession of al-Muʾayyad Shaykh.[44] The most striking feature of the *muḥtasib*s of this period is their short tenure: in these seventeen years, there were seventy-five appointments to the post (many of those appointed had held the position previously), indicating an average term of office of less than three months. More than one served for only a few days. The experience of Nūr al-Dīn al-Jīzī, who was removed from office after less than a month in 798/1396 because he was unable to pay the money for which he had been appointed,[45] suggests that the unstable character of *ḥisba* appointments may be related to the growing role of the post in the collection of revenue— or, more precisely, in the extortion of money from the *sūq*—which, as we shall see, became one of the *muḥtasib*'s principal functions. This period also witnessed a breakdown in the consensus for the appointment of *fuqahāʾ* to the *ḥisba*. Although men such as al-Maqrīzī and his rival Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī were appointed, it was not unusual to find as *muḥtasib*s men from outside the religio-legal establishment: a sugar-merchant,[46] a perfumer/druggist (an "ignoramus in the guise of a *faqīh*," said al-Maqrīzī),[47] even one who had begun his career as a bath-house attendant.[48] The chroniclers, such as al-Maqrīzī, who was himself a *muḥtasib* on several occasions and who was, presumably, aware of the higher professional and moral standards which the position might demand, disparaged such appointees as "scoundrels," "devoid of learning," and "famous for abominable deeds of stupidity, shamelessness, and evil conduct."[49] However, even a *qāḍī* appointed

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[44] Numbers 38 to 111 in ʿAbd al-Rāziq's list.

[45] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. III, 852.

[46] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 11.

[47] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 598.

[48] Ibn Ḥajar, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī, al-ʿAsqalānī, *Inbāʾ al-ghumr bi-abnāʾ al-ʿumr*, in 9 vols. (Haydarabad, 1975), vol. VI, 83; al-Sakhāwī, Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, *al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ li-ahl al-qarn al-tāsiʿ* (Cairo, 1934), vol. X, 122.

[49] For example, al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 64; Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbāʾ al-ghumr*, vol. VI, 83; al-Sakhāwī, *al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ*, vol. VI, 83; Yūsuf Abū al-Maḥāsin, Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī taʾrīkh Miṣr wa'l-Qāhira*, in 16 vols. (Cairo, 1929–72), vol. XIV, 165.

in 805/1403 and dismissed one month later was, in al-Maqrīzī's esti-
mation, "without virtue."[50]

(3) From approximately 816/1413 to 825/1422.[51] In this period,
coinciding with the relatively stable rule of al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh, we
can perceive the beginnings of a radical transformation in the office—
not *necessarily* a "decline," since the transformation may also be read
as a tentative effort to reform the office and restore some of its
authority, albeit in a different form. In the first place, the average
tenure more than doubled, to over six months. A number of promi-
nent scholars were appointed in this period, several of whom were
simultaneously chief *qāḍī*s, a development which might suggest an
effort to strengthen both the moral stature and practical authority
of the office. On the other hand, for the first time, Mamluk amirs
were themselves appointed *muḥtasib*s. By and large, however, the
chronicles comment favorably on the intelligence, training, and activ-
ities of those appointed to the *ḥisba* in this period, regardless of their
background. Ṣadr al-Dīn b. al-'Ajamī, whom we will encounter later
as one who took the religious and ethical sides of the *ḥisba* espe-
cially seriously, was appointed *muḥtasib* in 822/1419, and twice in
824/1421. The Arabic sources judge even the amirs who held the
post in this period in a more favorable light: one had a deep inter-
est in the religious sciences and is called a *faqīh*;[52] another, although
"tyrannical and unjust" (and nicknamed "*Shayṭān*"), was also "intel-
ligent, skillful, shrewd, and of good morals as well as expert in admin-
istration."[53] In one case, al-Jawharī directly implies that an individual
was appointed *muḥtasib* with a mandate to reform the office, although
he was unsuccessful in the attempt.[54] One month after his removal
from office, the Sultan felt obliged to appoint himself *muḥtasib* for a
short period. The evidence suggests that above all, this was a period
of transition. In it representatives of virtually all types held the post
at one time or another: pious scholars, efficient amirs, *qāḍī*s appointed

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[50] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1235.

[51] Numbers 112 to 130 in 'Abd al-Rāziq's list.

[52] Al-Sakhāwī, *al-Ḍaw' al-lāmi'*, vol. X, 173. Al-Sakhāwī appreciated the firmness
of Mankalī Bughā—as *muḥtasib* he was, the historian said, especially hard on women.

[53] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 428; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol.
XIV, 151; Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbā' al-ghumr*, vol. VII, 331.

[54] Al-Jawharī, 'Alī b. Dāwud, *Nuzhat al-nufūs wa'l-abdān fī tawārīkh al-zamān* (Cairo,
1970–73), vol. II, 357.

through bribery, others who saw the office chiefly as a source of personal income. The repeated appointment of men such as Ibn al-ʿAjamī suggests that the *ḥisba* was still, in the minds of some, a *waẓīfa dīnīyya*. Such an opinion must have been considerably more difficult to justify later in the century.

(4) From 825/1422 to 841/1438, covering the reign of al-Ashraf Barsbāy.[55] This was an interlude of relative stability, in which only four appointments were made. The historian and scholar Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī, a favorite of the Sultan, was appointed twice. Another *muḥtasib* was a leading Mamluk amir, Īnāl al-Shashmānī, who held the office for more than four years.[56] The last individual to hold the post during this span of time, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ḥasan b. Naṣr Allāh, from a prominent bureaucratic family, had an interesting and successful career, which blurred the usual distinctions between professional streams, and during which he held several important financial and administrative offices; his six-year tenure as *muḥtasib* was cut short only by the plague.[57]

(5) From 841/1438 until 910/1505.[58] This period, covering the bulk of the Circassian period, including the strong tenure of Qāyt Bāy, witnessed the triumph of the military establishment in securing appointments to the *ḥisba*. In terms of tenure it was a relatively stable period: the average term of office for a *muḥtasib* was over sixteen months, although there existed a wide variation among individual appointees. Religious or legal figures were eclipsed, however: few of those appointed to the post had any significant legal training. Of these, two were relatively short appointments of Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī at the beginning of the period. A third was a minor scholar who had become a companion and *Ḥadīth* reciter to Sultan Barsbāy, who appointed him at the end of his reign; when Barsbāy's son was replaced by Jaqmaq, the *muḥtasib* quickly fell out of grace with the new sultan and was dismissed.[59] Most of the others who had some

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[55] Numbers 131 to 134 in ʿAbd al-Rāziq's list.

[56] al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV. 706; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Yūsuf Abū al-Mahāsin, *al-Manhal al-ṣāfī waʾl-mustawfī baʿda al-wāfī*, vol. III, 207–8.

[57] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1063; Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbāʾ al-ghumr*, vol. XIX, 25–6. Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, XV, 218–19, gently mocked Ibn Naṣr Allāh as "the amir—then the *qāḍī*."

[58] Numbers 135 to 177 in ʿAbd al-Rāziq's list.

[59] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Yūsuf Abū al-Mahāsin, *Hawādith al-duhūr fī madā al-ayyām*

training in the *Sharīʿa* and the religious sciences, such as Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Makīnī (who was appointed *muḥtasib* for a payment of 3,000 *dīnār*s)[60] and Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr b. Muzhir,[61] principally pursued bureaucratic rather than academic or religious careers. Others who were from outside the military establishment all were appointed through the patronage of powerful Mamluks, a development which, of course, marks the subordination of the post to political interests.[62] But above all, *muḥtasib*s of this period were high-ranking amirs, or Mamluks on their way to that distinction. The contrast to the earliest period is stark; in fact, *fuqahāʾ* had lost control over the institution, and with their departure the activities of the *muḥtasib*s were—to say the least—"secularized." It must have been increasingly difficult to conceptualize the *muḥtasib* as a religious official; as we have seen, Ibn Taghrī Birdī, who wrote his chronicle in this period, did not even try.

6) From 910/1505 until the capture of Cairo by the Ottoman armies in 923/1517.[63] This final decade is distinguished from the five which preceded it only by the dominance of one man, who held the post of *muḥtasib* for all but seven months of the period. The chronicles at several points refer to Zayn al-Dīn Barakāt b. Mūsā as a "*qāḍī*," but this simply seems to reflect a certain looseness in the use of the title. Of apparently humble origins (his father was a Bedouin), he began his rise to the top as the "squire" (*rākib*) of an amir, and was appointed—and for the most part held—the *ḥisba* of Cairo by becoming and remaining a close and (more or less) loyal companion of the Sultan (although he also developed an independent base of power, which contributed to a certain tension in his relationship with the sultan).[64] His activities as *muḥtasib* will be discussed more fully below; for the present it is enough to comment that, under his direction, the post of *muḥtasib* shed any religious vestiges, and was fully incorporated as an arm of the government, not

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waʾl-shuhūr (*University of California Publications in Semitic Philology*, vol. VIII [1930]), 599; al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1089; al-Sakhāwī, *al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ*, vol. V, 126–27.

    [60] Al-Sakhāwī, *al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ*, vol. II, 99–101.
    [61] Al-Sakhāwī, *al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ*, vol. VIII, 197–98.
    [62] See, for example, al-Sakhāwī, *al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ*, vol. VI, 47–8 (ʿAlī b. Naṣr Allāh, known as ʿAlī al-Ṭawīl), and Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol. XVI, 190–91 (ʿAli b. Muḥammad b. Aqbars).
    [63] Numbers 178 to 184 in ʿAbd al-Rāziq's list.
    [64] Cf. Petry, *Protectors or Praetorians?*, 144–46.

only with responsibilities for the *sūq* at least conceivable within the original framework of the *ḥisba*, but also with functions of a strictly political, administrative nature.

The transformation in the character of the *ḥisba* may be approached from a slightly different angle: by comparing the career patterns of two *muḥtasib*s for whom we have comparatively more information. Jamāl al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-ʿAjamī, known as Abū al-Thanāʾ (d. 799/ 1397), a Ḥanafī *qāḍī*, had arrived in Cairo "in the prime of his youth, poor and penniless, and lived in the Sarghitmishiyya *madrasa* for a while in the service of the jurists." After his legal training, he became a teacher to the Mamluks in the Citadel, and received his first appointment—to the *ḥisba*—in 778/1377. His appointment as *muḥtasib*, as Ibn Taghrī Birdī explained, was the beginning of his career, as it was for other men advancing through the ranks of the *fuqahāʾ*, such as Badr al-Din al-ʿAynī. He was *muḥtasib* on three fur- ther occasions, for a total of seven years, but what is of particular interest is the wide range of positions he held. It is true that his appointments included bureaucratic and financial posts as well as religious and academic ones. While serving in the *ḥisba*, for exam- ple, he was also appointed controller of hospitals (*nāzir al-māristān*), as well as professor of *Ḥadīth* in the same *madrasa* in which he had first sought shelter. Later, he rose to become *nāʾib qāḍī al-quḍāt*, *nāzir al-awqāf*, *qāḍī al-ʿaskar*, and, finally, *nāzir al-jaysh*, *qāḍī al-quḍāt*, and head *shaykh* at the Shaykhūniyya monastery. But clearly the foun- dations of his career lay in his academic training.[65]

The career of Dūlāt Khujā (d. 841/1438), one of al-Zāhir Barqūq's mamluks, presents a striking contrast.[66] He held successively a num- ber of military and administrative posts, including that of governor of Cairo. Only at the end of his career was he appointed *muḥtasib*, and then, it seems, because, at a moment of crisis during an out- break of plague, the Sultan had need of an "energetic" man to enforce order in the *sūq*. His career is typical of later *muḥtasib*s in two respects, first and foremost because the *ḥisba* appears amidst a succession of military and political, and not religious or legal, appoint-

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[65] See al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. III, 292, 335, 357, 400, 469, 522, 582; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol. XII, 158–59; Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbāʾ al-ghumr*, vol. III, 362–4.
[66] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. 4, 1033, 1063; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol. XV, 217–18.

ments. But secondly, in contrast to the earlier *fuqahā'*, for whom the *ḥisba* was often the first step in a long career ladder, later *muḥtasib*s of a character and training similar to Dūlāt Khujā's seem to have become *muḥtasib*s at a more arbitrary stage: for some, most notably Barakāt b. Mūsā, the appointment came at the peak of personal power; for others it came earlier, or at a middle stage. The shift occurred at that time during which, as we shall see, the *muḥtasib* acquired new administrative and above all, financial functions. Appointment to the *ḥisba*, in short, depended less on one's training or "seniority" in the hierarchy of the legal establishment, than it did on a particular conjunction of personal power, energy, connections, and bribery.

Taken together, the evidence indicates, at a minimum, that the men appointed to the *ḥisba* throughout the fifteenth century were increasingly unsuited, both professionally and temperamentally, for a religious or legal post. To be sure, that a man was an *'ālim* did not guarantee his piety or attachment to those principles which a just enforcement of the *ḥisba* demanded. We have already noted, for example, that the first clear evidence of payments for the privilege of occupying the *ḥisba* appears during the tenure of certain *qāḍī*s. The amirs appointed to the office might even be, from an ethical standpoint, superior: Yashbak al-Jamālī was appointed in 873/1468 for the quality of his character, for during his eleven-year tenure he "conducted himself according to the standards of the office, and brought to it great reverence," in the opinion of Ibn Iyās.[67] On the whole, however, even if we leave room for exaggeration, the chroniclers' negative opinion of the *amīr-muḥtasib*s predominates. Since many of the chroniclers were *'ulamā'*—al-Maqrīzī himself of course having served as *muḥtasib*—there may be something of "sour grapes" in their accounts. But behind them, too, lay a genuine transformation in the character of the office. Al-Maqrīzī relates that when, in 841/1438, the Sultan sought a new appointee to the *ḥisba*, a man who was energetic and strong, he determined to confer the office on the afore-mentioned Dūlāt Khujā, for he "was not a Muslim and did not fear God."[68] Al-Maqrīzī's account indicates just how far, in the contemporary mind, the office had been transformed. The

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[67] Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i' al-zuhūr*, vol. III, 25.
[68] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1033.

amirs who became *muḥtasib*s in this period, even if they were pious and principled, were first and foremost soldiers. Ibn Iyās praised Yashbak al-Jamālī for his conduct as *muḥtasib*, but those of his activities which the chronicler records were of a political, or even military nature: personally advising the Sultan, or acting as ambassador to the Ottoman court. When, after several years in office, he was also named director of the armory (*zardkāsh*), he neglected even his market duties, so that prices rose, and bread became scarce—the worst that could be said of a *muḥtasib*. Eventually the people complained, and he was removed from office.[69] Would al-Ghazālī, or al-Māwardī, or even Ibn al-Ukhuwwa recognize these men as *muḥtasib*s?

The Muḥtasib *in action*

The vague, ethical origins of the *ḥisba* were, of course, never entirely forgotten, even in the Mamluk period. When the duties of the *muḥtasib* were discussed in a general way, the traditional obligation—"to command the good and forbid evil"—was usually cited.[70] They might even be conceptualized in the broadest sense: the *Maʿālim al-qurba*, example, cites with approval a *muḥtasib* who censured a certain sultan of Damascus for the purely ethical lapses of using silken cushions and wearing golden rings.[71] Nonetheless, in Western scholarship we frequently find the term *muḥtasib* translated as "market inspector," or "inspector of weights and measures"—phrases which suggest a more limited, or at least more precise conception of the *muḥtasib*'s duties. In the Mamluk period at least, these translations are justified, for the *muḥtasib* was increasingly associated with activities in the *sūq*. When al-Qalqashandī attempts to define the duties of the *muḥtasib* more precisely, he lists, among other things, the inspection of weights and measures, the preparation of food and drink, the supervision of prices and quack doctors (*mutaṭabbib*), and combating the fraudulent practices of astrologers (*ahl al-nujūm*), and in general, al-Qalqashandī says, he is to have jurisdiction over the *sūq*.[72]

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[69] Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. III, 94, 99, 159, 160, 165.
[70] See, for example, al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ*, vol. IV, 37, vol. V, 451.
[71] Ibn al-Ukhuwwa, *Maʿālim al-qurba*, 13; cf. al-Shayzarī, *Book of the Islamic Market Inspector*, 31.
[72] Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ*, 96–97.

Al-Maqrīzī's description of the *muḥtasib*'s activities in his *Khiṭaṭ* ties
the "market inspector" no less clearly to the *sūq*, to the inspection
of weights and measures, and to the regulation of various commer-
cial activities.[73] That connection to the marketplace accelerated the
transformation in the character of the office over the course of the
Mamluk period.

Activities of a religious or ethical nature

In the eyes of those Muslim scholars who wrote on the *ḥisba* and
(in theoretical terms) on the duties of the *muḥtasib*, those obligations
were clearly to include what we might call activities of a "religious"
or "ethical" nature. Al-Māwardī, in *al-Ahkām al-sulṭāniyya*, described
this aspect of the *ḥisba* most explicitly. When discussing the duties
which fell to the *muḥtasib* under his mandate to "order the good,"
he mentioned first the enforcement of prayer regulations.[74] Other
duties included specifically religious obligations, such as enforcing the
Ramaḍān fast, and the payment of *zakāt*, as well as issues of pub-
lic morality, such as the illicit public mixing of men and women,
public displays of drunkenness, or the use of musical instruments.[75]
Responsibilities involving market activities were also mentioned, but
only when there was a recognized basis for action in the *Sharīʿa*, for
example, preventing illicit exchanges (*al-muʿāmalāt al-munkara*), such
as contracts for usurious interest and invalid sales, provided, of course,
there was no disagreement among the *fuqahāʾ* over the transaction
in question.[76]

   In the Mamluk period, however, the chronicles and biographical
dictionaries provide little evidence that *muḥtasib*s engaged in such
activities. It is possible that their silence simply indicates that it was
commonplace for *muḥtasib*s to take seriously their supervision of

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[73] Al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, vol. I, 463–64.
[74] Al-Māwardī, *Aḥkām*, 243f.
[75] Al-Māwardī, *Aḥkām*, 247–49 and 249f. For a full treatment of the *muḥtasib*'s
religious and ethical duties as outlined in the *ḥisba* manuals, see Buckely, "The
Muhtasib," 97–107.
[76] That is, so long as the *muḥtasib* was not required to use *al-ijtihād al-sharʿi*; al-
Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām*, 253.

religious and ethical matters.[77] But the sources also lend themselves
to a subtler reading, one attuned to an evolution in the character
and function of the office. In the earliest period of Mamluk rule, in
which the post was dominated by men of legal and religious train-
ing, the chronicles do occasionally reveal the *muḥtasib* engaged in
these activities. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Burulusī, a Mālikī scholar who held
the post in the mid-eighth/fourteenth century, ordered the muezzins
to call out the evening prayer on Friday, "Peace upon you, O Apostle
of God, prayers and peace upon you, O Apostle of God."[78] Najm
al-Dīn al-Ṭanbādī, *muḥtasib* between 789/1388 and 791/1389, repeated
the order when a *shaykh*, "in whose sanctity the people believed,"
insisted that the Prophet had commanded him in a dream so to
instruct the *muḥtasib*.[79] This same al-Ṭanbādī once dispatched a num-
ber of poor legal scholars among the vendors, to teach them the
necessary Quranic verses for prayer, and charged each shopkeeper
"two coins" per day for the scholars' troubles.[80] In 779/1378, another
muḥtasib supervised the destruction of a church whose members obsti-
nately insisted on ringing its bells during the Friday prayers, "so that
one almost could not hear the *khaṭīb*'s sermon."[81]

   In later periods, evidence for activities of a strictly ethical or reli-
gious character all but disappears from the chronicles. When *muḥtasib*s
did invoke their powers to "order the good and forbid evil" in mat-
ters religious and moral, they did so in one of two circumstances.
On more than one occasion, *muḥtasib*s issued proclamations calling
for public prayers, or fasts, or enforcing orders confining women to
their homes.[82] In each case, however, the action was undertaken as
a direct response to a public crisis—a famine, for instance, or an
epidemic—not, that is, to enforce a pious act for its own sake, but
to command an exceptional one as a means of promoting public
order. More significantly, the chroniclers frequently tie the *muḥtasib*'s
activities in enforcing public morality specifically to the state of affairs
in the market, as al-Ṭanbādī once took a special interest in the

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[77] For this argument, see Buckley, "Introduction," 15.
[78] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. III, 94; Ibn Ḥajar, *al-Durar al-kāmina*, vol. IV, 81.
[79] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. III, 639.
[80] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. III, 574.
[81] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. III, 340–41.
[82] See, for example, al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 487, 1038; Ibn Taghrī Birdī,
al-Nujūm al-zāhira, vol. XIV, 78, vol. XV, 217–18, 424.

prayers of the merchants. In 876/1471–72, the *muḥtasib* proclaimed that women should not wear silk headbands, and should wear shawls that did not expose their hair; Ibn Iyās relates specifically that the *muḥtasib*'s agents went through the streets of the markets, arresting offending women, and parading them before the public with their shawls suspended from their necks.[83] A half-century earlier, a different *muḥtasib* had ordered that women abandon their custom of sitting *in the merchants' stores*, as the caravan gathered for the pilgrimage to Mecca, in order to catch a glimpse of the *maḥmal al-ḥajj*, decorated and adorned for the festive occasion.[84] We need not force the evidence in an attempt to prove that the *muḥtasib*'s role as moral guardian was strictly limited to the markets; it is enough simply to say that the *muḥtasib* was perceived as an officer whose interests, if not competence, were bounded by the *sūq*.

The exception may prove the rule. Ṣadr al-Dīn b. al-ʿAjamī, a Ḥanafī *qāḍī* first appointed *muḥtasib* in 808/1406, and then again on four separate occasions over the next sixteen years, was, in the opinion of more than one chronicler, "an outstanding, learned leader, a jurist, grammarian, versatile in many branches of science, esteemed among the Ḥanafī scholars for acumen, excellence of perception and apprehension"[85]—a cut, one could say, above the rest. His character, and the activities he undertook while *muḥtasib*, suggest that he may have owed his appointments to those tentative attempts at reform described above. The chroniclers repeatedly recount his attempts to instill pious behaviour in his Muslim charges, or to enforce restrictions against the *dhimmī*s: upbrading the Coptic Patriarch and publicly shaming the Christian secretary to the *wazīr*, in retaliation for the mistreatment of Muslims in Ethiopia;[86] ordering women not to pass through the al-Ḥākim mosque, so that it might be "made clean, may God be praised, from the shameful acts which occurred in it between men and women;"[87] shouting through the streets of Cairo the regulations against the *dhimmī*s, that they might not ride on horse

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[83] Ibn Iyās, *Badaʾiʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. III, 67.

[84] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 614.

[85] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol. XV, 167–8; cf. al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 848; Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbāʾ al-ghumr*, vol. VIII, 208; al-Sakhāwī, *al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ*, vol. II, 223–24.

[86] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 494.

[87] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 511.

or donkey within the city limits, and wear the proper clothing, and hang bells around their necks when visiting the *ḥammām*.[88]

In fact, the career of Ibn al-ʿAjamī highlights the extent of the transformation of the office in the eyes of his contemporaries. In 822/1419–20, Ibn al-ʿAjamī, as *muḥtasib*, began to investigate the "places of wickedness" (*amkān al-fasād*), and to take appropriate action: he emptied the contents of and destroyed 1,000 jars of wine, forbade women to wail in lamentation for the dead, proscribed the use of *ḥashīsh*, and clamped down on prostitution in the markets.[89] Al-Māwardī, or al-Ghazālī, would have approved, but al-Maqrīzī—who of course himself had experience as *muḥtasib*—expressed some surprise that the *muḥtasib* should do such things himself (*bi-nafsihi*), as if the event were out of the ordinary. In the career of such a pious man, we can perceive the frustration encountered by one who sought to energize the ethical dimensions of an institution which by then was dominated by a practical, secular, even mercenary approach. It was Ibn al-ʿAjamī who sought to end the custom popular among women of sitting in the merchants' shops at the beginning of the *ḥajj* festivities, "so that they see the [decorated] *maḥmal* on the following day, and mix freely with the men for a period of two days and a night."[90] The people were not prepared to accept such an order from a *muḥtasib*, however, and soon the women "returned as they had been before and neglected the order."

Ibn al-ʿAjamī himself discovered, through a bizarre event in 822/1419–20, the extent to which the office of *muḥtasib* had lost its moral authority. The *fuqahāʾ* had agreed that the *muḥtasib* was empowered, by the terms of his mandate to "order the good and forbid evil," to censure and correct *imāms*, *qāḍī*s, even rulers: al-Ghazālī had dedicated an entire chapter to the exercise of the *ḥisba* in relation to amirs or sultans, indicating that at least a verbal exhortation to the prince to amend his behavior was well within the purview of the *muḥtasib*.[91] Ibn al-ʿAjamī, perhaps naively, accepted this duty at face value. When the Sultan was taken ill, a group of *fuqahāʾ* ruled, conveniently, that he might combine two prayers, in order, pre-

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[88] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 495.
[89] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 486.
[90] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 614.
[91] Al-Māwardī, *Aḥkām*, 256–7; al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyāʾ*, 437–55.

sumably, not to tax him in his weakened condition. Such laxity, Ibn al-ʿAjamī felt, violated the principles of the Ḥanafī school to which both he and the Sultan belonged, and the *muḥtasib* reminded the ruler of his own obligations. His impertinence, however, was rewarded, for he was accused of, and punished for, having disparaged ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbbās in favor of Abū Ḥanīfa during the ensuing debate over the propriety of combining the prayers. According to the chronicler, however, the accusation was made without proof, and evidence was never offered. The circumstances strongly imply that Ibn al-ʿAjamī's true offense was to have stepped beyond the accepted bounds of his office.[92]

Prices and food supplies

In 862/1458, a group of Mamluks complained to the *nāẓir al-jaysh* about the high cost of certain garments. "He replied to them, 'This does not enter into my jurisdiction and is not one of my concerns; it is under the authority of the *muḥtasib* of Cairo.'"[93] In fact, throughout the Mamluk period, the *muḥtasib* was responsible, both practically and in the popular mind, for prices in the market and for the supply of certain items, in particular foodstuffs.

There existed some disagreement among the *fuqahāʾ* as to whether price-fixing (*tasʿīr*) was a licit activity. While the general principle that "the only price-fixer is God" was accepted, it was also recognized by some that, at least in time of famine or dire public necessity, it might be necessary to stabilize prices by official intervention in the markets.[94] In practice, one can only say that the terms of the scholarly dispute bore less and less resemblance to the practicing *muḥtasib* in Mamluk Egypt. In the chronicles, the setting of prices, particularly on foodstuffs, is the most often cited function of the *muḥtasib*, even in the early phase of Mamluk rule. In 776/1375, following an epidemic, the *muḥtasib* attempted to lower the cost of bread

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[92] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 498–50.
[93] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol. XVI, 118–19.
[94] This, for example, was the opinion of Ibn Taymiyya, *Ḥisba*, 15–16. On the role of the *muḥtasib* in the fixing of prices in Mamluk Cairo, see Boaz Shoshan, "Grain Riots and the 'Moral Economy': Cairo, 1350–1517," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, vol. X (1980), 459–78, esp. 466.

to consumers by fixing its price, and ordering millers to buy wheat only at a certain price. Wheat merchants, however, refused to sell at that level, and took their grains elsewhere; as a result, wheat became scarce, and the price of bread rose, despite the *muḥtasib*'s efforts.[95] Two decades later, another *muḥtasib* sought to resign when prices rose, but the Sultan ordered him to return to his post, and to bring down the price of wheat, to accomplish which the market inspector, acting with the *Wālī* of Cairo, summoned a group of millers and had them flogged.[96] In 821/1418, the *muḥtasib* gathered together the "chiefs of the professions," and ordered a general reduction of prices, not in response to a famine or epidemic, but corresponding to a reduction in the price of gold and silver.[97] The practice continued through the end of our period; increasingly, the fixing of prices seems to have been less a response to a particular shortage or crisis than a standing government policy.

The chronicles confirm the primacy of price-watching/fixing among the *muḥtasib*'s duties indirectly as well. Reasons for the removal of a *muḥtasib* are rarely mentioned; when they are, however, the chronicles usually indicate "high prices."[98] The public mind clearly associated the *muḥtasib* with prices in the *sūq*. Shortly after Bahā' al-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Burjī was appointed *muḥtasib* in 799/1397, prices rose steeply, an event the people regarded as an evil omen for his, and their future. In less than a month, he had been replaced.[99] The results of that mental association could be ominous for a *muḥtasib* unable to keep inflation in check. Sharaf al-Dīn al-Iskandarī, *muḥtasib* in 798/1396, was forced to hide in his house for three days, fearing the violence of the crowds unhappy with the prices which he had set for foodstuffs.[100] Mamluks, too, might be displeased with a *muḥtasib* for similar reasons. In 891/1486, a group rioted and attempted to burn down the home of Badr al-Dīn b. Muzhir, because he had set the prices of certain commodities, including meat, bread, and

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[95] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. III, 239.
[96] Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbā' al-ghumr*, vol. III, 280–81.
[97] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 437.
[98] See, for example, al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. II, 394; vol. III, 219–21; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol. XI, 394, vol. XVI, 118–19; Ibn Iyās, *Bada'i' al-zuhūr*, vol. IV, 146.
[99] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. III, 872.
[100] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. III, 860.

cheese, at levels unsuited to their taste.[101] Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī was forced to flee for his life from a crowd upset that he had negligently allowed the price of bread to rise while that of wheat was falling.[102]

Intervention in the market by the *muḥtasib* might be justifiable in times of famine, or more generally by a vision of the *ḥisba* which required a concern for the welfare of the Muslim community. When prices rose sharply in 894/1489, the Sultan was presented a petition accusing the *muḥtasib*, Kasbāy al-Sharīfī, of "not looking into the interests of the Muslims." After the Sultan had reprimanded him, and ordered him flogged, Kasbāy returned to the market, and took action against the retailers, action which, the chronicler somewhat ambiguously explained, "caused some disorder."[103] But in the increasingly desperate circumstances of the fifteenth century, the *muḥtasib* began to intervene in the market more directly, more frequently, and above all, less on behalf of the whole community than for his own benefit, and that of his patrons.

It has been convincingly suggested that the "rapacious" Mamluk policies of the fifteenth century were, at least in part, a consequence, and not an original cause, of the agricultural and industrial decline of Egypt, an attempt to extract more revenue from a shrinking economy.[104] Changes in the administration of the *ḥisba* reflect the general pattern. We caught a hint of the change in the two instances, one from the tail end of the fourteenth century, the other from the last quarter of the fifteenth, in which crowds rioted against the *muḥtasib* for *having fixed* prices—implicitly, at too high a level. More importantly, the *muḥtasib*'s activities themselves changed: their intervention became deeper, more arbitrary, less "correctional." It was not simply that the *muḥtasib*s showed a greater inclination to use flogging and other punishments to attain their ends, although this did occur: it is not difficult to believe al-Maqrīzī that Dūlāt Khujā, the *muḥtasib* appointed because "he was not a Muslim and did not fear God," increased the number and severity of the punishments he administered.[105] Increasingly throughout the final phases of the Mamluk

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[101] Ibn Iyās, *Badaʾiʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. III, 233.
[102] Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbāʾ al-ghumr*, vol. VIII, 77–8; al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 698.
[103] Ibn Iyās, *Badaʾiʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. III, 263.
[104] A.L. Udovitch, "England to Egypt, 1350–1500. Long-term Trends and long-distance Trade, Part III," in *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East*, ed. M.A. Cook (London, 1970), 115–28.
[105] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1033.

Sultanate, the *muḥtasib* would enter the market directly, forbidding the sale of foodstuffs on the open market, and allowing sales only from supplies which he provided or controlled.[106] In addition to helping supply a hungry capital with food,[107] such measures might also prove effective in *supporting* prices, or, since the grain distributed by the *muḥtasib* was often from the Sultan's personal supplies, in increasing royal revenues.

Such activities implied a deepening reliance on the military government. When civilians, such as Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī (in one of his later appointments as *muḥtasib*), or the aged Jamāl al-Dīn al-Bisāṭī (appointed 824/1421), held the post, they might rely on the services of amirs to distribute grain to the millers,[108] or simply to perform the normal *ḥisba* duties.[109] When the *muḥtasib* sold the sultan's grain, he acted, at one level, as the ruler's personal agent. All pretense of the *muḥtasib*'s independence disappeared when, at the end of the year 818/1415, the sultan himself assumed the office, and dispatched a eunuch to Upper Egypt to search for supplies of grain, and return them to the capital for distribution.[110]

Less and less as the sultanate stumbled toward its fall could the *ḥisba* be considered a *waẓīfa dīnīyya*. The *muḥtasib*'s authority possessed an increasingly arbitrary, coercive, political character—a point to which we will return. His role in the setting of prices and the supply of food became less that of a disinterested referee than a willing cog in direct state intervention in the economy—intervention for the dual purposes of feeding the capital and boosting the government's revenue (or that of a powerful patron or, for that matter, his own). These developments occurred, of course, simultaneously with the growing statistical dominance of the amirs among *ḥisba* appointees. The change in the *muḥtasib*'s functions, as well as in the character of those who held the office, should be seen as a response to a demographic and economic crisis, and as a reflection of the state's reaction to that crisis. The change in the office's character and functions could not be hidden, even from contemporaries, and so Ibn

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[106] For example, al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 334, 820.
[107] Which certainly was often the object, or, at least, one of several goals; e.g., Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. III, 238.
[108] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 343.
[109] Al-Jawharī, *Nuzhat al-nufūs*, vol. II, 507.
[110] Al-Jawharī, *Nuzhat al-nufūs*, vol. II, 358; cf. al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 337.

Taghrī Birdī, as we have seen, unconsciously reclassified the *muḥtasib* as an officer of the political and military authority.

Revenue collection

In a society which demanded a financial contribution from those who would participate—*zakāt* from believers, *jizya* from *dhimmīs*—we should not be surprised to find the *muḥtasib* collecting the taxes, as a part of his duty to "order the good." In 779/1378, the *muḥtasib* of Cairo assumed responsibility for collecting the "alms-tax," *zakat*, from, significantly, the "merchants and financiers."[111] Ibn al-Ukhuwwa listed the collection of the *jizya* among the *muḥtasib*'s responsibilities,[112] and al-Maqrīzī described the *muḥtasib* Ṣadr al-Dīn b. al-ʿAjamī accomplishing precisely that in 815/1412.[113] In general, however, the chronicles are silent on this score. Of course, the chronicles' silence may simply indicate that the practice was common. The knowledge that the one *muḥtasib* whom the chronicles actually mention collecting the *jizya* was Ibn al-ʿAjamī, whose devotion to the supposedly standard duties of the *ḥisba* caused such a stir, may arouse our suspicions, but the meager state of the evidence precludes firm conclusions.

Merchants and artisans were burdened with taxes of a more arbitrary nature, in the collection of which the *muḥtasib* also played a prominent role, especially near the end of the fifteenth century. Though they mention the new taxes frequently, the chronicles generally speak of them as an accomplished fact, rather than an innovation requiring comment, so that their development is difficult to trace. Goitein cited a Geniza document from the Mamluk period (date?) which referred to a tax levied on each store and workshop as the "*ḥisba*, or payment to the *muḥtasib*," a payment regular enough to form an important part of a contract of partnership.[114] In all likelihood, the Geniza document refers to a monthly tax (*mushāhara*), payable to the *muḥtasib* by those practising a craft or trade in the markets, which was in existence by the mid-fourteenth century—a

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[111] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. III, 564.
[112] Ibn al-Ukhuwwa, *Maʿālim al-qurba*, 45, English summary, 16.
[113] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 247.
[114] Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society*, vol. I, 270.

decree of 762/1360–61 proclaimed its abolition.[115] In the fifteenth century, however, the chronicles mention it regularly, usually by recording its (temporary) abolition.[116] Though at times the tax occasioned dissatisfaction among the people, it must also have become a regular and expected burden: Barakāt b. Mūsā, though repeatedly collecting the *mushāhara* during his long tenure as *muḥtasib*, nonetheless retained the good feeling of the populace, so much so that the population of Cairo once hung large banners of white silk, lit festive lamps, and perfumed themselves, all to celebrate his return to the post after a brief imprisonment.[117]

The repeated references to the *mushāhara* leave no doubt that its collection constituted one of the *muḥtasib*'s principal duties. Certainly contemporaries understood the connection. In the chaotic final year of Mamluk rule, a group of Mamluk recruits revolted after their pay had been discontinued; significantly, they demanded the abolition of the monthly taxes, as well as the dismissal of the *wazīr*, the *Wālī* of Cairo, but especially the *muḥtasib*, on whose firing (and, for that matter, execution) they were particularly insistent.[118]

By the fifteenth century, then, the *muḥtasib* functioned as much as a tax collector as a market inspector, let alone as the guardian of public morals which al-Ghazālī, al-Māwardī and others had envisioned. More *muḥtasib*s in the final century of Mamluk rule had previously held the position of "controller" (*nāẓir*) in the various bureaus than any other post.[119] But under the Mamluk sultanate, driven by a shrinking tax-base with no proportionate decline in expenditures, the collection of revenue became an ever more arbitrary practice. It was a process in which the *muḥtasib* participated; he became, in one scholar's estimation, "an arm of the royal extortion network."[120] When in 865/1461 the sultan demanded 100,000 *dīnār*s "out of the price of spices" for distribution to his mamluks, the *nāẓir al-khāṣṣ*, responsible for the sum, fled his post. His task was entrusted to the *muḥtasib* who, along with the new *nāẓir* and the *dawādār*, satisfied the sultan's demands—"I mean they exerted themselves to collecting the money

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[115] Lapidus, *Muslim Cities*, 99–100.
[116] For example, Ibn Iyās, *Badā'iʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. IV, 77, 304, vol. V, 17–18.
[117] Ibn Iyās, *Badā'iʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. IV, 274; cf. Petry, *Protectors*, 144–45.
[118] Ibn Iyās, *Badā'iʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. IV, 483–84.
[119] Cf. Petry, *Civilian Elite*, 224.
[120] Petry, *Civilian Elite*, 224.

from various quarters."[121] Ibn Taghrī Birdī's account does not spec-ify how exactly the funds were collected, but no doubt their meth-ods were not wholly dissimilar to those of the *muḥtasib* who, in 892/1487, on the sultan's command convened the "notable mer-chants of the markets" and simply ordered that they help defray the cost of a military expedition; after some negotiation, he squeezed from them some 12,000 *dīnār*s.[122]

   The new functions certainly detracted from the *muḥtasib*'s duties as originally conceived, but they were by no means without advan-tage for the individuals appointed to the post. The same period in which the *muḥtasib* became intimately linked to the process of rev-enue collection witnessed the transformation of the position from one dominated by the *fuqahāʾ* to one in which most appointees were mil-itary figures; the proportion of amirs acting as *muḥtasib*s was, in fact, higher than that for any other position in the legal category.[123] Indeed, the post became one which potential appointees, amirs, merchants, and unscrupulous *qāḍī*s actively sought. In 813/1410, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Shaʿbān, a *qāḍī* though "without virtue," who had previously held the appointment and (presumably) tasted its rewards, traveled as far as Damascus, where the Sultan was staying, to secure from him—al-Maqrīzī does not say how, or for how much—a decree conferring upon him the *ḥisba* of Cairo.[124]

   The reason for the job's popularity was simple: the opportunities for remuneration which the new functions offered.[125] Ibn al-Ukhuwwa had indicated that the *muḥtasib* was to receive a regular payment—a salary—from the public treasury;[126] al-Maqrīzī, who served as *muḥtasib* himself, suggested that his revenues were approximately 30 *dīnār*s per month.[127] By the fifteenth century, the *muḥtasib* was able to capitalize on his tax-collecting duties to supplement whatever emol-ument he might receive from the state. Exactly how much wealth a *muḥtasib* might appropriate we cannot say, but the figures must have been considerable: if those who held the post sought it one-half as

[121] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol. XVI, 260.
[122] Ibn Iyās, *Badaʾiʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. III, 242.
[123] Petry, *Civilian Elite*, 224.
[124] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 160.
[125] Cf. Darrag, "*al-Ḥisba wa-āthāruhā*," 127.
[126] Ibn al-Ukhuwwa, *Maʿālim al-qurba*, 11.
[127] Al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, vol. I, 464.

eagerly as did Ibn Shaʿbān, then the rapid turnover would indicate an intense competition. The chronicles furnish more direct evidence that the post was a profitable one. Ibn Shaʿbān himself returned to the *ḥisba* in 815/1412 for a payment of 500 *dīnār*s, plus 100 *dīnār*s for every month which he held it,[128] a practice which seems to have become more frequent in the later Mamluk period. Other amounts paid for the *ḥisba* varied, but on the whole increased over time: 5,000 *dirham*s, 150,000 *dirham*s, 1,000 *dīnār*s, then 3,000, finally 15,000 *dīnār*s.[129] Presumably the post was worth more than those figures— or at least, such was reasonably hoped—to justify the gamble.

The methods by which a *muḥtasib* might recoup his investment varied according to his functions. As a price-setter, the *muḥtasib* might hope to benefit from the manipulation of prices and supplies, through any one of those devices by which unscrupulous monopolies are still recognized. The *muḥtasib* Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī once reported that an amir had asked him to sell his supplies of wheat at an inflated price; when he refused, the amir became enraged, and al-ʿAynī was forced to resign his commission. Only al-Maqrīzī, al-ʿAynī reported, was willing to accept the post under these conditions.[130] No doubt al-ʿAynī's report is distorted by his rivalry with al-Maqrīzī; even so, it indicates how a less scrupulous *muḥtasib* might earn his reward. Or he might falsify the accounts of projects for which he had assumed responsibility, as did one who had been charged with supervising the construction of two towers over a gate beneath the Citadel.[131] But the most important source of income for a *muḥtasib* lay in his share of—or surcharge upon—the *mushāhara* it was his duty to collect from the merchants and craftsmen in the market. The *muḥtasib* appointed in 823/1420 recovered his initial payment by "taxing the vendors and the like."[132] Ibn Shaʿbān, too, probably recovered his investment through the monthly taxes collected in the market. Such sums could be substantial indeed. In 922/1516, Ibn Iyās reports that these taxes provided 76,000 *dīnār*s annually to the royal treasury, *in*

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[128] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 253.
[129] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. III, 566, 872, vol. IV, 534; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol. XVI, 112; Ibn Iyas, *Badāʾiʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. V, 27–28.
[130] Darrag, "al-Ḥisba wa-āthāruhā," 117–18.
[131] Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbāʾ al-ghumr*, vol. VII, 275.
[132] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 534.

addition to whatever the *muḥtasib* retained for himself or which he distributed to other officials, perhaps his deputies.[133]

Political and administrative duties

The tax-collecting duties which the *muḥtasib* assumed in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries represent only the most prominent instance of a broader phenomenon: his progressive transformation into a political and administrative officer of the state, and an agent of royal coercion. Appointed by the sultan, the *muḥtasib* came to perform, at the personal behest of the ruler, a variety of tasks which drove him well beyond the marketplace, and light years from the ethical duties which may once have been his domain. Once the sultans and *muḥtasib*s were routinely drawn, broadly speaking, from the same military elite, it became natural to find the *muḥtasib* acting (when circumstance and personal relationships permitted) as a personal advisor to the ruler on political matters. On several occasions, the *muḥtasib* served as ambassador to a foreign court.[134] At other times, the *muḥtasib* served the sultan as an officer of arrest.[135]

The administrative and, especially, coercive role of the *muḥtasib* blossomed in al-Zaynī Barakāt b. Mūsā, a man of humble, Bedouin origins who held the *ḥisba* for all but seven months during the final twelve years of the Mamluk sultanate. While in office, Ibn Mūsā amassed an unprecedented amount of power; indeed, so close was he to the sultan that when the ruler left Cairo to advance against the Ottomans, he placed Ibn Mūsā "in charge of all his personal interests."[136] The nature of Ibn Mūsā's responsibilities, and the depth of his power, not to mention his extended term of office, might suggest that he was an aberration, to be considered in a category entirely separate from the *ḥisba*. In fact, however, Ibn Mūsā merely developed and exercised more fully the power, and benefitted from the

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[133] Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. V, 17–18.

[134] For example, as ambassador to the Ottoman sultan Bayezid; Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. III, 94.

[135] For example, Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. III, 466; Ibn Taghrī Biridī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol. XVI, 266.

[136] Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. V, 46.

relationship to political authority, which his predecessors had acquired. What is striking about that authority is its thoroughly political character; more, its personal attachment to the sultan. Ibn Mūsā, like his immediate predecessors, served the ruler in administrative tasks utterly unconnected to his duty (still?) to "order the good and forbid evil," and unconnected to the market and its practices. On a number of occasions, he served as the sultan's paymaster in distributing funds to the troops, or—a less pleasant task—informing the mamluks of the cancellation of their expected bonus.[137] Twice following the pillaging of the *sūq* by packs of marauding mamluks or ruffians from the countryside, the *muḥtasib* took inventory of goods damaged or stolen as a preliminary toward compensation—not surprising, perhaps, for a "market inspector," but on both occasions specifically at the order of the sultan.[138] For the sultan's benefit, he combined—to put it gently—the power to arrest which his predecessors had acquired, with their role as revenue-collector, which perhaps they had sought. More bluntly, he acted as a royal "inquisitor," not in matters religious, but in matters financial; more specifically, he imprisoned, flogged, tortured, even unto death, those whom the sultan had fined but who refused to pay, or those who, simply by means of their wealth, tempted extortion.[139]

Ibn Mūsā was *muḥtasib* in name only. Could al-Māwardī or al-Ghazālī even have recognized the office? Would not even Ibn al-Ukhuwwa have been shocked?

Conclusions

In the early period of Mamluk rule, the *muḥtasib* was strong enough institutionally—aided, we are tempted to add, by the moral integrity and authority of those who held the post—to proclaim and enforce the principles of his office in the face of selfish opposition from amirs. In 737/1336, during a period of food shortages and high prices, the *muḥtasib*, a religious scholar beloved by the people of Cairo for the quality of his legal rulings, was actively involved in supplying grain

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[137] Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i' al-zuhūr*, vol. IV, 291, 430.
[138] Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i' al-zuhūr*, vol. IV, 86, 178–9.
[139] Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i' al-zuhūr*, vol. IV, 114–15, 131, 190, 393, 445.

to millers, and in fixing its price. When word reached him that several amirs were selling their own grain at higher prices, he arranged to have them brought before the sultan, humiliated and beaten. "After this," al-Maqrīzī commented, "not a single amir dared to open his granary without the *muḥtasib*'s order."[140] It is not hard to imagine, on the basis of the prosopographical data examined at the outset of this study, that those who filled the post in the latter half of the Mamluk sultanate possessed little inclination to maintain the principles of their predecessors. Indeed, the table had turned. When a more conscientious *muḥtasib* found himself in office, he might be unable to maintain his standards in the face of current expectations: that, at least, was the experience of one *muḥtasib* who resigned in 798/1395, when more powerful Mamluk officials pressured him to compel millers to purchase wheat at inflated prices.[141] From one perspective, there was this simple fact: that standards (as we are fond of saying) had declined.

More important than any decline of standards, however, the *ḥisba* experienced a transformation in its functions and in the nature and source of its authority, a process outlined in the pages above. The traditional notion of an official appointed to enforce public morality, to "order the good and forbid evil" within an Islamic ethical framework, bore less and less resemblance to the Mamluk *muḥtasib*s. Market inspector, price-fixer, supplier of food, tax-collector, political agent and royal inquisitor—the *muḥtasib* passed through a variety of guises, but one tendency predominated: the replacement of ethics by politics as the source of the *muḥtasib*'s authority.

The prosopographical evidence adds another perspective to the transformation of the office. By the end of the sultanate, legally-trained men were all but excluded from (or uninterested in) the post: during the sixty years before the Ottoman conquest, only one *muḥtasib* can certainly be said to have been drawn from the ranks of the 'ulamā'. Carl Petry suggested that the absence of religiously-trained men from the *ḥisba* in the fifteenth century indicates that they no longer sought the office,[142] a reaction, no doubt, not simply to the

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[140] Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. II, 395; cf. Ibn Ḥajar, *al-Durar al-kāmina*, vol. V, 257–58.
[141] Lapidus, *Muslim Cities*, 53.
[142] Petry, *Civilian Elite*, 224.

decline of standards, but to the transformation of the office to one for which a *Sharīʿa*-minded individual would have no interest, let alone skill.

That contemporaries perceived the transformation of the office—the more important half of the phenomenon—suggests a final question: why was the *ḥisba* in particular subject to this vicissitude? Three causes, above all, contributed to the office's vulnerability. First, tradition did not require that the *muḥtasib* be trained in the law, or any other religious science. While the loose but widely-appreciated system of education and the transmission of religious knowledge could, in theory, at least restrict the sultan's choices in the appointment of the chief *qāḍī*s and other prominent religious officials, no institutional safeguards for *ḥisba* appointments existed. Second, a distinct lack of "professionalism" characterized *ḥisba* appointments. It is striking, for instance, how rarely the sources provide evidence that a *muḥtasib* had previous experience as a *nāʾib al-ḥisba*. *Muḥtasib*s transferred to the office from other posts; in particular, the high proportion with previous experience as the "controller" (*nāzir*) of various bureaus must have accelerated the *ḥisba*'s transformation into an office of revenue collection. Most importantly, in the chaotic atmosphere of late Mamluk Egypt, characterized by economic crisis and extortion by virtually all levels of the ruling military elite, the vagueness of its definition doomed the *ḥisba* to manipulation and distortion—to its transformation. Guided not by legal or religious principles but by those of "custom" and "public interest," even an honest *muḥtasib* "ordering the good and forbidding evil" in the *sūq* wielded a weapon of enormous power. But under the prevailing circumstances of the last century of Mamluk rule, the association with the marketplace—with, that is, a source of exploitable wealth—proved fatal. Whether manipulating the price and supply of food, or collecting the *mushāhara*, or simply extorting money from merchants and artisans, the *muḥtasib* sat on a potential gold mine.

THE ESTATE OF AL-KHUWAND FĀṬIMA AL-KHAṢṢBAKIYYA: ROYAL SPOUSE, AUTONOMOUS INVESTOR

Carl F. Petry

The prominence of women as supervisors of charitable trusts (*awqāf*) during the medieval and Ottoman periods is widely known.[1] Islamic Law allows both men and women to administer property autonomously, and the narrative chronicles that constitute the primary foundation of our anecdotal knowledge about pre-modern Islamic History refer frequently to women in this context. But these narrative sources rarely provide statistical data about the estates of individuals they describe. Their tabulated information is confined for the most part to rates of exchange, commodity prices and, in Egypt, crests and troughs of the annual Nile flood. Archival sources, which are quintessentially statistical, have not survived in their original form throughout most of the medieval Islamic period. After the ninth hijrī/fifteenth common era century, they become progressively more replete as the Ottomans absorbed most of the central Islamic lands into their empire. Prior to the Ottoman conquest of Egypt and Syria in 922/1517, surviving archival material is limited for the most part to charitable trust documents (*ḥujaj awqāf*) and related deeds. Scholars had made sporadic use of this material for decades before Muḥammad Amin published his path-breaking *Al-Awqāf wa'l-Ḥayāt al-Ijtimāʿiyya fī Miṣr* (Cairo, 1981). As is common knowledge to participants at this

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[1] See Ronald C. Jennings, "Women in Early Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Judicial Records—The Sharia Court of Anatolian Kayseri," *JESHO*, vol. XVIII/1 (January, 1975), 53–114; C.F. Petry, "A Paradox of Patronage during the Later mamluk Period," *The Muslim World*, vol. LXXIII/3–4 (July-October 1983), 195–203; C.F. Petry, "Class Solidarity vs. Gender Gain: Women as Custodians of Property in Later Medieval Egypt," in *Women in Middle Eastern History; Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender*, ed. by Nikki Keddie and Beth Baron (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 122–42.

conference, Amin went on to compile a catalogue listing trust-related documents in Egypt, issued in the same year.[2]

I became interested in these documents when I worked through Amin's monograph and began examining the deeds associated with the last significant rulers of the independent mamluk period: al-Ashraf Qāytbāy (872–901/1468–96) and Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī (906–22/1510–16). Even before Amin's catalogue was printed, I had already realized that the documents issued, or amended, by these two sultans accounted for an astonishing thirty-three percent of all deeds surviving from the mamluk era. But my understanding of Fāṭima al-Khaṣṣbakiyya's role as a *wāqifa* developed after I had the opportunity to consult Amin's catalogue. I then ascertained that the thirty-eight to forty documents she commissioned, depending on how their transactions are counted, stood out as the most thoroughly recorded legacy of a female estate builder during the Mamluk Sultanate.

Fāṭima al-Khaṣṣbakiyya descended, according to my reconstruction of her genealogy, from Sayf al-Dīn Khaṣṣbak al-Nāṣirī (d. 734/1433), a prominent officer in the service of Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad (third reign 709–41/1309–40). Ibn Taghrī-Birdī states that he was the "progenitor" (*wālid*) of Ghars al-Dīn Khalīl ibn Shāhīn al-Shaykhī (b. 813/1410), who would be Fāṭima's paternal grandfather.[3] Khalīl's biography in al-Sakhāwī's *al-Ḍaw' al-Lāmiʿ*[4] makes no reference to this ancestral tie. Nor does Fāṭima's father, ʿAlī, appear in the work. Since Fāṭima died in 909/1504, al-Sakhāwī did not include her in his twelfth volume that lists women. Nor did he mention her in his detailed accolade to her spouse, Qāytbāy. The particulars of Fāṭima's life therefore remain unknown. The lengthiest commentary about her appears in Ibn Iyās's *Badā'iʿ al-Duhūr* and merits quoting:[5]

> On Wednesday the twenty-second (of Dhū'l-Ḥijja 909/6 June 1504), expired al-Khawand Fāṭima ibnat al-ʿAlā'ī ʿAlī ibn Khaṣṣbak. She was the wife of al-Malik al-Ashraf Qāytbāy. After him she married al-ʿĀdil

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[2] Muḥammad M. Amin, *Catalogue des documents d'archives du Caire de 239/853 à 922/1516* (Cairo: Institut Français d'Archéologie orientale), 1981.

[3] Ibn Taghrī-Birdī, *al-Manhal al-Ṣāfī wa'l-Mustawfī baʿd al-Wāfī*, edited by M.M. Amin (Cairo, 1988), 5:197, no. 975 (for Khaṣṣbak); 258, no. 1003 (for Khalīl).

[4] Khalīl's biography in al-Sakhāwī, *al-Ḍaw' al-Lāmiʿ fī Aʿyān al-Qarn al-Tāsiʿ*, edited by Ḥusām al-Qudsī (Cairo, 1934), vol. III, 195, no. 748.

[5] Ibn Iyās, *Badā'iʿ al-Ẓuhūr fī Waqā'iʿ al-Duhūr*, edited by M. Mustafa, H. Roemer, H. Ritter (Cairo and Wiesbaden, 1960–75), vol. IV, 64, line 6.

Ṭūmānbāy and it was rumored that she had married al-Ashraf Qānṣūh Khamsmi'a morganatically (*fī'l-khafīfa*). She was one of the most eminent princesses, possessing a vast fortune. She left behind an immense patrimony (*taraka ḥāfila*). She was mistress of the royal court (*qāʿa*) for some thirty years, with her own apartment in the Citadel. She was honored and respected as was no other princess. She died having exceeded the age of sixty. Upon her death she was carried on a dais embossed in gold. Before her walked the four *qāḍī*s and the senior amirs (*muqaddamūn*). The Sultan (Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī) descended from the Citadel to preside over her funeral prayers at the Mu'minī (corpse washing) font. The masses surged forward disrupting the penitence (*kaffāra*) of the official mourners when her cortege entered the Cross Street (*Ṣalība*). Her funeral was (thus) festive.

I add: At the end of her life, she encountered difficulties and adversity. The Julbān recruits had invaded her residence next to the Sunqur Bridge. They demanded a bonus (*nafaqa*) from her. They insulted her and intended to (continue) harassing her (further). The instigators of this (affront) were a cohort of mamluks belonging to the faction of Aqbirdī, the Executive Adjutant (*Dawādār*). When al-Malik al-Nāṣir (Muḥammad, Qāytbāy's son by a concubine and immediate successor) learned of this, he placed her under his protection. He proclaimed in Cairo that all mamluks were forbidden to approach the residence of al-Ashraf Qāytbāy's widow nor even to stand outside her gate. Any violator of this decree was to be hanged with no exceptions. These abuses then ceased. Their cause: These mamluks had surmised that the Khawand had married Qānṣūh Khamsmi'a in secret. After his assassination, they intimidated (*taḥarrasha*) her and demanded a bonus from her. She had remained in hiding away from her residence for some time after that. Subsequently, al-Ẓāhir Qānṣūh mulcted her, extracting a large sum of money from her and placing her in the custody of the *khuddām* eunuchs until she yielded up the demanded sum. Similarly, al-Nāṣir (Muḥammad) extracted a sum of money from her. She then married al-ʿĀdil Ṭūmānbāy but remained with him (only) two months (approximately). These events are known. After this, she became ill, suffering from an ulcer (*ākila*) in her side over a protracted period. When her condition worsened, she proceeded to Būlāq where she died. Her body was transported to her residence next to the Sunqur Bridge, from whence her funeral cortege departed.

The details Ibn Iyās provided focused on the precariousness of Fāṭima's estate after Qāytbāy's death. While the stance of the mamluk elite may appear draconian, it almost certainly reflected their concept of rights to a deceased peer's patrimony. Property accumulated by individual members of the mamluk caste seems to have been regarded as part of a vast fiscal reservoir held collectively by the entire military oligarchy. Since a substantial portion of an individual's

legacy had been alienated from land formally held by the Sultanate and allotted as *iqtāʿ*s on a usufruct basis in return for service, his peers' perception that they were improperly denied access to lucrative real estate that should have been restored to the *dīwān al-jaysh* for redistribution led to feelings of intense resentment.

Although Fāṭima had amassed her holdings autonomously from her spouse's properties, she could not avoid this deeply ingrained sense of collective entitlement after her powerful husband had died. Her marriages to the men who fought each other over the succession to her husband's office should be interpreted as a last-ditch effort by which Fāṭima strove to maintain the integrity of her estate, if not ultimate control over its disposition. The impression left by Ibn Iyās of an aging and infirm woman who once enjoyed enormous social prestige entering into marriages of convenience with ruthless claimants to ward off confiscation is not edifying. Ibn Iyās was not impressed by their conduct, and remained an acerbic critic of the man who eventually consolidated his position as sultan: Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī.

But the rapacity of these claimants was in all probability the inevitable consequence of a political tradition that recognized no succession by inheritance as binding and regarded fortunes amassed by even the most esteemed of their caste as a common patrimony to be divided among successors as fiefs. Fāṭima clearly understood the implication of this deeply embedded attitude and indulged in no illusions about her own fate after her spouse had died. Yet by placing a substantial portion of her estate in *waqf*, Fāṭima sought to preserve at least part of her holdings for charitable posterity. Fāṭima's trust deeds that survive should therefore be interpreted as tangible remnants of a strategy assiduously pursued over a period exceeding three decades to insure the preservation of her legacy.

The earliest document issued by Fāṭima is dated 21 Rabīʿ I 878/16 August 1473. The latest appeared soon before her death with a date of 27 Rajab 909/15 January 1504, and confirmed on 25 Ṣafar 910/7 August 1505. This latter date certified a transaction enacted sometime during Fāṭima's last months but was legally validated after her demise. The span of time elapsing between these two documents thus encompasses thirty-two years. Six kinds of transaction were concluded in these deeds. In descending order of frequency they were: *bayʿ* or sale/purchase with prices provided irregularly; *waqf* or charitable trust with foundation objectives mentioned only sporadically;

intiqāl or transfer/reassignment of a unit of property of an alternate
status of title; *istibdāl* or exchange/substitution of a unit of property
for another of presumably equivalent value; *ījār* or rent/lease of a
unit of property with the monthly fee provided; and *tamlīk* or alien-
ation of a unit of property with permanent transfer of ownership.

References to acquisition of property already held in waqf actu-
ally occurred only in Fāṭima's initial deed. Document 469, dated 21
Rabīʿ I 878, proceeded through three transactions, the latest certified
on 28 Dhū'l-Ḥijja 887/7 February 1483. All sixteen units were
acquired during the first transaction of 21/03/878, however. Of these
sixteen, ten were listed as trusted waqf property transferred under
title to Fāṭima. The remaining six were purchased. No distinction
between the two categories is discernible with regard to the type of
real estate acquired, although the six agricultural properties located
in the Delta provinces of Gharbiyya, Sharqiyya and Qalyūbiyya were
uniformly listed as waqf. The other properties were located within
the former Fāṭimid district (*dākhil al-Qāhira*, "inside Cairo"), the zone
extending from the Bāb Zuwayla to the Citadel (*ẓāhir al-Qāhira*, "out-
side Cairo"), and the city's environs (*ḍayʿa al-Qāhira*). They included
six residences (*sakan*), four retail shops or stalls (*ḥānūt*), three of which
were listed as a single unit, and a larger urban residence (*qaṣr*). The
irregular incidence of purchase prices may indicate inconsistent report-
ing of sums paid, or may certify acquisition in which Fāṭima actu-
ally turned over money to possess the property. Final tallies of
acquisition payments will be noted subsequently in this essay.

The confinement of transactions in which Fāṭima acquired title to
existing trust properties to this document warrants attention. All of
Fāṭima's following transactions involved purchases, transfers, substi-
tutions, rents or alienations. All of the six rural agrarian properties
had initially been held in the *dīwān al-jaysh* for allotment as iqṭāʿ
usufruct. Document 469 passed over Fāṭima's acquisition of these
properties without comment on either their alienation from regime
disposition to charitable trust, or to the gender of their final super-
visor (*nāẓira*).

Fāṭima's subsequent acquisitions are summarized on the List.[6]
Several years seem to have intervened between her initial foray into

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[6] The list is divided in two sections. Deed i.d. numbers (from Amin) are repeated
in section two to facilitate location of properties according to district. Deed #652

estate building and later agendas of acquisition. Document 502, trans-
action one, is dated 11 Rabī' I 886/10 May 1481. From that time,
no more than three years separate the occurrence of a transaction
until Fāṭima's death. When I initially reflected on the chronological
timing of Fāṭima's transactions, I noted heightened activity concen-
trated between the years 894–896/1488–1491.[7]

I hypothesized that these years followed closely upon the first of
Qāytbāy's serious accidents in which he fractured his upper leg and
verged on death. Although Qāytbāy recovered, he did not regain
his former vigor and his health began a prolonged decline. I spec-
ulated that the increased frequency of Fāṭima's acquisitions may have
been tied to her apprehension over the implications of her husband's
waning health and possible death for her own status and the integrity
of her holdings. Upon reconsideration of the chronological incidence
of deeds, however, I do not find the salience of this particular inter-
val of two and one half years persuasive. If the surviving deeds offer
an accurate pattern of Fāṭima's transactions, she was consistently
engaged in property acquisition at the same rate until her death.

The List summarizes the range of property Fāṭima sought: uni-
formly real estate with reliable rates of return. These properties do
not differ in type or preference from the profiles of real estate appear-
ing consistently within trust documents of the Mamluk period. They
are divided more or less equally between rent-generating residences,
commercial sites for sale or storage of commodities, and agrarian

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refers to the primary waqf instrument of Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī and indicates appro-
priation of a property from one of Fāṭima's deeds. tr. = transaction, always identified
by date in the waqf text. Districts are designated according to terminology used in
the waqf/transaction deeds: Dākhil Q. refers to 'within' Cairo (Qāhira) or the sec-
tion south of Bāb al-Naṣr and north of Bāb Zuwayla; Zāhir Q. refers to 'outside'
Cairo or the section extending from Bāb Zuwayla to the Maydān Rumayla below
the Citadel; Ḍay'a Q. refers to 'environs' of Cairo and includes the sections between
the preceding districts and the Nile; the Delta refers to the provinces of Qalyūbiyya,
Sharqiyya, Manūfiyya, Gharbiyya, Dakahliyya and Buḥayra; the Valley refers to
the provinces of Jīziyya, Fayyūmiyya, Aṭfīḥiyya, Bahnasawiyya, Ushmunayniyya,
Manfalūṭiyya, Asyūṭiyya, Akhmīmiyya and Qūṣiyya. Kh. refers to khuṭṭ or quarter
of Cairo. N. refers to nāḥiyya or rural fiscal district, usually but not always corre-
sponding to a village and attached farmland. Transaction terms: Waqf or charita-
ble trust, bay' or sale, ījār or rental, tamlīk or alienation/appropriation, intiqāl or
transfer, istibdāl or substitution. dr = dirham, dn = dīnār, dj = dīnār jayshī. ashr, zāh
= ashrafī, zāhirī dīnār. Dates are A.H.: day/month/year.

⁷ C.F. Petry, *Protectors or Praetorians? The Last Mamluk Sultans and Egypt's Waning as
a Great Power* (Albany, 1994), 201.

lands or irrigation sources. No manufacturing or processing centers of any sort emerged, confirming a disinclination sustained throughout the waqf-related documents of this era for investment in agencies that produced commodities or processed foodstuffs. No reference to any kind of cartage, shipping or transferral agencies appeared. Fāṭima's investments were restricted to fixed properties that yielded set rents on a reliable basis.

Because of the irregular incidence of purchase prices provided by the deeds, no accurate estimate of Fāṭima's expenditures is possible. Also, given our inexact understanding of currency values, equivalencies or exchange rates, final tallies are certain only in their imprecision.[8] As summarized in the List, I came up with a total of 9,747 dinars listed as *danānīr* only; 6,443 dinars calculated from 8,053 *danānīr jayshī* or units of account (one dj worth ca. eighty percent of a genuine dinar); 1,500 *ashrafī* dinars; 700 *ẓāhirī* dinars; 2,250 *nuṣṣ faḍḍa*s worth ninety full dinars; and 10,125 dirhams, so severely debased at this time that 300 equalled one full dinar, for a figure of 34 dinars. The resultant total came to 18,513 dinars. Quite obviously, these figures can be useful only as the broad estimates they are. Given the frequent lacunae in the documents, coupled with the errors built into these estimates, I suspect that these totals underestimate substantially the amounts Fāṭima actually spent.

Nonetheless, a contravening tendency should be considered at this juncture. We cannot be certain that Fāṭima actually paid the amounts listed in the deeds. Many of these figures may have represented 'front prices' that concealed far more complex, covert arrangements involving laundered sums calculated by individuals occupying supervisory positions in the fiscal bureaus. I previously observed that Fāṭima bought shares in properties already held or controlled by persons closely allied with her husband.[9] Her attempt to hedge against the likelihood of confiscation by so doing emerges as a readily discernible

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[8] See Richard S. Cooper, "Land Classification Terminology and the Assessment of the Kharāj Tax in Medieval Egypt," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 17 (1974), 91–102 for an introduction to fiscal terminology associated with agrarian revenues; R.S. Cooper, "A Note on the Dīnār Jayshī," *JESHO*, vol. XVI (1973), 317–18 for a discussion of this currency of account; for an overview of currency terminology generally, see Warren C. Schultz, "The Monetary History of Egypt, 642–1517," *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, vol. 1, edited by C.F. Petry (Cambridge, 1998), 318–38. Note bibliography, 585–91.

[9] Petry, *Protectors*, 201, note 39.

strategy. Less detectable would be the hidden deals that were struck over how much money actually changed hands, between whom and when. These caveats complicate our sense of the monies Fāṭima actually had at her disposal to lay out for her autonomous estate. Whether a more precise understanding of currency values and their rates of exchange would facilitate a better sense of the situation is unclear since these other matters of covert deals pose barriers that may defy a more accurate analysis.

One final issue merits comment: the ultimate disposition of Fāṭima's holdings. In the year following her death, on 24 Ṣafar 910/6 August 1504, Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī formally appropriated Fāṭima's properties into his own trust (Amin #652). As noted previously, this procedure was conducted according to past precedent. The entries in parentheses on the List indicate where specific units of property acquired by Fāṭima appeared in al-Ghawrī's primary waqf. Qāytbāy and Fāṭima had produced no children who survived them. As noted previously, Qāytbāy's heir, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, was the result of a concubinal union. Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī therefore violated no inheritance rights when he assumed title to Fāṭima's estate. It is worth noting, however, that al-Ghawrī did not tamper with Qāytbāy's own holdings that he (Qāytbāy) had placed in his primary trust (Amīn #475). Again, the likelihood here is that Qāytbāy's spouse could not expect the integrity of her personal estate to last after she died. An individual man of equivalent social rank, such as Qāytbāy's eventual successor and consolidator, Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī, could lay legitimate claim to it.

Yet this claim was not filed until after Fāṭima's demise. Ibn Iyās wryly noted the marital ploys Fāṭima was compelled to attempt in order to ward off confiscation of the legacy she had carefully built up over thirty years. The fact that she apparently succeeded in her own lifetime, as a widow without surviving male issue, should attract notice at least equivalent to the unpleasant realities of her status within the mamluk elite at the end of her days. It is unlikely that Fāṭima or her male contemporaries wasted time lamenting the fate of an aged widow confronting the avarice of ambitious rivals for rule over the Sultanate. Their actions were predictable and all parties involved anticipated such behavior. Fāṭima's achievement as the creator of an autonomous estate that rivalled the holdings of many prominent men in her caste merits respect as the legacy of a sophisticated investor fully attuned to the financial and political conditions

of her time. Fāṭima was an active participant rather than a passive
bystander, who enjoyed the benefits of royal status and suffered the
liabilities of royal widowhood.

List of Charitable Trusts (*Awqāf*) Endowed by al-Khawand Fāṭima
al-Khaṣṣbakiyya (Section 1)

Deed	Dākhil Q	Ẓāhir Q	Ḍayʿa Q
469, tr. 1 21/03/878	sakan kh. J. Azhar waqf	Qaṣr kh. AqSanqur waqf	
	sakan kh. Mashhad Ḥusaynī waqf	sakan kh. J. Mardīn bayʿ	
(652, tr. 1, #14)	8 ḥānūt kh. Khān Khalīlī waqf	sakan kh. Qubba Barmāk bayʿ	
10/11/881	sakan kh. Ḥārat Daylam bayʿ	3 ḥānūt kh. Sabʿ Saqābāt bayʿ	
28/12/887	riwāq kh. Kāfūrī bayʿ		
09/03/884 (652, tr. 1, #20)	sakan kh. Kāfūrī bayʿ		
502, tr. 1 11/03/886 (652, tr. 1, #3)	sāḥa, makhzan Sūq Warrāqīn Ijār: 500dr		
506, tr. 3 15/01/888			bustān anshāb Maṭariyya: kh. Jabal bayʿ: 1500ashr
504, tr. 2 03/12/888		iṣtabl 3 ḥānūt	

Table (*cont.*)

Deed	Dākhil Q	Ẓāhir Q	Ḍayʿa Q
(652, tr. 1, #38)		kh. Ḥusayniyya tamlīk: 510dn	
481, tr. 2 11/01/890		sakan kh. Ḥusayniyya bayʿ: 110dn	
450, tr. 2 19/12/890 (652, tr. 1, #55)			arḍ: biʾr sāqiyya Maṭariyya Intiqāl: 560dn
518, tr. 1 19/12/890 (652, tr. 1, #55)			arḍ: 2 qaṭʿa Ḍawāḥī Maṭariyya bayʿ: 600dn
			biʾr Ḍawāḥī Maṭariyya bayʿ
528, tr. 1 11/11/891 (same as 481)		sakan kh. Ḥusayniyya bayʿ: 110dn	
543, tr. 4 05/03/894		8 qaʿa, makhzan Būlāq bayʿ: 272dn	
376, tr. 4 12/04/894 (652, tr. 1, #28)		18 ṭabaqa, 9 ḥānūt kh. Qanṭara, Ḥārat Kirmān bayʿ: 700ẓāh	
544, tr. 2 12/04/894 (652, tr. 1, #28) (same as 376?)		ṭibāq, 9 ḥānūt kh. AqSanqur bayʿ: 4800dr	
545, tr. 1 12/04/894		ṭibāq, 9 ḥānūt	

Table (*cont.*)

Deed	Dākhil Q	Ẓāhir Q	Ḍayʿa Q
(652, tr. 1, #28) (same as 544?)		kh. Qanṭara AqSanqur bayʿ: 4825dr	
435, tr. 3 23/08/894 (652, tr. 1, #29)		7 ḥānūt kh. Qanṭara AqSunqur bayʿ: 250dn	
519, tr. 8 06/11/894		sakan kh. Qanṭara AqSunqur bayʿ: 52dn	
546, tr. 2 23/11/894			
548, tr. 1 25/11/894			
430, tr. 5 22/12/895 (652, tr. 1, #81)			
439, tr. 3 22/12/895 (652, tr. 1, #81)			
442, tr. 2 17/03/896	sakan kh. Bazbazāt bayʿ: 300dn		
553, tr. 1 17/03/896 (652, tr. 1, #24) (same as 442?)	sakan kh. Bazbazāt bayʿ: 240dn		
556, tr. 1 18/10/896 (652, tr. 1, #32)	sakan kh. Dār Naḥḥās bayʿ: 50dn		
565, tr. 2 06/10/899 (652, tr. 1, #54)		arḍ: anshāb junayna Birkat Raṭlī, kh. Fawwākhīn bayʿ: 150dn	

Table (*cont.*)

Deed	Dākhil Q	Ẓāhir Q	Ḍayʿa Q
502, tr. 2 06/03/900	ḥāṣil, makhzan Sūq Warrāqīn Ijār: 500dr		
566, tr. 3 06/05/900 (652, tr. 2, #4)	wakāla, khān Sūq Warrāqīn bayʿ: 1740dn		
576, tr. 3 15/11/901 (652, tr. 1, #30)		isṭabl, 5 ḥānūt kh. Qanṭara AqSunqur bayʿ: 670dn	
577, tr. 2 15/11/901 (652, tr. 1, #30)		5 ḥānūt kh. Qanṭara AqSunqur bayʿ: 750dn	
583, tr. 2 16/02/903 (652, tr. 1, #41)		sakan, junayna Bāb Shaʿriyya intiqāl: 2100dn	
427, tr. 6 02/06/903 (652, tr. 1, #36)		sakan kh. Qanṭara AqSunqur bayʿ: 340dn	
510, tr. 2 26/06/903 (652, tr. 1, #36)		sakan kh. Qanṭara AqSunqur bayʿ: 160dn	
421, tr. 5 24/10/904		sakan kh. Qanṭara AqSunqur intiqāl: 20dn	
555, tr. 3 06/11/904 (652, tr. 1, #37)		sakan kh. Qanṭara AqSunqur intiqāl: 27dn	

Table (*cont.*)

Deed	Dākhil Q	Ẓāhir Q	Ḍayʿa Q
592, tr. 1 10/11/904 (652, tr. 1, #37) (same as 555?)		sakan kh. Qanṭara AqSunqur bayʿ: 191dn	
595, tr. 3 14/04/905 (652, tr. 1, #20)		sakan kh. Khūkhat Awaz bayʿ: 400dn	
594, tr. 2 14/04/905		Riwāq, 4 ṭabaqa kh. Khūkhat Awaz bayʿ: 2250nf	
438, tr. 4 22/12/905 (652, tr. 1, #81)			
608, tr. 1 20/05/905 (652, tr. 1, #40)		sakan kh. Kaddāshīn bayʿ: 200dn	
622, tr. 2 22/09/906 (652, tr. 1, #17)	sakan kh. Raḥbat Aydamurī bayʿ: 155dn		
567, tr. 3 27/07/909	khirba intiqāl: 150dn		
660, tr. 1 27/07/909	sakan kh. Raḥbat Aydamurī bayʿ: 70dn		
469, tr. 2 25/02/910	qāʿa, ḥawānīt klh. Mashhad Ḥusaynī istibdāl khān arwiqa kh. Mashhad Ḥusaynī istibdāl		
469, tr. 3 29/09/910	sakan kh. J. Azhar istibdāl: 700dn		

Summary of Property Units and Expenditures

17 Units	21 Units	4 Units
9 sakan	1 qaṣr	1 bustān
9 ḥānūt	10 sakan	1 anshāb
1 riwāq	32 ḥānūt	2 arḍ
1 sāḥa	2 isṭabl	2 biʾr
2 makhzan	8 qāʿa	1 sāqiyya
1 ḥāsil	22 ṭabaqa	
1 wakāla	1 arḍ	
2 khān	1 anshāb	
1 khirba	2 junayna	
1 qāʿa	1 riwāq	
500dr	9625dr	1160dn
3905dn	5842dn	1500ashr
	700ẓāh	
	2250nf	

Calculated Totals

9747dn
6442dn   (calculated from 8053dj at 80%)
1500ashr
 700ẓāh
  90dn   (calculated from 2250nf)
  34dn   (calculated from 10,125dr)

18,513dn   total

List of Charitable Trusts (*Awqāf*) Endowed by al-Khawand Fāṭima al-Khaṣṣbakiyya (Section 2)

Deed	Delta	Valley
469, tr. 1 21/03/878	Arḍ Gharbiyya N. Tajrīj waqf	
(652, tr. 1, #14)	arḍ Sharqiyya N. Inshāʾ Buṣṣ waqf	
	arḍ Gharbiyya N. Minyat Sharīf waqf: 202dn	

Table (*cont.*)

Deed	Delta	Valley
10/11/881	arḍ Sharqiyya N. ʿAbbāsa waqf: 350dn	
28/12/887 (652, tr. 1, #79)	arḍ Gharbiyya N. Nasāhnā waqf: 360dn	
09/03/884 (652, tr. 1, #20)	arḍ Qalyūbiyya N. Minyat Marzūq waqf	
502, tr. 1 11/03/886 (652, tr. 1, #3)		
506, tr. 3 15/01/888		
504, tr. 2 03/12/888 (652, tr. 1, #38)		
481, tr. 2 11/01/890		
450, tr. 2 (19/12/890 (652, tr. 1, #55)		
518, tr. 1 19/12/890 (652, tr. 1, #55)		
528, tr. 1 11/11/891 (same as 481)		
543, tr. 4 05/03/894		
376, tr. 4 12/04/894 (652, tr. 1, #28)		

Table (*cont.*)

Deed	Delta	Valley
544, tr. 2 (12/04/894 (652, tr. 1, #28) (same as 376?)		
545, tr. 1 12/04/894 (652, tr. 1, #28) (same as 544?)		
435, tr. 3 23/08/894 (652, tr. 1, #29)		
519, tr. 8 06/11/894		
546, tr. 2 23/11/894		arḍ Ashmūnayn N. Sayf Almās intiqāl: 916dj
548, tr. 1 25/11/894 (same as 546?)		arḍ Ashmūnayn N. Sayf Almās bayʿ: 1000dj
430, tr. 5 22/12/895 (652, tr. 1, #81)	arḍ Gharbiyya N. Matbūl bayʿ: 3600dj	
439, tr. 3 22/12/895 (652, tr. 1, #81) (same as 430?)	arḍ Gharbiyya N. Matbūl bayʿ: 325dj	
442, tr. 2 17/03/896		
553, tr. 1 17/03/896 (652, tr. 1, #24) (same as 442?)		

Table (*cont.*)

Deed	Delta	Valley
556, tr. 1 18/10/896 (652, tr. 1, #32)		
565, tr. 2 06/10/899 (652, tr. 1, #54)		
502, tr. 2 06/03/900		
566, tr. 3 06/05/900 (652, tr. 2, #4)		
576, tr. 3 15/11/901 (652, tr. 1, #30)		
577, tr. 2 15/11/901 (652, tr. 1, #30)		
583, tr. 2 16/02/903 (652, tr. 1, #41)		
427, tr. 6 02/06/903 (652, tr. 1, #36)		
510, tr. 2 26/06/903 (652, tr. 1, #36)		
421, tr. 5 24/10/904		
555, tr. 3 06/11/904 (652, tr. 1, #37)		
592, tr. 1 10/11/904		

Table (*cont.*)

Deed	Delta	Valley
(652, tr. 1, #37) (same as 555?)		
595, tr. 3 14/04/905 (652, tr. 1, #20)		
594, tr. 2 14/04/905 438, tr. 4 22/12/905 (652, tr. 1, #81)	arḍ Gharbiyya N. Matbūl intiqāl: 1300dj	
608, tr. 1 20/05/905 (652, tr. 1, #40)		
622, tr. 2 22/09/906 (652, tr. 1, #17)		
567, tr. 3 27/07/909		
660, tr. 1 27/07/909		
469, tr. 2 25/02/910		
469, tr. 3 29/09/910		

Summary of Property Units and Expenditures		
	8 units	*1 unit*
	5 Gharbiyya 2 Sharqiyya 1 Qalyūbiyya	1 Ashmūnayn
	6137dj	1916dj

PART SEVEN

THE MAMLUKS IN SYRIA

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MAMLUKS AND THEIR HOUSEHOLDS IN LATE MAMLUK DAMASCUS: A *WAQF* STUDY

Michael Winter

The sources

The importance of *waqf* (and *milk*) documents for the study of Muslim social and economic history is well known. For the Mamluk period, which is rich in literary sources, but relatively poor in surviving archival materials, the *waqf* and *milk* documentation has special value. Unfortunately, the majority of such documents that came down to us are limited to the last decades of the Mamluk sultanate; most of them originate in Cairo. These documents have been the basis for studies of Egyptian culture, society and economy by several scholars, among them Muḥammad Amīn, Carl Petry, Jonathan Berkey, L. Fernandes, U. Haarmann, D. Behrens-Abouseif, and others.[1] The present study is based on *waqf* and *milk* documents from the Vilayet (Province) of Damascus (*Shām*) prepared after the Ottoman conquest of Syria in summer 1516 and located in the Ottoman archives in Istanbul.[2] These documents give us an opportunity to look at some

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[1] See, for example, Muḥammad M. Amīn, *al-Awqāf wa'l-ḥayāt al-ijtimāʿiyya fī Miṣr, 648–923/1250–1516*, Cairo, 1980; Carl F. Petry, *Protectors or Praetorians? The Last Mamluk Sultans and Egypt's Waning as a Great Power*, (Albany, 1994); Jonathan Berkey, *The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo; A Social History of Islamic Education* (Princeton, 1992).

[2] The main registers consulted for this study are located at Başbakanlık Arşivi, (the Prime Minister's Bureau Archive), Istanbul. *Tapu Defteri* nos. 127, 263, 393, *Maliyeden Müdevver*, no. 247. My main source, however, is a unique register (although resembling in form *Maliyeden Müdevver*, no. 247, which is much shorter and less detailed). It is an untitled manuscript and without pagination (the page references in the present paper are mine). The register, Mualim Cevdet O. 83:936, is located at the Atatürk Kitaplığı in Istanbul. I am preparing a study on the *awqāf* in the province of Damascus in the late Mamluk and early Ottoman periods for which this *defter* is a central source. In addition to the data that is presented here concerning Mamluks' *awqāf*, the register contains information about the early Ottoman period and aspects of the ways in which the Ottoman administration dealt with *awqāf*, which are outside the subject of this conference.

aspects of the Damascus elites (since only members of the elites could afford to establish *awqāf* or possess *amlāk* (private real estate). The present paper attempts to use these documents for a closer look at Mamluk sultans, amirs, mamluks' sons (*awlād al-nās*), and their households. The collection contains descriptions of hundreds of *waqf*s, including scores of mamluks' *awqāf* and *amlāk*. Although the sample is modest in size, it seems representative, and allows several observations about the mamluks and their households, as well as their religious and social values as these are expressed in their pious endowments that are not available from other sources.

The archival documents are mostly registers (*defter*s) prepared by Ottoman officials, who surveyed, among other taxable properties, the existing *awqāf* and *amlāk* around 950/1543, some 30 years after the conquest. As in most cases, the two categories were listed together, since neither were state lands, and thus could not be parceled out as military *iqṭāʿ* during Mamluk times, or *timar* under the Ottomans. Some of these registers summarize in Arabic (often clearly influenced by the clerks' Turkish) the essence of the *waqf* and *milk* documents that had been drawn up before and after the Ottoman takeover; and then, in Turkish, the Ottoman administration's decisions as to the status of the properties and the rights of the claimants. Most of the *defter*s available to me and, as far as I am aware, to other researchers,[3] represent later surveys (made some 30 years after the conquest) of the earlier survey conducted by Ottoman bureaucrats immediately after the conquest. These, as well as the majority of the original documents from the Mamluk sultanate, seem to have been lost.

Not surprisingly, the *waqf* founders were men and women of means—a few sultans and amirs, merchants, high-ranking bureaucrats and 'ulama', qadis, and a considerable number of women from such families. As usual, *waqf*s were typically lands or houses in the city or in villages in the province. These could consist of entire villages or parts thereof (particularly important were revenues from the

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[3] For some of the principal studies using *waqf* documents on Damascus, see Muḥammad Adnan Bakhit, *The Ottoman Province of Damascus in the Sixteenth Century*, Beirut, 1982; J.-P. Pascual, *Damas à la fin du XVIᵉ siècle d'après trois actes de waqf ottoman*, Damascus, 1983; R. Deguilhem (ed.), *Le waqf dans l'espace islamique, outil de pouvoir socio-politique*, Damascus, 1995; Richard van Leeuwen, *Waqfs and Urban Structures: The Case of Ottoman Damascus*, Leiden, 1999.

fertile al-Ghūta villages surrounding Damascus), *khan*s, warehouses, water mills, orchards, gardens and vineyards and other revenue-producing properties.

As is well known, *waqf* foundations could be *khayrī*, charitable, when the revenue is designated for the funding of public, religious, educational or charitable institutions and projects, or *dhurrī*, in which the founder designates the money for his or her family, usually starting with the donor and often including funds for manumitted slaves (*'utaqā'*). In such *awqāf*, the final religious, that is, public, beneficiaries for whom the funds are designated after the family becomes extinct must be specified in the *waqf* deed (*waqfiyya* in Arabic or *vakıfname* in Turkish). By far, the most frequently mentioned beneficiaries in such cases were institutions in the two holy cities of the Hijāz (*al-Ḥaramāni al-Sharīfāni*: Mecca and al-Madina); mostly for the poor residents in the hospices (*ribāṭ*, pl. *arbiṭa*), especially in al-Madina. Many founders of *awqāf* donated the revenues to institutions in Damascus: the great Umayyad mosque and lesser mosques in the city and its suburbs, primarily the important suburb of al-Ṣāliḥiyya that had been founded in the twelfth century by Ḥanbalī refugees from the crusaders in Palestine. The city's numerous *madrasa*s, the soup kitchen (*maṭbakh al-dashīsha*) near the Bāb al-Barīd gate and numerous mausolea (*turba*s) were also favored objectives. Sometimes the *waqf* documents mention "poor Muslims" generally, lepers, money to ransom prisoners of war and other people in need of help. It is important to note that almost all the *waqf* funds from local (the Province of Damascus) sources were to be spent in the province (the exception being, of course, the Holy Cities in the Hijāz). Most of the supported institutions existed in the city of Damascus itself, but a few religious institutions were in villages. The holy sanctuaries of Jerusalem (al-Aqṣā mosque) and Hebron (al-Khalīl) are also mentioned among the recipients of *waqf* charities. It is important to note that only rarely do we come across a case in which sources of revenue in Syria were to support an institution in Egypt.

Despite the distinction between the *khayrī* and *dhurrī waqf* (these terms are not used at the time in our sources), the *waqfiyya* in many cases combined both of them by dividing the funds at the time of establishing the *waqf* between family and charitable or religious projects (the two were really inseparable).

We learn from the chronicle of Muḥammad b. Tulun, a Damascene *'ālim* and important historian, who was an eyewitness to the Ottoman

conquest of Damascus, about the methods by which the Ottomans conducted the survey of *awqāf* and *amlāk*.[4] This procedure was extremely unpopular, and it was interrupted by the rebellion of Jānbirdī al-Ghazālī, the Mamluk amir who was appointed by the Ottomans as their first governor of Syria (end of 1520-early 1521). The rebellion was crushed quickly, however (February 1521), and the Ottomans completed the survey of the province, including that of the *waqf* and *milk* entitlements. The official who carried out this survey was Defterdār Nūḥ Çelebi. He must have been as harsh a man as he was an indifferent administrator, perhaps also tainted by corruption, as is claimed in later Ottoman documents. He was dismissed owing to many complaints from the people to the authorities.[5] His register was called *Defter-i Nūḥ Çelebi*, and has not survived. Some 30 years later, a revision was conducted on the basis of documents and oral testimony. The results were written down in the *Defter-i Cedīd-i Haqqānī*, the New Imperial Register. This new register points out many mistakes made by Nūḥ Çelebi. Sometimes he had registered *milk* and *waqf* properties as *timar*, either arbitrarily or because the luckless owners were outside the country at that time, occasionally for the hajj pilgrimage. By contrast, the procedures used during the new survey seem accurate and fair.

Finally, a note about the dates of the *awqāf*: Although some of them, mostly those established by sultans- date from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the great majority of the *waqf* deeds in our collections are from the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Generally speaking, the lifetime of most *awqāf* does not seem to have exceeded one century. Usually by this time either the family died out or the revenues ceased for one reason or another. Often the dates of the purchase of the property, its conversion into a *waqf* and its registration are close. In many cases, however, the time gap between the establishment of a *waqf* and its registration is significant, in a few extreme cases, more than a century. It is probable that when it became known that an inspection was imminent, the trustees hurried to register their rights.

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[4] Muḥammad ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahat al-khillān fī ḥawādith al-zamān*, ed. M. Muṣṭafā (Cairo, 1962), vol. II, 33, 36, 65.

[5] Ibn Ṭūlūn writes that Nūḥ Çelebi issued an order that all men when walking in the streets on pain of castration had to wear trousers (*sirwāl*). This was not enforced, however. *Ibid.*, 59.

Mamluk Sultans' awqāf *in Syria*

According to our documents, several Mamluk sultans founded *awqāf* for Syrian projects. It is important to emphasize this point, since Syria, or rather the Syrian provinces (*al-Bilād al-Shāmiyya* in Mamluk administrative terminology) were totally under the control of the sultan in Cairo. Nevertheless, it seems that the good sense of the center usually prevailed, and the resources funding *awqāf* in Syria were used for the benefit of local projects. In our sample, only one of the Mamluk sultans, Barqūq, used Syrian funds to support his *madrasa* in Cairo (in the Bayn al-Qaṣrayn Quarter).[6] All other Mamluk sultans established *waqf* for religious men and institutions in the Province of Damascus. Only al-Malik al-Ẓāhir Baybars established *awqāf* for his own children and descendants, in addition to his *waqf* on his *madrasa* and his *turba* in Damascus.[7]

The Mamluk sultans' prominent support for Sufis and their institutions is also obvious from their Syrian *waqf* policies. A farm in the Ḥawrān region financed an ancient *waqf*, established at the beginning of the Mamluk sultanate by Baybars for the upkeep of a Sufi *zāwiya*. The *waqf* was eventually confirmed by other sultans. Qalā'ūn, Khushqadam and Qāyitbāy gave their confirmation to the continuity of that *waqf* (*murabbaʿ al-istimrār wa'l-musāmaḥa*). Nevertheless, Nūḥ Çelebi registered it as *timar*. Here religious beliefs (or rather superstitions) find their way into an official document. The clerk writes that two men (soldiers) who received this property as *timar* were afflicted with blindness (as a result of the holy man's *karāma* or miracle), and gave up their rights to their *timar*.[8]

Baybars also established another *waqf* for a certain Sufi shaykh and his descendants.[9] Other sultans who donated *awqāf* for Sufis are al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalā'ūn (on Shaykh al-Suyūfī and the Sufis who resided in the *zāwiya* on the slopes of the famous Qāsiyūn mountain at the Ṣāliḥiyya quarter near Damascus), Īnāl, and Jaqmaq (on

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[6] *Atatürk Library Defter* (will be quoted as *ALD*, my pagination), fol. 57b. Also *Tapu Defteri* (*TD*) no. 263, 471.

[7] *ALD*, fol. 76b; *TD* no. 393, 190. The Ottomans did not find Baybars's *waqfiyya* for his *madrasa*; it was not necessary, since the terms of the *waqf* were engraved on stone on the gate of the *madrasa*.

[8] *ALD*, fol. 38b.

[9] *TD* no. 263, 536.

a *zāwiya* in a village, as well as a *madrasa* near the Umayyad mosque).[10] Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's *zāwiya* for an ascetic Sufi shaykh (Ibn al-Baṭā'iḥī) and his progeny is also mentioned as a continuously active *waqf*. Even the *waqf* established by his uncle Asad al-Dīn Shīrkūh (incorrectly called "sultan" in the Ottoman documents) to support a *madrasa* and a *khānqāh* in Damascus was functioning in the early sixteenth century.[11]

Sultan Khushqadam, who focused special attention on Damascus to enhance his religious prestige there, built his *turba* in Damascus at the Bāb al-Jayrūn quarter, and endowed it with rich *awqāf*. It was a large institution, known by the name al-Wajīziyya. In some documents it is called a *madrasa* rather than *turba*. A school probably grew around the sepulcher. The *waqfiyya* provides for salaries to the functionaries, such as an imām, a teacher, and custodial and maintenance personnel, as well as candles, rugs and mats.[12] Al-Malik al-Nāṣir Faraj was another sultan whose *turba* was built in Damascus.[13]

Governors of the province of Damascus

Unlike the sultans' *awqāf* which, as we have seen, survived until the early Ottoman period, there are no traces in our sources of the endowments established by the governors of the province (singular: *nā'ib al-salṭana*) apart from the last ones. For example, one looks in vain for *awqāf* founded by Tankiz, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalā'ūn's eminent governor of the province during the sultan's long reign. What survived (at least in the collections that I have seen) were the *awqāf* of governors of the late Mamluk period, either their own endowments, or, in some cases, those established to honor them by their mamluks after their death.

For example, *Nā'ib al-Shām* Arkmās (or Arkmāz) combined a family *waqf* with a large *turba*, his mausoleum, which was a center for dispensing charity in the name of this amir who was interred there. Three Qur'ān readers were to recite at the site for a fee every day

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[10] *TD* no. 393, 38 (al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalā'ūn); *Ibid.*, 20 (Īnāl); *ibid.*, 55 (Jaqmaq).

[11] *ALD*, fol. 28a (Saladin). Shīrkūh's *khānqāh* in Damascus, *TD* no. 393, 76, his *madrasa*, *ibid.*, 77.

[12] *ALD*, fol. 4b; *TD* no. 263, 418.

[13] *TD* no. 127, 101.

after the afternoon prayer. Every Friday night, 300 loaves of bread were to be distributed to poor people at the gate of the *turba*. Drinking water in a cistern and oil for lamps were made available. The *waqf* deed specifies the monthly salaries of the custodian (*qayyim*), 300 dirhams, and the director (*mutawallī*), 1,000 dirhams. The *waqfiyya* sees to it that the founders' wives and concubines who had given birth to his children will be provided for after his death. What remained should be paid to the founder's children, his brother's son, and to the governor's manumitted slaves. If no one remained, the money should be given to the poor wherever they are.[14] It should be noted that this is a typical *turba*: a mausoleum, a devotional center that also functioned as an agency for dispensing charity. Some *turba*s were more modest, and others larger and more elaborate. A *turba* could be a teaching institution, and even a place where people could stay. We have evidence of numerous *turba*s, which had a budget for distributing sweets on certain festivals and feasts and meat during the nights of Ramaḍān. An amir establishes a dinner (*ṣimāṭ*) on the first Friday of Rajab, and the night of mid-Shaʿbān and the nights of the two Muslim festivals (*al-ʿīdāni*).[15] In Damascus, there were many such *turba*s, which no doubt contributed a great deal to the well-being of the general population.

The largest and richest *awqāf* in late Mamluk Damascus were established by Sībāy, the last Mamluk governor of the province, who was killed at the battle of Marj Dābiq at which Sultan Selīm defeated the Mamluk army. Sībāy's *awqāf* were funded from the revenues of many villages throughout the province, as well as from shops, bathhouses and caravansaries (*khān*s) in Damascus. Sībāy provided for his children and manumitted slaves through his *awqāf*. There is even an entire *waqf* known as "Sībāy's children". Sībāy also established a *madrasa* and a mosque. In his family *awqāf*, Sībāy mentions the poor people in the holy cities in the Ḥijāz and at al-Aqṣā mosque in Jerusalem and at the Hebron sanctuary as the *waqf*'s delayed beneficiaries, as befits a governor of al-Shām. Among his *khayrī waqf*s, there is one for a Rifāʿī Shaykh and for the Sufis who lived in his *zāwiya* in the village of Ṭabgha.[16]

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[14] *TD* no. 393, 112.
[15] For example, *ibid.*, 60.
[16] See Sībāy's *awqāf*, *ALD*, fol. 52a, *TD* no. 263 (*madrasa*); *TD* no. 127, 43 (a

Mamluk amirs as founders of awqāf

Many amirs founded *awqāf*, both family and charitable foundations, or a combination of both kinds. As is well known, it is not difficult to identify the mamluks among the names of civilians, whose *awqāf* and *amlāk* are naturally included in the same registers. The mamluks are immediately recognizable by their Turkish names and the fact that their fathers were always called Ibn ʿAbdullāh, a name indicating a convert to Islam. The same signs applied to female slaves of similar background about whom more will be said below. Mamluk amirs constituted a relatively small minority of those who founded *awqāf*, but not surprisingly, their *awqāf* were among the richest. Their religious beliefs and values, as can be judged from the documents, were quite similar to those of the civilian elite, that is, impeccably orthodox Sunnism. Yet, it seems that the Mamluk amirs, more than other wealthy founders of *waqf*, were inclined to donate money by means of the *awqāf* to public (i.e., *khayrī*) projects, although most of their *awqāf* had a *dhurrī* component as well. It should be mentioned in this connection that *awqāf* founded by ʿulamaʾ were very rarely of the charitable type. The ʿulamaʾ are associated with *khayrī waqf* as beneficiaries, functionaries and teachers, but not as founders. Yet the amirs, more than others, could afford to be generous. These charitable endowments increased their reputation and enhanced their legitimacy, which as converts and of foreign background they were concerned about as well.

It is interesting to note that only one *waqf* in our documents provides for a purely military project: A fund for the strengthening and arming with gunpowder, cannon, bows and arrows a tower (*burj*) defending the coastline at Ṣaydā against the Franks. Yet this *waqf* was established by a member of the wealthy al-ʿAdawī family who were civilians. A Qurʾān reader was be hired to recite at that post.[17]

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mosque); *TD* no. 393, 7 (on a Rifāʿī Sufi, his descendants and their *zāwiya; ibid.*, 125 (family *waqf*, then Jerusalem and Hebron sanctuaries); *TD* no. 263, 247 (for his children).

[17] *ALD*, fols. 81a–b. The *waqfiyya* is dated 867 (1462 or 1463), when the Syrian coastline was frequently attacked by hostile ships. A question may be asked whether this defense post was still active and even necessary under the reign of Süleymān when the Ottomans had the strongest fleet in the eastern Mediterranean and after the island of Rhodes had been taken.

The family *waqf* of mamluks included support for many relatives, such as brothers, nephews, cousins, children, wives and concubines, and almost always also *'utaqā'*, freed slaves and their descendants. The causes for which Mamluk amirs founded charitable *awqāf* were similar to the civilians': *al-Ḥaramāni al-Sharīfāni*, with a clear preference to the *ribāṭ*s of al-Madina (they were more numerous than those in Mecca), mosques and *madrasa*s, sometimes an institution founded by a former master of that mamluk, the local hospitals, and again their own *turba*, to commemorate their name after their death through prayers and acts of charity centered at their sepulcher.

The following is a typical case of an amir's pious foundation. Jānī Bek b. 'Abdullāh al-Nāṣiri registered two *waqfiyya*s, in the year 858 (1454) and 864 (1459 or 1460) respectively. He donated the revenues of two villages as *waqf*. In the first document, the administrator (*nāẓir*) is ordered to spend what is needed for the *waqf*'s maintenance and improvement. Then a certain sum (the figure is missing in the document) is allocated to the poor residents of the *ribāṭ*s in the two Holy Cities. Every month a Qur'ān reader was to be paid 60 dirhams to recite at the sepulcher (*ḍarīḥ*) of Barsbāy, which is adjacent to his mosque at Suwayqat (or Sūq) Ṣārūja (a market and a quarter in Damascus). The same sum was to be paid to a reader (i.e., teacher) of *tafsīr* (commentary on the Qur'ān), Arabic, and *fiqh* (jurisprudence) at that mosque. The same salary is allotted to a reader of *ḥadīth* there. The *mu'adhdhin* of the mosque will receive 150 dirhams annually. Whatever remains after these expenses would go to the founder himself, his children and their descendants, after them to the manumitted slaves and their descendants. If no one remains, the money is designated for the interests of Barsbāy's mosque. The founder's attachment to the memory of Barsbāy is obvious, although the exact relationship is not clear. He could have been one of Barsbāy's mamluks.[18]

The second *waqfiyya*, prepared 6 years later, reveals Jānī Bek's concern for his own sepulcher and memory after he is gone. A *turba* has not yet been erected, but he already makes provisions for acts of charity and piety that are to be performed at his sepulcher "wherever it may be". Seven Qur'ān readers are to recite portions from

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[18] This Barsbāy al-Ḥājib (d. 851) was the governor of Ṭarābulus al-Shām and Ḥalab and built the mosque at Sūq Ṣārūja in Damascus.

the Book at his grave. Every week one kantar of wheat bread should be distributed to the poor at the site. At the Rajab festival, sweets will be distributed. During Ramaḍān nights, cows and sheep for a sum of 500 dirhams are to be slaughtered at the sepulcher, and the meat is to be given to the poor. Whatever remains afterwards should be given to the founder's children and their children, and afterwards to his freed slaves. When all the family and the *'utaqā'* die out, the money should go to the interests of the Barsbāy mosque.[19]

The Ottoman clerk adds after the *awqāf*'s summaries that a certain woman who claimed descent from one of the manumitted slaves was in charge of the *waqf*. Its supervision was taken away from her, however, and given to the Ottoman chief qadi of Damascus (*Mevlānā Shām efendisi*) in his capacity as supervisor of the *awqāf* (*nāẓir al-awqāf*), since she had not given anything to the Holy Cities or to the other religious institutions. In addition, her claim to have descended from one of the former slaves seems to have been false. Also, most of the *waqf* properties that had been abundant under the Circassian sultans had been sold, and only a small part remained. When Ibn Sulṭān, the local Ḥanafī mufti, was consulted, he issued a fatwa ruling that the manumitted slaves deserved nothing, since the *al-Ḥaramāni al-Sharīfāni* that had been mentioned first (in the earlier *waqfiyya*) took precedence.

Awlād al-Nās

There are a few cases of *awqāf* founded by *awlād nās*, yet identification of the fathers as mamluks is not always certain. The following example is clear: Shādī (or Shādhī) Bek al-Julbānī (d. 887) was a prominent amir in Damascus. According to some Arab biographers he was a tyrant, with false pretensions to religious knowledge. His son, al-Ṣārimī Ibrāhīm established a *waqf* for a Sufi *zāwiya* in a village in the Ḥawrān region.[20] The *waqf* was to provide a meal every morn-

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[19] *ALD*, fol. 22b.

[20] *ALD*, fol. 40b. A biographical notice about this amir can be seen in *Mut'at al-adhhān min al-tamattu' bi'l-iqrān bayna tarājim al-shuyūkh wa'l-aqrān* by Aḥmad al-Ḥaskafī (on the basis of works by Muḥammad b. Ṭūlūn and Yūsuf b. Ḥasan b. 'Abd al-Hādī), ed. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Khalīl al-Shaybānī al-Mawṣilī (Beirut, 1999), vol. I, 373.

ing and evening in the *zāwiya*. The *nāzir* (director of the endow-
ment) should read portions from the Qur'ān with the Sufis (*fuqarā'*)
every night after the evening prayer and the *dhikr* ritual. The founder
and his descendants would receive the (religious) reward for these
pious deeds. One can speculate that the son of that oppressive amir
felt the need to atone for his father's life-style, using the property
he had inherited from him to support a Sufi *zāwiya* in the remote
Ḥawrān region. His insistence on the daily Qur'ān reading after the
dhikr ceremony and the evening prayer is an indication of his inten-
tion to keep the Sufis firmly within the fold of orthodox Islam.

There are more founders of *awqāf* whose fathers or grandfathers
could have been mamluks, such as al-Ḥājj Sharaf al-Dīn Mūsā b.
Shādī al-Turkmānī, Aḥmad b. Sunqur, al-Nāṣiri Muḥammad b.
Tashbughā, or 'Alī b. Muḥammad b. Qorqmāz.[21] Yet, as has been
said above, there may be doubts whether all the men behind these
Turkish names were really mamluks.

The Manjak family were a special case of *awlād nās*. The head of
this aristocratic family was Sayf al-Dīn Manjak (d. 776/1374) a Mamluk
governor of Damascus. His grandson, Nāṣir al-Dīn Manjak, became
extremely rich and bought lands and founded two mosques outside
of Damascus, in the Maydān al-Qaṣab and al-Qubaybāt quarters.
The family maintained its strong standing with the Mamluk author-
ities. Later, the family was prominent under the Ottomans.[22] Our
sources are filled with information about vast *awqāf* founded by the
family, as well as by others for the support of mosques that are
named after them. The following is an example of one of the fam-
ily's religious projects. In the year 830 al-Nāṣiri Muḥammad b. al-
Ṣārimī Ibrāhīm b. Manjak established a *waqf* for the mosque at
Maydan al-Ḥaṣā. The document specifies the salaries of the *imām*,
the *khaṭīb*, the porter, the custodian, nine *mu'adhdhin*s, a *ḥadīth* reader,
etc. On the floor that was on the level of the water fountain (*sabīl*)
a Qur'ān school (*maktab*) for ten orphans (a standard number at the
time) had been established, with a budget to support them and their
shaykh. The houses north of the mosque were prepared to serve as
a residence for ten Sufis and a shaykh to teach them. The *waqfiyya*

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[21] See *ALD*, fols. 37b, 45b, 61a. *TD* no. 393, 182.
[22] M.A. Bakhit, *The Ottoman Province of Damascus in the Sixteenth Century* (Beirut,
1982), 189–90.

goes on to give details about the necessary expenses that would be
needed to maintain this religious complex. The family also founded
a separate Sufi *zāwiya*.[23]

Mamluk families and Mamluk women as visible in the waqf *documents*

One of the most striking characteristics of Mamluk society in the
Province of Damascus that emerges from the *waqf* documents is the
cohesiveness of Turkish-Mamluk families and their households. They
lived as an ethnic and socio-economic elite, and were less integrated
socially in the local, Arabic-speaking, elite than is often assumed. Of
course, because the mamluks' sons no longer belonged to the ruling
military class, this solidarity weakened naturally in the second gen-
eration that lost its Turkish characteristics. That the mamluks took
measures to provide for the economic future of their children and
descendants by *awqāf* is predictable, and abundantly clear from our
documents as well.

The mamluks' Turkishness in speech[24] and personal names set
them apart from their Arabic-speaking subjects. Mamluk status was
a one-generation phenomenon, however. As a general rule, the mam-
luks gave their children typical Muslim (that is, Arabic) names,
Muḥammad, Aḥmad and Maḥmūd being the most common choices.
And yet, our sources show that some of the *awlād al-nās* were given
Turkish names. A daughter of the Mamluk amir Baybars al-Jāliqī
was called Gerildi Khātūn.[25] Another case is the daughter of amir
Jānbek al-Ḥamrāwī (or al-Ḥamzāwī) who founded a *waqf* for her
son, Timūrbāy b. al-Sayfī Mughlabāy (or Muʿlabāy).[26]

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[23] *ALD*, fols. 8b, 68b, 105a; *TD* no. 393, 7 (in which the Manjaki amir creates
a charity fund and the rest for his two wives, both of them Turkish (Telek Khātūn
and Yılğan Khātūn). *Ibid.*, p. 17 (a whole village in the Karak region is a *waqf* for
the family's two mosques in Damascus. *Ibid.*, p. 49 (a mill and orchards are for a
waqf on a *zāwiya*.

[24] Even when they were Circassians who only learned to speak Turkish after they
arrived in Egypt and Syria!

[25] *ALD*, fol. 56b. This woman established in the year 737 a family and a char-
itable *waqf*. It was still active under the Ottomans; the evidence of the *khaṭīb* of the
Umayyad mosque and other Muslims confirmed its validity.

[26] *TD* no. 393, 133.

In addition to the famous solidarity of Mamluk factions, the *waqf* documents show the strength of solidarity, commitment and support within Mamluk families. One would like to know more about how the strong ties between brothers, sisters, cousins, nephews and other family relatives were maintained within a recruiting system according to which, in principle, every imported mamluk arrived as an isolated individual. It stands to reason that the slave traffic which brought mamluks and slave girls into the Sultanate did not disrupt all families, but brought members of the same families in clusters, at least in many cases. The pious endowments also reveal the loyalty to the memory of the mamluk's master by donating *waqf* funds to institutions associated with him. Yet this kind of donation usually falls in the category of the delayed *waqf*, operative only after the founder's family died out. This attitude, which is also supported by self-interest, applies to "Mamluk" women as well as to men.

For example, a woman, named Elchibāy bint ʿAbdullāh al-Yaḥyāwī, founded in the year 908 a *waqf* for herself and then for her brother's son. The brother is called Dawlatbāy, a mamluk, and his son, al-Zaynī Manṣūr. The *waqf* provides financial support also to her nephew's children and to her own manumitted slaves. Finally, if no one remains, the funds should go to the *turba* of Qānṣūh al-Yaḥyāwī outside the Bāb al-Jābiya in Damascus. Qānṣūh al-Yaḥyāwī was a governor (*nāʾib al-salṭana*) of Damascus who died in Shawwāl 902. The woman had a Turkish name, and was most probably Qānṣūh's concubine, hence her *nisba* al-Yaḥyāwī, unusual with regard to women. At the time of the Ottoman inspection of the *awqāf*, the *waqf* property, a village in the Biqāʿ valley, was under the control of Manṣūr b. Dawlatbāy, technically one of *awlād al-nās*.[27]

Another typical example: Ardabesh Bek issued a *waqfiyya* in the year 918. It was a family *waqf* for himself, his children, his brother Tīmūr Bek, his sister Yalmās (reading uncertain), and his nephew Qāyitbāy. Only then came the turn of the founder's own children and their progeny. After them were covered his own manumitted slaves and their progeny, and finally the manumitted slaves of his master Sībāy, the governor of Damascus, and their descendants. In another *waqfiyya*, granted at the same year, the beneficiaries were the

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[27] *Ibid.*, fol. 56b.

founder himself, his children, his brother, and finally, Sībāy's *madrasa*. Four years later, Ardabesh Bek issued another *waqfiyya*, providing support for his own *turba* and also, at the end, Sībāy's *madrasa* again.[28]

The central role of women as founders and administrators of *waqf* is well attested. Our documents reaffirm this general fact. The percentage of the women in the registers of the Province of Damascus who owned private property (*milk*), converted it into *awqāf*, administered it, laid claims to *milk* and *waqf* privileges, and were named as beneficiaries of *waqf* funds is very high indeed. In one case, a *waqf* established in the year 830 by Zaynab bint Shāms al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī, was a century later under the control of a woman who was her descendant after five generations. The documents mention the names of all five women while no men's names are given.[29]

Since mamluks are the subject of present paper, the following discussion will deal only with women who were Turkish slaves themselves, or who belonged to Mamluk families and households. Again, it is easy to recognize a "Mamluk" female slave by her Turkish name and the appellation "bint ʿAbdullāh". Several female slaves were called by Arabic rather than Turkish names, but not names that would be given to freeborn women.[30] According to our sample, mamluks' wives and concubines were predominantly, though not exclusively, Turks (or Circassian) like themselves, who had been imported to the Mamluk Empire by slave traders. Although in the Mamluk regime it was unthinkable that a civilian would own a mamluk, there is evidence of Turkish slave women as the concubines (*jawārī*, singular *jāriya*) of rich civilians. As far as our evidence shows, those Turkish concubines were for all practical purposes considered as their master's wives; sometimes they were referred to as *zawja*, a legally married wife. The following example demonstrates the point. A founder of a *waqf* (in 901) stipulates in his *waqfiyya*, among other things, that his wife (*zawja*) Zaynab (a common Arabic name) will be given 720 dirhams each year. Exactly the same amount goes to Malakbāy (a Turkish sounding name) bint ʿAbdullāh, his *umm walad*, a maid who had borne a son to her master.[31]

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[28] *Ibid.*, fol. 91a–b.
[29] *Ibid.*, fol. 95b.
[30] Faraḥ al-nās bint ʿAbdullāh, *ibid.*, fol. 23a; Sitt al-Awwal, *TD* no. 393, 43.
[31] *Ibid.*, fol. 3a.

In another case, a civilian stipulated in a *waqfiyya* that his *jāriya*, Savarbāy bint 'Abdullāh, be paid 800 dirhams annually. His children would receive whatever remains.[32] In a similar case, al-Najmī Yaḥyā b. Muḥammad al-Madanī willed his property as *waqf* to his wife Sakarbāy bint 'Abdullāh.[33] Another Turkish *jāriya* who was manumitted, Azwān Khātūn by name, previously in possession of a civilian, founded her own *waqf*.[34] Yet it seems that such cases were rare. In most cases, the Turkish *jawārī* became wives and concubines of Mamluk amirs.

The determination of the *waqf* founders, regardless whether they were mamluks or civilians, to care for the future of women in their families is obvious from the provisions of the *waqfiyya*s. In many documents the portions of what women obtained from the estate through *waqf* were explicitly higher than what they would have received by the Qur'ānic laws of inheritance (*bi'l-'irth al-shar'ī*). The reverse did occur, but was considerably rarer. The general impression is that the interests of the women in families were at least as close to the founder's mind as those of his sons. It is possible, of course, that the sons got their share through the mechanism of *shar'ī* inheritance or by other means. Our documents certainly do not give the entire picture. It was evidently realized that widows and unmarried daughters whose fathers had died might more than men need the economic safety that the *waqf* could provide. The same applies to *'utaqā'*, manumitted slaves.

An amir called Tanam b. 'Abdullāh min Sībāy (indicating that he had been a mamluk of Sībāy, the governor of Damascus) provided in his *waqf* document financial support for his wife Balqīs, who was also his female cousin. Her name appeared first before other beneficiaries, including his children.[35] In another *waqf*, established in 917, the amir Azbak (Özbek) b. 'Abdullāh al-Sayfī Qachmās set up a family *waqf* for himself, his wife (*zawja*) Jān Sivār (Jan Sever) and their daughter Satīta. The *waqf* provided financial support also for Jān Ḥabīb, his manumitted female slave (*'atīqa*). After the family became extinct (*ba'd al-inqirāḍ*), the revenues would go to the Turbat

[32] *Ibid.*, fol. 119a.
[33] *TD* no. 393, fol. 111.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 41.
[35] *ALD*, fol. 5b.

al-Qachmāsiyya and Turbat Īnāl. This amir was obviously a mam-
luk of Qachmās al-Ẓāhirī, the governor of Damascus from 886 until
his death in 892. Qachmās built a *turba* and a *madrasa* that were
named after him. When the Ottoman bureaucracy surveyed the enti-
tlements decades later, the clerk noted that the property, which was
12/24 (half the revenues) of a village, was now in the hands of the
above-mentioned women, both wives (*zawjatāni*) of the founder.[36]

In the year 921, amir Tīmūr Bāy b. ʿAbdullāh al-Yaḥyāwī granted
a *waqf* for his daughter Faraj and her mother (*sic*) Sulṭān Bāy, also
a Turkish former slave girl. In the year 947, already under the
Ottoman rule, the same Faraj founded her own *waqf*.[37]

Khushqadam min Sībāy, another former mamluk of the governor
made a *waqfiyya* for his wife Wardqān (unclear in the text, but cer-
tainly a Turkish name) and his daughter Balqīs (a favorite name).
When the family no longer existed, the revenues were to go to the
*ribāṭ*s in al-Madina. No other beneficiaries are mentioned.[38] What is
remarkable in this short document (it is really only a summary) is
the date of the *waqfiyya*—925 (1519), three years after the Ottoman
conquest of Syria. Several Arab writers praised the Ottomans at the
time for respecting the *awqāf* that had been established by the
Circassian mamluks, their fallen enemies.[39] Since the Ottomans wished
to respect the *Sharīʿa*, it should have been self-evident. Yet, recog-
nizing legally established *awqāf* that had been founded before the
Ottoman Empire annexed the Arab lands is one thing, permitting
mamluks or members of their families to make new *waqf*s from mam-
luks' private properties is another. Nonetheless, there is evidence of
such new *awqāf* dating from 927, 932, 928, 936, 946 and even 947.[40]
This lenient approach on the part of the Ottoman administration
can be explained by the Empire's policy with regard to Syria. The
number of mamluks in Syria was always much smaller than in Egypt.
After the Ottoman conquest, the number of surviving mamluks must
have been very small (in contrast to the situation in Egypt), and they

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[36] *Ibid.*, fol. 110a.
[37] TD no. 393, p. 132; *ibid.*, 226.
[38] *Ibid.*, 56.
[39] See, for example, Muḥammad al-Isḥāqī, *Kitāb akhbār al-uwal fīmā taṣarrafa fī
Miṣr min arbāb al-duwal* (Cairo, n.d.), 305–307. Several Arab writers who praise the
religiosity of the Ottomans are mentioned in my *Egyptian Society Under Ottoman Rule,
1517–1798* (London and New York, 1992), 29–30.
[40] *ALD*, fol. 5b; *TD* no. 393, 14, 38, 95, 226.

did not pose any threat to Istanbul. It is true that Jānbirdī al-Ghazālī, the Mamluk amir who was appointed by Sultan Selīm as the Ottoman governor of greater Syria (not only the Province of Damascus), rebelled against Süleymān when the young sultan ascended the throne (end of 1520–early 1521). But this was a personal revolt, not a Mamluk uprising, and it was crushed immediately.

Now we must discuss the activity of Mamluk women as founders of *awqāf*. From the *waqf* documents, the role of women in Mamluk families as active providers for the economic future of themselves and other members of their families emerges prominently. The following examples illustrate the point. While promoting the religious values of the community at large by pious endowments, women took care to ensure the interests and reputation of their Mamluk households.

Jān Sivār (Sever) bint ʿAbdullāh, a manumitted slave girl of Yilbāy had a *milk* of 6/24 (a quarter) of the revenues of the Dayr al-ʿAṣāfīr village in the Marj region.[41] In the year 928 (6 years after the Ottoman conquest) Faraḥ al-Nās bint ʿAbdullāh converted a mill on the al-Aʿwaj river in Wādī al-ʿAjam, which was her *milk*, into a *waqf* for al-Sharafī Maḥmūd b. Özbek and his progeny. It is not known what her relationship to the recipient was, but this is a case of a former *jāriya* making a donation for one of the *awlād al-nās*.[42]

The wife of a high-ranking Mamluk amir, Ṣanṭbāy al-Ḥājib by name, made a *waqf* for herself and then their son (significantly, the text says only "her son"), al-Nāṣiri Muḥammad b. Ṣanṭbāy. She also wills an income for another mamluk's son, called Nāṣir al-Dīn b. Sunqur. It is not clear what he was to her. Half of the *waqf*'s income was to be paid to these two men and the other half to her manumitted slaves and for charity. The *waqfiyya*'s date is 936 (1529 or 1530).[43] It is interesting to note that in the year 919, Ṣanṭbāy al-Ḥājib himself founded a much richer *waqf* for his two sons, the above-mentioned al-Nāṣirī Muḥammad and al-Shihābī Aḥmad, who was not mentioned in his widow's *waqfiyya*. It is possible that he fathered him by another woman.

Kamā (reading uncertain) Khātūn bint Aybak b. ʿAbdullāh granted a *waqf* for her son Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Özdemir, subsequently

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[41] *ALD*, fol. 7a.
[42] *Ibid.*, fol. 23a.
[43] *Ibid.*, fol. 59a.

for his children, and finally for her and her father's manumitted slaves. This is a case of a Mamluk amir's daughter who was married to a mamluk. Neither her husband nor his slaves are mentioned in the *waqfiyya*, only hers and her father's.[44]

Another former slave girl, called Jān Sivār, who gave birth to the child of Bard Bek (*mustawladat* Bard Bek) set up a *waqf* for her sister (*shaqīqa*, having the same parents) Jān Ḥabīb, a former slave girl of Sībāy.[45] Several women of Mamluk families founded their own *turba*s or donated money through *waqf* to support *turba*s established by their relatives.[46]

There is a rare record of a *waqfiyya* granted in 866 of a Mamluk couple establishing *together* a pious foundation, which was unusual. Gömüshbugha and his wife Aq Melek bint 'Abdullāh made a *waqf* for themselves and for their (*sic*) children. After their family died out, part of the revenues was to be given to the soup kitchen, another portion to buy bread for the (poor) residents of the Umayyad mosque, and another for the poor residents of the *ribāṭ*s in al-Madina, and to the founders' manumitted slaves.[47]

Acknowledging the limitations of information in these *waqf* registers, one still may venture certain general observations about the size of families, Mamluk and civilian, by using the information provided by the documents. It seems that families (not households, which include persons other than the biological family) were rather small. If a man or women named their children, sons and girls, in a legal document as beneficiaries of the *waqf* they were establishing, it can be assumed that they did not omit names. Only rarely more than three or four names of children were mentioned. The number of children in Mamluk families that appear in the *waqfiyya*s was not larger than civilian families. Indeed, the reverse seems to be the case. As to the number of wives, in practice, it was also limited to two, and that already included the *jawārī* (slavewomen), who, as shown above, enjoyed the same privileges as the *zawjāt* (legally married wives), and were often referred to as such. This indicates that almost all men, even those who belonged to the wealthy elite, usually dispensed with

[44] *ALD*, fol. 64a.
[45] *TD* no. 393, 126.
[46] See, for example, *ibid.*, 33, 43, 97.
[47] *Ibid.*, 22, *ALD*, fol. 93a.

their right to be married to four wives simultaneously and to keep indefinite number of concubines. The only time I have encountered a text which explicitly mentions more than two wives is a *waqfiyya* made in the year 919 by Arkmās, the governor of Damascus, who provided clothes and money after his death to "his wives and concubines who had borne him children (*zawjātuhu wa-mustawladātuhu*—in the Arabic plural), as long as they remain unmarried".[48] Even in this isolated case it, is not clear whether the plural form was used with regard to specific women (no names are mentioned), or whether it was a general statement to cover future eventualities in the amir's life.

Concluding remarks

The limitations of the sources for this study notwithstanding, the *waqf* (and the less frequent *milk* documents) offer a perspective on the mamluks and their families, which is not available from other sources. In many cases, the *waqfiyyāt* themselves have not survived, and all we have are summaries of the originals. Sometimes the Ottoman bureaucrats who prepared the registers did not see the *waqfiyya* itself and they had to rely on *maḥḍar*, the qadi's court records, or in some cases on other documents and witnesses. Yet, the documents seem orderly and accurate overall and enable us to see social and economic aspects of the wealthy people in the province of Damascus who could afford to establish *awqāf*. As *waqf* researchers are well aware, these documents can serve as informative sources for the history of education, religious institutions, urban history and the like. I am preparing a more comprehensive study in which I hope to use the documents for some of these subjects. In this paper I have attempted to focus on the mamluks themselves and have not discussed other *waqf* founders, notably the 'ulama', bureaucrats or merchants.

The fact that, in the view of the entire Mamluk elite—from the sultans down—the relevant space for creating *khayrī awqāf* from Syrian resources was Syria, *Bilād al-Shām*, and in this case the Province of Damascus, generally to the exclusion of Egypt, the center of the empire, is striking.

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[48] *TD* no. 393, 17. See his short biographical notice in *Muf'at al-adhhān* (see note 20 above) vol. I, 299–300.

There are indications, however, that the amirs were less inclined than the civilian elite to invest in purely residential institutions, such as mosques and school associated with a certain quarter or *madhhab*. This is not surprising, given their self-view as orthodox rulers of the whole population. Yet the mamluks did donate *waqf*s for the benefit of charity, education and religion. They seem to have preferred institutions on which there was a "consensus", such as the Umayyad mosque, *awqāf al-Ḥaramayni al-Sharīfayni* and Jerusalem and Hebron. They emphasized naturally the mosques, schools and *turba*s established by themselves or their masters. The subject requires further research.

The family *awqāf* and the *dhurrī* components of the *khayrī* foundations reveal important aspects of the Mamluk military society in late Mamluk Syria. We are considering not only individual mamluks or Mamluk factions, which are so important in understanding Mamluk politics, but families with widespread Mamluk (Turkish, even if these "Turks" were Circassian at the time) ties, common interests and loyalties that are reflected in the ways in which *waqf* funds were allocated. The Mamluk identities merged with family ties.

The centrality of women in creating and administering *awqāf* is well known, and obvious also in our documents regarding women with "Mamluk" background, as well as civilians. The women in Mamluk families fully exercised their economic and social power to enhance the solidarity of their families and households. We know from various studies of Mamluk society that mamluks married either women of a background similar to theirs, or daughters of the wealthy civilian elite. In our *waqf* documents at least, the women who were married to mamluks were predominantly former slave girls or, in some cases, daughters of mamluks. I have found very few other women. On the other hand, there are cases of former slave girls with Turkish names who were wives and concubines of rich civilians.

Finally, according the evidence of the *waqf* documents, I have ventured the generalization that the average Mamluk family was small. Frequently, only one wife was mentioned, and almost never more than two, including concubines. The number of children in the *waqfiyya*s was also low, rarely more than three, including daughters. The general impression is that civilians had more children than mamluks. This, too, is a preliminary impression that needs further investigation.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE LAST MAMLUK HOUSEHOLD

Thomas Philipp

The appearance of fully functioning, power wielding mamluks in Bilād al-Shām at the end of the eighteenth century was certainly an oddity. The Mamluk system in Syria had vanished with the conquest of the Ottomans. In sharp contrast to the situation in Egypt there also occurred later no resurrection of the system under Ottoman sovereignty. Why and how the Mamluk system should have survived and reorganized itself in Ottoman Egypt and how the mamluks there could again take over power, albeit recognizing officially the Ottoman Sultan—has been discussed extensively by Winter.[1] He argues that from early on the Ottomans had decided to use the mamluks in Egypt for their own administrative and military purposes. When the weakness of the Ottoman Empire reached its nadir in the eighteenth century the mamluks used the opportunity to regain almost all their power in Egypt. Winter adds that especially for the early period of Ottoman rule much about the fate of the mamluks remains conjecture because of the dearth of information.

After the conquest of Syria the Ottomans experimented also there briefly with coopting the mamluks. Jānbirdī al-Ghazālī was appointed governor of Damascus. But when he rebelled upon the news of the death of Selim I his resistance was quickly crushed by the Ottomans. Southern Syria was reorganized into different provinces and sancaqs while the officials and governors were appointed from among the Ottomans, not the mamluks. From then on we do not hear of any mamluks in Syria for the next 250 years.

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[1] Michael Winter "Military connections between Egypt and Syria (including Palestine) in the early Ottoman period" in: Cohen, A. and Baer, G. *Egypt and Palestine*, New York, 1984, 139–149; "The re-emergence of the mamluks following the Ottoman conquest" in: T. Philipp and U. Haarmann (eds.). *The mamluks in Egyptian politics and society*, Cambridge, 1998, 67–107.

It is perhaps easier to tackle the question why there occurred no re-emergence of mamluks in Ottoman Syria than to answer the question why, indeed, they did re-emerge in Egypt. The first point that comes to mind is that the mamluk realm always had its center in Egypt. Syria was administered by mamluks sent from Egypt and mostly returning to Egypt again.[2] Once the mamluks had lost their sovereignty in Egypt, they obviously could not project their power to Syria. While the Ottomans chose to keep the administrative system of Egypt unchanged they reorganized Syria. In Egypt seven military corps were organized, one of them manned by the defeated mamluks, paving the way for the later "mamlukization" of the Egyptian army.[3] In Syria Janissaries and Timariots constituted the new army. In addition, the importance of Egypt over Syria was signified by the size of the local Ottoman armies: while in Egypt the army counted in the sixteenth century between 10,000 to 15,000 men in Syria it had only one tenth the size.[4] To the greater demands for manpower by the army in Egypt was added the Ottoman unwillingness (practically a taboo) to use Egyptians or, for that matter, local Arabs anywhere, in the Ottoman army. In the ethnically very homogeneous Egypt this taboo forced the authorities to make use of the mamluks and tolerate the imports of new mamluks. In Syria one always could, in case of need, mobilize auxiliary troops among the Kurds, local Turkmens and possibly even Druze.

The appearance of mamluks in Syria, in Acre to be more precise, at the end of the eighteenth century occurred, ironically, at the very moment when the Mamluk system in Egypt began to disintegrate.[5] But it is also the one moment in neo-Mamluk history when the Egyptian mamluks reached again for Syria: When ʿAlī Bey al-Kabīr forged an alliance with Ḍāhir al-ʿUmar in 1770 and sent troops against the Ottoman *wālī* of Damascus. Eventually the mamluks in Acre outlasted the Egyptian mamluk system by a decade. If

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[2] Boaz Shoshan, "On the relations between Egypt and Palestine 1382–1517 A.D." in: Cohen, A. and Baer, G. (eds.) *Egypt and Palestine*, 94–101; Peter M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent 1516–1922*, Ithaca, 1966, 33–45.

[3] Winter, "Military Connections", 140.

[4] *Ibid.*, 142.

[5] For the reasons of this disintegration see Daniel Crecelius, "The Mamluk beylicate of Egypt in the last decades before its destruction by Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha in 1811" and Thomas Philipp "Personal loyalty and political power of the mamluks in the eighteenth century." Both in: Philipp and Haarmann, *op. cit.*

it did not sound too pedantic we could call them the post-neo-mamluks but we shall simply speak of the last mamluk household that wielded effective political power.

In the early seventies of the eighteenth century we hear for the first time of the appearance of the man in Syria who was to be the founder of the Mamluk household in Acre: Aḥmad Bey al-Jazzār, later better known as Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār. It is not surprising that he should have been a mamluk from Egypt, the only place where the system still existed.

In a way Aḥmad Bey's career in Egypt was already symptomatic for the disintegration of the Mamluk system. He came from a for mamluks untypical region: the Balkan, not the Caucasus. It is also not very likely that he came as a slave, and he certainly was already over twenty when he arrived in Egypt.[6] Eventually, however, the mamluks in Egypt accepted him as one of their own and he did acquire two essential Mamluk qualities: he became a superb warrior and he developed a fierce loyalty toward his mamluk masters and comrades. It was indeed this latter quality which made him refuse to participate in a treasonable plot and consequently forced him to flee from Egypt. When he surfaced, after some meandering, in Lebanon he had no claim to more than the clothes on his back. But as a true soldier of fortune he made his career in the shifting alliances, the intrigues, and the wars between Ḍāhir al-ʿUmar, the Druze, the governor of Damascus and the Egyptian mamluks of Abū al-Dhahab. After the death of Ḍāhir al-ʿUmar in 1775 he was appointed governor of the province of Sidon (with residence in Acre). This position he was to keep for almost thirty years until his death in 1804.

Given Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār's Mamluk background it was hardly surprising that he should have made the Mamluk patterns of military rule the principle of his own rule in Acre. He built up his own Mamluk household from which he drew his own bodyguard, his personal advisors, and trusted lieutenants who ruled various parts of the realm in his name and commanded most military expeditions. The inner circle of this group were Salīm Pasha al-Kabīr (the Elder), Salīm Pasha al-Ṣaghīr (the Younger), Sulaymān Pasha al-ʿĀdil, and ʿAlī Aghā Khāzindār. Apparently all were of Georgian origin and

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[6] For his biography, especially in Egypt, see ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī ʿAjāʾib al-āthar fī ʾl-tarājim waʾl-akhbār, vol. III, 321.

had been bought by or given to al-Jazzār in Egypt,[7] though it is not clear when and how they reached him in Acre. During al-Jazzār's first years in Syria, after 1770 and before becoming governor of Sidon, we do not hear of them. Yet his emotional attachment to this group of mamluks must have been very close. When his first mamluk, Salīm Pasha the Elder, died of the plague in 1786, al-Jazzār "cried like a child."[8] He was profoundly shaken by the rebellion of his mamluks in 1789, but when one of its leaders, Sulaymān Pasha, returned to him thirteen years later, he received him like a lost son. Al-Jazzār's mamluks were somewhat apart from, and above all other units. They served as guards of the palace and the treasury, as commanders of various units and of specific military campaigns, or as *mutasallim*s (temporary governors) in various cities, and formed a typical Mamluk household with al-Jazzār its head; hence their particular loyalty to al-Jazzār and his trust in them.

Recently it has been seriously questioned,[9] whether the appearance of the so-called neo-mamluks in Ottoman Egypt implied indeed a reemergence of the Mamluk system of old or whether this was rather part of a much more general phenomenon, namely, the Ottoman household, understood as a "patron-client and kinship grouping, both for political solidarity and economic activity."[10] It was "neither rigidly defined nor a static entity" and "evolved to serve the needs of a highly competitive society that frequently received new members from far-flung places."[11] Military and administrative elites, freeman and Mamluk, local elements and newcomers were integrated in it. Widening the concept from a strictly Mamluk military household of the Middle Ages to an Ottman household of the kind described above has its advantages. The concept certainly reflects

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[7] Ibrāhīm al-ʿAwra, *Tārīkh wilāyat Sulaymān Bāshā al-ʿĀdil*, Sidon 1936, 14 claims that Salīm the Elder had come with him from Egypt and that Salīm the Younger was a present from Ibrāhīm Bey al-Kabīr. But on p. 111 al-ʿAwra himself writes that al-Jazzār bought all of them only after he had settled in Acre; Ḥaydar Aḥmad Shihāb, *Tārīkh Aḥmad Bāshā al-Jazzār*, Beirut 1955, p. 87. Hananya Munayyir, *al-Durr al-marūf fī tārīkh al-Shūf*, al-Mashriq 69 (1955), p. 265 claims he came with a slave, a mamluk and a groom.

[8] Archives Nationales, Affaires étrangères, Paris (AN AE) B1 979, CC Acre, May 1, 1786.

[9] Jane Hathaway *The politics of households in Ottoman Egypt* (Cambridge, 1997), see especially ch. II and the Conclusion.

[10] *Ibid.*, 169.

[11] *Ibid.*, 21.

much better the reality of the household in Acre. As we had seen it was even doubtful whether al-Jazzār himself was a mamluk properly speaking. In one source he is even quoted as claiming that he always was a free man and hence disliked by the Mamluk establishment.[12] Though he later acquired other mamluks, he also bought or hired a variety of other troops. Numerically the mamluks were always a minority in al-Jazzār's household and seemed to have vanished after their rebellion in 1789. Sulaymān Pasha, al-Jazzār's successor, rebuilt the system but also hired mercenaries and concluded alliances with the Metualis and Druze and used their tribal forces. Administrators of local origin also belonged to the household in Acre. ʿAbdallāh Pasha finally included also elements of local elites in his household.

Notwithstanding the argument that these were not Mamluk households in the classical sense,[13] it is important to point out that their members considered themselves mamluks and referred to themselves as such. If this was "a calculated, if genuinely felt, nostalgia,"[14] as Hathaway claims, it was, nevertheless, a politically relevant sentiment. It could generate loyalties which caused al-Jazzār to risk his life. It identified political factions such as the party supporting Abū Nabbūt. Having been comrades (khushdāsh) under the same chief (ustādh) legitimized competing claims to power as was the case with ʿAlī Aghā Khāzindār, Abū Nabbūt and Sulaymān Pasha. The mamluks under al-Jazzār and then again under Sulaymān Pasha self-consciously styled themselves as mamluks and over long periods they were the decisive element in the household in Acre. It seems, therefore, not unreasonable to call this particular "patron-clients and kinship grouping" a Mamluk household even if it did not reproduce the classical form of that model.

In a more general manner Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār subscribed to the principle of using only imported soldiery. In contrast to his predecessor, Ḍāhir al-ʿUmar, he never entered alliances with local tribal

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[12] "The serving [low ranking] Mamluk race did not like anybody to serve their master who was not one of them, lest he would take precedence over them, because he was a free man. He [al-Jazzār] was a free man, a Bosnian . . ." This might, however, have been a strictly selfserving statement, to explain why he left Egypt. Mishāqā, 5. (I am translating here from the Arabic version, as the English translation is totally garbled at this point.)

[13] Maybe even the classical Mamluk households were much more porous and flexible than they appear today in the retrospective view.

[14] Hathaway, 170.

forces nor did he try to mobilize other local forces.[15] He hired
Maghrebi mercenaries, bought Albanian soldiers (both Christian and
Muslim), and relied on Bosnian troops. He also hired some of the
former Dalāt cavalry troops which had been officially dissolved by
the Ottoman sultan. A small group of Kurds under their leader Ṭāhā
became responsible—in as so far as such distinction was made at
all—for internal security, i.e., they ran the prisons and carried out
tortures and executions. How large was this army of al-Jazzār? As
so often in our attempt to reconstruct the history of the period, we
encounter the greatest difficulties when searching for some quanti-
tative information. We do not have any record of the troops them-
selves, their employment, or their provisions. French consuls and
Arab monk chroniclers were not usually eyewitnesses to battles and
warfare in general. Chroniclers and later historians supply us with
numbers whose roundness alone must make us suspicious. Whether
the numbers of participants in a battle, the numbers killed, wounded,
or prisoners—they are all guesses, often with the purpose of empha-
sizing the might or the courage of one side. We have one eyewitness'
report by the French consul Renaudot describing the caravan-cum-
parade of troops when Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār left Acre to assume,
for the first time, the position of *wālī* of Damascus. He was at the
peak of his power, and all the political and economic signs promised
a great future for al-Jazzār. Leaving Acre for Damascus he was
demonstrating his might. An important moment, and it is worth
giving the description in full.

The caravan left Acre on 18 April 1785. It included 400 camels
and 200 mules with baggage. Seventy-five banners[16] of the Maghrebi
infantry were followed by fifty-four banners of the Albanians, each
group with its own music. Twenty banners of mounted Maghrebis
and some 300 Dalāt marching in pairs were next. Four field can-
nons and baggage carriages drawn by mules followed, together with
twenty artillery men on camels equipped with fuses.

> Une bande des santons et prophéts burlesquement accoutrés qui por-
> taient tous les attributes de démence, en avoient les mascers et leurs
> chansons s'en ressentoient bien qu'elles fussent à la gloire de Dgezzar
> qui suivait immediament avec Selim et ses grands officiers de sa maison.

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[15] Only once, during the mutiny of his mamluks, did he arm craftsmen and other
people in Acre. See below.
[16] A banner consisted of ten soldiers.

The litter of the Pasha was accompanied by nine hand-led horses. Musical bands followed and "100 mamluks curassés, bardis de fer, ayant les casques en tête et la visier basse." The parade was concluded by 200 slaves mounted and bizarrely dressed, armed with rifles, two pistols, a sword, a dagger, and some even with hatchets. Renaudot commented:

> tout cet appareil avait quelques choses de fort ridicule pour un homme accoutumé aux évolutions d'arms. Mais les gens du pays en etoient effrayés. Dgezzar lui même, quoique bon comedien, paraissait étonné de la grandeur de spectacle.[17]

The total was somewhat more than two thousand troops plus the baggage train, apparently enough to establish his authority in Damascus. How many more troops can we assume would have been left to garrison Acre, Sidon, Beirut, and perhaps in the Metuali region and assisting Amīr Yūsuf in the Mountain as well? Even a generous estimate could not more than triple the number at the time to reach a total of perhaps six thousand troops. We have a variety of estimates by eyewitnesses and other contemporaries but none of them indicates by which methods such numbers were reached. Volney in 1784 estimated all troops to consist of 900 Bosnian horsemen and 1,000 Maghrebi infantry. This would mean that practically the whole army participated in the expedition to Damascus. This seems extremely unlikely, and other sources indicate that in earlier years the army probably was larger. Most estimates, and this constitutes another difficulty, relate to specific military actions without telling us how many troops were left elsewhere in al-Jazzār's realm. When al-Jazzār, who himself rarely left Acre for military operations, sent troops for one battle or another the Arab chronists most frequently use the terms "he appointed" (*ʿayyana*), "collected" (*jammaʿa*), "equipped" (*jahhaza*) troops (*ʿaskar*)—which makes it sound almost as if he *raised* new troops each time. This is unlikely but perhaps partially true, especially considering the high casualties of his troops in many lost battles. We know he imported troops directly from the Balkans, hired Maghrebi and Dalāt troops locally, and bought individual mamluks. In the early years at least he also paid them well, so that they felt a certain amount of gratitude and loyalty to him.[18] How many of

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[17] AN AE B1 979, April 30, 1785.
[18] AN AE B1 1040, July 21, 1784.

these were demobilized after a particular military campaign, how
many belonged to a standing army, what were the losses?

We shall probably never know the precise numbers but estimates,
coming from different sources, albeit some copied from each other,
seem to be fairly consistent. An upper limit of 7,000 to 8,000 troops
altogether appears to have been the rule. Military expeditions of a
1,000–2,000 seem to have been logistically sustainable; corps larger
than this were rather the exception. This means in any case a reg-
ular army three to four times as large as any Ḍāhir al-ʿUmar had
commanded. In contrast to the latter's army it saw almost continu-
ous action.

The vaguely ethnic character of the units had its advantages. It
served as an organizing principle of the army and it guaranteed a
minimum of loyalty and cooperation within these units. Typically
their immediate commanders were of the same origin and could suc-
cessfully establish some discipline. In fact it was they who com-
manded the loyalty of the troops, rather than the governor of Sidon
who paid for them. But this arrangement also had its shortcomings.
Troops of similar background and origin confronting each other on
opposing sides in a battle were liable to refuse fighting. Dalāt troops
refused to fight when facing other Dalāt units on the opposing side.
In another incident Dalāt troops of al-Jazzār accepted orders from
a Dalāt commander on the Damascus side, because most of the
officers of the Dalāt troops "were his protégés."[19] Any expeditionary
corps containing troops from more than one of the above-mentioned
ethnic units risked an outbreak of fighting between them. Joint mil-
itary expeditions between troops of Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār and the
Druze of whichever faction was momentarily allied with him can
serve as an example: Returning from one such expedition in 1795
the troops under Amīr Bashīr's command, Druze and Maghrebis,
broke into a fight over the distribution of booty they had collected
in the Mountain. In the following mêlée 500 people were killed. A
few days later the two sides attacked each other again and another
300 lost their lives.[20] A year earlier fighting had broken out between
Dalāt troops and Maghrebis, stationed in the Mountain. When the

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[19] Shihāb, *al-Jazzār*, 139–40.
[20] Rufāʾīl Karāma, *Ḥawādith Lubnān wa-Sūriyya*, al-Bushriyya, n.d. 146.

Albanian units decided to side with the former the Maghribi troops were defeated and dispersed.

The troops were usually well paid and constituted a continuous financial burden. On occasions al-Jazzār would delay payments to Istanbul in order to pay his troops; at other times, the troops would get restless, when not receiving their pay.[21] Once firmly established in Acre, al-Jazzār also seems to have had more resources available for paying his troops. They appeared to be "*fort attachés à lui*,"[22] badly trained and undisciplined. Frequently the desire to plunder won out over military discipline and fighting spirit. In one of the many campaigns against the Druze, an Albanian unit of five to six hundred soldiers disregarded explicit orders and advanced to plunder a Druze village. They were ambushed, and 100 were killed and as many wounded.[23] We never read about any particular training. The soldiers' discipline usually was limited to a certain ethnic identity and loyalty to their immediate commanders. After each defeat or dispersal of troops Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār spent enormous sums to buy and hire new troops at the cost of economic impoverishment.

The army of al-Jazzār distinguished itself by the variety of its organization, ranking, and payment of its units. The mamluks were only one of several military units, albeit the highest ranking one, mamluks seem to have been frequently in command positions. They manned the defenses of Acre and in particular of the palace of al-Jazzār. The highest ranking mamluks were regularly entrusted with the command of military expeditions, commanded occasionally the Pilgrimage instead of him, and filled high administrative posts. They were also in a true Mamluk sense his *khushdāshiyya*, his comrades, confidants and friends. We know very little about their background, how they joint al-Jazzār's household, and when. Some were said to

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[21] AN AE B1 1037, CC Seyde, vol. XXI, March 21, 1777: "Le Pacha est pressé; il lui faut absolument de l'argent. Les troupes reclament leur solde et murmurent;" *ibid.*, April 2, 1777 "Memoire"; *Ibid.*, 1038, CC Seyde, vol. XXII, March 21, 1781: "Ses troupes s'etant déja revoltées deux fois pour le payement de leur solde, et l'ayant ménacé de s'en prendre a lui personellement, et de mettre la ville et notre kan au pillage. Les officiers de la Porte le persecutant d'un autre coté pour le payement des mirhy, et l'irritant sans cesse a force de le presser tandis qu'il n'avoit pas un sol."

[22] AN AE B1 1040, CC Seyde, vol. XXIV, July 1784: "il a mis sa confiance en ces soldats, qui, de leur coté, luy paroissent fort attachés. Il le pays assez bien, pour devoir leur inspirer des sentiments de reconaissance a son endroit."

[23] AN AE B1 1040, CC Seyde, vol. XXIV, June 2, 1784.

have accompanied him from Egypt, though there is very little evidence for that. Most he could have only bought after his governorship and the trade of Acre provided him with the necessary means to do so. Some were bought as late as 1785. We can deduce al-Jazzār's intention to train new mamluks and to establish full-fledged Mamluk household from the fact that in 1789 there lived also a number of young mamluk boys at his court. Once more, we encounter difficulties when we want to estimate the numerical size of the Mamluk establishment. We know—mainly from Ibrāhīm al 'Awra, but also some other sources—about twenty of al-Jazzār's mamluks by name. Renaudot had talked of "100 mamluks curassés." Ḥaydar Aḥmad Shihāb mentions for 1789 "seventy" mamluks being in the palace of al-Jazzār while an undetermined number was at the same time participating in a military expedition under Salīm and Sulaymān Pasha against the Druze.[24] Compared to other military units, the mamluks seem to have been few. But there can be no doubt that they were at the core of the military and administrative organisation of al-Jazzār's rule. The whole Mamluk system in Acre, however, seemed to come apart in a gigantic crisis of loyalty and rebellion.

The rebellion of the mamluks in May 1789 was—apart from the French invasion and siege of Acre—Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār's gravest military and political crisis. In many ways it was more serious since it arose from an internal threat. It apparently also affected the personality of al-Jazzār profoundly. On May 4, 1789, Salīm Pasha al-Ṣaghīr was dispatched by Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār with 2,000 cavalry troops (presumably in their majority Albanian and Bosnian) to Ḥāṣbayya to convince Amīr Yūsuf to pay his taxes. Sulaymān Pasha was sent for the same purpose with some 800 infantry troops along the coast to the north. The French consul Renaudot suspected that behind this rather large campaign lay an attempt by al-Jazzār to deflect any possible demand from Istanbul to contribute troops to the war against Russia by demonstrating the need to fight against the Druze. From Renaudot's own account it also could very well be that al-Jazzār sent his chief mamluks off on an expedition so that he could deal with the those remaining in Acre.[25]

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[24] Shihāb, *Tārīkh Aḥmad Bāshā al-Jazzār*, 92–93.
[25] Mishāqa, M., *Murder, mayhem, pillage and plunder*, Albany 1988, 39–40, makes this suspicion explicit. The two early Lebanese chroniclers, the monks Karāma and

Four days after the departure of these troops he discovered, or perhaps exposed, illicit relations between some of his mamluks and some women of his harem. He had the arms of many of the mamluks, who worked in the seraglio, cut off, and in following night he had some women drowned, "*ce qui design le motif du châtiment des premiers.*" The next morning al-Jazzār continued with his purge. With a unit of thirty Bosnian soldiers he arrested more mamluks and killed some. At this point, the remaining mamluks offered resistance and defended themselves in the treasury which was situated in the Big Tower. The *Khāzindār*, brother of Salīm Pasha, freed the imprisoned mamluks and moved with them to the tower, joining the other mamluks.[26] According to the French reports, he was pushed into action after al-Jazzār killed his beloved valet. Barricaded in the Big Tower the mamluks turned the heavy guns, placed there to defend the city against enemies, on to the seraglio itself and threatened to blast it to pieces. In the ensuing stalemate the *muftī* of Acre played a mediating role and negotiated free departure with their weapons and horses for the mamluks, about seventy to eighty altogether. Their personal belongings were to be sent after them. Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār had no choice but to let them go. Only the prepubescent mamluks remained. Al-Jazzār killed many of them and had others exiled to Egypt.[27] Under the command of the *Khāzindār* the mamluks rode to the north and linked up with Salīm Pasha and Sulaymān Pasha. After an unsuccessful attempt at reconciliation with Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār, they all decided to fight against him. They reached a truce with Amīr Yūsuf and gained the support of the commander of the Maghrebi troops in Beirut, al-Jabūrī, who had actually been ordered by al-Jazzār to deliver him the head of Salīm. Sidon, where Sulaymān Pasha had been appointed previously as *mutasallim*,

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Munayyar are remarkably uninterested in and uninformed about the internal events in Acre. The whole rebellion is barely treated. As its motive Karāma, *Hawādith*, 111, suggests that Salīm Pasha received orders from the Ottoman government to kill al-Jazzār as a rebel; al-Munayyar, *al-Durr*, p. 415, and al-Munayyar *Tārīkh*, p. 413, follow basically this story. In this case the French reports from Acre seem to be more trustworthy. They, like Shihāb, *al-Jazzār* and al-Jabartī, ʿAbd al-Raman *ʿAjāʾib al-āthar fī ʾl-tarājim wa ʾl-akhbāi*, Cairo 1879–1880, 4 vols. vol. III, 321, mention the illicit relationships between mamluks and women of the harem as the trigger for al-Jazzār's revenge which led in turn to open rebellion by the mamluk leaders in the field; see especially AN AE B1 1041, "Extrait de la correspondance entre M. Renaudot et Beaussier au sujet de l'insurrection contre Dgezzar".

[26] Shihāb, *al-Jazzār*, 92.
[27] *Ibid.*, 93; al-Jabartī, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. III, 321.

served as the base for the rebels. They then proceeded south to
Tyre, which refused to open its gates. The result was the sacking of
the town and a subsequent looting in which the commanders lost
control over their soldiers. This was the turning point of the whole
rebellion: discipline among the troops could not be restored and they
remained more concerned with plundering than with fighting. More
importantly, the population in Acre, witnessing the events in Tyre,
was no longer convinced that Salīm's rule would be a liberation
from oppression. Still, for the moment Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār's posi-
tion was desperate. All he had left for the defense of Acre were some
200 Albanian soldiers under their commander, Juwāq 'Uthmān.[28]
But al-Jazzār's good fortune was that his opponents displayed a lack
of planning and decisiveness of action which led Renaudot to observe:
"*leurs démarches ne portent point ce caractere d'Energie qui annonce les grands
actions, ces sont des Esclaves dechainés plutot occupés à considerer leurs chaines
qu'au soin de les rompre.*" On June 3 the rebels finally appeared on the
plain of Acre, some 1,200 troops altogether, but had no clear idea
about how to proceed from there. In the meantime Aḥmad Pasha
al-Jazzār had worked feverishly to strengthen the defense of the city.
He collected all the workers and masons from the government work-
shops and armed them. Upon the advice of Shaykh Muḥammad al-
Qāḍī he prepared for a night assault on the camp of the rebels and
at the same time had a ship in the harbor ready to sail with him
in case of defeat.[29] The rebels underestimated the resolve and ini-
tiative of al-Jazzār and his resourcefulness. The sortie from Acre and
the simultaneous bombardment from the cannons on the fortifications
took them completely by surprise. In the ensuing five-hour battle
Salīm Pasha and Sulaymān Pasha were defeated and their troops
dispersed. The French consul commented that both sides fought with-
out great conviction and were mainly concerned with plundering.
But Salīm's troops did not know anything about tactics, defected
partially, and "those who fought did so only by fleeing." Betrayal
also seems to have played a role. Supposedly the Kurdish com-
mander Shaykh Ṭāhir had contacted one of Salīm's allies, Mullā
Ismā'īl, commander of the Dalāt troops, before the battle and had
persuaded him to prevent his troops from fighting. A number of

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[28] Shihāb, *al-Jazzār*, 95; AN AE B1 980, CC Acre, III, May 28, 1789.
[29] Munayyar, *al-Durr*, 416.

mamluks had been killed, others already exiled, and the rest fled defeated. Salīm and Sulaymān reached the Mountain and then Damascus, for a while still hoping to raise new troops against al-Jazzār. For the moment the Mamluk household of al-Jazzār was destroyed, and ceased to exist as part of the military establishment and political institution. Renaudot wondered why, in the end, people such as Sulaymān and Salīm rebelled against their master. They had made their careers under him, had been pampered and become rich.[30]

Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār must have asked himself the same question that Renaudot asked: Why would his top lieutenants rebel against him? Given his own identification with the Mamluk system and his keen sense of loyalty he was deeply traumatized by these events. Latent fears, suspicions, and distrust now jelled into a sense of paranoia: "After this event he became like an untamed animal. Nobody could stand up to him and he imagined that the whole world was against him."[31] Not surprisingly, he began a wave of purges, exiling and liquidating people from all ranks in society.

The military activities of al-Jazzār certainly continued on an undiminished level, but he must have had difficulties finding qualified commanding officers. He seems to have dealt with the problem by relying increasingly on a sort of military professionals who had flourished in an atmosphere of diminished Ottoman authority. These were military entrepreneurs who gathered volunteers around them: soldiers from dissolved units like the Dalāt but also tribal people, criminals and other dubious elements. They fed them, clothed them and provided them with money. The military entrepreneur—unlike the typical warlord—did not seek to control a particular region or province so as to ensure his and his soldiers livelihood, rather, he tried to hire out his military services to the various governors and amirs. These commanders looked at their military-for-hire services strictly as a business, not bound by territorial interests nor impeded by political loyalties. This explains also their frequent changing sides, which should not be understood so much as fickleness, but rather as a constant look-out for the greater benefits for his enterprise.

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[30] All the above information, unless indicated otherwise is drawn from the "Premier Cahier—Extrait de la correspondance entre M. Renaudot et Beaussier au sujet de l'insurrection contre Dgezzar," AN AE B1 1041, CC Seyde, vol. XXV.

[31] Shihāb, *al-Jazzār*, 95.

The name of Qarā Muḥammad, head of Dalāt units, appears now more frequently.[32] He was charged with leading an expeditionary corps of different units during the all-out war against the Druze in 1791. Ten years later he was still performing the same tasks.[33] Kanj Yūsuf, later to become governor of Damascus, started his career, too, as officer and later independent military entrepreneur.[34]

The most famous and typical was probably Mullā Ismāʿīl, another "commander of Dalāt." We have already encountered him above in the battle of the mamluks against al-Jazzār. He had probably pre-determined the defeat of the mamluks, once he had been swayed to stay out of the battle. Later he fought on al-Jazzār's side and also on supported Sulaymān Pasha against Kanj Yūsuf. Eventually Mullā Ismāʿīl was appointed by Sulaymān Pasha *multazim* of Ḥamāt and Ḥomṣ.[35]

The short but steep career of Ismāʿīl Pasha, an Albanian, who had come with the grand Vezier Yūsuf's army to dislodge the French from Egypt is also symptomatic for the shortage of officers in al-Jazzār's army. After the campaign Ismāʿīl Pasha accepted service with Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār and was immediately given command of a siege around Jaffa where a protégé of the vezier Yūsuf, Abū Maraq, had been appointed governor. Later Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār regretted his choice. He suspected Abū Maraq of conspiring with Ismāʿīl Pasha and had the latter imprisoned.[36]

Sulaymān Pasha, one of the oldest and most trusted of al-Jazzār's mamluks, but also one of the leaders of the Mamluk rebellion in 1789, returned in 1802 to al-Jazzār who received him like a lost son and immediately appointed him *mutasallim* of Sidon and commander of a campaign against Amīr Bashīr.[37] Eventually, Sulaymān Pasha was to succeed al-Jazzār as governor of Sidon and quite a number of Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār's mamluks continued to serve under him. But before we deal with the question of the role of the Mamluk

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[32] Mishāqa, *Murder*, 41; Munayyar, *al-Durr*, 416 explains that after the mamluks were dispersed al-Jazzār used in their stead the units of Qarā Muḥammad and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ṭawīr (possibly also Kurds).

[33] Shihāb, *al-Jazzār*, 116, 151; Munayyar, *Tārīkh*, 428, 434.

[34] Shihāb, Ḥaydar Aḥmad, *Lubnān fī ʿahd al-umarāʾ al-Shihābīn*, (ed. by A. Rustum and F. Bustānī), 3 vols., Beirut 1984, vol. I, 197; vol. II, 422f., 523f.

[35] *Ibid.*, vol. I, 182–202.

[36] Shihāb, *al-Jazzār*, 167.

[37] *Ibid.*, 156.

establishment under Sulaymān Pasha's rule we have to acknowledge
a considerable lacuna in our information. From the contemporary
reports it would appear that al-Jazzār's reaction to the rebellion of
1789 dealt a final blow to the Mamluk establishment. The mamluks
were either liquidated by him or had fled into exile. Apart from the
surprising and touching return of Sulaymān a dozen years later we
hear of no other mamluks playing any further role in al-Jazzār's gov-
ernment. It is the more surprising then to see how under Sulaymān's
rule quite a number of mamluks, identified as mamluks of al-Jazzār,
resurface and obtain positions of power and influence, ʿAlī Aghā
Khazindār and Muḥammad Aghā Abū Nabbūt being the most promi-
nent ones. Whether they had returned still during the rule of al-
Jazzār or, perhaps, never left after the rebellion or whether they had
been called back by Sulaymān Pasha, we do not know. The fact is
that under the rule of Sulaymān Pasha the Mamluk household of
al-Jazzār reconstituted itself again.

When Sulaymān Pasha acceded to power in 1805 the region was
exhausted. Not only the French military expedition against Acre, but
subsequent campaigns from Acre against Jaffa, Nablus, and the Druze,
had devastated the economy. Trade stagnated and the exorbitant
tax burden forced the peasants to flee from their villages. By force
of financial circumstance but also, it seems, by political inclination
of Sulaymān Pasha, the military was to play a much smaller role.
After having dislodged Abū Maraq from Jaffa at the very beginning
of his rule, Sulaymān Pasha was to fight only one further major bat-
tle, in 1810 against Kanj Yūsuf Pasha, governor of Damascus. But
a major element of his army in that battle were the Druze troops
of Amīr Bashīr. Sulaymān Pasha himself was reluctant to spend too
much money on the military. The French consul observed in 1808
with amazement that he was dismissing his Albanian troops, the best
he had. All this while he had no more than a thousand soldiers sta-
tioned from Beirut to Ghaza.[38] Mishāqa, without specifying the year,
speaks of some 1,500 or 2,000 troops.[39]

In December 1811 Muḥammad Abū Nabbūt, *mutasallim* in Jaffa,
came to visit Sulaymān Pasha in Acre. He brought 500 troops, while
in Acre itself barely 200 guards were garrisoned. As he was, like

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[38] AN AE, CC Acre, vol. I, April 6, 1808.
[39] Mishāqa, *Murder*, 58.

Sulaymān Pasha, a mamluk of al-Jazzār, Abū Nabbūt considered
himself very much the equal of Sulaymān Pasha.[40]

The French consul Pillavoine described the regime of Sulaymān
Pasha as follows:

> La Syrie depuis Lataquie, jusqu'a Gaza est une Republique dont le
> Sénat composé d'affranchis qui ont toutes les places es soumis au juif
> Haim Farhi qui la gouverne Despotiquement sous le nom de Soliman
> Pacha, Mamlouc qu'en est le Doge.[41]

—a sort of republic *à la Venicienne* in which the mamluks held all
the important positions. Pillavoine's claim that they were, however,
all subjected to the control by Ḥaim Farḥī is only somewhat of an
exaggeration. We know of at least a dozen and a half high-ranking
mamluks whose names appear again and again. The chief of the
treasury and closest confidant of Sulaymān Pasha was 'Alī Aghā
[later: Pasha] Khāzindār. He was Sulaymān Pasha's lieutenant in
Acre while the latter was governor in Damascus. He remained the
second in command until his death in 1814. His son 'Abdallāh Pasha
was later to succeed Sulaymān Pasha. Most other high-ranking mam-
luks served as *mutasallims* in the various cities. There were occasion-
ally changes but on the whole the permanence of the appointments
was remarkable. Only in regions or cities that were beyond the
immediate reach of Sulaymān Pasha would he make use of local
strongmen: the: Ṭūqāns in Nablus, Muṣṭafā Aghā Barbir in Tripoli,
and, of course Amīr Bashīr in Mt. Lebanon. The coastal cities and
the inland towns of the Galilee and the Jabal 'Āmil regions and a
few of the high administrative positions in Acre were always con-
trolled by the same small group of mamluks who had already belonged
to the Mamluk household of al-Jazzār. They were all *khushdāshs* of
the same *ustādh*. This comradeship cemented their loyalty to each
other, and was essential for the functioning of the mamluk system
as a whole. For Sulaymān Pasha this personal loyalty was the best
means to ensure his rule over Acre and its realm. New mamluks
were bought, and they served at the court of Sulaymān Pasha.

In fact, Sulaymān Pasha was master of the last functioning Mamluk
system in history. Understandably, there was great concern in Acre
about the fate of the mamluks in Egypt who had been massacred

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[40] AN AE, CC Acre, vol. II, Dec. 23, 1811.
[41] AN AE, CC Acre, vol. II, Jan. 20, 1812.

by Muḥammad ʿAlī. Two English travelers reported it in May 1811 and, soon after, a first-hand report was given by Amīn Bey, the famous mamluk who escaped the massacre in the Citadel by a daring jump over the wall with his horse. He settled for a time in Acre and worked as a cavalry commander for Sulaymān Pasha.[42] Additional mamluks who escaped the massacre seem to have made their way to Acre.[43] In September of this year the French consul reports that Sulaymān Pasha began to buy mamluks left and right after the massacre in Cairo "*tout les Chretiens qui se font Turcs sont amis dans ce corps à qui tous les emplois sont confiés.*"[44] Slave dealers flocked to Acre to sell their merchandise and by the summer of 1812 Sulaymān Pasha's army had increased to some 2,500 troops.[45] Partially these purchases must have been the result of a treasury flush with money from the grain exports to England in 1811. But we may suspect a more self-conscious motive: Listening to the travellers and the the escaped mamluk himself, the mamluks in Acre were quite aware that they were the last of their kind, and perhaps the massive purchase of further mamluks was less a question of enlarging the army than an attempt to ensure their own way of life. From all the information we have, the mamluks seem actually not to have played a large role in the military. The 700 artillery troops in Acre were almost by definition not mamluks and probably not mamluk commanded. But even in the cavalry, the very service branch of the mamluks, we rarely hear of them. More frequently mentioned are the Kurdish Dalāt cavalry with their commander Shamlīn or Shamdīn Aghā who seems to have been another military entrepreneur.[46] Mishāqa described the army as follows: "There was no longer any necessity for many soldiers [after settling relations with the Metualis], so only about two hundred infantry men were put under the command of an Albanian officer named Muḥammad Aghā al-Nuʿmān who lived in Tyre and

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[42] AN AE, CC Acre, vol. II, May 22, 1811; Shihāb, Lubnān, vol. III, 785; for the literary dramatization of the incident see Jurjī Zaydān, *al-Mamlūk al-Shārid* (Cairo, 1891).

[43] Al-Jabarti, vol. IV, 130–131.

[44] AN AE, CC Acre, vol. II, Sept. 30, 1811.

[45] AN AE, CC Acre, vol. II, Jan. 20, 1812, Aug. 11, 1812.

[46] Originally he had served in the troops of Kanj Yūsuf Pasha and had later accepted service under Sulaymān Pasha. Eventually he was made "head of the officers of the army." He was also to serve ʿAbdallāh Pasha until the end: al-ʿAwra, *Tārīkh*, 221–22, Shihāb, Lubnān, vol. III, 560.

about five hundred cavalry men were put under the command of three Kurdish officers, Shamdīn Aghā, Niʿmat Aghā and Ayalyaqīn Aghā; and two officers, ʿAlī Abū Zayd Aghā and Mūsā al-Ḥāsī Aghā where put in charge of around four hundred Hawwāra Arab horsemen, while an officer called the *sāgbān bāshī* was posted over a few infantry soldiers stationed as guards at the palace gate in Acre. A group of canoneers [was also stationed] on the city walls, just as there were artillerymen and officers in every city."[47]

The role of the mamluks during the rule of Sulaymān Pasha should not be looked for in their military tasks, though some clearly had also commanding functions there. As during the early period of al-Jazzār's regime the major function of the Mamluk household was it to provide coherence and stability to the rule of Sulaymān Pasha who appointed them to major political and administrative posts and could count on their loyalty. Sulaymān Pasha, like Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār, drew his legitimacy as a ruler from the fact that he was appointed governor of Sidon by the sultan. But neither ruler could count much on support or even aquiescence from the population in view of their stringent policy of monopolies applied to all cash crop cultivation and export.

The Mamluk system had been in decline since the rule of ʿAlī Bey al-Kabīr in the last third of the eighteenth century. In fact, his attempt to achieve absolute power, had been a symptom of the end of the traditional Mamluk system—just as Amīr Bashīr's concentration of power in his own hands would bring another traditional order to its end: the feudal system of Druze and Christian lords in Mt. Lebanon. The Mamluk system was beginning to suffer internally from lack of good manpower, negligent training and increasing lack of loyalty.[48] Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār had been an early victim of such disloyalty in Egypt. Later his own Mamluk rebellion caused an almost complete destruction of the system in Acre. As worrisome were other signs of decay. As in Egypt before, mamluks in this last phase were not only inclined to marry and establish kinship relations but to promote their offspring: ʿAbdallāh Pasha, son of ʿAlī Pasha Katkhudā

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[47] Mishaqa, *Murder*, 58.
[48] See D. Crecelius "The Mamluk beylicate of Egypt in the last decades before its destruction by Muḥammad ʿAlī," and T. Philipp "Personal Loyalty and Political Power of the mamluks in the Eighteenth Century," both in: Philipp and Haarmann, eds., *Mamluks*.

being the most glaring example. This added fuel to internal tensions. In April 1818 Sulaymān Pasha had been very sick, and people began to anticipate the time after his death. Possibly Abū Nabbūt had already insinuated in Istanbul that he would be the most suitable to take over the governorship from Sulaymān Pasha.[49] The mamluks of Acre were in close contact with Abū Nabbūt in Jaffa. They wanted to recreate an exclusive Mamluk regime such as they believed had existed in Egypt.[50] The son of the late ʿAlī Aghā Khāzindār had no place in their planning. Perhaps Abū Nabbūt was acting out of a sense that he was Sulaymān Pasha's equal, and perhaps he was willing to betray him.[51] But perhaps the mamluks altogether wanted only to safeguard their own existence and system. Natural children of mamluks had no place in this system. ʿAbdallāh Pasha, only twenty years old, and never truly part of the Mamluk establishment, tried to forge an alliance with local elements from religious and land controlling circles. This alliance was still shaky and he also depended on the support from Ḥaim Farḥī, the powerful secretary and finance administrator of Sulaymān Pasha. Ḥaim Farḥī "*détesté de tous les parties*," also worried that his patron might die. Sulaymān Pasha seemed inclined to recognize Abū Nabbūt as his successor but Farḥī was opposed to this because he feared the latter's strong position.[52] It was probably this fear that motivated Ḥaim Farḥī in the summer of 1818 to convince Sulaymān Pasha to move against Abū Nabbūt. He was removed from Jaffa through an internal coup. This step initiated the campaign against the mamluks which ʿAbdallāh Pasha began even before being confirmed as governor of Sidon. Ibrāhīm Aghā, chief of artillery since the time of Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār, was replaced in September 1819 with Muṣṭafā Aghā al-Istanbūlī. Another mamluk lost his life under obscure circumstances, but probably was killed by ʿAbdallāh Pasha who suspected him of disloyalty.[53] Throughout the summer of 1820 *mutasallims* of various places, all mamluks of al-Jazzār, were removed. Salīm Aghā Abū

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[49] Shihāb, Lubnān, vol. III, 644.
[50] AN AE, CC Acre, vol. III, April 27, 1818.
[51] In early 1818 a French traveler, observed that Abū Nabūt may be aiming at independence in southern Palestine: C. de Forbin, *Travels in Greece, Turkey and the Holy Land in 1817–18* (London, 1820), 132.
[52] AN AE, CC Acre, vol. III, Nov. 12, 1818.
[53] AN AE, CC Acre, vol. IV, Sept. 22, 1819, and Sept. 1, 1820.

Ṣayf, *mutasallim* of Beirut, barely appointed to Sidon, was soon exiled, like Hasan Aghā and ʿAlī Aghā ex-*mutasallims* of Beirut—all three mamluk comrades of Abū Nabbūt. They were suspected of having contact with him in Istanbul.[54] The *mutasallim* of Nazareth was replaced by a certain seventeen-years-old Salīm Aghā. It seems that ʿAbdallāh Pasha preferred to employ people as young as himself while pensioning off the old mamluks.[55] Some mamluks survived, and stayed with ʿAbdallāh Pasha until the bitter end. But from the list of his commanders who fell during the siege of Acre it is evident that among the troops ʿAbdallāh Pasha used there were no Mamluk commanders any more: Ḥusayn Aghā, and Ḥamādī Aghā, both *hawāra bāshās*, militia commanders, ʿAlī Aghā Farahāt, *maghribī bāshā*, commander of Maghrebi troops, and Shamlīn, commander of Dalāt cavalry, who survived.[56] All were units which with the exception of Shamlīn's troops did not exist during Sulaymān Pasha's time. The mamluks ceased to exist as the group they had been under Sulaymān Pasha's rule with specific exclusive functions, political ambitions, and loyalties. Just as with the assassination of Ḥaim Farḥī, it was ʿAbdallāh Pasha's aim to eliminate all elements that had been too close to Sulaymān Pasha and were perceived as a potential danger to his rule.

We know little about the military establishment during ʿAbdallāh Pasha's time. A rough estimate would indicate a standing army of less than two thousand men. In moments of war ʿAbdallāh Pasha obviously counted on the tribal levies of the Druze and possibly the Metualis. In 1824 ʿAbdallāh Pasha sent to battle some 3,000 troops, most of them Ḥawwāra militias under Abū Zaid Aghā, but also consisting of Dalāt, Albanians, and Maghrebis.[57]

In conclusion, we should ask ourselves why the Mamluk system was reintroduced in Syria at such a late point in time and how it could last for almost fifty years. The most obvious explanation is, of course, the personal one. Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār was a mamluk and clearly believed, at least initially, in the advantages of the system. This was especially true as he tried to ascertain his rule over a region to which he himself was a stranger, in contrast to his predecessor Ḍāhir al-

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[54] AN AE, CC Seyde, vol. XXVII, July 10, 1820.
[55] AN AE, CC Acre, vol. IV, Jan. 3, 1820.
[56] Shihāb, *Lubnān*, III, 852.
[57] Shihāb, *Lubnān*, III, 766.

ʿUmar, and where he could not rely upon local alliances and patronage systems to support his regime.

But I would suggest that there was a second more general reason leading to the attempt to govern with the help of a Mamluk household. These were times of enormous change in Acre and its hinterland. For the first time the region had been integrated into the European dominated world economy. The profits to be made from cash crop exports, mainly cotton, but later also grain, could be huge. The question was how this new economy could be used most profitably and by whom.

The organisation of the military forces in Acre reflected this challenge and the ambivalent responses to it. In fact, the whole spectrum of military options in Islamic history was tried out: from troops consisting of or controlled by a family clan to tribal alliances (predominant under Ḍāhir al-ʿUmar) from hired mercenaries, vaguely organized along ethnic lines, to military entrepreneurs, and to a well-defined Mamluk household, from infantry troops to cavalrymen—all traditional patterns of military organisation, together with their known advantages and disadvantages, were used at one point or another in the short century of Acre's power. It depended on the political circumstances and also on the personal inclinations of the respective rulers which sort of traditional military organisation would be preferred. The emphasis on fortifications and their defense was, at least since the crusades, in this region a particularly well-established military strategy. New tactics, new military technology or organization were not sought or needed, since the neighboring rivals and potential military opponents fought with equally traditional means and troop formations as the rulers of Acre. The contribution of the unique state monopoly on cotton and grain exports consisted in supplying the means to pay for more troops than the neighbors usually could afford. The policy of government monopolies, introduced by Ḍāhir al-ʿUmar but continued and elaborated upon by al-Jazzār and Sulaymān Pasha, necessitated the exclusion of local classes, such as merchants and primary producers, from the political process. To maintain the monopoly over cash crops and their export an imported foreign military elite, with no ties to the local population and only loyal to themselves, seemed the most suited, though the simultaneous use of all the above mentioned other military options shows that there reigned a great ambivalence about how to cope with the new economic situation. In any case, the revenues from the economic monopoly could

pay for and reinforce the foreign military elite. But once the cash crops were not in demand anymore on the world market, the mamluks were the least suited to deal with the economy and to respond to the changes. Once the economic basis had vanished, so did the mamluks.

URBAN RESIDENTIAL HOUSES IN MAMLUK SYRIA: FORMS, CHARACTERISTICS AND THE IMPACT OF SOCIO-CULTURAL FORCES*

Nimrod Luz

The house can be described as a manifestation and an epitomizing symbol of the self.[1] This is a truism in the sense that our house represents us as it reflects our morals, ideas, needs, social understanding and conduct. To no lesser extent, houses represent and are by-products of group social values and norms.[2] Empirical studies have indicated that individuals who belong to a group which is typified with weak relations would be more inclined to be unique and self representative as far as the architecture of the house is concerned. Those who identify with stronger groups (usually of more traditional nature) would be less concerned with the presentability of their house. That is to say, houses that belong to individuals whose social status is known and established in their peer group would be less self expressive.[3] However, I am not suggesting that such individuals would not build impressive and formidable houses, rather that they would inclined to follow similar architectural patterns. This can partly explain the extravagance of mamluks' houses within the urban context. These houses are supposed to inform "ignorant

[1] C. Cooper, "The House as a Symbol of the Self", in J. Lang, C. Burnette, W. Moleski, and D. Vachon, eds., *Designing for Human Behavior* (Stroudsburg, 1974), 130–146.

[2] G. Pratt, "The House as an Expression of Social World", in J.S. Duncan, ed., *Housing and Identity* (New York, 1982), 135–180.

[3] *Ibid.* See also on the importance of social networks, J.S. Duncan and N.G. Duncan, "Housing as Representation of Self and the Structure of Social Networks", in G.T. Moore and R.G. Golledge, eds., *Environmental Knowing, Theories, Research, and Methods* (Stroudsburg, 1991), 247–253.

others" of the current status of the proprietor. At the same time, the house is also a manifestation and a product of physical conditions such as building materials, technology, site availability and such like mundane matters. The latter are more often than not external and independent to any socio-cultural forces.[4]

Thus, there are multiple variables one has to consider in order to fully understand the house as a manifestation of the human agent responsible for its construction. It would be a mistake to highlight one aspect and play down others. To say that home architecture is responsive only to the immediate needs of its owner, which stems from reciprocal relations to the particular surrounding, is a partial and insufficient conclusion. On the other hand, playing down the socio-cultural realm and its effect on the final outcome would again lead us to a crude streamlining of a complex reality. This, as I will suggest below, was more often than not a current theme concerning the houses of the Islamic Middle East. The house is a fundamental and indispensable part of almost any human settlement. In the urban scene clusters of houses form neighborhoods, and on a larger scale they comprise the matrix of entire cities. In order to understand cities—in a more abstract manner the society that exists within a particular city—the house may be regarded as a source and a meaningful evidence of the latter. As with any other "text" we have to know how to read the language, familiarize ourselves with the cultural symbols and signs, and put it in the correct context. A full analysis of houses within a broad urban reality exceeds the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, it needs to be stressed that it is inconceivable to understand historical cities as a portrayal of past societies without a full scale view of houses within the broad urban context. In this paper I would like to focus on the types and forms of houses in cities of Syria during the Mamluk period. The analysis of the individual types and forms of houses will be complemented by a critical review of the common and recurrent notion regarding the Islamic origin and nature of the courtyard house. Bringing to the fore the socio-cultural influence on the shape and forms of houses does not in any way imply that I consider it more important than other variables. On the contrary, it serves as a way to mitigate the

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[4] The various variables effecting house form and type are heavily considered in A. Rapoport, *House Form and Culture* (New Jersey, 1969).

notion regarding the allegedly colossal impact of religion (i.e., Islam) on the residential dwellings.

A methodological note

The data and analysis put forward in this paper are the outcome of an extensive research regarding the provincial cities of Mamluk Syria.[5] The main goal of this survey was to establish a set of indicative characteristics of the urban vernacular architecture during the Mamluk period within the Syrian region.[6] This was a preliminary, yet indispensable, step toward a closer and more intimate acquaintance with the urban layers of the said period. The secondary goal was to enforce the results of the survey in the entire city and thus make it possible to define and classify various building artifacts of the Mamluk period and to distinguish them from other periods; a problem inherent in any discussion of the built environment in historical multi-layered cities. The physical evidence was corroborated with relevant studies and complemented with literary sources. Thus, I was able to arrive at a more coherent and reliable picture of types and forms of houses. This method further enabled me to map out and appreciate the contribution of different variables and their impact on the built environment.

Vernacular architecture[7]—the term refers mainly to architecture that is created without architects.[8] It is usually characterized by a lack of any theoretical or esthetical presumptions. A rigid set of rules is hardly in existence rather a practical need that is responded by functional acts. The lack of an elaborate theory implicates that the work is carried out in the basis or previous knowledge. The main

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[5] N. Luz, *Provincial Cities of mamluk Syria 1260–1517*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2000. The field survey was conducted throughout 1997 in several cities in Israel (mainly Jerusalem).

[6] The findings were corroborated with data collected in other cities of the region. I am currently preparing for publication the results of the field survey.

[7] I am following here the meaning of the term as Amos Rapoport articulated it. See, Rapoport, *House Form and Culture. Ibid.*, "Vernacular Architecture and the Cultural Determinants of Form", in A.D. King, ed., Building and Society (London 1980), 283–305.

[8] Regarding architects-less architecture see, B.S. Hakim, *Arabic-Islamic Cities, Building Principles* (London, 1986).

emphasis would be on the relations among the building particles
rather than the nature of the particles themselves. This would indi-
cate that the location of a window in a wall is essentially of higher
importance then the style or the material of that window. This type
of architecture is typically found in private houses, streets, and neigh-
borhoods. It is, by and large, the sum of collective, yet independent,
decisions of individuals. It is the absence if sufficient data regarding
this type of architecture—as opposed to public-monumental Mamluk
architecture—that necessitated the conduct of an extensive field sur-
vey in search for a better understanding of that particular manifes-
tation (houses as in the case in point) of Mamluk urban society.[9]

The following discussion is based on the results of the field sur-
vey which by and large defines the material evidence to be found
today. As always, with regard to morphological reality and findings,
we can only examine what has survived in contemporary urban land-
scape. In the case of residential housing, this approach bears an
inherent bias that needs to be explained.[10] Most of the houses that
have survived belong to the wealthier and upper strata of society. It
is within reason to speculate that houses of lower socioeconomic
classes were less resistant to the vicissitudes of time. In addition, it
would seem logical to assume that these houses (i.e., those of lower
socio economic status) are less represented in various documenta-
tions and literary references. This is all the more apparent in the
number of studies concerned with public and monumental architec-
ture compared to those of vernacular architecture and common res-
idential dwellings.[11] Our knowledge concerning the private house, or
to put it more strongly, the house of the less fortunate members of
society is considerably less than that relating to palaces and man-
sions. We can only speculate as to how many mud and straw bricks
houses or wooden huts have existed in Tripoli in the fourteenth cen-
tury. The nature of these materials as opposed to that of stone, a
common enough building material in the area, is to be remembered

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[9] Luz, 2000.
[10] This idea was already put forward in A. Raymond, *The Great Arab Cities in the
16th and 18th Centuries, An Introduction* (New York, 1984), 70–71.
[11] This is aptly demonstrated in the voluminous research regarding houses in
Cairo, J.-C. Garçin et al., *Palais et Maisons du Caire I: Époque Mamelouke (XIIIᵉ–XVIᵉ
siècles)*, (Paris, 1982). where the compounds discussed are mainly palaces or amiral
houses due to their very existence and the extensive source material related to them.

in such assumptions about cities of the past. The case may very well be that due to the natural limitations of different building material the hundreds of years that elapsed have weeded out dwellings that were constructed of less durable materials. This, as I will relate later on, is a rather important fact that should at least make us realize how difficult it is to arrive at firm and definitive conclusions. And as the case maybe, any conclusion should be understood in the proper light of these research limitations.

Private houses

The Syrian city in the Mamluk period features few types of individual or private houses. The common term found in various sources for the house is *dār*. This term usually refers to a house composed of several units: residential units or rooms, courtyards and different necessary amenities such as cistern, oven, warehouse (*makhzan*), toilet and other facilities as the case may be. Houses were built of local stone (usually limestone) to be found throughout the region. Ornamental components, found mainly in luxurious houses, were made out of marble, (either imported or in secondary use), or in rare cases, of basalt.

The field survey highlighted the following morphological characteristics and architectural traits of private houses:

HOUSE FACADE—the frontal side of the house (i.e., the part facing the street), includes a single entry gate. The gate is usually lower than the average person's height and not wider than 1 m. The entrance itself constitutes a massive door (either wood or metal) that stresses the transition and passage from the public, or semi-public, street into the private domain. Most of the houses surveyed had no more than two stories. In cases where a third story did exist, it usually carried indications of being constructed at a later date, i.e., Ottoman or modern period. This should not lead to the conclusion that Syrian Mamluk houses, unlike those in Cairo for instance, were limited to two stories height. It stands to reason that since upper floors were more exposed to eroding factors they were more accessible to dilapidation and hence to renovations and changes in the course of time.

WINDOWS AND PORCHES—front windows are relatively small and few variants were found. On the whole, windows are not be found

in the entrance floor (street level). In the rare cases that windows were to be found at street level, they were usually very small and shaded, or covered with a grille. Porches were not a common feature in simple houses. In the few cases where a porch was built, it was on a much smaller scale than that of the type known as *kishk*, which is commonly found in Mamluk public buildings.

ROOF—the roof was built, as in the rural building tradition of the area, in the shape of a masonry dome. This concurs perfectly with Mujīr al-Dīn's descriptions of the construction style in Jerusalem:

> In regard to the building of Jerusalem it is of the highest order and craftsmanship all made of white carved stones and the roofs are vaulted (*maʿqūd*). No bricks are to be used in the buildings and no wood in the [construction of] the roof.[12]

THE COURTYARD—In some of the houses, a corridor leads from the gate into a courtyard. The corridor is usually angular, and along its route a few twists and turns are a recurrent feature. The size of the courtyard varies considerably. The residential units (*bayt*, pl. *buyūt*) are built at the perimeter of the courtyard and their entrances face it. In cases where a second floor was built, a flight of stairs was constructed, usually at the side of the courtyard. The second floor is a mirror image of the first one that is, it is built of rooms/apartments facing the center of the courtyard. The central courtyard is but one of a few options of houses' ground plan. Many of the courtyard houses were arranged along a different pattern altogether, namely the courtyard was not an inner one, i.e. not completely enclosed.

Thus far, I have focused on the exterior part of the house. There is a marked difference between the external and internal parts of houses in the sense that the latter are far more accessible and viable to changes. The survey established the fact that the exterior parts of houses kept, for the better part, their original features. The situation remarkably differs in regard to the interior of the house. Recurrent renovations or changes of ownership or economic status are among the factors that lead to this state of affairs. In addition, the current problematic political situation in Old Jerusalem prevents us from a full scale survey of houses interiors. In order to overcome

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[12] Mujīr al-Dīn al-Ḥanbalī al-ʿUlaymī, *Al-Uns al-Jalīl bi-Taʾrīkh al-Quds wa-ʾl-Khalīl*, vol. II, (Baghdād, 1995), 55.

this impediment, literary evidence and various sources were used to further our understanding in regard to inner components and lay-out of houses. It was at times the only plausible way to traverse the threshold of the residential unit.

COURTYARD HOUSES—In 4 Rabī' II, 778/21 August 1376, a house was purchased in the Christian neighborhood (*Ḥarāt al-Naṣārā*) of Jerusalem.[13] The house, known as Dār ibn al-Launayn, comprised three vaulted units (*buyūt*), a kitchen and toilet facilities. The resi-dential units encompassed a courtyard in which two cisterns and fruit-bearing trees were to be found. An additional vaulted room that functioned as a warehouse was constructed below the courtyard. The entrance opened onto an alley located to the east of the house. Indeed several houses of this type were found in the survey but as is elaborated below this was not the sole plan in existence.

The house of Shaykh Burhān al-Dīn represents yet a different type and form of house plan. The house (*dār*) was purchased by Shaykh Burhān al-Dīn on 21 Dhū al-Qaʿda 780/12 March 1379 at the price of 825 dirhams.[14] It is composed of two vaulted parts; upper and lower. The transaction deed reveals that a courtyard and an external toilet unit were also within its legal domains. The court-yard in this case lay adjacent to the house. Few houses of the same plan were found in the field survey.

INDIVIDUAL HOUSES OF IRREGULAR PLAN—I have already established the fact that the term *dār* does not refer exclusively to houses that adopted the central courtyard plan.[15] More then that, it can refer to houses which do not have any form of courtyard at all. *Dār*, as the equivalent of a residential house or unit, is a term constantly being used in hundreds of documents from the Mamluk period found in the Ḥaram al-Sharīf in Jerusalem. Only rarely is a courtyard men-tioned and even then one can not be certain that this refers to a central courtyard. The early Ottoman *sijill* records not less then two hundred and twenty eight houses. Only forty two of them had a

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[13] D.P. Little, *A Catalogue of the Islamic Documents from al-Ḥaram aš-Šarīf in Jerusalem*, Beirut 1984, 255, no. 35. I am indebted to Mr. Kh. Salāmeh for enabling me to examine the original documents of the mamluk sijill of al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf library in Jerusalem.

[14] Little, *Catalogue*, 278, no. 39.

[15] See for example the description of a house from Tripoli, N.H. al-Khimṣī, *Taʾrīkh Tarabulus* (Beirut, 1986), 352.

courtyard (either enclosed or adjacent.[16] As with many other characteristics, the early Ottoman documents reflect the reality of the Mamluk period, in this case regarding the quantities of the various house plans and forms. So it is apparent that most of the houses were not of the courtyard type but rather what Raymond humorously called "atypical houses".[17]

Luxurious private houses

As with any other society, that of the Syrian cities included people of means. This was reflected on the urban scene in the existence of several houses that were considerably large in size featured on different plans than those of common private dwelling. In addition to a large plan, these houses are characterized with substantial investment in building material and ornamentation. The houses of this category (again one needs to stress the fact that the survey focused on external aspects of the house) employed architectural styles and features usually found in monumental Mamluk buildings. The facade of one such house, located above one of the main intersections of Ṭarīq al-Wād in Jerusalem, features the typical mamluk monumental style known as *ablaq*. The windows of that wall are reminiscent in size and style of the ones that are usually found in public buildings. The entrance of the house located opposite Dār al-Sitt Tunshuq is also monumental in style. The house is surrounded with an external high wall containing a single entry gate. As one enters through the gateway, one encounters an imposing entrance to the house. The house itself comprises two stories; on the upper floor large windows are to be found as well as a beautifully decorated porch. A decorated roof terrace and windows were found in a house located adjacent to the Madrasa al-Mu'aṭṭamiyya on the street leading to the Lions Gate in Jerusalem. Parts of the roof terrace were built of basalt, which is not to be found in the vicinity of Jerusalem, and was therefore obviously imported.

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[16] Kh. Salāmeh, 'Aspects of the *Sijill*s of the *Shari'a* court in Jerusalem', in S. Auld, and R. Hillenbrand, eds., *Ottoman Jerusalem*, vol. I (London, 2000), 128–132.
[17] Raymond, *Great Arab Cities*, 87.

The luxurious houses that were surveyed in Jerusalem were highly accessible to main routes in the city. This clearly indicates that residential location within the city was not altogether disconnected from economic status and personal preferences. In a period in which transportation was mostly on foot, proximity to main arteries of the city was indeed important. One cannot establish a firm conclusion based on the exiguous data presented here but as far as the field survey allows one to speculate, individuals of sufficient means chose to live in more accessible locations within the city. Again, this is a fundamental and well-recorded social behavior of people who belong to high socioeconomic strata.[18] This in itself is not highly innovative as far as current geographical theories are concerned, but it is put forward here to further undermine notions that were commonly found in previous studies of cities of the vast Islamic world.[19] This issue will be engaged with at the last section of this paper.

Collective houses

At least three types of collective houses were common in Syrian cities. However, the data, both literary and morphological, is somewhat sporadic in comparison to that available for private houses. In order to overcome this lacuna, analogies and references were made to the abundant material regarding urban life in Egypt.

KHĀN as a dwelling compound—*khān*s served as dwellings for parts of society that were in transitional phases (i.e., new immigrants) or for those who practised a life style of constant mobility (soldiers, merchants). Thus one may find merchants, soldiers who were not living in barracks, and new arrivals in town all living in *khān*s. Shaykh Ibrāhīm b. Aḥmad b. Fallaḥ al-Sa'dī resided in a place called *khān* Banū Sa'd which was located in the north-western external area adjacent to wall of Jerusalem.[20] The name Banū Sa'd indicates a

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[18] On the life and luxurious home of a certain merchant (Abu Taqiyya) in Cairo circa 1600 see in N. Hanna, *Making Big Money in 1600. The Life and Times of Isma'il Abu Taqiyya, Egyptian Merchant* (Syracuse, 1998), esp. 138–164. I would like to thank Warren Schultz for pointing out the relevance of this work to the current paper.

[19] See for example, P. Knox, and S. Pinch, *Urban Social Geography, An Introduction* (London, 2000), 77–128.

[20] Mujīr al-Dīn, 2, 167.

tribal group that immigrated to Jerusalem. The *khān* in question
served probably as their collective dwelling site. Residence in a *khān*
must have been a transitional stage for that particular group, along
their sedenterization process from a nomadic and rural way of life
to an urban one. The Banū Sa'd eventually settled down within the
city, as the name of a residential area, al-Sa'diyya, aptly demon-
strates.[21] In addition to their traditional function as inns for various
visitors and normative role as commercial compounds, some of the
*khān*s were built (or at least served) as residential compounds for city
dwellers. This conclusion may be inferred and supported not only
by documentation, but also from their locations. Some of the *khān*s
are situated within residential areas, as opposed to commercial or
peripheral parts of the city. In this manner we find in Jerusalem a
khān named al-Jubaylī in the heart of a neighborhood called Marzubān
as well as khān al-Sitt in Khaṭṭ Bāb al-'Amūd.[22]

RAB—the *rab'* is a collective residential unit that was built for
rental purposes.[23] It resembles, at least morphologically, the modern
apartment building. It is a multi-story building in which each story
contains several apartments with their own private entrance. The
apartments share a common staircase and street entrance. The apart-
ments were facing the streets (i.e., had windows to the facade side
of the building). The ground floor housed shops and warehouses
while apartments were to be found on the upper floors. The data
concerning *rab'* compounds in Syria is restricted to literary evidences.
As it so happens, no compound that even partially resembles the
Cairene type has been discovered in the survey. In Jerusalem we
learn about several compounds bearing the term *rab'*, such as rab'
al-Ḥusaynī, rab' ibn al-Ḥanbalī and rab' Tankiz.[24] Raymond's sur-
vey of Cairo provides us with ample data about existing *rab'* build-
ings. His conclusions are that the residence in such compounds was
not based on kinship ties or other social connections, but rather on

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[21] See a map of the city's neighborhoods, including that of the Banū Sa'ad, in
A. Arnon, "The Quarters of Jerusalem in the Ottoman Period", *Middle Eastern Studies*
28 (1992), 13–14.
[22] For Khan al-Jubaylī see Mujīr al-Dīn, 2, 53, and regarding Khān al-Siṭṭ see
Little, *Catalogue*, 116, no. 432.
[23] The following description is based on: S.D. Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society*, Vol.
IV (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1983), 13–14; Raymond, *Great Arab Cities*, 83–85.
[24] Little, *Catalogue*, 66, 85, 140.

the needs of Cairene citizens, mainly small artisans and shopkeep-
ers, to minimize distances between home and work. The burden of
costly private house in a central location was mitigated by existence
of cheaper collective house apartments. Entrepreneurs of substantial
means responded to the need middle class citizens by supplying them
with the *rab'*. This collective housing style was a thus a commercial
investment for the entrepreneur and an affordable solution for its
residents.

ḤAWSH—this is a residential collective unit that is characterized by
the low income of its residents and poor standard of the building.
It is a cluster of residential units that share a common courtyard
and other utilities. The entrance is through a single gate from which
a corridor leads into the heart of the compound. It differs from the
regular courtyard house in measurements and ownership. It is usu-
ally bigger then the common *dār* and belongs to a proprietor who
leases it to the residents. A *ḥawsh* by the name of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-
Ṭūrī is mentioned in Jerusalem as located not far from Bāb al-Asbāṭ
(one of the northern gates of Ḥaram al-Sharīf). This compound is
mentioned in the estate inventories of two men and a woman. The
two men are described as pilgrims (*ḥājj*), one being called al-Sūdānī
and the other al-Turkumānī.[25] The woman is referred to as al-
Dimashqiyya, meaning, from Damascus. Judging from their *nisba*s,
as well as the fact that no relatives are to be found in the city, one
may assume that the three figures were newcomers to the city and,
even more likely, temporary residents. The dates of the documen-
tary evidences put them together in the same compound simultane-
ously, which means that they shared accommodations although they
shared no family ties. It stands to reason that in the absence of
sufficient means the people in question could not meet with a bet-
ter residential solution save the very basic and cheapest option, i.e.,
a *ḥawsh*. *Ḥawsh*-type residences may still be found in the historical
parts of Syrian cities. The morphology basically has not changed
from the earlier periods, that is residential units encompassing and
facing a central courtyard with a single entrance.[26]

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[25] *Idem*, 87, 120, 138.
[26] See for example Y. Ben Arieh, *A City Reflected in Its Times* (Jerusalem, 1986),
360 (in Hebrew).

Characteristics of the residential house

TYPE AND PLAN—various house types and plans existed in Syrian cities. It seems that personal economic status was one of the primal forces leading to the choice of the house plan. The typical dwelling solution of lower strata was the collective residential house known as *ḥawsh*, or as the case may be the *khān*. Again, I should stress that houses of less durable material (that is, not solely of stone), did not survive, or may will not have existed at all, and therefore could not be dealt with in this current work. The private house, be it a court-yard house in several types or other "atypical forms" or the collec-tive house called *rabʿ*, were used by classes of more substantial means. Only a small minority of the city dwellers could afford a luxurious type of house. Some of the houses of the latter group adopted archi-tectural styles that are drawn from monumental Mamluk buildings.

ARCHITECTURE—this may be defined as inside-out architecture.[27] That is architecture that involves excessive use of methods and styles which enable maximum separation between the private domain and the street. Morphologically, this means a single entry point to the house, windows and other openings are usually found in upper floors while the ground floor is on the whole windowless. This type of architecture is an efficient tool for transferring activities of all sorts into the inner or rear parts of the house. It is an indication that privacy was a crucial factor for the contingent constructor or dwellers of these houses. Nevertheless, this building style, that helps preserve the privacy of the family, is not unique in any way to the Syrian region nor for that matter to Islamic domains. It is to be found in various traditional societies.[28] But cultural demands were not the sole constraint that shaped the house plan and architecture. A substan-tial role was played by climatic conditions, technology, building mate-rials, and other variables that existed in the region prior to the presence of Islam. This will be elaborated upon in the closing sec-tion of this paper.

PREFERRED LOCATIONS—within the residential areas it was possi-ble to discern a gradient of housing types that was an outcome of

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[27] For inside-out architecture see Rappoport, *House Form and Culture*, 48–49.
[28] *Ibid.*

economic status. The luxurious houses were more accessible to the main routes of the city. Location within one's neighborhood and city was dictated, as the few examples allow us to conclude, by one's economic position and ability. This conclusion is based on what might be legitimately criticized as only exiguous examples. Nevertheless, it can be corroborated by David's survey of 16th century Aleppo.[29] The survey and classification of house types in Aleppo disclosed the existence of a gradient of residential rings surrounding the urban center. The crucial factor in regard to house location was land cost. The price of land parcels drops as one draws away from the city center. Therefore, in addition to socio-cultural factors (kinship, ethnic affiliation) one has to consider economic and other personal issues when one is analyzing houses' location within the city. The decision concerning house plan and location were directly linked to a person's economic constraint.

In search of the socio-cultural impact: The case of the courtyard house

One of the most prominent plans, found in this survey of Mamluk Syrian cities, was the courtyard house type in its various manifestations. The data collected in the field survey did not refute or minimize either the existence or the occurrence of this plan. However, it is clear that the courtyard house was not the only type in existence. More than that, any assessment of its relative occurrence within Mamluk cities in comparison to other house types is impossible. There is no way one can estimate the ratio of houses that disappeared without leaving a trace in the landscape of cities or the literary evidences. One can only assume that for the lower strata of society the obtaining or constructing of a courtyard house was beyond reach. In spite of such limitations, a marked tendency in numerous previous studies was to play down or totally ignore the existence of other building plans and house types. Instead, the role and existence of the courtyard house, as an outcome of Islamic culture and its omnipresence and influence on the urban environment, was usually

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[29] J.C. David, "Alep, dégradation et tentatives actuelles de rédaption des structures urbaines trditionnelles", *Bulletin d'Études Arabes* 28, (1978), 19–50.

highlighted.[30] I would like to conclude this paper with a critical analysis of the traditional approach in regard to the Islamic traits and origins of the courtyard house.

   Houses are, as any other human product, cultural and social artifacts. As such, they may be examined as a non-verbal document reflecting the agents/agencies that were responsible for their construction. Throughout this paper, I have stipulated the existence of various types and forms of houses within urban societies of Syria. This state of affairs leads to the understanding that many variables are responsible for the final outcome: the individual house. Be that as it may, the quest for a clear cut definition and origin of the house throughout the vast Islamic world has not yet exhausted itself. This is aptly demonstrated in George Marçais's article regarding the term *Dār* in the Encyclopedia of Islam. Marçais is of the opinion that the traditional courtyard house is the optimal physical manifestation of Islamic moral values and needs. He is well aware to the existence of such houses prior to the Islamic era, but prefers to underscore their advantages as an ideal infrastructure for Islamic life:

> It is well adapted to the patriarchal view of the family and creates for it an enclosed sphere; it conforms easily with the element of secrecy dear to the private life of the Muslim, and this idea is reflected in the architectural arrangement both in elevation and in plan.[31]

This house type supposedly fulfills, by its introverted plan, Islamic social demands. The unified facade of houses allegedly bring together members of the community and helps to establish social harmony within cities. One may also find that this house plan carries with it, in addition to other cultural symbols, a cosmic meaning, because it enables its residents to communicate with the entire universe but not with other people.[32] In the face of such rampant generalization Raymond supplies us with two critical observations that need be

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[30] See for example, G.E. von Grunebaum, "The Structure of the Muslim City", in *ibid., Islam, Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition* (London, 1955), 147–150, and also a quintessential and stereotyped description in G. Marçais, "*Dār*", *EI*[2], II, 113–115.

[31] *Ibid.*

[32] A. Abdel Nour, "Types architecturaux et vocabulaire de l'habitat en Syrie aux xvie et xviie siecles", in D. Chevalier (ed.), *L'éspace social de la ville arabe* (Paris, 1979), 51–99 esp. 82–83.

remembered in any discussion concerning the "typical" house form in Islamic domains:[33]

1. The origins of the central courtyard house are Mediterranean. Plans of courtyard houses have been excavated throughout the Middle East and along the Mediterranean basin and dated as early as three thousand B.C.E.[34] The reasons for its widespread dispersion derive from climatic conditions and cultural demands that existed in the region long before the emergence of Islam.
2. Houses and other dwelling solutions of lower classes of society were not always documented, and in the same manner may have been less durable, and thus left us with fewer material findings than middle and upper class house types. I referred earlier to the inherent bias regarding the alleged typical house plan in historical cities.

The methodology applied in this research has helped to define few types of houses within the urban context. Most of the houses were not of the central courtyard type. But even if we cast aside all other options save the central courtyard house, we should remember that this plan pre-dates the introduction of Islam to the area. This in itself does not negate the religious realm as a crucial factor but rather indicates that the reasons are by far more general than just applying Islamic codes. It is indeed within the socio-cultural sphere that one can perhaps but explain the abundance of this house form. At the same time, it was a direct result of the climatic conditions. Indeed several studies have already demonstrated that the inner courtyard's key function is to serve as a regulator and modifier of micro-climatic conditions of residential solutions in hot environments and arid and semi-arid climates.[35] The introverted plan is a practical solution and

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[33] Raymond, *Grand villes arabes*, 305ff.

[34] See for example the excavation at Catal Huyuk where a radio-carbon dating has established its earliest levels to 5600 B.C., J. Mellart, *Catal Hüyük* (London, 1967). See also a similar ground plan of houses in, L. Woolley, *Ur of Chlaldes* (Ithaca, NY, 1982). (revised and updated edition by P.R.S. Moorey).

[35] Y. Belkacem, "Bioclimatic Patterns and Human Aspects of Urban Form in the Islamic Cities", in I. Seragldin and S. El-Sadek, eds. *The Arab City, Its Character and Islamic Cultural Heritage* (Riyadh, 1982), 2–12; B. Givoni, *Climate Consideration in Building and Urban Design* (New York, 1998), 343–351; G.T. Petherbridge, "Vernacular Architecture: The House and Society", in G. Michell (ed.), *Architecture of the Islamic*

morphological prop in shutting the house to outside effects such as excessive sunlight, hot winds and dust. Focusing on the climatic reasons for the development of house plans is not to be understood as minimizing or ignoring cultural aspects that have affected the morphology of dwelling places. The concept of the introverted house, with its various facilities and functions hidden from the outside world, is without dispute an expression of an outlook that stresses the role of the family as the primal social nucleus of a person's life. It is also a perfect house form for cultures which aspire for privacy and the protection of the female side of the family from outsiders. These notions are not innovations introduced by Islam, as they were already existing throughout the Middle East and parts of the Mediterranean long before the seventh century. Thus, one may deduce that the view, so often expressed in various studies, of the cultural demands of Islam as the primary and critical reasons for the overwhelming occurrence of the courtyard house plan, is simplistic and misleading. In addition, the cities of the Syrian region, and elsewhere, as the Egyptian case demonstrates, featured many different plans and house forms. And what about places where no courtyard houses were found; should they be considered atypical? Are they to be considered non-Islamic? The case of Thulā in Yemen may serve as an example for a different urban reality. The houses depicted by Golvin and Formont in Thulā had no inner courtyard and more than that, the walls facing the streets were supplied with excessively wide windows.[36] Within the confinements of climate, religious codes, other socio-cultural norms this was probably the best solution for the local population in Thulā.

The tendency to highlight the role of Islam and the omnipresence of the courtyard house is, more then anything else, an expression of a modelistic view. Models may be defined as selective approximations which, by the elimination of incidental detail, allow some fundamental, relevant or interesting aspects of the real world to appear in generalized form. Naturally, only by being unfaithful in some

World (London, 1987), 176–208, esp. 199–201; J. Akbar, "Courtyard Houses: A Case Study from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia", in I. Serageldin and S. El-Sadek eds., *The Arab City, Its Character and Islamic Cultural Heritage*, Riyadh 1982, 162–176.

[36] L. Golvin and M.C. Formont, *Thula, Architecture et Urbanisme d'une Cité de Haute Montagne en République Arabe du Yémen*, Mémoire no. 30 (Paris, 1984).

respect can a model represent its original.[37] This in itself is not a vice, as generalizations are a product of many scientific works. But in regard to the house plan, as with many other traits of the physical urban manifestations within the Islamic world, the reduction to a single house plan has yielded a forbidden fruit. The courtyard house is not Islamic in its essence nor does it derive from any Islamic law. It is first and foremost the optimal dwelling solution found under climatic and other constraints, mostly within the expanded Middle East. Islamic societies inherited this house plan and adopted it in accordance with private needs and abilities. Stressing the role of Islam as a cultural factor is misleading, because under the vague heading of culture, other traits that have nothing to do with Islam coexist. The ongoing attempt to create a complete congruence between the Islamic sphere and the urban milieu through the prism of a house plan is not successful since Islam (if one can accept such a clumsy definition) is not the sole factor that shapes the urban landscape. The house plan is surely a morphological expression of culture and it is, as I have portrayed it in the current paper, highly affected by socio-cultural forces. But as culture itself, the house should not be defined under a sole characteristic. The plan, space and use of a house are malleable subjects. They keep changing according to our viewpoint, sometimes dramatically within the same society from one individual to another due to the fact that so many variables are responsible for the final outcome. The search for socio-cultural impact is far from over. But it is better to unburden ourselves of the many chimeras and postulates regarding the typical and a-typical house forms in the area.

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[37] M. Black, *Models and Metaphors* (Ithaca, NY, 1962), 220.

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PART EIGHT

THE MAMLUKS IN OTTOMAN EGYPT

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CHAPTER SIXTEEN

THE WEALTH OF THE EGYPTIAN EMIRS AT THE END OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

André Raymond

I

At the time when I was using the archives in Cairo to work on the preparation of my book, *Artisans et commerçants au Caire*,[1] I had the occasion to note that the records of the Tribunal of Bāb al-ʿĀlī, where I was researching the estates of the artisans and merchants, naturally also contained a wealth of information with regard to the Egyptian emirs, whose estates were, generally speaking, set forth in the records of the "military" (*ʿaskariyya*) section of the Tribunal.[2] At the time, I made a collection of those estates for the two periods, each covering some 20 years, which then constituted the principal object of my attention: 1679–1700 and 1776–1798.

I thought it would be of some interest to study some of those documents, those having to do with the years between 1679 and 1700, because this important aspect of the ruling class—the financial means that was at the disposal of its members—has not yet been addressed in any systematic work. The basic studies which have been devoted to that elite, especially those by S.J. Shaw, P.M. Holt, Michael Winter, Doris Behrens-Abouseif, Jane Hathaway and Daniel Crecelius,[3] cover other characteristics.

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[1] *Artisans et commerçants au Caire au XVIIIème siècle*, Damascus, IFD, 1974, 2 vols.; reprinted in Cairo, IFAO, 1999.

[2] The sample includes only three cases of liquidation of the estates of those emirs in the *qisma ʿarabiyya* of the *Maḥkama*: Qayṭās Bey, vol. 60, 103, December 8, 1681; ʿAlī Bey, vol. 70, 266, February 15, 1695; Musā Aghā, vol. 64, p. 29, November 14, 1686.

[3] S.J. Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962. P.M. Holt, *Studies in the History of the Near East*, London, Frank Cass, 1973. Daniel Crecelius, *The Roots of Modern Egypt*, Minneapolis, 1981; "The Mamluk Beylicate of Egypt", in *The Mamluks in*

For the purpose of composing this compendium, I have perused
Vols. 75 to 89 of the *qisma ʿaskariyya* of the Tribunal of Bāb al-ʿĀlī
(for the years 1679–1700). From those volumes, I have studied the
estates of 14 beys and 99 aghas and *katkhudās* of the seven militias,
for a total of 113 high-ranking dignitaries of Ottoman Egypt.[4] I am
certain that this is only the outline of the study which should be
devoted to the problem, given that this enumeration is neither as
exhaustive nor as detailed as would be desired, and also given that
the sample used was too small in dimensions to enable the drawing
of truly definitive conclusions in figures. Nonetheless, I hope that this
study will constitute an apposite starting point for the consideration
of this question, and will encourage scholars to develop their inves-
tigations in this direction—that is, by consulting the archives of the
Tribunals, which have already been widely exploited in the study of
the native society and economy, and are naturally likely to provide
no less valuable information on the ruling class.

II   *The wealth of the emirs at the end of the seventeenth century*

The data relative to the estates of the emirs studied, dating from
the years 1679–1700,[5] may be summarized in the following table,
in which the amounts are expressed in constant paras, based on the
value of that silver currency in the years 1681–1688:[6]

Egyptian Politics and Society, T. Philipp and U. Haarmann ed., Cambridge, 1998.
Michael Winter, *Egyptian Society Under Ottoman Rule*, London, 1992. Doris Behrens-
Abouseif, *Egypt's Adjustment to Ottoman Rule*, Leiden, Brill, 1994. Jane Hathaway, *The
Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt*, Cambridge, 1997. See also: *The Cambridge History
of Egypt*, Cambridge, vol. 2, 1998, with contributions by M. Winter, J. Hathaway,
D. Crecelius and N. Hanna.
   [4] The beys (*sanjaq bey*), successors of the great Mamluk emirs, governed provinces
and exercised the highest powers in Egypt. The aghas were the commanding officers
of the regiments (of which there were seven in Cairo). In actual fact, the command
of the *ojaqs* was exercised by their assistants, the *katkhudās* (or *kāhyas*). See the works
cited in the previous note.
   [5] The wealth of the emirs was evaluated according to the total assets, prior to
the various deductions to which the estates were subject.
   [6] On the determination of a constant para, see *Artisans et commerçants au Caire*, LIII.

Table 16.1. Wealth of the emirs between 1679 and 1700

	No. of cases mentioned	Wealth of total sample	Average
Beys	14	25,332,747	1,809,482
Officers:	99	36,042,705	364,068
of which, aghas	61	20,244,713	331,880
katkhudās	38	15,797,992	415,737
of which, mutafarriqa	33	5,689,885	172,424
janissaries	24	13,053,500	543,896
ʿazab	23	10,891,755	473,555
Grand total	113	61,375,452	543,146

The first comment elicited by this table obviously concerns the vastness of the average overall wealth of the members of the ruling elite, which appears in all its glory if we compare these figures with those concerning individuals who belonged to "civilian society". For the same period, the 468 estates of artisans and merchants which I studied in my *Artisans et commerçants* amount to an average of 138,272 paras—four times lower. It is true that our sampling of emirs naturally provides us with the most important estates, because it concerns the superior officers of the militias and the beys. It would be interesting to be able to access comparable information on the wealth of ordinary soldiers and mamluks; the comparison between those classes and the average strata of the urban population would be significant.[7] Nonetheless, we may note that even the wealthier representatives of native society, the major merchants (*tujjār*) of coffee and textiles, were far from that level: the average of the 169 estates studied was 299,344 paras, just slightly over half the average estates of the emirs. The exploitation of Egypt and its active population (citizens and *fellahin*) produced a surplus which generated far more wealth than commercial speculation.

Within the group studied, the superiority of the beys over the officers (estates five times as large) is quite striking, especially as the emirs included were not always the most powerful of the period. Only three of them appear in the list provided by P.M. Holt, which

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[7] Several comments on this problem appear in my article "Soldiers in trade: the case of Ottoman Cairo", *BRIJMES*, 1991, 18–1.

mentions the emirs who played the most important roles and polit-
ical life and who may also be assumed to have been among the
wealthiest. These are Qayṭās Bey, d. 1691, who left an estate in the
amount of 5,978,617 paras (Holt, 88); Ḥusayn Bey, *daftardār*, d. 1696,
whose estate totaled 134,308 paras (Holt, 32); Murād Bey, d. 1696,
who left an estate amounting to 933,744 paras (Holt, 71).[8] The most
considerable estate recorded by us is that of Ibrāhīm Bey, son of
Dhulfiqār Bey, *amīr al-ḥajj*, d. 1696, in the amount of 7,130,124
paras. This was an extremely important personage, to whom, by the
way, Jabartī devotes an obituary notice.[9] We may appreciate the
vastness of such an estate by noting that Muṣṭafā, a *tājir* dealing in
coffee, left, upon his death in 1695, an estate in the amount of
2,423,540 paras—the largest estate observed by us for a "civilian"
during that period, at the end of the seventeenth century: that of
the emir is three times as large.

Another striking characteristic is the great inequality of the wealth
of the emirs whose estates we studied. The case of Yahyā Bey, whose
estate, liquidated in 1681, amounted to only 4,170 paras, should no
doubt be set aside, because he was only a follower (*tābiʿ*) of the
katkhudā (lieutenant) of ʿUthmān Pasha; it is possible that he had
only been in Egypt for a limited time. On the other hand, Qayṭās
Bey *mīr liwā*, d. 1681, left only a meager estate in the amount of
57,053 paras—definitely comparable to that of an average artisan
or merchant from Cairo.[10]

The superiority of the wealth of the beys, relative to that of the
superior officers of the militias, appears extremely important. While
there is only a rather limited number of beys in the sample pro-
posed, the gap nonetheless appears significant. If we rank the largest
of the estates, we see that the richest of the officers (Muṣṭafā Aghā
of the *ʿazab* corps, d. 1691) ranks no higher than fourth (with an
estate in the amount of 2.8 million paras)—rather far behind Ibrāhīm
Bey (7.1 million), Qayṭās Bey (5.9 million) and Dhulfiqār Bey (2.9

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[8] See P.M. Holt, "The Beylicate in Ottoman Egypt", in *Studies of the History of
the Near East*, 177–219. *Maḥkama, qisma ʿaskariyya*, vol. 85, p. 8, August 15, 1691;
vol. 90, p. 514, June 2, 1696; vol. 93, p. 312, October 4, 1700 (these references
are abridged in subsequent notes as follows: *Maḥkama*, 85, 8, August 15, 1691).

[9] *ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī's History of Egypt*, translation, T. Philipp and M. Perl-
mann, ed., Stuttgart, Franz Steiner, 1994, 3 vol., I, 90/147; *Maḥkama*, 89, 382,
October 25, 1692.

[10] *Maḥkama*, 76, 578, November 22, 1681; q. *ʿarabiyya*, 60, 103, December 8, 1681.

million).[11] The beys do appear to have been the dominant element of the class which governed and exploited Egypt. In any event, their financial means were far greater than those of the officers. This situation leads us to reflect upon a theme, frequently developed in the history of the time, to the effect that, in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the position of leader of an *ojaq* (and particularly of the militia of janissaries) was more important, and quite possibly more profitable, than that of bey. We have several examples of high-ranking officers who were accordingly subjected to the "sanction" of being expelled from their *ojaq* and "raised" to the exulted position of bey.[12] Reality, however, does not appear to comply exactly with this stereotype.

The wealth of the militia officers

In the course of my study of the *Maḥkama* records, I turned my interest to the superior officers of the Cairo militias: the aghas (regimental commanders) and the *katkhudās* (lieutenant colonels) who were effectively in charge of the *ojaqs*. The 99 estates compiled by me were those of superior officers in the seven militias then existing in Cairo, all of which (albeit unequally) were represented in the sample: the *mutafarriqa* militia (32 aghas and 1 *katkhudā*); the janissaries, or *mustaḥfizān* militia (eight aghas and 16 *katkhudās*); the ʿazab (10 aghas and 13 *katkhudās*); the *gamāliyya* (four aghas and two *katkhudās*); the *chāwīshiyya* (three aghas and three *katkhudās*); the *tufukchiyān* (two aghas and three *katkhudās*); the *charākisa* (two aghas).[13] These numbers certainly confirm the extreme numerical superiority of the three principal *ojaqs*: those of the *mutafarriqa*, the *mustaḥfizān* and the ʿazab.

The modest size of the sample studied hardly permits us to draw conclusions with regard to the greater wealth of the *katkhudās*, relative to that of the aghas: an average of 415,737 paras (for 38 individuals), as against 331,880 (for 61 persons). The difference does not appear to be very significant. However, it is slightly more noticeable

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[11] *Maḥkama*, 84, 441, 28 May 1691; 89, 382, 25 October 1696; 85, 8, 15 August 1691; 80, 411, 7 September 1687.

[12] Among the best-known cases, let us mention: Muḥammad Katkhudā al-Habashlī, d. 1682 (see A. Raymond, "The sabīl of Yusuf Aghā", in *The Cairo Heritage, Essays in Honour of Laila Ali Ibrāhīm*, Doris Behrens-Abouseif, ed., Cairo, 2001) and Ifranj Aḥmad, d. 1711 (A. Raymond, "Une 'Révolution' au Caire", *AI*, 6 (1975)).

[13] See M. Winter, *Egyptian Society*, and J. Hathaway, *The Politics of Households*.

among the janissaries, where the average wealth of the aghas was
446,822 paras, and that of the *katkhudās* 592,433 paras. This supe-
riority would seem logical, given that the *katkhudās* constituted the
element which effectively commanded the *ojaq* at the time.

By contrast, the difference between the average amount of the
estates of the janissaries (543,896 for 24 persons) and the *ʿazab* (473,555
for 23 individuals), relative to that of the remaining officers of the
other five *ojaqs* (232,643 for 52 persons), may well reflect the greater
financial power of the officers of the two *ojaqs* which, at that time,
were in the final stages of ensuring control over the urban popula-
tion, by means of protection (*himāya*), and that of production and
commerce, by means of tax farming (*muqāṭaʿa*).[14] From this point of
view, the relative wealth enjoyed by the *katkhudās* of the janissaries,
who controlled the *ojaq* and its resources and were very actively
engaged in commercial speculation, particularly the coffee trade,
appears quite significant: the average figure of 592,433 paras should
again be compared with the average fortune of a Cairo trader (*tājir*)
at the same time: 299,344 paras.

The majority of the "millionaires" (four and five respectively) came
from the *ʿazab* and the janissaries, as against only one each for the
chawīshiyya, the *mutafarriqa* and the *charākisa*. The richest of all, Muṣṭafā
Aghā of the *ʿazab* corps, left an estate in the amount of 2,891,928
paras upon his death in 1691—the largest of our sample, at least
were the officers are concerned.[15] The details of the estates indicate
that it essentially consisted of property owned by the officer in 16
villages, held in *iltizām*; part of the estate, however, consisted of mer-
chandise which had arrived from Turkey—a fact which may indi-
cate a certain degree of implication in commercial activity. This is
even more evident in the case of Sulaymān "Kūrjī", *katkhudā* of the
mustahfizān, the wealthiest of the janissary officers, whose estate, liq-
uidated in 1690, amounted to 2,878,062 paras. Over and above the
property related to his possession of four villages held in *iltizām*, this
officer left a large quantity of coffee and real estate, which attested
to his interest in commercial activities: a bathhouse, a mill (*ṭāḥūn*),
an caravanserai (*wakāla*) and a *rabʿ* (building acquired for rental pur-

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[14] On this question, see *Artisans et commerçants au Caire.*
[15] *Maḥkama*, 84, 441, 28 May 1691; 462, 13 June 1691.

poses) in the Shawwāʾīn quarter and another *wakāla* in Būlāq.[16] Sulaymān "Kūrjī" is the worthy predecessor of those who were to become the great emirs of the Qāzdaghlī "house" of janissaries at the beginning of the following century, on even a grander scale: Ḥasan Katkhudā (estate in the amount of 4.5 million paras in 1715) and especially ʿUthmān Katkhudā (estate in the amount of 21.5 million paras in 1736).[17]

It is interesting to note, with regard to officers as well as beys, the remarkable disparity of wealth disclosed by our sample—from the modest estate of 4,005 paras left by Muḥammad, agha of the *mutafarriqa* in 1694 to that of Muṣṭafā Aghā of the *ʿazab*, cited above (2,891,928 paras in 1691).[18] This disparity is accentuated in the *ojaq* of the janissaries, where the smallest estate is 14,905 paras (Salīm Katkhudā, in 1686) and the largest, that of Sulaymān "Kūrjī", is 2,878,062 paras in 1690. Given the fact that our sample gives us no data with regard to simple soldiers, we must conclude that military society was as inegalitarian as "civilian" society.[19]

III   *Wealth and places of residence*

It would be interesting, in order to improve our knowledge of the general structure of the city, to be able to cross-match two sets of data: those which concern the wealth of the emirs and those which concern their places of residence within Cairo. Part of the documents which I studied in the *Maḥkama* archives actually mention the "addresses" of the emirs whose estates were liquidated. Unfortunately, this applies to only a few of the estates of beys: only four out of 14. This low proportion, in a sample which is already small, does not enable the drawing of general conclusions. I shall therefore merely mention that Darwīsh Bey, who died in 1690 (estate in the amount of 1,163,647 paras), lived in Darb al-Gamāmīz (*Description de l'Egypte*:

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[16] *Maḥkama*, 83, 93, 21 January 1690.
[17] See André Raymond, *Le Caire des janissaires*, Paris, CNRS, 1995.
[18] *Maḥkama*, 87, 465, 6 August 1694; 84, 462, 13 June 1691.
[19] *Maḥkama*, 79, 57, 21 February 1686; 83, 93, 21 January 1690. As we know, this inequality was especially pronounced among "civilians"; see *Artisans et commerçants au Caire*, 373–378; see also C. Establet, J.-P. Pascual and A. Raymond, "La mesure de l'inégalité dans la société ottomane", *JESHO*, 37 (1994).

46 R 10, near Birkat al-Fīl); Qayṭās Bey, who died in 1691 (estate
in the amount of 5,978,617 paras), lived in Qanāṭir al-Sibāʿ (*Description*:
252 U 13); Salīm Bey, who died in 1692 (estate in the amount of
2,482,922 paras), lived in Khurunfish (*Description*: 164 G 7) within
Qāhira; Ḥusayn Bey, who died in 1696 (estate in the amount of
134,308 paras), lived in the Muẓaffar quarter (*Description*: 124 T 8,
near Birkat al-Fīl).[20] Two of the entries in this short list mention
Birkat al-Fīl, but there is no sensible way of exploiting this fact.

The situation is more favorable with regard to the militia officers,
where 50 (one-half) of the estates studied between 1679 and 1700
provide the information necessary with regard to domiciles. Although
the sample is limited, it allows us to propose certain general ten-
dencies. These 50 documents concern 17 *mutafarriqa*, 15 *ʿazab*, nine
janissaries, three *gamaliyya* and two representatives of each of the
other three *ojaqs*. The following table summarizes these data, accord-
ing to the various large areas of the city: Qāhira, the southern region,
the western region, and, within those regions, according to the char-
acteristic areas:[21]

Table 16.2. The residences of the militia officers

	Number	Average estate
Qāhira	6	168,679
Southern region	33	364,529
of which, Darb al-Aḥmar	6	124,208
Citadel	7	95,691
Birkat al-Fīl	20	530,719
Western region	11	777,991
of which, Qanāṭir al-Sibāʾ	7	768,588
ʿAbdīn	3	958,071
northern section	1	303,576
Grand total	50	431,998

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[20] *Maḥkama*, 84, 112, 22 October 1690; 85, 8, 15 August 1691; 86, 3, 31 August
1692; 90, 514, 2 June 1696.

[21] I divide the city into three large parts: Qāhira, the Fatimid foundations of the
city, within the walls and east of the Khalīj; the southern area, beyond the south-
ern Fatimid wall (Bāb Zuwayla), east of the Khalīj (Canal); the western area, beyond
the Khalīj.

N

Azbakiyya

QĀHIRA

168,679

Bāb Zuwayla
Darb al-Ahmar
124,208

'Abdīn 958,071

Birkat al-Fīl
530,719

St. Lālā

768,588
Qanāṭir al-Sibā'

Citadel
95,691

Ibn Ṭūlūn Mosque

0   500   1000 m

The distribution of residences which may thus be sketched falls within the framework of a development which had begun during the Mamluk era and continued throughout the first two centuries of the Ottoman period, as I had the occasion of pointing out in my article "The residential districts of Cairo's elite".[22]

The tendency to leave the Qāhira region, which henceforth became a center of economic activity and a residential area for the native population, is evident in this sample. It is marked, on one hand, by the small number of officers living there, and, on the other, by the mediocrity of their wealth: the average of 168,679 paras is barely higher than the average of the estates of "civilians" during the same period (138,272 paras). This move out of Qāhira by the elite was somewhat masked by the existence of "little houses"—residences which were in some way "secondary", which could be used by the emirs to store part of their wealth in order to protect it in case of misfortune, and, if necessary, as a place of refuge. Still, none of the wealthier officers maintained a dwelling place in the old part of the city.

The southern area of Cairo, outside the Fatimid walls, remained the area most preferred by the officers. Their residences, however, were primarily concentrated in the region of Birkat al-Fīl, which—as early as the fifteenth century—had begun to be the elite quarter. In the rest of that area, the decline in the number of emirs' residences was quite marked. To the south of Bāb Zuwayla and in Darb al-Aḥmar, as well as around the Citadel, the number of residences owned by superior officers was small—six and seven respectively; these, moreover, were officers of relatively modest wealth, as we will see by comparing the average amount of their estates (124,208 and 95,691) with the average amount for the total sample. It seems logical to explain this gradual decrease in terms of the growth of the native population in the southern region of the city—a population which was also relatively poor—and the development of business activity in that region, which motivated the officers to move else-

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[22] A. Raymond, "The residential districts of Cairo's elite", in *The Mamluks in Egyptian Politics and Society*, 207–223. In that publication, referring to the end of the seventeenth century, I supplemented the *Maḥkama* documents with information from various chronicles. Accordingly, the figures are not comparable with those of the present study.

where. With regard to the regions adjacent to the Citadel, there was
undoubtedly an additional, and understandable, hesitancy to settle
in a region often disturbed by demonstrations among the common
people and commotion among the military forces, inspired by the
presence of the ruling power (the Pasha's palace) and the large bar-
racks; this region may have been preferred as a place of residence
by ordinary soldiers.

  The high-ranking officers were concentrated around Birkat al-Fīl
(Elephant's Pool), as shown by the number and importance of the
estates registered. The region around that pool, which was flooded
whenever the Nile waters rose—an occasion of festivity, as described
by chroniclers and travelers—was favored by this military elite: 20
individuals (out of 50) whose estates averaged 530,719 paras, far
above the overall average for the sample (431,998 paras). Four of
the seven "millionaire" officers appearing in the sample had resi-
dences which were located around the *Birka*. The residences were
particularly numerous in several of the streets which surrounded the
pool: Ḥabbāniyya (66 Q 10), three officers; Darb al-Gamāmīz (46
R 10), five officers (this was apparently the most prestigious address);
Qawsūn (74 R 7), five officers; Sheikh al-Zalām (138 S 8); Hadrat
al-Hanna (near 183 U 9). It may be assumed that, over and above
the pleasant surroundings (a pool with greenery), the officers were
attracted by the convenience of a site relatively close to the Citadel—
a center of power and the location of the janissary and 'Azab bar-
racks, which naturally facilitated their incessant movements back and
forth between their residences and the *Qal'a*. It is interesting to note
that Birkat al-Fīl was particularly popular as a place of residence for
the janissary officers: out of nine whose dwelling I could identify,
seven lived in that quarter. By contrast, of the 15 superior officers
of the 'Azab appearing in the sample, only three lived near Birkat
al-Fīl. This attests to a double tropism, positive and negative: we
cannot assume that it was due to pure chance, or that there was no
collective "regimental" behavior in the case of these two *ojaqs*. It is
entirely logical that the officers of the same *ojaq* would have a ten-
dency to take up residence in the same quarter. It is just as inter-
esting to observe that Birkat al-Fīl—which was to remain the favorite
place of residence of the *ojaq* officers until the end of the eighteenth
century—was almost entirely closed to natives, even those belonging
to the elite. Only a very few merchants resided there. That quarter,
from this point of view, was apparently more tightly closed, during

the eighteenth century, than Azbakiyya, which was then also inhabited by some rich members of native society.[23]

The existence of a large core of residences maintained by members of the military elite in the southern part of the western area of Cairo, beyond the Khalīj, constituted the continuation of a movement which had begun during the Mamluk era. The largest group was located in the area of Qanāṭir al-Sibāʿ (*Description*, 252 U 13) and Suwayqat al-Lālā (115 T 12), with a total of seven residences maintained by officers whose estates averaged 768,588 paras, a figure higher than that in the area of Birkat al-Fīl; nonetheless, the limited number of documents makes it impossible to draw conclusions in this matter as well. Nor can we do so with regard to the ʿĀbdīn quarter (138 O/P 11), which had only three residences, although the average amount of the estates pertaining to those residences was quite high (958,071 paras). This entire region was subsequently to undergo a great degree of development and to become, during the eighteenth century, one of the principal places of residence of the military elite. In the course of research on the last two decades of the eighteenth century, I succeeded in locating, within that area, 18 of the 69 officers located, or more than one-quarter.[24]

The present study, however, indicates that the trend by members of the ruling elite to move into the northern half of that western area (especially the area adjacent to Azbakiyya) had not yet begun at the end of the seventeenth century. In my sample, this region is only mentioned once, in connection with the estate of Iqbāl, agha of the *chāwīshiyya*, whose domicile was located at the extreme southern end of that area (M 10). Moreover, this was only a relatively mediocre estate, in the amount of 303,576 paras.[25] The movement which was to lead the ruling elite to colonize the Azbakiyya area had not yet begun; at the time, the merchant bourgeoisie of Cairo maintained summer residences in that quarter, which subsequently became permanent homes. This migration would not develop until after 1725; still, it was rapid enough for the situation to have entirely

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[23] Certainly, however, toward the end of the century, Azbakiyya was increasingly taken over by members of the Mamluk elite.

[24] Results of an extensive search of the *Maḥkama* archives for documents related to the estates of the emirs between 1775 and 1798.

[25] *Maḥkama*, 90, 468, 24 May 1696.

changed by the end of the eighteenth century. In my study of the estates of officers between 1775 and 1798, I noted that the northern part of the western area been included seven residences (of a total of 69 estates studied).

In my opinion, these considerations—which admittedly must remain rather general, in view of the incomplete nature of the available documentation—appear to confirm that the location of the residences maintained by members of the ruling elite complied with a particular type of logic. Many of the residences were concentrated in the two (neighboring) areas of Birkat al-Fīl and Qanāṭir al-Sibāʿ—a total of 27 of the 50 residences studied—far from the areas where the native population lived and worked; in this respect, some type of segregation was very strictly observed. On the other hand, the choice of location of the residences maintained by members of the ruling caste was largely determined by the extent of their personal fortunes, with the preferred quarters inhabited by the richer elements of that caste. With few exceptions, only the less well-to-do members of the elite resigned themselves to living in less prestigious quarters, where they found themselves in contact with the native population; this proximity was undoubtedly one of the reasons for the shunning of those areas by the wealthiest members of that caste.

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PROBLEMS OF ʿABD AL-RAḤMĀN KATKHUDĀ'S LEADERSHIP OF THE QAZDUGHLI FACTION

Daniel Crecelius

ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā was one of the most important Egyptian amirs of the eighteenth century, yet his career remains somewhat out of focus. His longevity was itself unusual, but he is best known for the large number of constructions with which he endowed Cairo in the period 1744–1765.[1] His lineage and the incredible wealth he accumulated would suggest that he would have also assumed the leadership of his *bayt* (faction), but this was not the case. Following the lead of the famous late eighteenth century Egyptian historian al-Jabartī, whose career overlapped with ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā for approximately the last two decades of the amir's life, modern historians have concluded that ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā eschewed the rough and tumble of political life and preferred to devote his energies, and considerable wealth, to the large number of constructions which have beautified Cairo and immortalized his name. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān's seeming unwillingness to participate actively in the political plots and counter-plots that remained a constant during his long career have been said to be a function of his character, that is, a preference for the cultural life, a desire to avoid the political arena, and a devotion to construction.[2] This paper will question that view and suggest that it was the political culture of the prevailing Mamluk

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[1] These constructions are listed and described in André Raymond, "Les Constructions de l'Émir ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā au Caire," *Annales islamologiques*, vol. XI (1972), 235–251.

[2] The best review of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān's career is André Raymond's *Le Caire des Janissaires: L'apogée de la ville ottomane sous ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā* (Paris: CNRS Editions, 1995). Raymond notes ʿAbd al-Raḥmān's superior education, his ability to draw and understand architectural plans, and his command of Arabic. He also feels that the manner in which ʿAbd al-Raḥmān led the Janissaries demonstrates his lack of interest in politics and preference for construction. See page 42.

system of the period that prevented him from actively pursuing the leadership of his powerful political faction, a faction that dominated the political and economic life of Egypt from the 1730s to the arrival of French forces in 1798.

We are not certain of the exact date of 'Abd al-Raḥmān's birth, but it is usually attributed to a period shortly before the death of his father, Ḥasan Jāwīsh al-Qazdughli, in 1716. His mother, Āmina, the daughter of the amir Ḥasan Shurbaji Mustaḥfiẓān, was the free-born wife of Ḥasan Jāwīsh, so 'Abd al-Raḥmān was himself a free-born Muslim. I believe this freeborn status made the difference in his subsequent career.

In the late seventeenth century the politically astute Ḥasan, the *agha* of the Gönülliyan corps, had formed a triumvirate with his son-in-law Ismā'il Bey al-Daftardār and his former *sarrāj* Muṣṭafā al-Qazdughli to dominate the political life of Cairo. Ḥasan Aghā had been instrumental in placing Muṣṭafā al-Qazdughli as *katkhudā* of the most powerful Ottoman regiment in Egypt; the Janissary corps controlled the most lucrative tax farms, particularly the customs houses of the ports, was heavily involved in the extensive coffee trade of the Red Sea, and acquired significant payments from the estates of deceased corps members and from local and foreign merchants upon whom it imposed a "protection" tax. It is to Muṣṭafā Katkhudā, who died in 1704, the same year as his patron Ḥasan Aghā, that the Qazdughli faction traces its roots.

The Qazdughli faction split into two upon the death of Muṣṭafā Katkhudā in 1704. One branch was headed by his manumitted mamluk Ḥasan Jāwīsh, who remained dominant; the other was headed by Sulaymān Jāwīsh, another of Muṣṭafā Katkhudā's freed mamluks.[3] The base of Qazdughli power remained firmly established in the Janissary corps and upon the death of Ḥasan Jāwīsh in 1716 the faction, and the Janissary corps, was headed by 'Uthmān Katkhudā al-Qazdughli.[4]

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[3] The genealogical lines of the Qazdughli faction are laid out by Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazdağlis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 65f.

[4] Among 'Uthmān Katkhudā's freed Mamluks were Sulaymān Jāwīsh, Ibrāhīm Katkhudā, 'Abdallāh Katkhudā, Riḍwān Kāshif, 'Uthmān, 'Alī and Ḥasan Odabāshi of the Janissaries, 'Abdallāh, *shurbāji* of the Janissaries, Khalīl, Bashīr *Aghā Dār al-Sa'āda*, Muṣṭafā al-Khāzindār, Aḥmad Kāshif and 'Uthmān Kāshif. See Michel

When Ḥasan Jāwīsh died, his infant son ʿAbd al-Raḥmān suffered the first of many disappointments that marked his career and which have been attributed to his passivity. His father's senior mamluk, ʿUthmān al-Qazdughli, married his master's widow Āmina, the mother of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, and withheld the considerable inheritance due the infant ʿAbd al-Raḥmān. In maintaining control of the Janissary corps ʿUthmān, who was *katkhudā*, designated his own freed mamluk Sulaymān al-Çuhadār the *bash odabashi* of the unit and executor of his will, and in 1734 made his stepson a *jāwīsh* in the unit.[5]

ʿUthmān Katkhudā had a hand in a wide range of economic activities that made him a very wealthy amir and permitted him to undertake numerous constructions. He was actively involved in the lucrative trade between Cairo and the Hijaz, held many rural tax farms, gained control of the customs houses of Egypt's ports, and as a result of the great plague of 1736 acquired much from the inheritances of the members of his corps and of those rich merchants who died without heirs. He also profited from offering his protection to the foreign merchant community, particularly to the French. His fortune was therefore considerable when he was assassinated in the plot that was organized by the Ottoman governor Bākir Pasha in November 1736.[6]

Upon the death of ʿUthmān Katkhudā his freed slave and heir, and executor of his will, Sulaymān Jāwīsh, became head of the Qazdughli faction and laid his hand on his master's entire fortune, leaving ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, who was then around 21 years of age, a rural tax farm producing only four purses, or 100,000 *nisf fiḍḍa*s profit per year. Finding no support among his Janissary comrades, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān in disgust transferred to the ʿAzab corps, vowing not to return to the Janissary corps while Sulaymān Jāwīsh was alive.[7]

Tuchscherer, "Le pèlerinage de l'émir Sulaymān Ǧāwīš al-Qāzdugli," *Annales islamologiques*, vol. XXIV (1988), 157.

[5] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Ḥasan al-Jabartī, *ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī's History of Egypt*, Thomas Philipp and Moshe Perlmann, eds. (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, 1994), vol. I, 275; Aḥmad Katkhudā ʿAzabān al-Damurdāshī, *Chronicle of Egypt: 1688–1755*, Daniel Crecelius and ʿAbd al-Wahhāb Bakr, eds. and trans. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991), 309. Ḥasan Jāwīsh had another son, Ḥasan Çelebi, who took no significant part in political life. His title, *çelebi*, suggests that he pursued a scholarly or commercial life. His name is mentioned among a long list of those who died in the plague of 1736. See al-Jabartī, *op. cit.*, vol. I, 274.

[6] See Tuchscherer, "Le pèlerinage de l'émir Sulaymān Ǧāwīš al-Qāzdugli", 158–159.

[7] Al-Damurdāshī, *Chronicle of Egypt: 1688–1755*, 315; al-Jabartī, *op. cit.*, vol. II, 5.

In 1739 Sulaymān Jāwīsh was named *sirdār* of the troops assigned
to guard the pilgrims on their journey to the Hijaz. Suffering from
syphilis, and infirm, he was carried on a palaquin to Birkat al-Ḥājj,
the starting point for the departure of the Egyptian pilgrimage car-
avan. He was accompanied by his wife, the Sitt Shuwaykar, the for-
mer concubine of his deceased master ʿUthmān Katkhudā. Sulaymān
Aghā, the *katkhudā* of the Jāwīshiyya and freed mamluk of ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān's father Ḥasan Jāwīsh, who had married ʿAbd al-Raḥmān's
mother Āmina after the assassination of ʿUthmān Katkhudā in 1736,
was present in Sulaymān Jāwīsh's tent when he expired. As described
by al-Damurdāshī, Sulaymān Aghā then "took the registers from the
assistant (*mustawfī*) and put them in a trunk. He took the keys to
the other trunks, boxes and crates and informed ʿUthmān Bey Zayn
al-Faqār (the *amīr al-Ḥājj*). He then brought his heir, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
Jāwīsh, and bestowed upon him the robe of the *sirdār* of the
Mustaḥfiẓān guards. Sulaymān Aghā handed him the keys, and he
took charge of the pavillion with its furnishings, necessities, ground
coffee and all other comestibles."[8] Al-Damurdāshī comments that
"This was a gift of the powerful Lord, given without any effort [on
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Jāwīsh's part]."[9] While ʿAbd al-Raḥmān left the
ʿAzab corps and returned to an important post within the Janissary
regiment, the estates of ʿUthmān Katkhudā and Sulaymān Jāwīsh
were not settled until 1740 when ʿAbd al-Raḥmān had returned from
his service with the troops guarding the pilgrims. Shuwaykar, Sulaymān
Jāwīsh's widow, was taken by Ibrāhīm Jāwīsh, one of Sulaymān
Jāwīsh's manumitted mamluks who would assume the leadership of
the main Qazdughli faction.[10]

Although ʿAbd al-Raḥmān finally came into the immense delayed
inheritances of his father, ʿUthmān Katkhudā, and Sulaymān Jāwīsh
Çuhadār in 1740 he was unable to claim the leadership of the
Qazdughli amirs, which instead was seized by the ambitious and

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At least part of ʿUthmān Katkhudā's fortune by law should have gone to the son
of his master Ḥasan Jāwīsh, that is, to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā. See André
Raymond, *Le Caire des Janissaires*, 34. Hathaway, *op. cit.*, 79, notes that Sulaymān
Jāwīsh had received an imperial order entitling him to inherit ʿUthmān Katkhudā's
tax farms, some of which he was to divide among the other heirs, including ʿAbd
al-Raḥmān.

   [8] Al-Damurdāshī, *op. cit.*, 320.
   [9] *Loc. cit.*
   [10] *Ibid.*, 380 cites Shuwaykar as one of Ibrāhīm Katkhudā's wives.

astute Ibrāhīm Jāwīsh.[11] Some historians have sympathized with 'Abd al-Raḥmān's fate on the death of his father in 1716, but 'Abd al-Raḥmān's misfortune was not unusual, whether among the general public or the mamluks. Several points can be made to explain the events surrounding the transfer of power and wealth from Ḥasan Jāwīsh to 'Uthmān Katkhudā.

While recognizing that 'Abd al-Raḥmān had a clear claim to his legal share of his father's inheritance, it must be remembered that he was still a child at the time of his father's death; he had neither the age, political acumen, retainers of his own well placed to leverage his claim to his father's succession, nor the political power to challenge his father's senior freed mamluk. Nor was he able to contest Sulaymān Jāwīsh's usurpation of the inheritance of his master 'Uthmān Katkhudā. Finding little support within his Janissary ranks, he transferred to the 'Azab corps and attempted to establish friendly relations with the remnants of the defeated Qāsimī faction. The problems faced by 'Abd al-Raḥmān, and his frustrated claim to his rightful inheritance, can be explained satisfactorily with reference to the prevailing mamluk culture of that period.

Within Mamluk political culture of the eighteenth century the senior manumitted slave held a special position within his master's household. It was generally he to whom the rest of the household looked for leadership when the head of the household died. He usually was connected by marriage to his master. He frequently was given one of his master's daughters or concubines in marriage and, on the death of his master, married his master's senior wife, moved into his master's house, and, as in the case of 'Uthmān Katkhudā, acquired much of his master's wealth and positions. As the recognized new head of the household he was expected to maintain the "open house" for the faction and to maintain or expand the faction's control of positions and revenues within the province's administration.[12] All of these aspects of a "succession" can be seen in the

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[11] 'Uthmān Katkhudā's partial inheritance amounted to 21.5 million *para*s, while Sulaymān Jāwīsh Çuhadār's partial inheritance totalled 6.8 million *para*s, most probably making 'Abd al-Raḥmān the richest man in Egypt. It should be remembered that these figures do not include all of the deceased amirs' passive assets, such as potential income from tax farms and other sources of income controlled but not owned. See Raymond, *Le Caire des Janissaires*, 36.

[12] For the meaning of "open house" see David Ayalon, "Studies in al-Jabartī I:

career of Dhū al-Faqār Aghā, the retainer of Qānṣawh Bey al-Qāsimī. Jabartī notes that upon the death of Qānṣawh Bey in 1715, "his offices of amir and *sancak bey* were given to his retainer Dhū 'l-Faqār Aghā, who married his daughter and maintained the splendor of his master's house."[13] Another example would be Muṣṭafā Kāshif, who acquired all the inheritance of his master ʿAlī Bey Zayn al-Faqār (died in 1734), including his widow.[14] This special relationship between a master and his freed mamluk was consolidated in several ways, given legal status, and became a tradition.

First of all, the bond between master and slave remained unbreakable even after the manumission of the slave. At that moment the master often gave a woman of his own harem, either a concubine or his own daughter, in marriage to his slave. Examples abound throughout the century of the marriages of favorite manumitted mamluks being arranged by their masters.[15] Another tradition was for the most powerful (usually the senior) manumitted mamluk to marry the senior wife of the deceased master, as ʿUthmān Katkhudā did in marrying ʿAbd al-Raḥmān's mother Āmina.[16] The other wives or favorite concubines of the deceased master were taken by other of his powerful manumitted slaves; some of these, such as Shuwaykar or Nafīsa Khātūn, the famous wife of ʿAlī Bey who was claimed by Murād Bey following the death of ʿAlī Bey, played significant roles in the political careers of their new husbands, bringing considerable wealth and legitimacy to their new households.

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Notes on the Transformation of Mamluk Society in Egypt under the Ottomans," *JESHO*, vol. III (1960), 290–97.

[13] Al-Jabartī, *op. cit.*, vol. I, 182. Likewise, when ʿAlī Bey Zayn al-Faqār died in 1146 (1733–34), Muṣṭafā Kāshif acquired all his inheritance, including retainers and mamluks, paid the *hulvan* for his tax farm villages, and married his master's widow. See al-Damurdāshī, *op. cit.*, 319.

[14] Al-Damurdāshī, *op. cit.*, 319.

[15] ʿAlī Bey Bulut Kapan, for instance, married his sister to his favorite mamluk, the famous Muḥammad Bey Abu al-Dhahab. See Daniel Crecelius, *The Roots of Modern Egypt: A Study of the Regimes of ʿAlī Bey al-Kabīr and Muḥammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab, 1760–1775* (Minneapolis & Chicago: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1981), 45; 58–59. An interesting essay on marriages among the Mamluks of the eighteenth century is Jane Hathaway's "Marriage Alliances among the Military Households of Ottoman Egypt," *AI*, XXIX (1995), 133–149. See also Mary Ann Fay, "Women and Waqf: Toward a Reconsideration of Women's Place in the Mamluk Household," *IJMES*, vol. XXIX (February 1997), 33–51.

[16] Upon the death of ʿAlī Bey Bulut Kapan in 1773 Muḥammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab took his master's senior wife ʿĀʾisha Qādin in marriage and permitted his

The tradition of the senior manumitted mamluk being brought closer to the master of the household through marriage with one of the chosen women of the master's harem was not just a reward to a favorite, but was meant to provide continuity and protection to the household. That this was a tradition nurtured by mamluk grandees themselves can be seen in the stipulations they frequently included in the documents (*waqfiyyāt*) establishing their *awqāf*. It is common to find among the stipulations that the senior manumitted slave is named supervisor (*nāzir*) of the *waqf*, even when children of the donor/master are cited as beneficiaries.[17] It is clear that the children could not defend the wealth and property endowed in their father's *waqf* as well as a senior, well-placed manumitted mamluk amir. It is equally clear that a freeborn son, even one who had reached manhood, did not have the leverage and power to protect the family's inheritance against the increasingly frequent usurpations of the inheritance of deceased amirs as the century unfolded. 'Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā is a good example, for he would not have acquired the fortune he came to possess without the intervention at a propitious moment by his father's freed mamluk Sulaymān Aghā, who was his stepfather. An amir often designated his senior manumitted mamluk to act as supervisor of his *waqf* with the clear intention that this was a better way to hold the inheritance together and to insure its benefits to his wives and children. Moreover, in the lawless decades following the death of Muḥammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab in 1775 mamluks frequently usurped the inheritances of their deceased colleagues and of citizens alike. It was a particularly tumultuous time.

Of the pandemic plague of 1790–1791 which killed off so many citizens, among them entire mamluk households, al-Jabartī mentioned that "It happened that succession was transferred three times in one

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own mamluk Murād Bey to marry 'Alī Bey's second wife, the famous Nafīsa Qādin. 'Ā'isha was the freed slave of 'Alī Bey's master, the famous Ibrāhīm Katkhudā. 'Alī Bey's other two wives were Munawwar Khātūn bint 'Abdallāh al-Baydā and Gulsan bint 'Abdallāh al-Baydā. This information is recorded in 'Alī Bey's *waqfiyya*, preserved as Number 743 in the Ministry of Awqāf in Cairo. See also Crecelius, *op. cit.*, 116–17.

[17] Many *waqfiyyāt* include this stipulation, even stipulating that the eldest surviving mamluk should always hold the supervision of the *waqf*. Jabartī, vol. II, 352–53, gives an example of a mamluk taking care of the family of his deceased master, noting that Muḥammad Aghā al-Bārūdī married his master's widow and took care of his stepsons.

week."[18] When the plague had passed and the Ottoman-supported government of Cairo, including virtually the entire household of Ismāʿīl Bey the *shaykh al-balad*, had been carried away, the forces of Ibrāhīm Bey and Murād Bey returned to Cairo. Al-Jabartī describes the return of the rebel amirs thusly:

> The amirs entered their houses and spent the night there, forgetting what had happened, for in most of the houses that had been occupied by amirs who had died of the plague, their wives had remained in them, while most of the wives of those who had been absent had died. Then when they returned, they found the houses populated by women, servant girls and slaves, so they married them and renewed their beds and made their wedding feasts. Whoever had no house, entered whichever house he liked best and took it with everything in it without hindrance. He sat in the places of the men and awaited the completion of the waiting period, if any of it remained. So God bequeathed to them their land and houses, their wealth and their wives.[19]

Although ʿUthmān Katkhudā acted illegally when he denied ʿAbd al-Raḥmān his inheritance and had no clear intent to benefit his young stepson, his actions are understandable within the context of mamluk political culture in eighteenth century Egypt. Sulaymān Jāwīsh likewise disregarded the rules of inheritance to usurp the inheritance of his master ʿUthmān Katkhudā. That Sulaymān Aghā would restore the lost inheritance to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān upon Sulaymān Jāwīsh's death in 1739 demonstrates that Sulaymān Aghā felt that ʿAbd al-Raḥmān had been denied his share of the inheritance of his father, and he was fulfilling an obligation to the son of his deceased master Ḥasan Jāwīsh. Was Sulaymān Aghā acting in an altruistic manner, or in self-interest? By turning Sulaymān Jāwīsh's fortune over to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, he was insuring that his own wife Āmina (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān's mother) and stepson now had one of the grandest fortunes in Egypt.

The leadership of the Janissary corps, and of the Qazdughli faction whose base of power was within the corps, now fell to Ibrāhīm Jāwīsh, the manumitted slave of the deceased Sulaymān Jāwīsh Çuhadar. This paper will not examine the duumvirate that Ibrāhīm Jāwīsh formed with the Julfi leader Riḍwān, the *katkhudā* of the ʿAzab

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[18] Al-Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. II, 315.
[19] *Ibid.*, vol. II, 321.

corps, or the transformation for which Ibrāhīm Jāwīsh and Riḍwān Katkhudā are responsible in appointing their mamluks not only to positions within their respective corps, but to the beylicate. Instead, it shall continue to examine the relationship between 'Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā and the succession of Qazdughli leaders.

With Riḍwān Katkhudā as a junior, one might almost say silent, partner, Ibrāhīm Jāwīsh dominated the politics of the 1740s and the early 1750s and controlled a great portion of the revenues of the richest of Ottoman provinces. The contemporary historian al-Damur-dāshī remarked that, "The leadership of Egypt devolved upon Ibrāhīm Katkhudā Qazdughli and Riḍwān Katkhudā al-Julfī. Everything first went to Ibrāhīm Katkhudā Qazdughli, whether the spice revenues, bribes, or the like, and then he gave one-third to Riḍwān Katkhudā al-Julfī."[20] Although in possession of the largest fortune in Egypt, 'Abd al-Raḥmān was denied an active political life by the imposing will of Ibrāhīm Jāwīsh and contented himself with the income from the customs revenues of Alexandria, which the Janissaries held as a tax farm, and from his association with the Jewish and foreign (particularly French) merchant communities from whom he extracted an income in return for his "protection."[21] During the 1740s 'Abd al-Raḥmān accompanied several pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina in his capacity as *sirdār* of the troops guarding the pilgrims and began the massive building program that left Cairo and environs with so many religious edifices, both restored and newly constructed. 'Abd al-Raḥmān played no direct role in the continuing plots and counterplots of the 1740s which saw the elimination of Ibrāhīm Jāwīsh's rivals such as the Qaṭāmishiyya and Damiyāṭiyyā factions, the flight of 'Uthmān Bey Dhū al-Fiqār and the deposition of the governor Rāghib Pasha in 1748, but was said to instigate many of these conflicts.[22]

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[20] Al-Damurdāshī, *op. cit.*, 376. Much like 'Abd al-Raḥmān himself, Riḍwān Katkhudā refrained from taking an active role in the political life of the capital and devoted his energies to constructions of his own.

[21] See, for example, Raymond, *Le Caire des Janissaires*, 37.

[22] Al-Jabartī, *op. cit.*, vol. II, 9–10. Raymond, *Le Caire des Janissaires*, 34, notes the remark made by 'Abd al-Raḥmān's own stepfather, Sulaymān Jāwīsh, who had secured 'Abd al-Raḥmān's fortune for him. When he was exiled in 1765 by 'Alī Bey, Sulaymān Jāwīsh was asked if he didn't want to say something in his defense. "My son," said Sulaymān Jāwīsh, "is a hypocrite who has endeavored to create dissention among people. He has deserved (his exile)."

Towards the end of 1747 Ibrāhīm Jāwīsh suddenly ordered the exile of 'Abd al-Raḥmān to Mecca, where he stayed for slightly more than three years, when Ibrāhīm permitted his return to Cairo in the company of the *amīr al-ḥājj* 'Alī Bey, one of his mamluks whom Ibrāhīm Katkhudā had raised to the beylicate.[23] Upon his return Ibrāhīm, who himself had finally assumed the office of *katkhudā* of the Janissaries, named 'Abd al-Raḥmān to that important office for a two year period. Ostensibly, 'Abd al-Raḥmān was now the head of the Qazdughli faction and in control of the most powerful Otto-man corps in Egypt. While he continued to enrich himself by access to the many ways in which the Janissaries were able to exploit the rich revenue system in Egypt, he remained subordinate to Ibrāhīm Jāwīsh/Katkhudā until the latter's death in November 1754. It was then that 'Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā married the oft-widowed Sitt Shuwaykar.

One can rightfully ask why 'Abd al-Raḥmān was so easy to push around and why he seemed to accept exile to the Hijaz without resistance. The answer, I believe, lies in his status as a freeborn "out-sider" within the network of Mamluk households. There are, of course, examples from the eighteenth century of the freeborn sons of Mamluk amirs being named to their father's positions and assum-ing the control of their tax farms, but this was not the rule. Far more often, these sons were passed over, forgotten, or given a small stipend or tax farm to sustain them, but they seldom were accepted within the inner circles of Mamluk ranks and seldom played a significant role in the politics of the period. 'Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā was unique because of the enormous wealth he commanded, and even though Jabartī states that he purchased mamluks and concu-bines of his own, these were not placed in prominent positions within

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[23] Al-Damurdāshī does not state that 'Abd al-Raḥmān was exiled, but that he decided to accompany the *amīr al-ḥājj* 'Umar Bey on pilgrimage in 1747. He incor-rectly has 'Abd al-Raḥmān returning to Cairo in 1748 in the company of the *amīr al-ḥājj* 'Alī Bey and being made *katkhudā* of the Janissaries for the next two years. See al-Damurdāshī, *op. cit.*, 365; 372. In 1760 'Abd al-Raḥmān would name 'Alī Bey the *shaykh al-balad*. The chronicle by al-Jabartī is equally vague on this period. But Raymond used French consular reports for establishing a more accurate chronol-ogy for 'Abd al-Raḥmān's career. Moreover, 'Alī Bey served as *amīr al-ḥājj* in 1751, not in 1748. For a list of the amirs who led the pilgrimage, see Shaykh Aḥmad al-Rashīdī, *Ḥusun al-Ṣafā' wa al-Ibtihāj bi dhikr man Imārat al-Ḥājj*, edited by Laylā 'Abd al-Laṭīf Aḥmad al-Ṣafā' (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khanji, 1980), particularly 217.

the Ottoman regimental corps or the beylicate controlled by mam-
luks. While he was the recognized head of both the faction and the
Janissaries between 1754 and 1765, the year of his second exile to
Mecca, the officers of the corps and the mamluks who dominated
the beylicate were not his own creatures, but rather the amirs
appointed by Ibrāhīm Katkhudā and Riḍwān Katkhudā.[24]

As a freeborn Muslim, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā had no *khush-
dāshiyya* to support his political ambitions, to defend him when under
attack, or to intervene as mediators on his behalf. Without a well
placed cadre of mamluks or *khushdāshiyya* willing to fight for him, he
was an easy person to manipulate. Despite his enormous wealth,
he could not defend himself against a powerful bey or regimental
commander. He accepted passively his exile in the Hijaz and was
rewarded for his submission to his fate when Ibrāhīm Katkhudā
brought him back to Cairo and installed him as *katkhudā* of the
Janissary corps. We might repeat al-Damurdāshī's earlier remark
"This was a gift of the powerful Lord, given without any effort [on
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Jāwīsh's part]."

Upon the death of Ibrāhīm Katkhudā in November 1754 ʿAbd
al-Raḥmān could finally claim the leadership of the Qazdughli fac-
tion. With his influence in the Janissary corps and his enormous
wealth, he could prosper even greater than before by exploiting the
wide range of tax farms controlled by the faction's high ranking
officers. The customs of Egypt's busy ports, the "protection" taxes
that the Qazdughlis extracted from the various domestic and foreign
merchant communities, the revenues of the urban tax farms and the
vast revenues of the agricultural tax farms and *awqāf* now controlled
by Qazdughli beys and *kāshif*s, all these sources and more were
manipulated by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā.

In May 1755, just six months after the death of Ibrāhīm Katkhudā,
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān provoked his allies to attack and kill Riḍwān
Katkhudā al-Julfī. Perhaps remembering how he had been poorly
treated when his own father died, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān assured the sons

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[24] Al-Damurdāshī, *op. cit.*, 382 reveals that Ibrāhīm Katkhudā had sons and
grandsons who had been assigned the tax farms of villages before his death, yet
these did not engage in the contest for power. It was his mamluks and the mam-
luks of his ally Riḍwān Katkhudā al-Julfi who dominated the Ottoman corps and
the beylicate following Ibrāhīm Katkhudā's death.

of Riḍwān Katkhudā a respectable income from rural tax farms that
were registered in their names.[25] Although free of serious challengers
from rival factions, 'Abd al-Raḥmān continued to demonstrate a per-
sonal aversion to direct involvement in the political infighting that
characterized the struggle for leadership following the death of Ibrāhīm
Katkhudā and the murder of Riḍwān Katkhudā. Even so, he could
not contain splintering within his own faction. For instance, he
absented himself from the capital and made a long five month tour
of the delta to avoid the dispute among the amirs over the succes-
sion of Ibrāhīm Katkhudā.[26] And in October 1760, when he was
challenged by one of the senior mamluks whom Ibrāhīm Bey had
elevated to the beylicate, he fell back on countering this threat by
elevating another of Ibrāhīm Katkhudā's mamluks to the leadership
of the beylicate. Upon learning that 'Alī Bey al-Ghazzāwī was plot-
ting his assassination, 'Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā called a council of
Qazdughli amirs and officers, explained the threat posed by 'Alī Bey
al-Ghazzawi who had left Cairo with the pilgrimage, and asked, "O
amirs, who am I? They all replied, 'You are our master, son of our
master, to whom we owe allegiance.'" He then proclaimed that "'Alī
Bey (Bulut Kapan) here shall be *shaykh al-balad* and chief; and I will
be the first to obey and the last to oppose him." The next day 'Abd
al-Raḥmān "rode to 'Alī Bey's residence; the *dīwān* and the assem-
bly were transferred there as of that day, and 'Alī Bey's power
became momentous."[27]

   Available manuscript sources, including al-Jabartī's famous history,
remain largely silent on the period 1760, when 'Abd al-Raḥmān
Katkhudā elevated 'Alī Bey to the *mashyakha* of the beylicate, so we
know little of the activities of the two amirs until April 1765, when

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   [25] *Ibid.*, 386. The sons, one an adult, one a minor, were assigned villages pro-
ducing a profit of 30 purses, or 750,000 *paras*.
   [26] Raymond, *Le Caire des Janissaires*, 42.
   [27] Al-Jabartī, *op. cit.*, vol. I, 418–19; I, 637. Jabartī notes that "Since 'Abd al-
Raḥmān Katkhudā was the son of their chief and the mainstay of their power,
('Alī Bey) became his ally. ('Abd al-Raḥmān), for his part, befriended him in order
to win influence through him over the leaders of the *ikhtiyāriyya* of the ocaks. All
the while, 'Alī Bey and 'Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā were each vying for supremacy."
Jabartī, *op. cit.*, vol. I, 418. 'Alī Bey was eligible to assume the leadership mantle
of the Qazdughlis by virtue of being the manumitted mamluk of Ibrāhīm Katkhudā,
the Qazdughli leader who had firmly established the dominance of this faction over
both the Janissaries and the beylicate only a few years earlier.

'Alī Bey, who strengthened his own household considerably by the acquisition of many mamluks and retainers and the appointment of senior mamluks to important positions within the regiments and the beylicate, suddenly ordered the banishment of a group of amirs to the delta and the exile of 'Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā to Mecca. The contemporary historian al-Jabarti remarked the ease of this coup d'etat by 'Alī Bey.

> On that day Cairo was in a commotion, especially at the departure of 'Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā, for he had been the most important of the lot, the son of their former master, and a man of power, authority, and reputation. Because of him, the power of the Janissaries had increased over that of the 'Azab. Furthermore, he had so large a clan and so many Mamluks, retainers, Maghribi and other troops that the people supposed that on that day there would be great civil strife. However, all that occurred was a great deal of popular confusion and astonishment.[28]

This second exile of eleven years effectively ended 'Abd al-Raḥmān's career. He was brought back, in ill health, in March 1776, after the deaths of 'Alī Bey and his mamluk and successor Muḥammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab, and died only 11 days after his return.

How does one explain 'Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā's passive acceptance of his second exile to the Hijaz? He put up no resistance, did not assemble the mamluks and retainers of his own household to defend him, and apparently made no effort to return from exile and reclaim his position of leadership of the Qazdughli faction. "He lived during that time in Mecca as a lonely stranger."[29] Once again, I believe his inability to assume effective leadership of the now dominant Qazdughli faction was owing to his freeborn birth. He could call on no one to defend him because he was not a mamluk himself, hence was not truly a part of the governing system. It was in deference to his lineage that the mamluks of the Qazdughli faction paid him respect and it likewise was his enormous wealth that made his residence the "open house" used by the Qazdughlis between the death of Ibrāhīm Katkhudā in 1754 and his own exile in 1765. His control of the Janissaries and the respect he had from the 'ulama

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[28] Al-Jabartī, *op. cit.*, vol. I, 419–20.
[29] *Ibid.*, vol. II, 10, had also noted that when 'Alī Bey turned on him like a mad dog, "he found nobody to defend him."

and the common people who benefited so magnificently from his constructions and endowments could not be translated into political influence when he was suddenly ordered to leave Cairo.

He had been unable to insert his personal mamluks into positions of leadership within the regiments or the beylicate, hence had little political leverage within these two centers of political power. His household, despite supporting numerous personal mamluks, played no significant political role after his exile or death. Nor could the few remaining representatives of imprial power, such as the governor and the *kizlar agha*, intervene on his behalf. In reality, he might be compared to a rich merchant like the head of the Sharāyibī family, who possessed enormous wealth, a luxurious house, and mamluks and servants of his own. But Sharāyibī would not presume to interfere in the politics of the dominant ruling households.

In his review of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān's career, André Raymond asks if his freeborn status was not a hindrance to his leadership of the regiments since virtually all the officers of these corps were mamluks.[30] I believe the answer is an emphatic "Yes." It was not merely his personality, his alleged aversion for politics and preference for construction, that affected the course of his political career, but the norms and traditions of a political system that assigned little influence or roles to those of freeborn status.

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[30] Raymond, *Le Caire des Janissaires*, 35.

MAMLUK "REVIVALS" AND MAMLUK NOSTALGIA IN OTTOMAN EGYPT

Jane Hathaway

A key question in the historiography of Ottoman Egypt is whether the administrative leadership of the province continued or revived the administrative usage of the Mamluk sultanate.[1] The very manner in which this question is posed, however, reflects an unexamined assumption—one of several in the historiography of Ottoman Egypt. It assumes that Mamluk Egypt was an objective reality of which the administrative elite of Ottoman Egypt had unmediated knowledge. This seems a dangerous assumption when one considers, for example, that nineteenth-century Egyptian observers had a distorted view of conditions in eighteenth-century Egypt, even though these conditions had existed less than a century before. A prominent exponent of these distortions is Ismāʿīl al-Khashshāb, who composed a modern history of Egypt at the request of the French occupying force in the opening years of the nineteenth century. His treatment of Egypt's grandee households and political factions in the eighteenth century contains lacunae and errors obvious to anyone familiar with the corpus of eighteenth-century chronicles of Egypt.[2] Al-Khashshāb is, by his own admission, relying on the accounts (*akhbār*) told him by his own father.

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[1] P.M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent: A Political History, 1516–1922* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1966), 71–98; Michael Winter, *Egyptian Society Under Ottoman Rule, 1517–1798* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 20–27, 31–32, 47–54, 65–68, 72–77; Daniel Crecelius, *The Roots of Modern Egypt: A Study of the Regimes of ʿAlī Bey al-Kabīr and Muḥammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab, 1760–1775* (Minneapolis and Chicago: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1981), 22–34; Doris Behrens-Abouseif, *Egypt's Adjustment to Ottoman Rule: Institutions, Waqf, and Architecture in Cairo, Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 114–16, 128, 133.

[2] Ismāʿīl al-Khashshāb, *Tadhkira li-ahl al-baṣāʾir waʾl-abṣār maʿa wajh al-ikhtiṣār*, Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, MS Arabe 1858, fo. 2r.

We are accustomed nowadays to take European travellers', diplo-
mats', and administrators' accounts of Egyptian and other Middle
Eastern societies with a large grain of salt, expecting their descrip-
tions and opinions to be colored by Orientalist preconceptions. Yet
this skepticism seems not to extend to sources generated from within
such a society but at one or more centuries' remove. How can we
know that an eighteenth-century Egyptian grandee's view of Mamluk
Egypt is accurate? By the same token, if such a grandee claims to
recreate Mamluk institutions, should we take him at his word? If,
on the other hand, it seems to us that he is recreating Mamluk insti-
tutions, can we be sure that this is his perception, as well? How can
we know that he is not, like al-Khashshāb, relying on popular stories?

To be blunt, we cannot know because, in fact, he is. A scholar
such as 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī was familiar with the major
"canonical" Mamluk chronicles—those of al-Maqrīzī, Ibn Taghrī
Birdī (Tanrıverdi), and Ibn Iyās[3]—and drew his perceptions of the
Mamluk sultanate largely from them. Ottoman-era administrators,
for their part, were certainly aware of the most prominent Mamluk
sultans, particularly those who left behind mosques, tombs, and pious
foundations with which they had to contend. Thus, a document of
the seventeenth or eighteenth century may refer in passing to "the
*waqf*s of Sultan Qānṣūh-i Gavri" or "the mosque of Sultan Barqūq."[4]
Ottoman-era chroniclers can identify a character as "among the
emirs of Qāytbāy" without further explanation,[5] evidently confident
that their readers will be familiar with Qāytbāy and other leading
rulers of the late Mamluk era. But can we be sure that a chance
reference to Qāytbāy reflects a solid knowledge of the conditions and
institutions of the Mamluk sultanate?

What evidence we have of Ottoman-era depictions of the Mamluk
sultanate should leave us far from certain. The Mamluk sultans most

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[3] Tāqi al-Dīn Aḥmad b. 'Alī al-Maqrīzī (1364–1442), *Kitāb al-sulūk li-ma'rifat duwal
al-mulūk*; idem, *Al-Mawā'iz wa'l-i'tibār fī dhikr al-khiṭaṭ wa'l-āthār* (a.k.a. *Al-Khiṭaṭ*); Abū
al-Maḥāsin Yūsuf b. Taghrī Birdī (1411–1470), *Al-Manhal al-ṣafī wa'l-mustawfī ba'd
al-wāfī*; idem, *Al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī mulūk Miṣr wa'l-Qāhira*; Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b.
Iyās (1448–c. 1524), *Badā'i' al-zuhūr fī waqā'i' al-duhūr*.
[4] Istanbul, Başbakanlık Arşivi, Mühimme Defteri 104, no. 1024 (mid-Sha'bān
1104/late April 1693); *Mühimme-i Mıṣr* vol. V, no. 757 (late 1155/early 1743).
[5] For example, Aḥmad Shalabi (Çelebi) b. 'Abd al-Ghanī, *Awḍaḥ al-ishārāt fī man
tawalla Miṣr al-Qāhira min al-wuzarā' wa'l-bāshāt*, ed. A.A. 'Abd al-Raḥīm (Cairo:
Maktabat al-Khānji, 1978), 283.

frequently mentioned in Ottoman-era chronicles are, on the one hand, the most recent—Qāytbāy (r. 1468–1496), Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī (r. 1501–1516), and Tumanbay (r. 1516–1517)—and, on the other hand, the "founding fathers": Baybars (r. 1260–1277), who founded the Mamluk sultanate; Qala'ūn (1279–1290), who founded his own century-long dynasty; and Barqūq (r. 1382–1399), the first of the Circassian Mamluk sultans. These five sultans are all "fabled," whether because of their great accomplishments or, as in the case of al-Ghawrī, because of their appalling failures. Familiarity with any or all of them could be the result of common knowledge, as well as proficiency in Mamluk history.

The specific contexts in which these sultans appear, furthermore, point not so much to a profound appreciation of the "realities" of the Mamluk sultanate as to a sort of Mamluk nostalgia, nurtured by folkloric[6] presentations of key sultans. Thus, the perception that Ottoman-era grandees had of the Mamluk sultanate was a largely folkloric perception, comparable to the manner in which every American schoolchild learns the story of George Washington chopping down the cherry tree, then refusing to lie about it. Moreover, the reasons why grandees had such a perception were similar to the reasons why American schoolchildren learn about George Washington and the cherry tree: the transmission of such stories was part of the future grandee's education and acculturation. In the end, these folkloric accounts tell us much more about Ottoman Egypt than they do about Mamluk Egypt.

In this essay, I shall examine the presentation of several key Mamluk figures in Ottoman-era literary sources in order to demonstrate the folkloric qualities inherent in these presentations, and the correspondingly folkloric appreciation that Ottoman grandees must have had of Egypt's Mamluk past. Ultimately, I shall consider the utility of such folkloric presentations, both for the grandees themselves and for the Ottoman administration.

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[6] I use the terms "folkloric," "folklore," and "folktales" as layperson's terms, not intending to invoke the theoretical issues attached to the academic discipline of folklore studies. The terms "popular histories" and "popular narratives" could also be applied to the sorts of stories I discuss here.

Baybars: Myth and Reality

Baybars al-Bunduqdārī, the founder of the Mamluk sultanate, was evidently by the eighteenth century a legendary figure not unlike Alexander the Great as he appears in medieval Persian literature.[7] A Kıpchak Turk, probably from the territory of what is now Ukraine, Baybars was purchased as a mamluk by the Ayyūbid sultan al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb (r. 1240–1249). Ten years of bloody coups and counter-coups followed al-Ṣāliḥ's death in 1249, as the late sultan's mamluks struggled for supremacy. In perhaps the most notorious episode of this interregnum, al-Ṣāliḥ's widow, Fāṭima Shajar al-Durr, married the mamluk commander Quṭb al-Dīn Aybak al-Turkomānī; both were ultimately assassinated by rival mamluks. After scoring a critical victory over a Mongol army at ʿAyn Jālūt in Syria in 1260, Baybars participated in the assassination of the Mamluk general Quṭuz and ascended the throne himself.[8]

That said, the folkloric persona of Baybars bears only the most tenuous resemblance to the historical reality, hazy as the latter is. Baybars is the hero of an immense and varied epic cycle, originally orally transmitted, known as the *Sīrat al-Ẓāhir Baybars*. Several manuscripts of this epic exist, most dating from the nineteenth century.[9] Like other tales from the Arabic oral tradition, all are chock-full of accretions from the Ottoman era, so that the Baybars of the epic routinely fires off cannon and drinks coffee. Moreover, Ottoman titles and institutions abound in the tales; provincial governors are termed pashas, for a notable example.[10] Notwithstanding, much of the story line centers on continual struggles against the Crusaders, on the one

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[7] The three most popular literary sources in which Alexander (Iskender) appeared were the tenth-century poet Ferdowsī's *Shāhnāme*; the fifteenth-century poet Aḥmedī's Persian epic known as the *Iskendernāme*, itself derived from a Byzantine source; and the fifteenth-century poet Niẓāmī's cycle of poems known as the *Khamsa*.

[8] These events are described in some detail in Robert Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early Mamluk Sultanate, 1250–1382* (Beckenham, Kent: Croom Helm Ltd., 1986), 22–34.

[9] At least two versions of this epic have been published: *Sīrat al-Ẓāhir Baybars*, 2nd printing, 50 parts in 5 vols. (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Maʿāhad, 1923), reprint ed. Jamāl al-Ghīṭānī (Cairo: Al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya al-ʿĀmma li'l-Kitāb, 1996); and Jean-Patrick Guillaume, ed., *Le Roman de Baïbars*, 10 vols. (Paris: Actes Sud/Sindbad, 1985–1998). The Topkapı Palace Library also owns two unpublished manuscripts, MS Revan 1606–1607.

[10] See, for example, *Sīrat al-Ẓāhir Baybars*, vol. II, 821.

hand, and the Mongols, on the other. We can conclude only that these tales reflect Ottoman-era popular memory of the events of the early Mamluk sultanate, embellished with stock elements of shape-changing wizards and damsels in distress.

As depicted in these tales, Baybars is not really a Turkish mam-luk at all but the "Persian" ('Ajam) prince Maḥmūd, son of the last Khwarazm-shah, "Alqān Shāh Jamak," whose kingdom has been overrun by "Hula'ūn" (Hulagu) and the Mongols. This legendary identity does, to be sure, retain a hazy connection to historical reality, for the Kıpchak tribe from which Baybars came was driven into the Crimea by the Mongol incursions; moreover, Baybars married the daughter of the historical last Khwarazm-shah, Ḥusām al-Dīn Berke Khān. His son by this marriage was named Berke Khān after his grandfather.[11] In the stories, Baybars' comrades-in-arms, improb-able as it may seem, are the Ismāʿīlī guerrillas who inhabit the moun-tains of Lebanon. Different manuscripts present different versions of the rivalries between Baybars and other mamluks. In a late-nineteenth-century Egyptian manuscript, Aybak is Baybars' chief rival,[12] while in the most extensive manuscript, copied in nineteenth-century Aleppo, his nemesis is Qala'ūn. In this latter manuscript, Baybars and Qala'ūn are purchased from the same slave market and transported to Egypt jointly. Qala'ūn is contemptuous of Baybars' degraded physical state, which is only exacerbated by a bout of diar-rhea during the journey to Egypt.[13] Qala'ūn himself is portrayed as an arrogant Turk who speaks a broken Arabic replete with Turkicisms. (This feature may have some basis in historical fact, since Qala'ūn was enslaved at a relatively late age and never achieved fluency in Arabic.)[14] When Baybars dies, Qala'ūn attempts to promote his son Khalīl for the succession.

How do we know that these tales were widespread in the eight-eenth century and before if the only extant specimens date from

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[11] *Sīrat al-Ẓāhir Baybars*, vol. I, 277, 295, 703–04; vol. III, 1480–1487; Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages*, 17–18.

[12] *Sīrat al-Ẓāhir Baybars*, vol. II, 783, 823–26, 992, 1016.

[13] *Roman de Baïbars*, vol. I: *Les Enfances de Baïbars*, trans. and annotated by Georges Bohas and Jean-Patrick Guillaume (Paris: Actes Sud/Sindbad, 1985), 37–38. In the manuscript summarized by Lyons, it is "ʿAlā al-Dīn," another mamluk, who com-plains of Baybars' physical maladies; see *The Arabian Epic*, vol. III, 82.

[14] For example, *Roman de Baïbars*, vol. X: *Le Procès du moine maudit*, trans. and annotated by Georges Bohas and Jean-Patrick Guillaume (Paris: Actes Sud/Sindbad, 1998), 148. See also Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages*, 64.

the nineteenth century? Intriguingly, allusions to the *Sīrat al-Ẓāhir Baybars* appear in a group of chronicles on which historians commonly rely. This is the Damūrdāshī group of chronicles, so-called because all four of the chronicles in question derive from a common *urtext* and have some connection to officers of Egypt's ʿAzeban regiment who bear the sobriquet al-Damūrdāshī.[15] These allusions, moreover, appear right at the beginning of all four chronicles, when the chroniclers are explaining the origins of Saʿd and Ḥarām, Bedouin factions allied with the Faqārīs and the Qāsimīs, two political and military factions whose rivalry permeated Egypt during the seventeenth century and the early years of the eighteenth.

The Damūrdāshī chroniclers never explicitly state that they are referring to these folktales; rather, they make a metaphorical comparison between the implacable opposition of Saʿd and Ḥarām, on the one hand, and that of a series of opposed pairs from Arabic folklore. Thus, Muṣṭafā b. Ibrāhīm al-Maddāḥ al-Qīnalī, the author of one of the earlier chronicles, known as *Majmūʿ laṭīf*, explains, "The people of Egypt since ancient times were in two factions (*firqatayn*), soldiers and Bedouin (*ʿurbān*) and reaya, white flag and red flag; the white was Tubbaʿī and the red Kulaybī, Zughbī and Hilālī, Qalaʾūnī and Baybarsī, until the reign (*dawla*) of Āl ʿUthmān, may God make it victorious, [when they became] Faqārī-Saʿd [and] Qāsimī-Ḥarām. . . ."[16] "Qalaʾūnī and Baybarsī" clearly refer to Baybars and Qalaʾūn, his archrival in some versions of the *Sīra*.

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[15] On the Damūrdāshī chronicles, see P.M. Holt, "Al-Jabartī's Introduction to the History of Ottoman Egypt," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. XXV, 1 (1962): 38–51; idem, "Ottoman Egypt (1517–1798): An Account of Arabic Historical Sources," in P.M. Holt, ed., *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt* (Oxford and London: Oxford University Press, 1968); Daniel N. Crecelius, "Aḥmad Shalabi ibn ʿAbd al-Ghanī and Aḥmad Katkhudā ʿAzabān al-Damūrdāshī: Two Sources for al-Jabartī's *ʿAjāʾib al-āthār fiʾl-tarājim waʾl-akhbār*," in Daniel N. Crecelius, ed., *Eighteenth Century Egypt: The Arabic Manuscript Sources* (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1990), 92–101. On the ʿAzeban regiment, see "Mıṣır Kanunnâmesi," in Ömer Lutfi Barkan, ed., *XV ve XVIıncı asırlarda Osmanlı imparatorluğunda ziraî ekonominin hukukî ve malî esasları* (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1943), vol. I, chapter 105; Stanford J. Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517–1798* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 191–92.

[16] Quoted in P.M. Holt, "Al-Jabartī's Introduction to the History of Ottoman Egypt," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. XXV (1962): 42. My translation differs slightly from Holt's.

Likewise, the other two pairs of binary opposites that al-Qīnalī presents allude to other figures in Middle Eastern folklore. Like "Qala'ūnī and Baybarsī," "Tubba'ī and Kulaybī" have undeniable historical resonances. *Tubba'* was the title of the Himyarite kings who ruled northern Yemen in the early centuries of the Common Era.[17] Kulayb, meanwhile, could be a diminutive form of Kalb, a southern, or Yemeni, Arab clan who supported the caliph Marwān b. Ḥakam in the Umayyad civil war of 683 C.E.[18] On the other hand, Kulayb could as easily refer to the pre-Islamic northern, or Qaysī, Arab tyrant Kulayb b. Rabī'a al-Taghlibī.[19] More to the point, however, the characters Ḥasan al-Tubba'ī and Kulayb, both drawn, in somewhat distorted fashion, from historical figures, play prominent roles in the Arabic folktale known as the *Qiṣṣat al-Zīr*.[20] In this story, Kulayb is the brother of Salīm, known as al-Zīr. Aḥmad Katkhudā 'Azabān al-Damūrdāshī, putative author of the latest and most detailed chronicle, makes an unmistakable reference to this tale when he includes, among his own string of binary opposites, "Kulayb the brother of al-Zīr."[21]

As for al-Qīnalī's remaining pair of opposites, "Zughbī and Hilālī," these derive from the great epic cycles memorializing the migration of the Banū Hilāl Bedouin into the region of the central Arabian peninsula known as al-Najd, then westward into Egypt and, ultimately, as far as Morocco and Spain.[22] What al-Qīnalī is doing, in

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[17] Muḥammad 'Abd al-Qādir Bāfaqīh, *L'Unification du Yemen antique: La lutte entre Saba', Ḥimyar, et le Ḥadramawt du Ier au IIIème siècle de l'ère chrétienne* (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1990), chapter 2.

[18] Abū Ja'far Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, *The History of al-Ṭabarī*, vol. XX: *The Collapse of Sufyānid Authority and the Coming of the Marwānids*, ed. and trans. G.R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989); idem, *The History of al-Ṭabarī*, vol. XXI: *The Victory of the Marwānids*, ed. and trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990).

[19] *EI*², s.v. "Basūs," by J.W. Fück; s.v. "Kulayb b. Rabī'a," by Giorgio Levi Della Vida. See also Reynold A. Nicholson, *A Literary History of the Arabs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 55–61; Adel Sulayman Gamal, "The Beginnings of Classical Arabic Poetry," in Mustansir Mir, ed., *Literary Heritage of Classical Islam: Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of James A. Bellamy* (Princeton: The Darwin Press, Inc., 1993), 45–54. I am grateful to Adel Sulayman and Irfan Shahid for drawing my attention to this connection, and to Adel Sulayman for recommending the last two sources.

[20] Lyons, *The Arabian Epic*, vol. III, 651–60.

[21] Aḥmad Katkhudā 'Azabān al-Damūrdāshī, *Al-Durra al-muṣāna fī akhbār al-Kīnāna*, British Museum, MS Or. 1073–1074, 1.

[22] There are three cycles: *Sīrat Banī Hilāl al-kubrā*, *Taghrībāt Banī Hilāl*, and *Sīrat*

fact, is alluding to irreconcilably opposed enemies from well-known bodies of lore or Islamic tradition in order to underline the opposition of Saʿd and Ḥarām.

The strategy of al-Qīnalī and the other chronicles of the Damūrdāshī group becomes comprehensible only if we bear in mind that the chroniclers are telling stories. This is, indeed, how Aḥmad Katkhudā ʿAzebān presents his endeavor: "Some of the brothers (*ikhwān*) had asked me about events in Cairo among the *sancak bey*s (*ṣanājiq*) and the aghas and the officers (*ikhtiyāriyya*) of the seven *ocak*s since the deposition of Sultan Mehmed [IV, r. 1648–1687]."[23] He, like al-Qīnalī, proceeds to tell them by letting loose a string of binary oppositions. This strategy is reminiscent of the formula with which Turkish fairy tales typically begin: "*Bir varmış, bir yokmuş*," "There was and there was not." Thus, although they are recounting "real" events, chronologically arranged, that occurred in history,[24] these chronicles exploit the framework of popular folktales.

Barqūq and the Fabricated Genealogy

Sultan Barqūq makes a striking appearance in the fabricated seventeenth-century genealogy of one Riḍvān Bey. P.M. Holt erroneously identified this Riḍvān as Riḍvān Bey al-Faqārī, who monopolized the office of pilgrimage commander (*amīr al-ḥājj*) for an astonishing twenty-five years, from 1631 until his death in 1656.[25] As I have indicated elsewhere, the true identity of the genealogy-commissioner must be the contemporaneous Qāsimī leader Riḍvān Bey Abū'l-Shawārib.[26]

Banī Hilāl fī qiṣṣat Abī Zayd al-Hilālī wa'l-Nāʿisa wa-Zayd al-ʿAjjāj. See Lyons, *The Arabian Epic*, vol. III, 237–300; *EI*², s.v. "Hilāl: The Saga of the Banū Hilāl," by J. Schleifer; s.v. "Hilāl," by Hadi Roger Idris.

[23] Al-Damūrdāshī, *Durra*, 1.

[24] On the genre of the Damūrdāshī chronicles and that of other Arabic chronicles of Ottoman Egypt, see Jane Hathaway, "Sultans, Pashas, *Taqwīm*s, and *Mühimme*s: A Reconsideration of Chronicle-Writing in Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Egypt," in Crecelius, ed., *Eighteenth Century Egypt*, 51–78.

[25] P.M. Holt, "The Exalted Lineage of Riḍwān Bey: Some Observations on a Seventeenth-Century Mamluk Genealogy," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. XXII (1959): 221–230.

[26] Jane Hathaway, "Egypt in the Seventeenth Century," in Martin W. Daly, ed., *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, vol. II: *Modern Egypt: From 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 46–47.

Barqūq in this genealogy is not the historical mamluk of the emir
Yalbugha but, instead, a descendant of one Kīsa b. ʿAkrama, a mem-
ber of the Prophet's clan of Quraysh. This Kīsa had fled the Arabian
peninsula after accidentally putting out the eye of a bedouin, who
complained to the caliph ʿUmar (r. 634–644 C.E.); the Byzantine
emperor had allowed him to settle in what is now Circassia. Gener-
ations later, his descendant Barqūq was kidnapped by Bulgar slave
traders and brought to the Mamluk court.[27] Barqūq's story is one
of several included in the genealogy to illustrate the noble descent
of Riḍvān Bey, who is himself supposed to be a descendant of Barqūq
and, by extension, of the Quraysh. Barqūq's fictionalized origins bear
a striking resemblance to those of the fictionalized Baybars, who is
likewise supposed to have been kidnapped by Bulgar merchants and
brought to Egypt. The genealogist may well have used some version
of the *Sīrat al-Ẓāhir Baybars* as a model; when he first introduces
Barqūq, he implausibly claims that he was initially sold to the Ayyūbid
sultans. This was, of course, Baybars' fate; by Barqūq's time, how-
ever, the Ayyūbids had long since vanished from the scene. More
broadly, the genealogy taps into a well-established tradition that the
Circassians and other Caucasian peoples descended from Arabs; typ-
ically, however, their ancestors are not the Quraysh but the south-
ern, or Yemeni, Arab rulers of the kingdom of Ghassān, a Byzantine
vassal state conquered by the early Muslims.[28] This tradition features
in the chronicles of Badr al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-ʿAynī (1361–1451)

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[27] Anonymous, *Nisba sharīfa wa-risāla munīfa tashtamil ʿalā dhikr nasab al-Jarākisa min
Quraysh*, Princeton University Library, Garrett Manuscript Collection, MS 186H.
Holt consulted manuscripts in the John Rylands Library, Manchester, England; and
in the British Museum. He also had access to a published edition entitled *Kitāb qahr
al-wujūh al-ʿabbisa bi-dhikr nasab al-Jarākisa min Quraysh*, published under the auspices
of one Muḥammad Efendi Ḥāfiz al-Jarkasī al-Bājī by al-Maṭbaʿa al-Bahiyya al-
Miṣriyya in 1316 A.H. In this edition, *Nisba sharīfa . . .* is the first line of text after
the opening invocations. I am grateful to Professor Holt for supplying me with a
copy of this publication.

[28] On the Ghassānids, see Irfan Shahid, *Byzantium and the Arabs in the Fourth Century*
(Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1984),
119–21, 75, 91, 374–75, 526–27; idem, *Byzantium and the Arabs in the Fifth Century*
(Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1989), 175;
idem, *Byzantium and the Arabs in the Sixth Century*, vol. I (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton
Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1995), Part 1, 53–54, 144–47, 365–67, 547;
Part 2, 728–31; idem, "Ghassān Post-Ghassān," in C.E. Bosworth et al., eds., *The
Islamic World from Classical to Modern Times: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lewis* (Princeton:
The Darwin Press, 1989), 323–336.

composed for the sultans al-Muʾayyad Shaykh (r. 1412–1421) and al-Zāhir Tatar (r. 1421); it is later represented in the *Majālis* sponsored by Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī.[29] The same tradition is reported by Evliya Çelebi (c. 1611–1682), and also appears in a nineteenth-century collection of Circassian folklore.[30]

The purpose of Riḍvān Bey's genealogy was most likely to make the point that Riḍvān Bey, by virtue of his Circassian-cum-Qurashī lineage, deserved to be appointed pilgrimage commander at the expense of the likes of Riḍvān Bey al-Faqārī, who could boast neither an exalted lineage nor an ancestral tradition of service to the Holy Places.[31] The appearance of the genealogy, I believe, points to another element of "Mamluk nostalgia" that had evidently emerged by the middle of the seventeenth century and that seems to have found a champion in Ridvān Bey Abūʾl-Shawārib: namely, a form of Circassian self-assertion. Abūʾl-Shawārib evidently gloried in his Circassian ethnicity, using it to justify appointment to high office and even naming two of his sons Khushqadam and Özbek, an unmistakable allusion to a sultan and a general, respectively, of the late Mamluk sultanate.[32] There were a large number of Circassian grandees in Egypt toward the middle of the seventeenth century, as Evliya Çelebi tells us.[33] In all probability, the Mamluk emirs pardoned by Selim I after the Ottoman conquest of Egypt continued to purchase mamluks from Circassia, as, no doubt, did the beys and regimental officers assigned

[29] P.M. Holt, "Literary Offerings: A Genre of Courtly Literature," in Thomas Philipp and Ulrich Haarmann, eds., *The Mamluks in Egyptian Politics and Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 8–11. The chronicles are *Al-Sayf al-muhammad fī sīrat al-malak al-Muʾayyad* and *Al-Rawḍ al-zāhir fī sīrat al-Malik al-Ẓāhir*. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ʿAzzām, ed., *Majālis al-sulṭān al-Ghūrī: Ṣafaḥāt min taʾrīkh Miṣr fīʾl-qarn-ʿāshir al-hijrī* (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Lajnat al-Taʾlīf waʾl-Tarjama waʾl-Nashr, 1941), 85–108, cited in Behrens-Abouseif, *Egypt's Adjustment to Ottoman Rule*, 133 n. 126.

[30] Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, ed. Ahmed Cevdet, 10 vols. (Istanbul: Ikdām Maṭbaʿası, 1314 A.H.), vol. II, 100–101; Schora-Bekmursin-Nogmow, *Die Sagen und Lieder des Tscherkessen-Volks* (Leipzig: Verlag von Otto Wigand, 1866), 44–46.

[31] See Hathaway, "Egypt in the Seventeenth Century," 46–47.

[32] Anonymous, *Nisba sharīfa*, fo. 20r. On Khushqadam (r. 1461–1467), see Carl F. Petry, *Twilight of Majesty: The Reigns of the Mamluk Sultans al-Ashraf Qāytbāy and Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī in Egypt* (Seattle: Middle East Center, Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington; distributed by University of Washington Press, 1993), 20–21, 29, 47, 58; on Özbek (Azbak), see *ibid.*, 46–50, 59–69, 78, 92–100, 113–15. Kushqadam, however, was not himself Circassian but Greek (*Rūmī* in the sense it carried under the Mamluk sultanate).

[33] Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, vol. VII, 723.

to Egypt from Istanbul. By the mid-seventeenth century, the number of Circassian grandees in Egypt may have reached the "critical mass" necessary to support a Circassio-philic political culture and, by extension, a nostalgia for the late Mamluk sultanate, when Circassian grandees dominated.

Large numbers of Circassians, however, do not suffice to explain a culture of "Mamluk nostalgia." Following the Ottoman conquest, after all, Selim had sought to prevent such a development by, among other things, forbidding the grandees of Egypt to take Circassian names; they were obliged instead to settle for Turkicized Arab Muslim names. Yet little over a century after the conquest, Abū'l-Shawārib Riḍvān Bey apparently felt no compunction about naming his sons Özbek and Khushqadam, to say nothing of commissioning a genealogy glorifying his Circassian identity. The key to this change may be simply the passage of time. Naming one's sons after Mamluk notables and ordering a pro-Circassian genealogy in 1524 would have been construed as an act of near-rebellion, a thinly-veiled call for the resurrection of the Mamluk sultanate. And of course, the Ottomans had had to put down three major rebellions of this kind in the years immediately following the conquest: those of Janbirdī (Canverdi) al-Ghazālī, the governor of Damascus, in 1521; two sub-provincial governors of Egypt, Jānım al-Sayfī and Ināl, in 1522; and the Ottoman governor of Egypt, Aḥmed Pasha "al-Khā'in" ("the traitor"), in 1523–1524.[34] By 1640, on the other hand, the Mamluk sultanate was only a dim memory. Such nostalgic touches as names of Mamluk sultans and Circassian pedigrees were now tolerable, if not necessarily welcome. Moreover, the grandees were drawing their visions of Mamluk and Circassian identity not from memories of the Mamluk sultanate—which they, of course, could not have had—or even from histories produced under the Mamluk sultanate, but from folktales. Both Mamluk nostalgia and Circassian self-assertion were, by their very nature, heavily folkloric.

The Influence of Ibn Zunbul

Much the same could be said of another seemingly pro-Mamluk, anti-Ottoman demonstration described by Evliya Çelebi: the grandees

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[34] Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, 46–51.

of Egypt, he tells us, bowed their heads toward the tomb of the last Mamluk sultan, Ṭūmānbāy, whenever they passed it, as well as that of the Mamluk emir Kurtbāy, who in the course of the Ottoman conquest had killed the grand vezir Sinan Pasha. In contrast, they averted their heads from the tomb of Khayrbāy, whose collaboration with Selim had made the Ottoman victory possible.[35] In his survey of Egyptian society under Ottoman rule, Michael Winter adduces this custom as proof of the seventeenth-century grandees' hostility toward the Ottoman Empire and, by extension, their eagerness to re-establish Mamluk institutions.[36] Such an analysis, however, neglects the context in which this custom was practiced. Evliya was resident in Egypt during the 1660s and 1670s, when, as noted above, nostalgia for the Mamluk sultanate and assertion of Circassian identity were apparently a tolerated feature of provincial political culture.

Beyond this, however, this sort of analysis assumes that grandees of the seventeenth century subscribed to an unchanging, linear narrative of the Ottoman conquest of Egypt centered on verifiable events and consistent with the account of Ibn Iyās, which forms the basis for most present-day accounts of the conquest. This was in all likelihood not the case. The version of the Ottoman conquest story with which Ottoman-era grandees would have been familiar was most likely that of the chronicler Aḥmad b. Zunbul, composed around 1553 and entitled *Wāqiʿat al-sulṭān al-Ghawrī maʿa Salīm al-ʿUthmānī*; indeed, numerous Turkish translations of Ibn Zunbul's short chronicle had appeared by the early eighteenth century.[37] Ibn Zunbul's account, as opposed to that of the more scholarly Ibn Iyās, is decidedly ahistorical; in fact, it is reminiscent of the *Sīrat al-Ẓāhir Baybars*, complete with imagined conversations among the protagonists. In Ibn Zunbul's pages, Ṭūmānbāy is depicted as a noble warrior who is laid low by Ottoman gunpowder weaponry and the treachery of the Mamluk emirs Khayrbāy and Jānbirdī (Canverdi) al-Ghazālī.

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[35] Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, vol. X, 581, cited in Winter, *Egyptian Society under Ottoman Rule*, 54.

[36] Winter, *Egyptian Society under Ottoman Rule*, 54.

[37] Aḥmad al-Rammāl b. Zunbul, *Wāqiʿat al-sulṭān al-Ghawrī maʿa Salīm al-ʿUthmānī*, ed. ʿAbd al-Muʿnim ʿĀmir, Adab al-Ḥarb (Cairo: Al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya al-ʿĀmma li'l-Kitāb, 1997). For Turkish versions, see, for example, ʿAbdullah Çelebi Rıḍvān Paşazade, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣr*, Istanbul, Süleymaniye Library, MS Fatih 4362; Yūsuf Efendi, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣr*, Süleymaniye Library, MS Esad Efendi 2148.

Time and again, Ibn Zunbul stresses that the Ottomans were poorly skilled in the equestrian arts and would never have defeated the Mamluks had it not been for their cannon and rifles.[38] Selim, meanwhile, is portrayed as a worthy sultan who, however, is misled by the Mamluk traitors on whom he relies. Decisive battles take place not between massed armies but between single combatants, one pro-Mamluk and one pro-Ottoman; such combats are a hallmark of the heroic narrative, familiar from the *Sīrat al-Ẓāhir Baybars* and other Arabic folktales.[39] On being captured by the Ottomans, the emir Kurtbāy and, later, Ṭūmānbāy lecture Selim on the cowardice of using firearms.[40] As if to underscore the folkloric context in which he writes, Ibn Zunbul compares the well-nigh superhuman heroism of the Mamluk emir Sharbak to that of ʿAntar, the Herculean pre-Islamic hero of the *Sīrat al-ʿAntar*.[41]

Ibn Zunbul's tale exhibits the binarism typical of heroic folktales: heroes and villains are clearly distinguished in almost cartoon-like fashion. Ṭūmānbāy, in particular, is clearly a hero—in fact, a martyr—while Khayrbāy is just as clearly a traitor. If grandees in seventeenth-century Cairo had been exposed to this version of the Ottoman conquest of Egypt, then it is little wonder that they bowed toward Ṭūmānbāy's tomb and were repulsed by Khayrbāy's. Their behavior would have reflected not a genuine rejection of Ottoman rule but a folkloric nostalgia for an idealized late Mamluk order.

ʿAlī Bey's Revolt

This reconceptualization of Mamluk nostalgia can likewise be brought to bear on the most far-reaching revolt in pre-nineteenth-century Ottoman Egypt—and, not coincidentally, the one that historians of the province invariably single out as the epitome of Mamluk revivalism: that of Bulut Kapan ʿAlī Bey, also known as ʿAlī Bey al-Kabīr,

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[38] For example, Ibn Zunbul, *Wāqiʿat*, 53, 71–74, 118, 165.
[39] For example, Anonymous, *Sīrat al-Ẓāhir Baybars*, vol. II, 1289–92, 1297, 1468; vol. III, 1497; Lyons, *The Arabian Epic*, vol. III, 334, 439, 447, 479, 569, 575, 578, 581, 582, 627. Doris Behrens-Abouseif also notes the prevalence of single combat in Ibn Zunbul's account; see *Egypt's Adjustment to Ottoman Rule*, 121–22.
[40] Ibn Zunbul, *Wāqiʿat*, 71–74, 165.
[41] See Lyons, *The Arabian Epic*, vol. III, 17–76.

in 1768–1770. After leading an expedition to the Ḥijāz on the Ottoman sultan's orders, in order to settle a dispute between two rival candidates for *sharīf* of Mecca, ʿAlī Bey invaded Syria in collaboration with the Bedouin chieftain of Tiberias, Ḍāhir al-ʿUmar. ʿAlī Bey's general, his freedman Meḥmed Bey Abū al-Dhahab, succeeded in conquering Damascus but then, for reasons that remain obscure, turned back.[42] In justifying his rebellious actions, ʿAlī Bey is said to have remarked, "The kings of Egypt were mamluks like us; these Ottomans took Egypt through superior force and the treachery of [Egypt's] people."[43] Modern-day historians cite this alleged remark, put into the bey's mouth by al-Jabartī, as evidence that ʿAlī Bey, too, had a "realistic" picture of the Mamluk sultanate drawn from canonical Mamluk-era chroniclers such as al-Maqrīzī and Ibn Taghri Birdī.[44] Yet it is not difficult to recognize in the bey's remark the rhetoric of Ibn Zunbul, from the vague reference to "kings of Egypt" to the trope of the unchivalrous Ottoman deployment of firepower to the allusion to the treacherous emirs who engineered Selim's victory. Indeed, it seems possible that the works to which ʿAlī Bey was exposed more closely resembled that of Ibn Zunbul than those of the "canonical" Mamluk chroniclers. They may, in fact, have included Ibn Zunbul's own chronicle or Turkish translations based on it.

If ʿAlī Bey did make this remark or remarks similar to it, perhaps our focus should be not his veiled allusion to Ottoman illegitimacy but his mention of "mamluks like us," a reference that was not to be taken lightly at a time when mamluks from Georgia in particular had achieved unprecedented administrative authority in the Ottoman Empire. As I have noted elsewhere, we might even speak of a Georgian mamluk preponderance in the late eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire.[45] ʿAlī Bey's archrival, Gürcü Osman Pasha, the governor of Damascus, was, as his name implies, a Georgian mamluk—specifically, the Georgian mamluk of former governor Asʿad Pasha al-ʿAẓm. Indeed, ʿAlī Bey's antagonism toward Osman Pasha

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[42] Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, 94–98; Crecelius, *Roots of Modern Egypt*, 72–90.
[43] Quoted in Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, 96.
[44] See n. 3, above, and Crecelius, *Roots of Modern Egypt*, 65.
[45] Hathaway, *Politics of Households*, 170.

has been adduced as an incitement to his invasion of Syria.[46] At the same time, the strategically vital province of Baghdad was governed by the Georgian mamluk "dynasty" founded by the governor Ḥasan Pasha (1704–1723) and his son Aḥmed (1724–1747).[47] In Egypt, in contrast, a Georgian mamluk purchased by the governor or by a provincial grandee and trained in the province could never hope to attain the governorship. Instead, governors were still sent out from Istanbul, and by the mid-eighteenth century, they were more likely to be free-born Anatolian bureaucrats, "efendis-turned-pashas,"[48] than slaves of any kind. This can only have seemed a gross injustice to the ambitious ʿAlī Bey. Although a re-examination of his motives lies well beyond the scope of this essay, I believe it is plausible that his true goal was not to revive the Mamluk sultanate—which he knew only in the mythologized form supplied by the likes of Ibn Zunbul—but to become governor of Ottoman Egypt.

A usable past

So far from representing hostility toward the Ottoman Empire, these rather fanciful legends and invented traditions were an integral part of Ottoman rule in Egypt during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Nor were Egypt's grandees unique in constructing an idealized vision of their province's pre-Ottoman past. Grandees in other Ottoman provinces certainly exploited spurious genealogies and legends of ancient heroes to enhance their own status within their respective localities.

The Afrāsiyāb household, a localized clan who governed the southern Iraqi port of Basra during the seventeenth century, claimed descent from the Great Seljuks, whose empire had straddled Iran and Iraq during the eleventh and twelfth centuries C.E.[49] It seems

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[46] Abdul-Karim Rafeq, *The Province of Damascus* (Beirut: Khayats, 1966), 250–84; Crecelius, *Roots of Modern Egypt*, 76, 80–83, 88.

[47] Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, 143–148; Thabit A.J. Abdullah, *Merchants, Mamluks, and Murder: The Political Economy of Trade in Eighteenth-Century Basra* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 11–12, 87–91.

[48] Norman Itzkowitz, "Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Realities," *Studia Islamica*, vol. XVI (1962): 73–94, esp. 86–87.

[49] Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, 134–135, 140, 142.

more than coincidental, furthermore, that the clan's collective patrony-
mic, that of Afrāsiyāb, the clerk of the Ottoman garrison, evoked a
hero of the Persian epic *Shāhnāme*: Afrāsiyāb, in this work, is the
king of the Turanians, or Turks, the perennial enemies of the Iranians.
In the course of the epic, he fights lengthy wars against the Iranian
forces, led by the hero Rustam; he is finally killed by the Iranian
king Key Khusrau.[50] In the sixteenth century, the Turanians appear
in a magnificent illuminated manuscript of the *Shāhnāme*, produced
at the Safavid court in Tabriz, as virtual stand-ins for the Ottomans,
while the heroic Iranians represent the Safavids.[51] In this context,
the patronymic of the Afrāsiyāb clan arguably emphasized their mil-
itary and ideological opposition to the Safavids, who, in southern
Iraq, posed an ever-present threat to Ottoman authority.[52] This inter-
pretation makes it seem unlikely that the Afrāsiyābs' manufactured
Seljuk pedigree conveyed a desire to return to the pre-Ottoman past,
the more so since the Seljuk sultan, according to legend, sent a flag
and a military band (*mehter*) as symbols of legitimacy to Osman, the
founder of the Ottoman dynasty.[53] On the contrary, the genealogi-
cal myth can itself be interpreted as an anti-Savafid statement since
it evoked a time when the Great Seljuks, an ethnically Turkish, albeit
Persophone, dynasty, ruled both Iran and Iraq. This makes it all the
more ironic that the last Afrāsiyāb governor, caught in a regional
struggle for influence, fled to the Safavids in 1668.[54]

Over a century later and far to the west, the Phanariot Greek
governors whom the Ottomans appointed to govern the Danubian
Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia (present-day Romania)
employed a similar strategy, albeit for slightly different reasons. The
Phanariots took their name from Istanbul's Fener quarter, the tra-
ditionally Greek neighborhood on the Southern shore of the Golden

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[50] Ferdowsī, *The Epic of the Kings: Shāh-Nāma by Ferdowsī*, trans. Reuben Levy, 2nd
ed., foreword by Ehsan Yarshater, preface by Amin Banani, new introduction by
Dick Davis (Costa Mesa, CA, and New York: Mazda Publishers, in association with
Bibliotheca Persica, 1996), 49, 69–70, 92–145, 150–51, 155–74.

[51] See, for example, Stuart Cary Welch, *A King's Book of Kings: The Shah-Nameh of
Shah Tahmasp* (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1972), 136–39, 140–41,
156–57.

[52] Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, 140.

[53] Fevzi Kurtoğlu, *Türk Bayrağı ve Ay Yıldız* (Ankara: Türk Tarıh Kurumu Basımevi,
1938, 1987, 1992), 59–60, quoting the histories of Aşıkpaşazade, Neşri, and Oruç;
Riza Nour, "L'histoire du croissant," *Revue de Turcologie*, vol. I (1933): 113/342.

[54] Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, 142.

Horn, west of Balat. Here most of their leading families, wealthy Greek Orthodox merchants and government functionaries, originated. Known as *hospodar*s, they were assigned to the Principalities to replace the *voyvoda*s, governors drawn from the provincial elite who showed too many signs of independence.[55] Aside from their religion, they had little in common with the indigenous population of these regions. By the mid-eighteenth century, however, the Phanariots had evolved their own elaborate provincial court culture, which in turn spread throughout the Romanian nobility. It was modeled on the usages of the Byzantine empire: the court language was Greek; Byzantine titles, ceremonies, and even costumes were used.[56] Yet the Phanariots were unquestionably the sultans' servants; they cannot have wished to rebuild Byzantium in actual fact. Rather, they used their own Byzantine heritage, as well as the distant Byzantine past of Romania, to project authority at the local level.

In fact, all three of these provincial authorities—the Afrāsiyābs in Basra, the Phanariots in Romania, and the grandees of Egypt—exploited the pre-Ottoman past of their respective locales as a source of the grass-roots authority with which the Ottoman center could not supply them. Nonetheless, this local authority was not so much a threat to Ottoman authority as a complement to it. Claiming authority by reimagining the pre-Ottoman past seems, indeed, to have been a key strategy in Ottoman provincial administration by the seventeenth century. By this time, Ottoman territorial expansion had slowed, and incorporating conquered empires and kingdoms into the Ottoman domain was no longer a constant military and administrative challenge. Hence, the Ottoman central authority could allow its provincial elites a usable past.

Ironically, the elites who posed the greatest threat to Ottoman authority in the provinces during the seventeenth century came from within the Ottoman palace. These were Abaza Mehmed Pasha, governor of Erzurum, who rebelled in 1623, and Abaza Ḥasan Pasha, governor of Aleppo, who rebelled in 1657–1659. Both Abkhazian

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[55] Peter F. Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354–1804*, A History of East Central Europe, vol. V (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977, 1996), 128–29, 132–41.

[56] William H. McNeill, *Europe's Steppe Frontier, 1500–1800* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 107–10, 140–41, 173–76; Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule*, 135–136.

mamluks reared in the imperial palace, the two were assigned to the provinces, where they raised personal armies of mercenaries (*sekban*s) culled largely from the Caucasus and eastern Anatolia. Gabriel Piterberg has demonstrated that Abaza Mehmed's rebellion in particular constituted a delayed reaction against the deposition and murder of Sultan Osman II (1618–1622) by the Janissaries, whom he sought to replace with *sekban*s.[57] This regicide resulted in a reinforcement of Janissary-based palace culture that would culminate in the regime of the Köprülü grand vezirs from 1656–1676; indeed, Köprülü Mehmed Pasha's reforms triggered Abaza Ḥasan's revolt.[58] Nonetheless, the image of the rebellious, untrustworthy Abkhazian itself became legendary.

It is this image, ironically, that the Ottoman statesman Şemdanizade Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi evokes to explain ʿAlī Bey's rebellion in Egypt. Claiming that ʿAlī Bey was Abkhazian,[59] Şemdanizade interprets his overtures to Russia as a scheme to ensure a steady supply of Abkhazian mamluks, and even has the bey exclaiming, after the disastrous Ottoman naval defeat by the Russians at Çeşme in 1770, "There can be no more auspicious time for Abkhazian supremacy than this!"[60] If Şemdanizade's account is a fair indication, representatives of the Ottoman central authority unquestionably saw ʿAlī Bey as a threat, but not as a Mamluk revivalist threat. They had their own alternative lore within which to frame his uprising.

Folklore as a tool of acculturation

Even if we agree that Egypt's grandees were not attempting to resurrect the Mamluk sultanate, we still face the question of why

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[57] Gabriel Piterberg, "The Alleged Rebellion of Abaza Mehmed Pasha: Historiography and the Ottoman State in the Seventeenth Century," in Jane Hathaway, ed., *Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002).

[58] Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, 105.

[59] In all likelihood, he was either Abkhazian or Georgian; on his ethnicity, see Crecelius, *Roots of Modern Egypt*, 40–41, n. 5.

[60] Şemdanizade Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi, *Şemdanizade Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi Taʾrīhi*, ed. M. Münir Aktepe, 4 vols. in 3 (Istanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1976), vol. III, 99. On ʿAlī Bey's overtures to Russia, see W.F. Reddaway, ed., *Documents of Catherine the Great: The Correspondence with Voltaire and the Instruction of 1767 in the English Text of 1768*, reissue (New York, 1971), 96, 143, 326.

they exploited legends of the Mamluk sultans, as well as tales of other heroes, both historical and fictional. Again, the Damūrdāshī chronicles' connection to the 'Azeban corps provides a clue. Aḥmad Katkhudā 'Azabān's claim that "the brethren" asked him to recount the deeds of past heroes makes sense if we consider the circumstances of soldiers in the 'Azeban or any other regiment. Egypt's regiments and grandee households in the early eighteenth century contained young men—mamluks, mercenaries, members of the palace soldiery—from a disparate array of locales: Abkhazia, Albania, Anatolia, Armenia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Circassia, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Serbia.[61] These young men suddenly found themselves in a strange land, attached to the troop or household of a patron and, perhaps, to a political faction for no self-evident reason, although some may well have shared ethnicity, language, or even blood ties with the heads of their households.[62] In any event, they needed to be socialized and to make sense of their new environment. More than that, they needed to internalize their new identities as members of a particular household and faction.

Folktales provide an instrument for this sort of acculturation, much as the story of George Washington and the cherry tree introduces American children to one of their country's founding fathers. To this analogy, we might add that of a child at the Jewish holiday of Passover. At the ritual Passover meal, or *seder*, the youngest child makes sense of the unfamiliar holiday traditions by asking ritual questions that begin with "why": "Why is this night different from all others?" "Why on this night do we eat unleavened bread?" and so on. By the same token, we can imagine a raw recruit from Bosnia or Georgia or eastern Anatolia asking his commanding officer, Why do we hate the Qāsimīs? How did these two factions originate, and why? Why do we carry a white banner while the Qāsimīs carry a red one? (We must bear in mind, of course, the difference between a highly ritualized annual holiday and the presumably more casual, *ad hoc* atmosphere of barracks story-telling.) Just as the youngest child, over years of *seder*s, internalizes the story of the Hebrew exodus from Egypt, so the recruit internalized a body of lore repeated by successive household heads and barracks commanders.

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[61] On this point, see Hathaway, *Politics of Households*, 44–46, 101–03.
[62] See *ibid.*, 57, 61–62, 71 and n. 79, 103–05.

Thus, the tales of the Mamluk sultans aided the indoctrination of recruits to an Ottoman-era provincial political culture. The typical seventeenth- or eighteenth-century grandee viewed the Mamluk sultanate through an Ottoman provincial lens that presented a highly idealized, anachronistic picture, heavy with larger-than-life heroes and heroines in dire struggles with irredeemably evil villains. Nonetheless, we should view these stories as fluid rather than fixed, and as having a genuine relationship with the historical figures and events on which many of them loosely draw. The Mamluk sultanate portrayed in the *Sīrat al-Ẓāhir Baybars*, the chronicle of Ibn Zunbul, or the genealogy of Riḍvān Bey was not a wholly fictitious creation; rather, these stories represented a point in the transformation of historical reality into myth and fable. This "mythologization" was an ongoing process to which events were—and, arguably, are, even in our own societies—susceptible. True, the aforementioned literary works testify to the mythologization of the Mamluk sultans and transmitted that mythologized history to new generations, such as al-Damūrdāshī's "brethren". At the same time, however, the Ottoman-era events documented by the Damūrdāshī chronicles and other chronicles—which are, to some degree, mythologized in the pages of the chronicles by virtue of the authors' arrangement and presentation—would later be transformed into myths and fables by the likes of al-Khashshāb.

Indeed, al-Khashshāb's purpose in writing *Tadhkira li-ahl al-baṣā'ir* was not unlike that of the authors of the Damūrdāshī chronicles: to instruct a population—in this case, the French—new to Egypt, who knew little or nothing of its history and customs. The French, like the raw barracks recruits of earlier years, did not know any better than to take al-Khashshāb's memoir at face value, although they were presumably aware that he was not an historian and was drawing on popular tradition. We historians, I fear, too often assume the same position: we take our narrative sources' evocations of the Mamluk sultanate at face value and ignore the fact that they are, blatantly or not, stories, with all the insights and distortions that stories can offer. We, however, are supposed to know better.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

BEDOUIN AND MAMLUKS IN EGYPT—CO-EXISTENCE IN A STATE OF DUALITY

Reuven Aharoni

The destinies of the Bedouin and the Mamluks[1] in Egypt, were inti-
mately linked ever since the mid-thirteenth century, when the Mamluks
founded their sultanate and established its ruling center in Cairo,
lasting until they vanished from the stage in 1811 with the massacre
of their leaders by Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha. During this period of
almost 600 years, the Bedouin elite developed complex symbiotic
relationships with the Mamluk military elite. These relationships were
rooted in historical and cultural heritage, which each of the Bedouin
and the mamluks had practiced. From the start, the Mamluk Sultanate
granted some Bedouin shaykhs the title of amir in the Mamluk mil-
itary administration. The Bedouin amirs built *bayt*s (households) and
had mamluks at their disposal. Despite their social marginality in
Egypt, the Bedouin were significantly involved in most of the his-
torical developments in which the mamluks played a role.

The article shows that the Bedouin were both natural enemies
and natural allies of the Mamluks simultaneously: the Bedouin needed
the Mamluk backing in order to maintain a reasonable degree of
independence, local military strength and political power, while the
central government and their mamluks found it useful to integrate
the Bedouin, who were a key element in the countryside and in the
peripheral desert regions, into the local Ottoman/Mamluk military
and fiscal administration. With the elimination of the Mamluk lead-
ers, the Bedouin became marginal in the Egyptian life, both socially
and politically.

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[1] The discussion in this article refers to the elite groups—the Mamluk leaders of
factions and their households, and the Bedouin chiefs of clans and other tribal
groupings, i.e., the amirs and the shaykhs and their associate groups.

A two-sided mirror: Similarities and dissimilarities

Bedouin tribal society and the Mamluk militaristic and slave-based
society were characterized by a complex set of similarities and dis-
similarities, that may be viewed as a two-sided mirror. Politically and
socially, Mamluk society was based on a singular origin and a mil-
itary lifestyle of the group. Young boys were imported to Egypt from
the Caucasus and neighboring regions in Central Asia and sold to
high-ranking military figures-amirs—who educated them and trained
them to be skilled cavalrymen. In return, the recruit was loyal to
his master and felt solidarity with his master's other slaves—the
khushdāshīn ("brothers"). The "brothers" formed the Mamluk house-
hold (*bayt*) made up of the master, his retinue and allies. The recruit-
ment of this society from distant ethnic and religious backgrounds
strengthened the loyalty of the recruit, or at any rate reduced any
temptation to leave. Like the Bedouin tribesmen, they came from a
rough background and were not accustomed to comforts that often
weaken urban rulers. Unlike the Bedouin, however, they were also
severed from the pull of kin links. Ernest Gellner has argued that
the Mamluk system was an alternative to a tribal base and pure ver-
sions of either one constitute the two endpoints of a spectrum. It
endeavored to dispense with the kin or tribal element altogether.
The mamluks, in effect, constituted a replacement tribe, forged by
a specific type of education.[2]

Like the Mamluk amirs, each of the Bedouin shaykhs also had an
armed protective retinue. Kin societies generally have self-created
warrior bands that are rarely distinct from their descent groups,
forming for other lineage activities, i.e. to acquire and secure means
of productivity, like pasture and water, usually through the threat of
force. Secondly, they are responsible for controlling the population
and securing its continuity against any threat of rebellion from within
or attack from without.[3] The military element in both Mamluk soci-

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[2] E. Gellner, "Tribalism and the State in the Middle East", in P. Khoury, and
J. Kostiner (eds.), *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1990), 115, 121.

[3] See a broad discussion in H. Rosenfeld, "The Social Composition of the Military
in the Process of State Formation in the Arabian Desert", *Journal of the Royal
Anthropological Institute*, vol. XCV, part I, January 1965; part II, July 1965, 75–86,
174–94.

ety and in tribal society was relied on to achieve and maintain power. This meant that the milieu of both Mamluk amirs and Bedouin shaykhs, was made up of slaves and a sedentary population. Both, Bedouin tribal groups and Mamluk houses solved conflicts by military means and they carried on their feuds for long periods.[4] In the process, not only were rival lineages destroyed, but also close relatives within a ruling clan or house, eliminated one another when power and prestige could not be equitably divided. Power transferred among the Mamluk factions from the leader of the clan to his chief mamluk or another prominent amir. Among the Bedouin, the successor to the shaykh might be a son, but equally he could be an uncle or a cousin.[5] Both Mamluk amir and the Bedouin shaykh were regarded as the ideal linchpin for binding the household/clan together as a durable and effective military faction.

A parallel historical heritage: Heroic epics

The mamluks were descendants of nomadic tribes from Central Asia, masters of a culture of perpetual movement. Based on expertise in horsemanship and martial arts. The firm bond to horse, lance and bow went back to earliest childhood in Mamluk culture, when the fighters still lived in the wild prairies or mountains of their homeland. Similar values underlay Bedouin society. Knighthood (*furūsiyya*), which was also based on horsemanship, was the pivot of Bedouin tribal life, viewed as society's pride and strength. The role models in both societies were male warriors.

Poetic Epics reflecting these ancestral customs, emerged in both societies in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The heroes of these epics are tribal horsemen—in Central Asia Turkish speakers, and in the Arabian epics famous Bedouin horsemen of the pre-Islamic period.[6] The motifs in these epics are similar and became integral to the cultural heritages of both the mamluks and the Bedouin.

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[4] See on the relations and distribution of power among the mamluks in Egyptian Society, 65–68.

[5] A. Musil, *Arabia Deserta*, New York: American Geographical Society, 1927, 238.

[6] The epics of the Turkomans' *Dede Korkut*, the Azars' *Köroğlu*, the Uzbeks' *Alpamiş*, and the Kirghizians' *Manas*, for example, are based on the tribal and nomadic traditions. The epics emphasized the characteristics of glory in the battlefield, splendor

The similarity of social patterns between the Bedouin leading clans and the Mamluk houses resulted in a conceptual blurring on both parts between the two elite-groups upon their encounter with each other in Egypt. David Ayalon has pointed out that the Bedouin terms *ʿashīra* (tribal confederation) and *qabīla* (tribe) were used to signify a Mamluk faction. A member of Mamluk "*qabīla*" was precisely parallel to a *khushdāsh* in his obligatory loyalty to "tribe".[7] The growing influence of the Bedouin during the sixteenth century was a factor in closing the gap between the mamluks and the other sectors of Egyptian society, as compared to their superior status at the time of the Mamluk Sultanate (1250–1517). However, in Ottoman Egypt, the intimate relationships that developed between various Mamluk factions and certain Bedouin clans, paradoxically inflamed the hatred between the factions and the clans, compared with the situation in the earlier period. Conceivably, these links heightened the practice of blood revenge, which was already inherent in the structure of Mamluk society under the Ottomans,[8] especially as relationships in the Mamluk *qabīla* were based on quasi-kin relationship as in the tribal structure.

So blurred did the boundaries become between mamluks and non-mamluks, implies intermarriage as well, during the Ottoman period, that the nineteenth century Egyptian chronicler ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī used the terms *ʿashīra* and *qabīla* interchangeably with *bayt* (household) and *ʿāʾila* (clan, family), i.e., he viewed Mamluk factions as tribes and clans rather than households precisely as the Bedouin social structure. It also indicates that there was an interaction between the Bedouin and the mamluks at that time.[9]

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and honor of the tribe, respect for the elders, etc. A similar picture was provided by the epics of the Bedouin poet ʿAntar b. Shadād, the Yemenite prince Sayf b. Dhū al-Yazan, and the great epic of Banī Hilāl. See, on the *furūsiyya* (horsemanship), A.N. Poliak, *Feudalism in Egypt, Palestine, Syria and the Lebanon 1250–1900*, London, 1939, 15 and n. 6; D. Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom*, Jerusalem: Magnes, 1994, 68, n. 45, (Hebrew). See, on the epics, W. Barthold, *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion*, 3rd ed. London 1968. In some Egyptian villages, reciting the epic of Banī Hilāl is still common as part of the oral tradition. See D.F. Reynolds, *Heroic Poets, Poetic Heroes*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995.

[7] D. Ayalon, "Studies in al-Jabartī I", in: *Studies on the Mamluks of Egypt (1250–1517)*, London: Variorum, 1977, 301.

[8] *Ibid.*, 303.

[9] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī, *ʿAjāʾib al-āthār fī l-tarājim waʾl-akhbār*, Cairo: Būlāq, 1879–80, I, 127, line 1–6; III, 171, line 5–6.

Michael Winter, examining the use of the term *awlād al-'Arab* (lit. sons of the Arab, local Arabic speaking population) as referring to the Ottoman army, reached the conclusion, similarly, that in Ottoman Egypt no distinctions existed between the mamluks and other local social groups, which meant Bedouin in certain cases. He argued that most of the Janissaries and the *'azab* regiment were *awlād al-'Arab* in a broad sense, i.e., that Bedouin Arabs were included as well.[10] With this, however, the tension between mamluks and *awlād al-'Arab* did not vanish.

The burden of coexistence: The mamluks, the Bedouin and the Ottomans

The mamluks settled in Egypt after succeeding in suppressing a resistance by a coalition of tribal groups in 1253. The resistance was widespread throughout several provinces beginning in Upper Egypt (al-Ṣa'īd) in 1249 and spreading to the provinces of Manūfiyya, Gharbiyya and Buḥayra. It marked a turning point in the history of Muslim Egypt in the Middle Ages. The failure of the resistance, according to Maqrīzī, boded ill for the destiny of the Egyptian Bedouin, and their power diminished over time.[11]

The Mamluk army, which was based exclusively on Mamluk soldiers then, showed decisive military superiority over the Bedouin, heightening from then on the alienation between the mamluks and the Bedouin and turning it into rivalry. With their weakness exposed, the Bedouin had no choice but to accept the supremacy of the mamluks. Although more numerous, the Bedouin did not manage to unite for a joint struggle against the mamluks. Rivalry became an integral

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[10] M. Winter, "Turks, Arabs and Mamluks in the Army of Ottoman Egypt", *Zeitschrift fur die Kunde des Morgenlands*, vol. LXXII (1980), 113. He was referring to the chronicle by al-Ḥallāq (al-Khallāq). He also pointed out that in 1698–9 the Hawwāra Bedouin refused to pay taxes in cash or in goods, pleading that they were *'azab* and *inkishāriyya*. He posits the theory that the semi-nomads of Upper Egypt could claim this because the barriers that had been set up against the entry of the *ra'iyya* (subjects) into the army were removed. See also Aḥmad Shalabī, (Çelebi) b. 'Abd al-Ghanī, *Awdaḥ al-ishārāt fīman tawalla Miṣr wa'l-Qāhira min al-wuzarā' wa'l-bāshāt al-mulaqqab bi-ta'rīkh al-'Aynī*, Cairo, 1978, 203, 442.

[11] Aḥmad b. 'Alī al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-sulūk lima'rifat duwal al-mulūk*, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Ziyāda, Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, 1934–1942, 5 Vols., Part I, vol. II, 386–388; Y. Shwartz, *The Bedouin in Egypt During the Mamluk Period*, Ph.D. Thesis, Tel Aviv University, 1987, 282, (Hebrew).

part of the relationship between the two populations, yet reality, which forced them to live close to each other, ultimately led to an interweaving of the Bedouin into the Mamluk order.

A vital aspect of this reality was the necessity for the mamluks to rely on the Bedouin as mercenaries. This was problematic from the Mamluk point of view for several reasons. The Bedouin were fickle and wayward. They took advantage of every opportunity to profit from the battlefield losses of those who hired their services by plunder. They did not hesitate to desert the battlefield the moment they realized that victory would elude their masters. They perceived warfare as a business transaction with no political commitment whatsoever, not even to the shaykh of their fighting unit, through whom they were recruited. Moreover, the Bedouin never forsook their traditional economy—livestock and seasonal arid agriculture, which gave them their basic economic security. All Bedouin fighters left behind grazing animals and fields that needed care. Their behavior stemmed from their perception of the heads of the Mamluk factions for whom they fought not as ruling authorities but more as local partners or allies. This enabled the Bedouin to allow themselves a large degree of freedom of action.

The Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517 fanned the Bedouin-mamluk hostility to a new peak. The Bedouin exploited the unsettled situation at the time of the conquest to retaliate against the mamluks for their bloody repression whenever the Bedouin would rebel. Bedouin vengeance underlay the betrayal of Ṭūmān Bāy, the last Mamluk sultan. Ṭūmān Bāy escaped when the Ottomans invaded Egypt in 1517 and was given asylum in the camp of Shaykh Ḥasan b. Marʿī.[12] The shaykh however, handed him over to the Ottomans, an act contradictory to the Bedouin tradition of asylum. The mamluks, seeking to avenge this betrayal, could do so only after they were integrated into the new Ottoman order in Egypt. Indeed, they recovered their authoritative status and restored their position as provincial governors. In March 1519 mamluks murdered Ḥasan b. Marʿī and his nephew.[13] That same month *Shaykh al-ʿArab* ʿAlī al-

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[12] Ḥasan b. Marʿī was the shaykh of al-Muḥārib Bedouin. He was murdered in March 1519. See Aḥmad al-Rimāl Ibn Zunbul, *Āḥirat al-Mamālīk, wāḳiʿat al-Sulṭān al-Ghūrī maʿ Salīm al-ʿUthmānī*, Cairo: al-Maʿādī, 1962, 105.

[13] Ibn Iyās argued that following this event, the Circassian mamluks increased their power at the Bedouin's expense. See Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾi*

Asmar b. Abī al-Shawārib was invited to visit the *kāshif* (provincial governor) of Minūfiyya. He was served wine and became drunk. Afterwards, he was murdered by the *kāshif*'s deputy.[14] In this case, the *kāshif* was forced to pacify the Bedouin's anger and execute his deputy. The shaykhs of ʿArab al-Sawālim were murdered in a similar way in December 1519 by mamluks who were assisted by Bedouin from other tribes. The Bedouin were forced to appeal for help to the Ottoman authorities.

Faqāriyya-Niṣf Saʿd and Qāsimiyya-Niṣf Ḥarām:
Imagined genealogies

The Ottomans incorporated tribal structures in paradigmatically Ibn Khaldūnian[15] fashion, on one hand, and the rival Mamluk/slave bureaucracy on the other, exploiting both in various proportions in the formation of Ottoman state in Egypt. The central authority made use of the sociopolitical link between mamluks and Bedouin in Egypt through two traditional supra-structures or leagues, Saʿd and Ḥarām. They were the largest traditional social grouping to be found in Mamluk and Ottoman Egypt. Saʿd and Ḥarām were loose informal twofold factions that gained a hold among both nomad and sedentary groups in Egypt. This social grouping resembled in several respects the kind usually referred to by the term "moiety" or "dual" organization. Entire tribes and Mamluk factions belonged to one or the other of such dual groupings, which were known by name pairs in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East, such as Qaḥtān and ʿAdnān, Yafaʿ and Ḥamdān, Hināwī and Ghāfrī, and Qays and Yaman. Saʿd and Ḥarām as the other pairs, were actually, old and mythological tribal confederate groupings. This division into groups of tribes went back to tribal conflicts in pre-Islamic period and the emergence of Islam.

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al-zuhūr fī waqāʿi al-duḥūr, Cairo: Dār iḥyā al-kutub al-ʿArabiyya, 1963, vol. V, 298. See also ʿAbd al-Karīm Rāfiq, *Bilād al-Shām wa Miṣr min al-fatḥ al-ʿUthmānī ilā ḥamlat Nabūliyūn Būnabārt (1516–1798)*, Damascus, 1968, 138.

[14] Ibn Iyās, 298.

[15] On Ibn Khaldūn's theory of the tribe and state, see S. Caton, "Anthropological Theories of Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East: Ideology and the Semiotics of Power", in Khoury and Kostiner, 85–90.

Perhaps the clearest indication of the interwoven social history of
the Bedouin and mamluks in Ottoman Egypt was the bond that
emerged between the Bedouin Saʿd and Ḥarām groupings and two
major Mamluk factions—Faqāriyya and Qāsimiyya.[16] Tribes and
Mamluk factions were associated with either one of the two factions.
Through their association with Saʿd and Ḥarām, the various Mamluk
factions forged on identification with historic populations and ancient
mythologies of Arabia. This identification had only a loose connec-
tion to their actual roots, and was based on an imagined genealogy
that blended Egyptian Bedouin, Mamluk and classic Arab tribal
characteristics.

The major Egyptian-based Faqāriyya-Niṣf Saʿd faction comprised
mamluks, urban elements and Bedouin belonging to the Niṣf Saʿd.
The other major faction, Qāsimiyya-Niṣf Ḥarām, comprised rival
mamluks, other urban elements and Bedouin of the Niṣf Ḥarām.
According to the chronicle by al-Qināli:

> [3a] From ancient times the people of Egypt, soldiery, Arabs (ʿurbān)
> and civilians (raʿiyya) were two parties: white flag and red flag. The
> white was Tubbāʿī and the red was Kulaybī: Zughbī and Hilālī,
> Qalāʾūnī and Baybarsī until the time of the House of ʿUthmān . . .
> when the two parties became Faqārī-Saʿd and Qāsimī-Ḥarām.[17]

By the seventeenth century, the Bedouin were fully involved in most
of the political intrigues and military disputes between the Mamluk
factions, exploiting this situation in their favor. The link between the
Faqāriyya and Saʿd and between the Qāsimiyya and Ḥarām posi-
tioned the Bedouin as a pivot in the political arena. The weaker the
central government became and the stronger the Mamluk *bey*s grew,
the greater the influence of clans and tribal groups.

Further evidence of the imagined Mamluk genealogy as a reflection
of Mamluk assimilation in Egyptian society is discernible in the
struggle between the two Mamluk factions, the Faqāriyya and the

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[16] The *Faqāriyya* and the *Qāsimiyya* first appeared in 1640. See P.M. Holt, "The
patterns of Egyptian political history from 1517 to 1798", in *idem: Modern Egypt:
Historical Studies from the Ottoman Conquest to the United Arab Republic*, London: Oxford
University Press, 1968, 86. For an exhaustive review on the *Qāsimiyya* by Holt, see
*EI*², vol. IV, 722b–723a.

[17] Mustafa b. Ibrāhīm al-Maddāḥ al-Qināli, *Majmūʿ laṭīf*, Nationalbibliothek,
Vienna (MS. Hist. Osm. 38), 3a. The chronicle is part of the eighteenth century
Dimurdāshī group.

Qāsimiyya, during the eighteenth century. Their symbols of identity were a white flag (Faqāri) and a red flag (Qāsimi). The white flag embraced the Tubbā'i, Ḥusaynī, Zughbī, Qalā'ūnī, Sa'd and Faqārī groupings. The red flag, the Kulaybī, Yazīdī, Hilālī, Baybarsī, Ḥarām and Qāsimī.[18] The genealogical differences between mamluk and non-mamluk, by than, were ambiguous.[19]

Historiographically, too, the non-differentiation between the Bedouin tribal groups and the Mamluk factions was almost complete by the eighteenth century, to the extent that a distinction made between *sanjaq*s [*bey*s] (high ranking amirs) of Niṣf Sa'd and *sanjaq*s of Niṣf Ḥarām referred in actuality to the Faqāriyya and the Qāsimiyya.[20] This was also the case regarding the various Bedouin groupings in Egypt. "The Bedouin of Buhayra their flag is red, [they are] always with the Qāsimiyya."[21] The tribal confederation of the Ḥabāyba, which dominated parts of central Egypt under the leadership of Shaykh Ḥabīb and his sons Sālim and Suwaylim in the second half of the eighteenth century, was identified with the Faqāriyya.

The mamluks, acknowledging the Bedouin's link to these ancient confederations, defined their own political loyalties accordingly. When the amir Ibrāhīm Abū Shanab appointed in 1703–4 his mamluk Aḥmad al-As'ad governor, he posted him in the province of Buhayra "because it always belonged to him, since the Bedouin there are Niṣf Ḥarām without exception."[22] However, the Bedouin were not always faithful in their group affiliation. Bedouin groups transferred from one camp to the other according to pragmatic interests, state of relationship and personal connections with particular mamluks. The Bedouin were clearly involved in the armed conflict of 1711, between the Faqāriyya and the Qāsimiyya, known as the *fitna* (lit. rebellion). However, the support they gave to one or the other of the rivals was not necessarily determined by their belonging to the Niṣf Sa'd

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[18] Anonymous (Dimurdāshī group), *Kitāb (majmū') al-durra al-munṣāna fī waqāi' al-kināna*, Cambridge University Library (MS. Add. 2787, Bodleian Library, MS. Bruce 43, 2a, 5a–6b. On the historical background of the groups, see P.M. Holt, "al-Jabartī's introduction to the history of Ottoman Egypt", in: *Studies in the History of the Near East*, London: Frank Cass, 1969, 174, n. 4.

[19] Ayalon, *Studies*, 157–60.

[20] *Majmū'*, 306.

[21] Al-Qinālī, 68a.

[22] Aḥmad (*Kaḥiya 'Azebān*) Dimurdāshī, *al-Durra al-muṣāna fī akhbār al-kināna*, The British Museum, MS. Or. 1073–74.

or the Niṣf Ḥarām. Al-Zaydiyya Bedouin, who belonged to the Niṣf
Ḥarām, found themselves in the Ḥabāiba camp, which belonged to
the Niṣf Saʿd. In contrast, Muḥammad Bey Çerkes, the leader of
the Qāsimiyya, managed to unite most of the groups identified with
Niṣf Ḥarām around himself, in addition to the Zaydiyya. These
groups were Bedouin of Buḥayra province, Ḥanādī Bedouin and oth-
ers.[23] Saʿd and Ḥarām existed as Bedouin groupings in Egypt at
least until the end of the eighteenth century.

   The primary manifestations of the close mamluk-Bedouin rela-
tionship were marriage alliances and the granting of asylum to each
other's rebels and to rebels from allied camps. Ibn Zunbul noted
that the Mamluk amir Qanṣuh al-ʿAdlī had marriage alliances with
the Bedouin of Qatāra, and that he escaped there after his defeat
by Sultan Selim's army during the Ottoman conquest.[24] The rem-
nants of the Qāsimiyya, who took refuge in Upper Egypt after their
defeat by the Ottomans, settled there and intermarried with the
Hawwāra Bedouin. This may have been the reason that they named
ʿAlī Bey al-Armanī *Abū al-ʿArab*.[25] The Abwāẓiyya, one of the house-
holds within the Qāsimiyya faction that had an alliance with Niṣf
Ḥarām, established marriage alliances with the ʿĀʾid tribe in the
Sharqiyya province. This intermingling produced the Abāẓa clan,
which played an important role in the local political life of the
Sharqiyya in the second half of the nineteenth century.

                Amirs *and* shaykhs: *Similarities between households*

Mamluk society in Egypt was divided internally by factional rival-
ries. The mamluks, who held senior ranks and had a high income,
established households, *bayt* or *ṭāʾifa*—a cluster of groups and indi-

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   [23] Anonymous (Dimurdāshī group), *Kitāb al-Asrār al muṣāna fī waqāʾiʿ al-kināna fī
Miṣr ilā sana 1123*, Paris, L.O. Arabe 437, 112.
   [24] Ibn Zunbul, 106.
   [25] He held a governmental post in Jirja, later becoming responsible for the gra-
naries in Cairo. See *al-Asrār al-muṣāna*, 71. It appears that in this case the granting
of asylum should be ascribed to political considerations and not necessarily to the
close relations that led to marriage alliances (and certainly not to the Bedouin cus-
tom of hospitality). As is known, marriages in contemporary Bedouin societies, are
agreed upon mainly because of economic considerations, and it is absolutely rea-
sonable to assume that the considerations were the same then.

viduals, bound to the head of the household. In time, these households coalesced into factions based on kinship and origin. The household provided the context for the various components of Mamluk elite, including marriage alliances aimed at consolidating political and economic interests. This practice led to the absorption of rootless clients and associates and increased the household membership, enhancing the political power of the household and its control over sources of wealth. Ultimately, the goal was to create political alliances and attain access to economic resources. The wives, concubines and daughters of the head of the household exercised influence and contributed to the economic strength of the household.[26] This social structure closely resembled Bedouin society, which was a system of tribal organizations based on a common origin according to mythological, imagined or real blood kinship and divided into rival tribes and sub-tribes that carried on persistent struggles against each other.

Evidence shows that Bedouin shaykhs bearing the title of amir established households with similar features in Upper Egypt at the end of the Mamluk period (late fifteenth—early sixteenth centuries).[27] Moreover, marriage alliances were made between Bedouin and Mamluk households. Like the mamluks, the Bedouin tribes used this strategy to enhance the power of the group. Such households consisted of kin living in the same compound, although they could vary greatly in composition and size. Large households could also include non-kin, such as servants and retainers. Furthermore, the Bedouin shaykh's residence was a center for political gathering. These households were part of a diversified system of tribal frameworks, each of which filled certain functions. They were organized sociopolitically and territorially according to economic tasks. For example, the pasturing of camels and other flocks demanded the organization of small groups for wandering in search of pasture, while agriculture called for seasonal settlement in larger groups. The distinguishing feature of the household was the maintenance of a shared set of resources,

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[26] See J. Hathaway, "The Military Household in Ottoman Egypt", *IJMES*, vol. XXVII, 1995, 46.

[27] The Bedouin amirs of Banū ʿUmar of the Hawwāra federation held the *iqṭāʿ* (tax farm) of Girga since the end of the fourteenth century. See the list of the Hawwāra beys and amirs edited by J.-C. Garcin, "Emirs Hawwāras et beys de Girga aux et XVII siècles", *Annales Islamologiques*, tome XII, 1974.

including land and all other property, to which all members con-
tributed and from which they subsisted. In short, the Bedouin house-
hold was a corporate political unit.[28] In this it differed from the
households of the mamluks, who were not nomads and whose econ-
omy rested on a different base (mainly income from taxation and
government allowances). Although when Bedouin shaykhs moved
from the tribal areas and settled on lands granted to them by the
authorities, or shifted to sedentary settlements, they did not cut them-
selves off from the tribal federations. These groupings, acting as ter-
ritorial organizations and controlled a *dīra* (moving territory),[29] secured
their members' rights to pasture and water resources.

The Bedouin shaykhs kept fewer mamluks than the amirs, in their
households, despite the fact that their households were fairly similar
to those of the mamluks. Perhaps the Bedouin feared the emergence
of Mamluk clans within the tribal framework, which were likely to
threaten the integrity of the Bedouin social organization and even
block the option of entering into alliances with the mamluks in Cairo.
Perhaps the mamluks of Cairo themselves would have not been favor-
able to the establishment by Bedouin of their own separate Mamluk
units. In a similar vein the Ḥabāyba, who belonged to the Niṣf Saʿd
and were the most important nomadic element in Central Egypt,
had quotas of black slaves who could participate in battles.[30] Only
Shaykh al-ʿArab Humām, the shaykh of the Hawwāra confederation
and the de facto ruler of Upper Egypt during the second half of the
eighteenth century, held a large number of mamluks in addition to
black slaves and concubines.[31] He belonged to the Niṣf Ḥarām camp,
and making him an ally of the Qāsimiyya. After their defeat in bat-
tle against the Faqāriyya in 1730, many members of the Qāsimiyya
found refuge with the Hawwāra, worked in Humām's service, and
eventually were assimilated into the local tribal society. Humām

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[28] See E. Marx, "Are there pastoral nomads in the Arab Middle East?" in
U. Fabietty, and P.C. Salzman (eds.), *The Anthropology of Tribal and Peasant Pastoral
Societies*, Pavia: Ibis, 1996, 143–157; E. Wolf, *Peasants*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966,
65ff.

[29] Bedouin did not regard the *dīra* as a fixed geographical location; rather it was
a territory for moving, which could in principle be delineated spatially around any
moving individual male. On the distinction between the concepts of *dīra* and terri-
tory, see A. Meir, *As Nomadism Ends*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, 23–24, 77–78.

[30] *ʿAjāʾib*, I, 345, 346.

[31] *Ibid.*, 343.

successfully dominated Upper Egypt, where the rebel mamluks who sought refuge in the area benefited by his benevolence and became totally reliant on his good will.

The households established by prominent Bedouin shaykhs in the nineteenth century functioned as political units. They resembled kin factions and had some of the characteristics of the Mamluk households of the eighteenth century and the *kapı*[32] of the Ottoman-Egyptian elite of the nineteenth century, which Kenneth Cuno termed joint family households.[33] The members of these households consisted of his wives, his married sons with their families, and a retinue of attached persons who included Coptic and other clerks, soldiers, black slaves, concubines and various protégés. 'Alī Mubārak, in his biography of *Shaykh al-'Arab* 'Alewa Abū Kuraysha, provided evidence that Bedouin shaykhs kept slaves in the nineteenth century. "When Abu Kuraysha went for a ride, all his slaves followed him on foot."[34] The residence of the shaykh's estate functioned as an administrative and center of control. The primary impetus of notable Bedouin families to establish joint family households was their wish to reproduce their political and economic status into the new reality and to perpetuate their control and entrench sedentary settlement.[35] The greater the threat to group solidarity, the stronger the impetus of the shaykhs and notables to strengthen the familial household structure. Such households were evidence of the growing wealth of the Bedouin shaykhs in the nineteenth century. Many of the shaykhs went so far as to build a castle (*qaṣr*) in a strategic location close to the tribal *dīra*. For example, the shaykhs of the Lamlūm clan of the Fawā'id tribe built a castle, which they named Lamlūm. *Shaykh al-'Arab*

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[32] Literally, door or gate. The *kapı* was a variation of a political/military/administrative unit based on status and descent.

[33] The composition of the Bedouin households under the leadership of amirs and shaykhs approximates Cuno's version more than the structure that Hathaway outlines. See K. Cuno, "Joint family households and rural notables in 19th century Egypt", *IJMES*, vol. XXVII, no. 4, 1995, 485–502.

[34] 'Alī Bāshā Mubārak, *al-Khiṭaṭ al Tawfiqīyya al-jadīda li-Miṣr al-Qāhira wa-mudunuhā wa-bilāduhā al-qadīma wa'l-mashhūra*, 20 vols., Cairo (Būlāq): 1888–89, vol. XIV, 38. See also G. Baer, "The settlement of the Beduin", in: *Studies in the Social History of modern Egypt*, Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1969, 11.

[35] Cuno argued that setting up a joint household was a tactic by rural notables to prevent the fragmentation of the land as an outcome of divided inheritances. See "Joint family", 485.

al-Saʿdāwī al-Jabālī of the Ḥarābī tribe built several castles, one in the town of al-Fayyūm and others in a nearby suburb.[36]

The households of the shaykhs, who held offices in Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha's administration, became foci for the buildup of large estates. The shaykhs enjoyed an advantage over the rest of Bedouin society because they could acquire land both legitimately, through grants from the ruler or by purchase, and through coercion. The wealthiest shaykhs were those who held positions at the lower level of the provincial hierarchy (for example district chiefs).[37] An outstanding example was Muḥammad Sulṭān (1825–1884), whose acquisition of large tracts of land had a significant sociopolitical effect: the land became a source of benefits to the members of the shaykh's clan while also enhancing their personal influence in the province or the district (nāḥiya) in the same way as had occurred with the Mamluk leaders of the past. The shaykhs had a retinue of their own warriors, which enabled them to impose control in their area as well as fulfill missions assigned by the authorities, for example, supplying horsemen to the pasha's army. A Bedouin shaykh who built up a sedentary settlement or an estate elevated his status in his tribe. His tribesmen favored and supported him in this move, perceiving him as having gotten close to the governing center and thus better able to promote their interests. For this reason they were not distressed at his leaving the tribal territory and did not try to harm his interests or the social and economic rights of his kin group in his absence. So long as the shaykh could manage to represent his tribesmen successfully, no one undermined him or challenged his leadership. However, one can see some problematic aspects of the *Shaykh al-ʿArab*'s status.

With this, the shift of the status of some shaykhs to landlords engendered certain problems. It exposed them to greater dependency on the authorities. They were obliged to pay taxes and to carry out various tasks for the government. The pasha, for his part, preferred that the shaykhs reside in their tribal vicinity in order to control the tribe and the tribal territory more efficiently.

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[36] See "settlement", 11; *al-Khiṭaṭ*, vol. XVII.
[37] *Ibid.*, vol. IX, 14, 99; vol. XV, 73.

Amirs *and* shaykhs: *Integration in the administration and the military*

Bedouin shaykhs were regarded as an integral part of the Mamluk Sultanate military and government. The most prominent and the powerful among them were granted the title amir, with military and administrative functions. Mamluk amirs and prominent Bedouin shaykhs appeared to have the same level of political power. Both of them were at one and the same time leaders of groupings and commanders of military structures. The military Mamluk society, was open to assimilate military structures of tribal society, such as the kin base of the warrior bands. The last Mamluk sultans appointed Bedouin shaykhs to high positions in their administration, such as post of amir *ṭablkhāneh* and *kāshif* (provincial governor).[38] From the period of the rule of Sultan Barqūq (1382–1398) onward, prominent shaykhs of the ʿĀʾid Bedouin bore the title *amīr*.[39] Toward the end of the Mamluk period, Bedouin shaykhs were also employed in the ḥājj caravans in administrative posts traditionally held by mamluks.[40]

Clearly, the Bedouin ruled Upper Egypt during the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries as part of the Sultanate administration. The Banū ʿUmar clan of the Hawwāra Bedouin in Upper Egypt had a close relationship with the Mamluk authorities and its shaykhs bore the title *amīr*.[41] After the death of the Mamluk amir Yashbaq in 1480, the central government appointed Muḥammad b. Yūnis of the Hawwāra as *amīr*, marking the beginning of the continuous rule of the clan for over 120 years. From 1493 their ruling center was at

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[38] Literally Turkish, the amir of the orchestra. He commanded 40–80 mamluks. See D. Ayalon, "Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army", *BSOAS*, XV, 1953, 448–476; XVI, 1954, 57–90. In this case it was the Shaykh of the ʿĀʾid Bedouin Muḥammad b. ʿĪsā, who was also appointed in 1388 as *Kāshif al-Jusūr* in the Sharqiyya. See *Kitāb al-sulūk* vol. II, Part 3, 544, 585, 589. The nominations were made by *tawqiʿ* (signature) of the sultan. See Aḥmad b. ʿAlī, al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā fī ṣināʿat al-inshāʾ*, Cairo: al-Muʾasasa al-Misriyya al-ʿāma lil-taʾlīf, 1964, 14 vols., vol. XI, 211.

[39] Shwartz, 304.

[40] Amir al-Hawwāra Dāʾud b. ʿUmar in 1488, the amir Aḥmad b. Baqar and Ḥusām al-Din b. Baghdād in 1511. See Ibn Iyās, part III, 257, part IV, 249, 256; ʿAbd al-Qādir b. Aḥmad Al-Jazīrī (al-Jazarī), *Durar al-fwāʾid al-munazzama fī akhbār al-ḥājj wa-ṭarīq Makka al-muʿazzama*, ed. Ḥama al-Jāsir, Riyāḍ: Dār al-Yamāmah, 1983, 1054.

[41] Shwartz, 226–229; J.-C. Garcin, "Émirs Hawwāras et Beys de Ǧirǧe aux et XVII Siècles", *Annales Islamologiques*, Tome XII, Cairo, 1974.

Girga. The Ottomans, who arrived in 1517, recognized and confirmed the status of the Banū ʿUmar and integrated the Bedouin *amīr*s of this clan into the new administration.[42] During the process of the Ottoman takeover, Amir al-Hawwāra ʿAlī b. ʿUmar denied a request for help by Tumānbāy, the last Mamluk sultan, and declared his loyalty to the new suzerain the Ottoman sultan Selim. As a reward, the Ottomans recognized his rule in Upper Egypt. Ibn Iyās described ʿUmar as "the administrator of Upper Egypt regions" (*mutawallī jihāt al-Saʿīd*).[43] Under his rule, Girga became the capital of Upper Egypt and and evolved into a new Muslim urban center that displacing Qūs. The *amīr*s of Banū ʿUmar continued to rule until 1607, after which the Ottomans succeeded in appointing an *amīr* of their own in 1608.[44] The Bedouin Hawwāra clan of the Awlād Humām then gained power, prompting the *ketkhudā* (deputy commander) of the grand vizier to note that when he had been the *agha* (commander) in Upper Egypt, the Bedouin undermined the position of the *ṣanjaq*, owned Mamluk fighters and slaves, had representatives who purchased concubines in Cairo for them and were *multazim*s (tax farmers).[45]

In the province of Buḥayra, the Bedouin amirs Aḥmad al-ʿAdilī and his brother Mūsa were recognized *kāshif*s in 1596, responsible for security, for which they were paid.[46] In the Sharqiyya, the Bedouin amir Aḥmad b. Baqar retained his position under the Ottomans.[47]

The Bedouin shaykhs had been granted the title *Shaykh al-ʿArab* during the Mamluk Sultanate and were granted estates (*iqṭāʿāt*) as a return for services rendered to the authorities, such as guarding the roads and tracking down robbers. This system continued until 1525 when Grand Vizier Ibrāhīm Pasha introduced the *Qānūn-nāme-i Miṣir*[48] marking an entrenchment and reinforcement of the role of the *shaykh*

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[42] Ibn Iyās used the title *amīr al-Saʿīd* for amir al-Hawwāra Dāwūd. See I, 290. See also J.-C. Garcin, *Un centre musulman de la Haute-Égypte: Qūṣ*, Cairo: Institute Français D'archéologie Orientale, 1976, 498.

[43] Ibn Iyās, III, 130, 159.

[44] See *Émirs Hawwāras* and *Qūṣ*, 516, n. 1; 517, n. 2.

[45] *Kitāb al-asrār*, 17.

[46] Stanford J. Shaw, *The Budget of Ottoman Egypt 1005–76/1596-7*, The Hague: Mouton, 1968, 92.

[47] Ibn Zunbul, 145, 146.

[48] The edict codifying the administrative practice of the province. See M. Winter, *Egyptian Society Under Ottoman Rule 1517–1798*, London: Routledge, 1992, 16.

al-ʿArab in the administration of the countryside (al-rīf).[49] At the same time the Ottomans evicted the shaykhs from the iqṭāʿāt and appointed them tax farmers tasked with collecting the kharāj (land tax) from tenant farmers and tribute payments from "despised" and protege tribes.[50] The tax farmers were required to set aside the government share—the mīrī—and submit an annual report to the pasha.

The imperial decrees of the sixteenth century are an important source of information about the position of the Bedouin shaykhs in the Ottoman administration. Michael Winter made extensive use of this resource regarding the offices of the Shaykh al-ʿArab, the amir and the kāshif. The decrees confirmed the strong position of the Bedouin shaykhs in certain provinces where their dominance was undisputed. He found that the decrees refer to the shaykhs as rulers of a region and not merely as tribal leaders. In acquiring the status the Qānūn-nāme, the Bedouin shaykhs were given the same functions and authority as kāshif. Moreover, Winter argued the offices of shaykh al-ʿArab and kāshif were virtually synonymous in the imperial decrees.[51] The kāshifs and the shaykhs were responsible for agriculture, public works and public order. Both constituted backbone of the tax collection system. The central government treated them identically and both were granted the same authority and functions. The only difference between them was that the kāshifs were army officers with the title of amirs, while the shaykhs were not members of the military elite.

Still, some noted Bedouin shaykhs were integrated in the military establishment and became commanders over Mamluk amirs. This occurred in the provincial areas, which in any case were under the control of the Bedouin shaykhs. Winter concluded that this demonstrated the vitality of the Bedouin as well as the greater flexibility (or even weakness) of the military class.[52] Yet the point should be made that not only were the Bedouin the only population group readily available, they were structurally suitable and qualified to play a major role in the government administration and become

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[49] See G.W.F. Stripling, *The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs, 1511–1574*, Urbana Ill: The University of Illinois Press, 1942, 73–74.
[50] Tribes, which were ascribed to inferior pedigree, i.e. the Hatīm in the Sinai and the "protected" Murābiṭīn tribes of the Awlād ʿAlī Bedouin in the Western Desert.
[51] *Egyptian Society*, 90–102.
[52] *Ibid.*, 95.

integrated into the Mamluk-based military and fiscal system. Both
the Bedouin and the mamluks spent much of their time in warfare.
Furthermore, the Bedouin were not committed to a sedentary life,
they were knowledgeable about the social and economic conditions
in the countryside, and maintained reasonably good relations with
the local Mamluk officials. The central Ottoman government could
not fail to take note of the similarities between the Bedouin and the
mamluks and to perceive the potential for cooperation between the
two groups.

   The Bedouin gradually entered the ranks of the regiments of the
Ottoman garrisons, the *ojāq*s. Aḥmad Shalabī referring to this issue,
claimed that the Hawwāra Bedouin were *'azab* or *mustahfizān* (Janissaries)
and that they exploited this status in refusing to pay the *māl* and
ghilāl (grain) tax on land they were granted. The governor of Girga,
'Abd al-Raḥman Bey, complained about this in 1698, and the pasha
promised to issue a *ḥujja* (legal title) annulling Bedouin membership
in the military class (*'askariyya*). Shalabī pointed out that a few years
earlier, residents of Cairo alleged claims that Bedouin nevertheless
serve in the *ojāq*s and indeed they were dismissed in 1657–8 fol-
lowing an imperial decree (*firmān*).[53] The Hawwāra's entitlement to
serve in the *ojāq*s, however, was retained in the law, and they were
registered as *inkishāriyya* (Janissaries) and *'azab* in Ibrāhīm Pasha's
registers (*daftar*s) already in the first half of the sixteenth century. In
1723 Muḥammad Pasha, the Ottoman viceroy of Egypt, made an
effort to remove them from the *ojāq*s but withdrew this initiative
when he realized that their status was officially entrenched.[54]

   Winter cites several examples of Bedouin chiefs who attained senior
military ranks in the Ottoman/Mamluk *'askariyya* under Ottoman
rule and who were regarded as military commanders or governors
of regions, based on the *Mühimme Defteri* documents. Aḥmad b. Baqar,
the shaykh of the Bani Wā'il Bedouin, was appointed amir of forty
elite *amir ṭablkhāneh* (commander of orchestra) at the end of the
Mamluk Sultanate. Hammād b. Khabīr, (1571), who had been given
the district of Jabal al-Akhdar in Cyrenaica as an *iltizām* (tax farm)
was granted the military rank of amir (*ṣanjaq bey*), *Shaykh al-'Arab*
'Umrān's predecessors of the Banu 'Umar clan in Upper Egypt (1573)

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[53] Aḥmad Shalabī, 156, 202–203.
[54] *Ibid.*, 442.

had 50–60 Janissaries from Cairo at their disposal, Shaykh ʿArab al-Ghazāla ʿUmrān[55] al-Khabīrī (1713–4), bore the rank of amir in the *nāḥiya* (district) of Umm Ḥanān in the province of Gīza. Powerful Bedouin shaykhs also served in the position of commander of the annual pilgrimage caravan (*amīr al-ḥājj*), considered one of the most prestigious offices in Egypt.[56] One of the prominent of them was ʿĪsa b. Ismāʿīl b. ʿĀmir, the *amīr* of the Banī ʿAwna Bedouin in the Buḥayra in 1555–6 and during 1562/3–1564/5. His son ʿUmar succeeded him in 1590/1, 1591/2, 1593/4 and 1594/5.[57] ʿĪsā was the *wālī* (governor) of Buḥayra province until 1561/2 and was succeeded in this post, too, by his son ʿUmar. Both these shaykhs had mamluks under their command as well.[58] According to al-Jazarī, the reason for ʿĪsa's promotion in the Ottoman military hierarchy was solely attributable to the gifts he brought during his annual visits to the court of the sultan in Istanbul.[59]

Allies in the struggle for rule over Egypt

The end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries witnessed a continuous state of war between the Ottomans and the various Mamluk factions, with French and British forces periodically fighting alongside one or another of the parties. Bedouin tribal groups played a key role in these confrontations, fighting in the service of all the parties. During the French occupation, tribesmen served in the ranks of the Mamluk *beys* as well as in the struggle against the French. This was the last period the Bedouin could exploit their advantages to assist rival Mamluk factions in their battles against each other and to reinforce the Mamluk ranks against the Ottomans, the British and the French. Notably, just as the Mamluk struggle for rule in Egypt after the French withdrawal was

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[55] In the manuscript titled *Asrār al-munṣāna* that I used, his name is ʿUmar al-Khabīrī. See 61. Also see *Kitāb al-durra al-muṣāna*, 185a.

[56] On the office of amīr *al-ḥājj*, see Jacques Jomier, *Le Mahmal et la caravane Égyptienne des pèlerins de la Mecque (XIII–XX siècles)*, Cairo: Institute français d'archéologie orientale, 1953, by index; and al-Jazarī.

[57] In 999, 1000, 1002, 1003 *hijra*. See Al-Jazarī, 947, 1076, and by index.

[58] *Ibid.*, 1032, 1054. See also *Egyptian Society*, 96.

[59] Al-Jazarī, 947.

not national character, but economic and territorial, the Bedouin
too, sought only to preserve their economic and territorial interests.
They favored Mamluk control of Egypt so as to exploit of the rivalry
between the Mamluk factions for their own purposes.

An important source of information about the last stage in Bedouin-
Mamluk coexistence is the chronicle by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī.[60]
It shed light on the political role of the Bedouin in the Mamluk's
final struggle for the rule of Egypt after the French withdrawal, a
struggle that ended with the victory of Muḥammad ʿAli. With the
Mamluk amīrs constituting the main political actors in the chroni-
cle, most of the information about the Bedouin deals with their rela-
tionship with the Mamluk beys and the amīrs. The chronicle reveals
that in many cases the Bedouin pinned their hopes on the leaders
of the major Mamluk factions, perceiving them as a source of sta-
bility. While al-Jabartī illuminate the background descriptions to the
treaties and the rivalries between the Bedouin and the mamluks, his
attitude toward the Bedouin is revealed as mostly hostile. Because
of his social background as a man of urban middle class family, he
was not familiar with the Bedouin lifestyle and was prejudiced against
them. In this case, he sided with the French, who claimed that the
mamluks and the Bedouins aimed to plunder the country and destroy
Egypt.[61]

Following the French evacuation from Cairo in July 1801 and two
months later from Egyptian territory entirely, several Bedouin tribal
groups joined the Mamluk beys and amirs in making a stand against
the Ottoman attempts to re-establish their sovereignty over Egypt.
With this, the Bedouin enjoyed unprecedented freedom of action
then because Ottoman rule was impotent and political chaos reigned.
Even so, there is no indication that Bedouin groupings formed any
kind of independent chiefdom in one of the regions or even had
exclusive control over any part of Egypt.[62]

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[60] Al-Jabartī is a valuable source for descriptions of the relationships between
mamluks and Bedouin in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, although there
are gaps in his coverage and he constitutes a secondary source regarding such
chronicles as *Awdah al-ishārāt* covering Jabartī's early period. However, al-Jabartī
was an eyewitness to the events between the years 1776/7–1820/1.
[61] *ʿAjāʾib*, III, 76.
[62] The single exception is the case of the Maʿāza tribes, which attained a terri-
torial identity during Muḥammad ʿAli's regime. See J. Hobbs, *Bedouin life in the
Egyptian Wilderness*, Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1990, 74–81.

After the death of Murād Bey (1801), two factions vied for Mamluk leadership. One, led by Muḥammad Bey al-Alfī al-Kabīr, consisted of supporters of the late Murād and favored a treaty with the British. The other, led by ʿUthmān Bey al-Bardīsī and Ibrāhīm Bey, sought affiliation with the Ottomans. The major Bedouin tribal groups assisted both parties. Bedouin from Upper Egypt secured the superiority of the al-Alfī faction and went so far as to attack Ottoman posts in September 1802.[63] Following a failed attempt by al-Bardīsī in 1802 to eliminate al-Alfī, the Ḥuwayṭāt and Maʿāza Bedouin helped al-Alfī escape and the Maʿāza Bedouin gave him asylum. It was Muḥammad ʿAlī, however, who was the most serious contender for rule over Egypt. According to the picture sketched by al-Jabartī, most of the Bedouin tribes joined one or the other of the Mamluk factions and in addition to fighting as part of Muḥammad ʿAli Pasha's troops, exploited the prevailing political disorder to steal and plunder. One of the major battles that the pasha led took place in April 1804 near Imbāba in Gīza province. Al-Jabartī reported that the Egyptian (Mamluk) *amīr*s (*al-umārāʾ al-misrliyya*)[64] and the Bedouin deployed in the Gīza region until they reached Imbāba, which they attacked and pillaged while the inhabitants escaped.[65] A description of events following a battle near Bāb al-Naṣr in Cairo a month later again emphasizes the Bedouin's role in acts of plunder while fighting in the Mamluk ranks and further illuminates the convoluted relationship and cooperation between mamluks and Bedouin. At the end of the battle the *amīr*s and the Bedouin retreated and dispersed through the provinces of Sharqiyya and Qalyūbiyya, wreaking havoc along the way. They destroyed grain harvests in the fields and seized what had been threshed. Afterwards, they released their mounts to graze on whatever was still growing in the fields and set fire to what had not been threshed. They also pillaged the livestock, slaughtering it and eating the meat. One of the Bedouin fighting unit took the *kāshif* of Sharqiyya prisoner at Bilbays for two days while they pillaged the town, killing some two hundred people. The shaykh of the ʿĀʾid Bedouin, Abū Ṭawīla, came to the *amīr*s and rebuked them for the pillaging, saying: "These crops belong mostly to the

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[63] *ʿAjāʾib*, III, 227–31.
[64] The Mamluk leaders were referred to thus in the chronicle.
[65] *ʿAjāʾib*, III, 292.

Bedouin, but your allies, the dregs of the Bedouin, have no part in
it." When the Hanādī Bedouin shaykhs and other allied Bedouin
who were fighting on their side heard the word "dregs",[66] they were
enraged and came close to killing Abu Tawīla, and fights broke out
between the various Bedouin groups. The *amīr*s also besieged the
kāshif of Qalyūbiyya, summoning the shaykhs of the Zawāmil and
'Ā'id Bedouin in the area and ordering them to carry out forced-
labor projects (*kulaf*).[67] They also levied heavy taxes on the villages,
appointing Bedouin allies as collectors and paying them unusually
high commissions.[68]

   Al-Alfī was Muḥammad 'Alī's most dangerous Mamluk adversary
once the French withdrew from Egypt in 1801.[69] Al-Alfī sought the
support of prominent Bedouin shaykhs such as Ibn Shadīd, shaykh
of the Ḥuwayṭāt, shaykhs of the 'Ā'id in the Sharqiyya, and the
shaykh of the Bedouin of the Jazira area, to help him become the
new ruler of Egypt. Muḥammad 'Alī, meanwhile, had the support
of the Ḥuwayṭāt and Niṣf Ḥarām Bedouin and of Shaykh Ibn Shā'ir,
leader of one of the tribal groups in the Buḥayra province. The
reconfirmation by the Sublime Porte of Muḥammad 'Alī's appoint-
ment as pasha of Egypt in July 1805 marked al-Alfī's failure in his
quest.[70] He understood this once and for all while waiting in the
Buḥayra province for three months for British help that had been
promised to him but was late. The time was the height of summer,
when there were no crops or pasture. The Bedouin in his service
demanded to be allowed to go to Upper Egypt in search for food
and pasture. Al-Alfī had no choice but to submit to the demand
and to depart to the Ṣa'īd with his force, which included 6,000
Bedouin fighters, among them the Awlād 'Alī and Hanādī tribes as
well as Bedouin from the Sharqiyya, the core of his army.[71] He

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[66] Al-Jabartī uses the term *hubūd al-'Arab*. See *'Ajā'ib*, III, 294.
[67] *Corvée*, (in Arabic, *kulfa*), or forced labor, was a practice imposed by the Ottoman
authorities.
[68] *'Ajā'ib*, III, 295.
[69] See 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Rāfi'ī, *'Aṣr Muḥammad 'Alī*, Cairo, 1951, 25. Muḥammad
'Alī struggled against several Mamluk rivals for two years after he seized the gov-
ernment of Egypt. Each had mounted Bedouin fighters in their employ. See below
21–22. See George Douin (ed.), *L'Egypte de 1802 a 1804—correspondance des Consuls
de France en Egypt*, Cairo, 1935, 218.
[70] Al-Rāfi'ī, 11–15.
[71] *Ibid.*, 43.

arrived with his troops at Kafr Ḥakīm on January 27, 1807, dismounted on a hill near Cairo, and while delivering a speech, suddenly fell ill. He managed to appoint Shāhīn Bey as his successor and died that night. The Bedouin tribes that had rallied around him promptly went their separate ways, returning to their lands tend their animals and fields. Some sent requests to the pasha for an amnesty, realizing that he would succeed in stabilizing his rule.[72]

Months of continual warfare and sieges of this kind between the two sides—Muḥammad ʿAlī and the *amīrs*—thus came temporarily to an end, although law and order were not soon restored. Land and sea routes were disrupted, local Bedouin shaykhs imposed arbitrary control in the wake of ineffective governments, and the *fellahin* (the rural peasant population) mounted unsuccessful efforts at resisting the Bedouin. The mamluks, for their part, were uncoordinated and focused on internecine struggles for control, with each of the rival amir*s* engaging Bedouin to assist him in his fight.

Muḥammad Bey al-Alfī, the "Bedouin" mamluk

Al-Alfī's special ties with the Bedouin propelled to the head of the anti-pasha Mamluk camp and positioned him as having the best chance to get the upper hand in the Mamluk struggle for power. The amirs who preceded him in this struggle, late in the eighteenth century, such as Ibrāhīm Jawīsh, Muḥammad Bey al-Ṣaʿīdī, Ṣāliḥ Bey al-Qāsimī and Ḥusayn Kashkash had gained only limited support from the Bedouin tribes and only of small tribal groups, mainly from their own provinces. The pasha often said: "As long as this al-Alfī lives, my life will not be comfortable." Informed of al-Alfī's death, he obscured: "He and I are like two acrobats walking a tightrope, except that he has wooden shoes on his feet."[73]

Al-Jabartī is including detailed biography of al-Alfī in his chronicle, provided rare insights into the Mamluk attitude to the Bedouin and the relationship between the two groups:

> Al-Alfī was an important and dignified amir. . . . A noteworthy accomplishment of his—one unique to him—was that all the Bedouin tribes

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[72] *ʿAjāʾib*, IV, 37–38.
[73] *Ibid.*, 38.

in Egypt were subservient to him, carried out his orders, and never
disobeyed him. He had an uncanny ability to manage them and such
deep knowledge of their character and circumstances that he might
have been one of them or raised among them. They would stand or
sit at his command, in spite of the fact that he exacted money, camels,
and livestock from them, imprisoned them or released them and killed
some of them. Despite this they never turned away from him. He fre-
quently married Bedouin women; those he liked, he would keep as
long as it suited his purpose; those who did not suit his temperament
would be sent back to live with their families. Only one of them con-
tinued in his household, one who had pleased him, and whom he left
at his death. When the Bedouin learned of his death, their women
gathered to mourn him with remarkable dirges that have since been
sung again and again by singers to the accompaniment of musical
instruments.

How strange it was! When he came into the area formerly under the
sway of the Bedouin, making his yearly stay east of Bilbays, he would
enforce his control over the Bedouin, punishing them with arrests and
imprisonment, cooperating with one faction against another, taking
money, horses, camels, sheep and goats from them, taxing them heav-
ily, and preventing them from exercising their power over the peas-
ants. Yet, when he returned from England, and al-Bardīsī with his
army had ganged up against him and beset him on every side, he
went into hiding among the Bedouin and fled to al-Wādī and the
home of ʿUshayba the Bedouin, who gave him refuge, hid him, and
kept the matter secret. . . . This was unprecedented; some even said
he was using magic on them or had some secret means of reducing
them to obedience. When he died, their unity broke up and they no
longer gathered around a single man after him. Each tribe went to
its own area; some sought amnesty from the Pasha.[74]

Continuing al-Jabartī records a typical monologue that testifies once
again to the Bedouin's fickleness even toward al-Alfī, who had built
up an exceptional relationship with them. In a moment of frankness
the Mamluk leader addressed one of his companions and articulated
what he probably really thought about the Bedouin:

It is no easy matter for me [to live] now that I have become one man
among thousands of enemies. Here are my own kin and companions
who abandoned me and attacked me for no fault of mine. . . . Then
there are these Bedouin gathered around me, whom I must cajole and
lead, now with conciliation, now with threats, and likewise my horse-
men and mamluks. Each of them ask me for a position of influence

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[74] *Ibid.*, 39.

or a command, thinking in his heedlessness that the country is under my control and believing that I am curtailing his rights. Sometimes I treat them with gentleness; sometimes I rebuke them with severity. In the midst of all these groups, I am like a hunted animal, and those around me are like hungry dogs trying to tear me to pieces and devour me. Not having at my disposal the treasures of Qārūn to support these throngs of people, I am forced to commit unjust actions against God-fearing men, seizing their money and eating up their crops and live-stock. If God grants me victory, I will compensate them for it and treat them kindly. . . .[75]

Twilight of the Mamluk beys' rule: The loss of allies

Al-Alfī's death paved the way for Muḥammad ʿAlī to try to impose control over all the Bedouin tribes, attempting to capitalize on the wide connections that al-Alfī had with the Bedouin. However, the strong Awlād ʿAlī, al-Hanādī and al-Hawwāra tribal federations, which had been allies of the Mamluk amirs Mūrād Bey, Muḥammad Bey al-Alfī and al-Bardīsī, resisted his efforts. Still, to the pasha's good fortune, the hatred between the Hanādī and Awlād ʿAlī group-ings was so strong that a united Bedouin front against him did not emerge. So long as the mamluks remained active, Muḥammad ʿAlī encountered difficulties, as the Bedouin maintained their practice dat-ing back to the Ottoman conquest, of forming alliances with rival Mamluk factions. Only in 1811, after massacring all the Mamluk chiefs, could the pasha begin to try to implement his ideas con-cerning the Bedouin and the desirable policy toward them.

Significantly, al-Jabartī observed that with al-Alfī's death, there was no Mamluk amīr who could rally the Bedouin around himself. Indeed the amīr Yāsīn Bey still managed gathering Bedouin in order to fight Sulaymān Bey al-Alfī, but was defeated in June 1808 despite the fact that Sulaymān Bey was killed in an ambush. The amīr Shāhīn Bey al-Alfī also had good relationship with the Bedouin. He was the intermediary in settlement of a conflict between the Awlād ʿAlī Bedouin and two other Bedouin tribes—the Hanādī and the Jahna in the Buḥayra province—in October-November 1808 and managed by that to drive out the Awlād ʿAlī from the province.[76]

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[75] Ibid., ibid.
[76] Ibid., 75, 78.

However, they were of the last Mamluk leaders to have significant
relations with Bedouin.

The year 1810 was critical for the Bedouin. Muḥammad ʿAlī and
the mamluks held discussions about the future governing of Egypt.
Shāhīn Bey, the central personality in the Mamluk camp, crossed
over to the pasha's side but after a serious falling out returned to
the Mamluk *bey*s as one of their chief leaders. It seems that the
Bedouin perceived that the mamluks' role would end during
Muḥammad ʿAlī's rule, and that it was only a matter of time before
the pasha would finally subdue them. Late in 1809, the *amīr*s Shāhīn
Bey al-Alfī, Muḥammad Bey al-Ibrāhīmī and Muḥammad Bey al-
Manfūkh al-Murādī had led a revolt against the pasha. This revolt
reached a turning-point in May-June 1810, when large numbers of
Bedouin fighters were massed in a Mamluk camp erected outside
Gīza under the command of ʿUthmān Bey Ḥasan. They awaited
the firing of the pasha's canons, which would augur his arrival to
sign a peace agreement, but the pasha chose not to appear, leaving
the Mamluk camp humiliated. This act marked the beginning of the
final deterioration of the mamluks' relationship with the pasha. Shortly
thereafter, Ibrāhīm Bey, one of the amirs who attended in the camp,
was given an ultimatum by the pasha under which Ibrāhīm would
submit to his authority and would then be appointed to any posi-
tion he desired, on the condition that he pay all the levies assessed
in his districts, including the *mīrī*, grain and *kharāj*, and the cus-
tomary retainer fees to the Bedouin. That same night, most of the
Mamluk *amīr*s abandoned Cairo, took their horses, camels and chat-
tel, and crossed the Nile toward Gīza. There they all gathered
together and split up into three camps: the Murādis, led by Shāhīn
Bey; the Muḥammadis, led by ʿAlī Bey Ayyūb and the Ibrāhīmis,
led by ʿUthmān Bey Ḥasan. The first step they took was to write
letters to the Bedouin shaykhs with the intent of ensuring the Bedouin's
support. At that very time, however, the shaykhs of the Awlād ʿAlī
were making their way to the pasha who granted them robes of
honor, cashmere shawls and 150 purses.[77]

Following the failure of the negotiations with the pasha, Shāhīn
Bey took the Mamluk initiative and led a series of battles against
Muḥammad ʿAlī over a six-month period, which was to constitute

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[77] *Ibid.*, 113, 114.

the final stage of the pasha's-mamluks struggle. Bedouin horsemen took part in all the campaigns as an act of support and identification despite their perception that the mamluks' effort was doomed. The three amirs of the Alfī wing had abandoned the Mamluk camp, prompting Shāhīn Bey reorganize the mamluks' war effort and appoint the amirs Naʿmān Bey, Amīn Bey and Yaḥya Bey as commanders. Once the news of the split among the *amīrs* spread through Upper and Lower Egypt, however, the Hanādī Bedouin and their shaykhs, who were on their way to join them decided instead to head for the pasha declared their loyalty to him and asked for safe conduct. The pasha heaped cloth and other gifts on them.

Following several defeats and attempts at mediation, Shāhīn Bey returned to Cairo in December 1810 and contracted an alliance with Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha. This, however, did not enable him to survive the massacre of the Mamluk *amīrs* in the citadel of Cairo three and a half months later, at the pasha's orders. His Bedouin allies had proven to be unstable. As ever, the Bedouin, foreseeing the future, had deserted after each defeat. Some of them found their way into the pasha's camp. Indeed, the Bedouin were no longer valuable partners to any of the amirs, in their ongoing resistance to the pasha. Some of Bedouin began searching for ways to cooperate with Muḥammad ʿAlī, who was gradually entrenching his position as the ruler of Egypt, others withdrew to their desert territories and ceased being involved in warfare and politics.

On March 1, 1811, Muḥammad ʿAlī invited the *amīrs* and their Mamluk retainers and soldiers to the citadel to greet him and than killed them all, thereby removing the most serious threat to his rule on Egypt.[78] Until their elimination, the mamluks were the Bedouin's main allies and chief partners in intrigues, revolts and takeover of various regions in Egypt. Once the mamluks left the stage, the Bedouin lost their constant ally. They were now entirely in the hands of the regime that the pasha had fashioned and were forced to choose between maintaining a relationship of alienation and suspicion toward the government or submitting to the pasha's authority. In the event, they chose submission while keeping some degree of alienation.

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[78] For details about the massacre, see *ibid.*, 126–29.

Conclusion

The intimate relations between mamluks and Bedouin in Ottoman
Egypt were the result of a similarity of attitudes, values and social
norms. The elite of both groups developed a similar social and polit-
ical structure based on the household (*bayt*). However, the Mamluk-
Bedouin relationship was a reluctant one: it would not have evolved
if the Bedouin had not been the population in the countryside
(*al-rīf*) available to render services to the ruling mamluks and back
it in warfare. The Bedouin were better acquainted with the social
and economic system in the Egyptian *rīf* and were rooted in its agri-
cultural and cattle-based economy. The central authorities were com-
pelled to grant them a major role in the local administration, where
they developed a symbiotic relationship with the local Mamluk office-
holders. These Mamluk *amīr*s were so preoccupied by inter-factional
rivalries, that they required qualified, reliable and available allies.
The Bedouin were there at the right time and the right place.

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Fig. 1: Safed, The Red Mosque. General view from the north, 1940s. Courtesy of Israel Antiquities Authority.

The ground plan

(according to Mayer, Pinkerfeld and Hirschberg)

Fig. 2: Safed, The Red Mosque. Ground plan. After Mayer, Pinkerfeld and Hirschberg.

Fig. 3: Safed, The Red Mosque. *Muqarnaṣ* portal. General view.

Fig. 4: Safed, The Red Mosque. The open courtyard. General view.

Fig. 5: Safed, The Red Mosque. Interior of the prayer hall.

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(according to the author, H.T.)

Fig. 6: Safed, The Red Mosque, Baybar's era. A suggested plan of the mosque.

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Fig. 8: Safed, The Red Mosque. Details of the portal.

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