Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191) famously criticised the central concepts of Avicennian metaphysics as merely mind-dependent (or iʿtibārī) notions. This paper aims to show that despite his cr Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191) famously criticised the central concepts of Avicennian metaphysics as merely mind-dependent (or iʿtibārī) notions. This paper aims to show that despite his critique, Suhrawardī held that these concepts are meaningful, indeed necessary for human cognition. By the same token, it is argued that their re-emergence in Suhrawardī’s ishrāqī metaphysics is not a matter of incoherence. Although the paper’s findings can be generalised to hold of all iʿtibārī concepts, mutatis mutandis, our focus is on the concept of substance, mainly because of the importance of the concept of ‘dusky substance’ in ishrāqī metaphysics.

Šihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī’s philosophical works seem to contain two conflicting views on providence: in the Talwīḥāt and the Mašāriʿ, he endorses the Avicennian view, only to deny providence altogeth Šihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī’s philosophical works seem to contain two conflicting views on providence: in the Talwīḥāt and the Mašāriʿ, he endorses the Avicennian view, only to deny providence altogether in the Ḥikmat al-išrāq. This contribution aims to explain the seeming inconsistency by investigating it in light of the underlying question of God’s knowledge of particular things. I will also argue that despite his qualms concerning providence, Suhrawardī accepts the closely related Avicennian answer to the problem of evil.

This paper investigates Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī’s critical reception and development of an Avicennian argument that hinges on the intuitive evidence provided by our awareness of ourselves. Accordin This paper investigates Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī’s critical reception and development of an Avicennian argument that hinges on the intuitive evidence provided by our awareness of ourselves. According to the argument, each of us is indubitably aware of enduring as a single subject and agent behind the constantly varying stream of experience and action. On the basis of this intuitive certainty Avicenna concludes that the human soul is similarly one. By introducing problematic acts related to the Peripatetic concept of soul, such as digestion and growth, Abū al-Barakāt suggests that if we want to save the argumentative power of the relevant phenomena, we must revise the Avicennian concept of self-awareness.

This important book investigates the emergence and development of a distinct concept of self-awareness in post-classical, pre-modern Islamic philosophy. Jari Kaukua presents the first extended analysi This important book investigates the emergence and development of a distinct concept of self-awareness in post-classical, pre-modern Islamic philosophy. Jari Kaukua presents the first extended analysis of Avicenna's arguments on self-awareness - including the flying man, the argument from the unity of experience, the argument against reflection models of self-awareness and the argument from personal identity - arguing that all these arguments hinge on a clearly definable concept of self-awareness as pure first-personality. He substantiates his interpretation with an analysis of Suhrawardī's use of Avicenna's concept and Mullā Sadrā's revision of the underlying concept of selfhood. The study explores evidence for a sustained, pre-modern and non-Western discussion of selfhood and self-awareness, challenging the idea that these concepts are distinctly modern, European concerns. The book will be of interest to a range of readers in history of philosophy, history of ideas, Islamic studies and philosophy of mind.

Focusing on metaphysics and theory of science, Kaukua argues that Suhrawardī’s illuminationist philosophy combines rigorous metaphysical monism with a modest but positive assessment of scientific expl Focusing on metaphysics and theory of science, Kaukua argues that Suhrawardī’s illuminationist philosophy combines rigorous metaphysical monism with a modest but positive assessment of scientific explanation. This philosophical core of Suhrawardī’s illuminationism is reconcilable with but independent of the mystical side of the shaykh al-ishrāq.